1
ARTICLES 2-3 The Court holds that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders No.
DIGESTS
Topic: Introduction
De Joya vs. The Jail Warden of Batangas City and Hon Ruben
Galvez GR No. 159418-19
Facts:
Norma De Joya was convicted for violating BP22, the decision was
released March 21, 1997. She remained at large and was arrested
December 3, 2002. On November 21, 2000, the Supreme Court issued
Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 giving courts option to impose
penalty over imprisonment.
Issue:
Norma De Joya contended that her detention was illegal and that
Administrative Circular No 12-2000 have erased the penalty of
imprisonment. This case also raises the issue: Are Administrative
Circulars or Jurisprudence sources of Criminal Law.
Ruling:
No. Administrative Circulars or Jurisprudence are not sources of Criminal
Law. The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a
penalty of fine or a penalty of imprisonment only or both fine and
imprisonment. Therefore, the petition was dismissed due to lack of merit.
Topic: Introduction
People vs Gregorio Santiago GR No 17584 March 8, 1922
Facts:
Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy, by striking him with
an automobile that he was driving, the herein appellant was prosecuted
for the crime of homicide by reckless imprudence and was sentenced to
one year and one day imprisonment. He was prosecuted in conformity
with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that the act is
unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case.
Issue:
If Act 2886 is unconstitutional and does the Philippine Legislature have
power to pass laws.
Ruling:
For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not
incorporated in the Constitutions of the States, but is left in the hand of
the legislatures, so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law.
This power of the States of the North American Union was also granted
to its territories such as the Philippines:
The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses over the
territories and possessions of the United States may be exercised by that
body itself, or, as is much more often the case, it may be delegated to a
local agency, such as a legislature, the organization of which proceeds
upon much the same lines as in the several States or in Congress, which
is often taken as a model, and whose powers are limited by the Organic
Act; but within the scope of such act is has complete authority to
legislate, . . . and in general, to legislate upon all subjects within the
police power of the territory. (38 Cyc., 205-207.)
Limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of the complaint in
criminal matters, it is within the power of the Legislature to prescribe the
form of the criminal complaint as long as the constitutional provision of
the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation is not
violated.
58, as amended by Act No. 2886, do not partake of the same character
as the provisions of a constitution; that the said Act No. 2886 is valid and
is not violative of any constitutional provisions and that the court a quo
did not commit any of the errors assigned.
The sentence was therefore affirmed.
Topic: Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code
US vs. H.N. Bull GR No. 5270 January 15, 1910
Facts:
he appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of
section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and
from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court, where under
proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not
state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under
the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and
determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of
certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as
applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient
to support the conviction. HN Bull was travelling with cattles and did not
observe proper care for the animals.
Issue:
Act 55 as passed by the Philippine Congress was deemed
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in
general terms subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not
alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the
legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific
authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain
subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon
certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as
enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready
to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local legislative
authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16,
1908.) Therefore, Act 55 is not unconstitutional.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two
hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is affirmed.
So ordered.
Topic: Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code
People vs Wong Cheng GR No. L-18924
Facts:
Wong Cheng is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the
merchant vessel while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two
and a half miles from the shores of the city.
Issue:
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have
jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard
merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.
Ruling:

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection
with International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes
committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted
in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the
territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and
followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated
under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the
country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the
last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories
and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are
authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel
in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being
the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the
Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug,
its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory,
does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered
a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a
foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here
established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects
within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our
Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law,
without special findings as to costs.
Topic: Article 2
People vs Look Chaw GR No 5887
Facts:
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, stated that he “carried, kept, possessed and had in his
possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of opium,” and that “he had
been surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium.”
Issue:
The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the
court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned therein
did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the conclusion of his argument,
asked that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon the
defendant, in view of the considerable amount of opium seized.
Ruling:
The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime
had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.
The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made
therein by the parties, it is found: That, although the mere possession of
a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in
transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a
crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel
being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule
does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the
Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the
vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws
of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in
force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court
established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six
months and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all other respects the
2
judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.
US vs Ah Sing GR No. 13005 October 10, 1917
Facts:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No.
2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing him to two years imprisonment,
to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of
China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The Shun
Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25,
1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant
bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the
steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his possession during the trip
from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on
April 25, 1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight cans
of opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the
steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of this
opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess,
however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it
was his intention to import the prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands.
No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the
accused was to import illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was
introduced.
Issue:
Whether Philippines has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the
views just quoted, we return to an examination of the applicable
provisions of the law. It is to be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381
begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous
terms. The Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere
act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of
importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again, the
importation is not the making entry of goods at the custom house, but
merely the bringing them into port; and the importation is complete
before entry of the Custom House. (U. S. vs. Lyman [U. S.], 26, Fed.
Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots vs. U. S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As applied to the
Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person unlawfully imports or
brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the
prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has
come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits
of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal
importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the
defense proves otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurb
to think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and forth
between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It would
likewise be impossible to conceive that the accused needed so large an
amount of opium for his personal use. No better explanation being
possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium
to be brought into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find that there
was illegal importation of opium from a foreign country into the Philippine
Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be said that
these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation
not present.
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of the trial court being

within the limits provided by law, it results that the judgment must be
affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
ARTICLE 3-FELONIES
People vs Gonzales G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
Facts:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales,
Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the
accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has
remain at large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of
P14,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada,
44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo. Custodio
Gonzales was the only appellant in this case.
Issue:
Whether Custudio Gonzales has criminal liability. When can a person
incur criminal liability?
Ruling:
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we
find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave
much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his
sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the commission of the crime
as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of
little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains
and their locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was however
no indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the
prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred
on where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found
would have provided a more definite clue as to which version is more
credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired
inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been
more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground
directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an additional
mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the
other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed in
the field near the linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that place
would have been more than in any other place.
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific
act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial
court and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal
liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article
17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in
the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement,
under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable
cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in
the killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment
imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?
3
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is
incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through
the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies
(delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by
means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence,
lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or
omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised
Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by
means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both
found, that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was
performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article
3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily
movement tending to produce some effect in the external world." 40 In
this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the
appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim
that produced his death. This was not established by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
Topic : Article 3
People vs Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza GR No. L- 35748
Facts:
Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicting them upon
the information of the crime of arson as follows: The former as principal
by direct participation, sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and
one day of cadena temporal, in accordance with paragraph 2 of article
550, Penal Code; and the latter as accomplice, sentenced to six years
and one day ofpresidio mayor; and both are further sentenced to the
accessories of the law, and to pay each of the persons whose houses
were destroyed by the fire, jointly and severally, the amount set forth in
the information, with costs.

Issue:
Whether Romana Silvestre is criminally liable just because she remained
silent and did not report the crime?
Ruling:
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold,
that: (1) Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere
silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or
conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by article 14 of the
Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed
passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent; and (2) he who
desiring to burn the houses in a barrio, without knowing whether there
are people in them or not, sets fire to one known to be vacant at the
time, which results in destroying the rest, commits the crime of arson,
defined and penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, Penal Code.
By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows:
It is affirmed with reference to the accused-appellant Martin Atienza, and
reversed with reference to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, who
is hereby acquitted with
one-half of the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Topic: Mistake of Fact vs Mistake of Law
Diego vs Castillo
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint against Judge Castillo for
allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and
rendering judgment in gross ignorance of law. Lucena Escoto was
acquitted of the crime of bigamy, she contracted a second marriage
after filing a divorce in the state of Texas for her first marriage. The
decision states that the main basis for the acquittal was good faith on the
part of the accused. Respondent Judge gave credence to the defense of
the accused that she acted without any malicious intent. The combined
testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense was aimed at
convincing the court that accused Lucena Escoto had sufficient grounds
to believe that her previous marriage to Jorge de Perio had been validly
dissolved by the divorce decree and that she was legally free to contract
the second marriage with Manuel P. Diego.
In rendering the decision, respondent Judge reasoned, thus:
While it is true that in our jurisdiction the matrimonial bond between
Jorge de Perio and the accused are not yet annulled, it remains
undisputed that cessation of the same was decreed in the Family District
Court of Harris County, Texas, 247th Judicial District, effective February
15, 1978.
Issue:
Can Lucena Escoto be excused because of the misinterpretation of the
law? Is this case a mistake of fact or a mistake of law?
Ruling:
In his comment, respondent Judge stated: “That the accused
married Manuel P. Diego in the honest belief that she was free to do so
by virtue of the decree of divorce is a mistake of fact.”
This Court, in People v. Bitdu,[4] carefully distinguished between a
mistake of fact, which could be a basis for the defense of good faith in a
bigamy case, from a mistake of law, which does not excuse a person,
even a lay person, from liability. Bitdu held that even if the accused, who
4
had obtained a divorce under the Mohammedan custom, honestly
believed that in contracting her second marriage she was not committing
any violation of the law, and that she had no criminal intent, the same
does not justify her act. This Court further stated therein that with
respect to the contention that the accused acted in good faith in
contracting the second marriage, believing that she had been validly
divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is
presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his
act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof.[5]
Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for bigamy,
is People v. Schneckenburger, [6] where it was held that the accused who
secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in thePhilippines, in the
belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy.
These findings notwithstanding, the issue before us is whether or
not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.
WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is
hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
People vs Bindoy G.R. L- 34665
Facts:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion
temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime
charged against the accused is homicide, according to the following
information:
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of
Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental
Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attacked and with his bolo wounded Emigdio
Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a serious wound in the
chest which caused his instant death, in violation of article 404
of the Penal Code.
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his
counsel in this instance contends that the court erred in finding him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime of
homicide.
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance
arose in a tuba wineshop in the barrio market of Calunod, municipality of
Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of
the tubadrinkers. There were Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife
called Tibay. One Donato Bindoy, who was also there, offered
some tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having already
done so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There
ensued an interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas
stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the
bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which attracted the
attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near the
market. Emigdio left his house to see what was happening, while Bindoy
and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. In the course of this struggle,
Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo
from the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with such
violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest,
who was then behind Bindoy.
Issue:
Whether Bindoy is criminally liable when there is no intent to kill Emigdio
Omamdam.
Ruling:

The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that
the accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on that
occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas,
who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the
chest; but, as we have stated, there is no evidence to show that he did
so deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. If, in his
struggle with Pacas, the defendant had attempted to wound his
opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would
have had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits a felony
or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But,
as we have said, this is not the case.
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the
defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling
for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former
had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very
moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the
chest, without Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed behind
him. The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home
later, and asked him about his wound when he replied: "I think I shall die
of this wound." And then continued: "Please look after my wife when I
die: See that she doesn't starve," adding further: "This wound was an
accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap." The
testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence
adduced by the fiscal.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which,
had it existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution of this case. And
we deem it well to repeat what this court said in United States vs. Carlos
(15 Phil., 47), to wit:
The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of
provincial fiscals, directed to the importance of definitely
ascertaining and proving, when possible, the motives which
actuated the commission of a crime under investigation.
In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in
completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the
accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives
which tempted the mind of the guilty person to indulge the
criminal act.
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the
appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8, No. 8, Penal Code.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused
Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So ordered.
ARTICLE 4
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Injurious Result is greater than that intended- praetor
intentionem
PP VS. CAGOCO, 58 PHIL 524
FACTS: About 8:30 on the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee,
father and son, stopped to talk on the sidewalk. Yu Lon was standing
near the outer edge of the sidewalk, with his back to the street. While
they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or
twice, and when Yu Yee was about to take leave of his father,
approached Yu Lon from behind and suddenly and without warning
struck him with his fist on the back part of the head. Yu Lon fell
backwards. His head struck the asphalt pavement; the lower part of his
body fell on the sidewalk. His assailants immediately ran away. Yu Yee
pursued but then lost sight of him. Two other Chinese, Chin Sam and Yee
Fung, who were walking by, saw the incident and joined him in the
pursuit of Yu Lon’s assailant. The wounded man was taken to the
Philippine General Hospital, were he died about midnight. A post-mortem
5
examination was made the next day by Dr. Anastacia Villegas, who found
that the deceased had sustained a lacerated wound and fracture of the
skull in the occipital region, and that he had died from cerebral
hemorrhage; that he had tuberculosis, though not in an advanced stage,
and a tumor in the left kidney.
HELD: In the fifth assignment of error it is contended that the appellant if
guilty at all, should be punished for slight physical injuries only instead of
murder. Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provide
that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended; but in order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony
different from that which he proposed to commit, it is indispensable that
the two following requisites be present, to wit: (a) That a felony was
committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the
direct consequence of the crime committed by the offender.
In the Brobst case, supra, it was held that death may result from a blow
over or near the heart or in the abdominal region, notwithstanding the
fact that the blow leaves no outward mark of violence; that where death
result as the direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere
fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person
contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal
responsibility; that one is not relieved, under the law in these Islands,
from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one’s illegal acts,
merely because one does not intend to produce such consequences; but
that in such cases, the lack of intention, while it does not exempt from
criminal liability, is taken into consideration as an extenuating
circumstance. (U.S. vs. Luciano, 2 Phil. 96.) The reasoning of the
decisions cited is applicable to the case at bar. There can be no
reasonable doubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon. There is
nothing to indicate that it was due to some extraneous case. It was
clearly the direct consequence of defendants felonious act, and the fact
that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury does not
relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act, but is merely a
mitigating circumstance (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 23 Phil. 22).
PEOPLE VS NATALIO ILLUSTRE GR NO L 32076
Facts:
That on or about June 24, 1929, in the municipality of Balayan, Province
of Batangas, Philippine Islands, the above-named defendant willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously dealt Juan Magsino a blow with his closed fist
in the right hypochondriac region, bruising his liver and producing an
internal hemorrhage resulting in the death of said Juan Magsino.
Issue:
The victim already suffered tuberculosis and the question is whether this
affects the defendant’s criminal liability.
Ruling:
Doctors Ilagan, Agoncillo, and Roxas agree, with this exception, that
while the first two who performed the autopsy on the body, with their
own eyes saw the result thereof, the latter, that is, Doctor Roxas, simply
considered the data hypothetically. We are therefore convinced there is
no fundamental disagreement among the medical witnesses as to the
cause of the victim’s death; and that is was caused by the defendant’s
blow on the deceased right hypochondrium, which bruised the liver and
produced an internal hemorrhage.
The appellant denies having hit Magsino, protesting that he had no
motive for doing so; but the evidence shows that he punched Magsino in
the abdomen a little to the right, felling him to the ground.
The fact that the deceased had a delicate constitution and suffered from
incipient pulmonary tuberculosis does not affect the defendant’s criminal
liability, for eve if it rendered the blow more fatal, the efficient cause of
the death remains the same. (U. S. vs. Fenix, 11 Phil. 95) And the
circumstance that the defendant did not intend so grave an evil as the
death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability, since he
deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, but simply mitigates his

guilt in accordance with article 9, No. 3, of the Penal Code. (U. S. vs.
Samea, 15 Phil. 227.)
The instant case comes under the provision of article 404 of the Penal
Code providing the penalty ofreclusion temporal, which must be imposed
in its minimum degree in view of the mitigating circumstance just
mentioned, or twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal. Therefore,
the judgment appealed from must be, as it is, hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant.1 So ordered.
US VS. MARASIGAN, 27 PHIL 181
FACTS: A fight ensued between the accused-appellant, Filomeno
Marasigan and one Francisco Mendoza. As a result of the fight Mendoza
received three wounds, two in the chest and one in the left hand, the
latter being the most serious. The middle finger of the left hand was
rendered useless. The accused asserts that he should have a new trial
upon the ground that if he should be given another opportunity to
present evidence he would be able to show by a physician, Gregorio
Limjoco, that the finger which the court found to have been rendered
useless by the cut already described was not necessarily a useless
member, inasmuch as, if the accused would permit a surgical operation,
the finger could be restored to its normal condition. He also asserts that
he could demonstrate by the physician referred to that it was not the
middle finger that was disabled but the third finger instead.
HELD: We do not regard the case made as sufficient to warrant a new
trial. It is immaterial for the purposes of this case whether the finger, the
usefullness of which was destroyed, was the middle finger or the third
finger. All agree that one of the fingers of the left hand was rendered
useless by the act of the accused. It does not matter which finger it was.
Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the original
condition of the finger could be restored by a surgical operation to relieve
the accused from the natural and ordinary results of his crime. It was his
voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and he must abide by the
consequences resulting therefrom without aid from Mendoza.
US VS. MOLDES, GR NO. 42122
FACTS: There was a dance in a private house, and the deceased was the
master of ceremonies at that dance. The appellant insisted on dancing
out of turn and was reproved by the deceased. Appellant then went to
the porch of the house and with his bolo began cutting down the
decorations. He descended into the yard of the house and challenged
everyone to a fight. Not attracting sufficient attention, he began
chopping at the bamboo trees and repeated his challenged for a fight.
The deceased, unarmed, started down the stairs, speaking to him in a
friendly manner, and as deceased had about reached the ground,
appellant struck at him with his bolo, inflicting a wound on his left arm.
As deceased fell to the ground, appellant inflicted a slight wound in the
back and ran away from the scene of action. The wound was seen and
treated the next morning by the sanitary inspector of Abuyog, but the
deceased remained in the care of a local “curandero.” This treatment
failed to stop the hemorrhage, and the deceased died.
HELD: The attorney de oficio urges that appellant did not intend to
commit as serious a wound as was inflicted but struck only in the dark
and in self-defense. It is clear that there is no element of self-defense in
the case and that appellant was the aggressor. When one resorts to the
use of a lethal weapon and strikes another with the force that must have
been used in this case, it must be presumed that he realizes the natural
consequences of his act. It is also contended by the attorney for the
appellant that if the deceased had secured proper surgical treatment, the
wound would not have been fatal. In the outlying barrio in which this
assault took place, proper modern surgical service is not available.
The general rule is “… that he who inflicts the injury is not relieved of
responsibility if the wound inflicted is dangerous, that is, calculated to
destroy or endanger life, even though the immediate cause of the death
was erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical treatment … .”
6
Doctrine of Proximate Cause
VDA BATACLAN VS. MEDINA, 102 Phil 181
FACTS: There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and
conductor. While the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,
Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until
it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they
could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while four passengers could
not get out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came about ten
men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick
on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably
approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire
started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned,
gasoline began to leak, spreading over and permeating the body of the
bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch
brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
HELD: There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant
carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court was
of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan and the
other trapped passengers was not the overturning of the bus, but rather,
the fire that burned the bus. We disagree. Proximate Cause has been
defined as 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.' It may be that
ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger,
merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected
and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or
if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the
passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate
cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle.
But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same,
we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning
of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on
its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the
tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a
lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning),
the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from
a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what
was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In
other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of
some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the
burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the
carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the
driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They,
or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in
which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from
the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside
from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can
be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver
nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
URBANO VS. PP, GR NO. 182750
FACTS: The victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the
compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) having just arrived
from a picnic in the nearby town of Bugallon, Pangasinan, where, they
drunk beer in a restaurant with some other co-workers While inside the
compound, the two had a heated altercation in the course of which
Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. The exchange of words
led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up the
fight, but only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to be
pacified and continued throwing fist blows at each other. Then petitioner
delivered a "lucky punch," as described by eyewitness Orje Salazar, on
Tomelden’s face, which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden was on
the verge of hitting his head on the ground had their companions not

caught him and prevented the fall. The blow, however, caused
Tomelden’s nose to bleed and rendered him unconscious. The deceased
told his wife of the mauling incident. Thereafter, the deceased was still
able to go to work however, his complaints to his wife of severe pain in
the head, prompted him to be admitted at the community hospital.
Finally, Tomelden died on October 10, 1993 due, per Dr. Arellano, to
"cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant
cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident."
The defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill,
asserting that hypertension, for which Tomelden was receiving
treatment, was the cause of the latter’s death.Moreover, the Tomelden
only died 12 days later after the incident and was still able to report to
work engenders doubt on the proximate cause of victim’s death.
Petitioner, thus, contends that he could only be adjudged guilty of
physical injuries.
HELD: The prosecution witness, Salazar, testified about petitioner’s lucky
punch hitting Tomelden right smack on the face. And even if Tomelden’s
head did not hit the ground as his co-workers averted that actuality, that
punch gave him a bleeding nose and rendered him unconscious right
after the September 28, 1993 fight. From then on, Tomelden was in and
out of the hospital complaining of headache, among other pains, until his
demise 12 days after the blow was made. Significantly, Dr. Arellano
opined that the fist blow which landed on Tomelden’s head could have
shaken his brain which caused the cerebral concussion; and that the
cause of the victim’s death was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to
cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling
incident." The combined effects of the testimonies of Salazar and Dr.
Arellano, buttressed by that of Rosario who related about her husband’s
post September 28, 1993 severe head pain, clearly establish beyond cavil
the cause of Tomelden’s death and who was liable for it. It was through
the direct accounts of the prosecution witnesses of the events that
transpired during the fisticuff incident more specifically the landing of the
"lucky punch" on the face of [Tomelden], taken together with the result
of the medical examinations and autopsy report which described the
death of the victim as "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral
concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident"
that we are convinced that the "lucky punch" was the proximate cause of
[Tomelden’s] death. The prosecution had satisfactorily proven that it was
only after the incident that transpired on September 28, 1993 that the
victim was hospitalized on several occasions until he expired, twelve days
later. It is moreover of no consequence whether the victim was able to
report for work during the intervening days
SEGURITAN VS. PP, G.R. NO. 172896
FACTS: Petitioner was having a drinking session with his uncles Lucrecio
Seguritan (Lucrecio), Melchor Panis and Baltazar Panis in the house of
Manuel dela Cruz in Barangay Paradise, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Petitioner,
who was seated beside Lucrecio, claimed that Lucrecio’s carabao entered
his farm and destroyed his crops. A heated discussion thereafter ensued,
during which petitioner punched Lucrecio twice as the latter was about to
stand up. Petitioner’s punches landed on Lucrecio’s right and left temple,
causing him to fall face-up to the ground and hit a hollow block which
was being used as an improvised stove.
Lucrecio lost consciousness but was revived with the assistance of
Baltazar. Thereafter, Lucrecio rode a tricycle and proceeded to his house.
Upon his arrival, his wife noticed blood on his forehead. Lucrecio
explained that he was stoned, then went directly to his room and slept.
At around 9 o’clock in the evening, Lucrecio’s wife and daughter noticed
that his complexion has darkened and foamy substance was coming out
of his mouth. Attempts were made to revive Lucrecio but to no avail. He
died that same night.
NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Antonio Vertido exhumed Lucrecio’s body
and performed the autopsy. Dr. Vertido concluded that Lucrecio’s cause
of death was traumatic head injury.7
7
HELD: Petitioner disputes the conclusion that the fracture on the right
middle fossa of the skull, beneath the area where a hematoma developed
was due to the blow he delivered because according to the testimony of
Dr. Vertido, the fracture may also be caused by one falling from a height.
Petitioner also maintains that the punches he threw at Lucrecio had
nothing to do with the fatal head injuries the latter suffered. According to
him, Lucrecio sustained the head injuries when he accidentally hit the
hollow block that was used as an improvised stove, after falling from the
opposite end of the bench. Petitioner insists that Lucrecio died due to a
fatal heart attack.
We are not persuaded. It is on record that Lucrecio suffered two external
injuries and one internal injury in his head. The autopsy report showed
that Lucrecio died of internal hemorrhage caused by head injuries.
Melchor’s eyewitness account of the fist blows delivered by petitioner to
Lucrecio and the manner by which the latter fell from the bench and hit
his head on the improvised stove is consistent with the autopsy findings
prepared and testified to by Dr. Vertido. The testimony of Dr. Vertido also
ruled out petitioner’s contention that Lucrecio died of a heart attack.
Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code states that Criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Petitioner
committed an unlawful act by punching Lucrecio, his uncle who was
much older than him, and even if he did not intend to cause the death of
Lucrecio, he must be held guilty beyond reasonable doubt for killing him
pursuant to the above-quoted provision. He who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused.
PP VS. RAFAEL MARCO, DEFENDANT APPELLANT, GR NOS. L-28324-5
FACTS: Simeon Marco, son of appellant Rafael, approached Constancio
Sabelbero and after asking him if he were the one who boxed his
(Simeon's) brother the year before, brandished a hunting knife, which
caused Constancio to run away. While thus running, he passed by
appellant who hit him with a cane causing him slight physical injuries.
When Simeon was about to pursue Constancio, the latter's father,
Vicente, who was in the crowd, grabbed Simeon's hand that was holding
the knife. When Vicente, however, saw that appellant, who was holding a
round cane and a hunting knife, was approaching them, he shouted to
Constancio and to his other son Bienvenido who appeared in the scene to
run away, which they did, as he himself released Simeon and ran away.
Appellant followed Bienvenido and stabbed him, but the latter parried the
blow which caused injuries to his left hand. Bienvenido tried to run
farther but his feet got entangled with some vines and he fell down.
Whereupon, Beltran, who came from nowhere, stabbed him near the
anus, followed by Simeon who stabbed him on the left side of the breast.
Thereafter, Bienvenido died. On the theory that there was obvious
conspiracy among appellants Rafael, Simoen, and Beltran, the trial court
convicted them of murder. Only Rafael appealed.
The Supreme Court ruled that the act of appellant stabbing the victim
which caused injuries to the latter's left hand is separate from the fatal
stabs inflicted by his two co-accused, because the existence of bad blood
between the families of the deceased and the accused which could have
established commonality of intent on the part of the three accused was
denied by both parties. Moreover, there was no clear evidence
connecting the act of appellant in trying to stab the victim which caused
the latter injuries on the left hand, with the fatal stabs inflicted by his two
other co-accused.
HELD: Appellant cannot be held liable for the death of decedent under
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code. "Article 4, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code provides that, 'criminal liability shall be incurred by
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended.' Under this provision, one who
commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences
which may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or
intended or not.

