Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 5


[G.R. NO. 172248 : September 17, 2008]




The spouses Dionesio and Matea S. Asok owned several parcels of land.
Upon their death on September 14, 1973 and February 22, 1982,
respectively, their eleven children inherited the properties. One of the
lands inherited was a lot covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-4272, a free patent issued on July 19, 1967, located at Pagawan,
Manticao, Misamis Oriental with an area of 39,552 sq. m.4 The land was
inherited by Denison Asok (Asok). As a result, OCT No. P-4272 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-9626 was issued
and registered in his name on November 17, 1987.5

On August 31, 1989, Asok and his wife, respondent Ella Gagarani Asok,
borrowed P100,000 from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines.
They mortgaged the subject lot as collateral to guarantee payment of the
loan. They failed to pay the loan and the mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed pursuant to Act 3135.7 Petitioner emerged as the highest
bidder with a bid of P163,297.8

On November 28, 1991, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of

petitioner. This was registered on December 24, 1992.9 On March 25,
1998, petitioner's ownership over the property was consolidated and TCT
No. T-27172 was issued in its name.10

Meanwhile, Asok died on October 24, 1993 and was succeeded by his
surviving spouse and children (respondents).11

On May 15, 1998, respondents filed a complaint for repurchase against

petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Initao, Misamis Oriental,
Branch 44, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-68. On July 3, 1998, they filed
an amended complaint on learning that TCT No. T-9626 had been
cancelled by TCT No. T-27172 issued in the name of petitioner. They
invoked their right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of CA 141,
as amended.


(1) Whether Sec. 119 of CA 141 is applicable in this case;

(2) Whether respondents are the legal heirs of the patentees
(3) Whether the right to repurchase has already prescribed.


The plain intent of Sec. 119 is to give the homesteader or patentee every
chance to preserve and keep in the family the land that the State has
gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in cleaning, developing
and cultivating it. Hence, the fact that the land had been inherited by the
patentees’ son (and a new title in his name issued) does not bring it
outside the purview of Sec. 119. In fact, the policy behind the law is
fulfilled because the land remains in the family of the patentee.

The applicant for a homestead is to be given all the inducement that the
law offers and is entitled to its full protection. Its blessings, however, do
not stop with him. This is particularly so in this case as the appellee is the
son of the deceased. There is no question then as to his status of being a
legal heir. The policy of the law is not difficult to understand. The
incentive for a pioneer to venture into developing virgin land becomes
more attractive if he is assured that his effort will not go for naught
should perchance his life be cut short. This is merely a recognition of how
closely bound parents and children are in a Filipino family. Logic, the
sense of fitness and of right, as well as pragmatic considerations thus call
for continued adherence to the policy that not the individual applicant
alone but those so closely related to him as are entitled to legal
succession may take full advantage of the benefits the law confers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner Development

Bank of the Philippines is ordered to execute a deed of re-conveyance in
favor of respondents upon payment by the latter of the redemption price.

Petitioner Gullas maintains a current account with herein respondent PNB. He together with one Pedro
Lopez signed as endorsers of a Warrant issued by the US Veterans Bureau payable to the order of one
Francisco Bacos. PNB cashed the check but was subsequently dishonored by the Insular Treasurer. PNB
then sent notices to petitioner which could not be delivered to him at the time because he was in Manila.
PNB in the letter informed the petitioner the outstanding balance on his account was applied to the part
payment of the dishonored check. Upon petitioner’s return, he received the notice of dishonor and
immediately paid the unpaid balance of the warrant. As a consequence of these, petitioner was
inconvenienced when his insurance was not paid due to lack of funds and was publicized widely at his
area to his mortification.
Whether or not PNB has the right to apply petitioner’s deposit to his debt to the bank.
Ruling: NO.
As a general rule, a bank has a right of set off of the deposits in its hands for the payment of any
indebtedness to it on the part of a depositor. The Civil Code contains provisions regarding compensation
(set off) and deposit. The portions of Philippine law provide that compensation shall take place when
two persons are reciprocally creditor and debtor of each other. In this connection, it has been held that
the relation existing between a depositor and a bank is that of creditor and debtor. [General Rule]
Starting, therefore, from the premise that the Philippine National Bank had with respect to the deposit of
Gullas a right of set off, we next consider if that remedy was enforced properly. The fact we believe is
undeniable that prior to the mailing of notice of dishonor, and without waiting for any action by Gullas,
the bank made use of the money standing in his account to make good for the treasury warrant.
Gullas was merely an indorser and had issued in good faith. As to an indorser, the situation is different
and notice should actually have been given him in order that he might protect his interests. We
accordingly are of the opinion that the action of the bank was prejudicial to Gullas.
128 SCRA 577. 4 April 1984. Second Division (Makasiar, Actg., C.J.)

