Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
The posting
G.R. No. 90501. August 5, 1991.*
of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein.’ ”
ARIS (PHIL.) INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER FELIPE
248
GARDUQUE III, LEODEGARIO DE GUZMAN, LILIA PEREZ, ROBERTO BESTAMONTE, AIDA OPENA, REYNALDO
TORIADO, APOLINARIO GAGAHINA, RUFINO DE CASTRO, FLORDELIZA RAYOS DEL SOL, STEVE SANCHO, 248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
ESTER CAIRO, MARIETA MAGALAD, and MARY B. NADALA, respondents.
Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. NLRC
Labor Law; Dismissal of Laborers; Police Power; Provision concerning the mandatory and automatic This is a new paragraph ingrafted into the Article.
reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid exercise Sections 2 and 17 of the “NLRC Interim Rules On Appeals Under R.A. No. 6715, Amending the Labor
of the police power of the state and the contested provision “is then a police legislation.”—Respondent Code”, which the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated on 8 August 1989, provide as
NLRC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on 20 November 1989. Meeting follows:
squarely the issues raised by petitioner, it submits that the provision concerning the mandatory and “Section 2. Order of Reinstatement and Effect of Bond.—In so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned,
automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee shall immediately be
exercise of the police power of the state and the contested provision “is then a police legislation.” executory even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms
Remedial Law; Execution Pending Appeal; Appeal; The right to appeal is not a constitutional, and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation, or, at the option of the employer, merely be
natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if reinstated in the payroll.
granted or provided by statute.—Execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal. One The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement.
cannot be divorced from the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing party or a party who is not xxx
satisfied with a judgment, while the former may be applied for by the prevailing party during the pendency Section 17. Transitory provision.—Appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the effectivity
of the appeal. The right to appeal, however, is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory of these Interim Rules must conform to the requirements as herein set forth or as may be directed by the
privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. The law may Commission.”
then validly provide limitations or qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the event an The antecedent facts and proceedings which gave rise to this petition are not disputed:
appeal is interposed by the losing party. Execution pending appeal is one such relief long recognized in this On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by
jurisdiction. The Revised Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal and the grant thereof is left to management’s failure to attend to their complaints concerning their working surroundings which had
the discretion of the court upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. become detrimental and hazardous, requested for a grievance conference. As none was arranged, and
Statutory Construction; Constitution; Laws are presumed consti-tutional.—To justify nullification of believing that their appeal would be fruitless, they grouped together after the end of their work that day
a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative with other employees and marched directly to the management’s office to protest its long silence and
implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the constitution is clear beyond inaction on their complaints.
reasonable doubt. On 12 April 1988, the management issued a memorandum to each of the private respondents, who
were identified by the petitioner’s supervisors as the most active participants in the “rally”, requiring them
to explain why they should not be terminated from the service for their conduct. Despite their explanation,
PETITION to review the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. private respondents were dismissed for violation of company rules and regulations, more specifically of
the provisions on security and public order and on inciting or participating in illegal strikes or concerted
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. actions.
Cesar C. Cruz & Partners for petitioner. 249
Zosimo Morillo for respondent Rayos del Sol.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy & Associates for private respondents. VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 249
Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. NLRC
DAVIDE, JR., J.: Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner and Mr. Gavino
Bayan with the regional office of the NLRC at the National Capital Region, Manila, which was docketed
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the amendment introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. therein as NLRC-NCR-00-04-01630-88.
6715 to Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (PD. No. 442, as amended) allowing execution After due trial, Labor Arbiter Felipe Garduque III handed down on 22 June 1989 a decision1 the
pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or dispositive portion of which reads:
separated employee and of Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under R.A. No. 6715 “ACCORDINGLY, respondent Aris (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate within ten (10) days from
implementing the same. It also questions the validity of the Transitory Provision (Section 17) of the said receipt hereof, herein complainants Leodegario de Guzman, Rufino de Castro, Lilia M. Perez, Marieta
Interim Rules. Magalad, Flordeliza Rayos del Sol, Reynaldo Toriado, Roberto Be-smonte, Apolinario Gagahina, Aidam (sic)
The challenged portion of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on 21 March 1989, Opena, Steve C. Sancho, Ester Cairo, and Mary B. Nadala to their former respective positions or any
reads as follows: substantial equivalent positions if already filled up, without loss of seniority right and privileges but with
“SEC. 12. Article 223 of the same code is amended to read as follows: limited backwages of six (6) months except complainant Leodegario de Guzman. All other claims and
‘ART. 223. Appeal. prayers are hereby denied for lack of merit.
xxx SO ORDERED.”
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so On 19 July 1989, complainants (herein private respondents) filed a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of
far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The Execution2 pursuant to the above-quoted Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715.
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to On 21 July 1989, petitioner filed its Appeal.3
On 26 July 1989, the complainants, except Flor Rayos del Sol, filed a Partial Appeal.4
On 10 August 1989, complainant Flor Rayos del Sol filed a Partial Appeal.5
On 29 August 1989, petitioner filed an Opposition6 to the motion for execution alleging that Section arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state and the contested provision “is then a police
12 of R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases pending at the legislation.”
time of its effectivity because it does not As regards the retroactive application thereof, it maintains that being merely procedural in nature, it
_______________ can apply to cases pending at the time of its effectivity on the theory that no one can claim a vested right
in a rule of procedure. Moreover, such a law is compatible with the constitutional provision on protection
1 Annex “C” of Petition; Rollo, 35-43. to labor.
2
Annex “G” of Petition; Id., 69. On 11 December 1989, private respondents filed a Manifestation14 informing the Court that they are
3 Annex “D” of Petition; Id., 44-57. adopting the Comment filed by the Solicitor General and stressing that petitioner failed to comply with the
4
Annex “E” of Petition; Id., 58-61. requisites for a valid petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
5 Annex “F” of Petition; Id., 62-68. On 20 December 1989, petitioner filed a Rejoinder15 to the Comment of the Solicitor General.
6
Annex “H” of Petition; Rollo, 71-75. In the resolution of 11 January 1990,16 We considered the Comments as respondents’ Answers, gave due
250 course to the petition, and directed that the case be calendared for deliberation.
