MIDTERM COVERAGE: disqualification?

- Know the 2 requisites (case in point:

Start up to Campaign Ongsiako Reyes v. COMELEC)

TIPS: 5. Aldovino vs. COMELEC - What is the effect of preventive

suspension?
1. Read the case of Reyes vs COMELEC – The Supreme Court
highlighted the 3 requirements of how would one become a 6. Adorneo vs. COMELEC and Socrates vs. COMELEC - What
member of the House of Representatives. is the effect of a recalled election?

2. Focus on Abundo vs COMELEC – this case revisited all
related cases on the 3 term limit rule (see the requisites) (1)
one must have been elected for 3 consecutive terms for the
same elective position (2) fully served those 3 consecutive
terms
3. Take not of the 3 instances where the COMELEC is
allowed to go beyond the 4 corners of the certificate of
candidacy
4. 2 requisites for false material representation – Would a
mere false or wrong entry of one’s gender a ground for
7. Makiling vs. COMELEC & Artea vs. COMELEC - succession
8. ER Ejercito case & Peñera case - about campaign funds
9. Quinto case - What is the effect of filing of certificate of
candidacy? (there are two ruling in this case) ruling 1:
anchored on equal protection of laws; ruling 2: do not treat
elected & appointed officials equally
10. Arnado vs. COMELEC – What is the effect on a candidate
using a foreign passport after renouncing US citizenship?

Answers:

1. it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of
the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. (Reyes vs
COMELEC)

2. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials; Elements. To constitute a disqualification to run for an
elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites
must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms;
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual milieus has its
complicated side.
In the instant case, the Court revisited and analyzed the various holdings and relevant pronouncements of the
Court on the matter.
The Supreme Court further held that there has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of
the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth
term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a “voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected.” This qualification was made as a deterrent against
an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third
term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought
about by certain events or causes. (abundo vs comelec)

3. Instances when comelec may go beyond the faces of the coc:

1. Authority over Nuisance candidates
2. Power to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under sec.78 of OEC
3. Filling of a disqualification case on any of the grounds enumerated in sec 68 of OCE
4. A false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." It must be made with an intention to deceive the
electorate as to one's qualifications for public office. (salcedo vs. comelec)

5. “Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that preventive
suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself
disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. (Aldovino vs.
COMELEC)

6. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a... recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for
two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the... continuity of
service.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a... recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for
two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the... continuity of
service. (Socrates vs. COMELEC). The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. (Adorneo vs. COMELEC)

7. The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a
Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to
run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from
participating as candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void
from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible
to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections
were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which
Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's
disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 2010 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling
as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under
the Local Government Code will not apply. (Makiling vs. COMELEC)
The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified under Sec. 78 of the OEC. It also held that
Antipolo, the "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy was void
ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus,
Antipolo actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position. (Artea vs. COMELEC)
8. COMELEC hasthe discretion to take judicial notice of the Advertising Contract; Ejercito should be disqualified for
spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of what is allowed by the OEC; US policies
on“independent expenditures” during elections are not applicable in the Philippine jurisdiction since thesame is
neither recognized nor allowed under our laws; Validity of laws limiting political contributions;Contributions
made by third parties are included in the election spending limit set under the law. (ER Ejercito case & Peñera
case)
under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of
persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan... political activity except during the campaign period
If the commission of the prohibited act of premature campaigning is duly proven, the consequence of the
violation is clearly spelled out in Section 68... which reads
Any candidate who... violated any of Sections 80... shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he
has been elected, from holding the office.
In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established
, not just by Andanar's evidence, but also those of Penera herself, that Penera and her partymates,...
participated in a motorcade which passed through the different barangays... of Sta. Monica, waived their hands
to the public, and threw candies to the onlookers.
Additionally, the Joint Affidavit... gave an even more straightforward account of the events, thus:... after actual
registration with the COMELEC... the motorcade proceeded to three (3) barangays out of the 11 barangays while
supporters were throwing sweet candies to the crowd;... there was merriment and marching music
For violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election campaign or partisan political activity
outside the campaign period, Penera must be disqualified from holding the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica.
(Peñera case)

9. The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privelege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and
conditions both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not enfringed
by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class and reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials. Elective officials occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation by an appointing authority.
In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the
Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the
equal protection clause.
the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised
therein was against the repealing clause. It didn’t squarely challenge Sec. 66. (Quinto case)

10. One of these is that they should “make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their COC.”
In Arnado vs Comelec and Capitan, the SC upheld the Comelec’s decision to disqualify Rommel Arnado from
running in the May 13, 2013 elections and to “set aside his proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte.” The Comelec instead declared Florante Capitan as mayor of Kauswagan.
This is because Arnado continued using his US passport even after he executed an affidavit on April 3, 2009, to
renounce his foreign citizenship.