It cannot be denied that the stabbing of the decedent by the appellant
which caused a slight wound on the former's hand was intentionally
made; hence, felony. However, the ensuing death of the decedent was
not the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wound inflicted by
the appellant. There was an active intervening cause, which was no other
than the sudden and unexpected appearance and participation of Simeon
Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran. And there is authority that if the
consequences produced have resulted from a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the criminal act, the offender is not responsible
for such consequence.
PP VS. VILLACORTA, GR NO. 186412
FACTS: Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending
her sari-sari store located at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz
and Villacorta were regular customers at Mendeja’s store. At around two
o’clock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread at Mendeja’s store,
Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz
on the left side of Cruz’s body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The
bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s body. Immediately after the
stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch
Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor
Aron removing the broken bamboo stick from Cruz’s body. Mendeja and
Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro
Hospital. When Cruz sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he
was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-
patient. Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on February
14, 2002, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. While
admitting that he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to
determine, using Cruz’s medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz died of
tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.
HELD: There is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the
event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held
liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon
Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection, and
not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as “that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.”
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early
morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-
patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz was
admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus
infection, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The
prosecution did not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment
Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz to
Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up medical treatment
of his stab wound, or Cruz’s activities between January 23 to February 14,
2002.
There are doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the
conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days
between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to
San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If
Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the
symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the
Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation
period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to
three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%)
mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was
merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might
have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s
stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is
guilty of slight physical for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.
8
IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES
PP VS. DOMASIAN, GR NO. 95322
FACTS: In the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with
a classmate, he was approached by a man who requested his assistance
in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to
help and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he
waited outside while the man went into a building to get the certificate.
Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking
him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside,
holding him firmly all the while. The man told him to stop crying or he
would not be returned to his father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they
took another tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from
where they walked to the market. Here the man talked to a jeepney
driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the
boy's father. The two then boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente,
with the man still firmly holding Enrico, who continued crying. This
aroused the suspicion of the driver, Alexander Grate, who asked the man
about his relationship with the boy. The man said he and the boy were
brothers, making Grate doubly suspicious because of the physical
differences between the two and the wide gap between their ages. Grate
immediately reported the matter to two barangay tanods when his
passengers alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods went after
the two and saw the man dragging the boy. Noticing that they were
being pursued, the man told Enrico to run fast as their pursuers might
behead them. Somehow, the man managed to escape, leaving Enrico
behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met
his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already
looking for him. 2
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return,
Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note
demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise
the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was
familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the
note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination. 3
The test showed that it had been written by Dr. Samson Tan. 4 On the
other hand, Enrico was shown a folder of pictures in the police station so
he could identify the man who had detained him, and he pointed to the
picture of Pablito Domasian.
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of
the ransom note was an impossible crime which he says is not
punishable. His reason is that the second paragraph of Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred "by
any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons
or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means." As the crime alleged is not against persons or
property but against liberty, he argues that it is not covered by the said
provision.
HELD: Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraph of the same article,
which clearly applies to him, thus: Criminal liability shall be incurred: By
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended.
Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be
considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent
improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or
ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of
the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. The sending
of the ransom note would have had the effect only of increasing the
penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too
would not have been possible under the new Constitution.
 9

INTOD VS. PP, GR NO. 103119 under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient
to make the act an impossible crime.
FACTS: Petitioner together with other men, all armed with firearms,
arrived at Palangpangan's house. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio
and Daligdig fired at bedroom of Palangpangan. It turned out, however,
that Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then occupied
PP VS. ENOJA, GR NO. 102596
by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the
accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
SYNOPSIS: The five appellants here, all farmers and residents of
Barangay Caraudan, Janiuay, Iloilo, are related to each other. The victim,
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder.
Siegfred G. Insular, was a suspected commander of the "New People's
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's decision. This
Army" (NPA). The provincial fiscal filed an nformation for murder against
petition questions the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), as
herein appellants and their three companions who remained at-large.
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of
They were arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty. The trial court
attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the
rendered a decision finding appellants herein guilty as charged. The trial
judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime,
court did not give credence to the claim of self-defense and found
conspiracy in committing the crime. The appellants filed this appeal
HELD: Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation of the Revised Penal Code. before the Supreme Court. DIET
This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where: it was
necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the
In this case, circumstances indubitably showed that appellants acted
person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed,
concertedly to kill Siegfred. Here, the Supreme Court found that the trial
employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a
court did not err in finding that conspiracy was present in this case. Both
reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been
the victim and the assailant knew each other and the victim gave no
physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law
provocation in the attack. Clearly the qualifying circumstance was present
and the courts did not hold him criminally liable.
in this case. The defense of alibi did not prosper when the appellants
failed to prove the physical impossibility of their presence at the crime
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an scene at the time of its commission. The decision of the Regional Trial
offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the Court was affirmed with modification that the award of actual damages
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means was deleted.
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. That the offense
cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
As an alternative defense, appellants present the theory that even
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be
assuming they participated in the killing of Siegfred, they should only be
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by
held liable for the commission of an impossible crime under Article 4, Par.
its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1)
2 of the Revised Penal Code, penalized under Article 59
legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the
thereof. Appellants theorize that the shots fired by Armada already
intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal
resulted in the death of the victim, and hence, their subsequent shooting
impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would
of the victim merely constitutes the impossible crime of killing an already
not amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those
dead person. The proposition not only completely contradicts their
circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform
defense of alibi and denial, it is also speculative as to cause of death. The
an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the
defense of impossible crime is irreconcilable with alibi.
physical act, (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and
(4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to
a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this
category. On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the ARTICLE 6
man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention
to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. The case at bar Attempted, Frustrated and Consummated Stages
belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said
place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
ATTEMPTED STAGE
In the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is
factuallyor physically impossible of accomplishment, the offender cannot PP VS. LAMAHANG, GR NO. L-43530
escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the
substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It FACTS: At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing,
appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and CR Fuentes streets of the
but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an
offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named
liable for any crime — neither for an attempt nor for an impossible crime. street. At the time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside
The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as with another Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one
an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman
to a crime charge — that is, attempt. showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes
are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is
not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the
phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised
Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility
and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar presents physical impossibility
which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And
HELD: There is no doubt in the case at bar it was the intention of the
accused to enter Tan Yu’s store by means of violence, passing through
the opening which he has started to make in the wall, in order to commit
an offense which, due to the arrival of policeman Tomambing did not
develop beyond the first steps of execution. But it is not sufficient, for the
purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed
constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its
unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause
and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop
into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is
necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its

complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
Thus, in the case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by
means of force or violence another person’s dwelling may be considered
an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender
clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some
personal property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is
nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may
reasonably be inferred. The fact under consideration does not constitute
attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling.
PP VS. RIVERA et. al. GR No. 16632
FACTS: The accused, all surnamed Rivera, attacked and assaulted one
Ruben Rudil, hitting him with a piece of hollow block while the latter went
to a nearby store to buy food together with his daughter. People who
saw the incident called for them to stop. Policemen arrived in the scene
prompting the three accused to fled to their house. Ruben was rushed to
the hospital where the attending physician declared that the wounds
sustained by Ruben were slight and superficial and would heal in about 7
days. The RTC and the CA convicted the accused of attempted murder.
Accused, now petitioners, aver that the prosecution had failed to prove
that they had intention to kill Ruben. They aver that based on the
testimony of the attending physician, the victim did not sustained a fatal
wound.
HELD: As stated by the attending physician, appellants could have killed
the victim had the hollow block hit his head and had the police not
promptly intervened. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but
intent to kill is evident, the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown
by the fact that the three brothers helped each other maul the
defenceless victim, and even if he had already fallen to the ground; that
one of them proceeded to hit the victim with a hollow block had not the
police arrived. The accused commenced of the felony directly by overt
acts, but failed to perform all acts of execution which would produce the
crime of murder by reason of some causes other than their own
spontaneous desistance, that is, Ruben Rodil was able to run away and
the timely response of the policemen. Furthermore, petitioners also draw
attention to the fact that the injury sustained by victim was superficial
and thus not life threatening. However, the nature of the injury does not
negate the intent to kill. An essential element of murder and homicide,
whether, consummated, frustrated or attempted, is intent of the
offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injury. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution
must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence while general criminal
intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.
PEOPLE VS LIZADA GR NO 143468-71, JANUARY 24, 2003
Facts:
Accused-appellant[2] was charged with four (4) counts of qualified
rape under four separate Information for raping his stepdaughter.
Issue:
Will Lizada be charged with attempted rape or act of lasciviousness
Principles Applied:
In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no
introduction of the penis of accused-appellant into the aperture or within
the pudendum of the vagina of private complainant. Hence, accused-
appellant is not criminally liable for consummated rape.[36]
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not accused-
appellant is guilty of consummated acts of lasciviousness defined in
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code or attempted rape under Article
335 of the said Code, as amended in relation to the last paragraph of
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. In light of the evidence on record,
10
we believe that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape and not of
acts of lasciviousness.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
“Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness.—Any person who shall commit any act
of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished
by prision correccional.”[37]
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
“There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.”
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
“1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by
overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony;
3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due
to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.”[40]
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements,
namely:
“(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to
be committed.”[41]
Ruling:
In Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant is hereby found
guilty of attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended in relation to Article 6 of the said Code and is hereby meted an
indeterminate penalty of from six years of prision correccional in its
maximum period, as minimum to ten years of prision mayor in its
medium period, as maximum. Accused-appellant
ARANETA VS CA JULY 30, 1990
Facts:
In an Information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of
Manila, 6th Judicial District on May 14, 1973, Eliseo Araneta, Jr.
y Macute, herein petitioner, Benjamin Bautista y Mendoza, also a
petitioner, Eden Ng y Dumantay and Joselito "Boy" Santiago
were charged with murder for the death of one Manuel Esteban,
Jr. due to multiple gun shot wounds on March 23, 1972.
Issue:
Should an accused who admittedly shot the victim but is shown to have
inflicted only a slight wound be held accountable for the death of the
victim due to a fatal wound caused by his co-accused?
Principles Applied:

The gunshot wound inflicted by petitioner Araneta, Jr. was a slight wound
which did not cause the death of the victim nor materially contributed to
it in order that he may be held liable for homicide. 18His liability should
therefore be limited to the slight injury he caused. However, the fact that
petitioner Araneta Jr. inflicted a gunshot wound on the victim shows the
intent to kill. The use of a gun fired at another certainly leads to no other
conclusion than that there is intent to kill. He is therefore liable for the
crime of attempted homicide and not merely for slight physical injury.
Ruling:
Considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without
any other attendant circumstances, petitioner Araneta, Jr. is imposed the
penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) months of prision correccional.
Although, he is still guilty of attempted homicide.
PP VS. BALEROS, JR. GR NO. 138033
SYNOPSIS: About 1:50 in the morning of December 13, 1991 in Manila,
the accused Renato Baleros Jr., forcefully covered the face of Martina
Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying
effects, and commenced the commission of rape by lying on top of her
with the intention to have carnal knowledge with he but was unable to
perform all acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against
her will and consent to her damage and prehudice. The petitioner argues,
however, that the above mentioned information, does not allege the
complained act of covering the face of the victim with a piece of cloth
soaked in chemical caused her annoyance, irritation, torment, distress
and disturbance.
HELD: Malice, compulsion, or restraint need not be alleged in an
information for unjust vexation. The paramount question (in a
prosecution for unjust vexation) is whether the offender’s act causes
annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the
person to whom it is directed. That the victim, after the incident, cried
while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack
and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond
reasonable doubt that she was disturbed, if not, distressed, by the acts of
the petitioner.
FRUSTRATED STAGE
US VS. EDUAVE, GR NO L-12155
FACTS: The accused rushed upon the girl, suddenly an struck her from
behind, in part at least, with a sharp bolo. A deadly weapon was used.
The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for
the reason that she had theretofore charged him criminally before the
local officials with having raped her and causing her pregnancy.
HELD: The crime was frustrated, not attempted murder. A felony is
frustrated when the offender performs all acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause between the
beginning of the commission of the act and the moment when all the acts
have been performed which would result in the consummate crime. In
other words, the subjective phase had been passed. In the case at bar,
the blow was directed toward a vital part of the body. The aggressor
stated his purpose to kill, thought he had killed and threw the body into
the bushes. When he gave himself up, he declared that he had killed the
complainant. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the
offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime,
however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes
independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to
commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due
11
to something beyond his control. In this case, he thought he already
killed the victim.
PP VS. DAGMAN, et al GR NO. L-23133
FACTS: On the 2nd of May, 1924, Elias Magbual, was attacked by a
crowed of persons and was nearly killed. The motive of the crime was
that the persons who harbored enmity against Magbual had previously
been dispossessed of portions of the land by judicial order. Magbual
managed to escape death from his tormentors by the use of feigning
death.
HELD: The murder should be regarded as frustrated because the
offenders performed all acts of execution which should precede the
felony as consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrators; in this
instance, the playing possum by Magbual. There was an intent upon the
part of the assailants to take the life of the person attacked, which intent
may be gathered from the circumstances surrounding the attack; in this
instance, the nature of the wounds, the cry of the accused and their
fingering of the nose of Magbual to see if respiration continued. Deadly
weapons were used, blows were directed at the vital parts of the body,
the aggressors stated their purpose to kill and thought they had killed.
The subjective phase of the crime was entirely passed, and subjectively
speaking, the crime was complete. The particular parts of the body of the
person struck during the assault, the deadly character of the weapons
used, the violence of the attack, and the accomplishment of the crime
with alevosia, classifies the crime as frustrated murder. And finally, the
victim did not die, was owing to a chance or accident or reason
independent of the criminal act performed.
VALENZUELA vs. Pp, GR NO. 160188
FACTS: Petitioner was seen outside the Super Sale Club within the SM
Complex by security guard, Lorenzo Lago. Petitioner was seen unloading
cased of Tide detergent with an accomplice. Valenzuela then haled a taxi,
loaded the detergent inside and boarded the same. Lago proceeded to
stop the taxi and asked for the receipt of the merchandise. Petitioner and
accomplice was about to flee when Largo fired a warning shot to alert his
fellow security guards. Valenzuela and accomplice was then apprehended
at the scene. The trial convicted the two with consummated theft. Only
Valenzuela appealed to the CA asserting that he should only be convicted
of frustrated theft. CA affirmed decision of the trial court hence the
present petition.
HELD: Valenzuela invoked the Diño and Flores cases. In both cases, the
accused were convicted of frustrated theft, of which it was held “the fact
determinative of consummation is the ability of the thief to dispose freely
of the articles stolen, even if it were more or less momentary. Under
Article 308 of the RPC, “Theft is committed by any person who, with
intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons not
force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the
latter’s consent. Reading the Diño and Flores cases, the ability of the
offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive
element of the crime of theft defined under Article 308 of the RPC. In the
present case, for the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible
of commission in the frustrated stage, the question is, when is the crime
of theft produced? Theft is produced when there is the deprivation of
personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed
from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that
the offender, once having committed all acts of execution for theft, is
able to unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the
deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of
execution. Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing even if he has no opportunity to
dispose of the same. Hence, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, it can
only be consummated or attempted.
ARTICLE 8
CONSPIRACY

CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL
PP VS. ALETA, ET AL, GR NO. 179708
Marcelo, Ferdinand, Rogelio, Marlo and Jovito, all surnamed Aleta was
charged for the murder of Celestino Duldulao y Yadao and Ferdinand
Acob. All above-named accuse club with the use of hard objects both the
victims. The Court upholds the version of the prosecution: While the
deceased Acob’s mother, Marina, went to the community center, she
heard a commotion on the yard of the appellants. Returning home, she
told Acob of the quarrel. Acob went to the appellants’ compound. Upon
following her son, Marina witnessed Rogelio striking Acob with a piece of
wood, causing the latter to fall. She thereafter saw Rogelio striking
Duldulao causing the latter’s eyes to pop out. Rogelio then ran towards
the family house whereupon Marina heard gunshots. Jovito, Marlo and
Ferdinand continued to hit them. When Rogelio emerged from the house,
he got another piece of wood and clubbed the victims.
Held: Conspiracy was present during the attack. When two or more
persons aim their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful
object, each doing a part of their acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact connected and cooperative indicating closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, conspiracy may be inferred.
And where there is conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.
PP VS. LOPEZ, REGALADO AND ARAGON GR NO. 177302
FACTS: Appellant Rogelio Regalado who was outside a tailoring shop,
called out to victim, Edencito Chu and prompted him to come out of his
mother’s bakery. Chu thereupon emerged from the bakery, put his arms
around Regalado’s shoulders and asked forgiveness. Regalado however
pushed his arms aside, drew a curved knife and stabbed Chu on the left
nipple. As Chu ran towards Villaluz Street, Regalado chased him and
picked up two pieces of firewood along the way with which he hit Chu.
Appellant Jaime Lopez in the meantime surfaced from the back of the
tailoring shop and also joined the chase. Soon appellant Aragon also
surfaced from the back of the tailoring shop and joined the chase. The
three caught up with Chu. Aragon boxed Chu, causing the latter to fall.
He then kicked the victim. Lopez stabbed Chu several times as Regalado
looked on. When Chu was no longer moving, the three appellants left.
HELD: Appellants’ disclaimer of the presence of conspiracy fails. The
evidence shows that they cooperated in a common design to kill Chu.
Regalado initiated the killing when he stabbed Chu on the chest, and the
two other appellants joined Regalado in chasing Chu, with Regalado
hitting Chu with firewood along the way. Then, when the three of them
had cornered Chu, Aragon boxed and kicked Chu enabling Lopez to stab
him several times. These indicates a conspiracy.
DIRECT PROOF OF CONSPIRACY IS NOT REQUIRED
PP vs. PABLO AMODIA, accused-appellant, GR NO. 17391
FACTS: Romildo Ceno testified that he along with two friends were
talking and watching television when he heard a noise coming
somewhere below the C-5 Bridge, located 40-50 meters away from their
house. He also heard somebody shouted “may away doon.” Curious, he
and Mario went to the bridge and saw five persons whom he identified as
the victim (Felix Olandria Bergaño), Pablo Amodia, Arnold Partosa,
George Palacio and Damasio Amodia. He knew these men as they were
neighbors. Illuminated by light coming from a post, he saw the victim
being held in the right hand by Pablo, while the other hand was held by
Arnold. George was positioned at the victim’s back and clubbed the victim
on the head; Damaso was in front of the victim and stabbed him three
times. Luther Caberte who happened to be passing by the C-5 bridge at
that time, also saw what happened. He testified that he saw men fighting
12
under the C-5 bridge which was illuminated by a light from a lamppost.
He saw Pablo, Damaso, George and Arnold ganging up on the victim. He
saw Pablo holding the victim’s hand while Damaso was stabbing him. He
also affirmed that George was positioned behind the victim. He
personally knew both the victim and Pablo as they have been neighbors.
Both eyewitnesses left the scene after the stabbing; Romildo was chased
away by George and Damaso while Luther went on home immediately.
The accused-appellant Pablo Amodia invoked the defense of alibi. In his
appeal, Pablo argues that the trial court and the CA erred in failing to
give evidentiary weight to his alibi. He alternatively argues that granting
that he was part of Damaso’s group and that the group killed the victim,
the prosecution failed to establish the conspiracy among them. There
was no evidence adduced to establish how the incident that led to the
stabbing began.
HELD: As an alternative argument, Pablo puts into issue the failure of the
prosecution’s evidence to establish the conspiracy between him and his
other co-accused to make him liable for murder. He emphasizes that the
evidence, as testified by the eyewitnesses, only relate to events during
and not prior to the assault and the stabbing of the victim. He argues
that no evidence was adduced to show that the accused all agreed to kill
the victim.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises
the very instant the plotters agrees, expressly or impliedly, to commit a
felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. It may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found;
circumstantial evidence is often resorted to in order to prove its
existence. Absent of any direct proof as in the present case, conspiracy
may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when
such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest. An accused participates as a conspirator if he or
she has performed some overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in
the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself,
or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy
over the other co-conspirators. Stated otherwise, it is not essential that
there be proof of the previous agreement and decision to commit the
crime, it is sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective.
Although there was no evidence in the present case showing a priot
agreement of Pablo, Arnold, George and Damaso, the following chain of
events however show their commonality of purpose in killing the victim:
first, the accused surrounded the victims on all sides; Damaso at the
front, George at the victim’s rear; while Pablo and Arnold flanked the
victim on each side; second, Pablo then wrested the right arm of the
victim and restrained his movement; while Arnold did the same to the left
arm of the victim; third, George then hit the victim’s head with a piece of
wood; and fourth. Damaso stabbed the victim three times.
PP vs. LAGAT and PALALAY, GR No. 187044
FACTS: The accused-appellants were convicted of the crime of Qualified
Carnapping and the crime of Homicide for the killing of one Jose Biag,
owner of the tricycle which the accused-appellants stole. Prosecution
witness SPO2 Arthur Salvador testified that he was on duty with other
colleagues when they received a report from one Jimmy Esteban that the
cavans of palay stolen from him were seen at the Alice Palay Buying
Station in a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified male persons.
The police then proceeded to verify the report. At the buying station they
saw the tricycle described to them with the cavans of palay and the two
accused. They then brought the two to the police station together with
the tricycle and its contents. Salvador then contended that when they
unloaded the contents of the tricycle, they saw bloodstains inside and
outside of the vehicle. They also found a wallet containing the tricycle’s
Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt issued by the LTO in the
 13

name of Jose Biag. The accused voluntarily admitted that the name in
the papers is that of the owner of the tricycle whom they killed and
dumped along the Agadanan and Guillermo Road when they carnapped
the tricycle. Prosecution witness P02 Ignacio testified that the accused
told the police that they rented a tricyle from Santiago to Alicia but they
proceeded to Angadanan. And upon arrival at the site, they poked a knife
to the driver and the driver ran away. They chased him and stabbed him.
HELD: Circumstancial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or
series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by
inference. Such evidence is founded on experience and observed facts
and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and the
proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. Hence, to justify a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. An exhaustive
examination of the evidence presented show that the circumstantial
evidence when viewed as a whole establishes the guilt of Lagat and
Palalay beyond reasonable doubt:
First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle, the
same day that, together with its owner Biag, was reported missing.
Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying station, with the
stolen tricycle packed with the cavans of palay allegedly stolen. Third,
Lagat and Palalay who were then on board the tricycle jumped and ran
the moment they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them. Fourth, Lagat
and Palalay could not explain to the police why they were in possession
of Biag’s tricycle. Fifth, Biags wallet and his tricycle’s registration papers
were found in the tricycle upon its inspection. Sixth, Biag’s body bore
hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem autopsy done on him,
while the tricycle had bloodstains.
The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the conclusion that
Lagat and Palalay conspired to kill Biag in order to steal his tricycle.
Direct proof that the two conspired is not essential as it may be inferred
from their conduct before, during, and after their commission of the
crime that they acted with a common purpose and design. The pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution are consistent with one another
and the only rational proposition that can be drawn therefore is that the
accused are guilty of killing Biag to carnap his tricycle.
PP VS. MUIT, PANCHO JR., HERMANO, DEQUILLO, PANCHO, AND
FAERRER, GR NO. 181043
crimes. In their respective briefs, one of the errors assigned by
defendants to court is the finding of the RTC that they acted in
conspiracy in the commission of the crimes against them.
HELD: Even though Pancho Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not participate in
the actual abduction of the victim, they should still be held liable because
of the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and
intention in the commission of a crime. Where conspiracy is established,
the precise modality or extent of the participation of each individual
conspirator becomes secondary since the act of one is the act of all. The
degree of participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial. The
conspiracy to kidnap the victim was proven through circumstantial
evidence. The group thoroughly planned the kidnapping in Faerrer’s
house and patiently waited for the day when the victim would be at the
construction site and upon victim’s arrival at the site, the group received
a call from Romeo so they proceeded to the construction and carried out
their plan. All the appellants took active part in the criminal conspiracy
and performed different roles to consummate their common plan. The
roles which Muit and his other companions played in the actual abduction
were described earlier. As for Dequillo, he was the one who procured the
guns used by the group. Pancho Jr. served as the driver of the back-up
vehicle, and Romeo was the group’s informant.
PP vs. AGACER, GR No. 177751
FACTS: Cesario was a farmer and owner of a ricefield. He was then
clearing a section of section of his farm and preparing the beddings for
the rice seedling intended for the coming planting season. Farm laborers,
were nearby in a separate section of the same ricefield harvesting
Cesario’s palay. According to prosecution witnesses and farm laborers,
Genesis and Roden, it was at that moment while Cesario was tending to
his farm that appellants suddenly emerged from a nearby banana
plantation and surrounded Cesario. Intimidated, Cesarion retreated to
where the other farm laborers were working. However, Franklin Agacer
set fire to the rice straw which prompted the Cesarion to return and save
his seedlings. At this point, Franklin and Eric started throwing stones at
him. Thereafter, Florencio motioned for Cesario to come closer upon
which the latter did. Eric Agacer then shot at Cesario. Almost
simultaneously, Elynor took aim at Cesario with his bow and arrow.
Thereafter, a short firearm was thrown from where appellants ran
towards the direction of Cesario’s body. Appellants immediately left the
scene of the crime. In their present appeal, appellants contend that the
RTC erred in finding that conspiracy existed among the appellants in the
killing of Cesario Agacer.

