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JURIS RENIER C.

MENDOZA
SUCCESSION M(6:30-9:00PM) TUE(7:30-9:00PM)

CARMEN LINART Y PAVÍA, plaintiff and appellee, vs. MARÍA JUANA UGARTE É
ITURRALDE, defendant and appellant.
G.R. No. 2599. October 27, 1905

Principle: The intestate left as heirs T., the daughter of a sister of the deceased, and C.; a
granddaughter of another sister of the deceased: Held, That C. was entitled to no part of the
inheritance. The word children in intestate estates can not include "grandchildren."

Facts:
Ramon Iturralde y Gonzales died intestate on December 28, 1900. Maria Ugante e Iturralde
asked the court that she’d be declared the legitimate heir of the deceased. There being no
legitimate heirs to the estate in the direct ascendant or descendant line of succession,
Carmen Linart, the petitioner, presented herself as the collateral descendant (the legitimate
niece of the deceased). The petition of Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, then the only claimant
to the estate, having been heard in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure in force at the time, intestate proceedings were instituted, and she was declared, in
an order made on the 31st of January, 1901, without prejudice to third parties, to be the heir
of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez.

In the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela
Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and
asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared the
lawful heir of the deceased — a fact which this new relative did notdeny — be required to
render an account of the property of the estate.

It is the contention of the petitioner that what she claims is that, although she is one degree
lower in the line of succession that her aunt, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is
entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased through her father, Pablo Linart, by
representation — that is to say, that even though a grandniece, she is entitled to the same
share in the estate as the direct niece, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde.

The trial court held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate that the
niece was entitled to.

Issue:
Whether or not herein petitioner is entitled to represent his father Pablo Linart and is entitled
to half of the estate of the deceased.

Ruling:
NO.
the error which the appellant claims was committed in the court below is very clearly shown.
The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate that the
niece was entitled to, when, as a matter of law, the right of representation in the collateral line
can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the
plaintiff in this case is not a daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the
appellant, but the daughter of a son of a sister of the deceased. It would have been quite
different had it been shown that her father, Pablo Linart, had survived the deceased. In that
case he would have succeeded to the estate with his cousin, Maria Juana Ugarte, and then,
by representation, she, the plaintiff, might have inherited the portion of the estate
corresponding to her father's. It is not an error to consider that the word "children" in this
connection does not include "grandchildren." There is no precedent in our jurisprudence to
warrant such a conclusion.

The decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 19, 1899, and December 31, 1895,
relied upon, are not applicable to this case. Those decisions were rendered in cases relating
to testate and not to intestate successions. In both cases, and in many others decided by the
supreme court of Spain, prior to the operation of the Civil Code, where a testator had named
certain persons as heirs and, they failing, that the property should pass to their children, it
was held that "Grandchildren" were necessarily included in the word "children," and that in
such a case the grandchild does not, properly speaking, inherit by representation, "for the
reason that he must in any event succeed the child in the natural and regular order," and
pointed out in the last decision referred to. And, as is also pointed out in the first decision, "the
fact that it was stated with more or less correctness in the prayer of the complaint that the
action was based upon the right of representation, is not sufficient to deny to the appellant a
right which he had under the terms of the will." The difference is this, that in the case of a
testamentary succession, we must take into consideration and give force to the intention of
the testator when he substitutes the children for the heirs first named by him. The
descendants are ordinarily considered as included in the term "children," unless they are
expressly excluded, whereas in intestate successions, reference should only be had to the
provisions of the law under which it is evident that the rights of representation in the collateral
line do not obtain beyond the sons and daughters of brothers or sisters.

We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased can not
participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer relative, the more
distance grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not
obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the
case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.

The court ordered the record be remanded to the court of First Instance from whence it came
for execution of the said judgment.
JURIS RENIER C. MENDOZA
SUCCESSION M(6:30-9:00PM) TUE(7:30-9:00PM)

Benita Salao vs Juan Salao


G.R. No. L-26699. March 16, 1976

Principle: In the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood. The nephew excludes a
grandniece or great-grandnephews.

Facts:
Upon the death of Valentina Ignacio, her heirs, their three children and 1 grandson partitioned
her property. (pls. see table below) Prior to Valentina’s death, her children Ambrosia and Juan
Sr. secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their
names for a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at SitioCalunuran and they exercised
dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao. Later, Ambrosia and
Juan Sr., acquired that Pinanganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544
of the Hermosa cadastre which adjoins the Calunuran fishpond. Said Calunaran and Lewa
fish ponds are the bone of contention in this case.

