Historicism

Historicism and Civilizational Discontinuity in Spengler and Troeltsch
Author(s): JOANNE MIYANG CHO

Source: Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte, Vol. 51, No. 3 (1999), pp. 238-262
Published by: Brill
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JOANNE MIYANG CHO
Historicism and Civilizational Discontinuity

in Spengler and Troeltsch
In last thirty years German and Anglo-Saxon historical scholarship ha

produced numerous works which highlight the distinctive worldviews of
libérais and neo-conservatives in the Weimar Republic. Various scholar
have offered an extensive overview of one or both groups of intellectuals.
While in général maintaining this thesis of discontinuity, a number of scholars
have also suggested some continuity between the two groups, especially in
terms of their historical thinking. According to Iggers, Jaeger and Rüsen,
Schulin, Faulenbach, Sontheimer, and Antoni,1 the crisis of historicism had
already existed in the work of liberal historicists before neo-conservative
historians sensationalized and exploited it after World War I. A close
examination of historicist reflections on civilizations, both by an amateur
historicist, Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) and an académie historicist, Ernst
Troeltsch (1865-1923), will highlight both continuity and discontinuity. This
study thus expands Faulenbach's argument, while historians subscribed to
the German Sonderweg in their historical works, they maintained politically
divergent positions.21 will examine this Sonderweg question, not only on a
national, but more importantly, on a civilizational level in the 1920s.
This paper will proceed in three sections. The first section starts with a
brief sketch, which shows how Troeltsch and Spengler generally agreed
with each other, as well as with current scholarship, in seeing the relationship
between Weimar libérais and neo-conservatives in terms of opposition. This
model needs some reconsideration, however, because of a limited, but
important similarity in Troeltsch's and Spengler's historicist thinking. The
second and third sections will then elaborate this similarity in terms of its
rejection of humanity and of civilizational continuity. Their political thinking
and scholarly methods, nevertheless, still conformed to the général opposition
of Weimar liberalism and neo-conservatism.
1 Georg Iggers, New Directions in European Historiography (Middletown, Conn. 1984),

30. Friedrich Jaeger and Jörn Rüsen, Geschichte des Historismus: eine Einführung (München,
1992), 105-111. Bern Faulenbach, Ideologie des deutschen Weges; Die deutsche Geschichte in
der Historiographie zwischen Kaiserreich und Nationalsozialismus (München, 1980), 09. Emst
Schulin, Einleitung, Universalgeschichte, ed. by Emst Schulin (Kiepenhauer & Witschköln,
1984), 29-30. Kurt Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik. Die
politischen Ideen des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen 1918 und 1913 (München, 1962), 58
60. Fritz Ringer, The Décliné of the German Mandarins. The German Académie Community,
1890-1933 (Hanover & London, 1969), 340. Carlo Antoni, From History to Sociology: The
Transition in German Historical Thinking, trans. by Hayden V. White (Westport, Conn, 1959), 83.
2 Faulenbach, Ideologie des deutschen Weges, 313-14.
© Koninklijke Brill ΝV, Leiden ZRGG 51,3 ( 1999)
Civilizational Discontinuity in Spengler and Troeltsch 239
I. Weimar Liberais and Neo-conservatives
If the Weimar Republic had found a more lasting stability, „the history of
völkisch thought would have ended in 1918."3 The author of this Statement
undoubtedly knows it is a wishful thinking. In reality the Republic did not
enjoy lasting stability, but instead experienced enormous social and political
chaos in its early years. The „harassment" from the Allies and immense
domestic problems opened „the gates towards the millennium," which gave
Germans „either undue despair or undue hope."4 In such a chaotic time several
extreme groups rejected „impotent" libérais and competed for the allegiance
of the masses. Given the large number of unemployed, one would have
expected communist leaders to have attracted mass support, but it soon feil
to the neo-conservatives.5
The neo-conservative movement was underpinned by several intellectual
activities. It produced a distinctive and lively movement „in and around
universities, political clubs, and little magazines. "6 Moreover a number of
neo-conservative intellectuals from various fields avidly supported the
movement with their „eloquent and spirited interprétations of the crisis."7
Authors with the same agenda as Spengler were Moeller van den Bruck,
Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, Martin Heidegger, and Hans Freyer. They
frequently used expressions - such as „catastrophe" and „hunger for
wholeness."8 They politicized Lebensphilosophie and equated the vital with
the living and the rational with the dead.9 They blamed liberal individualism
for degenerating the unified Gemeinschaft to the fragmented Gesellschaft
and industrialism and democracy for heightened social chaos. Ironically they
thus committed „ideological suicide," as Christian Graf von Krockow points
out, by inciting the middle class into war against itself.10
Spengler exploited this new tendency more than anyone eise with a
sensational title, The Décliné of the West. Although Spengler's book was
3 George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of Ihe Third Reich
(New York, 1964), 238.
4 Klemens von Klemperer, Germany's New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the
Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1968), 77.
5 The term, „conservative révolution", was first used by Hugo von Hofmannstahl in his
Das Schriftum als geistiger Raum der Nation. Cited in Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural
Despair (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961), 27.
6 Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and
the Third Reich (Cambridge, 1984), 24. The two most important postwar right-wing journals
were Das Gewissen and Die Tat. The former appealed „for renewed nationalist spirit and
rearmament", and the latter favored active State intervention over „the restraints of parliamentary
delay." Ibid, 25.
1 Von Klemperer, Germany's New Conservatism, 120.
8 Respectively, Helmut Kuhn, „Das geistige Gesicht der Weimarer Zeit", 214-223, and
Peter Gay, „Hunger nach Ganzheit", 224-236, Die Weimarer Republik: Belagerte Civitas, se
cond ed., ed. Michael Stürmer (Königstein/Ts, 1985), 214-223.
9 Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik, 56-61.
10 Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Entscheidung: Die Untersuchung über Ernst Jünger,
Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger (Stuttgart, 1958), 28.
240 Joanne Miyang Cho
conceived in 1911 „as a critique of German

significant transformation during the w
volumes in 1919 and 1922, its overt analy
but its covert agenda was to oppose Weim
académie establishments through numerou
conservatives to fight against their co
advocated medioere democracy, ruthl
capitalist compétition. Together with Jü
conservatism into „a public discourse bro
readership of small right-wing journals su
Spengler's book also prepared the read
conservative scholarship, both séminal and
attacked liberal ideas and politics.14
Although older conservative professio
Meyer and Georg von Below, criticized Sp
reeeived some of his conclusions.15 The
Republic were, on the other hand, were d
of the right."16 Several libérais wrote abo
and fought against its negative scholarly
Heussi's Die Krisis des Historismus, which
ideals of the libérais.17 In Heussi and oth
Meinecke detected only the newly awake
forms of the past, but no genuine sense
Wissenschaft als Beruf, harshly criticized
for meaning, Erlebnis, irrational Gemeins
Weber defended the necessity of speciali
" See Walter Lacquer, Weimar: A Cultural Histo

90-91. Also Heinz Hiirten, „Der Topos vom christl
beiden Weitkriegen", Katholizismus, nationalen G
Langner (Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich, 1985
121.S. Kon, Die Geschichtsphilosophie der Epoc
schichtsphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts. Kritisc
188, here 178; Detlef Feiken, Oswald Spengler: Ko
und Diktatur (München, 1988), 77.
13 Fritz Stern, Politics of Cultural Despair: A Stud
(Berkeley, 1963), 101.
14 Several séminal works include Karl Barth's Co
(1919), Carl Schmitt's The Crisis of Parliamentarian
and Time (1927). Though less intellectual rigorous t
include Moeller van den Bruck's The Third Reich (
Righti, 1931) and Krieg und Krieger (1932), ed. Jüng
101.
15 Ringer, The Décliné ofthe German Mandarins, 2
of History, 230.
16 Walter Laqueur, Weimar: A Cultural History,
17 Iggers, The German Conception of History, 241
18 Friedrich Meinecke, „Von der Krisis des Histori
separated the rôle of scholars from prophets, démagogues, and political Füh
rer.19
Troeltsch not only took over Weber's struggle with neo-conservatives,

