SUPREME COURT DECIDED CASES & OTHER ISSUES
THAT MADE IT TO THE HEADLINES IN YEARS 2015-2018
Justin Ryan D. Morilla
Last Updated on October 12, 2018
PARDON OF ERAP
Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC
January 21, 2015
POLITICAL LAW; PARDON: Former President
Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective
office, the focal point of this controversy. The
wording of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
It is this Court’s firm view that the phrase in the
presidential pardon at issue which declares that
former President Estrada "is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights" substantially complies with
the requirement of express restoration under Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
POLITICAL LAW; DISQUALIFICATION TO
RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE: Section 40 of the
LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for
any elective local position, to wit: (a) Those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence. While it may be
apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the
LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the
OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition –
a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the
latter provision allows any person who has been
granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction
by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public
office, whether local or national position. The
disqualification of former President Estrada under
Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the
OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him.
Page 1 of 22
DEATH BY HAZING
Dungo v. People
July 1, 2015
CRIMINAL LAW; MALUM PROHIBITUM:
The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum
prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would show
that the lawmakers intended the anti-hazing statute to
be malum prohibitum. In Vedana v. Valencia, the
Court noted that in our nation's very recent history,
the people had spoken, through the Congress, to
deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act
previously considered harmless by custom, as
criminal. The act of hazing itself is not inherently
immoral, but the law deems the same to be against
public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly,
the existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the
crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith
cannot be raised in its prosecution.
See Republic Act 11053 for the Anti-Hazing Act
of 2018
DISMISSAL OF JUNJUN BINAY
Carpio Morales v. CA
November 10, 2015
POLITICAL LAW; ABANDONING THE
CONDONATION DOCTRINE: To begin with, the
concept of public office is a public trust and the
corollary requirement of accountability to the people
at all times, as mandated under the 1987
Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that
an elective local official’s administrative liability for
a misconduct committed during a prior term can be
wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second
term of office, or even another elective post. Election
is not a mode of condoning an administrative
offense, and there is simply no constitutional or
statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the
notion that an official elected for a different term is
fully absolved of any administrative liability arising
from an offense done during a prior term.
 SUPREME COURT DECIDED CASES & OTHER ISSUES
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Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the
LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated
therein cannot anymore be invoked against an
elective local official to hold him administratively
liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section
40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the
first place, an elective local official who is meted
with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected
to an elective local position due to a direct
disqualification from running for such post. In
similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS
imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from
holding public office as an accessory to the penalty
of dismissal from service.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s
abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines
KILLING OF JENNIFER LAUDE
Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde
November 24, 2015
REMEDIAL LAW; NOTICE OF HEARING:
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly
makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be
given notice of hearing on the motion at least three
days prior. While the general rule is that a motion
that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15
is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made,
and the motion may still be acted upon by the court,
provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the
other party nor violate his or her due process rights.
113 The adverse party must be given time to study
the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare
properly and engage the arguments of the movant.
114 In this case, the general rule must apply because
Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study
petitioners' Motion, thereby depriving him of his
right to procedural due process.
Page 2 of 22
POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
VISITNG FORCES AGREEMENT: The
constitutionality of an official act may be the subject
of judicial review, provided the matter is not raised
collaterally. The constitutionality of the Visiting
Forces Agreement is not the lis mota of this Petition.
Petitioners started their Petition with a claim that
their right to access to justice was violated, but ended
it with a prayer for a declaration of the Visiting
Forces Agreement's unconstitutionality. They
attempt to create the connection between the two by
asserting that the Visiting Forces Agreement
prevents the transfer of Pemberton to Olongapo City
Jail, which allegedly is tantamount to the impairment
of this court's authority.
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION AND CUSTODY: The issues of
criminal jurisdiction and custody during trial as
contained in the Visiting Forces Agreement were
discussed in Nicolas v. Secretary Romulo.
REMEDIAL LAW; WRIT OF MANDATORY
INJUNCTION: It is likewise established that a writ
of mandatory injunction is granted upon a showing
that (a) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and
permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. Nowhere in their Petition did petitioners
discuss the basis for their claim that they are entitled
to the sought writ, let alone mention it in their
arguments. This court cannot consider the issuance
of a writ of mandatory injunction or a temporary
restraining order without any legal and factual basis.
GERRY ORTEGA MURDER CASE
De Lima v. Reyes
January 11, 2016
REMEDIAL LAW; PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION: In a preliminary investigation,
the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or
 SUPREME COURT DECIDED CASES & OTHER ISSUES
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Justin Ryan D. Morilla
Last Updated on October 12, 2018
innocence of an accused. The prosecutor only
determines "whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial." As such, the
prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions.
REMEDIAL LAW; EXECUTIVE AND
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF
PROBABLE CAUSE: There are two kinds of
determination of probable cause: executive and
judicial. The executive determination of probable
cause is one made during preliminary investigation.
It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to
charge those whom he believes to have committed
the crime as defined by law and thus should be held
for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-
judicial authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not
that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a
correct ascertainment of the existence of probable
cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself
does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the
other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity
for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue
the arrest warrant.
REMEDIAL LAW; EFFECT OF FILING OF
INFORMATION TO THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION: The preliminary investigation
conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is
terminated upon the filing of the information in the
proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of
Page 3 of 22
said information sets in motion the criminal action
against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it
proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at
such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted
to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true
that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in court or not, once the case had already been
brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may
feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be
addressed for the consideration of the Court, the only
qualification is that the action of the Court must not
impair the substantial rights of the accused or the
right of the People to due process of law. (Citing
Crespo v. Mogul)
REMEDIAL LAW; REFUSAL BY THE COURT
TO GRANT MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY
THE PROSECUTOR UPON THE DIRECTIVE
OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE: The rule
therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint
or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and
control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose
his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best
and sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. · The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or
deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that
the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records of the investigation. (Citing Crespo v.
Mogul)
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ENHANCED DEFENSE
COOPERATION AGREEMENT
Saguisag v. Ochoa
January 12, 2016
POLITICAL LAW; EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS: The Constitution prohibits the
entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities,
except by way of a treaty concurred in by the Senate
- a clear limitation on the President's dual role as
defender of the State and as sole authority in foreign
relations. However, the President may enter into an
executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that
allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an
existing law or treaty (Mutual Defense Treaty and
Visiting Forces Agreement).