On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a year before
Ambrosia Salao's death on September 14, 1945 due to senility (she was allegedly eighty-five
years old when she died), she donated her one-halfproindiviso share in the two fishponds in
question to her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time she was living with Juani's
family. He was already the owner of the the other half of the said fishponds, having inherited it
from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) The deed of denotion included other pieces of real
property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufruct over the said properties
during her lifetime.

The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of VictorinaSalao in a letter dated January 26,
1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds
and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita and
Victorina's children their one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to
P200,000.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that Valentin
Salao did not have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his
father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917,
and that he Juani was the donee of Ambrosia's one-half share.

Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against Juan S. Salao,
Jr. on January 9, 1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Exh. 36). They amended their
complaint on January 28, 1955. They asked for the annulment of the donation to Juan S.
Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao's
supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y.
Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the Torrens title
secured by his father and aunt. He also invoked the Statute of Frauds, prescription and
laches. As counter-claims, he asked for moral damages amounting to P200,000, attorney's
fees and litigation expenses of not less than P22,000 and reimbursement of the premiums
which he has been paying on his bond for the lifting of the receivership Juan S. Salao, Jr. died
in 1958 at the age of seventy-one. He was substituted by his widow, Mercedes Pascual and
his six children and by the administrator of his estate.

In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two fishponds in question
were adjudicated to his seven legal heirs in equal shares with the condition that the properties
would remain under administration during the pendency of this case.

The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Y. Salao, Sr.,
Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran and Pinanganacan (Lewa) lands
were acquired; that a co-ownership over the real properties of Valentina Ignacio existed
among her heir after her death in 1914; that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia
Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918 when her estate was partitioned among her three
children and her grandson, Valentin Salao.

Issue:
Whether or not plaintiffs (Benita and heirs of Victorina) have successional rights over
Ambrosia’s share.

Ruling:
Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights
to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest
relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would
have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the
daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia
since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers
or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew
excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza
(Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).
JURIS RENIER C. MENDOZA
SUCCESSION M(6:30-9:00PM) TUE(7:30-9:00PM)

LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,


Branch 120, Caloocan City, and RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 118449. February 11, 1998

Principle: With respect to Rafael’s estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to
be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. As such, petitioner may not
be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to
intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding, which petitioner
correctly argued in his manifestation.

Facts:
Spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas have five children, namely: Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde
(wife of herein petitioner LauroVizconde); Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas
de Leon; and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. On June 30, 1991, Estrellita and her two
daughters were killed. In an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita,
Rafael and Salud, together with petitioner Vizconde, inherited from Estrellita’s estate.

Subsequently, when Rafael died in 1992, an intestate estate proceeding was instituted by one
of the heirs of Rafael. Private respondent Ramon, among other things, averred that petitioner
should be impleaded as one of Rafael’s children “by right of representation as the widower of
deceased legitimate daughter Estrellita.” Pursuant to the order of the probate court, petitioner
filed a Manifestation contending that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of
Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The trial court granted
Ramon’s motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate estate proceeding
regarding Rafael’s estate is proper.

Ruling:
No. The enumeration of compulsory heirs in Article 887 of the Civil Code is exclusive, which
negates the rulings of the RTC and CA that Lauro shall be included in the proceeding as a
compulsory heir for he is only a son-in-law of decedent Rafael. Thus, petitioner who was not
even shown to be a creditor of decedent is considered a third person or stranger. Petitioner
may not be dragged into the proceeding herein instituted; neither may he be permitted to
intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding. Thus, petition is granted.
JURIS RENIER C. MENDOZA
SUCCESSION M(6:30-9:00PM) TUE(7:30-9:00PM)

LANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all


surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO
SANTERO, et al., vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN,
G.R. No. L-66574. June 17, 1987

Principle: Illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child.

Facts:
Thee respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of
Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona
PamutiVda. deSantero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of
Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of
the properties of the deceased Simona PamutiVda. De Santero.

It is undisputed: 1) that FelisaPamutiJardin is a niece of Simona PamutiVda. de Santero who


together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe
Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union
were born FelisaPamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona
PamutiVda. deSantero is the widow of PascualSantero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4)
that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents PascualSantero and Simona
PamutiVda. deSantero; 5) that PascualSantero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and
Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his
mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with
Anselma Diaz and two minor children with FelixbertaPacursa.

Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9, 1976 2 declared
FelisaPamutiJardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona PamutiVda. DeSantero.

Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the intestate Estate
of Pablo Santero;
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate
of PascualSantero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent
Person, Simona PamutiVda. deSantero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona
PamutiVda. deSantero.
Issue:
Whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero
could inherit from Simona PamutiVda. deSantero, by right of representation of their father
Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.