but also broadened its scope. It is no coïncidence that he was assigned to
review Spengler's book as well as other neo-conservative works for the
Historische Zeitschrift, then under Meinecke's editorship. What Troeltsch
saw in the neo-conservative movement was the stringent rejection of mo
dern scholarly and liberal values. First, the younger génération expressed
nothing but „the revolutionary disdain of middle-class science, of modern
political-social éducation, of professional specialization and of Treitschkian
Bismarckian conventions."20 Their anarchie thinking rejected „firm, exact
contents and methods"21 and compared académie historicism with
specialization and relativism. Secondly, it was strongly influenced by
irrationalism. They used the message of Nietzsche for their own political
goals. The Scheler School was „anti-intellectualistic, anti-middle class."22
Stefan George himself eut out „with merciless sharpness all that is liberal,
démocratie, socialistic, rationalistic and individualistic."23 Thirdly, Hermann
Hefele, Paul Natorp, Leonhard Nelson, Rudolf Steiner, and others sought
„connection and unity, dogma and the law of spiritual life"24 as well as a
mystical personality cult. Keyserling's methodology had much in common
with Spengler and Gundolf.
As this brief sketch shows, there has thus been a broad agreement
concerning the main liberal and neo-conservative characteristics, not only
from Spengler (and other neo-conservatives) and Troeltsch (and other
libérais), but also among most historians. While the liberal view was
connected with modernism, reason, plurality, Gesellschaft, toleration, and
demoeraey, the neo-conservative view defined itself in opposition to
liberalism, by Gemeinschaft, unity, life, and nationalism. An exception to
this contrast has to be made, however, in the case of Spengler's and Troeltsch's
historicist thinking, since there was a limited, but important similarity
between them. As several recent authors have pointed out, the crisis of
historicism already existed in liberal historicists before neo-conservative
historians sensationalized and exploited it after World War I. Relativism,
which eventually triumphed, affecting both libérais and neo-conservatives,
was, according to Jaeger and Rüsen, responsible for the intellectual empty
room which the National Socialists were able to occupy.25
19 Max Weber, Wissenschaft als Beruf, in: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre,
ed. Johannes Winckelmann, 6th ed. (Tübingen, 1985), 582-613. See also Klaus Lichtblau,
Kulturkrise und Soziologie um die Jahrhundertwende. Zur Genealogie der Kultursoziologie in
Deutschland (Frankfurt a/M, 1996), 420-431.
20 Emst Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften IV: Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religions
soziologie (hereafter, GS IV), ed. by Hans Baron (Tübingen, 1925; Aalen, 1966), 666.
21 Troeltsch, GS IV: 677.
25 Jaeger and Rüsen, Geschichte des Historismus, 111.
A number of authors pinpoint Spengler

terms of their lack of a universal framew
Troeltsch's history of Europeanism as „onl
Décliné ofthe West {Untergang des Abend
civilization. " Troeltsch lacked „the bold
ler, " but „the criteria and the method
historicism, Iggers points out, was dram
and Spengler.27 But Troeltsch was ahead
was already evident in Troeltsch's 191
Beurteilung historischer Dinge") before Sp
was „primarily a resuit of intellectual de
mid-nineteenth Century philosophie assum
the realities of the twentieth Century."29
the cause of the crisis of historicism and on
was influenced in certain political and spir
epoch, but dragged itself into a period
scholarship.30
Ernst Schulin points out that both Sp
eurocentricism, but did not attain a unive
formulation as the more problematic, be
liberal thinker (and „the most important ph
lent it more scholarly credibility.31 Troelts
as unsociological found several successors
openly. It comforted both the ancient hist
mention the orientalists. It became the fra
Weber, and also for a neo-conservative, H
geschichte Europas?2 As these authors po
continuity between Spengler's and Troe
aeeepted the principle of individuality and r
Their théories of civilizations without
however, subjected to relativism. Both Tro
fought against the threats posed by this rel
Why did Spenger and Troeltsch find re
fear of relativism was related to their critic
from two very différent starting points. Sp
for the breakdown of the conservative world
26 Antoni, From History to Sociology, 83.

27 Iggers draws attention to the fact that both Tro
history, but only the history of separate, closed cultu
of History: The National Tradition of Historical Tho
(Middletown, Connecticut, 1983), 199, 240.
28 Iggers, New Directions in European Historiograp
29 Georg Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth
the Postmodern Challenge (Hanover, NH and Lond
30 Faulenbach, Ideologie des deutschen Weges, 29
31 Schulin, Einleitung, Universalgeschichte, 30.
32 Schulin, Einleitung, Universalgeschichte, 29-31
individualism, industrialism, and democracy, which increased social chaos.

The völkisch ideology, which gave an illusion of the unity of the Volk, was
then developed in order to relativize the reality of class division.33 This was,
as Jeffrey Herf argues, ingenious, since a potentially threatening modern
idea, socialism, was reformulated to suit indigenous German traditions.34
The concept of German socialism was advocated not only by Spengler's
Prussianism and Socialism, but also by other neo-conservative works.35
Spengler's fear of relativism was not unusual among neo-conservatives, but
his prophétie tone and the idea of decay held a much greater appeal for the
public than the work of other neo-conservatives.
While Spengler can be grouped with other neo-conservatives in his fear
of relativism, such an association of Troeltsch with other libérais would
présent a danger of overgeneralization. Troeltsch's fear of relativism was
excessive, even in comparison to his liberal colleagues. He criticized Max
Weber for being indifferent to the threats of relativism; he called Weber „a
complété relativist " in all political and social matters, and portrayed Weber's
recent thinking as „heroic skepticism."36 Even Meinecke, although he was a
fellow historicist and also disapproved of Weber's positivism, could not
agree with Troeltsch's excessive fear of relativism. Whereas Troeltsch
criticized Meinecke for being too contemplative, Meinecke portrayed
Troeltsch as preoccupied, more than anybody eise with „the immanent
limitations and weaknesses of historicism."37 Hintze also questioned
Troeltsch's excessive fear of relativism.38
Why did Troeltsch fear relativism more than other libérais? The answer
lies in his theological background. He pursued the modernist project
passionately, but feared that its excess might relativize Christianity. Although
he transferred to the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Berlin in
1915 and pursued, like Weber, the sociology of religions, he never, as Ralf
König argues, made a shift from theology to sociology.39 While boldly
recognizing other world religions to be equally as valid as Christianity,
33 Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 12.

34 It also ended the domination of the economy over social life by expanding the social
control State over society. Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 36-38.
35 Ernst Jünger's Der Arbeiter envisioned a new type of worker, both Moeller van den
Bruck's Das Dritte Reich separated German socialism from Western European individualism
and Bolshevik socialism, and Hans Freyer's Revolution von Rechts wanted to overcome the ills
of soulless modernity.
36 Troeltsch, „Max Weber", Religion in History, trans. James Luther Adams and Walter F.
Bense & intro. James Luther Adams (Minneapolis, 1991), 360-364, here 363.
37 Meinecke, „Ernst Troeltsch und das Problem des Historismus", in: Werke IV, 367-378,
here 378. Gerhard Masur, „Max Weber und Friedrich Meinecke in ihrem Verhältnis zur politi
schen Macht", in: Studium Berolinense: Aufsätze und Beiträge zu Problemen der Wissenschaft
und zur Geschichte der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, ed. Hans Leussink, Eduard
Neumann and Georg Kotowki (Berlin, 1960), 720.
38 Otto Hintze, „Troeltsch and Historicism", The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, ed. Felix
Gilbert (New York, 1975), 417-418.
39 Ralf König, Soziologie in Deutschland: Begründer, Verächter, Verfechter (München, Wien,
1987), 271.
Troeltsch wanted to point out the cultura

Christians, and argued that it was unnatur
was preparing, in his liberal way, „for a C
somewhat sarcastically notes. Despite the
Spengler and Troeltsch showed one simila
of individuality and in being faced with the
these, Spengler turned to nationalism an
II. The Crisis of Historicism and National
Despite its murky and abstract ideas, The

audience among post-war Germans. What
It can be attributed partially to his drama
deterministic assertions. Such interwea
opposite responses from his critics. (In so
coexistence of two apparently contradicto
of them.) Some critics, however, particula
aspect. Koktanek points to Spengler's o
Hughes sees him in the tradition of Nietz
him in the tradition of the early German
several historians have pilloried his dogma
criticizes him as „most unilluminatingly
Spengler, Klemperer argues, was „far from
naturalistic phase of rise and décliné."45 F
renegade of historicism."46 In this section,
that rather than seeing Spengler in terms
have tended to do, we should begin by aeeep
40 Antoni, From History to Sociology, 73.