CITIZENSHIP OF SEN. GRACE POE
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
Dissenting Opinion of J. Del Castillo
March 8, 2016
POLITICAL LAW; CANCELLATION OR
DENIAL OF DUE COURSE TO A COC: To be
sufficient, a Section 78 petition must contain the
following ultimate facts: "(1) the candidate made a
representation in his certificate; (2) the
representation pertains to a material matter which
would affect the substantive rights of the candidate
(the right to run for the elective position for which he
filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate made the
false representation with the intention to deceive the
electorate as to his qualification for public office or
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide
a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible."
XXX
Anent the contention that the Comelec lacks
jurisdiction over candidates for national positions,
suffice it to state that Section 78 of the OEC does not
distinguish between CoCs of candidates running for
Page 4 of 22
local and those running for national positions. It
simply mentions "certificate of candidacy." Ubi lex
non distinguit nee nos distingu-ere debemus - when
the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.
This is a basic rule in statutory construction that is
applicable in these cases. Hence, the Comelec has the
power to determine if the CoC of candidates, whether
running for a local or for a national position, contains
false material representation. In other words, any
person may avail himself/herself of Section 78 of the
OEC to assail the CoC of candidates regardless of the
position for which they are aspiring.
POLITICAL LAW; SECTION 78 AND QUO
WARRANTO: While it is admitted that there is a
similarity between a petition under Section 78 of the
OEC and a quo warranto proceeding in that they
both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
candidate, what sets them apart is the time when the
action is filed, that is, before or after an election and
proclamation. As the election subject of these
petitions is yet to be held, there can be no doubt that
the issues raised by respondents were properly set
forth in their respective petitions for cancellation
and/or denial of due course to petitioner's CoC.
POLITICAL LAW; JURISDICTION OF
COMELEC AND PET: As heretofore stated, a
petition under Section 78 seeks to cancel a
candidate's CoC before there has been an election
and proclamation. Such a petition is within the
Comelec's jurisdiction as it is ''the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies."
On the other hand, the PET is "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President of
the Philippines." Particularly, the PET has
jurisdiction over an election contest initiated through
an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto against the President or Vice-President.
The PET's adjudicative powers come into play after
the President or the Vice-President concerned had
been elected and proclaimed. Under the PET Rules
an election protest may be filed only within 30 days
 SUPREME COURT DECIDED CASES & OTHER ISSUES
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Last Updated on October 12, 2018
after proclamation of the winner, while a quo
warranto petition may be initiated within 10 days
after the proclamation of the winner. In other words,
it is the date of proclamation of the candidate
concerned that is determinative of the time when the
PET's jurisdiction attaches.
POLITCAL LAW; EFFECT OF SET
DECISION ON COMELEC: Furthermore, the
Comelec is an independent constitutional body
separate and distinct from the SET. While the SET is
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of Members of the
Senate, its decisions do not have any doctrinal or
binding effect on the Comelec. It is settled that there
is "only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all
other courts [or tribunals] should take their
bearings." Here, the November 17, 2015 SET
Decision is the subject of a Petition
for Certiorari entitled David v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal, and docketed as GR. No. 221538, that is
still pending before this Court. Until said petition is
decided with finality by this Court, any ruling on
petitioner's citizenship does not, subject to the
conditions that will be discussed later, constitute res
judicata.
POLITICAL LAW; REMEDIAL LAW; RES
JUDICATA IN CITIZENSHIP CASES: In Go,
Sr. v. Ramos, the Supreme Court held that res
judicata may apply in citizenship cases only if the
following conditions or circumstances concur: 1. a
person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue
in a controversy where said person is a party; 2. the
Solicitor General or his authorized representative
took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3. the
finding o[f] citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
POLITICAL LAW; RESIDENCY: Section 2 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires, among
others, that a person aspiring to become a President
must be a resident of the Philippines for at least 10
years immediately preceding the election. This
requirement is mandatory and must be complied with
Page 5 of 22
strictly. For one, no less than our Constitution itself
imposes it.
XXX
For purposes of election laws, the Supreme Court, as
early as 1928, held that the term residence is
synonymous with domicile. Domicile denotes the
place "'where a party actually or constructively has
his permanent home,' where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends
to return and remain"
POLITICAL LAW; TYPES OF DOMICILE:
Domicile is classified into three types according on
its source, namely: (1) domicile of origin, which an
individual acquires at birth or his first domicile; (2)
domicile of choice, which the individual freely
chooses after abandoning the old domicile; and (3)
domicile by operation of law, which the law assigns
to an individual independently of his or her
intention. A person can only have a single domicile
at any given time.
POLITICAL LAW; ACQUISITION OF NEW
DOMICILE: To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or
an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose." In the absence of clear
and positive proof of the above-mentioned requisites,
the current domicile should be deemed to continue.
Only with clear evidence showing concurrence of all
three requirements can the presumption of continuity
of residence be rebutted, for a change of legal
residence requires an actual and deliberate
abandonment of the old domicile.
REMEDIAL LAW; ADMISSIONS: To be
admissible, an admission must: (a) involve matters of
fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite;
(c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be
adverse to the admitter's interests, otherwise it would
be self-serving and inadmissible.
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POLITICAL LAW; REACQUISITION OF
CITIZENSHIP NOT A MODE TO
REESTABLISH DOMICILE: However, it must be
emphasized that petitioner's reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship neither automatically resulted
in the reestablishment of her Philippine domicile nor
in the abandonment of her U.S. domicile. It is settled
that RA 9225 treats citizenship independently of
residence. It does not provide for a mode of
reestablishing domicile and has no effect on the legal
residence of those availing of it. This is only logical
and consistent with the general intent of the law for
dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may
hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign
citizenships, he[/she] may establish residence either
in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which
he[/she] is also a citizen.
POLITICAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE: The
Supreme Court may choose to ignore or side-step a
constitutional question if there is some other ground
upon which the case can be disposed of.
LOTTERY AND PLUNDER
Macapagal-Arroyo v. People
July 19, 2016
REMEDIAL LAW; CERTIORARI:
Notwithstanding the interlocutory character and
effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of
the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY: To be
considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the
accused must be shown to have performed at least an
overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the
conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of
them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may
only be held responsible for the results of his own
acts. The treatment by the Sandiganbayan of
GMA’s handwritten unqualified "OK" as an overt act
Page 6 of 22
of plunder was absolutely unwarranted considering
that such act was a common legal and valid practice
of signifying approval of a fund release by the
President. Indeed, pursuant to People v. Lizada,
supra, an act or conduct becomes an overt act of a
crime only when it evinces a causal relation to the
intended crime because the act or conduct will not be
an overt act of the crime if it does not have an
immediate and necessary relation to the offense.