In urging Us to declare as unconstitutional that portion of Section 223 of the Labor Code introduced
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, as well as the implementing provision covered by Section 2 of the NLRC
Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. NLRC Interim Rules, allowing immediate execution, even pending appeal, of the reinstatement aspect of a
expressly provide that it shall be given retroactive effect7 and to give retroactive effect to Section 12 decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, petitioner submits that said
thereof to pending cases would not only result in the imposition of an additional obligation on petitioner portion violates the due process clause of the Constitution in that it is oppressive and unreasonable. It
but would also dilute its right to appeal since it would be burdened with the consequences of argues that a reinstatement pending appeal negates the right of the employer to self-protection for it has
reinstatement without the benefit of a final judgment. In their Reply8 filed on 1 September 1989, been ruled that an employer cannot be compelled to continue in employment an employee guilty of acts
complainants argued that R.A. No. 6715 is not sought to be given retroactive effect in this case since the inimical to the interest of the employer; the right of an employer to dismiss is consistent with the legal
decision to be executed pursuant to it was rendered after the effectivity of the Act. The said law took effect truism that the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither the oppression nor the
on 21 March 1989, while the decision was rendered on 22 June 1989. destruction of the employer. For, social justice should be implemented not through mistaken sympathy
Petitioner submitted a Rejoinder to the Reply on 5 September 1989.9 for or misplaced antipathy against any group, but evenhandedly and fairly. 17
On 5 October 1989, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order10granting the motion for execution and the To clinch its case, petitioner tries to demonstrate the oppressiveness of reinstatement pending appeal
issuance of a partial writ of execution “as far as reinstatement of herein complainants is concerned in by portraying the following consequences: (a) the employer would be compelled to hire additional
consonance with the provision of Section 2 of the rules particularly the last sentence thereof.” employees or adjust the duties of other employees simply to have someone watch over the reinstated
In this Order, the Labor Arbiter also made reference to Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules in this employee to prevent the commission of further acts prejudicial to the employer, (b) reinstatement of an
wise: undeserving, if not undesirable, employee may demoralize the rank and file, and (c) it may encourage and
“Since Section 17 of the said rules made mention of appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to embolden not only the reinstated employees but also other employees to commit similar, if not graver
the effectivity of these interim rules which must conform with the requirements as therein set forth infractions.
(Section 2) or as may be directed by the Commission, it obviously treats of decisions of Labor Arbiters These rationalizations and portrayals are misplaced and are purely conjectural which, unfortunately,
before March 21, 1989. With more reason these interim rules be made to apply to the instant case since proceed from a misunderstanding of the nature and scope of the relief of execution pending appeal.
the decision hereof (sic) was rendered thereafter.11 Execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal. One cannot be divorced from the
Unable to accept the above Order, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 October 1989 12 raising the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing party or a party who is not satisfied with a judgment, while
issues adverted to in the introductory portion of this decision under the following assignment of errors: the former may be applied for by the prevailing party during the pendency of the appeal. The right to
appeal, however, is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory
origin18 and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. The law may then validly provide
“A.THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC, IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE limitations or qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PENDING APPEAL AND IN PROVIDING FOR SECTION 2 OF THE the losing party. Execution pending appeal is one such relief long recognized in this jurisdiction. The
INTERIM RULES, RESPECTIVELY, ACTED WITHOUT AND IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION SINCE THE Revised Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal and the grant thereof is left to the discretion of
BASIS FOR SAID ORDER AND INTERIM RULE, i.e., SECTION 12 OF R.A. 6715 IS VIOLATIVE OF the court upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.19
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS—IT BEING OPPRESSIVE AND Before its amendment by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, Article 223 of the Labor Code already allowed
UNREASONABLE. execution of decisions of the NLRC pending their appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the Labor Arbiter
B.GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE PROVISION IN (SIC) REINSTATEMENT PENDING APPEAL IS reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which,
VALID, NONETHELESS, THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC STILL ACTED IN EXCESS once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on labor and the workingman.
AND WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RETROACTIVELY APPLYING SAID PROVISION TO PENDING These provisions are the quintessence of the aspirations of the workingman for recognition of his role
LABOR CASES.” in the social and economic life of the nation, for the protection of his rights, and the
_______________
In Our resolution of 7 March 1989, We required the respondents to comment on the petition. 18 Aragon vs. Araullo, et al., 11 Phil. 7; U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218; Layda vs. Legaspi, 39 Phil.
Respondent NLRC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on 20 November
1989.13 Meeting squarely the issues raised by petitioner, it submits that the provision concerning the 93; Aguilar vs. Navarro, 55 Phil. 898; Santiago vs. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397; Abesames vs. Garcia, 98 Phil.
mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor 769; Gonzalez vs. CA, 3 SCRA 465; Bello vs. Fernando, 4 SCRA 138; United CMC Textile Workers Union vs.
Clave, 137 SCRA 346; Tropical Homes Inc. vs. NHA, 152 SCRA 540; Municipal Gov’t. of Coron vs. Carino, 154
SCRA 216; and Ozaeta vs. CA, 179 SCRA 800.
19Section 2, Rule 39.
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
254
Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. NLRC
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
clear beyond reasonable doubt.25 In Paredes, et al. vs. Executive Secretary,26 We stated:
Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. NLRC “2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions,
promotion of his welfare. Thus, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights of the one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former is to be
Constitution,20 which principally directs Congress to give highest priority to the enactment of measures preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all, the
that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political basic presumption all these years is one of validity. The onerous task of proving otherwise is on the party
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the seeking to nullify a statute. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is an
common good, the State is mandated to afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and infringement of a constitutional provision, save in those cases where the challenged act is void on its face.
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all; to Absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, does
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and not suffice. Justice Malcolm’s aphorism is apropos:‘To doubt is to sustain.’ ”27
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law, security of tenure, The reason for this:
human conditions of work, and a living wage, to participate in policy and decision-making processes “x x x can be traced to the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins on each department a proper
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law; and to promote the principle of shared respect for the acts of the other departments. x x x The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and
responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional
disputes. Incidentally, a study of the Constitutions of various nations readily reveals that it is only our before it was finally enacted. Hence, as long as there is some other basis that can be used by the courts
Constitution which devotes a separate article on Social Justice and Human Rights. Thus, by no less than its for its decision, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched upon and the case will be
fundamental law, the Philippines has laid down the strong foundations of a truly just and humane society. decided on other available grounds.”28
This Article addresses itself to specified areas of concern—labor, agrarian and natural resources reform, The issue concerning Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules does not deserve a measure of attention. The
urban land reform and housing, health, working women, and people’s organizations—and reaches out to reference to it in the Order of the Labor Arbiter of 5 October 1989 was unnecessary since the procedure
the underprivileged sector of society, for which reason the President of the Constitutional Commission of of the appeal proper is not involved in this case. Moreover, the questioned interim rules of the NLRC,
1986, former Associate Justice of this Court Cecilia Muñoz-Palma, aptly describes this Article as the “heart promulgated on 8 August 1989, can validly be given retroactive effect. They are procedural or remedial in
of the new Charter.”21 character, promulgated pursuant to the authority vested upon it under Article 218(a) of the Labor Code of
These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the the Philippines, as amended. Settled is the rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive
workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, effect.29 There are no vested rights in rules of procedure.30 A remedial statute may be made applicable to
which the Constitution also expressly affirms with equal intensity.22 Labor is an indispensable partner for cases pending at the time of its enactment.31
the nation’s progress and stability. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
If in ordinary civil actions execution of judgment pending appeal is authorized for reasons the Costs against petitioner.
determination of which is merely left to the discretion of the judge, We find no plausible reason to SO ORDERED.
withhold it in cases of decisions reinstating dismissed or separated employees. In such cases, the poor Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
employees had been deprived of their only source of livelihood, their only means of support for their Jr.,Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
family—their very lifeblood. To Us, this special circumstance is far better than any other which a judge, in JJ., concur.
his sound discretion, may determine. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law Petition dismissed.
itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal.