41 Anton Mirko Koktanek, Nachwort to Oswald
des: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte
text, this title will be abbreviated as Untergang.
42 H. Stuart Hughes, Introduction to The Décliné o
by Helmut Werner & trans. by Charles Francis At
Hughes, Oswald Spengler: A Critical Estimate (
emphasizes Spengler's romantic side, he is nonethe
considers Toynbee even more dogmatic than Spengle
Décliné of the West, xiii-xiv.
43 Tracy Strong, „Oswald Spengler - Ontologie, K
te, ed. Peter Christian Ludz (München, 1980), 81.
44 Toynbee was wholly not without praise for Sp
smallest intelligible field of historical study" to be w
modern West or the city-states of the Greco-Roman
„in some sense parallel and contemporary." As he con
too dogmatic, however, Toynbee decided instead to
native possible explanations in the light of the facts
from chapter I of Civilization on Trial, excerpted in
(New York, 1959), 205-210.
45 Von Klemperer, Germany's New Conservatism,
46 Feiken, Oswald Spengler, 66.
descriptions, and look for reasons for them in Spengler's ideas. Spengler, I
argue, started out as a historicist, but his fear of relativism drove him to
attempt to overcome it by employing anti-relativistic measures. Such
measures question the common portrayal of Spengler's world history as
anti-eurocentric,47 and instead point to his nationalist tendency.
Historicism and Its Crisis. Although Spengler's Décliné of the West is

regarded as a classical work in world history, he denied universal synthesis.
There are no universal expériences which people in différent civilizations
share. There are also „no eternal truths " of which to speak, since „no two
ages possess the same philosophie intentions."48 „Humankind," Spengler
argued, is „an empty word," having „no aim, no idea, no plan, any more
than the family of butterflies and orchids."49 Consequently he concluded
that „the history ofhumanity has no meaning whatever,"50 Such a concept
only exists in the minds of Western progress-philistines, who lack „the
historically relative character of his data, which are expressions of one
specific existence and one only."51
In contrast, Spengler considered himself to be generating the Copernican
révolution in historical thinking by aeeepting „the overwhelming multitude
of the facts. " In terms of his study of civilizations this meant that each
culture has „its own new possibilities of self-expression."52 Instead of one
universal history, there is „the drama of a number of mighty cultures"53
which are différent in every detail.
There are many sculptures, paintings, mathematics, physics, each of which is
in its deepest essence différent from the others, each limited in duration and
self-contained, just as each species of plant has its peculiar blossom or fruit, its
special type of growth and décliné.54
Instead of seeing cultures in terms of hierarchical relationships, Spengler's

historicism celebrated uniqueness and multiplicity.
There is another side to of Spengler's historicism which, unlike the first
aspect, présents a pessimistic outlook. Civilizations, like isolated islands,
are utterly separated and have no meaningful contacts with each other. They
are condemned to isolationism. Spengler's civilizations thus suffer from the
47 Schulin calls Spengler „this Überwinder of the eurocentric world picture." Although
Spengler believed in the inévitable European world domination, his pessimistic outlook only
regarded Europe as a „ZivilisationEinleitung, Universalgeschichte, 29-30. Hughes sees
Spengler ,,cast[ing] his net beyond the fate of his own people." Introduction to The Décliné of
the West, vii. Koktanek points out that Spengler's Historik conquers Eurocentricism, although
he remarks upon a contradiction in Spengler's politics, which supported the Western domination
of the Third World. Koktanek, Nachwort to Untergang, 1254-55.
48 Spengler, Untergang, 57.
discontinuity of historical process55 and a

of relativism. It is true that Spengler did
relationships, admitting some exampl
„unimportant and accidentai."56
What was Spengler's attitude towards t
accept it passively, as his highly pessimi
seemed to suggest? In a recent article, Fa
Spengler's pessimism by challenging the t
prophet, poet, or a proponent of purporte
philosophy, discredited by the fashionable
historical philosophy. "Farrenkopf wants
master spirit of historical pessimism," ab
of the late 20th Century, as it experience
the North-South economic imbalance a
Although Farrenkopf offers a new interp
like many others, he accepts the typical p
I question this as a one-sided portrayal
pessimistic and anti-relativistic aspect
confirmed by Spengler himself. In an ar
a final word to his much debated concep
terms of „the goal of mankind," but pref
pessimism in dealing with immédiate and
anti-relativist measures, ranging from q
centricism, and Prussian socialism.
Anti-Relativism. First, Spengler attemp

relativism through his unique formulation
civilizational grafting and emphasizing th
he simultaneously introduced a quasi-univ
of his world history was to delineate the
civilizations. Civilizations, Spengler argue
„entirely similar as regards the inward p
towards its end."59 One common historical law which all civilizations have
to follow is the morphological cycle of „youth, growth, maturity, decay."60
In this common cycle Spengler found a basis for comparing diverse
civilizations, and came up with amalgamated historical notions, such as a
Chinese Augustus, an Arabie Cromwell, an Egyptian Baroque, and an Indian
Morovingian period amongst others. These are certainly stränge notions for
a historicist!
55 Kon criticizes Spengler for „metaphysical absolutization of the discontinuity of historical

process," I.S. Kon, Die Geschichtsphilosophie der Epoche des Imperialismus, I: 181, 183.
57 John Farrenkopf, „Spengler's Philosophy of World History", Journal of the History of
Ideas, 52 (3): 484-85.
58 Oswald Spengler, „Pessimismus" (1921), Reden und Aufsätze (München, 1951), 63-79,
here, 63, 73-74, 75.
Beside his broad task, Spengler had a „narrower task " concerning his
own period. He wanted to predetermine history of West Europe and America
„at the epoch of 1800-2000. "61 What was „the organic and symbolic meaning
of its political, artistic, intellectual and social expression-forms"?62 He
regarded the Great War not merely as a war, but also as „ahistorical change
of phase,"63 that is, the West's entrance into the phase of décliné. Even „the
West-European-American" civilization, which was then considered, in the
heyday of European Weltpolitik, to be „the only culture of our time and on
our planet which is actually in the phase of fulfillment,"64 could not escape
this historical law of décliné. Here Spengler seemed to treat all civilizations
equally, not favoring the West over the non-West, although this is a stränge
kind of equality: the equality of décliné!
Although pessimism can be a virtue, as it causes us to reflect on the costs
of modern technological progress, Spengler was not the right pessimist to
appreciate its best qualities. While Spengler, like Freud, criticized the high
optimism of Western civilization around the time of World War I, he
considered décliné as the inévitable and irreversible final stage, and not a
temporary breakdown as in the case of Freud. Freud realized the heavy price
of maintaining a civilization, but still cautiously gave expression to a
optimism, dépendent on the wills of Europeans. A comparison of Spengler
and Nietzsche highlights further limits of Spengler's pessimism. On the one
hand Spengler continued the Nietzschean tradition of cultural pessimism.
Just as Nietzsche had scoffed at the whole 19th-century furor about historical
optimism, Spengler denounced Hegelian teleology, a linear development
from Oriental despotism to nineteenth-century Prussia as „a caricature of
the idea of fate."65 Spengler's ultimate interest in history, like that of Nietz
sche, was on the level of meaning and often exhibited carelessness with
regard to facts. Their similarities were, however, less important than their
différences in some key points. While Nietzsche's cyclical view of history
emphasized its eternally recurring tendency, Spengler's cyclical view
dramatized the concept of décliné. Although both were influenced by
„Schopenhauer's virulent life-philosophical premises," Nietzsche did not
support a social-darwinistic and racist view as Spengler did.66 For Spengler
race, like time and destiny, was „a décisive element in every question of
life."67 Lastly, Nietzsche emphasized the very active individual will to power,
whereas Spengler buried individual wills beneath the wills of nations and
subjugated individual wills of civilizations to the morphological laws of
world history. His historicist intention was, in the end, overwhelmed by
historical determinism.
61 Spengler, Untergang, 3, 36.