CRIMINAL LAW; PLUNDER: The law on
plunder requires that a particular public officer must
be identified as the one who amassed, acquired or
accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly
states that plunder is committed by any public officer
who, by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least
P50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of
overt criminal acts as described in Section l(d)
hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal
charge for plunder against several individuals that
there must be a main plunderer and her co-
conspirators, who may be members of her family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons. Here,
considering that 10 persons have been accused of
amassing, accumulating and/or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth aggregating P365,997,915.00, it would be
improbable that the crime charged was plunder if
none of them was alleged to be the main plunderer.
As such, each of the 10 accused would account for
the aliquot amount of only P36,599,791.50, or
exactly 1/10 of the alleged aggregate ill-gotten
wealth, which is far below the threshold value of ill-
gotten wealth required for plunder.
POLITICAL LAW; REMEDIAL LAW;
RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED: Despite the silence
of the information on who the main plunderer or the
mastermind was, the Sandiganbayan readily
condemned GMA as the mastermind despite the
absence of the specific allegation in the information
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to that effect. In fine, the Prosecution's failure to
properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to
the cause of the State against the petitioners for
violating the rights of each accused to be informed of
the charges against each of them.
POLITICAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY: The
Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of
command responsibility to impute the actions of
subordinate officers to GMA as the superior officer.
The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA
under those terms was legally unacceptable and
incomprehensible. The application of the doctrine of
command responsibility is limited, and cannot be
true for all litigations. The Court ruled in Rodriguez
v. Macapagal-Arroyo that command responsibility
pertains to the responsibility of commanders for
crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control
in international wars or domestic conflict. The
doctrine has also found application in civil actions
for human rights abuses. But this case involves
neither a probe of GMA' s actions as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, nor of a human rights issue.
MARCOS BURIAL
Ocampo v. Enriquez
J. Del Castillo joining
the Separate Opinion of J. Mendoza
November 8, 2016
POLITICAL LAW; POLITICAL QUESTION:
Decision of President Duterte to allow President
Marcos to be interred in the LNMB is beyond the
ambit of judicial review.
REMEDIAL LAW; GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION: In the situation at hand, no grave
abuse of discretion is manifest as there is no violation
of any constitutional provision or law. In fact, the
public respondents were guided by, and complied
with, the law. Under AFP Regulation G 161-375,
Page 7 of 22
Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI,
WWII and recognized guerrillas are eligible for
interment in the LNMB. When the public
respondents based their decision on the applicable
laws and regulations, they cannot be said to have
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Moreover, the decision to allow the interment of
President Marcos in the LNMB is not contrary to
R.A. No. 289 and R.A. No. 10368. As explained by
the public respondents, the National Pantheon
mentioned in R.A. No. 289 was quite different from
the LNMB. As such, the standards claimed by the
petitioners in R.A. No. 289 are not applicable to the
LNMB.
Likewise, the interment of President Marcos in the
LNMB is not repugnant to the avowed policy of R.A.
No. 10368, which seeks to recognize the heroism of
human rights violation victims (HRVV) during
martial law. First, R.A. No. 10368 neither expressly
nor impliedly prohibits his burial in the LNMB.
Second, his interment is not incongruous with
honoring HRVVs considering that the burial is not
intended to confer upon him the title of a hero. Third,
the State can continue to comply with its obligation
under R.A. No. 10368 to provide recognition and
reparation, monetary or non-monetary, to the
HRVVs, notwithstanding his burial in the LNMB.
MODERNIZATION OF PUJs
February 2017
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. Board of
Transportation
September 30, 1982
POLITICAL LAW; DUE PROCESS: Dispensing
with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the
Circulars (in this case -- Phasing out and
Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis) is neither
violative of procedural due process.
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POLITICAL LAW; POLICE POWER: As
enunciated in the preambular clauses of the
challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding
public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated
taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power,
can prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare
of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to
comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also
regulate property rights.
IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINTS AGAINST
PDU30, COMMISSIONER ANDY BAUTISTA
& SC JUSTICES
2017
POLITICAL LAW; INITIATING
IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT: Impeachment
shall be initiated by the filing and subsequent referral
to the Committee on Justice of: (a) a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives; or (b) a verified
complaint filed by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof; or (c) a
verified complaint or resolution of impeachment
filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all Members of the
House.
POLITICAL LAW; DETERMINING
SUFFICIENCY IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE:
Upon due referral, the Committee on Justice shall
determine whether the complaint is sufficient in from
and substance. If the committee finds that the
complaint is insufficient in form, it shall return the
same to the Secretary General within three (3)
session days with a written explanation of the
insufficiency. The Secretary General shall return the
same to the complaint(s) together with the
committee's written explanation within three (3)
session days from receipt of the committee resolution
finding the complaint insufficient in form.
Page 8 of 22
Should the committee find the complaint sufficient
in form, it shall then determine if the complaint is
sufficient in substance. The requirement of substance
is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction
of the committee. If the committee finds that the
complaint is not sufficient in substance, it shall
dismiss the complaint and shall submit its report as
provided hereunder.
POLITICAL LAW; VOTE REQUIRED FOR
APPROVAL: A vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all
Members of the House is necessary for the approval
of the resolution setting forth the Articles of
Impeachment. If the resolution is approved by the
required vote, it shall then be endorsed to the Senate
for its trial. On the other hand, should the resolution
fail to secure the approval by the required vote, the
same result in the dismissal of the complaint for
impeachment.
POLITICAL LAW; WHEN COMMITTEE ON
JUSTICE RECOMMENDS DISMISSAL: When
the report of the Committee on Justice dismisses the
complaint, it shall submit to the House a resolution
for the dismissal of the verified complaint and/or
resolution of impeachment. A vote of at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary to override such resolution, in which case
the Committee on Justice shall forthwith prepare the
Articles of Impeachment.
POLITICAL LAW; BAR ON IMPEACHMENT:
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a
period of one (1) year.