FACTS: Accused appellants were convicted with the crime of kidnapping

HELD "Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
for ransom with homicide and carnapping. Conviction was established by
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
the direct testimony of Faerrer and the witnesses of the prosecution,
it." In conspiracy, it is not necessary to adduce direct evidence of a
Seraspe and Chavez. Faerrer testified on how the group approached and
previous agreement to commit a crime. It "may be shown through
convinced him to let them use his house to keep the victim they planned
circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which
to kidnap. They planned the crime in Faerrer’s house and waited for the
the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
call from Romeo to inform them when the victim was already at the
themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted
construction site. The group received a call from Romeo on December
action, and community of interest." 25 Proof of a previous agreement
2,1997 informing them that the victim was already at the construction
and decision to commit the crime is not essential but the fact that the
site and so they went there to carry out their plan. At the construction
malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices.
site, as testified by Seraspe and Chavez, Muit and the other members of
the group pointer their guns at the victim and his companions and
Here, while there is no proof of any previous agreement among
ordered them to lie prostrate on the ground. After getting the keys to the
appellants to commit the crime and while it was established during trial
Pajero from Seraspe, they forced the victim to board the vehicle with
that Eddie alone shot Cesario, the acts of all appellants before, during
Muit driving it. They immediately reported the kidnapping of the victim to
and after the incident establish the existence of conspiracy to kill Cesario
the police and the kidnappers were intercepted. The kidnappers refused
beyond reasonable doubt. First, all of them emerged at the same time
to surrendered and engaged the police in a shoot out in which the victim
from a banana plantation beside the ricefield. Second, they surprised
was among the casualties. Muit was one of the two persons who survived
Cesario by immediately surrounding him. Third, all of them were armed
the shoot out, but was apprehended by the police. Pancho Jr. and
at the time of the incident. Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a sack,
Pancho Sr. learned from the news that the group engaged the police in a
Florencio was armed with a bolo, Elynor had a bow and arrow, while Eric
shoot out and most of them were killed and that Muit was arrested by
and Franklin had stones in their hands. Fourth, Eric and Franklin struck
the police. After investigation, the police were able to apprehend
Cesario with stones moments before the shooting. Fifth, Eddie
appellants Pancho Jr., Romeo and Dequillo who all took part in the
immediately shot Cesario at close range while the latter was approaching
botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim. During the
the group of appellants upon being summoned by Florencio. Sixth,
investigation, Pancho Jr., Dequillo and Muit with the assistance of their
Florencio, Franklin, Eric and Elynor stood just a meter away from Eddie
counsels and family members, executed extra-judicial confessions
when he shot Cesario, but did not do anything to stop or dissuade Eddie
divulging their respective roles in the planning and execution of the
 14

from the assault. Seventh, after Cesario was shot, all appellants departed
from the scene of the crime together.
Undoubtedly, the acts of the assailants constitute proof of their unanimity
in design, intent and execution. 27 They "performed specific acts with
closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common
purpose and design" to ensure the death of Cesario. We thus uphold the
lower courts' finding that appellants conspired to commit the crime of
murder against Cesario.
Having established conspiracy, appellants' assertion that each of them
can only be made liable for his own acts deserves no merit. Evidence as
to who among the appellants delivered the fatal blow is therefore no
longer indispensable since in conspiracy, a person may be convicted for
the criminal act of another. 29 In a conspiracy, the act of one is deemed
the act of all.
PP vs. MALIBIRAN, GR No. 178301
that appellant thereafter gave the duplicate key to Rolando; that on
February 5, 1995, appellant told Oswaldo to follow the red Honda Accord
of Reynaldo until the latter parked the car; that appellant told Oswaldo to
thereafter pick up Rolando at Katipunan and bring the latter to where
Reynaldo parked his red Honda Accord. Reynaldo died soon after due to
injuries he sustained from an explosion caused by grenades planted in his
car.
Another notable fact is that according to the expert opinion of Inspector
Selverio Dollesin, Chief of the Bomb Disposal Unit of the Eastern Police
District, the perpetrator had information about the victim's movements.
Dollesin also observed that the perpetrator knew his intended victim,
since the grenade was specifically placed in between the driver's seat and
the front door. That the perpetrator knew the victim's movements was
further corroborated by the affidavits executed by the Tan children,
Renevie 37 and Jag Carlo, 38 attesting that while they spent their
Sundays with their father, this was the only time that they spent a
Sunday in Greenhills. Only someone who had close personal contact with
Reynaldo would know his movements, where the car would be parked,
and that he was the one who usually drove the red Honda Accord, such
that it was precisely positioned to ensure damage to the intended victim.

FACTS: Rolando "Botong" Malibiran and Beverly Tibo-Tan were convicted

of Murder and Parricide, respectively, and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The conviction arose from the death of
Reynaldo Tan on February 5, 1995. The antecedents that led to PP vs. REYES, ARNALDO and FLORES, accused-appellants GR NO.
Reynaldo's death, however, go way back in the 70's when Reynaldo left 178300
his common-law wife, Rosalinda Fuerzas and their two children, Jessie
and Reynalin, in Davao, and went to Manila to seek greener pastures.
FACTS: The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua Ong Ping
While in Manila, Reynaldo met and had a relationship with appellant.
Sim (mother), Robert and Raymond (children), Lenny (daughter-in-law,
They eventually married in 1981. Reynaldo and appellant begot three
wife of Robert), Matthew and Charlene (grandchildren), and Jona
children — Renevie, Jag-Carlo and Jay R. In 1984, Reynaldo's and
Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea (housemaids).
Rosalinda's paths crossed again and they resumed their relationship. This
led to the "souring" of Reynaldo's relationship with appellant; and in
The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay Santo
1991, Reynaldo moved out of the conjugal house and started living again
Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00
with Rosalinda, although Reynaldo maintained support of and paternal
p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van, arrived at the their
ties with his children. On that fateful day of February 5, 1995, Reynaldo
poultry farm. Yao San alighted from the van to open the gate of the
and appellant were in Greenhills with their children for their usual Sunday
farm. At this juncture, appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray
gallivant. After finishing lunch at the Kimpura restaurant, the family
(Pataray) approached, poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged him
separated at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to do some shopping.
inside the van. Appellant Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van.
Later, they regrouped and purchased groceries at Unimart. At around
Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo and Flores, with two male companions, all
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the family stepped out of the shopping mall
armed with guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant
and Reynaldo proceeded to the parking lot to get his red Honda Accord,
Flores took the driver's seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and
while the rest of his family stayed behind and waited. Immediately
Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Yao
thereafter, the family heard an explosion coming from the direction
family inside the van with packaging tape. After about 30 minutes of
where Reynaldo parked his car. Appellant and Renevie got curious and
traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order of appellants and their
proceeded to the parking lot. There, they saw the Honda Accord burning,
cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Jona Abagatnan
with Reynaldo lying beside the driver's seat, burning, charred and
(Abagatnan) stepped out of the van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo,
bleeding profusely. A taxi driver named Elmer Paug (Elmer) appeared and
Pataray and one of their male companions. Appellant Flores, with the
pulled Reynaldo out of the car. Reynaldo was then rushed to the Cardinal
other male companion, drove the van with the remaining members of the
Santos Medical Hospital where he eventually died because of the severe
Yao family inside the vehicle.
injuries he sustained. 3 The underlying cause of his death was Multiple
Fracture & Multiple Vascular Injuries Secondary to Blast Injury.
Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male companion
told Yao San to produce the amount of five million pesos as ransom in
HELD: The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Janet and Oswaldo
exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and
clearly link appellant to the planning of the crime. True, as intimated by
Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant Flores and his male companion left the
appellant, she may not have been at the scene of the crime at the time
van and fled; while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine
of the explosion; but then again, if she was, then she would have
remained inside the van. Yao San then drove the van towards the poultry
suffered the same fate as Reynaldo. Moreover, the nature of the crime
farm and sought the help of relatives.
and the manner of its execution, i.e., via a booby trap, does not demand
the physical presence of the perpetrator at the very time of its
Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were
commission. In fact, the very manner in which it was carried out
taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male
necessitated prior scheming and execution for it to succeed. Thus,
companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part of San Jose
appellant's absence from the actual scene of the crime does not negate
Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole night.
conspiracy with Rolando in plotting the death of her husband. A
conspiracy exists even if not all the parties committed the same act, but
On the morning of the following day, the kidnappers tried to contact Yao
the participants performed specific acts that indicated unity of purpose in
San regarding the ransom demanded, but the latter could not be
accomplishing a criminal design. Moreover, direct proof of previous
reached. Thus, appellants instructed Abagatnan to look for Yao San in
agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy —
the poultry farm. Upon arriving therein, Abagatnan searched for Yao San,
conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence.
but the latter could not be found. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo told
Abagatnan to remind Yao San about the ransom. Thereafter, appellants
The testimonies of Janet and Oswaldo established the following set of Reyes and Arnaldo and their male companion left Abagatnan in the
circumstances which, if taken collectively, show the guilt of appellant: poultry farm and went back to the safe-house.
that appellant and Rolando conspired, planned and agreed to kill
Reynaldo using a grenade; that appellant duplicated the key to the red In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release him so
Honda Accord of Reynaldo so that Rolando could gain access to the car; he could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. Abandoned by the

appellants and upon arriving at the poultry farm, Robert found Yao San
and informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants for the
remaining held victims.
A series of calls were made between Yao San and the kidnappers in
which he was instructed to deliver the ransom and not tell the
authorities. However, kidnappers did not show up when Yao San
delivered the ransom money.
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were
found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon City. Both died of
asphyxia by strangulation.
HELD: Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend that the
prosecution failed to prove that they conspired in kidnapping the Yao
family. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy
when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy presupposes unity of purpose and unity in the
execution of the unlawful objective among the accused. When the
accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part
and the other performing another part as to complete the crime, with a
view to the attainment of the same object, conspiracy exists. As can be
gleaned from the credible testimonies and sworn statements of
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao, appellant Reyes and Pataray approached
and poked their guns at Yao San, and thereafter dragged the latter into
the van. Appellant Flores then took the driver's seat and drove the van,
while each member of the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants
Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts inside the van. Thereafter, appellant
Flores instructed Yao San to produce the amount of P5 million as ransom
money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert,
Raymond and Abagatnan. Appellant Reyes and appellant Arnaldo were
among the kidnappers who guarded Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping
Sim and Raymond in the safe-house. They also accompanied Abagatnan
and Robert in going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San
about the ransom demanded. Further, appellants Arnaldo and Flores
narrated in their respective extra-judicial confessions how they planned
and executed the kidnapping of the Yao family. Their extra-judicial
confessions also detailed the particular role/participation played by each
of appellants and their cohorts in the kidnapping of the family. Clearly,
the foregoing individual acts of appellants and their cohorts
demonstrated their unity of purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao
family for the purpose of extorting ransom.
PP vs. EVANGELIO, GR No. 18902
FACTS: Appellant Joseph Evangelio (Joseph), accused Edgar
Evangelio y Gallo (Edgar), Atilano Agaton y Obico (Atilano) and Noel
Malpas y Garcia (Noel) are charged with the crime of Robbery with Rape.
On October 3, 2001, at 6:30 in the evening, while AAA, a 17-year-old
househelper, was cooking in the kitchen of the house of BBB, four
persons, suddenly barged inside the house through the open kitchen
door. She was brought to the living room. There, they herded all the
other members of the household and bound their hands and feet, and
thereafter, placed masking tapes over their captives' eyes. With her eyes
partially covered by the tape, AAA was brought by the appellant inside
the comfort room and thereat, appellant and one of the robbers stripped
off AAA's clothes and removed her panty. AAA resisted and fought back
but they slammed her head twice against the concrete wall, causing her
to lose consciousness. When she regained her senses, appellant and the
other robbers were already gone, and she found herself lying on the side
on the floor of the comfort room with her feet untied and her hands still
tied behind her back. She saw her shorts and panty strewn at her side.
She suffered pain in her knees, head, stomach, and her vagina, which
was bleeding. Later on, AAA was freed from the comfort room by the
other occupants of the house, who were earlier freed.
Prosecution witness Evelyn was in the living room when the incident
happened. She was tutoring her nieces when the four men barged inside
the house. Upon the instruction of accused Edgar, Edelyn was divested of
her earrings, bracelet, watch, and ring. Thereafter, appellant tied her
15
hands and feet, and blindfolded her with masking tape. She was hit on
the head with a firearm, causing a cut and her losing consciousness.
When she regained her senses, she found herself in the maids' room. She
heard accused Edgar ask her nieces where their father kept their pieces
of jewelry and firearm. When her nieces told him that the valuables were
kept upstairs, accused Edgar brought one of them there.
BBB came home around 7:00 in the evening and when he entered the
sliding door facing the garage, he saw the four accused inside. When he
entered, he was immediately accosted and warned to keep quiet. Upon
accused Edgar's command, the other three accused, tied him up.
Accused Edgar, then struck him with the gun on his head, causing him to
fall face down on the floor with blood oozing from his left eyebrow. After
a while, appellant and the three accused went out of the house, through
the kitchen door, carrying two traveling bags and the jewelry box of his
wife.
CCC, the wife of BBB, came home from the office in the early evening of
October 3, 2001. Upon arriving thereat, she tried to open the door but
was not able to do so. She then called out the names of her children, but
nobody responded. She peeped through the window screen and saw
people inside the house with whom she did not recognize. One of the
accused then poked a gun at her head and told her to come inside. She
ran away from their house, and cried out for help from the neighbors.
They called the police. Shortly thereafter, the policemen arrived. They
found the house in complete disarray, the cabinets were forcibly opened,
CCC's jewelry box and her pieces of jewelry stolen, and the members of
the household traumatized. An inventory was taken of the stolen
valuables which amounted to PhP336,000.00, more or less. Some of the
stolen items were later recovered from the house of accused Edgar.
HELD: For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must
be shown that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of a
robbery and not the other way around. This special complex crime under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation where the
original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal
property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion
thereof or as an accompanying crime. 29 In the case at bar, the original
intent of the appellant and his co-accused was to rob the victims and AAA
was raped on the occasion of the robbery.
The trial court also found the presence of conspiracy between the
perpetrators. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is
conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the
accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when
taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal
design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a
chain of circumstances. 30 To be a conspirator, one need not participate
in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act
or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in
the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned
separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another
but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common
criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of
all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of
each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals. 31
In the instant case, conspiracy was shown by the coordinated acts of the
four persons. From the time they gained entry into the victims' residence,
they tied and blindfolded the members of the household; inflicted
physical injuries on some of the victims; some went upstairs and
proceeded to ransack the house; the others brought AAA in the comfort
room and sexually abused her; they then left the house together carrying
the loot. With the foregoing circumstances, there can be no other
conclusion than that the successful perpetration of the crime was done
through the concerted efforts of the four armed men. EScAID
In People v. Suyu, we ruled that once conspiracy is established between
several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all
be equally culpable for the rape committed by anyone of them on the
occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them proves that he

endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape. There is no
showing that the other accused prevented appellant from sexually
abusing AAA.
PP VS. BOKINGO, GR No. 187536
FACTS: The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa, pawnshop,
which formed part of his house and a series of apartments. Appellants
were among the 13 construction workers employed by Pasion.
Witness Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes inside his apartment when
Pasion came from the front door, passed by him and went out of the
back door. A few minutes later, he heard a commotion from Apartment
No. 3 and headed to said unit to check. He peeped through a screen door
and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio,
Bokingco proceeded attacked him with a hammer in his hand. A struggle
ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times. Vitalicio bit Bokingco's neck
and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but was
eventually subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and
was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the kitchen of
Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio went back said apartment and saw Pasion's
body lying flat on the kitchen floor.
Elsa testified that she was in the master's bedroom on the second floor of
the house when she heard banging sounds and her husband's moans.
She immediately got off the bed and went down. Before reaching the
kitchen, the accused-appellant, Col, blocked her way. Elsa asked him why
he was inside their house but Col suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear
gas on her eyes and poked a sharp object under her chin. Col then
instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him
that she does not know the combination lock. Elsa tried offering him
money but Col dragged her towards the back door by holding her neck
and pulling her backward. Before they reached the door, Elsa saw
Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell Col: "tara, patay na
siya." Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco. Elsa
proceeded to Apartment No. 3 where she saw her husband lying on the
floor.
HELD: Bockingco was convicted of Homicide by the lower court. Col, on
the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator. He contends that to
hold him guilty as co-conspirator, it must be established that he
performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Applying Section
30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, Col asserts that Bokingco's
uncounselled testimony that appellants planned to kill Pasion bears no
relevance considering the fact that there was no other evidence which
will prove the conspiracy. Col also claims that Elsa's statements during
trial, such as the presence of Col inside her house and his forcing her to
open the vault of the pawnshop, as well as the alleged statement she
heard from Bokingco "Tara, patay na siya," are not adequate to support
the finding of conspiracy. This decision was affirmed by the OSG. We
disagree.
In order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case, it
is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to
commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime.
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing
a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community
of interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful
objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy. As a rule,
conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the
crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the
crime.
The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa's testimony that
appellants fled together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial
confession of Bokingco. Nobody witnessed the commencement of the
attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where Pasion was being
16
attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsa's house and allegedly
ordering her to open the pawnshop vault.
Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col
conspired with Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Col's actuations
can be equated to attempted robbery.
Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been
killed and that they had to leave the place. This does not prove that they
acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves,
at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they
were united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately
committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco
had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were
not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his
pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.
In as much as Bokingco's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against
him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he
implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration
or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is
considered as hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios
acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration. In order that
the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-
conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by
evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to
the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. As we have previously discussed,
we did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of
conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value
and is inadmissible in evidence against Col.
Bokingco's judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted
that he only attacked Pasion after the latter hit him in the head. All told,
an acquittal for Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was
adduced to implicate him.
ARTICLE 12-CASES
INSANITY OR IMBECILITY
PP VS. AMBAL
FACTS: The accused was convicted of parricide for the death his wife,
Felicula. In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found
Felicula Vicente-Ambal, mortally wounded. She was subsequently brought
to the hospital where she died forty minutes after arrival thereat. On that
same morning, Honorato Ambal went to the house of the barangay
captain and informed the latter's spouse that he had killed his wife. After
making that oral confession, Ambal went to the municipal hall and
surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the latter that he had
liquidated his wife. The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old
marriage featured by quarrels and bickering. The immediate provocation
for the assault was a quarrel induced by Felicula's failure to buy medicine
for Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated
alteration. Felicula told her husband that it would be better if he were
dead. That remark infuriated Ambal and impelled him to attack his wife.
Accused's counsel de oficio manifested that the defense of Ambal was
insanity.
HELD: A doctor attending to Ambal is of opinion that he was normal
before and after the commission of the crime and that he suffered from

prsychosis. Another doctor testified that Ambal suffered from a
psychoneurosis, a disturbance of the functional nervous system which is
not insanity. The doctor concluded that Ambal was not insane. He was
normal and had no mental disorder whatsoever.
For his part, Ambal said that at the time of the killing he did not know
what he was doing because he was allegedly not in full possession of his
normal mental faculties. He pretended not to know that he was charged
with the capital offense of having killed his wife. But he admitted that he
knew that his wife was dead because he was informed of her death.
During his confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked food for
his fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he worked in the town plaza or was sent
unescorted to buy food in the market. He recalled incidents prior to the
commission of the crime. The trial court concluded from Ambal's behavior
immediately after the incident that he was not insane and that he acted
like a normal human being.
The Court agrees with the conclusion of the trial court. in order that a
person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12
of the Revised Penal Code, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there
must be complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act
or that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. The law
presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to
the contrary. The burden is upon the defendant to overcome this
presumption. In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not
substantiated by any sufficient evidence. The presumption of sanity was
not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of reason or discernment
and freedom of will when he mortally wounded his wife. He was not
suffering from any mental disease or defect. The fact that immediately
after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing
authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done
was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it.
PP VS. BASCOS
FACTS: The accused Donato Bascos was convicted of homicide for the
death Victoriano Romero. The proof for the prosecution established that
the accused was the one who had killed Victoriano Romero, while the
latter was sleeping. The defense was that of insanity.
HELD: The wife of the accused and his cousin testified that the accused
had been more or less continuously out of his mind for many years. The
assistant district health officer, who examined the accused and conducted
an investigation, found that the accused is a violent maniac, and that
from the information he had received from the neighbors of the accused,
the latter had been insane for some time. The physician expressed the
opinion that the accused was probably insane when Victoriano Romero
was killed. The total lack of motive of Bascos to kill Romero bears out the
assumption that the former was insane. The Court is convinced that the
accused was a lunatic when he committed the grave felony described in
the record and that consequently he is exempt from criminal liability, and
should be confined in an insane asylum.
PP v BONOAN
FACTS: The defendant Celestino Bonoan was charged with murder for
the killing of one Carlos Guison. Accused was subsequently confined in
the Psychopathic Hospital. Trial was suspended as the doctors who
examined the accused testified that the accused was not in at condition
to defend himself. Trial resumed upon the report of the attending doctor
that he defendant could be discharged from the hospital and appear for
trial, as he was "considered a recovered case." The accused was
convicted of the crime charged against him. Upon appeal, counsel for the
accused averred that the trial court erred in finding that the evidence
establishes that the accused has had dementia praecox only occasionally
and intermittently and has not had it immediately prior to the commission
of the offense.
HELD: As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is
admitted, it does not seen necessary to indulge in any extended analysis
of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set up
being that of insanity, the only question to be determined in this appeal
is whether or not the defendant-appellant. Proof of insanity at the time of
committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to
17
acquit the accused on the ground of insanity. To ascertain a person's
mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive
evidence of the condition of his mind a reasonable period both before
and after that time. Direct testimony is not required nor are specific acts
of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to establish insanity
as a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we
read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to
determine whether this acts conform to the practice of people of sound
mind. To prove insanity, therefore, circumstantial evidence, if clear and
convincing, suffice. Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law
from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression
resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane
murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. In
the case at bar, however, we are not concerned with connecting two or
more attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof during the
intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a particular and
isolated attack, beginning with the demonstration of symptoms thereof
prior to the commission of the crime charged, and ending with a positive
diagnosis of insanity immediately following the commission of the act
complained of. To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental
normalcy of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime, the
prosecution called on policeman D. A. who testified as to certain
statements made to him by the defendant-appellant after his arrest. A
detective corroborated the policeman's testimony. That such kind of
evidence is not necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the
commission of the offense. Expert findings concluded that the accused is
suffering from a type of dementia praecox called manic depressive
psychosis. In the type of dementia praecox "the crime is usually preceded
by much complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal attacks
are common, because of delusions that they are being interfered with
sexually or that their property is being taken." The Court is of the opinion
that the defendant-appellant was demented at the time he perpetrated
the serious offense charged in the information and that consequently he
is exempt from criminal liability.
PP vs. LIBAO
FACTS: Accused-appellant Libao was charged with the crimes of rape
and robbery. The victim, Honorata Ong, while sleeping with her
daughters, was awakened by a man armed with a knife standing by her
feet. The man already had his pants and briefs down on his knees and he
was pointing to her eldest daughter. Alarmed, Honorata told the man not
to touch her daughter. The man poked his knife at her and told her to
stand up and then was made to lie down on the adjacent sofa where he
raped her. All this time, he had his knife at Honorata's neck. Honorata
noticed that the man reeked of alcohol. Afterwards, Honorata's assailant
stood up then asked for money. The trial court convicted the accused of
the crimes charged against him. In accused-appellant's last assignment
of error, he claims that the trial court erred in not ruling that he is
entitled to the exempting circumstance of insanity.
HELD: For insanity to be considered, Paragraph 1, Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code requires a complete deprivation of rationality in
committing the act, i.e., that the accused be deprived of reason, that
there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be
complete absence of the power to discern. The defense of insanity or
imbecility must be clearly proved, however, for there is a presumption
that acts penalized by law are voluntary. To prove his insanity, accused-
appellant's counsel points to his confinement at the National Center for
Mental Health prior to the incident in question. Likewise, his counsel
claims that when Honorata saw accused-appellant, the latter's pants and
briefs were already down on his knees. He takes this to be an indicium of
insanity. Mere prior confinement does not prove that accused-appellant
was deprived of reason at the time of the incident. Firstly, accused-
appellant did not submit proof that he was adjudged insane by the
National Center for Mental Health, only that he had been confined
therein. Accused-appellant had already been discharged from the Center
prior to the incident. Even if accused-appellant were adjudged insane
prior to the incident, his discharge implies that he was already considered
well. In fact, the psychiatric evaluation report of accused-appellant states
that his disorder "runs a chronic course with periods of exacerbations and
remissions." If the insanity is only occasional or intermittent in nature,
the presumption of its continuance does not arise. He who relies on such
insanity proved at another time must prove its existence also at the time
of the commission of the offense. Neither does having one's pants and
briefs on one's knees indicate deprivation of reason. If anything else, it
shows the lechery and moral depravity of accused-appellant which results