66 Jaeger & Riisen, Geschichte des Historismus, 101-102.
Secondly, although Spengler wanted to a

unable to refute it because of his fear of re
attempts to impugn a eurocentric view. He
who had assigned a „privileged position "
the Western (Faustian) culture, as opposed
China, Egypt, the Arabs, and Mexico.68 H
„pupils and successors of the classical wo
abandoned linear continuity within the t
medieval-modern. Even Basel professors,
and Bachofen, whom Spengler in général
escape his criticism, because they had los
antiquity."69
Despite Spengler's attack on the privileged place of Classical civilization
in the West, his critique of eurocentricism was not carried through
consistently. He tended to compare the West with Classical civilization,
whereas other civilizations, with the exception of the Arabian (Magian)
civilization, received very scant treatment.70 Following the long-established
trend of scholarship, Spengler pointed out the fréquent interaction between
Western and Arab civilizations, but his primary interest in this was to
demonstrate their différences. His treatment of Classical civilization, on the
other hand, was intended to show numerous similarities with West European
culture. It may therefore be argued that The Décliné of the West was not so
much of a world history as a European history, with non-European history
more or less confined to the footnotes.
Spengler constantly compared the décliné of the West in the post-war
years with the transition from the Hellenistic era to the Roman age.71
We might have found the constant alter ego of our own actuality in establishing
the correspondence, item by item, from the „Trojan War " and the Crusades,
Homer and the Nibelungenlied, through Doric and Gothic, Dionysian movement
and Renaissance, Polycletus and Johann Sebastian Bach, Athens and Paris,
Aristotle and Kant, Alexander and Napoleon, to the world-city and the
imperialism common to both Cultures.72
A closer comparison between Classical civilization and Western civilization

was, however, hardly flattering, for Spengler's main interest lay in
establishing their common Symptoms of décliné. What were these Symptoms
of décliné? His age, like Rome, was marked by rigorous realism, which was
„uninspired, barbarie, diseiplined, practical, Protestant, Prussian."13 He
highlighted the distinction of Zivilisation/Kultur. In the contemporary We

70 See also Heinz Hiirten, „Der Topos vom christlichen Abendland und Publizistik nach
den beiden Weltkriegen", 132.
71 See Alexander Demandt, „Spengler und die Spätantike", in Spengler Heute, ed. Peter
Christian Ludz (München, 1980), 25-48.
stern world, just as in 4th Century Rome, Zivilisation unfortunately took

precedence over Kultur. The most visible Symptom of Zivilisation for the
19th Century was the city encroaching upon the countryside.
In place of a world, there is a city, a point, in which the whole life of broad
régions is collecting while the rest dries up. In place of a type-true people, born
of and grown on the soil, there is a new sort of nomad, cohering unstably in
fluid masses, the parasitical city dweller, traditionless, utterly matter-of-fact,
religionless, clever, unfruitful, deeply contemptuous of the countryman and
especially that highest form of countryman, the country gentleman. This is a
very great stride towards the inorganic, towards the end - what does it signify?74
Spengler connected the victory of the city (especially Berlin and New York)
over the country (old Crete, the Scandinavian North) with other Symptoms,
such as the triumph of materialism over idealism, the Gesellschaft over the
Gemeinschaft, money over arts and philosophy, the intellect over the soul,
and the masses over the Volk.
Although Spengler was critical of industrialization, he accepted
technology as a sign of the advent of décliné. He clearly preferred Kultur,
that is, the arts and philosophy, to Zivilisation, that is, technics, but he told
his contemporaries to study technics, rather than the arts and philosophy. In
the âge of décliné only technics could flourish and one it was important to
listen carefully to the law of history, for no individual could change such a
historical course. Like the Italian Futurists, Spengler's ideas were anti-mo
dern in their goal, but to achieve this he employed modernist means, which
led Jeffrey Herf to call him a reactionary modernist75 and Georg Lukàcs to
criticize him for merely modemizing reactionary Prussian tendencies.76
Thirdly, Spengler tried to compensate for the threats of relativism by
means of nationalism, that is, Prussian socialism. Although Spengler's
historicist project used civilizations as the basic category of history, his anti
relativist project saw „the most significant of all major associations" to be
nations, defined as „peoples in the style of their culture."77 He not only tried
to overcome the décliné of the West through nationalism; he actively
emphasized pessimism to promote his nationalist cause. His cultural
pessimism was thus closely connected to its political rôle as „the vehicle of
nationalism."78 In his observation of the décliné of the West, he saw diffé
rent European countries facing décliné at différent times due to various
degrees of urbanization and industrialization. Western Europe was ahead of

75 Jeffrey Herf, „Paradox of Cultural Pessimism; Spengler as a Reactionary Modernist", in
Der Fall Spengler: Eine Kritische Bilanz, ed. Alexander Demandt and John Farrenkopf (Köln,
Weimar, Wien, 1994), 94-114, here, 99-100. Farrenkopf, „The Transformation of Spengler's
Philosophy", 475.
76 Georg Lukàcs, Die Zerstörung der Vernunft (Berlin, 1954), 377-78.
78 Rolf Hellmut Foerster, Europa: Geschichte einer politischen Idee (München, 1967), 295.
Foerster does not develop this idea, however, since it belongs to German intellectual history
rather than to the main theme of the book.
Germany in this process: „France and Engl

and Germany is beginning to do so... Afte
Berlin and New York."79 He was interested
of the Weimar Republic, but in finding „w
fate [décliné]"80 for Germany through neo-c
to Max Weber, who tried to separate scien
dismissed such a distinction as political ide
and righteousness, liberty and equality."82
The chief aspect of Spengler's nationalism
and Western Europe. Parliamentarianism
would only be a „nonsense and betrayal " of i
thinking deepened as he feit it confirmed b
Weimar Republic: strikes, révolutions, cou
Weimar democracy was merely another exa
it could not guarantee true, but only negative
The masses cannot function politically wit
„Party leaders, dictators, présidents, proph
took over executive power from „tradition
their will to the people through the machin
democracy, which suffered from the absen
Estâtes and callings," the masses became incr
Spengler, like Carl Schmitt, saw Rousseau's
dictatorship; „Caesarism grows on the soil of
the modern électoral masses paved the way
find a way „out of the fragmentation and
Century" by turning a traditional category
subject.87
Spengler's anti-democratic thinking was synonomous with his rejection
of Western Europe. Broadly Western Europe stood for values which he
rejected, such as „the 'Age of Reason', Humanity, the greatest happiness of
the greatest number, enlightenment, economic progress, national freedom,
the conquest of nature or world-peace."88 Spengler particularly attacked „this
England of Parliamentarianism, business morality and journalism."89 After
witnessing the French occupation of the Rhine, he was especially bitter
towards France and accused her of resuming the Napoleonic plans to

80 Horst Möller, „Oswald Spengler - Geschichte im Dienste der Zeitkritik", Spengler Heute, 52.
81 Walter Lacquer, Weimar: A Cultural History, 1918-1933 (1974; New York, 1980), 93.
83 Oswald Spengler, Preußentum und Sozialismus (München, 1920), 54.
87 Hans Freyer, Die Bewertung der Wirtschaft im philosophischen Denken des 19. Jahr
hunderts (1921), Vol. 5 of Arbeiten zur Entwicklungspsychologie, 159-60.
conquer Europe.90 Spengler wanted to initiate a „second religiousness"91