REJECTION OF APPOINTMENT OF
CABINET SECRETARIES
2017
POLITICAL LAW; POWER TO APPOINT: The
power of appointment is vested in the President by
the Constitution. Under this provision, there are two
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kinds of presidential appointments: (1) appointments
made during the session of Congress or the so-called
regular appointments or nominations, and
(2) appointments made during the recess of Congress
which are also known as ad interim appointments
POLITICAL LAW; APPOINTMENT
PROCESS: The regular appointments which are
contemplated under the first paragraph of Article
VII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution go through
the following stages: (1) nomination; (2) consent; (3)
appointment; (4) acceptance by the nominee.
What the President sends to the Commission is just a
nomination. After the Commission has given its
consent, the President issues the appointment. It is
only when the last stage has been completed may the
officer concerned take his oath of office.
The second paragraph of Article VII, Sec. 16, of the
1987 Constitution also empowers the President to
issue appointments while Congress is not in session.
Such appointments are called ad interim
appointments, and it goes through the following
stages: (1) appointment and (2) confirmation.
POLITICAL LAW; AD INTERIM
APPOINTMENTS: An ad interim appointment is
permanent in nature and takes effect immediately.
Thus, one who was issued an ad interim appointment
may immediately enter upon the discharge of his
functions. An ad interim appointment ceases to be
valid upon disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or, if not confirmed, until the next
adjournment of Congress.
COMPLAINT AGAINST PDU30 BEFORE ICC
June 2017
POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: The International Criminal
Court (“the ICC” or “the Court”) is a permanent
international court established to investigate,
Page 9 of 22
prosecute and try individuals accused of committing
the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole, namely the
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and the crime of aggression.
POLITICAL LAW; PRINCIPLE OF
COMPLEMENTARITY: The ICC does not
replace national criminal justice systems; rather, it
complements them. It can investigate and, where
warranted, prosecute and try individuals only if the
State concerned does not, cannot or is unwilling
genuinely to do so. This might occur where
proceedings are unduly delayed or are intended to
shield individuals from their criminal responsibility.
This is known as the principle of complementarity,
under which priority is given to national systems.
States retain primary responsibility for trying the
perpetrators of the most serious of crimes.
POLITICAL LAW; JURISDICTION OF ICC:
When a State becomes a party to the Rome Statute,
it agrees to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the ICC
with respect to the crimes enumerated in the Statute.
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction in situations
where the alleged perpetrator is a national of a State
Party or where the crime was committed in the
territory of a State Party. Also, a State not party to
the Statute may decide to accept the jurisdiction of
the ICC.
POLITICAL LAW; WHO MAY BE
PROSECUTED BEFORE ICC: The ICC
prosecutes individuals, not groups or States. Any
individual who is alleged to have committed crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC may be brought
before the ICC. In fact, the Office of the Prosecutor’s
prosecutorial policy is to focus on those who, having
regard to the evidence gathered, bear the greatest
responsibility for the crimes, and does not take into
account any official position that may be held by the
alleged perpetrators.
SOURCE: https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf
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MARTIAL LAW IN MINDANAO
Lagman v. Medialdea
Penned by J. Del Castillo
July 4, 2017
POLITICAL LAW; HIERARCHY OF
EXTRAORDINARY POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT: Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives
the "President, as Commander-in- Chief, a 'sequence'
of 'graduated power[s]'. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the power to declare martial law." It
must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers
only to hierarchy based on scope and effect. It does
not in any manner refer to a sequence, arrangement,
or order which the Commander-in-Chief must
follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does
not dictate or restrict the manner by which the
President decides which power to choose.
POLITICAL LAW; POWER OF SUSPENDING
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AND DECLARING MARTIAL LAW:
The extraordinary powers of suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or
declaring martial law may be exercised only when
there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety
requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the
following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1)
a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible
revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and
possible nullification by the Supreme Court."
POLITICAL LAW; PURPOSES OF SECTION
18, ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION: The third paragraph of Section
18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the
1987 Constitution to constitutionalize the pre-
Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the
Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Lansang, to wit: that the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
Page 10 of 22
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a
political question but precisely within the ambit of
judicial review.
Further, Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide
additional safeguard against possible abuse by the
President in the exercise of his power to declare
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
The most important objective, however, of Section
18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the
powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the
primary reason why the provision was not placed in
Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained
under Article VII or the Executive Department.
POLITICAL LAW; TERRITORIAL
COVERAGE OF MARTIAL LAW: Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law."
Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the
discretion to determine the territorial coverage of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire
Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law.
POLITICAL LAW; RECOMMENDATION OF
DND SECRETARY NOT A CONDITION FOR
DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW: Even the
recommendation of, or consultation with, the
Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking
military officials, is not a condition for the President
to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution shows that the
President's power to declare martial law is not
subject to any condition except for the requirements
of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety
requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common
sense if the decision of the President is made
dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter
ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no
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other that the exercise of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution is bestowed.
REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION: A plain
reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it
specifically grants authority to the Court to
determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not
restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of
Article VIII. For instance, its jurisdiction to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President can be found in the last paragraph of
Section 4, Article VII. The power of the Court to
review on certiorari the decision, order, or ruling of
the Commission on Elections and Commission on
Audit can be found in Section 7, Article IX(A).
POLITICAL LAW; REMEDIAL LAW;
APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING TO REVIEW
SUFFICIENCY OF FACTUAL BASIS OF
PROCLAMATION OR SUSPENSION: It could
not have been the intention of the framers of the
Constitution that the phrase "in an appropriate
proceeding" would refer to a Petition
for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of
Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition
for certiorari is whether the respondent has
committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance
of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool
to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized
that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked
to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
President's exercise of emergency powers. Put
differently, if this Court applies the standard of
review used in a petition for certiorari, the same
would emasculate its constitutional task under
Section 18, Article VII.
Page 11 of 22
In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding"
appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen
for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's
emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be
denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to
be resolved by the Court.
POLITICAL LAW; SUFFICIENCY OF
FACTUAL BASIS TEST: In determining the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration
and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the
full complement or totality of the factual basis, and
not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the
Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated
in the proclamation and in the written Report as the
President could not be expected to verify the
accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due
to the urgency of the situation. To require precision
in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly
burden him and therefore impede the process of his
decision-making. [It] would not only place the
President in peril but would also defeat the very
purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him
xxx.
In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the
determination of whether the President in declaring
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus,
our review would be limited to an examination on
whether the President acted within the bounds set by
the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his
possession prior to and at the time of the declaration
or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial
law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
To summarize, the parameters for determining the
sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual
rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the
first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is
probable cause for the President to believe that there
is actual rebellion or invasion.