not from any disease of the mind, but from a perverted condition of the
moral system. The Court cannot, therefore, appreciate the defense of
insanity brought by accused-appellant.
Pp vs. MADARANG
FACTS: Accused-appellant Fernando Madarang y Magno was charged
with parricide for killing his wife. Appellant put up insanity as his defense.
Accused was previously confined in the National Center for Mental Health
and was diagnosed with schizophrenia.The accused claimed that he had
absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not
remember where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the
whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the hearings when his
mother-in-law showed him a picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned
about her death. He, however, was not aware of the cause of her
demise. The trial court convicted appellant as his evidence failed to refute
the presumption of sanity at the time he committed the offense. Hence,
the present appeal. Appellant insisted that at the time he stabbed his
wife, he was completely deprived of intelligence, making his criminal act
involuntary. He further contended that the fact that he and his wife never
engaged in a fight prior to that fateful day should be considered. The
marked change in his behavior when he uncharacteristically quarreled
with his wife on that day and suddenly turned violent on her confirmed
that he was mentally disturbed when he committed the crime.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction. In the case at
bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia
when he was committed to the NCMH months after he killed his wife.
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he
exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated with schizophrenia
immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be
sure, the record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre
behavior on the part of the appellant prior to that fateful day. Although
there is a high possibility that the appellant was already suffering from
schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, the doctor who diagnosed him
also declared that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they
are capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Hence the importance of
adducing proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at
the time he committed the offense. Although the appellant was
diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident,
the evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may
be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior
immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime.
Evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act
under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. In the case at
bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish
his claim of insanity at the time he killed his wife. The arguments
advanced by the appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-
sequitur. His claim that he had absolutely no recollection of the stabbing
incident was to a mere general denial that can be made with facility.
Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately
after he stabbed his wife an indicium of his alleged insanity because even
criminals of stable mental condition take this non-remorseful stance. That
the appellant and his wife were never seen quarreling prior to that fateful
day does not by itself prove the appellant's unstable mental condition.
Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a
pregnant spouse because jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives
had been terminated for the flimsiest reason.
PP VS. OPURAN
FACTS: Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts of
murder for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan Dacles. The
accused invokes the exempting circumstance of insanity. The defense
relied on testimonies of witness that could show the abnormal behaviour
of the accused as constituting insanity and the expert testimony of Dr.
Verona who diagnosed that the accused was psychotic before and during
the commission of the crime and even up to the present. Her diagnosis
was that Anacito was suffering from schizophrenia.
HELD: A careful scrutiny of the records, indicates that Anacito failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence the defense of insanity. For one
thing, it was only Bambi's personal perception that there was no reason
or occasion for Anacito to wear Barong Tagalog. Tested against the
stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting, such deportment of
Anacito, his occasional silence, and his acts of laughing, talking to
himself, staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-minute
18
interval are not sufficient proof that he was insane immediately before or
at the time he committed the crimes. Such unusual behavior may be
considered as mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which will not
exclude imputability Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted
condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language and
conduct. However, not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency
constitutes insanity. Anacito's psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the
stringent yardstick established by case law. What it shows is that Anacito
was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, and later an injectable medicine
to remedy "his lack of sleep and noisiness." It was never shown that
these drugs were for a mental illness that deprived Anacito of reason.
Further, Anacito was just an out-patient at the NCMH, EVRMC, and
Samar Provincial Hospital. The records are likewise clear that Anacito was
not subjected to treatment from 1991 until 1999. While Remedios
insisted that the medicine prescribed for Anacito ran out of stock
allegedly in 1990, there was no proof that Anacito needed the medicine
during that period. Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of
Dr. Verona's examinations on Anacito were based on incomplete or
insufficient facts. She failed to demonstrate how she arrived at her
conclusions. She failed to show her method of testing. Further, she did
not have Anacito's complete behavioral and psychiatric history. The most
that we can conclude is that her findings refer to the period after the
stabbing accident and, hence, would prove Anacito's mental condition
only for said time. It could be that Anacito was insane at the time he was
examined by Dr. Verona. Moreover, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the
earliest opportunity. He invoked the defense of insanity only after he had
already testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held that
the invocation of denial and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused
was in full control of his mental faculties. Further, the trial judge
observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was attentive, well-behaved,
and responsive to the questions propounded to him. Thus, the shift in
theory from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after
the appellant realized the futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear
indication that insanity is a mere concoction or an afterthought.
INJURY BY MERE ACCIDENT WITHOUT FAULT OR INTENTION OF
CAUSING IT
PP vs. GENITA
FACTS: While the victims Reynaldo Timbal and Jesus Bascon were
loading firewood in a truck, appellant who was drunk and armed with an
M-14 rifle, asked for a Christmas gift. He was told to come back because
they were still loading firewood. Appellant left the place. Not long after,
he returned and fired his gun at the victims. Appellant, relying on the
exempting circumstance of accident as his defense, presented a different
version. He testified that he was a member of the CAFGU hence, he was
officially issued an M-14 rifle. On the evening of the incident, while on
his way to his camp, he saw a truck parked at the right side of the road
with its rear lights on. While approaching the vehicle, somebody grasped
his neck. As a consequence, he accidentally pulled the trigger of the M-
14 rifle slung on his shoulder. The weapon automatically fired. At this
instance, his assailant set him free. Immediately he rushed to the camp
and reported the incident. Appellant stayed in the camp during the entire
evening. The following morning, he learned that two persons were killed.
HELD: Apellant’s version that he “accidentally shot” the two victims is
incredible. For accident to be an exempting circumstance, appellant
must show with clear and convincing proofs that: 1) he was performing a
lawful act with due care, 2) the injury caused was by a mere accident,
and 3) he had no fault or intention of causing the injury. Considering
appellant’s evidence, it is clear that the requisites of accident as an
exempting circumstance were not proven. First, appellant’s manner of
carrying his M-14 rifle negates his claim of “due care” in the performance
of an act. Knowing that his rifle was automatic, he should have seen to it
that its safety lock was intact. Worse, he admitted that his finger was
constantly on the trigger. With the safety lock released and his finger on
the trigger, how can we conclude that he acted with due care? We
cannot accept his version that he was just following his trainer’s
instruction to release the safety lock while in a critical area. For one, he
never presented his trainer to corroborate his statement; and for
another, he was not in a critical area. Second, the number of wounds
sustained by the victims shows that the shooting was not merely
accidental. Both victims sustained more than one wound. While it could
have been possible that the first wound sustained by both victims was by
accident, however, the subsequent wounds sustained by them in
different parts of their bodies could not have been similarly

inflicted. And third, appellant manifested an unmistakable intent to kill
the victims when he reloaded his rifle after his first unsuccessful attempt
to kill them. Jesus had already sought refuge by jumping into the truck
when another bullet hit his right leg. Reynaldo was already running away
when he was shot on his nape and right hand. That appellant chased the
victims and shot them several times clearly show that he had the intent
to kill them. His defense must necessarily fail.
Moreover, if it were true that someone attacked appellant, thus causing
him to accidentally pull the trigger of his rifle, then his natural reaction
should have been to defend himself. Instead, he rushed towards the
camp. Furthermore, he did not present any evidence to support his
allegation that the CAFGU was placed on alert. And not a single witness
corroborated his version of accidental shooting, an indication that it is
fabricated
PP VS. AGLIDAY
FACTS: Appellant was convicted of parricide for fatally shooting his own
son with a shotgun. Appellant, however, alleged that he was cleaning his
homemade shotgun when the same accidentally went off and hit his son.
Thus, he should be exempted from criminal liability under par. 4 of Art.
12 of the RPC.
HELD: The Court found no reason to reverse the ruling of the trial court.
Before the accused may be exempted from criminal liability by reason of
Article 12 (paragraph 4), the following elements must concur: (1) a
person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care, and (3) he causes an
injury to another by mere accident and (4) without any fault or intention
of causing it. For an accident to become an exempting circumstance, the
act has to be lawful. The act of firing a shotgun at another is not a lawful
act. An accident is an occurrence that "happens outside the sway of our
will, and although it comes about through some act of our will, lies
beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences." It connotes
the absence of criminal intent. Intent is a mental state, the existence of
which is shown by a person's overt acts. In the case at bar, appellant got
his shotgun and returned to the kitchen to shoot his son, who had
intervened in the quarrel between the former and his wife. It must also
be pointed out that the firearm was a shotgun that would not have fired
off without first being cocked. Undoubtedly, appellant cocked the
shotgun before discharging it, showing a clear intent to fire it at
someone. Appellant cannot claim the exempting circumstance of
accident.
ANY PERSON WHO ACTS UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
POMOY VS. PP
FACTS: The version of the prosecution is as follows: The deceased, was
a suspect of a robbery that took place in the municipality. He was
arrested and thereby detained. While in detention, Balboa was directed
by the petitioner to come out of his cell, purportedly for tactical
interrogation at the investigation room. When petitioner and Balboa were
near the investigation room, two gunshots were heard. When the source
of the shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber
pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two feet
away. The version of defense is as follows: Petitioner (Pomoy) testified
that he got Tomas Balboa from their stockade for tactical interrogation;
as he was already holding the door knob of their investigation room and
about to open and enter it, all of a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa
approach him and take hold or grab the handle of his gun. The deceased
was not able to take actual hold of the gun because of his efforts in
preventing him (Balboa) from holding the handle of his gun. Tomas
Balboa was not able to take actual hold of the gun because of his efforts
in preventing him (Balboa) from holding the handle of his gun. His gun
was already loaded in its chamber and cocked when he left his house,
and it was locked when it fired; during the grappling he used his left
hand to prevent Balboa from holding his gun, while the victim used his
right hand in trying to reach the gun; after the gun fired, they were
separated from each other and Balboa fell. Findings of the Rural Health
Physician who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Tomas Balboa
revealed that the location of the wounds found on the body of the
deceased did not support the assertion of petitioner that there had been
a grappling for the gun. The trajectory of the wounds was front-to-back
belying the allegation of petitioner that he and the victim were side-by-
19
side each other when the grappling ensued. Furthermore, a deformed
slug in the pocket of the jacket of the victim. Petitioner claims that the
shooting was a mere accident. He also invokes self-defense as
alternative.
HELD: In determining whether an "accident" attended the incident,
courts must take into account the dual standards of lack of intent to kill
and absence of fault or negligence. This determination inevitably brings
to the fore the main question in the present case: was petitioner in
control of the .45 caliber pistol at the very moment the shots were fired?
Petitioner did not have control of the gun during the scuffle. The
deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he
resolutely tried to thwart those attempts. In the course of grappling for
the gun, both hands of petitioner were fully engaged. It would be difficult
to imagine how, under such circumstances, petitioner would coolly and
effectively be able to release the safety lock of the gun and deliberately
aim and fire it at the victim. It is undisputed that both petitioner and the
victim grappled for possession of the gun. The eyewitness account amply
illustrated the logical conclusion that could not be dismissed: that in the
course of the scuffle, the safety lock could have been accidentally
released and the shots accidentally fired. Ordinarily, the location of
gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of the parties at the precise
moment when the gun was fired. Their positions would in turn be
relevant to a determination of the existence of variables such as
treachery, aggression and so on. In the present case, however, the
location of the wounds becomes inconsequential. Where, as in this case,
both the victim and the accused were grappling for possession of a gun,
the direction of its nozzle may continuously change in the process, such
that the trajectory of the bullet when the weapon fires becomes
unpredictable and erratic.
All these elements were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner
was a member PNP thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as
investigating officer that to fetch the victim for a routine interrogation.
Thus there is the lawfull exercise of duty. Petitioner cannot be faulted for
negligence either. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent
his service weapon from causing accidental harm as he had kept his
service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at
all times, especially within the premises of his working area. At no
instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to
cause injury to the deceased, much less kill him. The participation of
petitioner, if any, in the victim's death was limited only to acts committed
in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of
the law.
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo
that he intentionally shot Balboa, he claims he did so to protect his life
and limb from real and immediate danger. Self-defense is inconsistent
with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent
to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a
premeditated intent to kill in order to defend oneself from imminent
danger. Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur out
of any conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the
victim for the purpose of self-defense against any aggression; rather,
they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental result of both
parties' attempts to possess the firearm.
ANY PERSON WHO ACTS UNDER THE COMPULSION OF AN
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
PP VS. LORENO
FACTS: Eustaquio Loreno Malaga and Jimmy Marantal Londete were
charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Rape. Appellants Loreno
and Marantal claimed that they acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal
or greater injury. They admitted that they were in the house of Elias
Monge on the night of January 7, 1978, 4 but they were only forced by a
man wearing black sweater and his five companions who claimed to be
members of the New People's Army (NPA), operating in the locality, with
the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and their families would
be killed.
HELD: The Court finds the contention untenable. A person who acts
under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the
impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from

criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. The force must
be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only
without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation
must be present, imminent and impending and of such a nature as to
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if
the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to the
accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the appellants' statement of the robbery-
rape incident as, summarized in their joint brief, showed that they
admitted their participation in the commission of the crime of robbery
and rape against Elias Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further
established were facts inconsistent with appellant's claim of having acted
under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of
an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. The records likewise
revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata
Monge to the master's room and the teacher's room where he made her
open the trunk and the "aparador" with her keys and got the contents
which he brought and poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno
acted alone, without the threat and assistance of the man in dark
sweater. And after the man in the dark sweater consummated his lust on
Cristina Monge in the teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge lying on
the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss her and touch her
private parts.
All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of
the appellants.
ANY PERSON WHO ACTS UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN
UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF AN EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY
PP VS. SALDAÑA
FACTS: Fernando Morales and Arturo Malit, and their co-accused Narciso
Saldaña and Elmer Esguerra were found guilty of the crime of kidnapping
for ransom and imposing on them the penalty of death. Appellant
Fernando Morales similarly maintains that he acted due to an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. He argues that Romeo
Bautista's threat against him and appellant Malit constituted a clear and
imminent danger to their lives and instilled fear in them which made
them incapable of acting with deliberate or criminal intent. This fear
existed even at the time they received the ransom from Feliciano Tan
because at that time, accused Narciso Saldaña, Elmer Esguerra, and
Romeo Bautista were only one (1) kilometer away. Had he not joined the
group that met Feliciano Tan to get the ransom money as instructed, or
had anything gone wrong at that time, their lives or the lives of their
families would have been endangered.
HELD: Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt
from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible
force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater
injury, because such person does not act with freedom. For such defense
to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be
done. A threat of future injury is not enough.
In this case, the evidence on record shows that at the time the ransom
money was to be delivered, appellants Arturo Malit and Fernando
Morales, unaccompanied by any of the other accused, entered the van
wherein Feliciano Tan was. At that time, the other accused were waiting
for both appellants from a distance of about one (1) kilometer. By not
availing of this chance to escape, appellants' allegation of fear or duress
becomes untenable. We have held that in order that the circumstance of
uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of
such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in
equal combat.
Appellant Morales' contention that their families were similarly threatened
finds no support in the evidence. The records are bereft of any showing
that such threats to appellants' families were made at all. Duress as a
valid defense should not be speculative or remote. Even granting
arguendo that the other accused threatened to harm appellants' families
to coerce appellants to receive the ransom money, such threats were not
20
of such imminence as to preclude any chance of escape. In fact, as
already discussed, appellants had a real chance to escape when they
went to Feliciano's van. Under the circumstances, even if true, the fear
that appellants allegedly suffered would not suffice to exempt them from
incurring criminal liability.
Moreover, kidnap victim Jefferson Tan categorically testified that each of
the kidnappers acted of his own accord and that nobody commanded
anyone. The trial court found Jefferson's testimony worthy of credence.
Based on the evidence at hand, we find no sufficient reason to disturb
the trial court's assessment of the defense presented by appellants. The
crime of kidnapping is not committed on impulse. It requires meticulous
planning to determine who would be the prospective victim or victims. Its
execution needs precise timing and coordination among the malefactors.
It is improbable that a group of kidnappers would risk the success of
their well-planned criminal scheme by involving unwilling persons, much
less strangers, who could abort the kidnapping by refusing to cooperate
in its execution. Worse, such unwilling companions could easily expose
their plan to the authorities and subsequently even testify against them
in court. Thus, we find the defense claimed by appellants neither logical
nor satisfactory, much less consistent with human experience and
knowledge.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSTIGATION AND ENTRAPMENT
PP VS. VALENCIA
FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged with violation of Section 15
of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, for
unlawfully selling or offering to sell 634.0 grams of Psuedoephedrine
Hydrochloride which is a regulated drug, after a buy-bust operation was
conducted by police officers. The trial court convicted accused of the
crime charged and sentenced each of them to death.
HELD: In affirming the conviction of appellants, the Supreme Court ruled
that a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years
has been accepted as a valid means of arresting violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police officers as an
effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a
crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates
from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit
the offense. Its opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police
or its agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to
prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy and
considered an absolutory cause. In this case, appellants apparently have,
for some time, been engaged in drug dealing. They were in fact the
subject of a surveillance conducted by the operatives of the PNP
Narcotics Group. The police engaged the services of a confidential
informant to lead them to transact with them. The confidential agent
facilitated the meeting of appellants and the poseur buyer. Hence, it was
not the police nor the confidential agent who induced appellants to
commit a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. They were already
violating the law and the police only used the buy-bust operation to
apprehend them in the act of unlawfully selling drugs. This is certainly a
legitimate entrapment operation and not instigation.
PP VS. TIU
FACTS: Accused William Ong Li, Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu were
charged with violation of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise known as The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for offering for sale 980.50 grams of
Methyl Amphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.
The prosecution, sought to establish a confidential informant (CI) of the
Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP Narcotics Group, reported to the
Chief Inspector about the alleged illicit drug activities of a certain William
Ong and an unidentified Chinese male partner. Chief Inspector Ferro
decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. He constituted a team of eight
with SPO1 Gonzales as poseur-buyer and the rest as back-up support.
According to SPO1 Gonzales, the CI called up the alleged pusher, placed
an order for one kilo of shabu. The CI likewise agreed to meet with his
contact. The boodle money was prepared. The team, together with the
CI, proceeded to the meeting place. The CI rode with SPO1 Gonzales.
They parked their car along 6th Street corner Gilmore Avenue while the
rest of the team posted themselves at their back and their right side.

A little while, accused Ong approached their car. SPO1 Gonzales showed
him the slightly opened plastic bag containing the boodle money. SPO1
Gonzales then demanded to see the shabu. Accused Ong went out of the
car and then waved his right hand to somebody. A green Toyota Corolla
parked in front of their car and a Chinese-looking male, later identified as
accused Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu alighted, approached accused Ong
and handed to him a gift-wrapped package. Accused Ong then
demanded for its payment. SPO1 Gonzales gave to accused Ong the
boodle money. Thereafter, the SPO1 Gonzales arrested accused Ong
while the CI and the back-up agents arrested accused De Ming. Accused
foisted the defense of instigation which is in sharp contrast to the claim
of entrapment by the prosecution.
HELD: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent
years has been accepted as a valid means of arresting violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police officers as an
effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a
crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates
from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit
the offense. Its opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police
or its agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to
prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy and
considered an absolutory cause.
To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper
procedures were undertaken in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is
incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the operation
are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and
competent evidence. For, the courts could not merely rely on but must
apply with studied restraint the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty by law enforcement agents. This
presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of
innocence and the constitutionally protected rights of the individual. 27 It
is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the
prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement. Courts
should not allow themselves to be used as instruments of abuse and
injustice lest innocent persons are made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses.
In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust
operation is incomplete. The confidential informant who had sole
knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it was
perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given
instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same.
On this score, SPO1 Gonzales' testimony is hearsay and possesses no
probative value unless it can be shown that the same falls within the
exception to the hearsay rule. To impart probative value to these hearsay
statements and convict the appellant solely on this basis would be to
render nugatory his constitutional right to confront the witness against
him, in this case the informant, and to examine him for his truthfulness.
As the prosecution failed to prove all the material details of the buy-bust
operation, its claim that there was a valid entrapment of the appellants
must fail.
Appellants are hereby acquitted from the crime of violation R.A. No.
6425.
PP V. LEGASPI
FACTS: Accused-appellant Nenita Legaspi Lucas was charged for
violation of Republic Act No. 9165 having sold, delivered and give away
to Police Officer Arturo San Andres, a police poseur buyer, one plastic
sachet containing of shabu, a dangerous drug. A confidential informant,
approached San Andres to report about the rampant incidence of drug
abuse at Centennial Village, Pasig City and about the drug pusher who
was identified as Legaspi. A buy-bust operation was thereby conducted
by the Mayor Special Action Team. San Andres was to act as the poseur-
buyer. San Andres, together with the informant, proceeded to Legaspi's
house, while the rest of the team strategically placed themselves in the
entrapment area. Upon seeing Legaspi, the informant introduced San
Andres to her as a "scorer." Legaspi asked them how much they wanted
to "score," to which San Andres replied "P200.00 panggamit lang."
Afterwards, San Andres gave Legaspi the buy-bust money. As soon as
San Andres got the sachet, he signalled his team that the transaction was
over. Legaspi was thereafter arested. Legaspi contends that she was
instigated to commit the crime, as she was not the one who sought out
San Andres to sell him shabu. She avers that San Andres's own testimony
21
clearly shows that he had suggested the commission of the crime by
offering her P200.00 for the purchase of shabu. Legaspi claims that this
is supported by her testimony wherein she denied selling shabu to San
Andres or to anyone for that matter. This, she says, is confirmed by the
fact that she has no police or criminal record.
HELD: Entrapment is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate method of
apprehending criminals. Its purpose is to trap and capture lawbreakers in
the execution of their criminal plan. Instigation, on the other hand,
involves the inducement of the would-be accused into the commission of
the offense. In such a case, the instigators become co-principals
themselves. Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the
instigating person and the accused is lured into the commission of the
offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is instigation and no
conviction may be had. Where, however, the criminal intent originates in
the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, even after
a person acted as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the
accused an opportunity for the commission of the offense, or the accused
was aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence
necessary to prosecute him, there is no instigation and the accused must
be convicted. Instigation is recognized as a valid defense that can be
raised by an accused. To use this as a defense, however, the accused
must prove with sufficient evidence that the government induced him to
commit the offense. Legaspi claims that she was induced into committing
the crime as charged, as she was the one approached by San Andres,
who was then looking to buy shabu. We find, however, that Legaspi's
defense of instigation must fail.
In the case at bar, the police officers, after receiving a report of drug
trafficking from their confidential informant, immediately set-up a buy-
bust operation to test the veracity of the report and to arrest the
malefactor if the report proved to be true. The prosecution evidence
positively showed that Legaspi agreed to sell P200.00 worth of shabu to
San Andres, who was then posing as a buyer. Legaspi was never forced,
coerced, or induced to source the prohibited drug for San Andres. In fact,
San Andres did not even have to ask her if she could sell him shabu.
Legaspi was merely informed that he was also a "scorer"; and as soon as
she learned that he was looking to buy, she immediately asked him how
much he needed. Under the circumstances, the police officers were not
only authorized but were under an obligation to arrest Legaspi even
without an arrest warrant as the crime was committed in their presence.
Furthermore, when Legaspi testified in court, her defense was one of
denial and not instigation. While instigation is a positive defense, it
partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance. In instigation, the
crime is actually performed by the accused, except that the intent
originates from the mind of the inducer. Thus, it is incompatible with the
defense of denial, where the theory is that the accused did not commit
the offense at all. Instigation and denial, therefore, cannot be present
concurrently.
Article 13
1. ALL REQUISITES NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY OR TO EXEMPT
FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARE NOT ATTENDANT
PP VS. LIBRANDO
FACTS: On their way home from the market, Edwin Labandero, his 8-
year old daughter, Aileen, and a relative, Fernando de los Santos,
traversed a hilly portion of the trail leading to Barangay Purok Maisan
when they met accused-appellants Raelito Librando, Larry Surdillas and
Eddie Purisima. Raelito inquired from Edwin the whereabouts of
Fernando and without any warning hit Edwin with a piece of wood. Eddie
Purisima followed suit and delivered another blow to Edwin. Edwin ran
but he was chased by Raelito. Thereafter, the three men took turns
hitting Edwin with pieces of wood until the latter fell and died. Although it
was already dark at that time, Aileen had no trouble identifying the
accused-appellants since Edwin was carrying a lighted torch. Thereby,
accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of murder. Accused-
appellant Raelito Librando claims that the trial court erred in failing to
appreciate the mitigating circumstances of incomplete self defense in his
favour.