through the German Geist, „the living Nature of Goethe," which would desire
only to believe and not to dissect. The German Geist contrasted to the English
spirit, „the dead nature of Newton," which was an example of „scientific
critical Alexandrianism."92
In Prussianism and Socialism (1919), the work which politically
compléments The Décliné of the West,93 Spengler pointed to Prussian
socialism, embodied in Friedrich Wilhelm I and Friedrich II, as his solution.
Unlike the communist East, the Prussian spirit treated socialism as an ethical
attitude rather than an economic principle.94 Unlike the capitalist West, it
was based not upon individual freedom, but upon command and obedience.
Spengler's Prussian socialism was no mere theoretical construct, but was
intended to mobilize the German right wing. It emphasized the Mitteleuro
pa ideology, which supported a solid German Space in central Europe.95 It
also contributed, if not directly, to the National Socialist ideology, although
Spengler, left unimpressed after two meetings with Hitler, called him a
„Dummkopf."96 Moreover he continued, to some extent, to emphasize the
category of tradition; a category for which Hitler's révolution made no
provision.
In short, Spengler's so-called world history denied the concept of
humankind and any common characteristics between civilizations. Lacking
meaningful contacts between civilizations, his historicist position was thus
faced with the threats of relativism. Although he seemed on the surface
resigned himself to this crisis, he actually made several attempts to fight
against it. Yet his anti-relativist solutions were problematic, for they seriously
contradicted his historicist position. How could he argue the unique
individuality of every civilization and, at the same time, advocate universal
morphological laws and hold more or less eurocentric and nationalistic
positions? His apparent concern for the fate of Western civilization was only
a disguise of his rejection of Western Europe's Enlightenment and démocratie
tradition. His concept of the West thus opposed European fédération, as a
supporter of Coudenhove's Pan-Europeanism pointed out: „If we fail to create
a European fédération, we will find ourselves in the tragic predicament
90 Oswald Spengler, „Frankreich und Europa" (1924), Reden und Aufsätze (München, 1951),
80-88.
93 Whereas The Décliné of the West does not specifically mention the political présent,
Preußentum und Sozialismus explicitly refers to contemporary politics. Feiken, Oswald Spengler,
104; for more détails on Preußentum und Sozialismus, see Hughes, Oswald Spengler, 98-119.
94 Spengler, Jahre der Entscheidung, Erster Teil. Deutschland und die weltgeschichtliche
Entwicklung (München, 1933), 61-80.
95 Carl Pegg, The Emergence ofthe European Idea (Chapel Hill & London, 1983), 128-29,
133; Foerster, Europa, 285.
"Hermann Lübbe, „Historisch-politische Exaltation: Spengler wiedergelesen," Spengler
Heute, 14. Horst Möller, Oswald Spengler, 71; Heinz Gollwitzer, Geschichte des weltpoliti
schen Denkens, II (Göttingen, 1982), 551; Georg Lukacs, Die Zerstörung der Vernunft, 377
78; Lacquer, Weimar, 93-94.
foreseen by Spengler in his Untergang

European fédération, which had „more v
federalists ... dared believe,"98 was e
Germany in the 1920s the neo-conservat
and Spengler's rôle as its initiator and p
III. The Crisis of Historicism and Europ
Troeltsch's position as a liberal spokesm

are confirmed by his rôle as the review
Historische Zeitschrift. It is a matter of
was the best choice for this assignment.
editor, Meinecke, or Troeltsch, Troeltsch
continuity between liberal and neo-con
More than any other liberal histori
individuality principle and, at the same tim
of relativism.100 While both Troeltsch and
to overcome relativism,101 Meinecke w
successfully than Troeltsch by portr
phenomenon, although pioneered by Ger
on the 18th Century.102 In contrast Tro
contemporary issue, came face to face w
suggested the universal idea of Europea
attempts, this ultimately failed, but the
of methodology and political thinking
advocated both reconciliation with former First World War enemies,
especially with Great Britain, and the adoption of Britain's parliamentary
democracy for the Weimar Republic. Troeltsch's criticism of Spengler's
methodology was, however, less successful than that of Spengler's politics.
Historicism and Its Crisis. Troeltsch subscribed to the historicist principle

which regarded civilizations a basic and self-contained historical units.
According to this, the great révélations remain „distinct" to individual
97 Erich Obst in Hannoverischer Anzeiger (9 Dec. 1928). Quoted in Pegg, Evolution ofthe
European Idea, 107.
98 Pegg, Evolution of the European Idea, 14.
99 Troeltsch was originally trained as a theologian, but his desire to historicize theology led
him to devote his attention to history. Thus his knowledge of history, especially the philosophy
of history, was at the level of a specialist. Graf points out that as a non-EachhistorikerTroe\tsch
published more articles than any other non-specialists in the Historische Zeitschrift. Friedrich
Wilhelm Graf, „Ernst Troeltsch. Kulturgeschichte des Christentums", Deutsche Geschichts
wissenschaft um 1900, ed. Notker Hammerstein (Stuttgart, 1988), 131-152, here 131.
100 Otto Gerhard Oexle, Geschichtswissenschaft im Zeichen des Historismus: Studien zu
Problemgeschichten der Moderne (Göttingen, 1966), 57-61.
101 König criticizes both Troeltsch and Meinecke for remaining at the level of Innerlichkeit
and failing to recognize social structures and forms. König, Soziologie in Deutschland, 271.
102 Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus (München, 1965). Oexle, Ge
schichtswissenschaft im Zeichen des Historismus, 95-136.
civilizations.103 Even science and logic cannot be applied universally; each

civilization has its own!
Indeed, even the validity of science and logic seemed to exhibit, under diffé
rent skies and upon différent soil, streng individual différences présent even in
their deepest and inner-most rudiments. What was really common to mankind,
and universally valid for it, seemed, in spite of a général kinship and capacity
for mutual understanding, to be at bottom exceedingly little, and to belong
more to the province of material goods than to the ideal values of civilization.104
The boundary of truth for Europeans was only to be found within their
Occidental cultural circle;105 it could not be applied to people in other
civilizations. Troeltsch was pleased to see that Keyserling confirmed his
conclusion. Troeltsch pointed out that despite wide travels and much
experience of other civilizations, Keyserling nonetheless admitted „his
European fate" as „the absolute for him and his people."106 Troeltsch's work,
which consistently treated civilizations as equal but distinct, demonstrated
very clearly the strengths and weaknesses of the German historicist tradition.
On the one hand Troeltsch showed the strength of historicism by
emphasizing the equality of civilizations, as his critique of foreign missions
demonstrates. His position could best be seen in contrast with that of a leading
missionary to Africa at that time, Albert Schweitzer. Although both rejected
the absoluteness of Christianity, they drew différent conclusions concerning
the relationship between the West and non-Westem civilizations. In his 1922
lecture at Selley Oak Colleges in England, Schweitzer described Christianity
as „the highest wisdom " and „the deepest expression of the religious mind, "
which was capable of leavening „the thought, the will and the hope of all
mankind."107 Christianity, more than other religions, produced permanent
and profound incentives to the inward perfecting of personality and ethical
activity.108 In a 1923 lecture, which was also prepared for an English audience,
Troeltsch admitted that he could no longer claim even the relative superiority
of Christianity over other world religions, as he had done in The Absoluteness
of Christianity (1902). Instead he asked; why believers of other world
religions could not attain salvation in a way which befits their own tradi
tion?109 He also pointed out the ideological aspect of Christian missionaries
who spread European spheres of influence by being „in part simply a
concomitant of the political, military, and commercial expansion of a State
103 Ernst Troeltsch, „The Place of Christianity among the World Religions", Christian
Thought: Its History and Application, ed. Baron von Hügel (London, 1923), 33.
104 Troeltsch, „The Place of Christianity among the World Religions", 23-24.
105 Ernst Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften III: Der Historismus und seine Probleme (hereafter
GS III), ed. Hans Baron (Tübingen, 1922; rp. Aalen 1977), 700.
106 Ernst Troeltsch, a bookreview of Graf Hermann Keyserling's Die Reisetagebuch einer
Philosopher, GS IV: 691 -696, here 696.
107 Albert Schweitzer, Christianity and the Religions of the World. Lectures delivered at the
Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham (Feb, 1922), trans. Johanna Powers (New York, 1951), 17.
108 Schweitzer, Christianity and the Religions of the World, 87.
109 Troeltsch, „The Place of Christianity among the World Religions", 26.
or a nation.'"10 He therefore did not advoca