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POLITICAL LAW; REMEDIAL LAW;
STANDARD OF PROOF FOR THE
PRESIDENT: In determining the existence of
rebellion, the President only needs to convince
himself that there is probable cause or evidence
showing that more likely than not a rebellion was
committed or is being committed. To require him to
satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the
exercise of his emergency powers.
POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL POWER TO
REVIEW VERSUS THE CONGRESSIONAL
POWER TO REVOKE: In reviewing the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension, the Court considers only the information
and data available to the President prior to or at the
time of the declaration; it is not allowed td
"undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings." On the other hand, Congress may take
into consideration not only data available prior to,
but likewise events supervening the declaration.
Unlike the Court I which does not look into the
absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be
discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and
further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts
presented before it.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is
only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other
hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in
the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself
at any time after the proclamation or suspension was
made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the
power to revoke by Congress are not only totally
different but likewise independent from each other
although concededly, they have the same trajectory,
which is, the nullification of the presidential
proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the
Court to review can be exercised independently from
the power of revocation of Congress.
Page 12 of 22
POLITICAL LAW; POWERS THE
PRESIDENT CAN EXERCISE DURING
MARTIAL LAW: In David v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court, quoting Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza's (Justice Mendoza) Statement
before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13,
2006, stated that under a valid declaration of martial
law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may
order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial
warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover]
of news media and agencies and press censorship;
and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x x".
Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts
that the President may perform do not give him
unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of
civilians during martial law. This is because martial
law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation of
civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the
guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place
during its pendency. And in such instance where the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also
suspended, such suspension applies only to those
judicially charged with rebellion or offenses
connected with invasion.
POLITICAL LAW; VOID FOR VAGUENESS;
APPLICATION TO FREE SPEECH CASES:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is
facially invalid if "men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application." "[A] statute or act may be said to be
vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such
instance, the statute] is repugnant to the Constitution
in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure
to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle."
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The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law,
First Amendment cases. A facial challenge is
allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one
which is overbroad because of possible "'chilling
effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes
violating free speech. A person who does not know
whether his speech constitutes a crime under an
overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself
from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a
crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him
into silence." It is best to stress that the vagueness
doctrine has a special application only to free-speech
cases. They are not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutes.
Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the
grounds of vagueness is unwarranted. Proclamation
No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights that may be facially
challenged. What it seeks to penalize is conduct, not
speech.
CRIMINAL LAW; TERRORISM NEITHER
NEGATES NOR ABSORBS REBELLION:
There is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372
which states that rebellion and terrorism are
mutuallty exclusive of each other or that they cannot
co-exist together. RA 9372 does not expressly or
impliedly repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And while
rebellion is one of the predicate crimes of terrorism,
one cannot absorb the other as they have different
elements.
P1000 BUDGET FOR THE CHR
September 2017
CHREA v. CHR
July 21, 2006
POLITICAL LAW; FISCAL AUTONOMY: The
1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously
grants fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
constitutional commissions, and the Office of the
Page 13 of 22
Ombudsman. As envisioned in the Constitution, the
fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the
Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with
the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It
recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess
and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and pay plans of the government and
allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided
by law or prescribed by them in the course of the
discharge of their functions.
BAIL OF JINGGOY ESTRADA
September 15, 2017
Note: Sandiganbayan Decision
REMEDIAL LAW; QUESTION OF BAIL CAN
BE REVISITED: As resolving bail issues is an
interlocutory order, it cannot attain finality. It may
change as the circumstances allow. (Macapagal-
Arroyo v. Sandiganbayan Case)
REMEDIAL LAW; ADMISSION TO BAIL:
Although there is evidence to show that there were
glaring irregularities in the disbursement of accused
Estrada’s PDAF allocations and that he received a
sum of money from his participation in these
irregularities, there is no strong evidence to show that
he is a main plunderer within the contemplation of
the plunder law and as alleged in the Information.
Thus, his admission to bail is in order.
FILING OF CASES AGAINST DEPUTY
OMBDUSMAN CARANDANG
October 2017
Gonzales v. Office of the President
January 28, 2014
POLITICAL LAW; INDEPENDENCE OF THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN: The mere
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filing of an administrative case against the Deputy
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor before the
OP can already result in their suspension and can
interrupt the performance of their functions, in
violation of Section 12, Article XI of the
Constitution. With only one term allowed under
Section 11, a Deputy Ombudsman or Special
Prosecutor, if removable by the President, can be
reduced to the very same ineffective Office of the
Ombudsman that the framers had foreseen and
carefully tried to avoid by making these offices
independent constitutional bodies.
ARREST OF SENATOR DE LIMA
De Lima v. Guerrero
Separate Concurring Opinion of J. Del Castillo
October 10, 2017
REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION OF RTC:
Petitioner is being charged with conspiring to engage
in trading of illegal drugs, a case that is cognizable
by and within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The
mention in the Information of the phrases "taking
advantage of public office" and "with the use of their
power, position, and authority", vis-a-vis the rest of
the allegations in the Information, does not wrest
from the RTC its jurisdiction over the case. To my
mind, said phrases were mentioned specifically to
highlight the fact that some of the personalities
involved are public officials, in view of the fact
that Section 28 of RA 9165 specifically deals with
the "criminal liability of government officials and
employees" and provides for the imposition of the
maximum penalties if the violators were government
officials and employees. By their being government
officials and employees, their liability is aggravated
and would necessitate the imposition of the
maximum penalty, pursuant to Section 28.
REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION OF
SANDIGANBAYAN: The mere fact that the salary
grade corresponding to the position of a Secretary of
Justice is within the ambit of
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction does not necessarily
Page 14 of 22
mean that said court should take cognizance of the
case. It must be stressed that it is not the salary grade
that determines which court should hear or has
jurisdiction over the case; it is the nature thereof and
the allegations in the Information. RA 9165
specifically vested with the RTC the jurisdiction over
illegal drugs cases. On the other hand,
the Sandiganbayan was specially constituted as the
anti-graft court. And since petitioner is being charged
with conspiring in trading of illegal drugs, and not
with any offense involving graft, it is crystal clear
that it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over the
matter as well as over the person of the petitioner.
REMEDIAL LAW; EXHAUSTION OF
REMEDIES: Petitioner has several available
remedies to take before resort is made to this Court.