HELD: Accused-appellant Raelito Librando claims that he was "waylaid"
by the deceased, Edwin Labandero, on his way home. He was forced to
defend himself when the deceased tried to hit him with a piece of wood
but, unfortunately, in the process of defending himself from the blows
delivered by the deceased, he accidentally killed the latter. The Court,
however, is not inclined to consider the mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self defense in Raelito Librando's favor. To avail of the
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self defense, there must be
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. In the case at bar,
prosecution witness Aileen testified that it was in fact the said accused-
appellant who after inquiring from Edwin the whereabouts of Fernando,
delivered the first blow without any warning to the deceased. The
severity of the injuries inflicted on the deceased as well as the fact that
Raelito who admitted that he was of bigger built than the deceased,
could hardly present any evidence of injuries allegedly inflicted on him by
the deceased belie his claim of self defense.
2. MINORITY
PP V. ARPON
Facts: Accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts
of rape against the private complainant AAA. The victim testified that she
was born on November 1, 1987. In one afternoon in 1995, when she was
only eight years old, she stated that the accused-appellant raped her
inside their house. AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped
her again in July 1999 for five times on different nights AAA further
related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August 1999
at nighttime. The trial court and the Court of Appeals sentenced the
accused to death penalty. In the present case, the accused-appellant
asserted that the trial court failed to consider his minority as a privileged
mitigating circumstance. As stated in his direct examination, the accused-
appellant claimed that he was born on February 23, 1982, such that he
was only 13 and 17 years old when the incidents of rape allegedly
occurred in 1995 and 1999, respectively.
HELD: Article 355 of the RPC provides that rapes when committed to a
woman below 18 years of age is punishable by death and the offender is
a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. In the
case at bar, the victim was below 18 and the accused was a relative of
the victim. Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order. In
the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on
February 23, 1982 and that he was only 13 years old when the first
incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995. Other than his testimony, no
other evidence was presented to prove the date of his birth. However,
the records of this case show neither any objection to the said testimony
on the part of the prosecution, nor any contrary evidence to dispute the
same. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals should have appreciated
the accused-appellant's minority in ascertaining the appropriate penalty.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic
Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, provisions under the Act is still
applicable to the case at bar.
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which was allegedly committed in
1995, the testimony of the accused-appellant sufficiently established that
he was only 13 years old at that time. In view of the failure of the
prosecution to prove the exact date and year of the first incident of rape,
any doubt therein "should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being
more beneficial to the latter." The Court, thus, exempts the accused-
appellant from criminal liability for the first count of rape pursuant to RA
No. 9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable
therefor. For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in
the year 1999, the accused-appellant was already 17 years old. We
likewise find that in the said instances, the accused-appellant acted with
discernment. In this case, the fact that the accused-appellant acted with
discernment was satisfactorily established by the testimony of AAA, which
we had already found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified that she at first
did not tell anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at the hands of
the accused-appellant because the latter told her that he would kill her
22
mother if she did so. That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in
an effort to conceal his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full well
that what he did was wrong and that he was aware of the consequences
thereof. For purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still
the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, for the second and third counts of
rape, the proper penalty imposable upon the accused-appellant
is reclusion perpetua for each count. D
3. OFFENDER HAD NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A
WRONG AS THAT COMMITTED
US V. REYES
FACTS: For stabbing Alfredo Senador from behind, done in a sudden and
unexpected manner while the latter was sitting close to the ground and
while his attention was focused on the ongoing cara y cruz game, Elbert
Callet was convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the
penalty ofreclusion perpetua. The accused also claims that his liability
should be mitigated by the fact that he had no intention to commit so
grave a wrong.
HELD: The lack of "intent" to commit a wrong so grave is an internal
state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part of the body
injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that
the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from
behind, without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, clearly
shows that he intended to do what he actually did, and he must be held
responsible therefor, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance.
URBANO V. PP
FACTS: The victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the
compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) having just arrived
from a picnic in the nearby town where, they drunk beer in a restaurant
with some other co-workers While inside the compound, the two had a
heated altercation in the course of which Tomelden hurled insulting
remarks at petitioner. The exchange of words led to an exchange of
blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up the fight, but only for a
brief moment as the protagonists refused to be pacified and continued
throwing fist blows at each other. Then petitioner delivered a "lucky
punch," as described by eyewitness Salazar, on Tomelden’s face, which
made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his
head on the ground had their companions not caught him and prevented
the fall. The blow, however, caused Tomelden’s nose to bleed and
rendered him unconscious. The deceased told his wife of the mauling
incident. Thereafter, the deceased was still able to go to work however,
his complaints to his wife of severe pain in the head, prompted him to be
admitted at the community hospital. Finally, Tomelden died on October
10, 1993 due, per Dr. Arellano, to "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to
cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling
incident."
With the decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals convicting
the accused of homicide, the petitioner now contends that the trial Court
and the CA erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong in favor of the petitioner
HELD: The mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed should also be appreciated
in his favor. While intent to kill may be presumed from the fact of the
death of the victim, this mitigating factor may still be considered when
attendant facts and circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case.
Consider: Petitioner tried to avoid the fight, being very much smaller than
Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows of Tomelden, albeit he was able,
during the scuffle, to connect a lucky punch that ended the fight. And
lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped carry his unconscious co-worker to
the office of the LIWAD's general manager. Surely, such gesture cannot

reasonably be expected from, and would be unbecoming of, one
intending to commit so grave a wrong as killing the victim. A bare-
knuckle fight as a means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden was
commensurate to the potential violence petitioner was facing. It was just
unfortunate that Tomelden died from that lucky punch, an eventuality
that could have possibly been averted had he had the financial means to
get the proper medical attention.
Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of "no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed" must also be appreciated in
favor of petitioner while finding him guilty of homicide. That petitioner
landed a lucky punch at Tomelden's face while their co-workers were
trying to separate them is a compelling indicium that he never intended
so grave a wrong as to kill the victim. TI
PENALTY: With no aggravating circumstance and two mitigating
circumstances appreciable in favor of petitioner, we apply par. 5 of Art.
64, RPC, which pertinently provides: When there are two or more
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present,
the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law,
in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and
nature of such circumstances.
The prescribed penalty for homicide under Art. 249 of the RPC
is reclusion temporal or from 12 years and one day to 20 years. With the
appreciation of two mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed and of sufficient provocation from the
victim, and the application of par. 5 of Art. 64, RPC, the imposable
penalty would, thus, be the next lower penalty prescribed for homicide
and this should be prision mayor or from six years and one day to 12
years.
PP. VS. GONZALES
FACTS: The vehicles of the accused and the victim’s family almost
collided at an intersection inside the memorial park. A heated exchange
of remarks followed the near collision in which case, the accused-
appellant, was augmented by the improvident use of a firearm resulting
to the death of Feliber Andres, wife of Noel Andres and their children,
sustaining injuries. The trial court found the accused guilty of the
complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated murder and
accordingly sentenced him to death.
HELD: The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is devoid of merit. This
mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity
between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the
resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of
the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the
mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The
appellant's use of a gun, although not deliberately sought nor employed
in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of
the possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to
produce the resulting crimes committed.
PP V. ENRIQUEZ
FACTS: The accused-appelant Candido Enriquez bordered enmity
towards the victim Ciriaco Gines. Enriquez was the son of the owner of a
bus-operating company which has been filed with various complaints
before the Public Service Commission for infractions of its rules. The
victim was an inspector of the rival bus Co. who was allegedly the one
who had supplied the material for these complaints. He hired ruffians in
Manila who would beat up Gines so that he would not interfere in the
future with the business of the Mallorca Transportation. Gines was left
unconscious upon the ground as his assailants fled. As he recovered
consciousness, he called for help, and his cries attracted the attention of
his father and other who came to his aid. After he was mauled by the
ruffians, Gines died from shock and loss of blood.
23
HELD: Upon the circumstances that the wound made with the knife on
the leg of the person assaulted was the primarily cause of death and that
the author of this injury has not been identified, the attorney for the
accused chiefly plant their defense, and in this connection it is insisted
that the conspiracy to attack Gines contemplated only beating him up
and did not include the infliction of injury by means of a cutting
instrument. Such an Act, so it is said, was not within the scope of the
agreement; and it is insisted that only the individual who inflicted the cut
could be held responsible for the death, if that person were known. It
resulted, in this view, that none of the appellants can be held liable
further than for the bruises inflicted by means of the iron bars. These
injuries, so it is claimed, would in the natural course of events have been
curable in a few days. The accused had undoubtedly conspired to do
grave personal injury to the deceased, and now that the injuries actually
inflicted have resulted in death, they cannot escape from the legal effect
of their acts on the ground that one of the wounds was inflicted in a
different way from that which had been intended. The crime committed
in this case was murder but all of the accused are entitled to the benefit
of the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to
commit so grave a wrong. The estimation of this circumstance was
proper, and its allowance was not inconsistent with the finding that the
crime was murder.
PP VS. PAJENADO
FACTS: Eyewitnesses for the prosecution testified they saw appellant
holding the now deceased Carlos Tapong by the neck. As the two were
apparently wrestling with each other, Carlito Pajenado, appellant's
cousin, intervened and the two Pajenados were able to throw Tapong to
the ground. Carlito Pajenado held Tapong by the shoulder and pinned
him down to the ground, while appellant held him by one leg. As they
thus held Carlos Tapong helpless, appellant drew his gun and fired at
him. Thereupon, Carlito Pajenado stood up and ran away, while appellant
remained at the scene of the crime until he
4. SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR THREAT OF THE OFFENDED
PARTY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE ACT
PP VS. URBANO
FACTS (see facts in PP vs. URBANO in no. 3)
HELD: Tomelden's insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered
immediately before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is
not to mention other irritating statements made by the deceased while
they were having beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was the one provoked and
challenged to a fist fight.
Petitioner's unrebutted testimony on the events immediately preceding
the fisticuff and earlier dovetails with the testimony of Salazar.
In gist, petitioner testified being, in the afternoon of September 28, 1993,
in the nearby town of Bugallon for a picnic. He was with Tomelden and
several others, including Dominador Navarro, Chairperson of LIWAD. At a
restaurant in Bugallon, the group ordered goat's meat and drank beer.
When it was time to depart, Navarro asked petitioner to inform
Tomelden, then seated in another table, to prepare to leave.
When so informed, Tomelden insulted petitioner, telling the latter he had
no business stopping him from further drinking as he was paying for his
share of the bill. Chastised, petitioner returned to his table to report to
Navarro. At that time, petitioner saw that Tomelden had already
consumed 17 bottles of beer. In all, the group stayed at the picnic place
for three and a half hours before returning to the LIWAD.
Upon reaching the LIWAD compound, Tomelden allegedly slapped and
hurled insults at him, calling him "sipsip" just to maintain his employment
as Navarro's tricycle driver. Tomelden allegedly then delivered several fist
and kick blows at petitioner, a couple of which hit him despite his evasive

actions. Petitioner maintained that he only boxed the victim in retaliation,
landing that lucky punch in the course of parrying the latter's blows.
Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why the same mitigating
circumstance should not be considered in favor of petitioner.
IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE
PP VS. PARANA
FACTS: The deceased took part in said game where the appellant was
designated to attend to the players. A discussion ensued between him
appellant and one Lamay. As both raised their voices, they were
admonished by the deceased. As the appellant disregarded said
admonition, the deceased slapped him and ordered him to leave the
house. The following day, the deceased took part in another game of
monte, this time in another house. As he was about to leave the place in
his car, the chauffer, who saw the appellant behind the deceased in the
attitude of stabbing him with a dagger, shouted to warn him of the
danger. The deceased, looking behind, really saw the appellant about to
stab him. Defending himself, he retreated until he fell on his back into a
ditch two meters wide and 1.7 meters deep. Without lessening the
aggression the appellant mounted astride of the deceased and continued
to stab him with the dagger.
HELD: The mitigating circumstance that he had acted in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense committed against him a few hours before,
when he was slapped by the deceased in the presence of many persons,
must likewise be taken into consideration. Although this offense, which
engenders perturbation of mind, was not so immediate, this court is of
the opinion that the influence thereof, by reason of its gravity and the
circumstances under which it was inflicted, lasted until the moment the
crime was committed.
PP VS. VENTURA
FACTS: When appellant Ventura arrived in Negros Occidental from
Manila where he had been working as a security guard, he noticed that
his wife, Johanna, who had previously been employed as a house helper
of the Bocateja spouses, was wearing a new ring. When he confronted
her, she said that it came from Jaime (the deceased) who was courting
her, and that it was because Jaime's wife, Aileen, had discovered their
illicit relationship that she had been dismissed from the Bocateja
household. Incensed at the revelation, he slapped his wife whereupon
she left the conjugal home. That same day, appellant Flores visited his
uncle-appellant Ventura. The two spoke at length and appellant Flores,
who had previously worked for a day at the meat shop of the Bocateja
spouses, confirmed that Johanna and Jaime were having an affair. Since
appellant Flores knew where the Bocateja spouses lived, appellant
Ventura asked him to go with him to their residence so he could confront
Jaime about his affair with Johanna. Appellants, armed with an
unlicensed revolver and a knife, thus repaired to the Bocateja residence
where the killing took place.
HELD: No mitigating circumstances are present in the case at bar. While
the trial Court noted that appellants were apparently motivated by their
belief that Johanna and Jaime were carrying on an illicit relationship, it
nevertheless ruled out immediate vindication of a grave offense as
mitigating circumstance.
While "immediate" vindication should be construed as "proximate"
vindication in accordance with the controlling Spanish text of the Revised
Penal Code, still this mitigating circumstance cannot be considered where
sufficient time elapsed for the accused to regain his composure. In this
case, appellant Ventura's suspicions were aroused as early as February
17, almost a week before the stabbing incidents on February 23, when he
first confronted his wife about her ring. Moreover, as previously noted,
ten hours had elapsed from the time appellants left Murcia, Negros
Occidental, weapons in hand, to the time they entered the Bocateja
residence in Bacolod City. Within that period appellant Ventura had
opportunity to change his clothes at a relatives' house in a neighboring
24
barangay and both appellants were able to take their dinner at the
Burgos Market in Bacolod City. They even waited three hours outside the
Bocateja residence before carrying out their plan. Without question,
sufficient time had passed for appellants' emotions to cool and for them
to recover their equanimity.
6. PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
PP vs. NOYNAY
FACTS: A carabao belonging to Martin Noynay was destroying sugar
cane planted by the deceased Silvestre Arriesgado. The deceased caught
the carabao and took it to the house of Martin Noynay. The deceased
was accompanied by his son, Jose. When they reached the house of
Martin Noynay, they found him and the appellant Buenaventura Ruiz. The
deceased told Noynay that his carabao had destroyed the sugar cane and
that he had to pay the damages. Noynay replied that he did not have to
pay anything because his carabao was tied. The deceased then told
Noynay that if he did not wish to pay, he would take the carabao to the
lieutenant of the barrio, and started to do so. Thereupon Noynay grabbed
a spear from the azotea of his house, and he and Buenaventura Ruiz
pursued the deceased. The deceased began to run, but he was over
taken and stabbed by the accused.
HELD: The finding that the defendants acted upon an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation was not
justified by the evidence of record. The deceased, was clearly within his
right in what he did. The defendants, without any rational cause for
provocation, pursued the deceased and deliberately killed him. In order
to be entitled to this mitigating circumstance, it must appear that the
obfuscation of the accused arose from lawful sentiments. “The fact that
an offense was committed in an uncontrollable burst of passion should
not be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance unless it
appears that it was provoked by prior unjust or improper acts.”
PP VS. LAYSON
FACTS: Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that they killed Gasang
because the latter urinated on their coffee cups a number of times.
Garces stated that he killed Gasang because the latter spat on him a
week before. The four plotted to kill Gasang a few days prior to the
actual slaying. In the early morning of that hapless day, the four
accused, armed with bladed weapons, entered the cell where the
unsuspecting victim, prisoner Regino Gasang, was. Layson locked the
door of the room. Without warning and acting in concert they then swiftly
took turns in stabbing Gasang.
HELD: Three of the accused admitted that they harbored ill-feeling
against Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups several
times, all these taking place at least ten days before the actual slaying.
Gasang spat on Garces a week before the day of the killing. All of the
accused plotted to kill Gasang a few days before January 17, 1964. In the
light of these circumstances, it is evident that sufficient time had elapsed
during which the accused regained their equanimity. They moved their
evil scheme forward to consummation after obtaining weapons from their
fellow inmates whose aid they had solicited. The aforenarrated
circumstances negate the presence of passion and obfuscation; upon the
contrary, they prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation.
PP VS. GRAVINO
FACTS: The defendant-appellant Nonceto Gravino, a 27 year old farmer
at the time the offenses were committed, had been courting Zosima
Diagbel, a 20 year old student, for about a year. In fact the two had been
sweethearts until Zosima told the accused-appellant that she did not wish
to marry him because her parents did not want him to be Zosima's
husband. In the evening of June 10, 1969, accused-appellant went to
the house of the Diagbels. He entered the house surreptitiously, but he

was discovered or in his own words "I was noticed by the parents"
whereupon he committed the crimes that led to the deaths of two
persons and almost led to the death of the third victim. The accused was
held guilty of murder in the trial court.
HELD: Accused-appellant argues that he was in love with Zosima and
that she reciprocated this love; that for almost a year, they were
sweethearts; that he once asked her hand in marriage; that the refusal
caused the tragedy and that this tragedy was the product of legitimate
passion and obfuscation. There is no merit in this contention.
To appreciate the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation,
the following requisites must concur: (1) that there be an act both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) that
said act which produces the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which
the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. The only
provocative act which the records reveal came from the parents of
Zosima who did not approve of the accused appellant's proposal to marry
their daughter. Clearly, this act was not unlawful. Neither was it sufficient
to sustain passion and obfuscation. Accused-appellant was actuated more
by a spirit of lawlessness and revenge rather than any sudden and
legitimate impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury.
Passion and obfuscation as affecting the mind and resulting in lack of
reason and self-control must originate from lawful sentiments. The
Solicitor-General also correctly observed that the said act of Anita Diagbel
in refusing the proposal of the accused-appellant to marry her daughter
was far removed from the commission of the crimes. There was more
than enough time for accused-appellant to have recovered his personal
equanimity.
US VS. HICKS
FACTS: For about five years, Augustus Hicks and Agustinal Sola, a
Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived together, until after the trouble
arising between them in 1907, Agustina quitted Hick's house, and,
separating from him, she contracted new relations with another negro
named Wallace Current. Thereafter, Hicks shot Agustina to death.
HELD: The alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the aggressor was the
convict's vexation disappointment and anger engendered by the refusal
of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations with him, which she
had a perfect right to do, his reason for killing her being merely that she
had elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and live with
another.
PP VS. DE LA CRUZ
FACTS: The accused, killed the deceased, who had theretofore been
his querida (concubine or lover) upon discovering her in flagrante in
carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance..
HELD: The facts in this case distinguished from those in the case of U.
S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep., 217), wherein the defendant was held not to
be entitled to the benefits of the provisions of the above-mentioned
article of the code.In the former case the cause of the alleged "passion
and obfuscation" of the aggressor was the convict's vexation
disappointment and anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to
continue to live in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect right
to do, his reason for killing her being merely that she had elected to
leave him and with his full knowledge to go and live with another. In the
case at bar the impulse upon which the defendant acted, and which
naturally produced 'passion and obfuscation," was not that the woman
declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden revelation that
she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms
of another.
PP VS. HERRERA
25
FACTS: The accused wounded Silvestre Bautista at the moment when
the latter was getting into his vehicle after a fight between them, in
which they wrestled together without using any weapon. After they were
separated for the third time, Silvestre Bautista recovered his hat, and just
as he was getting into his vehicle Ciriaco followed him up and wounded
him in the right sacrolumbar region, causing a lesion which necessitated
medical attendance for more than eight days.
HELD: Where two individuals have been wrestling together and after
being separated one of them follows up the other and wounds him on
the buttock with a penknife as he was entering a vehicle, and without the
wounded party noticing it until after he was so wounded, the aggressor
can not claim in his favor that the previous struggle produced in him
entire loss of reason or self-control, for the existence of such excitement
as is inherent in all who quarrel and come to blows does not constitute
said mitigating circumstance; it is necessary that the guilty party must
have acted under the impulse of special motives which may be classified
according to the attending circumstances.
ROMERA vs. PP
FACTS: Petitioner contends that the victim provoked him to a fit of anger
when the latter woke him up and thrust a bolo at him without warning as
petitioner opened the door. Moreover, by hacking and destroying the
bamboo wall of his house, and endangering the lives of his children, the
victim also obfuscated his thinking and reasoning processes.
HELD: Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and
hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view, sufficient
provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his
thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger.
Petitioner stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations, and while
petitioner was still in a fit of rage. In our view, there was sufficient
provocation and the circumstance of passion or obfuscation attended the
commission of the offense.
But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not
two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if
these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be
treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the facts
established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the
same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as
two separate mitigating circumstances.
7. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
PP VS. OBLIGADO
FACTS: Appellant Alejo Obligado was charged with murder in the RTC.
The defense presented SPO4 David Sarto, police community officer of the
PNP Buhi station. According to SPO4 Sarto, he and his fellow police
officers were ordered to arrest appellant on March 13, 2000. They met
appellant while traversing the lone footpath leading to his residence.
Appellant surrendered his person and the bolo. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the guilt of the appellant but modified the civil liabilities imposed
by the RTC. Because SPO4 Sarto testified that appellant intimated a
desire to surrender, the appellate court appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
HELD: There was no voluntary surrender. For this mitigating
circumstance to be appreciated, the defense must prove that:
(a)the offender had not been actually arrested;
(b)the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority;
(c)the surrender was spontaneous and voluntary.
In this case, SPO4 Sarto testified that appellant’s residence could be
accessed only through a footpath where they met appellant. Inasmuch as
he was intercepted by the arresting officers there, appellant had no
means of evading arrest. His surrender therefore was neither voluntary

nor spontaneous. On the contrary, the aforementioned circumstances
revealed that he had no option but to yield to the authorities.
PP VS. CONCILLADO
FACTS: Diosdado Pado was shot, stabbed and hacked by Edgar, Erlito
and Dolores, all surnamed Concillado, Deceased sustained a total of 26
wounds. He instantly died from the blows sustained. Edgar, one of the
accused and appellant herein invoked self-defense. He admitted that he
was the one who inflicted all 26 injuries and that he acted in self-defense
after deceased suddenly appeared before him and challenged him to a
fight while he was urinating near the fence of his house. Contrary to the
prosecution’s version, Edgar testified that it was the deceased who
attacked first using a bolo hitting accussed on the right chest. Getting his
surit from inside his house, he fired at the deceased who continued on
hacking him. Accussed was able to parry his blows and grab a bolo.
Concillado and Diosdado continued exchanging blows and after some
time, the deceased turned his back on Edgar. Thinking that Diosdado was
already fleeing, Edgar went back to his house and eventually surrendered
himself at the police station and have his wound treated by a Dr. De
Veyra.
PP VS. VERGES
FACTS: Inmates of Dormitory 5-B of the New Bilibid Prisons, all
members of the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik gang, were on their way to
Dormitory 4-D where they were to be transferred, when the prisoners
confined at Dormitory 4-C, members of the rival Sigue-Sigue Commando
gang, suddenly bolted out and attacked them with improvised weapons,
killing three of them. Accused claimed surrender of weapons as
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
HELD: Surrender of weapons is not analogous to voluntary surrender to
a person in authority or his agent. Moreover, in the case at bar, there is
nothing in the record to show that the surrender was made voluntarily or
with spontaneity. In fact, the surrender of the weapons did not take
place where the incident took place but in Dormitory 4-C which was
occupied by the appellants.
PP VS. PALO
FACTS: Ildefonso Palo and his brother Pedro were charged for the
murder of Candido Catapang, their own brother-in-law. The trial court
sentenced each of them to life imprisonment. The defense invokes the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender as the accused Ildefonso
Palo handed the gun used in shooting the victim to the barrio lieutenant
upon the latter's demand.
HELD: Murder was undoubtedly committed, qualified by treachery. It is
said that voluntary surrender may mitigate defendants' offense. Although
Ildefonso Palo handed the gun to the barrio lieutenant upon the latter's
demand, there is no evidence that he willingly delivered himself to the
authorities. On the contrary, Pedro Palo denied having voluntarily
surrendered, alleging he had been taken from his house the following
morning by some policemen. Anyway this mitigation is compensated by
the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the deceased being
brother-in-law of the offenders (Art. 15 Revised Penal Code).Therefore in
the absence of other modifying circumstances, life imprisonment was
properly imposed upon these appellants.
PP VS. LAGRANA
FACTS: Accused LAgrana and his nephew, Salazar were found guilty of
the crime of murder by the trial court, the former as principal and the
latter as accomplice. Only Lagrana appealed the decision of the lower
court. On appeal, Lagrana did not question his conviction nor the
characterization of the crime, but merely assigned the error to the trial
court’s decision of not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
26
voluntary surrender. Lagrana claimed they went to the police station to
report but that they were both sent home.
HELD: The evidence on record does not support voluntary surrender, as
contended. As aptly pointed out by the Trial Court:
"Although both accused reported to the police authorities the
following day after the commission of the crime, it was not for
the purpose of submitting themselves unconditionally. Accused
Carlo Lagrana claimed self-defense when interrogated, while
accused Frangeline Salazar did not give any statement, either
verbal or written. Accused did not go to the police authorities
to surrender but merely to report the incident. Indeed, they
never evinced any desire to own the responsibility for the
killing of the deceased.
Indeed, wanting in this case are the following requisites for voluntary
surrender to be considered mitigating:
"A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of
the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either
(1) because he acknowledges his guilt, or (2) because he wishes to save
them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and
capture."
PLEA OF GUILTY
PP v. CRISOSTOMO
FACTS: Eugenio Crisostomo was convicted of the crime of murder in the
trial court. Accused assigns the error that the lower court failed to
appreciate his plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance.
HELD: He cannot be credited with the mitigating circumstance of a plea
of guilty to a lesser offense of the charge of homicide as invoked under
the sixth assigned error. The requisites of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilty are: (1) that the offender spontaneously
confessed his guilt; (2) that the confession of guilt was made in open
court, that is, before the competent court that is to try the case; and (3)
that the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution.
In the present case the appellant offered to enter a plea of guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide only after some evidence of the prosecution
had been presented. He reiterated his offer after the prosecution rested
its case. This is certainly not mitigating.
PP V. ORTIZ
FACTS: Appellant was charged with murder and frustrated murder. Upon
arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. After two witnesses for the
prosecution had testified, appellant manifested his willingness to plead
guilty to the lesser offenses of homicide and frustrated homicide.
Consequently, the Fiscal, with leave of court, amended the information
accordingly, and upon new arraignment, appellant entered a plea of
guilty to the amended information.
HELD: The amended information was an entirely new information and no
evidence had been presented to prove the charges made therein when
appellant entered his plea of guilty. Therefore, he was entitled to have
the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty considered in his favor in
connection with the imposition of the corresponding penalty.
PP vs. ESPIDO

FACTS: Appellant Dalacat was arraigned and with the assistance of his
counsel, he pleaded not guilty. At the ensuing trial, the prosecution
presented its two witnesses. Shortly after the prosecution's third witness
was sworn in, appellant changed his tune and his counsel manifested in
open court about appellant's desire to change his plea to guilty. Appellant
was re-arraigned and to the charge of robbery with homicide in a Band,
he pleaded guilty.
The trial court set another hearing to assess appellant's comprehension
of his plea and inquired from appellant if his new counsel clearly
explained to him the legal effects and consequences of his plea of guilty.
He answered in the affirmative. The trial court deemed the case
submitted for decision and rendered the assailed decision finding the
accused guilty of the crime charged against him and sentencing him to
the penalty of death.
On appeal, Dalacat waxes lyrical on the lower court's imposition of the
penalty of death upon him on the basis of his plea of guilty sans his full
comprehension of its sense and substance. He bemoans the trial court's
failure to propound sufficient questions to ascertain if he had indeed
intelligently understood such plea. He remonstrates that the trial court
did not proceed with the reception of his evidence, which he says was in
flagrant violation of law and jurisprudence concerning a plea of guilt to a
capital offense.
HELD: Based on Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, there are three conditions that the trial court should kowtow
to in order to forestall the entry of an improvident plea of guilty by the
accused:
1.The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension [by the
accused] of the consequences of his plea;
2.The court must require the prosecution to present evidence
to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability; and
3.The court must ask the accused whether he desires to
present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do
so if he so desires.
The mandatory nature of these three requisites for a valid plea of guilty
to a capital offense is easily deducible from the letter of the law.
Lamentably, the court a quo failed to play the rules of the game.
In the case at bar, a cursory look at the transcripts easily reveal the fact
that appellant's plea of guilty was far from spontaneous and persistent as
envisioned by Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The trial court not only failed to probe into the spontaneity of
appellant's plea, it made no effort to apprise him of the impact of his
change of plea as the accused herein was merely told that he could face
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. A mere warning that the
accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient, for more often
than not, an accused pleads guilty upon bad advice or because he hopes
for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty.
Like the first requirement of a searching inquiry, the second and third
indispensable requirements have, likewise, remained intact through the
years.
Given the unchanging state of the three-tiered requisites in Section 3,
Rule 116, there is, indeed, no justification for the trial court's failure to
observe them.
Thus, we purge the decision under review of its errors and remand the
case to the trial court for further re-arraignment, a more incisive
searching inquiry and the reception of evidence for the prosecution and
the defense, if the latter so desires.
27
8. THE OFFENDER IS DEAF, DUMB, BLIND OR SUFFERING FROM
SOME PHYSICAL DEFECT
PP V. FRANCISCO
FACTS: Accused-appellants Ricardo, Reynaldo, and Teodoro, all
surnamed Francisco, and Antonio Sioco were convicted by the Regional
Trial Court of Malabon of the crimes of murder and frustrated murder.
The accused-appellants fault the RTC for not appreciating as mitigating
circumstances accused RICARDO's physical disability.
HELD: After a careful assessment of the established facts, we find that
these circumstances cannot be appreciated in their favor. The limp
allegedly suffered by RICARDO has not been shown to restrict his means
of action, defense or communication with his fellow beings as required by
Article 13(8) of the Revised Penal Code as no evidence was presented in
relation thereto other than the bare allegation that he suffered from such
a physical defect.
PP V. DEOPANTE
FACTS: Rogelio Deopante was convicted of the crime of murder and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant stabbed one Dante
Deopante with a fan-knife. Witnesses presented by the prosecution
testified that appellant and victim grappled with each other and both fell
on the ground. Appellant was able to assume the dominant position and
as Dante lay flat on his back the former proceeded to stab the latter
twice with his fan knife. Immediately thereafter, appellant stood up and
fled the scene leaving Dante mortally wounded. Appellant assigns the
error that the RTC has failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of
physical defect as attendant to the crime, appellant having only one
hand.
HELD: The fact that appellant suffers from a physical defect, a severed
left hand, does not mean that he should automatically be credited with
the mitigating circumstance contained in paragraph 8, Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code. In order for this condition to be appreciated, it must
be shown that such physical defect limited his means to act, defend
himself or communicate with his fellow beings to such an extent that he
did not have complete freedom of action, consequently resulting in
diminution of the element of voluntariness. Such cannot be appreciated
in the case at bar where the appellant's physical condition clearly did not
limit his means of action, defense or communication, nor affect his free
will. In fact, despite his handicap, appellant nevertheless managed to
attack, overcome and fatally stab his victim.
At this point, one might wonder how a one-handed attacker can open a
fan knife and grapple with and overcome his two-handed prey. This was
answered by the testimony of Renato Molina who revealed that at the
time the accused closed in for the kill, his balisong was already open and
ready for use in his back pocket, and that he had already drawn the
same even during the chase. Hence, at the time the accused-appellant
chased the victim, the former already had the balisong in hand. Clearly,
the fact that he had only one hand in no way limited his freedom of
action to commit the crime.
9. ILLNESS OF THE OFFENDER
PP V. FORMIGENES
FACTS: The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his
wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing
a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow
sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed
by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up
the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down
beside her. The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because
according to his statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the
reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias.