of other non-European world religions for
to promote dialogues for mutual édificatio
the purest multiculturalist position in pos
On the other hand in Troeltsch, as in Spe
weakest moment. Like Keyserling, he
between Christianity, Judaism, and Islam
in Hebraic prophetism and Greek scie
Keyserling, he generally objected to the i
especially between Europe and East and S
pointed out that Keyserling not only dis
the non-West, but also considered the in
Japan's westernization as a sign of „depe
Troeltsch, we do not find the experience o
civilizations.
Thomas Mann's review of Spengler shed light not only on Spengler's,
but also Troeltsch's anti-universalist position. Mann shared Troeltsch's
criticism of Spengler's pessimism, although he preferred to call Spengler a
fatalist rather than a pessimist."4 He also sided with Troeltsch's optimism
for European civilization, influenced partly by Troeltsch's „Naturrecht und
Humanität in der Weltpolitik" (1922).115 Yet Mann's criticism of Spengler's
déniai of cross-civilizational grafting can also be extended to Troeltsch. It is
interesting to observe that both Mann and Troeltsch appealed to the objectivity
of mathematics in criticizing Spengler, but that the scope of their criticisms
varied significantly. Troeltsch accepted Spengler's rejection of the history
of humankind, which was similar to his own thinking, but he objected to
Spengler's exclusion of the Classical world of Greece and Rome from the
history of European civilization. Troeltsch hoped that a mathematician would
expose Spengler's failure to see the connection between the mathematics of
the Classical period and of contemporary Europe."6 Mann criticized Speng
ler for rejecting the universal appeal of mathematics. He also would have
110 Troeltsch, „The Place of Christianity among the World Religion", 28ff.
'"In the early Weimar years, his Imperialist side was still weaker than his Isolationist side,
but the former was not completely absent. Troeltsch rejected imperialism towards major
civilizations, but still emphasized „a missionary duty" of Western Christians toward „the crude
heathenism of smaller tribes." In Albert Schweitzer, Troeltsch saw this missionary duty of the
West being put into practice. Troeltsch, „The Place of Christianity among the World Religions",
26-29.
114 Thomas Mann, „Über die Lehre Spenglers", Altes und Neues: kleine Prosa aus fünf
Jahrzehnten, vol. 9 of Stockholmer Gesamtausgabe: Die Werke von Thomas Mann (Frankfurt,
a.M., 1953), 142-150, here 144-45.
115 Kurt Sontheimer, Thomas Mann und die Deutschen (München, 1965), 69.
116 Troeltsch, review of Spengler's Décliné (vol I in GS IV: 677-684; vol II in GS IV: 685
691), here 682.
rejected Troeltsch on the same account, only had he realized Troeltsch's

anti-universalist position. Whereas Mann's Europeanism was compatible
with Weltbürgertum, Troeltsch's Europeanism excluded it. It is ironie that in
this rejection of universalism Troeltsch, supposedly Spengler's chief critic,
in fact agreed with him.
Troeltsch's Isolationist tendency is, however, ignored by a number of his
commentators, who for the most part praise only the egalitarian aspect of
his Europeanism.117 The Isolationist tendency makes the fréquent comparison
between Lessing and Troeltsch unacceptable. After having read Troeltsch's
Oxford lecture, „The Place of Christianity among World-Religions," C. S.
Webb wrote to Troeltsch's long-time supporter in England, Friedrich von
Hügel; „T[roeltsch]'s second thoughts do not go much beyond Nathan in
Lessing's Nathan der Weise."118 This remark fails to note one important
différence. Lessing followed the Enlightenment model of universalism,
whereas Troeltsch rejected its catégories of mankind119 and humanity.120
Lessing actively encouraged interaction between différent cultures through
marriage, adoption, and friendship; Troeltsch did not emphasize active
sharing, but only mutual toleration. Although Troeltsch's liberalism was based
upon the Enlightenment tradition, he however rejected its notion of
universalism, as his criticism of a Marburg Kantian, Ernst Cassirer, shows.121
There have been some critics, however, who have perceptively noted
Troeltsch's anti-universalist position. In the early Weimar years, Hintze gave
the typical impression of Troeltsch as an Optimist and Spengler as a pessimist.
Initially Hintze agreed with the populär response, being unable to share
„Troeltsch's unquestioning optimism, " and tending „toward Spengler's view
in many respects, though with considérable réservations, both général and
specific." In the end Hintze sided with Troeltsch's historical optimism,
idealism and „illusions" for the sake of moral forces.122 He could not be so
forgiving, however, when it came to Troeltsch's restriction of historical
optimism to European civilization, not extending it to the relationship
between the latter and non-European civilizations.123 „His [Troeltsch's]
117 Mark D. Chapman, „A Theology for Europe's Universality and Partiality in Christian
Theology", The Heythrop Journal: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy and Theology (April
1994), 35,(2): 125-139, esp. 131-134.
118 C. S. Webb's letter to Friedrich von Hügel. Quoted in Mark D. Chapman, „The 'sad
Störy' of Ernst Troeltsch's proposed British Lectures of 1923", Zeitschrift für neuere
Theologischegeschichte/ Journal for the History of Modern Theology, I (1994): 97-122, here 116.
119 Ernst Troeltsch, „Über Maßstäbe zur Beurteilung historischer Dinge", Historische Zeit
schrift, 116 (1916), 41.
170 Troeltsch argued that if „humanity" were employed in the twentieth Century, it could
only be used to mean „a mutual understanding and tolérance, and a feeling of fundamental
human obligation, without any very definite content." „The Place of Christianity among World
Religions", 121.
121 Ernst Troeltsch, review of Ernst Cassirer, Freiheit und Form. Studien zur deutschen
Geistesgeschichte, in GS IV:696-698.
122 Otto Hintze, „Troeltsch and Historicism", The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, ed.
Felix Gilbert (New York, 1975), 370-71.
123 Hintze, „Troeltsch and Historicism," 370-71.
unequivocal rejection of non-European culture

attributed to „a product of the Christian bias in
and Continental European bias as well." In thi
Well's English philosophy of history overTroel
Hintze did not work on universal history exten
in contrast to Troeltsch, accepted the principle
„the many peoples and civilizations of the wo
one, and Europe and American leading t
unification."124 Hintze, like Weber, had a mo
historicism, demonstrating partial support and
the sustained emphasis on the sociological app
men).125
Friedrich von Hügel, an English Catholic modernist, also sharply criticized
Troeltsch's excessively Individualist position. He supported Troeltsch's
theological modernism enthusiastically, but could not accept Troeltsch's
„excessive individualism, which ail but completely mastered him in recent
years."126 Troeltsch ignored common elements in différent forms of
Christianity:
Dr. Troeltsch maintains that the Russian Church is utterly différent from the
Latin Church, and a fortiori, of course, that Christianity, taken as a whole, is
utterly différent from Judaism and Mohammedanism. Yet how can we fail to
find real qualities really common to ail the ancient episcopal, sacramental Chri
stian bodies—qualities as real as are the qualities peculiar to the Roman Catholic
Church, to the Greco-Roman Church, and to the other similar institutional Chri
stian bodies severally?127
Von Hügel saw in Troeltsch's excessive historicism the destructive touch of

Midas.
Midas died of hunger from his fatal gift of turning all he touched into gold, so
also Troeltsch, qua vehement Individualist, finds himself incapable of deriving
spiritual force and food from those entrancing historical perspectives which
everywhere arise under his magical touch. Since each such scene is utterly
unique, we are left without common standard, or common ideal — ,..128
Although each culture has a set of distinguishable characteristics, how

could he maintain such a complété séparation between civilizations?
Troeltsch's multiculturalist position was thus faced with the same problem
which Spengler encountered, that is the discontinuity between civilizations.
It should however be noted that Troeltsch was more consistent than Speng
ler in applying the historicist principle. Unlike Spengler, Troeltsch did not
resort to quasi-universalist laws and made almost no universal Claims
124 Hintze, „Troeltsch and Historicism," 407.