The validity of the questioned law is not only supported and sustained by the foregoing
considerations. As contended by the Solicitor General, it is a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
Certainly, if the right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State,
basically in the exercise of its permanent police power on the theory that the preservation of the lives of
the citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is more vital than the preservation of corporate profits. 23Then,
by and pursuant to the same power, the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending
appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to
stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat
or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and his family.
The charge then that the challenged law as well as the implementing rule are unconstitutional is
absolutely baseless. Laws are presumed constitutional.24 To justify nullification of a law, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication; a law
shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the constitution is
_______________
23
Manila Electric Co. vs. NLRC, supra, citing Euro-Linea, Phil. Inc. vs. NLRC, 156 SCRA 78. See also PAL,
Inc. vs. PALEA, 57 SCRA 498; Phil. Apparel Workers Union vs. NLRC, 106 SCRA 444.
24 La Union Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Yaranon, 179 SCRA 828; People vs. Permskul, 173 SCRA 324.
256
G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995.* VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 651
HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as
Lim vs. Pacquing
Judge, Branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila and ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents. from local governments, including the City of Manila, and transferred to the GAB on 1 January 1951
by Executive Order No. 392. The net result is that the authority to grant franchises for the operation of
G.R. No. 117263. January 27, 1995.* jaialai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory function is vested in the GAB.
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and DOMINADOR R. CEPEDA, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. VETINO REYES and Same; Same; Same; Legislative Franchise; ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-
ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. alai.—In relation, therefore, to the facts of this case, since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate
the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-
Constitutional Law; Validity of Statutes; PD No. 771; All laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed alai in the City of Manila.
valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by the Court.—The time-honored doctrine is that all Same; Same; Same; Legislative Enactment; Gambling is generally prohibited by law, unless another
laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this law is enacted by Congress expressly exempting or excluding certain forms of gambling from the reach of
Court. Not only this; Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution states: “Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, criminal law.—It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the Revised Penal Code punishes gambling
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with and betting under Articles 195 to 199 thereof. Gambling is thus generally prohibited by law, unless another
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.” law is enacted by Congress expressly exempting or excluding certain forms of gambling from the reach of
Same; Same; Same.—There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been criminal law. Among these forms of gambling allowed by special law are the horse races authorized by
repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still Republic Acts Nos. 309 and 983 and gambling casinos authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1869.
exercised legislative powers). Same; Same; Same; Same.—While jai-alai as a sport is not illegal per se, the accepting of bets or
_______________ wagers on the results of jai-alai games is undoubtedly gambling and, therefore, a criminal offense
punishable under Articles 195–199 of the Revised Penal Code, unless it is shown that a later or special law
*EN BANC. had been passed allowing it. ADC has not shown any such special law.
650 Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) enacted by
Congress on 18 June 1949 gave the Municipal Board powers that are basically regulatory in nature.—
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) which was enacted by Congress on 18 June
Lim vs. Pacquing 1949 gave the Municipal Board certain delegated legislative powers under Section 18. A perusal of the
Same; Constitution; Article VIII, Section 4(2); Only the Court En Banc can declare a law powers enumerated under Section 18 shows that these powers are basically regulatory in nature. The
unconstitutional under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.—Neither can it be tenably stated that regulatory nature of these powers finds support not only in the plain words of the enumerations under
the issue of the continued existence of ADC’s franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 Section 18 but also in this Court’s ruling in People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56).
was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court’s First Division in said case, aside from not Same; Same; Same; A law which gives the Provincial Board the discretion to determine whether or
being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En not a law of general application
Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution. 652
Same; Estoppel; The well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or 652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
errors, if any, of its officials or agents.—And on the question of whether or not the government
is estopped from contesting ADC’s possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State Lim vs. Pacquing
cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents (Republic v. Intermediate would be operative within the province is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of
Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90). legislative power.—ln Vera, this Court declared that a law which gives the Provincial Board the discretion
Same; Intervention; The Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise of its to determine whether or not a law of general application (such as, the Probation Law-Act No. 4221) would
governmental functions to protect public morals and promote the general welfare.—Consequently, in the or would not be operative within the province, is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of
light of the foregoing expostulation, we conclude that the Republic (in contra distinction to the City of legislative power.
Manila) may be allowed to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. The Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in Same; Same; Same.—From the ruling in Vera, it would be logical to conclude that, if ADC’s
the exercise, not of its business or proprietary functions, but in the exercise of its governmental functions arguments were to prevail, this Court would likewise declare Section 18(jj) of the Revised Charter of Manila
to protect public morals and promote the general welfare. unconstitutional for the power it would delegate to the Municipal Board of Manila would give the latter
Same; Delegation of Power; Rep. Act No. 409; What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in the absolute and unlimited discretion to render the penal code provisions on gambling inapplicable or
Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was the power to “license, permit, or regulate” which inoperative to persons or entities issued permits to operate gambling establishments in the City of Manila.
would not amount to something meaningful unless the holder of the permit or license was also franchised Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Validity; The rule is that laws must be presumed valid,
by the national government to so operate.—It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate constitutional and in harmony with other laws.—We need not go to this extent, however, since the rule is
to the City of Manila the power “to franchise” wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for that laws must be presumed valid, constitutional and in harmony with other laws. Thus, the relevant
itself such power “to franchise.” What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with provisions of Rep. Acts Nos. 409 and 954 and Ordinance No. 7065 should be taken together and it should
respect to wagers or betting. was the power to ‘license, permit. or regulate” which therefore means that then be clear that the legislative powers of the Municipal Board should be understood to be regulatory in
a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity, such as the jai-alai nature and that Republic Act No. 954 should be understood to refer to congressional franchises, as a
where bets are accepted, would not amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of the permit or necessity for the operation of jai-alais.