Topic: Article 1980; Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits.

From March 20, 1979 to March, 1981, private respondent David, together with his sister, Denise
Kuhne, invested with the Nation Savings and Loan Association (NSLA) the total sum of Pl,336,614.02
on several savings and time deposits. It appears further that private respondents David and Kuhne also
made investments in the aforesaid bank in the amount of US$75,000.00.
When the NSLA was placed under receivership on March 21, 1981, petitioners Guingona and
Martin, upon the request of private respondent David, assumed the obligation of the bank to the latter by
executing on June 17, 1981 a joint promissory note in favor of private respondent acknowledging an
indebtedness of Pl,336,614.02 and US$75,000.00
Thereafter, David received a report from the Central Bank that only P305,821.92 of those
investments were entered in the records of NSLA; that after demands, petitioner Guingona Jr. paid only
P200,000.00, thereby reducing the amounts misappropriated to P959,078.14 and US$75,000.00.
On December 23,1981, private respondent David filed I.S. No. 81-31938 in the Office of the City
Fiscal of Manila, which case was assigned to respondent Lota for preliminary investigation.
In I.S. No. 81-31938, David charged petitioners and the directors of the Nation Savings and Loan
Association, Inc., with estafa for allegedly misappropriating the balance of the investments, and violation
of Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related Central Bank regulations on foreign exchange transactions.

Whether the transactions between David and NSLA were simple loans which are civil in nature,
and not estafa?

It must be pointed out that when private respondent David invested his money on time and
savings deposits with the NSLA, the contract that was perfected was a contract of simple loan or
mutuum and not a contract of deposit. Thus, Article 1980 of the New Civil Code provides that:
Article 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of-money in banks and similar institutions shall be
governed by the provisions concerning simple loan.
The relationship between the private respondent and the Nation Savings and Loan Association is
that of creditor and debtor; consequently, the ownership of the amount deposited was transmitted to the
Bank upon the perfection of the contract and it can make use of the amount deposited for its banking
operations, such as to pay interests on deposits and to pay withdrawals. While the Bank has the
obligation to return the amount deposited, it has, however, no obligation to return or deliver the same
money that was deposited. And, the failure of the Bank to return the amount deposited will not constitute
estafa through misappropriation punishable under Article 315, par. l (b) of the Revised Penal Code, but it
will only give rise to civil liability.
CA Agro-Industrial Development Corp. vs CA
G.R. No. 90027 March 3, 1993

Doctrine: Contract of rent of a safety deposit box is a special kind of deposit, which is not to be strictly
governed by the provision on deposit.

Petitioner, CA Agro-Industrial Development Corp, and spouses Ramon and Pallia Pugao entered into an
agreement whereby the former purchased from the latter two (2) parcels of land in installment basis.
Among the terms and conditions of the agreement were that the titles to the lots shall be transferred to
the petitioner upon full payment of the purchase price and that the owner's copies of the certificates of
titles thereto, shall be deposited in a safety deposit box of any bank. Petitioner and the Pugaos then
rented Safety Deposit Box of private respondent Security Bank and Trust Company. Thereafter, a certain
Mrs. Margarita Ramos offered to buy from the petitioner the two (2) parcels of land. Ramos demanded
the execution of a deed of sale, which necessarily entailed the production of the certificates of title. In
view thereof, Aguirre, accompanied by the Pugao’s, then proceeded to the respondent Bank to open the
safety deposit box and get the certificates of title. However, when opened in the presence of the Bank's
representative, the box yielded no such certificates. Mrs. Ramos withdrew her offer and consequence
thereof, petitioner allegedly failed to realize the profit prompting them to file for complaint against the

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent bank. The CA affirmed the assailed decision on the ground
that the contract executed by the petitioner and the bank is a contract of lease, thus the bank has neither
possession nor control over the contents of the safety deposit box. Hence, this present petition.

Issue: WON the contract entered into by Ca-Agro Industrial Development Corp. and Security Bank and
Trust Company is a contract of rent.

No, the SC held that the contract for the rent of the safety deposit box executed by the parties is not an
ordinary contract of lease as defined in Article 1643 of the Civil Code which states that, in the lease of
things, one of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price
certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite. It cannot be characterized as an ordinary
contract of lease under Article 1643 because the full and absolute possession and control of the safety
deposit box was not given to the joint renters - the petitioner and the Pugaos. The guard key of the box
remained with the respondent Bank; without this key, neither of the renters could open the box. On the
other hand, the respondent Bank could not likewise open the box without the renter's key.