As enumerated in the Separate Concurring Opinion
of Justice Peralta, the following options were
available to petitioner: "1) filing of counter-affidavit
with an alternative prayer for referral of the case to
the Ombudsman; 2) filing a motion for re-
investigation before the information is filed in court;
3) filing of a motion for leave of court to file a motion
for re-investigation if an information has been filed;
4) filing of a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause; 5) motion for bill of particulars; and
6) motion to quash warrant of arrest." Unfortunately,
petitioner did not opt to avail of any of these
remedies before bringing her suit to the Court of last
resort. Petitioner's claim, that it was pointless for her
to avail of any of these remedies, not only lacks basis
but also strikes at the very core of our judicial
system. Rules are basically promulgated for the
orderly administration of justice. The remedies
chosen by the parties must be in accordance with the
established rules and should not depend on their
whims.
REMEDIAL LAW; FORUM SHOPPING;
PREMATURITY: Petitioner is guilty of forum
shopping; the petition suffers from prematurity. The
instant Petition was filed before this Court despite the
pendency of the motion to quash before respondent
Judge. Suffice it to say that between the motion to
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quash and the instant Petition, there is identity of
parties; the prayers in the two suits are similar; and
the resolution of one will result in res judicata to the
other.
GRAFT AND USURPATION OF AUTHORITY
CHARGES AGAINST P-NOY
November 2017
CRIMINAL LAW; CORRUPT PRACTICES:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful: (a) Persuading,
inducing or influencing another public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority
or an offense in connection with the official duties of
the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded,
induced, or influenced to commit such violation or
offense.
CRIMINAL LAW; USURPATION OF
AUTHORITY: Article 177. Usurpation of authority
or official functions. - Any person who shall
knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an
officer, agent or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government or of any
foreign government, or who, under pretense of
official position, shall perform any act pertaining to
any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government,
or any agency thereof, without being lawfully
entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
PROCLAMATION NO. 374 DECLARING
CPP-NPA AS TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
December 5, 2017
CRIMINAL LAW; TERRORIST: RA 10168,
Section 3 (i) Terrorist refers to any natural person
who: (1) commits, or attempts, or conspires to
Page 15 of 22
commit terrorist acts by any means, directly or
indirectly, unlawfully and willfully; (2) participates,
as a principal or as an accomplice, in terrorist acts;
(3) organizes or directs others to commit terrorist
acts; or (4) contributes to the commission of terrorist
acts by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose where the contribution is made intentionally
and with the aim of furthering the terrorist act or with
the knowledge of the intention of the group to
commit a terrorist act.
CRIMINAL LAW; PROSCRIPTION OF
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: RA 9372,
SEC. 17. Any organization, association, or group of
persons organized for the purpose of engaging in
terrorism, or which, although not organized for that
purpose, actually uses the acts to terrorize mentioned
in this Act or to sow and create a condition of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the populace in order to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon
application of the Department of Justice before a
competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and
opportunity to be heard given to the organization,
association, or group of persons concerned, be
declared as a terrorist and outlawed organization,
association, or group of persons by the said Regional
Trial Court.
PH WITHDRAWAL FROM
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
March 17, 2018
POLITICAL LAW; WITHDRAWAL FROM
ROME STATUTE: Article 127. Withdrawal
1. A State Party may, by written notification
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal
shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of
the notification, unless the notification specifies a
later date.
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2. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its
withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this
Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including
any financial obligations which may have accrued.
Its withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with
the Court in connection with criminal investigations
and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing
State had a duty to cooperate and which were
commenced prior to the date on which the
withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in
any way the continued consideration of any matter
which was already under consideration by the Court
prior to the date on which the withdrawal became
effective.
BORACAY SHUTDOWN
April 2018
In The Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al.
and Sacay, et al. v. the Secretary of the DENR, et al.,
the Supreme Court ruled that the entire island of
Boracay is state-owned except for lands already
covered by existing titles. Therefore, the island,
being owned by the State, can only be declared or
made subject of private ownership by the
Government. And only the Government can
determine the manner in which the island should be
disposed of or conveyed to private individuals,
pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine.
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF DOJ
CIRCULAR NO. 241
Genuino v. De Lima
April 17, 2018
POLITICAL LAW; LIMITATIONS TO
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: Like almost
all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power
of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power: (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
Page 16 of 22
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
POLITICAL LAW; LIMITATIONS ON RIGHT
TO TRAVEL: It is apparent, however, that the right
to travel is not absolute. There are constitutional,
statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right
to travel. Section 6 itself provides that the right to
travel may be impaired only in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health, as may be
provided by law.
POLITICAL LAW; COMPLETENESS AND
SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST: It is, however,
important to stress that before there can even be a
valid administrative issuance, there must first be a
showing that the delegation of legislative power is
itself valid. It is valid only if there is a law that (a) is
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate: and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate and determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance
of his functions.
POLITICAL LAW; POLICE POWER; VALID
EXERCISE: Police power pertains to the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare." "It may be said to be that inherent
and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and
welfare of society. "Verily, the exercise of this power
is primarily lodged with the legislature but may be
wielded by the President and administrative boards,
as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal
levels, including the barangay, by virtue of a valid
delegation of power.
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It bears noting, however, that police power may only
be validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
REMEDIAL LAW; POWER OF THE COURTS
TO ISSUE HDO: It bears reiterating that the power
to issue HDO is inherent to the courts. The courts
may issue a HDO against an accused in a criminal
case so that he may
be dealt with in accordance with law. It does not
require legislative conferment or constitutional
recognition; it co-exists with the grant of judicial
power.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 51
PROHIBITION AGAINST ILLEGAL
CONTRACTING AND SUBCONTRACTING
May 2018
LABOR LAW; SECURITY OF TENURE:
Security of Tenure refers to the right of employees
not to be dismissed or removed without just or
authorized cause and observance of procedural due
process consistent with the Constitution, Labor
Code, as amended, and prevailing jurisprudence.
LABOR LAW; VISITORIAL AND
ENFORCEMENT POWER OF DOLE: Art. 128.