HELD: The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an
imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability under article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code. His counsel presented the testimony of two
guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect
that his conduct there was rather strange and that he behaved like an
insane person. In order to be appreciated, imbecility or insanity at the
time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of
intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not exclude imputability. After a careful study of the
record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. As to the
strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that
it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his
being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition
produced by remorse at having killed his wife. fact that the accused is
feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating
circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article
13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely, that the accused is "suffering
some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense or
communication with his fellow beings," or such illness "as would diminish
the exercise of his will power." To this we may add the mitigating
circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, — that of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation. The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.
PENALTY: The penalty applicable for parricide under article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code is composed only of two indivisible penalties, to
wit, reclusion perpetua to death. Although the commission of the act is
attended by some mitigating circumstance without any aggravating
circumstance to offset them, article 63 of the said code is the one
applicable and must be applied where the lesse penalty should be
applied. Article 64 is not applicable as it refers to the application of
penalties which contain three periods whether it be a single divisible
penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which
forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77,
which is not true in the present case where the penalty applicable for
parricide is composed only of two indivisible penalties. Appellant is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
10. ANALOGOUS CIRCUMSTANCES
PP V. VENTURA
FACTS: In the midst of their merriment, petitioner's wife arrived and
started an argument with him. The argument turned violent and his wife
lunged at him with a chair, but he was able to parry the blow. The scene
was witnessed by his neighbors who were next door
playing "panya." They began laughing at him and petitioner felt
humiliated as a result. Because of his annoyance, petitioner said he
kicked the "panya" table. This incensed his neighbors and a melee
erupted with three of his nighbors ganging up on him. Petitioners said he
received a beating, but he was able to run home. Once home, the
enraged petitioner got hold of a knife. He soon went out of the assailants
where he went bersek and killed one of his assailants.
HELD: Passion and obfuscation exist when (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of the mind, and (2)
the said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from
the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during
which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. There is
passion and obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts,
or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. In
this case it was established that petitioner and his wife had a violent
altercation and that petitioner was mauled by his neighbors after he
kicked some of them for laughing at him. These events and
circumstances prior to the killing of Alfredo Gonzales could have caused
unusual outbursts of passion and emotion on petitioner's part. These
resulted in the tragic stabbing of the victim thus entitling petitioner to the
mitigating circumstance analogous to passion and obfuscation.
28
PENALTY: Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable
penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal, whose duration in its entirety
is from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Since there is one mitigating
circumstance, under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
should be imposed in its minimum period, or from 12 years and 1 day to
14 years and 8 months of imprisonment.
Article 14
DWELLING
PP VS. ALCALA
FACTS: About midnight, his wife, who was sleeping within the house, was
awaked by the noise produced by a blow. She got up, looked out, and
saw at the foot of the staircase of the house, the accused Valentine
Alcala upon Eugenio Rubion, holding the latter by the neck, while the
appellant, Paulo Alcala, who had a club in his hand, held the knees of the
deceased.
HELD: The foot of the staircase of a house is considered an integral part
thereof for the purposes of the aggravating circumstance of the crime
being committed in the dwelling of the offended part of the house, said
circumstance must be taken into consideration.
PP VS.DEQUIÑA
Appellant's attorney contends that the fact that the deceased was killed
in his own dwelling should not constitute an aggravating circumstance in
the present case, because that fact or circumstance was likewise inherent
in the qualifying circumstance of treachery or premeditation, and for the
further reason that the offended party provoked the crime by his illicit
relations with the defendant's wife.
HELD: Although the Code provides that the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling cannot be properly taken into account if the provocation was
given by the offended party, this is only true when there exists a close
relation between the provocation and the commission of the crime in the
dwelling of the person from whom the provocation came. The
provocation was not given immediately prior to the commission of the
crime and had no particular relation to the house of the deceased. If the
defendant had entered the house of the deceased and surprised the
deceased and the wife of the defendant in the act of adultery, the
aggravating circumstance of morada would not exist.
Obiter: Dwelling is not included in treachery.
PP VS. AGONCILLO
FACTS: While she was sleeping in their house, the victim was roused
to look at their wall clock if it is already time to prepare their
breakfast; when suddenly, somebody covered her mouth and told her
not to shout or else, he will cut off her head; that the said person was
armed with a scythe; that she was then dragged to the banana
plantation where she was raped by the accused.
HELD: We agree with accused-appellant that the trial court erred in
appreciating the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime, and
uninhabited place in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty.
Dwelling is considered as an aggravating circumstance primarily because
of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to the human abode. However,
in the present case, Rosalyn was not raped therein. Although she was
abducted therefrom, accused-appellant was not charged with forcible
abduction with rape but only with rape. Considering that she was not
raped in her home, dwelling cannot be appreciated.
NIGHTTIME

PP VS. SILVA
By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance, however,
it becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is especially sought by the
offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the
commission of the crime by ensuring the offender's immunity from
capture. 33 In this case, the trial court correctly appreciated nighttime as
aggravating considering that nighttime facilitated the abduction of the
Ceriales brothers, the killing of Manuel Ceriales and the attempt to kill
Edmundo Ceriales. Evidence shows that accused-appellants took
advantage of the darkness to successfully consummate their plans. The
fact that they brought with them a flashlight clearly shows that they
intended to commit the crime in darkness
PP VS. CARIÑO
The records reveal that the crime was committed during nighttime. This
circumstance is considered aggravating only when it facilitated the
commission of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of
by the accused for the purpose of impunity. The essence of this
aggravating circumstance is theobscuridad afforded by, and not merely
the chronological onset of, nighttime. Although the offense was
committed at night, nocturnity does not become a modifying factor when
the place is adequately lighted and, thus, could no longer insure the
offender’s immunity from identification or capture. 56 In the case at bar,
it was not shown that nighttime was especially sought for or used to
insure the offender’s immunity from identification or capture.
BAND
PP VS. MAGDAMIT
The aggravating circumstance of band was properly appreciated by the
trial court. An offense is committed en cuadrilla when more than three
armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission thereof.
In the present case, there were seven armed conspirators involved in the
commission of the composite crime.
PP VS. DINAMLING
The trial court correctly appreciated band as an aggravating
circumstance. Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have
acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to
have been committed by a band. All four accused-appellants were armed,
three with long firearms and the other with a short one. They all took
part in the commission of the robbery with homicide, poking their guns at
their victims' heads, tying them up, ransacking the house, and killing the
two victims.
PP VS. LOZANO
We find that the offenses were not committed by a band. A crime is
deemed to have been committed by a band or en cuadrilla when more
than three armed malefactors take part in its commission. The four
armed persons contemplated in this circumstance must all be principals
by direct participation who acted together in the execution of the acts
constituting the crime. The Code does not define or require any particular
arms or weapons; any weapon which by reason of its intrinsic nature or
the purpose for which it was made or used by the accused, is capable of
inflicting serious or fatal injuries upon the victim of the crime may be
considered as arms for purposes of the law on cuadrilla. In the case at
bar, the prosecution alleged that the accused and his three other co-
conspirators used unlicensed firearms in the perpetration of the offenses.
However, the evidence on record shows that only two of them carried
firearms. En cuadrilla, as an aggravating circumstance, cannot therefore
be appreciated.
AID OF ARMED MEN
29
PP VS. LOZANO
There was also no evidence presented to show that the offenses were
committed with the aid of armed men. Aid of armed men or persons
affording immunity requires that the armed men are accomplices who
take part in minor capacity, directly or indirectly. We note that all four
accused were charged as principal. The remaining suspects —John Doe,
Jane Doe and Peter Doe — were never identified and charged. Neither
was proof adduced as to the nature of their participation.
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
PP VS. DREW
Antonio Cordial, Jr., was walking towards an eatery. Suddenly, appellants
Drew and Ramos, with the 11 other accused waylaid him. Drew was
armed with a 2" x 2" piece of wood with which he clubbed the unarmed
Cordial. Ramos then struck him on the back of his head with a lead pipe,
followed by several blows on the body. The victim fell. As he lay prostrate
on the ground, the others joined in beating him with blows and
kicks. Appellants and their co-accused then fled.
For the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength
to be appreciated, the prosecution must show that the accused were
physically stronger than the victim, and that they abused such superiority
by taking advantage of their combined strength to consummate the
offense. In the present case, we find that appellants and their 11
confederates took advantage of their collective strength to inflict fatal
injuries upon the victim by rendering him defenseless and preventing his
escape from the attackers. The unarmed victim could not match the
combined strength of the 13 maulers. Appellants Drew and Ramos, who
were armed with a wooden club and a lead pipe, respectively, reduced
the unarmed victim into helplessness. The weapons used by appellants
negated any defense the victim could put up. Alone and unarmed, the
victim was no match to appellants and their co-accused.
PP VS. BARCELON
To take advantage of superior strength means to use purposely excessive
force, out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is considered
whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of
by him in the commission of the crime. ACEIac
As held in People vs. Ocumen, an attack by a man with a deadly weapon
upon an unarmed woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that
superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him,
and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.
The disparity in age between the assailant and the victim, aged 29 and
69, respectively, indicates physical superiority on appellant's part over the
deceased. It did not matter that appellant was "dark" with a "slim body
build" or "medyo mataba." What mattered was that the malefactor was
male and armed with a lethal weapon that he used to slay the victim.
Thus, abuse of superior strength was present in the commission of the
crime. But should it be considered as qualifying or aggravating? We note
that the amended information states: "That in the commission of the
crime, the qualifying aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse
of superior strength were present." In its decision, the trial court
considered abuse of superior strength as a generic aggravating
circumstance and deemed it absorbed in treachery. We agree that here
abuse of superior strength should be treated as merely aggravating. And
we find it is present in this case, although there is no treachery.
PP VS. VENTURA

With respect to the death of Aileen, the trial court found both appellants
guilty of murder qualified not by evident premeditation but by taking
advantage of superior strength, 58 to wit:
The killing of Aileen Bocateja is qualified by the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. The accused Arante Flores who
delivered the stabbing blow is big and strong,
standing about five feet and six (5'6") inches
tall. His weapon was a 14 inch dagger. Aileen
Bocateja [stood] only about five (5'0") feet
tall. The disparity of their strength is
enormous. 59 (Emphasis supplied)
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive
force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked. 60 The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends
on the age, size and strength of the parties, and is considered whenever
there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous
to the aggressor, which is selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime. 61
Appellants "agree with the trial court that accused-appellant Arante
Flores is taller, and probably stronger than the victim Aileen Bocateja
because of their difference in sex as well as the fact that the accused
appellant Flores was armed at that time . . ." Nevertheless, they argue
that Aileen's death was not attended by abuse of superior strength since:
(1) though ultimately unsuccessful, she was able to put up a defense
against appellant Flores; and (2) the prosecution failed to show that
appellant Flores deliberately took advantage of the disparity in their size
and sex in order to facilitate the commission of the crime.
Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to
defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior
strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless.
Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor's
natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary
position of both and the employment of means weakening the
defense, although not annulling it. Hence, the fact that Aileen attempted
to fend off the attack on her and her husband by throwing nearby
objects, such as an electric cord, at appellant Flores does not
automatically negate the possibility that the latter was able to take
advantage of his superior strength.
On the contrary, this Court in a very long line of cases has consistently
held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an
unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse
of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded
him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.
By deliberately employing a deadly weapon against Aileen, appellant
Flores clearly took advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex
and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim.
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
PP VS. HILARIO
Keyword: White Shirt
It is to be noted that the lower court, in finding the appellant guilty of
murder, qualified the killing by evident premeditation. Evident
premeditation, however, may not properly be taken into account when
the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the
one who became his victim. 12 When the person decided to kill a
different person and premeditated on the killing of the latter, but when
he carried out his plan he actually killed another person, it cannot
properly be said that he premeditated on the killing of the actual victim.
30
Thus premeditation was not aggravating in the case ofPeople
vs. Guillen, 13 where the accused had deliberately intended to
assassinate former President Manuel Roxas but he killed instead Simeon
Varela and wounded others. This doctrinal rule applies here.
PP VS. TOBECHUKWU
Keywords: Nigerian, sex worker
Similarly, the elements of evident premeditation must be established with
equal certainty as the criminal act itself before it can be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance. These elements are: (1) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly
indicating that they clung to their determination to commit the crime; and
(3) a sufficient lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime
and the execution thereof to allow the accused to reflect upon the
consequences of their act. The essence of evident premeditation is that
the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that the killing of Atin was the product of cool
thought and reflection. There is absolutely no showing how and when the
plan was hatched or how much time elapsed before the crime was
carried out. On the contrary, what appears very much evident is that he
was killed on the occasion of an altercation with accused-appellant in the
latter's rented room. Suffice it to state that without such evidence, mere
presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable, will
not suffice. In other words, the evidence falls short of proving evident
premeditation. cDTSHE
PP VS. CONCILLADO
Keywords: 26 wounds
Evident premeditation "requires proof showing: (1) the time when the
accused decided to commit the crime; (2) the overt act manifestly
indicating that he clung to his determination; (3) a sufficient lapse of time
between the decision and the execution, allowing the accused to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. Such proof must be based on external
acts that are not merely suspicious but also notorious, manifest, evident
and indicative of deliberate planning. The evidence must show [that] the
decision to kill prior to the moment of its execution was the result of
meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent attempts. Absent such
evidence, mere presumptions and inferences are insufficient. Evident
premeditation may not be appreciated where there is no proof as to how
and when the plan to kill was hatched or the time that elapsed before it
was carried out. The premeditation must be evident and not merely
suspected."
In the instant case, the testimony of Lorenzo having been properly
discredited by the CA, the prosecution has no evidence to show how the
attack was commenced or how it was perpetrated. There is also no
evidence to show that Edgar decided to kill Diosdado and has clung to
such determination even after a sufficient time has elapsed.
Consequently, there is no basis for us to appreciate the qualifying
aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
PP VS. DUAVIS
Keywords: long bolo about twenty-four (24) inches in length
In finding that appellant is guilty of homicide, instead of murder, the CA
ruled that there was an absence of the qualifying circumstances of
evident premeditation and treachery. The essence of evident
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded
by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment. 23 For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung
to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such

determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
circumstances of his act. 24 On the other hand, to appreciate treachery,
two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment of
means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted. 25 The CA, therefore, did not err
when it ruled that the killing of the victim was neither attended by
evident premeditation nor treachery, thus: HI
The element of evident premeditation is
manifested by the careful planning and
preparation undertaken by the offender prior to
the commission of the crime. A perusal of the
evidence on record shows that the
altercation between appellant Duavis and
Dante Largado, Sr. took place at around
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 2,
2003, and the hacking incident took place
at around 5:30 in the afternoon of the
same day. To the mind of the Court, the lapse
of time between the decision and the
execution is not sufficient to allow
appellant to fully reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to effectively
and efficiently prepare and plan his actions
prior to the commission of the crime.
Although it may be argued that there was some
kind of premeditation on the part of appellant
Duavis, it was not proved to be evident.
This Court further finds that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery is not present in the
instant case because evidence on record show
thatappellant Duavis chased Dante
Largado, Sr. before the latter was hacked;
hence, it cannot be concluded that
appellant Duavis employed means of
execution which gives Dante Largado, Sr.
no opportunity to retaliate or escape.
Moreover, the location of the hack wound on
the left side of the face of the victim will
also show that a frontal attack was made.
Thus, in the absence of any circumstance which
would qualify the killing of Dante Largado, Sr.,
appellant Duavis can only be convicted of
Homicide, not murder.
TREACHERY
PP VS. SICAD
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against
persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. Here, the accused-appellants attacked the
victim from behind in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner.
Without warning and without risk to themselves, they threw a
dynamite at him and shot him even as he had already fallen to the
ground. The attack was thus treacherous, affording the victim no
opportunity to resist or escape or defend himself.
PP VS. YANSON
Both the trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery. "There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that
the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and
31
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two
elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that
gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted." 44
The prosecution established that appellant suddenly stabbed the victim
from behind thereby giving him no opportunity to resist the attack or
defend himself. As correctly observed by the appellate court: SEcTHA
It is apparent that there was treachery in the
killing of [Magan]. As surely testified by [Galfo],
[appellant] followed the unsuspecting victim
when he was going home and thereafter,
deliberately stabbed him in the back which
resulted in the falling of [Magan] to the ground
and rendering him defenseless to [appellant's]
further attacks. Verily, [appellant] employed
means which insured the killing of [Magan] and
such means assured him from the risk of
[Magan's] defense had he made any. It must
also be noted that [Magan] was stabbed four
times in the back and two of these wounds were
the proximate cause of his death. Stabbing from
behind is a good indication of treachery.
PP. VS. ABDULLAH
Treachery and evident premeditation, the circumstances alleged in the
informations, cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder,
considering that these were not proven during the trial. It is an ancient
but revered doctrine that qualifying and aggravating circumstances
before being taken into consideration, for the purpose of increasing the
penalty to be imposed, must be proved with equal certainty as those
which establish the commission of the criminal offense. It is not only the
central fact of a killing that must be shown beyond reasonable doubt;
every qualifying or aggravating circumstance alleged to have been
present and to have attended such killing must similarly be shown by the
same degree of proof.
PP. VS. GIDOC
As to the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find
the same to be present in these cases.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof,
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense that the offender might make. 21 The
essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed
victim without the slightest provocation on the latter's part. 22
In these cases, the circumstances showing how the victims were stabbed
reveal that they had no opportunity to defend themselves. They were
unarmed and unsuspecting, as they were just singing and drinking when
accused-appellant stabbed them. As properly observed by the trial court,
the swift and unexpected attack by the accused rendered them helpless.
There was also no provocation on their part to justify the ire of appellant.
Treachery thus qualifies the killings to Murder.
PP VS. LOPEZ
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack that renders
the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the
suddenness and severity of the attack. 21
In the case at bar, Chu was caught off-guard when, after he was asking
forgiveness from Regalado, the latter suddenly drew a curved knife and
stabbed and pursued the following victim. And once Regalado and his co-
appellants cornered Chu, Aragon kicked and punched him while Lopez

stabbed him several times to thus preclude Chua * from defending
himself.
PP V. DELA PEÑA
The RTC also correctly ruled that treachery attended the killing, thus:
It is undisputed that the gunshot wound sustained by the
victim was located at the left back portion of the chest and he
has no other injuries apart from this wound. Thus, it is evident
that the victim was shot from behind, with his back towards
the assailant. It has many times been held that treachery
exists when the defenseless victim was shot from behind and
that this shows that accused had employed means of attack
which offered no risk to himself from any defensive or
retaliatory act which the victim might have taken. It is clear,
therefore, that the victim has not even thought that he will be
shot by the accused while scooping with a laddle (sic) rice
inside the pot. Accused employed deliberately the kind of
attack which offered no risk to himself what the victim might
do.
Treachery was employed by the accused because he sought
the cover of darkness to shot (sic) the victim to avoid his
recognition. Accused likewise shot the victim while he was
behind the railings of the kitchen and it would be hard for the
victim to retaliate even if he had the knowledge that he could
be shot by the accused. With all these circumstances
attendant to the instant case no doubt could be entertained by
this court that the accused shot the victim
treacherously. SaAcHE
Nighttime, however, as aggravating circumstance is absorbed
by treachery. 43
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the
aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to
the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim. 44 In this case, the victim was unarmed; and was attacked from
behind and at close range. The assailant further hid behind the window
to mask his presence and identity.
PP VS. AGACER
We are also unimpressed with appellants' contention that both the trial
and appellate courts erred in ruling that treachery qualified the killing of
Cesario to murder. They maintain that since the attack on Cesario was
frontal, there was therefore no element of surprise on the victim or
suddenness of the assault that characterizes treachery.
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might
make." 31 Two conditions must concur for treachery to be appreciated.
First, is the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. Second, the
means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted. 32 "The
essence of treachery is the sudden attack by an aggressor without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any
real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the
crime without risk to the aggressor." 33
In this case, treachery is evident from the same circumstances we have
already discussed above. From the facts, Cesario could not have been
aware that he would be surrounded, attacked and killed by the appellants
who were all related to him. He could not have also been aware that
Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a sack because if he was, he would not
32
have casually approached Florencio when the latter summoned him.
Unfortunately, while Cesario was advancing towards Florencio, Eddie shot
him at close range without any warning whatsoever. Evidently, the crime
was committed in a manner that there was no opportunity for Cesario to
defend himself. Also, the mode of attack did not spring from the
unexpected turn of events but was clearly thought of by the appellants.
Hence, it no longer matters that the assault was frontal since its
swiftness and unexpectedness deprived Cesario of a chance to repel it or
offer any resistance in defense of his person. 34
Appellants' contention that treachery was not alleged with certainty in the
Information is also devoid of merit. In People v. Villacorta 35 the Court
appreciated treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it having been
alleged in the Information and proved during trial that the ". . . accused,
armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ . . .
."
Similarly, we hold that treachery was sufficiently alleged in the
Information
PP VS. MANINGDING
There is treachery when "the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make." 39 These means or methods are made in the form of a swift,
deliberate and unexpected attack, without any warning and affording the
victim, which is usually unarmed and unsuspecting, no chance at all to
resist or escape the impending attack. 40
In this case, it is undisputed that it was accused-appellant who stabbed
and killed the victim, which is neither a crime of parricide nor infanticide.
We are, therefore, left with the issue of whether there was treachery in
the attack. Going over the records of the case, We are convinced that,
indeed, treachery was employed and present in the stabbing by accused-
appellant of the victim, which led to the latter's ultimate death.
From the testimonies of Aladino and Rommel, it cannot be gainsaid that
accused-appellant without any warning or suspicion, and taking
advantage of the circumstances, immediately attacked the victim. The
victim did not have any suspicion that could have alerted him of the
impending attack. As clearly demonstrated in the trial court, the attack
was swift and unexpected, even to the eyewitnesses, Aladino and
Rommel. We, therefore, agree with the RTC's ruling and finding, and We
find no reason to veer away from them.
PP VS. GUEVARRA
It is settled that aggravating/qualifying circumstances must be alleged in
the information and proven during the trial before they can be
appreciated. 51
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim
might make. 52 The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden
attack that renders the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself
by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. Two essential
elements are required in order that treachery can be appreciated: (1) The
employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would
ensure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the
offended party who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods or
manner of execution. 53
In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the information and all its
elements were duly established by the prosecution.