Ruling:
Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona PamutiVda.
deSantero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision
of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:

ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the
oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish
broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona PamutiVda. deSantero as the word
"relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the
commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late
Simona PamutiVda. deSantero are FelisaPamutiJardin and the six minor natural or
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of
Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding
FelisaPamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona
PamutiVda. deSantero.
JURIS RENIER C. MENDOZA
SUCCESSION M(6:30-9:00PM) TUE(7:30-9:00PM)

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO


SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant, vs. PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and
ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965

Principle: When an intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with only one legitimate
child of the deceased is entitled to one-half of the estate of the deceased spouse under Art.
996 of the Civil Code.

Facts:
The case is a review of the decision declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate
heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. The present
controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece
1. of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the
only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion.
2. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and
another child who died during infancy
3. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of
Pablo Santero
4. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero
5. Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976
6. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero
and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor
children with Felixberta Pacursa.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate
child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

RULING:
No The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate
children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate
or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselves illegitimate.

The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by
right of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are
subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence
of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
ground of resentment."

While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those
articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from
being exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the
determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the
person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his
illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his
legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier
imposed Article 992.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
"relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. In the case
at bar, the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be
the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
The Court view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation.
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive
sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he
further states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies
the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code. Thus,
the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context
indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense.

SANTILLON VS MIRANDA
G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965

FACTS:
Pedro Santillon died intestate, leaving one son, Claro and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During
his marriage, pedro acquired several parcels of land
1. After his death, Claro Santillon filed petition for letters of administration. His mother,
Perfecta and spouses Benito Miranda opposed the petition on the following grounds:
a. Properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except for 3 parcels which
Perfecta claims to be her exclusive property
b. Perfecta conveyed ¾ of her undivided share in most of the properties to spouses
Miranda
c. Perfecta should be appointed administrator over her spouse’s estate
2. Thereafter, Claro filed a motion to “declare shares of heirs” and resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties with respect to their rights in the estate. Invoking Art 892, Claro insisted
that after deducting Perfecta’s ½ share from the conjugal property, the remaining property
shall be divided as: ¼ for Perfecta and ¾ for him
3. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed that she was entitled under Art 996 to another ½
of the remaining half
4. The trial court held in favor of Perfecta, declaring that the surviving spouse Perfecta is
entitled to ½ of Pedro’s estate and the remaining ½ is given to Claro
ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only
survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?

RULING:
Half and half pursuant to Art 996 NCC.
Art 892 NCC falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession, whereas Art 996 comes
under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that
Claro cannot rely on Art 892 to support his claim to ¾ of his father’s share. Art 892 merely
fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art 888 thereof, the legitime of children in
testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares
that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the
amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. As such,
the pertinent provision on intestate succession shally apply, i.e. Art 996.
In his commentary, JBL Reyes, noted that: if there is only one legitimate child surviving with
the spouse, since they share equally, ½ of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes
to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to “children or descendants,” the rule in
statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular in this case.
The theory of commentator’s sharing Claro’s position are premised on the following
arguments:
a.Art 996 speaks of “children” therefore it does not apply when there is only one “child” and as
such Art 892 should be applied through a process of judicial construction and analogy
b.Art 996 is unfair because in intestate succession, the widow gets only ¼ while in testacy,
she would get ½ shares
It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. As such,
“children” in Art 996 also refers to a “child.”
The equal shares theory seems to be a logical inference from the circumstance whereas Art
834 Spanish Civil Code, from which Art 996 was taken, contained 2 paragraphs governing
two contingencies: (a) where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children; and (b)
where the widow or widower survives with only one child. Since Art 996 NCC omitted to
provide for the second situation, it can be deemed that the legislator’s intent was to
promulgate only one general rule applicable to both situations.
SUAREZ V CA
G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992

FACTS:
• Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his estate
consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been liquidated or
partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the
consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1
of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay, jointly and
severally, herein respondents the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as damages.
• The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become
final and executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be
millions then) were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private
respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were
then issued a certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.
• On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a
reinvindicatory action 2 against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal,
thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the auction sale and the
recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of property. Therein, they alleged, among
others, that being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they cannot be held
liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither
be levied nor sold on execution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-
owned by petitioners and registered in the name of petitioner’s deceased father?

RULING:
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution
of the case.
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
Article 888 further provides:
"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children
and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:
"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be
entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each
child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from
and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not
because of their mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father.
Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction
sale to protect their own interests.