license was also FRANCHISED by the national government to so operate. Moreover, even this power to Same; Same; Same; Legislative Franchise; Franchises to operate jai-alais are for the national
license, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed government (not local governments) to consider and approve.—On the other hand, it is noteworthy that
651 while then President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 169 revoking PD No. 810 (which granted a
franchise to a Marcos-crony to operate the jaialai), she did not scrap or repeal PD No. 771 which had
revoked all franchises to operate jai-alais issued by local governments, thereby reaffirming the Same; Same; Same; Fundamentally, intervention is never an independent action but is ancillary and
government policy that franchises to operate jai-alais are for the national government (not local supplemental to an existing litigation.—Fundamentally then, intervention is never an independent action
governments) to consider and approve. but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor unnecessarily
Same; Same; Same; Same; Police Power; A gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, yet
police power for the public welfare.—Onthe alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection having a certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could
clauses of the Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple assert or protect such right or interest.
contract but rather it is, more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the Same; Same; Same; Intervention may be properly filed only before or during the trial of the case—
government’s The grant of an intervention is left to the discretion of the court. Paragraph (b), Section 2, Rule 12 of the
653 Rules of Court provides: (b) Discretion of court.—In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the
court, in the exercise of discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 653
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor’s rights
Lim vs. Pacquing may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. It is thus clear that, by its very nature, intervention
power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling presupposes an existing litigation or a pending case, and by the opening paragraph of Section 2, Rule 12
franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare. of the Rules of Court, it may be properly filed only before or during the trial of the said case. Even if it is
Same; Same; PD No. 771; Legislative Franchise; Gambling; The purpose of PD No. 771 is to give to filed before or during the trial, it should be denied if it will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the national government the exclusive power to grant gambling franchises.—As earlier noted, ADC has not the rights of the original parties and if the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate
alleged ever applying for a franchise under the provisions of PD No. 771. And yet, the purpose of PD No. proceeding.
771 is quite clear from its provisions, i.e., to give to the national government the exclusive power to grant Same; Same; Same; The motion to intervene was filed on the 15th day after the First Division had
gambling franchises. Thus, all franchises ‘then existing were revoked but were made subject to reissuance promulgated the decision. Consequently, intervention herein is impermissible under the rules.—lt is not
by the national government upon compliance by the applicant with government-set qualifications and disputed that the motion to intervene was filed only on 16 September 1994, or on the fifteenth (15th) day
requirements. after the First Division had
Same; Same; Same; Same; PD No. 771 did not violate the equal protection clause since the decree 655
revoked all franchises issued by the local governments without qualification or exception.—There was no VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 655
violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree revoked all franchises issued by
local governments without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the equal protection Lim vs. Pacquing
clause simply because it was the only one affected by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the promulgated the decision, and after petitioner Mayor Alfredo Lim complied with or voluntarily
government, ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. Besides, it is too late in satisfied the judgment. The latter act brought to a definite end or effectively terminated G.R. No. 115044.
the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its constitutional rights for it could have raised Consequently, intervention herein is impermissible under the rules. To grant it would be a capricious
these issues as early as 1975, almost twenty (20) years ago. exercise of discretion. The decision of this Court in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals cannot be used
Same; Statutory Construction; Validity of Statute; Requirement that all laws should embrace only to sanction such capriciousness for such decision cannot be expanded further to justify a new doctrine on
one subject which shall be expressed in the title is sufficiently met if the title is comprehensive enough to intervention. In the first place, the motions to intervene in the said case were filed before the rendition by
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect.—Finally, we do not agree that Section 3 of PD this Court of its decision therein. In the second place, there were unusual and peculiar circumstances in
No. 771 and the requirement of a legislative franchise in Republic Act No. 954 are “riders” to the two (2) the said case which this Court took into account. Of paramount importance was the fact that the
laws and are violative of the rule that laws should embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the prospective intervenors were indispensable parties.
title, as argued by ADC. In Cordero v. Cabatuando (6 SCRA 418), this Court ruled that the requirement Same; Same; Same.—Considering then that the intervention in the case at bar was commenced
under the Constitution that all laws should embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title only after the decision had been executed, a suspension of the Rules to accommodate the motion for
is sufficiently met if the title is comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the intervention and the intervention itself would be arbitrary. The Government is not without any other
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the recourse to protect any right or interest which the decision might have impaired.
accomplishing of the objective. Criminal Law; Illegal Gambling; Administrative Law; City Ordinance; Betting an the results of jai-alai
654 games whether within or offfronton is illegal and the City of Manila cannot, under the present state of the
law, license such betting.—Pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 483, which was not repealed by P.D. No. 1602
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
since the former is not inconsistent with the latter in that respect, betting in jai-alai is illegal unless allowed
Lim vs. Pacquing by law. There was such a law, P.D. No. 810, which authorized the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement
Corporation. However, as stated in the ponencia, P.D. No. 810 was repealed by E.O. No. 169 issued by then
DAVIDE, JR., J., Separate Opinion: President Corazon C. Aquino. I am not aware of any other law which authorizes betting in jai-alai. It follows
then that while the private respondent may operate the jai-alai fronton and conduct jai-alai games, it can
do so solely as a sports contest. Betting on the results thereof. whether within or off-fronton, is illegal and
Remedial Law; Intervention; Pleadings and Practice; Intervention could not be allowed after the
the City of Manila cannot, under the present state of the law, license such betting. The dismissal of the
trial had been concluded or after the trial and decision of the original case.—The phrase “at any period of
petition in this case sustaining the challenged orders of the trial court does not legalize betting, for this
a trial” in Section 1, Rule 13 of the old Rules of Court has been construed to mean the period for the
Court is not the legislature under our system of government.
presentation of evidence by both parties. And the phrase “before or during the trial” in Section 2, Rule 12
of the present Rules of Court “simply means anytime before the rendition of the final judgment.”
Accordingly, intervention could not be allowed after the trial had been concluded or after the trial and KAPUNAN, J., Separate Opinion:
decision of the original case.
Constitutional Law; Legislative Franchise; Administrative Law;City Ordinance; While the City of restraint neither violates the impairment of contracts nor the equal protection clauses of the Constitution
Manila granted a permit to operate under Ordinance No. 7065, this permit or authority was at best only a if the purpose is ultimately the public good.