Inspector Barte was sitting inside the jeep when appellant suddenly
appeared and approached him. Appellant asked Inspector Barte if he was
"Major Barte". However, before Inspector Barte could respond or utter a
word, appellant quickly shot him several times in the head and chest with
a caliber .45 pistol. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the
appellant's attack rendered Inspector Barte defenseless and without
means of escape. There is no doubt that appellant's use of a caliber .45
pistol, as well as his act of waiting for Inspector Barte to be seated first in
the jeep before approaching him and of shooting Inspector Barte several
times on the head and chest, was adopted by him to prevent Inspector
Barte from retaliating or escaping. Considering that Inspector Barte was
tipsy or drunk and he was seated inside the jeep where the space is
narrow, there was absolutely no way for him to defend himself or
escape. cTAaDC
PP VS. TRINIDAD
The crime committed was murder with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, as characterized by the fact that the victim was shot at close
range while she was asleep, thus ensuring the commission of the crime
without risk to the assailants [People v. Dequina, 60 Phil. 279 (1934)].
That Juan Angel, and not his mother, was apparently the intended victim
is not incompatible with the existence of treachery. Treachery may be
taken into account even if the victim of the attack was not the person
whom the accused intended to kill.
IGNOMINY
PP VS. ABAIGAR
The circumstance of ignominy was not present because no means were
employed nor did any circumstances surround the act tending to make
the effects of the crime more humiliating. Ignominy is a circumstance
pertaining to the moral order, which adds disagree and obloquy to the
material injury caused by the crime. The fact that the deceased was killed
in the presence of his wife certainly could not have such a signification,
and this is the circumstance which the court below had in view when
declaring that this circumstance had concurred.
PP VS. ACAYA
Neither should the aggravating circumstance of ignominy be appreciated,
defined as "a circumstance pertaining to the moral order which adds
disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime" (U.S.
vs. Abaigar, 2 Phil. 417 [1903]). The fact that the crime was committed
in a public place and in the presence of many persons did not necessarily
tend to make the effects of the crime more humiliating or put the
offended party to shame.
PP VS. SIAO
Accused-appellant was held guilty of rape with the use of a deadly
weapon, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. 23 But the
trial court overlooked and did not take into account the aggravating
circumstance of ignominy and sentenced accused-appellant to the single
indivisible penalty ofreclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the
accused in committing the rape used not only the missionary
position, i.e. male superior, female inferior but also the dog position as
dogs do, i.e. entry from behind, as was proven like the crime itself in the
instant case, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended the
commission thereof.
Article 15 Case Digests
-Relationship-
33
Pp v. Calongui
FACTS: Accused-appellant was guilty of two-counts of rape. Accused-
appellant and the victim were first cousins.
HELD: relationship is not aggravating because the relationship between
Marinel and the appellant as first cousins is not within the concept
contemplated in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.
PP v. Capareda
FACTS: Accussed-appellant was guilty of four counts of rape. The victim
was the step-granddaughter of the accused.
HELD: The alternative aggravating circumstance of relationship under
Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be considered in the instant
case considering that the relationship between a step-grandniece and her
step-grandfather is not one of the relatives specifically enumerated
therein
Pp v. Orillosa
FACTS: Accused-appellant was found guilty of acts of lasciviousness and
two counts of rape. Accused was the father of the victim.
HELD: The alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of
the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated against appellant. In
crimes of chastity such as acts of lasciviousness, relationship is
considered as aggravating. Inasmuch as it was expressly alleged in the
information and duly proven during trial that the offended party is the
daughter of appellant, relationship, therefore, aggravated the crime of
acts of lasciviousness.
Penalty: Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of acts of
lasciviousness is punished by prision correccional. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and appreciating relationship as an
aggravating circumstance, appellant could be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to six years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay the victim
P30,000.00 as moral damages.
PP v. Glodo
FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of rape by the trial court. The victim
was appellant’s own daughter.
HELD: The Information alleges that Maricel was only 15 years old at the
time the crime was committed and that she is the daughter of appellant.
However, the prosecution merely presented the oral testimony and sworn
statement of Maricel. It failed to present independent evidence proving
the age of the victim and her relationship with appellant so as to warrant
the imposition of death penalty. In People vs. Viajedor, we held:
The minority of the victim and the offender's
relationship to the victim, which constitute only one
special qualifying circumstance, must be alleged in
the Information and proved with certainty. Recent
rulings of the Court relative to the rape of minors
invariably state that in order to justify the
imposition of the penalty of death, there must be
independent evidence proving the age of the victim,
other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
and the absence of denial by the accused . . . The
prosecution has the burden of proving all the
elements of a crime, including the qualifying
circumstances, especially in death penalty cases.

Thus, for failure of the prosecution to present independent evidence
to prove the age of victim Maricel and her relationship with
appellant, the trial court erred in considering the special qualifying
circumstance of minority and relationship as basis for the imposition
of the death penalty. Appellant should have been found guilty of
simple rape and the penalty that should be imposed on appellant
is reclusion perpetua by virtue of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code.
-Intoxication-
PP v. Borbon
FACTS: Appellant was in front of the house of a certain Aling Pet Pingol
having conversation with one Jaime Talibangan and Cristina David,
appellant’s neice. The appellant reeked of liquor and appeared to be
drunk. The group of the deceased arrived and talked about the basketball
game they had seen earlier. Cristina took leave of the group. Appellant
meanwhile, did not take part in the conversation. Suddenly he expressed
to Jaime his intention to kill. The latter went inside the house of Aling Pet
for fear. The group of the deceased remained in conversation. Appellant
then went into the house and brought back with him two knives.
Immediately and without warning, he stabbed the deceased at the right
side of the belly with one of the knives. The victim died along the way to
the hospital. The trial court convicted the appellant of murder with the
mitigating circumstance of intoxication.
HELD: In its decision, the court a quo appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication in favor of the appellant. This Court,
however, disagrees with such finding. Under the third paragraph of
Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, intoxication is considered as an
alternative circumstance, it may either be taken as an aggravating or a
mitigating circumstance. For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating
circumstance, the following conditions must be present: (1) the same is
not habitual or is not subsequent to a plan of the commission of a felony;
otherwise, it is aggravating if it is habitual and intentional; and (2) the
consumption of alcoholic drinks was in such quantity as to blur the
accused's reason and deprive him of certain degree of control.
Jaime testified that he noticed that the appellant was drunk as his
movement was swaying and he smelled of liquor. Nothing else was
mentioned about the appellant's drunkenness during the incident. For his
part, the appellant presented nothing to prove that he was, indeed, not
drunk. Having failed to prove that intoxication was neither habitual nor
intentional, the mitigating circumstance of intoxication cannot be
appreciated against or in favor of the appellant.
PP v. Inggo
FACTS: Accused bought a bottle of beer from the store of the deceased’s
father. The helper tried to give him his change but the accused refused
saying that he wanted the original amount back. Heated words were
exchanged between accused and the helper. Afterwards, the victim
arrived and offered to give the accused his change. The accused,
however, refused and an argument between accused and deceased
ensued. While appellant and the deceased were thus arguing, appellant
suddenly rushed to the deceased. When he was already near her, he
loosened his belt and removed it from his waist. Rosemarie Reinante
consequently ran. Appellant chased her and when he caught up with her,
appellant stabbed her. The helper tried to separate the two. Rosemarie
then ran to the road but appellant continued to chase her. When he
failed to catch up to the deceased, he ran instead towards the cemetery.
Rosemarie was rushed to the hospital where she was pronounced dead
on arrival. The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution credible
and sufficient to convict appellant of murder beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: We find the alternative circumstance of intoxication in existent.
Intoxication to be aggravating must have been the source of bravado
that propelled the accused to commit the crime. As we have previously
held:
34
Our penal laws do not look kindly on habitual
drunkards, or if the accused already resolved to
commit the crime, then got intoxicated so as to
fortify that resolve with false courage dictated by
liquor, his liability should be aggravated.
Although there is no hard and fast rule on the
amount of liquor that the accused imbibed on
that occasion, but the test is that it must have
sufficed to affect his mental faculties, to the
extent of blurring his reason and depriving him
of self-control.
Here, appellant's degree of intoxication was not proved with certainty. He
had allegedly been drinking tuba earlier that day, and he did buy a bottle
of beer at the store of the victim's in-laws. But these facts are not
sufficient to establish that indeed appellant was intoxicated at the time
he committed the crime, much less that he sought intoxication to fortify
his resolve in committing it. Absent clear and convincing proof as to
appellant's state of intoxication, we are unable to agree that the
alternative circumstance of intoxication was present to aggravate the
offense.
In any event, intoxication as well as disregard of sex were not alleged in
the information, hence, these may not be considered to aggravate the
crime for the imposition of a higher penalty, whether by degrees or
periods. This is pursuant to the amendments made to the Revised Rules
of Court, particularly toSec. 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
PP v. Bernal
FACTS: Accused-appellant was found guilty by the trial court of the
crime of murder for which he was sentenced to death, violation of the
gun ban and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition for which he
was sentenced to suffer indeterminate prison terms. Appellant together
with deceased and a group of men, were on board a tricycle on their way
to the Benedisco pub house. Upon reaching the pub house, the
deceased, Pedrito, invited the group to go inside to dance. Pedrito, Rey
and the appellant, Arnel, went inside while Felix and Fernando were left
outside. Later, Fernando went inside to look for the three and found
them asleep. He brought each to the tricycle where Felix was waiting to
bring them home. Fernando first fetched the deceased and then the
accused. Upon fetching Rey, he heard a gunshot and upon returning to
the tricycle, he saw appellant holding a gun. He heard another gunshot.
It turned out the accused had shot Pedrito. Fernando and the appellant
grappled with the gun where at that point, policemen arrived.
HELD: Accused-appellant argues that the trial court committed an error
when it imposed the death penalty on him on account of the alternative
aggravating circumstance of habitual drunkenness. He claims that the
prosecution was not able to prove the same at the trial, much less that
he intentionally got drunk to commit the crime. We agree.
The general rule is that intoxication may be considered either as
aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the circumstances attending
the commission of the crime. Intoxication is mitigating and therefore has
the effect of decreasing the penalty if the intoxication is not habitual or
attendant to the plan to commit the contemplated crime. On the other
hand, when intoxication is habitual or done intentionally to embolden the
malefactor and facilitate the plan to commit the crime, it is considered as
an aggravating circumstance.
In the instant case, accused-appellant's intoxication cannot be considered
aggravating because there was no showing that it was habitual or
intentional. As testified to by prosecution witness Felix Bernal, their group
drink liquor only occasionally, that is, if they had visitors. His testimony
that if they had visitors everyday, they drank everyday does not suffice to
prove that accused-appellant was a habitual drunkard. Nor should such
statement be taken against the accused-appellant. Undeniably, accused-
appellant was a mere visitor at that time. He came to Bangued to attend

a hearing and from there went to Barangay Dangdangla, Bangued to visit
his relatives.
Further, the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant got drunk
on the day the murder occurred for the purpose of committing the same.
Neither did accused-appellant initiate the drinking spree. He merely
acceded to the invitation of the victim to join his group in their drinking
spree. Thus, in the absence of clear and convincing proof that the
intoxication was habitual or intentional on the part of accused-appellant,
it is improper to consider the same as an aggravating circumstance.
But his intoxication cannot likewise be considered mitigating because
accused-appellant failed to show that his intoxication impaired his will
power or his capacity to understand the wrongful nature of his acts. The
person pleading intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of
alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur
his reason. This accused-appellant failed to do. No proof was presented
by accused-appellant that the amount of liquor he had taken was of such
quantity as to affect his mental faculties. The mere claim of intoxication
does not entitle him to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication.
-Lack of Instruction-
PP v. Mangsant
FACTS: The defendant appealed from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila finding him guilty of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The information against him
alleged that the said accused attack Demetria Ferrer, a girl 14 years of
age, stabbing her from behind with a knife and inflicting upon her various
wounds in different parts of the body which produced her instantaneous
death.
HELD: As to the mitigating circumstances, it is not proper to consider
lack of instruction in favor of the defendant, inasmuch as he admitted
that he had studied in the first grade in a public elementary school. Lack
of instruction cannot apply to one who has studied in the first grade in a
public school, but only to him who really has not received any instruction
(art. 15, first paragraph, Revised Penal Code).
Article 17-Principals
Indicators of conspiracy
PP V. SICAD
FACTS: Accused-appellant, Melchor Sicad went to his parents' house to
attend to his ailing mother who suffered a stroke. Present in the house
were his co-accused, namely, Jimmy Asturias, Rudy Sicad and Camelo
Lobaton. The deceased, Roberto Asturias, Sr., Melchor's cousin, also
arrived. Melchor offered Roberto a bottle of beer, but he refused. This
resulted in a verbal clash and an exchange of fist blows between
them. Roberto finally left, while Melchor returned to the bedside of his
mother who, shortly thereafter, died.
Later that evening, Roberto Asturias, Sr. was found dead near his fishing
banca. The victim's 11-year old son, and Jimmy Asturias pointed to
accused-appellants Rudy Sicad, Camelo Lobaton, Melchor Sicad, and the
latter's employees, Paquito Bernil and Johnny Guiñez, as the assailants.
Roberto Asturias, Jr. testified that he saw Paquito Bernil throwing a
dynamite at his father which exploded and hit his father's back. Then
Rudy Sicad fired a gun at his father. While his father was already lying on
the ground with his face down, Camelo Lobaton also shot him. All the
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while, Melchor Sicad and Johnny Guiñez stood as lookouts under a
nearby. Thereafter, the five accused-appellants escaped toward the
house of Melchor. Jimmy Asturias corroborated the testimony of Roberto
Asturias, Jr.
HELD: There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. As a rule, conspiracy must be proved as convincingly and indubitably
as the crime itself. It is not necessary, however, that conspiracy be
proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime.
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused which
show a joint or common purpose and design, a concerted action and a
community of interest among the accused.
This Court holds that the trial court did not err when it found that
conspiracy exists in this case. While there is no direct evidence to show
that accused-appellants agreed to commit the crime, however, their acts
and the attendant circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime disclose a common design that would make all of them co-
principals in the crime committed.
As shown by the records, accused-appellants Paquito Bernil, Rudy Sicad
and Camelo Lobaton threw a dynamite and fired at the victim, while
accused-appellants Melchor Sicad and Johnny Guiñez stood guard and
acted as lookouts. All of them performed specific acts with such closeness
and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose of
bringing about the death of the victim. Moreover, the simultaneous
convergence of the accused-appellants at the crime scene, their specific
acts in the commission of the crime, and their simultaneous flight toward
the house of Melchor Sicad pointed to a conspiracy among them.
The contention of Melchor Sicad and Johnny Guiñez, who acted as
lookouts, that their mere presence in the scene of the crime did not make
them co-conspirators does not persuade us. One who participates in the
material execution of the crime by standing guard or lending moral
support to the actual perpetrators thereof is criminally responsible to the
same extent as the latter. In a conspiracy, it is not necessary to show
that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. Indeed, the
accused-appellants' synchronous presence at the place was not a mere
coincidence but was in pursuance of a design to kill Roberto Asturias, Sr.,
with whom Melchor Sicad had a previous fight.
There being conspiracy among the accused-appellants, they are liable as
co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation
since, in point of law, the act of one is the act of all.
The trial court's appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation cannot be sustained. Proof of conspiracy does not imply
the existence of evident premeditation. The rule is that evident
premeditation may not be taken into account where, as here, conspiracy
is not based on direct proof but is inferred from the acts of the accused
in the perpetration of the crime.
The Court sustains the trial court's finding that the accused-appellants
are guilty of murder, qualified by treachery.
PP vs. REYES
FACTS: The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua Ong Ping
Sim (mother), Robert and Raymond (children), Lenny (daughter-in-law,
wife of Robert), Matthew and Charlene (grandchildren), and Jona
Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea (housemaids).
The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay Santo
Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00
p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van, arrived at the their
poultry farm. Yao San alighted from the van to open the gate of the
farm. At this juncture, appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray

(Pataray) approached, poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged him
inside the van. Appellant Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van.
Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo and Flores, with two male companions, all
armed with guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant
Flores took the driver's seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Yao
family inside the van with packaging tape. After about 30 minutes of
traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order of appellants and their
cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Jona Abagatnan
(Abagatnan) stepped out of the van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo,
Pataray and one of their male companions. Appellant Flores, with the
other male companion, drove the van with the remaining members of the
Yao family inside the vehicle.
Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male companion
told Yao San to produce the amount of five million pesos as ransom in
exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and
Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant Flores and his male companion left the
van and fled; while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine
remained inside the van. Yao San then drove the van towards the poultry
farm and sought the help of relatives.
Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were
taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male
companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part of San Jose
Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole night.
On the morning of the following day, the kidnappers tried to contact Yao
San regarding the ransom demanded, but the latter could not be
reached. Thus, appellants instructed Abagatnan to look for Yao San in
the poultry farm. Upon arriving therein, Abagatnan searched for Yao San,
but the latter could not be found. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo told
Abagatnan to remind Yao San about the ransom. Thereafter, appellants
Reyes and Arnaldo and their male companion left Abagatnan in the
poultry farm and went back to the safe-house.
In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release him so
he could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. Abandoned by the
appellants and upon arriving at the poultry farm, Robert found Yao San
and informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants for the
remaining held victims.
A series of calls were made between Yao San and the kidnappers in
which he was instructed to deliver the ransom and not tell the
authorities. However, kidnappers did not show up when Yao San
delivered the ransom money.
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were
found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon City. Both died of
asphyxia by strangulation.
HELD: Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend that the
prosecution failed to prove that they conspired in kidnapping the Yao
family. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy
when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy presupposes unity of purpose and unity in the
execution of the unlawful objective among the accused. When the
accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part
and the other performing another part as to complete the crime, with a
view to the attainment of the same object, conspiracy exists. As can be
gleaned from the credible testimonies and sworn statements of
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao, appellant Reyes and Pataray approached
and poked their guns at Yao San, and thereafter dragged the latter into
the van. Appellant Flores then took the driver's seat and drove the van,
while each member of the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants
Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts inside the van. Thereafter, appellant
Flores instructed Yao San to produce the amount of P5 million as ransom
money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert,
Raymond and Abagatnan. Appellant Reyes and appellant Arnaldo were
among the kidnappers who guarded Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping
Sim and Raymond in the safe-house. They also accompanied Abagatnan
and Robert in going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San
about the ransom demanded. Further, appellants Arnaldo and Flores
narrated in their respective extra-judicial confessions how they planned
and executed the kidnapping of the Yao family. Their extra-judicial
confessions also detailed the particular role/participation played by each
of appellants and their cohorts in the kidnapping of the family. Clearly,
36
the foregoing individual acts of appellants and their cohorts
demonstrated their unity of purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao
family for the purpose of extorting ransom.
PP VS. ALETA, ET AL
FACTS: Marcelo, Ferdinand, Rogelio, Marlo and Jovito, all surnamed
Aleta was charged for the murder of Celestino Duldulao y Yadao and
Ferdinand Acob. All above-named accuse club with the use of hard
objects both the victims. The Court upholds the version of the
prosecution: While the deceased Acob’s mother, Marina, went to the
community center, she heard a commotion on the yard of the appellants.
Returning home, she told Acob of the quarrel. Acob went to the
appellants’ compound. Upon following her son, Marina witnessed Rogelio
striking Acob with a piece of wood, causing the latter to fall. She
thereafter saw Rogelio striking Duldulao causing the latter’s eyes to pop
out. Rogelio then ran towards the family house whereupon Marina heard
gunshots. Jovito, Marlo and Ferdinand continued to hit them. When
Rogelio emerged from the house, he got another piece of wood and
clubbed the victims.
HELD: Conspiracy was present during the attack. When two or more
persons aim their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful
object, each doing a part of their acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact connected and cooperative indicating closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, conspiracy may be inferred.
And where there is conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.
PP vs. PABLO AMODIA
FACTS: Romildo Ceno testified that he along with two friends were
talking and watching television when he heard a noise coming
somewhere below the C-5 Bridge, located 40-50 meters away from their
house. He also heard somebody shouted “may away doon.” Curious, he
and Mario went to the bridge and saw five persons whom he identified as
the victim (Felix Olandria Bergaño), Pablo Amodia, Arnold Partosa,
George Palacio and Damasio Amodia. He knew these men as they were
neighbors. Illuminated by light coming from a post, he saw the victim
being held in the right hand by Pablo, while the other hand was held by
Arnold. George was positioned at the victim’s back and clubbed the victim
on the head; Damaso was in front of the victim and stabbed him three
times. Luther Caberte who happened to be passing by the C-5 bridge at
that time, also saw what happened. He testified that he saw men fighting
under the C-5 bridge which was illuminated by a light from a lamppost.
He saw Pablo, Damaso, George and Arnold ganging up on the victim. He
saw Pablo holding the victim’s hand while Damaso was stabbing him. He
also affirmed that George was positioned behind the victim. He
personally knew both the victim and Pablo as they have been neighbors.
Both eyewitnesses left the scene after the stabbing; Romildo was chased
away by George and Damaso while Luther went on home immediately.
The accused-appellant Pablo Amodia invoked the defense of alibi. In his
appeal, Pablo argues that the trial court and the CA erred in failing to
give evidentiary weight to his alibi. He alternatively argues that granting
that he was part of Damaso’s group and that the group killed the victim,
the prosecution failed to establish the conspiracy among them. There
was no evidence adduced to establish how the incident that led to the
stabbing began.
HELD: As an alternative argument, Pablo puts into issue the failure of
the prosecution’s evidence to establish the conspiracy between him and
his other co-accused to make him liable for murder. He emphasizes that
the evidence, as testified by the eyewitnesses, only relate to events
during and not prior to the assault and the stabbing of the victim. He

argues that no evidence was adduced to show that the accused all
agreed to kill the victim.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises
the very instant the plotters agrees, expressly or impliedly, to commit a
felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. It may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found;
circumstantial evidence is often resorted to in order to prove its
existence. Absent of any direct proof as in the present case, conspiracy
may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when
such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest. An accused participates as a conspirator if he or
she has performed some overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in
the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself,
or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy
over the other co-conspirators. Stated otherwise, it is not essential that
there be proof of the previous agreement and decision to commit the
crime, it is sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective.
Although there was no evidence in the present case showing a prior
agreement of Pablo, Arnold, George and Damaso, the following chain of
events however show their commonality of purpose in killing the victim:
first, the accused surrounded the victims on all sides; Damaso at the
front, George at the victim’s rear; while Pablo and Arnold flanked the
victim on each side; second, Pablo then wrested the right arm of the
victim and restrained his movement; while Arnold did the same to the left
arm of the victim; third, George then hit the victim’s head with a piece of
wood; and fourth, Damaso stabbed the victim three times.
PP VS. REGALARIO
FACTS: Accused-appellants, all surnamed Regalario, are barangay
officials and related to one another. Appellants Sotero and Bienvenido
Regalario were seen striking Rolando Sevilla several times with their
nightsticks. The blows caused Sevilla to fall down in a sitting position but
after a short while he was able to get up. He ran away in the direction of
the house of appellant Mariano Regalario, the barangay captain.
Bienvenido and Sotero Regalario chased Sevilla. When Sevilla was
already near Marciano's house, he was waylaid by appellant Ramon
Regalario and at this point, Marciano Regalario and his son Noel
Regalario came out of their house. Noel was carrying a seven-inch knife.
The five appellants caught the victim in front of Marciano's house. Armed
with their nightsticks, they took turns in hitting the victim until he
slumped to the ground face down. In that position, Sevilla was boxed by
Marciano in the jaw. After a while, when Sevilla was no longer moving,
Marciano first ordered the others to kill the victim and to tie him up.
Upon hearing the order, Bienvenido, with the help of Sotero, tied the
neck, hands and feet of the victim with a nylon rope used by farmers for
tying carabao. The rest of the group just stood by watching.
HELD: The Court agrees with the findings of the lower courts as to the
presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found. The agreement to
commit a crime, however, may be deduced from the mode and manner
of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent. It
does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the
act of all, and each incurs the same criminal liability. We quote with
approval the findings and observations of the CA, thus:
The eyewitnesses' account surrounding Rolando Sevilla's death shows
that the accused-appellants performed concerted acts in pursuit of a
common objective. Sotero, Bienvenido, and Ramon, armed with
nightsticks, and Noel armed with a knife, seven inches in length, beat
Rolando Sevilla. All five accused-appellants caught up with the victim,
blocked all means through which the victim could escape and ensured
37
the achievement of their plan to kill Rolando Sevilla even as the latter
already fell to the ground. Accused-appellant Marciano hit the victim on
his jaw and later, ordered his co-accused to kill and tie the victim. Upon
hearing Marciano's instruction, Bienvenido Regalario tied Rolando's neck,
hands and feet with a rope. The collective act of the accused-appellants
is sufficient to make them co-principals to the killing.
Considering the foregoing, as well as the manner in which the attack
against Rolando was carried out, and the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses positively identifying the accused-appellants as the assailants,
we concur in the rulings of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, in
(a) disregarding Ramon Regalario's declaration that he attacked the
victim in self-defense and (b) holding that all the accused-appellants
acted in concert and killed Rolando.
PP vs. MALIBIRAN
FACTS: Rolando "Botong" Malibiran and Beverly Tibo-Tan were
convicted of Murder and Parricide, respectively, and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The conviction arose from the
death of Reynaldo Tan on February 5, 1995. The antecedents that led to
Reynaldo's death, however, go way back in the 70's when Reynaldo left
his common-law wife, Rosalinda Fuerzas and their two children, Jessie
and Reynalin, in Davao, and went to Manila to seek greener pastures.
While in Manila, Reynaldo met and had a relationship with appellant.
They eventually married in 1981. Reynaldo and appellant begot three
children — Renevie, Jag-Carlo and Jay R. In 1984, Reynaldo's and
Rosalinda's paths crossed again and they resumed their relationship. This
led to the "souring" of Reynaldo's relationship with appellant; and in
1991, Reynaldo moved out of the conjugal house and started living again
with Rosalinda, although Reynaldo maintained support of and paternal
ties with his children. On that fateful day of February 5, 1995, Reynaldo
and appellant were in Greenhills with their children for their usual Sunday
gallivant. After finishing lunch at the Kimpura restaurant, the family
separated at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to do some shopping.
Later, they regrouped and purchased groceries at Unimart. At around
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the family stepped out of the shopping mall
and Reynaldo proceeded to the parking lot to get his red Honda Accord,
while the rest of his family stayed behind and waited. Immediately
thereafter, the family heard an explosion coming from the direction
where Reynaldo parked his car. Appellant and Renevie got curious and
proceeded to the parking lot. There, they saw the Honda Accord burning,
with Reynaldo lying beside the driver's seat, burning, charred and
bleeding profusely. A taxi driver named Elmer Paug (Elmer) appeared and
pulled Reynaldo out of the car. Reynaldo was then rushed to the Cardinal
Santos Medical Hospital where he eventually died because of the severe
injuries he sustained. The underlying cause of his death was Multiple
Fracture & Multiple Vascular Injuries Secondary to Blast Injury.
HELD: The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Janet and Oswaldo
clearly link appellant to the planning of the crime. True, as intimated by
appellant, she may not have been at the scene of the crime at the time
of the explosion; but then again, if she was, then she would have
suffered the same fate as Reynaldo. Moreover, the nature of the crime
and the manner of its execution, i.e., via a booby trap, does not demand
the physical presence of the perpetrator at the very time of its
commission. In fact, the very manner in which it was carried out
necessitated prior scheming and execution for it to succeed. Thus,
appellant's absence from the actual scene of the crime does not negate
conspiracy with Rolando in plotting the death of her husband. A
conspiracy exists even if not all the parties committed the same act, but
the participants performed specific acts that indicated unity of purpose in
accomplishing a criminal design. Moreover, direct proof of previous
agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy —
conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence.
The testimonies of Janet and Oswaldo established the following set of
circumstances which, if taken collectively, show the guilt of appellant:
that appellant and Rolando conspired, planned and agreed to kill
Reynaldo using a grenade; that appellant duplicated the key to the red
Honda Accord of Reynaldo so that Rolando could gain access to the car;
that appellant thereafter gave the duplicate key to Rolando; that on
February 5, 1995, appellant told Oswaldo to follow the red Honda Accord