Visitorial and enforcement power.
a. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or
his duly authorized representatives, including
labor regulation officers, shall have access to
employer’s records and premises at any time
of the day or night whenever work is being
undertaken therein, and the right to copy
therefrom, to question any employee and
investigate any fact, condition or matter
which may be necessary to determine
violations or which may aid in the
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enforcement of this Code and of any labor
law, wage order or rules and regulations
issued pursuant thereto.
b. Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles
129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and
in cases where the relationship of employer-
employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor
and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to issue
compliance orders to give effect to the labor
standards provisions of this Code and other
labor legislation based on the findings of
labor employment and enforcement officers
or industrial safety engineers made in the
course of inspection. The Secretary or his
duly authorized representatives shall issue
writs of execution to the appropriate
authority for the enforcement of their orders,
except in cases where the employer contests
the findings of the labor employment and
enforcement officer and raises issues
supported by documentary proofs which
were not considered in the course of
inspection. (As amended by Republic Act
No. 7730, June 2, 1994).
An order issued by the duly authorized
representative of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment under this Article may be
appealed to the latter. In case said order
involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in
the amount equivalent to the monetary award
in the order appealed from. (As amended by
Republic Act No. 7730, June 2, 1994)
c. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
may likewise order stoppage of work or
suspension of operations of any unit or
department of an establishment when non-
compliance with the law or implementing
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rules and regulations poses grave and
imminent danger to the health and safety of
workers in the workplace. Within twenty-
four hours, a hearing shall be conducted to
determine whether an order for the stoppage
of work or suspension of operations shall be
lifted or not. In case the violation is
attributable to the fault of the employer, he
shall pay the employees concerned their
salaries or wages during the period of such
stoppage of work or suspension of operation.
d. It shall be unlawful for any person or entity
to obstruct, impede, delay or otherwise
render ineffective the orders of the Secretary
of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives issued pursuant to
the authority granted under this Article, and
no inferior court or entity shall issue
temporary or permanent injunction or
restraining order or otherwise assume
jurisdiction over any case involving the
enforcement orders issued in accordance with
this Article.
e. Any government employee found guilty of
violation of, or abuse of authority, under this
Article shall, after appropriate administrative
investigation, be subject to summary
dismissal from the service.
f. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
may, by appropriate regulations, require
employers to keep and maintain such
employment records as may be necessary in
aid of his visitorial and enforcement powers
under this Code.
QUO WARRANTO AGAINST
A CHIEF JUSTICE
Republic v. Sereno
May 11, 2018
Dissenting Opinion of J. Del Castillo
Page 18 of 22
POLITICAL LAW; MODE OF REMOVAL OF
IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS: The only
"exclusivity" that may be reasonably read from the
wording of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution
is the list of impeachable officers and the grounds for
which they may be impeached. This "exclusivity" is
deducible, not from the use of the word "may," but
from the enumeration of the officers and the grounds,
following the rule of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius in statutory construction.
xxx
Had the framers intended to restrict the mode of
removal from office of the enumerated public
officers only to impeachment in the first sentence of
Section 2, they would have adopted a similar
categorical and unequivocal language as they did in
the second sentence of Section 2 and in Section 3. I
believe that their deliberate omission to do so is a
strong indication that the framers recognized other
modes by which impeachable public officers may be
removed from office.
POLITICAL LAW; REMEDIAL LAW; QUO
WARRANTO AGAINST ELECTIVE
IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS: The Court's quo
warranto jurisdiction over elective impeachable
officials obtains, not on the basis of the general grant
of jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, but on the specific grant under the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution. Given this specific constitutional
mandate, there is practically no discretion left for the
Court but to assume jurisdiction over quo warranto
petitions against (and only against) this particular
class of impeachable officials.
POLITICAL LAW; REMEDIAL LAW; QUO
WARRANTO AGAINST APPOINTIVE
IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS: With particular
regard to appointive impeachable officers, it is my
humble submission that quo warranto petitions
against them threaten the constitutionally-decreed
independence of their offices. While the Constitution
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has granted this Court general jurisdiction over quo
warranto petitions, this jurisdiction may not be
asserted against appointive impeachable officers
without compromising institutional independence
which is intended to uphold core constitutional
principles and values.
REMEDIAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION: It is
therefore clear that the grant to the SolGen of
unrestricted and imprescriptible power to institute
quo warranto petitions against appointive
impeachable officers poses serious risks to the
independence of constitutional offices declared to be
independent. In Bengzon v. Drilon, we ruled that
"[t]he judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman must have the independence
and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties." They "should be free to act as
their conscience demands, without fear of
Rretaliation or hope [of] reward.” With the SolGen
wielding a quo warranto sword of Damocles over the
heads of these officers, the Filipino people cannot be
assured that they will discharge their constitutional
mandate and functions without fear or favor. Without
such assurance, there can be no guarantee that the
primordial interest of the sovereign people is
promoted.
POLITICAL LAW; REVIEW OF
QUALIFICATIONS OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES: In constituting the PET, the JBC, and
the ComAppt, the framers of the Constitution
intended that there be a "vetting agency" in charge
of reviewing the eligibility and qualifications of
those elected as President and Vice-President, and
those appointed to the other constitutional offices.
The determination of an elected candidate or an
appointee's eligibility and qualification is therefore
primarily a function that the Constitution decreed is
to be discharged by the PET, the JBC, and the
ComAppt.
POLITICAL LAW; GROUNDS FOR
IMPEACHMENT; INELIGIBILITY FOR
OFFICE: Nevertheless, it is neither improbable nor
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illogical to suppose that a public officer's ineligibility
for office (whether. for lack of qualification or
possession of grounds for disqualification) can be
considered an act which constitutes an impeachable
offense. The ponencia itself recognizes this.
Although "culpable violation.of the Constitution,"
"other high crimes," and "betrayal of public trust"
escape precise definitions, their common
denominator is that they "obviously pertain to 'fitness
for public office.'" Thus, it can be said that a public
officer who does not possess the minimum
constitutional qualifications for the office commits a
violation of the Constitution that he/she has sworn to
uphold or, at the very least, betrays the public trust
when he/she assumes the position without the
requisite eligibility. Impeachment then becomes the
mode by which we exact accountability from the
public officer who assumes a constitutional office
notwithstanding his/her ineligibility.
POLITICAL LAW; PRIMARY
JURISDICTION: The matter of the respondent's
ineligibility is already before the Congress as one of
the charges in the Articles of Impeachment. The
House Committee on Justice overwhelmingly ruled,
by a vote of 33-1, in favor of finding probable cause
to impeach the respondent. The Articles of
Impeachment have been transmitted to the
Committee on Rules so that the matter may be
calendared and submitted to the plenary for its vote.