656 Same; Same; Same; Franchise and licensing regulations aimed at protecting the public from the
pernicious effects of gambling are extensions of the police power addressed to a legitimate public need.—
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Restraints on property are not examined with the same microscopic scrutiny as restrictions on liberty. Such
Lim vs. Pacquing restraints, sometimes bordering on outright violations of the impairments of contract principle have been
local permit to operate and could be exercised by the ADC only after it shall have obtained a made by this Court for the general welfare of the people. Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v. Haskel once
legislative franchise.—I find no incompatibility therefore, between P.D. 771, which revoked all authority expansively described the police power as “extending to all public needs.” Franchise and licensing
by local governments to issue franchises for gambling and gaming establishments on one hand, and the regulations aimed at protecting the public from the pernicious effects of gambling are extensions of the
municipal ordinance of the City of Manila, granting a permit or license to operate subject to compliance police power addressed to a legitimate public need.
with the provisions found therein, on the other hand, a legislative franchise may be required by the Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; City Ordinance; ADC, while possessing a permit to operate
government as a condition for certain gambling operations. After obtaining such franchise, the franchisee pursuant to Ordinance 7065 of the
may establish operations in any city or municipality allowed under the terms of the legislative franchise, 658
subject to local licensing requirements. While the City of Manila granted a permit to operate under 658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ordinance No. 7065, this permit or authority was at best only a local permit to operate and could be
exercised by the ADC only after it shall have obtained a legislative franchise. Lim vs. Pacquing
Same; Same; Constitutional Adjudication; Where a controversy may be settled on a platform other City of Manila, still has to obtain a legislative franchise, PD No. 771 being valid and constitutional.—
than one involving constitutional adjudication, the court should exercise becoming modesty and avoid the In Lim vs. Pacquing, I voted to sustain the ADC’s position on issues almost purely procedural. A thorough
constitutional question.—This skirts the constitutional issue. Both P.D. 771 and Ordinance 7065 can stand analysis of the new issues raised this time, compels a different result since it is plainly obvious that the
alongside each other if one looks at the authority granted by the charter of the City of Manila together ADC, while possessing a permit to operate pursuant to Ordinance 7065 of the City of Manila, still has to
with Ordinance No. 7065 merely as an authority to “allow” and “permit” the operation of jai-alai obtain a legislative franchise, P.D. 771 being valid and constitutional.
facilities within the City of Manila. While the constitutional issue was raised by the respondent corporation
in the case at bench, I see no valid reason why we should jump into the fray of constitutional adjudication QUIASON, J., Dissenting Opinion:
in this case, or on every other opportunity where a constitutional issue is raised by parties before us. It is
a settled rule of avoidance, judiciously framed by the United States Supreme Court in Ashwander v.
Constitutional Law; Non-Impairment Clause; A law may be voided when it does not relate to a
TVA that where a controversy may be settled on a platform other than one involving constitutional
legitimate end and when it reasonably infringes on contractual and property rights.—Under the
adjudication, the court should exercise becoming modesty and avoid the constitutional question.
“substantive due process” doctrine, a law may be voided when it does not relate to a legitimate end and
Same; Same; Police Power; The State has every legitimate right, under the police power, to regulate
when it unreasonably infringes on contractual and property rights. The doctrine as enunciated in Allgeyer
gambling operations by requiring legislative franchises for such operations.—The State has every
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) can be easily stated, thus: the government has to employ means
legitimate right, under the police power, to regulate gambling operations by requiring legislative franchises
(legislation) which bear some reasonable relation to a legitimate end (Nowak, Rotunda and Young,
for such operations. Gambling, in all its forms, unless specifically authorized by law and carefully regulated
Constitutional Law 436, 443 [2d ed]).
pursuant to such law, is generally proscribed as offensive to the public morals and the public good. In
Same; Same; The grant of franchise to PJAC exposed PD No. 771 as exercise of arbitrary power to
maintaining a “state policy” on various forms of gambling, the political branches of government are best
divest ADC of its property rights.—Themotivation behind its issuance notwithstanding, there can be no
equipped to regulate and control such activities and therefore assume
constitutional objection to P.D. No. 771 insofar as it removed the power to grant jai-alai franchises from
657
the local governments. We said so in Basco v. Pagcor, 197 SCRA 52 (1991). The constitutional objection
VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 657 arises, however, when P.D. No. 771 cancelled all the existing franchises. We search in vain to find any
reasonable relation between Section 3 of P.D. No. 771 and any legitimate ends of government intended to
Lim vs. Pacquing
be achieved by its issuance. Besides, the grant of a franchise to PJAC exposed P.D. No. 771 as an exercise
full responsibility to the people for such policy. Parenthetically, gambling, in all its forms, is of arbitrary power to divest ADC of its property rights.
generally immoral. Section 3 of PD No. 771 is violative of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.—Section 3 also violated
Same; Same; Same; The police power to establish all manner of regulation of otherwise illicit, Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provided: “Every bill shall embrace only one subject
immoral and illegal activities is full, virtually illimitable and plenary.—The disturbing implications of a grant which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” The title of P.D. No. 771 reads as follows: “Revoking all
of a “franchise,” in perpetuity, to the ADC militates against its posture that the government’s insistence powers and authority of local government to grant franchise, license or permit and regulate wagers or
that the ADC first obtain a legislative franchise violates the equal protection and impairment of contracts betting by the public on horse and dog races, jai-alai or basque pelota, and other forms of gaming.”
clauses of the Constitution. By their very nature, franchises are subject to amendment, alteration or 659
revocation by the State whenever appropriate. Under the exercise of its police power, the State, through
its requirement for permits, licenses and franchises to operate, undertakes to regulate what would VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 659
otherwise be an illegal activity punished by existing penal laws. The police power to establish all manner Lim vs. Pacquing
of regulation of otherwise illicit, immoral and illegal activities is full, virtually illimitable and plenary.
Same; Same; PD No. 771; Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention
Same; Same; Same; In its exercise of police power, the State may impose appropriate impositions
of the parties, necessarily impairs the contract itself.—Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner
or restraints upon liberty or property in order to foster the common good.—ln Edu v. Ericta we defined the
changes the intention of the parties, necessarily impairs the contract itself (U.S. v. Conde, 42 Phil. 766
police power as “the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
[1922]; Clemons v. Nolting, 42 Phil. 702 .[1922]). A franchise constitutes a contract between the grantor
property in order to promote the general welfare.” In its exercise, the State may impose appropriate
and the grantee. Once granted, it may not be invoked unless there are valid reasons for doing so (Papa v.
impositions or restraints upon liberty or property in order to foster the common good. Such imposition or
Santiago, 105 Phil. 253 [1959]). A franchise is not revocable at the will of the grantor after contractual or
property rights thereunder have become vested in the grantee, in the absence of any provision therefor
VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 661
in the grant or in the general law (Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U.S. 544). D. The Republic
hypothesized that the said Constitutional guarantees presuppose the existence of a contract or property Lim vs. Pacquing
right in favor of ADC. It claims that Ordinance No. 7065 is not a franchise nor is it a contract but merely a multiple-sala station.” The Republic does not claim that Administrative Circular No. 1 has been
privilege for the purpose of regulation. violated in the assignment of the case to respondent Judge. The presumption of regularity of official acts
Ordinance No. 7065 is a franchise that is protected by the Constitution.—Ordinance No. 7065 is not therefore prevails.