of Reynaldo until the latter parked the car; that appellant told Oswaldo to
thereafter pick up Rolando at Katipunan and bring the latter to where
Reynaldo parked his red Honda Accord. Reynaldo died soon after due to
injuries he sustained from an explosion caused by grenades planted in his
car.
Another notable fact is that according to the expert opinion of Inspector
Selverio Dollesin, Chief of the Bomb Disposal Unit of the Eastern Police
District, the perpetrator had information about the victim's movements.
Dollesin also observed that the perpetrator knew his intended victim,
since the grenade was specifically placed in between the driver's seat and
the front door. That the perpetrator knew the victim's movements was
further corroborated by the affidavits executed by the Tan children,
Renevie and Jag Carlo, attesting that while they spent their Sundays with
their father, this was the only time that they spent a Sunday in
Greenhills. Only someone who had close personal contact with Reynaldo
would know his movements, where the car would be parked, and that he
was the one who usually drove the red Honda Accord, such that it was
precisely positioned to ensure damage to the intended victim.
Where there is no conspiracy
PP vs. GENSOLA
FACTS: Rufino Gensola was the driver, while Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo
Tan were the conductors, of a passenger truck. They suspected Miguel
Gayanilo of having punctured the tires of the truck while it was parked in
front of his carinderia. Passengers overheard Fidelina Tan mutter to
herself, obviously referring to someone she did not name: "He does not
appear because I will kill him." A day later, Miguel Gayanilo was
crossing the street from the public market in the direction of
his carinderia with Rufino Gensola, holding in his right hand a stone as
big as a man's fist, following closely behind. At this time, Felicisimo and
Fidelina Tan were standing in the middle of the street After Miguel
Gayanilo had crossed the middle of the street near the two, Fidelina Tan
shouted, "Rufino, strike him." Upon hearing the shout Miguel looked back
and Rufino suddenly struck him on the left face with the stone. Felicisimo
then struck Miguel with a piece of iron on the back of the head causing
serious wounds and fracture of the skull. Not content with the two blows
already given, Fidelina struck Miguel with another piece of iron on the left
forehead causing serious wounds and fracture of the skull. Miguel fell to
the ground near the canal along the side of the street. Rufino Gensola
immediately left for his house situated on Gonzales St. Felicisimo and
Fidelina observed the prostrate body for a few seconds until Fidelina
muttered: "He is already dead." The two then left the scene of the crime.
The lower court found the three defendants guilty as principals of the
crime of murder.
HELD: Let us now consider the criminal liability of the three appellants.
The lower court found them guilty as principals of the crime of murder on
the assumption that there was conspiracy among them. We do not agree,
for the following reasons: (1) Fidelina Tan's intention revealed by the
words she muttered to herself, "He does not appear because I will kill
him," was not shared by Felicisimo Tan who kept silent. Silence is not a
circumstance indicating participation in the same criminal design. With
respect to Rufino Gensola, he was not even in the truck at the time (2)
When Miguel Gayanilo was crossing Gerona St., it was only Rufino
Gensola who followed closely behind Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan
were in the middle of the street. The words shouted by Fidelina Tan,
"Rufino, strike him," were meant as a command and did not show
previous concert of criminal design. (3) The blows given with pieces of
iron on the back of the head and on the forehead by Felicisimo and
Fidelina after Rufino had struck with a piece of stone the left face of
Miguel, do not in and by themselves show previous concert of criminal
design. Particularly when it is considered that Rufino immediately left
thereafter while Felicisimo and Fidelina remained for a few seconds
observing the prostrate body of Miguel until Fidelina muttered, "He is
already dead."
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In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the three appellants is
individual, that is, each appellant is liable only for his own act.
Appellant Rufino Gensola is liable only for the lacerated wounds inflicted
by him on the left face of Miguel Gayanilo.
Is appellant Fidelina Tan also liable for the offense considering that she
gave the command "Rufino, strike him"? The second class of principals,
according to Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, comprises "those who
directly force or induce others to commit it (the act)." Those who directly
induce others to commit the act are called "principals by inducement" or
"principals by induction," from the Spanish "autores por inducción." The
word "inducement" comprises, in the opinion of Viada and the Supreme
Court of Spain, reward, promise of reward, command, and pacto. With
respect to command, it must be the moving cause of the offense. In the
case at bar, the command shouted by Fidelina, "Rufino, strike him," was
not the moving cause of the act of Rufino Gensola. The evidence shows
that Rufino would have committed the act of his own volition, even
without said words of command.
PP VS. PADRONES
FACTS: The victim was at the MGR Family Disco and Restaurant,
celebrating his birthday. Biare arrived thereafter and about ten minutes
later, Alex Padrones appeared. It seems that the two had been old
acquaintances who, up to then, had not seen each other. The two
apparently exchanged pleasantries, shook hands, but separated
immediately. Padrones sat at a table where he met certain women while
Biare sat alone on another table. The victim then approached Padrones
and apparently challenged him to a fight. A brawl ensued where both
Padrones and Sison struggled in possession of a knife. A while later, the
companions of the victim ganged up on Padrones. Biare, all the while,
remained seated. When the dust settled and the lights went on, Padrones
lay crawling on the dis co floor, bloodied and his head bowed.
According to Biare, Padrones had his hands raised in surrender and he
allegedly pleaded.Biare then allegedly offered to bring him to a hospital,
but the latter declined and instead asked that he be brought home. What
turned out, however, is that while Padrones nursed his injuries, Lorenzo
Sison had also in fact been wounded, as a result also of a knifing,
although both Padrones and Biare denied harming him. Meanwhile,
Lorenzo Sison signed a handwritten statement in his hospital bed to the
Surallah police accusing Padrones of having inflicted one stab wound on
him. He also implicated Biare and charged him with stabbing him once.
He later on expired due to respiratory failure and internal bleeding.
The star witness for the prosecution, Llaneta, testified that he was
involved in that brawl that he was one of those who ganged up on
Padrones. He testified that as he beat up Padrones, the latter slipped out
a knife and so did Biare. He allegedly retreated whereupon, saw
Padrones bury his knife on Sison. Dr. Velasquez, testifying for the
prosecution, added that the victim had been stabbed by two different
instruments, belonging to two different persons, "or one person, if he
changed his instrument. The trial court found the existence of conspiracy
and convicted both accused of murder.
HELD: The trial judge portrays the accused-appellants' "chance meeting"
as an effort "to establish no conspiracy between them took place." What
he, the trial judge, loses sight of is the fact that the accused were not
called upon to discredit the prosecution's theory of conspiracy. It was the
prosecution's duty to establish the existence of what the prosecution
alleged to be conspiracy.
The trial judge also expresses doubts whether or not the accused, Joseph
Biare, indeed just minded his own business while the Sisons ganged up
on his co-accused. "Would one permit his friend molested," he inquired,
"without raising a voice of protest?" His rich imagination is fascinating,
but that hardly belongs to a judge. As Biare averred, he did come to the
aid of his co-accused, although after the damage had been done and the
latter lay battered on the ground. What the judge would make out,
however, from the defense's version is that either Padrones or Biare
 39

merely contrived the whole yarn, and that the melee never occurred at all
(because as he states, if there indeed was one, Biare would have
allegedly stood up for a friend in distress). But the very testimony of
Antonio Llaneta, witness for the prosecution, is arrayed against him, the
latter having admitted "that he boxed [sic] Alex [Padrones]."
Padrones' parting statement: "Diputa kamo, lenti kamo, magkita-ay kita
buas," and the fact that both accused left together can not be accepted
by the Court as a piece of evidence of conspiracy. It has been held that
conspiracy, like the offense itself, must be shown to exist beyond
reasonable doubt. So also has it been held that conspiracy "transcends
companionship." Hence, the fact that the two accused may have
happened to leave together, and one of them left a closing warning, can
not instantly support a finding of conspiracy. The prosecution is, in
addition, hard put to adduce evidence demonstrating facts that the
parties had priorly come to an agreement to commit the crime with which
they are charged. Although the act of agreeing need not be
demonstrated, evidence of the fact of agreement must nonetheless be
convincingly shown. The accused's acts after the fact, by themselves, are
inadequate to show that previous agreement.
Principal by Induction
PP VS. YANSON-DUMANCAS
FACTS: Of the 13 accused charged with Kidnapping for Ransom with
Murder of one Rufino Gargar, Jr., 3 accused were acquitted, 9 were
convicted as principals and 1 accused was convicted as accessory. On
appeal, the Supreme Court acquitted 3 more accused including Jeanette
Yanson-Dumancas.
HELD: On the case of accused-appellant Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas, the
information charged her of the crime of kidnapping for ransom with
murder as principal by induction together with her husband, Charles, who
was found by the trial court not guilty of the crime.
money delivered by Ricardo Yanson to the group was with the knowledge
and approval of Jeanette is completely baseless.
The only matter left for consideration is whether the order supposedly
given by Jeanette to accused-appellant Geroche "to take care of the two"
constitutes words of command which may be considered sufficient basis
to convict Jeanette as principal by inducement. prLL
In order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the
following must be present: (1) the inducement be made with the
intention of procuring the commission of the crime, and (2) such
inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material
executor. To constitute inducement, there must exist on the part of the
inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to
secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation to
the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation to commit
the crime.
By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to "take care of the
two" does not constitute the command required by law to justify a finding
that she is guilty as a principal by inducement. “A chance word spoken
without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase,
a thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to
crime in the mind of one for some independent reason predisposed
thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed the act having
any expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real
intention that it produce the result. In such case, while the expression
was imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he (the one
who spoke the word or performed the act) would not be guilty of the
crime committed."
Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly the act of inducement,
should precede the commission of the crime itself. In the case at bar, the
abduction, which is an essential element of the crime charged
(kidnapping for ransom with murder) has already taken place when
Jeanette allegedly told accused-appellant Geroche to "take care of the
two." Said utterance could, therefore, not have been the inducement to
commit the crime charged in this case.

What the Court now has to examine is whether or not sufficient evidence Most importantly, it was duly proven by no less than the prosecution
was adduced by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that witness himself, Moises Grandeza, that the intention of Jeanette was but
Jeanette indeed performed any of the following acts: (a) to allow the law to its course.
directly forcing the killers to commit the crime, or (b)
directly inducing them to commit the crime.

There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime, namely:

Principal by Indispensible Cooperation
(i) by using irresistible force, or (ii) by causing uncontrollable fear. Upon
review of the testimony of all the witnesses of the prosecution, we find
nothing to conclude that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused PP VS. CARIAGA
uncontrollable fear upon the other accused-appellants. From the factual
findings of the trial court, it is patent that the plan to abduct and
FACTS: The victim Ernesto de Guzman, Sr. confided to his brother,
liquidate the victims was hatched on August 5, 1992 (10:30 A.M.) without
Balbino de Guzman, that appellants Cosme and Nestor Carriaga were
Jeanette's involvement or participation whatsoever. The record is entirely
grabbing his land and that they threatened to kill him. Ernesto became
bereft of any evidence to show that Jeanette directly forced the
the object of their ire since he started to improve the river as a source of
participants of the said meeting to come up with such plan, by either
livelihood. On one occasion, the appellants Carriaga brothers told Ernesto
using irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear. The only basis
not to continue working the area or else something might happen to him
relied upon by the trial court in arriving at its conclusion that Jeanette is
and his family. Appellant Ben Palis accused Ernesto of informing the
guilty of the crime as principal by inducement, is the supposed
police that the Carriaga brothers owned guns.
"commands" or order given by her to accused-appellant Dominador
Geroche on two occasions. By no stretch of the imagination may these
so-called "commands", standing alone, be considered as constituting On the night of December 3, 1933, accused-appellants proceeded to the
irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear. house of the victim. The wife of the accused testified that she then saw
appellants Cosme and Nestor, each holding a bolo, and Palis, standing by
the door, with both hands placed at his back. Nestor and Cosme went
Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to commit a
directly to where Ernesto was sleeping and immediately began hacking
crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, or offering reward or promise, and
him. Both the wife and the son of the victim escaped from the house for
(ii) by usingwords of command. The Court finds no evidence, as did the
fear. As they were escaping, they heard a vehicle approaching. Thinking
trial court, to show that Jeanette offered any price, reward, or promise to
that the killers might have boarded the same, they hid among the tall
the rest of accused-appellants should they abduct and later kill the
grasses. When they peeped, they saw the three appellants in the front
victims in this case. If at all, the prosecution witness mentioned the name
seat of a blue passenger jeepney. After the vehicle passed, the two
of Ricardo Yanson as having lent money to accused-appellant Col. Torres
continued to run until they reached the poblacion.
to be used for paying the latter's debts or obligations. But definitely, no
money ever came from Jeanette herself. The trial court's surmise that the

HELD: Conspiracy having been established, the Court deems it necessary
to distinguish the nature of the participation of appellants Nestor, Cosme
and Palis. in the commission of a crime by two or more persons, those
who take direct participation are principals by direct participation; those
who directly force or induce others to commit the crime are principals by
induction; while those who cooperate in the commission of the crime by
another act without which the commission of the offense would not have
been accomplished are principals by indispensable cooperation under
paragraph 3 of Article 17.
In the present case, it is clear that appellants Nestor and Cosme are
principals by direct participation. Both of them with the same purpose
and design hacked Ernesto repeatedly to kill the victim.
The question is: What is the nature of participation of appellant Palis? It
is an established fact borne by the prosecution evidence that the three
appellants went inside the house of Ernesto without prior notice or
permission from the occupants of the house; that appellant Palis merely
stood by the door of the house while his co-appellants hacked Ernesto to
death; that he left the scene of the crime together with the other
appellants; and that they were altogether found riding in a jeepney and
arrested by the police. That Palis just stood by the door without saying
anything cannot therefore be considered as a mere passive presence that
would have negated his participation as a conspirator. However, there
are no other facts established by the prosecution that would prove
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Palis committed acts in the killing
of Ernesto that would categorize him as a principal by induction, by direct
participation or by indispensable cooperation. What is certain from the
facts established by the prosecution, is that he had the same purpose
and design as the other appellants as shown by the fact that he went
inside the house of the victim, uninvited and unannounced together with
his co-appellants Nestor and Cosme who were armed with bolos; and
that after the hacking, he left the house together with appellants Nestor
and Cosme and rode a jeepney together.
In such case, we apply our ruling in People vs. Ubiña where we held that
when an accused does not fall under any of the three concepts defined in
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, he may only be considered guilty as
an accomplice.
Penalties
PEOPLE VS. LUCAS
FACTS: In the decision in this case, the First Division touched on the
nature of the penalty of reclusion perpetua in the light of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 7659 which amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code by
specifically fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua at twenty (20) years
and one (1) day to forty (40) years. It opined that since no
corresponding amendment to Article 76 of the Revised Penal Code was
made, the said law has not made explicit an intention to
convert reclusion perpetua into a divisible penalty. Nevertheless, it
applied Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code and stated:
"Accordingly, the time included in the penalty
of reclusion perpetua (twenty [20] years and one
[1] day to forty [40] years) can be divided into
three equal portions with each composing a
period. The periods of reclusion perpetua would
then be as follows:
minimum—20 years and 1 day to 26
years and 8 months
medium—26 years, 8 months and 1
day to 33 years and 4 months
maximum—34 years, 4 months and 1
day to 40 years.
40
Taking into account the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of relationship in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, the accused may
finally be sentenced to thirty-four (34) years,
from (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
perpetua."
In a motion for clarification seasonably filed by the appellee on 28 June
1994 which was not opposed by the accused-appellant in his comment,
the appellee asks the Court to correct the duration of the maximum
period of reclusion perpetua from thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to forty (40) years, as stated in the decision, to thirty-
three (33) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
HELD: After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislative
history of R.A. No. 7659, the Court concludes that although Section 17 of
R.A No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty
(20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty.
[I]f reclusion perpetua was reclassified as a divisible penalty, then Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code would lose its reason and basis for
existence. To illustrate, the first paragraph of Section 20 of the amended
R.A. No. 6425 provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
whenever the dangerous drugs involved are of any of the quantities
stated therein. If Article 63 of the Code were no longer applicable
because reclusion perpetua is supposed to be a divisible penalty, then
there would be no statutory rules for determining when either reclusion
perpetua or death should be the imposable penalty. In fine, there would
be no occasion for imposing reclusion perpetuaas the penalty in drug
case, regardless of the attendant modifying circumstances.
This problem revolving around the non-applicability of the rules in Article
63 assumes serious proportions since it does not involve only drug cases,
as aforesaid. Under the amendatory sections of R.A. No. 7659, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is also imposed on treason by a
Filipino (Section 2), qualified piracy (Section 3), parricide (Section 5),
murder (Section 6), kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Section 8),
robbery with homicide (Section 9), destructive arson (Section 10), rape
committed under certain circumstances (Section 11), and plunder
(Section 12). Now then, if Congress had intended to reclassify reclusion
perpetua as a divisible penalty, then it should have amended Article 63
and Article 76 of the Revised Penal Code. The latter is the law on what
are considered divisible penalties under the Code and what should be the
duration of the periods thereof. There are, as well, other provisions of
the Revised Penal Code involving reclusion perpetua, such as Article 41
on the accessory penalties thereof and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 61,
which have not been touched by a corresponding amendment. What then
may be the reason for the amendment fixing the duration of reclusion
perpetua? The deliberations in the Bicameral Conference Committee and
in both Chambers of Congress do not enlighten us on this, except the
cryptic statement of Senator Tolentino adverted to above on the
elimination of the "new penalty" of life imprisonment by the Bicameral
conference Committee. It may however, be pointed out that although the
Revised Penal Code did not specify the maximum of reclusion perpetua, it
is apparent that the maximum period for the service of this penalty shall
not exceed forty (40) years. At most then, in fixing a specific duration
for reclusion perpetua Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659 merely restated the
existing jurisprudence.
PDEA V. BRODETT
FACTS: Richard Brodett and Jorge Joseph were charged with
a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26 (b), of
Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act in the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City.
Likewise, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City;
filed another information charging only Brodett with a violation
of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.
Brodett filed a Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence. He
averred that during his arrest, PDEA had seized several

personal non-drug effects from him, including a 2004 Honda
Accord car with license plate no. XPF-551; and that PDEA
refused to return his personal effects despite repeated
demands for their return.
The Office of the City Prosecutor objected to the return of the
car because it appeared to be the instrument in the
commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due
to its being the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of
dangerous drugs. The RTC directed the release of the car.
PDEA contend that Brodett’s Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence did not
intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third person; and that
even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her
ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release, because she was under
the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the
commission of the crime.
HELD:
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to
Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in connection with the illegal
possession and sale of illegal drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that
were the subject of the criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any
other criminal proceedings.
The Court agrees with the finding of the CA that:
A careful reading of the above provision shows
that confiscation and forfeiture in drug-
related cases pertains to "all the proceeds and
properties derived from the unlawful act,
including but not limited to, money and other
assets obtained thereby, and the instruments
or tools with which the particular unlawful act
was committed unless they are the property
of a third person not liable for the unlawful
act." Simply put, the law exempts from the
effects of confiscation and forfeiture any
property that is owned by a third person
who is not liable for the unlawful act.
Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda
Accord subject of this petition is owned by
and registered in the name of Myra S.
Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also,
it does not appear from the records of the case
that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of
any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases
of possession and sale of dangerous drugs.
Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at
bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the
subject Honda Accord may not be exempted
from confiscation and forfeiture.
Even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text of Section 20 of R.A. No.
9165 relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that of Article 45 of
the Revised Penal Code, which provides that “Such proceeds and
instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government, unless they be the property of a third person not
liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful
commerce shall be destroyed.”
To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments belonging to a third
person, therefore, there must be an indictment charging such third
person either as a principal, accessory, or accomplice. Less than that will
not suffice to prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the third
person, for a mere suspicion of that person's participation is not sufficient
ground for the court to order the forfeiture of the goods seized.
41
However, the Court also agrees with PDEA and the Office of the City
Prosecutor that the release was premature:
We note that the RTC granted accused Brodett's Motion to Return Non-
Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the criminal proceedings were
still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the release
of the car at that point of the proceedings was premature, considering
that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly forbids
the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or income derived
therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused charged under
R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the proceedings in the Regional
Trial Court. Section 20 further expressly requires that such property or
income derived therefrom should remain in custodia legis in all that time
and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warranted pursuant to either Article 45 of
the Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part
of the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of whether or not the
car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would
be subject of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be
rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the
unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the RTC as being in custodia
legis is primarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure its
availability as such. To release it before the judgment is rendered is to
deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as evidence.
We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply
strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and
should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for
the duration of the trial and before the rendition of the
judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable
for the unlawful act.
PP VS. MATEO
FACTS: Accused-appellant was convicted of ten counts rape.
The trial court imposed the penalty of death.
HELD: While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory
review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death,
nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review.
If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of
death,reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the
Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these
cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at
stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence
must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of
the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the
Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would
minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court
of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment
imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so
warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire
records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final
disposition.
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-
making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of
Congress. The rule here announced additionally allowing an intermediate
review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the
case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a
procedural matter.

Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more
particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124,
Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide for
direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in
cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc,
dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in
cases similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified
accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records
thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action and disposition, consistent with the discussions
hereinabove set forth. No costs.
PEOPLE V. DE LOS SANTOS
FACTS: The accused was charged with the crimes of Multiple
Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted
Murder in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City for having run over with a vehicle,
several members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) who
were undergoing an "endurance run" as part of the Special
Counter Insurgency Operation Unit Training.
HELD: Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious
intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, GLENN
should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less
serious physical injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes
through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as
"acts or omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of
deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).
The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other victims
through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have
constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by
Article 48, they should be treated and punished as separate offenses.
Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed.
It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multiple
frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial
court. However, nothing appears in the record that GLENN objected to
the multiplicity of the information in a motion to quash before his
arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have waived such defect. Under
Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to
object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for
each of them.
Now, we come to the penalty. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; and if it would have constituted a light
felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be
imposed. The last paragraph thereof provides that the penalty next
higher in degree shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on
the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hand to give.
This failure to render assistance to the victim, therefore, constitutes a
qualifying circumstance because the presence thereof raises the penalty
by one degree. Moreover, the fifth paragraph thereof provides that in the
imposition of the penalty, the court shall exercise its sound discretion
42
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64. Elsewise stated, in
felonies through imprudence or negligence, modifying circumstances
need not be considered in the imposition of the penalty.
In the case at bar, it has been alleged in the information and proved
during the trial that GLENN "escaped from the scene of the incident,
leaving behind the victims." It being crystal clear that GLENN failed to
render aid to the victims, the penalty provided for under Article 365 shall
be raised by one degree. Hence, for reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical
injuries, the penalty would be prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period. Applying Article 48, the maximum
of said penalty, which is prision mayor in its medium period, should be
imposed. For the separate offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer, for each
count, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period.
Although it was established through the testimonies of prosecution
witness Lemuel Pangca and of GLENN that the latter surrendered to
Governor Emano of Misamis Oriental, such mitigating circumstance need
not be considered pursuant to the aforestated fifth paragraph of Article
365.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, GLENN may be
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty whose minimum
is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that
prescribed for the offense, and whose maximum is that which
could properly be imposed taking into account the modifying
circumstances. Hence, for the complex crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical
injuries and less serious physical injuries, qualified by his
failure to render assistance to the victims, he may be
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to prision
mayor in its medium period, as maximum. As to the crimes of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, since
the maximum term for each count is only two months the
Indeterminate Sentence Law will not apply.
PP VS. CELINO
FACTS: Two separate informations were filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Roxas City charging petitioner with violation of Section 2 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 6446 (gun ban), and Section 1, Paragraph 2 of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8294 (illegal possession of firearm).
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the gun ban violation
charge. Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash contending that he "cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of
firearms . . . if he was also charged of having committed another crime of
violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts.
Petitioner, citing Agote v. Lorenzo, People v. Ladjaalam, and other similar
cases, 25 contends that the mere filing of an information for gun ban
violation against him necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal
possession of firearm.
The trial court denied the Motion to Quash hence the present petition.
HELD: The accused can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms,
provided no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
Petitioner's reliance on Agote, Ladjaalam, Evangelista, Garcia, Pangilinan,
Almeida, and Bernal iscmisplaced. In each one of these cases, the
accused were exonerated of illegal possession of firearms because of
their commission, as shown by their conviction, of some other crime. In
the present case, however, petitioner has only been accused of
committing a violation of the COMELEC gun ban. As accusation is not
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synonymous with guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact
commit the other crime charged.

In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated

under R.A. 8294, any information for illegal possession of firearm should
be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be
tried together with such other offense, either considered as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an
element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup
d'etat. Conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those
enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal
possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.

PP VS. REYNES

FACTS: For shooting one Claro Bernardino to death, appellant Celso was
convicted of murder aggravated by treachery. He was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of death and hence, this appeal.

HELD: The Court sustained the conviction of appellant for the crime of
murder, it ruled that the penalty imposed should be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. Murder exists when one of the circumstances described in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, is
present. When more than one of said circumstances is proven, the others
must be considered as generic aggravating. However, when the other
circumstances are absorbed or included in one qualifying circumstance,
they can not be considered as generic aggravating. Certainly, once a
circumstance is used to qualify a crime, the same could no longer be
considered as generic aggravating. Since treachery qualified the
commission of the crime to murder, this circumstance could no longer be
appreciated anew as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death.

The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The
two penalties being both indivisible, and there being neither mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser
of the two penalties should be applied pursuant to the second paragraph
of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.