That it is speculative whether the respondent may be
held accountable because no impeachment has yet
taken place is beside the point. The impeachment
proceeding has commenced, and Congress has taken
cognizance thereof with its finding of probable
cause. Thus, it behooves this Court to exercise
judicial restraint and accord respect to the processes
that the Constitution has lodged within the powers of
a co-equal department. The impeachment
proceedings should be allowed to take its due course.
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ACQUITTAL OF IMELDA MARCOS
IN CASE FOR DOLLAR SALTING
Chavez v. Marcos
June 27, 2018
REMEDIAL LAW; LEGAL ETHICS;
INHIBITION: Whether or not to voluntarily inhibit
from hearing a case is a matter within the judge's
discretion. Absent clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that the judge will
dispense justice in accordance with law and
evidence, the Supreme Court will not interfere.
REVOCATION OF RAPPLER’S
REGISTRATION
Rappler v. SEC
July 26, 2018
Note: CA Decision
POLITICAL LAW; OWNERSHIP AND
MANAGEMENT OF MASS MEDIA: Article
XVI, Section 11.
1.The ownership and management of mass media
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-
owned and managed by such citizens.
The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies
in commercial mass media when the public interest
so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or
unfair competition therein shall be allowed.
POLITICAL LAW; MASS MEDIA: Pursuant to
RA 9211, Rappler is engaged in the business of mass
media and by its actuations effectively admit that it
is subject to the foreign equity restriction under
Section 11(1), Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution.
POLITICAL LAW; COMMERCIAL LAW;
FOREIGN EQUITY RESTRICTION; VOTING
CONTROL TEST: The term capital in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refers only shares of
stock entitled to vote in the election of directors and
not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising
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both common and non-voting shares. (Gamboa v.
Teves)
POLITICAL LAW; COMMERCIAL LAW;
FOREIGN EQUITY RESTRICTION; FULL
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP TEST: Mere legal
title is not enough to meet the required Filipino
equity, which means that it is not sufficient that a
share is registered in the name of a Filipino citizen or
national, i.e. he should also have full beneficial
ownership of the share. If the voting right of a share
held in the name of a Filipino citizen or national is
assigned or transferred to an alien, that share is not to
be counted in the determination of the required
Filipino equity. In the same vein, if the dividends and
other fruits and accessions of the share do not accrue
to a Filipino citizen or national, then that share is also
to be excluded or not counted. (Roy v. Herbosa)
POLITICAL LAW; COMMERCIAL LAW;
FOREIGN EQUITY RESTRICTION: It bears
stressing that the foreign equity restriction on mass
media implies “zero” foreign control. It thus includes
any appearance of control that will influence the
corporate actions and decisions of Rappler. Also, it
does not matter whether the approval of Omidyar is
required only when the actions taken by Rappler will
prejudice the rights of Omidyar, because RHC will
still nonetheless be required to secure the approval of
at least 2/3 of the PDR Holders before Rappler can
carry out or implement any action which has the
effect of altering, modifying or otherwise changing
Rappler’s Articles of Incorporation or By-laws or
take any other action where such alteration,
modification, change or action will prejudice the
rights in relation to the Omidyar PDR.
COMMERCIAL LAW; NEGATIVE
COVENANT: A negative covenant is defined as “a
covenant that requires a party to refrain from doing
something.”
POLITICAL LAW; COMMERCIAL LAW;
WAIVER AND DONATION OF OMIDYAR
PDR: Thus, it is incumbent upon the SEC to evaluate
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the terms and conditions of said alleged supervening
donation and its legal effect, particularly, whether the
same has the effect of mitigating, if not curing, the
violation it found petitioners to have committed. If
so, this may warrant a re-examination of the sanction
of revocation of petitioners’ Certificates of
Incorporation imposed by the SEC En Banc in the
assailed Decision.
REVOCATION OF TRILLANES’
AMNESTY COVERAGE
August 2018
POLITICAL LAW; CRIMINAL LAW;
AMNESTY: Amnesty commonly denotes a general
pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one
sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations.
Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts
into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that
the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense.
(People v. Patriarca)
POLITICAL LAW; CRIMINAL LAW;
AMNESTY; ADMISSION OF GUILT: Amnesty
presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an
accused maintains that he has not committed a crime,
he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an
amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as
in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove
the existence of such conditions. The invocation of
amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the
allegations against him but disclaims liability
therefor on account of intervening facts which, if
proved, would being the crime charged within the
scope of the amnesty proclamation. (People v.
Llanita, et al and People v. Guillermo, et al.)
POLITICAL LAW; CRIMINAL LAW;
AMNESTY AND PARDON: Pardon is granted by
the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act
Page 21 of 22
which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof;
while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief
Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it
is a public act of which the courts should take judicial
notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction;
while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from
the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the
punishment, and for that reason it does ""nor work
the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no
case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence"
article 36, Revised Penal Code). while amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the
offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely
as though he had committed no offense. (section
10[6], Article VII, Philippine Constitution; State vs.
Blalock, 62 N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs, 135 N.C.,
118; 47 S.E. 402., 403; Ex parte Law, 35 GA., 285,
296; State ex rel Anheuser—Busch Brewing
Ass'n. vs. Eby, 170 Mo., 497; 71 S.W 52, 61;
Burdick vs United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267; 271;
236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.)
CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION: Article
134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. -
The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed
by rising publicly and taking arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the
territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof,
of any body of land, naval or other armed forces,
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature,
wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives. (As amended by R.A. 6968).
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CRIMINAL LAW; COUP D’ ETAT: Article 134-

A. Coup d'etat; How committed. - The crime of coup
d'etat is a swift attack accompanied by violence,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed
against duly constituted authorities of the Republic
of the Philippines, or any military camp or
installation, communications network, public
utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and
continued possession of power, singly or
simultaneously carried out anywhere in the
Philippines by any person or persons, belonging to
the military or police or holding any public office of
employment with or without civilian support or
participation for the purpose of seizing or
diminishing state power. (As amended by R.A.
6968).
CONVICTION OF JOVITO PALPARAN
September 2018

CRIMINAL LAW; KIDNAPPING AND

SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION: Article
267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any
private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death: 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have
lasted more than five days. 2. If it shall have been
committed simulating public authority. 3. If any
serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats
to kill him shall have been made. 4. If the person
kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a
public officer. The penalty shall be death where the
kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of
the offense.

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