merely a personal privilege that can be withdrawn at any time. It is a franchise that is protected by the Same; Same; Same; Notice; The purpose of notice is to afford the parties a chance to be heard in
Constitution. the assignment of their cases and this purpose is deemed accomplished if the parties were subsequently
Same; Legislative Franchise; A privilege 18 bestowed out of pure beneficence on the part of the heard.—Going back to Section 7 of Rule 22, this Court has ruled in Commissioner of Immigration v.
government. In a franchise, there are certain obligations assumed by the grantee which make up the Reyes, 12 SCRA 728 (1964) that the purpose of the notice is to afford the parties a chance to be heard in
valuable consideration for the contract.—The distinction between the two is that a privilege is bestowed the assignment of their cases and this purpose is deemed accomplished if the parties were subsequently
out of pure beneficence on the part of the government. There is no obligation or burden imposed on the heard. In the instant case, Executive Secretary Guingona and GAB Chairman Cepeda were given a hearing
grantee except maybe to pay the ordinary license and permit fees. In a franchise, there are certain on the matter of the lack of notice to them of the raffle when the court heard on September 23, 1994 their
obligations assumed by the grantee which make up the valuable consideration for the contract. That is Motion to Recall Temporary Restraining Order, Urgent Supplemental Motion to Recall Temporary
why the grantee is first required to signify his acceptance of the terms and conditions of the grant. Once Restraining Order and Opposition to Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
the grantee accepts the terms and conditions thereof, the grant becomes a binding contract between the Injunction (G.R. No. 117263, Rollo p. 434).
grantor and the grantee. Same; Restraining Order; Injunction; The purpose of a temporary restraining order or preliminary
Same; Same; A franchise in which money has been expended assumes the character of a vested injunction is to preserve the status quo ante litem motam or the last actual, peaceable, noncontested
right.—Another test used to distinguish a franchise from a privilege is the big investment risked by the status.—Thepurpose of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, whether preventive or
grantee. In Papa v. Santiago, supra, we held that this factor should be considered in favor of the grantee. mandatory, is merely to prevent a threatened wrong and to protect the property or rights involved from
A franchise in which money has been expended assumes the character of a vested right (Brazosport further injury, until the issues can be determined after the hearing on the merits (Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway,
Savings and Loan Association v. American Savings and Loan Association, 161 Tex. 543, 342 S.W. 2d. 747). 279 U.S. 813, 73 L. Ed. 972, 49 S. Ct. 256; Gobbi v. Dilao, 58 Or. 14,111 p. 49, 113, p. 57). What is intended
660 to be preserved is the status quo ante litem motam or the last actual, peaceable, noncontested status
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED (Annotation, 15 ALR 2d 237).
Same; Same; Same; Status quo sought to be maintained was that ADC was operating the jai-alai
Lim vs. Pacquing pursuant to Ordinance No. 7065 of the City of Manila.—In the case at bench, the status quo which the
Same; Statutes; Construction and Interpretation; Republic Act No. 938 as amended by Republic Act questioned orders of Judge Reyes sought to maintain was that ADC was operating the jai-alai pursuant to
No. 1224 provides that night clubs, cabarets, pavilions, or other similar places are covered by the 200-lineal Ordinance No. 7065 of the City of Manila, the various decisions of the different courts, including the
meter radius.—The operative law on the siting of jai-alai establishments is no longer E.O. No. 135 of Supreme Court, and the licenses, permits and provisional authority issued by GAB itself. At times, it may
President Quirino but R.A. No. 938 as amended by R.A. No. 1224. Under said law only night clubs, cabarets, be necessary for the courts to take some affirmative act essential to restore the status quo (lowa Natural
pavilions, or other similar places are covered by the 200-lineal meter radius. In the case of all other places Resources Council v. Van Zee [Iowa] 158 N.W. 2d. 111).
of amusements except cockpits, the proscribed radial distance has been reduced to 50 meters. With 662
respect to cockpits, the determination of the radial distance is left to the discretion of the municipal council
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
or city board (Sec. 1).
Remedial Law; Raffle of Cases; Assignment of Cases; Assignment of cases to the different branches Lim vs. Pacquing
of the trial court need not always be by raffle.—At the outset, it should be made clear that Section 7 of
Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of Court does not require that the assignment of cases to the different PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
branches of a trial court should always be by raffle. The Rule talks of assignment “whether by raffle or
otherwise.” What it requires is the giving of written notice to counsel or the parties “so that they may be
Constitutional Law; Construction and Interpretation; The title of a law is a valuable intrinsic aid in
present therein if they so desire.” Section 7 of Rule 22 provides: “Assignment of cases. In the assignment
determining legislative intent.—The title of R.A. No. 954 does not show that it seeks to limit the operation
of cases to the different branches of a Court of First Instance, or their transfer from one branch to another
of jai-alai only to entities with franchise given by Congress. What the title trumpets as the sole subject of
whether by raffle or otherwise, the parties or their counsel shall be given written notice sufficiently in
the law is the criminalization of certain practices relating to jai-alai games. The title of a law is a valuable
advance so that they may be present therein if they so desire.”
intrinsic aid in determining legislative intent.
Same; Same; Same; Cases necessitating the issuance of a temporary restraining order can be
Same; Same; The Explanatory Note of House Bill 3204 reveals that the intent of the law is to
allowed through a special raffle.—There may be cases necessitating the issuance of a temporary
criminalize the practice of illegal bookies and game-fixing in jai-alai.—The Explanatory Note of House Bill
restraining order to prevent irreparable injury on the petitioner. To await the regular raffle before the
3204, the precursor of R.A. No. 954, also reveals that the intent of the law is only to criminalize the practice
court can act on the motion for temporary restraining order may render the case moot and academic.
of illegal bookies and game-fixing in jaialai. It states: “This bill seeks to prohibit certain anomalous practice
Hence, Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 was issued by this Court allowing a special
of ‘bookies’ in connection with the holding of horse races or ‘basque pelota’ games. The term ‘bookie’ as
raffle. Said Circular provides: “8.3. Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of
commonly understood refers to a person, who without any license therefor, operates outside the
the interested party who seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive
compounds of racing clubs and accepts bets from the public. They pay dividends to winners minus a
Judge that unless a special raffle is conducted irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The
commission, which is usually 10%. Prosecutions of said persons have been instituted under Act No. 4240
special raffle shall be conducted by at least two judges in a multiplesala station.”