125 Oexle, Geschichtswissenschaft im Zeichen des Historismus, 59-61.
126 Friedrich von Hügel, Introduction to Christian Thought: Its History and Application ed.
Baron von Hügel (London, 1923), xxiii.
121 von Hügel, Introduction to Christian Thought, xxi.
128 von Hügel, Introduction to Christian Thought, xxiii.
regarding other civilizations. Whereas Spengler retained a eurocentric

tendency, Troeltsch completely rejected the claim in conservative Christianity
that salvation was only attainable through Christianity.
In Troeltsch, the German historicist tradition demonstrated both its
strength and weakness. It enabled him to respect the uniqueness of other
civilizations, and this led him to reject imperialism. Troeltsch went beyond
Hegel and many 19th-century German thinkers in acknowledging the equal
value of other civilizations. But it also forced him to deny any common
understanding between civilizations, resulting in an Isolationist position.
Like many of these thinkers he expressed very limited interest in other
civilizations.129 Without any sense of connection, Troeltsch's study of
civilizations was subjected to relativism. His dilemma was how to find an
anti-relativist measure which also respect the principle of individuality. He
proposed the universal idea of Europeanism as a solution.
Troeltsch's Critique ofSpengler and Anti-Relativism. Although I pointed

out the similarity between Troeltsch and Spengler in terms of their historicist
position, a similarity which Troeltsch did not articulate, his bookreviews on
Spengler nonetheless highlight their important différences as a liberal and a
neo-conservative. Troeltsch saw Spengler's Décliné of the West as „an
important cultural document from the time of the spiritual crisis of German
science."130 He grouped Spengler together with other neo-conservative
thinkers such as Friedrich Gogarten, Stefan George, Erich Kahler and Ar
thur Salz, whose works Troeltsch also reviewed,131 but he considered Spengler
the most représentative of this movement. In the following section I will
analyze Troeltsch's anti-relativist measure, that is, Europeanism, in the light
of his criticisms of Spengler on methodological and political levels.
Troeltsch's appréciation of the work was not entirely lacking; he found it
extremely interesting with a number of good thoughts. But he pointed out
several methodological problems which seriously undermined its scholarly
rigor. Not only had Spengler failed to live up to Troeltsch's académie
standards, „the laboriously achieved critical rationalism, the philological
element, empirical exaetness, and sober causality in research ";132 the work
also had other methodological shorteomings, ranging from the lack of source
information, excessive synthèses, obvious falsification or assertion based
upon suspicion and fear.133
Troeltsch found Spengler's morphological laws particularly problematic.
129 Geoffrey Barraclough points out the limit of 19th-century German analysis, which hardly
knew anything about other civilizations. Hegel's portrayal of the Eastern cultures as
unprogressive and incapable was adopted by Ranke and Burckhardt. „Europa, Amerika, und
Rußland in Vorstellung und Denken des 19. Jahrhunderts", Historische Zeitschrift, 203 (1966),
280-315, here 314-315.
130 Troeltsch, GS IV:677.
131 Troeltsch, GS IV: 653-676.
132 Troeltsch, GS IV:677, 684.
Not only did they violate the principle of indiv

further than others in stretching strict scholarly
Gundolf in his ability to symbolize tendencies.13
more unreserved and independent of the so
positivistic-psychological laws.136 The othe
Spengler's dogmatic pessimism. Spengler's last p
cause of skepticism, of amoralism, of pessimism
of force, of simple cynicism."137 In contrast to J
often praised, Spengler merely perpetuated „a
and economic-rational aliénation of Europe."138
Spengler in the tradition of Schopenhauer and N
lacked a rédemption analogous to Schopenhau
superman, but had also contributed to the caus
actively.139 Troeltsch also differentiated betwee
and Dilthey's. Dilthey, like Spengler, found it i
truth or moral values, but, unlike Spengler, did
achieve partial objectivity.140
Such distancing from Spengler's work was
libérais, such as Hintze, Meinecke, Mann, Weber
like Troeltsch, criticized Spengler's work for bea
to literature and for lacking original research mat
debated with Spengler and accused the latter's d
results of historical research into spéculative const
Thomas Mann, criticized Spengler for blurri
scholarship (Wissenschaft) and arts (Kunst).1
criticisms, Spengler readily acknowledged hims
himself from the académie world, rejecting an offe
in Göttingen.
Troeltsch was far more careful about method
scholarly restraints than Spengler, who exploite
utterances. Yet Troeltsch's assertion that Spengler's
while his last major work, Der Historismus und

137 Ernst Troeltsch, „The Ideas of Natural Law and Human
Law and Theory of Society, 1500-1800, ed. Otto Gierke (Bo
140 Troeltsch, GS IV:678; Hughes, Oswald Spengler, 376.
141 Friedrich Meinecke, „Über Spenglers Geschichtsbetra
Philosophie der Geschichte, vol. 4 of Werke, ed. Eberhard
Mann, „Über die Lehre Spenglers", 142-150; Marianne Web
685ff; Hintze, „Troeltsch and Historicism", 370-71.
142 Meinecke, „Über Spenglers Geschichtsbetrachtung",
143 Weber, Max Weber, 685.
144 Mann, „Über die Lehre Spenglers", 143.
145 Weber, Max Weber, 687.
of sciences may only be partially accepted. Troeltsch's concept of European

ism also contained an element of faith. Fearing the threats of relativism
from his Isolationist position vis-à-vis other civilizations, Troeltsch sought
quasi-universal values, the relatively absolute values, within European
civilization. Here he certainly misused his principle of compromise.146 How
could he justify emphasizing that Europe was utterly différent from other
civilizations, but also stress similarities between European countries,
reversing his wartime Sonderweg position towards Western Europe? While
he rejected the principle of individuality in the German Romantic tradition
in relation to Western Europe, he emphasized it even more than before in
relation to non-Western civilizations. Iggers accuses Troeltsch of wishing to
show „the special dignity of the modern Western World."147 Troeltsch's
Europeanism was even subjected to strong criticisms from other libérais.
Weber and Hintze criticized Troeltsch's Nietzschean project, that is, serving
life through history, although it should not be overlooked that Troeltsch
paid much more attention to the scientific (wissenschaftlich) character of
history than Nietzsche had.148
Although Troeltsch was less successful in separating himself from
Spengler's methodology, he was clearly différent from Spengler in terms of
politics. Unlike Spengler, who saw stable values on a nationalist level and
refused to think of reconciliation with Western Europe, Troeltsch rejected
nationalist politics and appealed to common European values. He presented
a perceptive analysis of Spengler's neo-conservative politics, clearly seeing
the hidden meanings of Spengler's book,149 although, as Felken has suggested,
it was „perhaps the only in the Weimar Republic, which related itself to the
political présent without taking it as one's own theme."150 Troeltsch argued
that if the book was nominally about Spengler's pessimism towards the
général course of history, the real motive was to interpret the philosophy of
history in the atmosphère of the Great War.151 The aim was to serve the neo
conservative political agenda, which calculatingly mixed reactionary and
modem elements, that is, cold-blooded imperialism and capitalism with
146 For his concept of compromise, see „The Ethic of Compromise corresponding to the
Church Conception", The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, II, trans. Olive Owen
(London, 1931; φ. Chicago, 1981), 494-501; „Bis zum Verfall der demokratischen Mitte im
Frühjahr 1920", Spektator-Briefe: Aufsätze über die deutsche Revolution und die Weltpolitik
1918/22 (1924; Aalen, 1966), 113-149; „Politics, Patriotism and Religion", Christian Thought:
Its History and Application, ed. Baron von Hügel (London, 1923), 133-167.
147 See Georg Iggers, „Historicism: The History of Meaning of the Term", Journal of the
History ofldeas (1995), 56 (1): 129-52, here 134.
148 Oexle, Geschichtswissenschaft im Zeichen des Historismus, 59-61.
149 Cf. Horst Möller, „Oswald Spengler—Geschichte im Dienste der Zeitkritik", Spengler
Heute, ed. Peter Christian Ludz (München, 1980), 52.
150 The political nature of The Décliné of the West is not explicitly explained; so Feiken
suggested reading i t together with Preußentum und Sozialismus (1919). Feiken, Oswald Spengler,
104. For more détails on Preußentum und Sozialismus, see Hughes, Oswald Spengler, esp. 98
119.
völkisch socialist Organization.152 The