which was enacted in 1935. However, in a recent opinion released by the City Fiscal of Manila, he maintains
Same; Same; Same.—In a case where a verified application for special raffle is filed, the notice to
that Act No. 4240 has already been repealed, so that the present law regulating ordinary horse races
the adverse parties may be dispensed with but the raffle has to “be conducted by at least two judges in a
permits ‘bookies’ to ply their trade, but not on sweepstakes races and other races held for charitable
661
purposes. With the operation of ‘booking’ places in the City of Manila, the Government has been losing no Same; Same; Delegation of Power; The revocation of delegated power to local governments does
less than P600,000.00 a year, which amount represents the tax that should have been collected from bets not impair any right. Applicants to franchises have no right to insist that their applications be acted upon
made in such places. For these reasons, the approval of the bill is earnestly recommended” by local governments, Their right to a franchise is only in posse.—Part of the plenary power of Congress to
Same; Same; Nothing from the Explanatory Note suggests any intent of the law to revoke the power make laws is the right to grant franchises and permits allowing the exercise of certain privileges. Congress
of the City of Manila to issue permits to operate jai-alai games within its territorial jurisdiction.—As said can delegate the exercise of this innate power to grant franchises as it did to the City of Manila when it
Explanatory Note is expressive of the purpose of the bill, it gives a reliable keyhole on the scope and granted its charter on June 18, 1949 thru R.A. No. 409. Congress can also revoke the delegated power and
coverage of R.A. No. 954. Nothing from the Explanatory Note remotely suggests any intent of the law to choose to wield the power itself as it did thru then President Marcos who exercised legislative powers by
revoke the power of the City of Manila to issue permits to operate jaialai games within its territorial enacting P.D. No. 771. In the petitions at bench, Congress revoked the power of local governments to issue
jurisdiction. franchises and permits which it had priorly delegated, In doing so and in deciding to wield the power itself
Same; Same; Legislative debate is a good source to determine the intent of the law.—The Debates to meet the perceived problems of the time, the legislature exercised its distinct judgment and the other
in Congress likewise reject the reading of R.A. No. 954 by petitioners. Again, legislative debate is a good branches of government, including this Court, cannot supplant this judgment without running afoul of the
source principle of separation of powers. To be sure, this particular legislative method to regulate the problem of
663 mushrooming applications for jai-alai franchise cannot be faulted as bereft of rationality. In the hearing of
the petitions at bench, Executive Secretary Guingona established the fact that at the time of the enactment
VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 663
of P.D. No. 771, there were numerous applications to run jai-alai games in various cities and municipalities
Lim vs. Pacquing of the archipelago. To prevent the proliferation of these applications and minimize their ill effects, the law
to determine the intent of a law. centralized their screening by the national government alone. The law excluded local governments in the
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 954; R.A. No. 954 itself does not intimate that it is repealing any process. The revocation of the delegated power to local governments does not impair any
existing law, especially section 18(jj) of R.A. No. 409 otherwise known as the Charter of Manila.—To top it right. Applicants to franchises have no right to insist that their applications be acted upon by local
all, the text of R.A. No. 954 itself does not intimate that it is repealing any existing law, especially section governments. Their right to a franchise is only in posse.
18(jj) of R.A. No. 409, otherwise known as the Charter of Manila. Indeed, R.A. No. 954 has no repealing 665
provision. The reason is obvious—it simply prohibited certain practices in jai-alai then still unregulated by VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 665
the laws of the land. It did not regulate aspects of jai-alai already regulated by existing laws, like the matter
of whether it is the national government alone that should issue franchises to operate jai-alai games. Lim vs. Pacquing
Same; Same; PD No. 771; In clear and certain language, P.D. No. 771 recalled the power of local Same; Same; Same; Section 3 of P.D. No. 771 must be struck down as constitutionally infirmed.—
governments to issue jai-alai franchises and permits.—The subsequent enactment of P.D. No. 771 on Truth, however, has its own time of sprouting out. The truth behind the revocation of ADC’s franchise
August 20, 1975 further demolished the submission of petitioners. In clear and certain language, P.D. No. revealed itself when former President Marcos transferred ADC’s franchise to the Philippine Jai-Alai and
771 recalled the power of local governments to issue jai-alai franchises and permits. It also revoked existing Amusements Corporation then under the control of his brother-in-law, Mr. Alfredo “Bejo” Romualdez. The
franchises and permits issued by local governments. If R.A. No. 954 had already disauthorized local favored treatment was extended hardly two (2) months after the revocation of ADC’s franchise and it left
governments from granting franchises and permits, there would be no need to enact P.D. No. 771. No rule Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusements Corporation the sole jai-alai operator in the Philippines. The Court is
of statutory construction will consider any law a meaningless redundancy. not informed of any distinction of PJAC that will justify its different treatment. The evidence is thus clear
Same; Same; Same; If the City of Manila is empowered to license the ADC it is because the power and the conclusion is irresistible that section 3 of P D. No. 771 was designed with a malignant eye against
was delegated to it by Congress.—Thepassage of P.D. No. 771, also negates petitioners’ insistence that for ADC. In light of the established facts in field, section 3 of P.D. No. 771 must be struck down as
ADC to continue operating, it must show it has a franchise from Congress, not just a permit from the City constitutionally infirmed.
of Manila. The suggested dichotomy between a legislative franchise and city permit does not impress. If Same; Same; Same; P.D. No. 771 seeks merely to control the multiplication by restoring the
the City of Manila is empowered to license the ADC it is because the power was delegated to it by Congress. monopoly of national government in the dispensation of franchises.—There is no way to treat the self-
The acts of the City of Manila in the exercise of its delegated power bind Congress as well. Stated interest of a favored entity as identical with the general interest of the Filipino people. It will also be
otherwise, the permit given by the City to ADC is not any whit legally inferior to a regular franchise. Through repulsive to reason to entertain the thesis that the revocation of the franchise of ADC is reasonably
the years, the permit given by the City endows the grantee complete right to operate, Not once, except in necessary to enable the State to grapple to the ground the evil of jai-alai as a form of gambling. Petitioners
these cases, has the national government questioned the completeness of this right. For this reason, P.D. have not demonstrated that government lacks alternative options to succeed in its effort except to cancel
No. 771 has to revoke all existing franchises and permits without making any distinction. It treated permits the lone franchise of ADC. Well to stress, it is not the lofty aim of P.D. No. 771 to completely eradicate jai-
in the same class as franchises. alai games; it merely seeks to control its multiplication by restoring the monopoly of the national
664 government in the dispensation of franchises.