philosophy of history was, however, no l
tum und Sozialismus appeared in 1919.
Troeltsch's suspicion of Spengler's ulterio
in the second volume of The Décliné of
opportunism was apparent, for he attuned
of Weimar politics. He fought „against d
lic" and called for „the neo-conservative
realization of the German spirit.153 Speng
culture in the anti-political sense," bu
history,154 promoting blood, romantic cy
also considered that the political messages
post-war Germany international harm, for
of the world Propaganda against Germany
terrorists of both right and left.155
In contrast to Spengler, Troeltsch was p
right-wing Kapp Putsch, believing that i
Germany genuinely wanted democracy
Troeltsch largely hoped for reconciliation
with Great Britain. Düring the war year
belief in the idea and the Geist " against W
showed only materialistic concerns.156
witnessed the stupendous blindness of th
to the idea of Europeanism.157 While rea
between Western Europe and Germany, a
their similarities,158 he urged their rapp
Germanness (Deutschtum) was thus expan
Germanic and American world."160 He ur
stern Europe's parliamentarian democracy
anglophilism161 was hardly new; it co
152 Troeltsch, GS IV:680-81.
I5J Troeltsch, GS IV:690.
154 Spengler quoted in Troeltsch, GS IV:690.
'"Troeltsch, GS IV:691.
156 Ernst Troeltsch, Deutscher Glaube und deutsche Sitte in unserem großen Kriege (Ber
lin, 1914), 28, 30. Troeltsch, „Die Ideen von 1914", Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa (Tübin
gen, 1925; rp. Aalen 1966), 48. C. Bernd Sösemann, „Das erneuerte Deutschland: Ernst
Troeltschs politisches Engagement im Ersten Weltkrieg", Protestantismus und Neuzeit, vol. 3
in Troeltsch-Studien (Gütersloh, 1986), 125-26.
157 Hans Kohn, The Mind of Germany: The Education of a Nation (New York, 1960) and
Hermann Lübbe, Politische Philosophie: Studien zu ihrer Geschichte (Basel & Stuttgart, 1963).
158 Dockhorn criticizes Troeltsch and Weber for oversimplifying the picture of England and
Germany, and thus failing to see the Kultursynthesis, for example, English Hegelianism. Klaus
Dockhorn, Der deutsche Historismus in England: ein Beitrag zur Englishen Geistesgeschichte
des 19. Jahrhunderts (Göttingen, 1950), 191-193.
159 Faulenbach, Ideologie des deutschen Weges, 132. Also see Ringer, The Décliné of the
German Mandarins, 197.
161 Troeltsch, Spektatorbriefe, 68.
thought.162 Whereas his pre-war writings placed démocratie Calvinism above

authoritarian Lutheranism, his post-war writings emphasized the benefits if
undemoeratie Germany were to learn from British demoeraey. His
„conservative demoeraey," which supported parliamentary demoeraey, was
closer to the English model, and less conservative than the plebiscitary
demoeraey of Meinecke and Weber.163
Troeltsch shared the spirit of Coudenhove's Pan-European movement of
the 1920s, and tried to work together with Western Europe for peace. The
Pan-European movement, like Troeltsch, saw in Spengler's Décliné of the
West an opposition to its movement. A striking différence concerning Great
Britain nonetheless served to distinguish between them. Whereas Troeltsch
considered her demoeraey a key element to the idea of Europeanism,
Coudenhove excluded it from the Pan-European movement for as long as
her overwhelming colonial power rendered the relationship between her
and continental Europe greatly disproportionate.164 Whereas Troeltsch
devoted his final days before his sudden death in 1923 to praising Great
Britain, Coudenhove wanted to accomplish his movement by strengthening
the relationship with France by enlisting the support of the French Prime
Minister, Briand, and the German foreign minister, Stresemann (whose early
death in 1929 was unfortunate for the Pan-European movement).
Coudenhove's objection to British imperialism did not seem to trouble
Troeltsch, who not only overestimated England's virtue, but also neglected
her other traditions. His excessive Anglophilism had two negative aspects.
Unlike Coudenhove, he paid much less attention to France, the country which
was more important for the day-to-day political stability of the Weimar
Republic,165 and he failed to realize that post-war Europe was no longer
solely dominated by Western Europe. He was at a loss about the new powers,
such as the U.S., Russia, and Japan. In contrast, Coudenhove's Europeanism
investigated Europeanism in the context of the world politics. Schwarz's
portrayal of Troeltsch as a „slave instead of master of his history" seems
harsh, but nonetheless points to his weakness.166
In conclusion, Spengler and Troeltsch were two leading historicists in
the German post-war debate on civilizations, one amateur and the other
académie. Despite their liberal/neo-conservative différences, there was a
certain continuity in their historical thinking. They rejected the history of
humankind and then encountered the threats of relativism. German historicist
thinking, which maintained the balance between universality and indivi
duality in its eighteenth-century founder, Herder, saw a dangerous development
"'2 G. M. Schwarz, „Deutschland und Westeuropa bei Ernst Troeltsch", Historische Zeit
schrift, 191 (1960): 510-547, here 534-35.
163 Gustav Schmidt, Deutscher Historismus und der Übergang zur parliamentarischen
Demokratie. Untersuchung zu den politischen Gedanken von Meinecke, Troeltsch, Max Weber
(Lübeck and Hamburg, 1964), 209, 223-226.
164 Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europa (Wien, Leipzig, 1924), 39-50.
Troeltsch, Spektatorbriefe, 272. Schwarz, „Deutschland und Westeuropa bei Ernst
Troeltsch," 539.
166 Schwarz, „Deutschland und Westeuropa bei Ernst Troeltsch", 536.
in the 1920s towards isolationism vis-à-vis

Isolationist view prevented Troeltsch and Spen
new place in post-First World War world polit
Although neither Spengler nor Troeltsch succ
of relativism, an assessment which only high
be one-sided. The neo-conservative Weltan
continuation of the bourgeois culture," but al
strengest example of which was the national-
rejecting „the continuity of the common Europ
Spengler's idea of the West was not only unab
perspective towards other civilizations, but ev
place of Great Britain and France in the same
zealous nationalisai.168 In contrast, Troeltsc
Germans to accept cultural grafting from Wes
eurocentricism towards non-Western civilizatio
167 Jaeger & Rüsen, Geschichte des Historismus, 111, 10

168 Hürten, „Der Topos vom christlichen Abendland und
kriegen", 132.

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Historicism and Civilizational Discontinuity in Spengler and Troeltsch

Author(s): JOANNE MIYANG CHO

Historicism and Civilizational Discontinuity

In last thirty years German and Anglo-Saxon historical scholarship ha

1 Georg Iggers, New Directions in European Historiography (Middletown, Conn. 1984),

© Koninklijke Brill ΝV, Leiden ZRGG 51,3 ( 1999)

I. Weimar Liberais and Neo-conservatives

conceived in 1911 „as a critique of German

" See Walter Lacquer, Weimar: A Cultural Histo

Troeltsch not only took over Weber's struggle with neo-conservatives,

A number of authors pinpoint Spengler

26 Antoni, From History to Sociology, 83.

individualism, industrialism, and democracy, which increased social chaos.

33 Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 12.

Troeltsch wanted to point out the cultura

II. The Crisis of Historicism and National

Despite its murky and abstract ideas, The

40 Antoni, From History to Sociology, 73.

Historicism and Its Crisis. Although Spengler's Décliné of the West is

Instead of seeing cultures in terms of hierarchical relationships, Spengler's

discontinuity of historical process55 and a

Anti-Relativism. First, Spengler attemp

55 Kon criticizes Spengler for „metaphysical absolutization of the discontinuity of historical

61 Spengler, Untergang, 3, 36.

Secondly, although Spengler wanted to a

A closer comparison between Classical civilization and Western civilization

68 Spengler, Untergang, 24.

stern world, just as in 4th Century Rome, Zivilisation unfortunately took

74 Spengler, Untergang, 45.

Germany in this process: „France and Engl

79 Spengler, Untergang, 45.

conquer Europe.90 Spengler wanted to initiate a „second religiousness"91

foreseen by Spengler in his Untergang

III. The Crisis of Historicism and Europ

Troeltsch's position as a liberal spokesm

Historicism and Its Crisis. Troeltsch subscribed to the historicist principle

civilizations.103 Even science and logic cannot be applied universally; each

or a nation.'"10 He therefore did not advoca

rejected Troeltsch on the same account, only had he realized Troeltsch's

unequivocal rejection of non-European culture

Von Hügel saw in Troeltsch's excessive historicism the destructive touch of

Although each culture has a set of distinguishable characteristics, how

124 Hintze, „Troeltsch and Historicism," 407.

regarding other civilizations. Whereas Spengler retained a eurocentric

Troeltsch's Critique ofSpengler and Anti-Relativism. Although I pointed

Not only did they violate the principle of indiv

134 Troeltsch, GS IV:682.

of sciences may only be partially accepted. Troeltsch's concept of European

völkisch socialist Organization.152 The

thought.162 Whereas his pre-war writings placed démocratie Calvinism above

in the 1920s towards isolationism vis-à-vis

167 Jaeger & Rüsen, Geschichte des Historismus, 111, 10

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