Same; Same; Same; Section 3 of P.D. No. 771 offends the Constitution which demands faithful
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
compliance with the requirements of due process, equal protection of the law, and non-impairment of
Lim vs. Pacquing contracts.—Prescinding from these premises, I share the scholarly view of Mr. Justice Quiason that Sec. 3
Same; Same; Police Power; Tests to determine validity of police measure.—But while the State is of P.D. No. 771 offends the Constitution which demands faithful compliance with the requirements of
bestowed near boundless authority to promote public welfare, still the exercise of police power cannot be substantive due process, equal protection of the law, and non-impairment of contracts. Capsulizing their
allowed to run riot in a republic ruled by reason. Thus, our courts have laid down the test to determine the essence, substantive due process exacts fairness; equal protection disallows distinction to the distinctless;
validity of a police measure as follows: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those and the guaranty of non-impairment of contract protects its integrity unless demanded otherwise by the
of particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the public good. Constitutionalism eschews the exercise of unchecked power for history demonstrates that a
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Deeper reflexion will reveal meandering, aimless power ultimately tears apart the social fabric of society. Thus, the grant of police
that the test reiterates the essence of our constitutional guarantees of substantive due process, equal power to promote public welfare cannot carry with it the privilege to be oppressive. The Constitution
protection, and nonimpairment of property rights. ordained the
666
3. 3.Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Development Corporation on 7 September 1971 in view of Executive Order No. 392 dated 1
Lim vs. Pacquing January 1951 which transferred from local governments to the Games and Amusements
State not just to achieve order or liberty but to attain ordered liberty,however elusive the balance Board the power to regulate Jai-Alai.”1
may be. Cognizant of the truism that in life the only constant is change, the Constitution did not design
that the point that can strike the balance between order and liberty should be static for precisely, the On 15 September 1994, respondent Associated Development Corporation (ADC) filed a petition for
process of adjusting the moving point of the balance gives government greater elasticity to meet the needs prohibition, mandamus, injunction and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ
of the time. of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner Guingona and then GAB
chairman Sumulong, docketed as Civil Case No. 94–71656, seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing the
PETITIONS for review of the decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 40 and Br. 4. provisional authority that had earlier been granted to ADC. On the same day, the RTC of Manila, Branch 4,
through presiding Judge Vetino Reyes, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the GAB from
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. withdrawing ADC’s provisional authority. This temporary restraining order was converted into a writ of
Chavez, Laureta & Associates and Cayanga, Zuñiga & Angel for private respondent. preliminary injunc-
Henry L. Domingo for movant-intervenors. _______________
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. x x x” 1. 1.The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949. Section 18
670 thereof provides:
III
On the issue of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes
in issuing the temporary restraining order (later converted to a writ of prelimi-
680
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lim vs. Pacquing
nary injunction) and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunc-tion, we hold and rule there was.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. While ADC could allege these grounds, respondent judge should have taken judicial notice of
Republic Act No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. These laws negate the
existence of any legal right on the part of ADC to the reliefs it sought so as to justify the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction. Since PD No. 771 and Republic Act No. 954 are presumed valid and constitutional
until ruled otherwise by the Supreme Court after due hearing, ADC was not entitled to the writs issued
and consequently there was grave abuse of discretion in issuing them.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, judgment is hereby rendered:
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995.* VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 651
HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as
Lim vs. Pacquing
Judge, Branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila and ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents. from local governments, including the City of Manila, and transferred to the GAB on 1 January 1951
by Executive Order No. 392. The net result is that the authority to grant franchises for the operation of
G.R. No. 117263. January 27, 1995.* jaialai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory function is vested in the GAB.
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and DOMINADOR R. CEPEDA, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. VETINO REYES and Same; Same; Same; Legislative Franchise; ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-
ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. alai.—In relation, therefore, to the facts of this case, since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate
the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-
Constitutional Law; Validity of Statutes; PD No. 771; All laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed alai in the City of Manila.
valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by the Court.—The time-honored doctrine is that all Same; Same; Same; Legislative Enactment; Gambling is generally prohibited by law, unless another
laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this law is enacted by Congress expressly exempting or excluding certain forms of gambling from the reach of
Court. Not only this; Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution states: “Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, criminal law.—It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the Revised Penal Code punishes gambling
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with and betting under Articles 195 to 199 thereof. Gambling is thus generally prohibited by law, unless another
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.” law is enacted by Congress expressly exempting or excluding certain forms of gambling from the reach of
Same; Same; Same.—There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been criminal law. Among these forms of gambling allowed by special law are the horse races authorized by
repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still Republic Acts Nos. 309 and 983 and gambling casinos authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1869.
exercised legislative powers). Same; Same; Same; Same.—While jai-alai as a sport is not illegal per se, the accepting of bets or
_______________ wagers on the results of jai-alai games is undoubtedly gambling and, therefore, a criminal offense
punishable under Articles 195–199 of the Revised Penal Code, unless it is shown that a later or special law
*EN BANC. had been passed allowing it. ADC has not shown any such special law.
650 Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) enacted by
Congress on 18 June 1949 gave the Municipal Board powers that are basically regulatory in nature.—
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) which was enacted by Congress on 18 June
Lim vs. Pacquing 1949 gave the Municipal Board certain delegated legislative powers under Section 18. A perusal of the
Same; Constitution; Article VIII, Section 4(2); Only the Court En Banc can declare a law powers enumerated under Section 18 shows that these powers are basically regulatory in nature. The
unconstitutional under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.—Neither can it be tenably stated that regulatory nature of these powers finds support not only in the plain words of the enumerations under
the issue of the continued existence of ADC’s franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 Section 18 but also in this Court’s ruling in People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56).
was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court’s First Division in said case, aside from not Same; Same; Same; A law which gives the Provincial Board the discretion to determine whether or
being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En not a law of general application
Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution. 652
Same; Estoppel; The well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or 652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
errors, if any, of its officials or agents.—And on the question of whether or not the government
is estopped from contesting ADC’s possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State Lim vs. Pacquing
cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents (Republic v. Intermediate would be operative within the province is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of
Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90). legislative power.—ln Vera, this Court declared that a law which gives the Provincial Board the discretion
Same; Intervention; The Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise of its to determine whether or not a law of general application (such as, the Probation Law-Act No. 4221) would
governmental functions to protect public morals and promote the general welfare.—Consequently, in the or would not be operative within the province, is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of
light of the foregoing expostulation, we conclude that the Republic (in contra distinction to the City of legislative power.
Manila) may be allowed to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. The Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in Same; Same; Same.—From the ruling in Vera, it would be logical to conclude that, if ADC’s
the exercise, not of its business or proprietary functions, but in the exercise of its governmental functions arguments were to prevail, this Court would likewise declare Section 18(jj) of the Revised Charter of Manila
to protect public morals and promote the general welfare. unconstitutional for the power it would delegate to the Municipal Board of Manila would give the latter
Same; Delegation of Power; Rep. Act No. 409; What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in the absolute and unlimited discretion to render the penal code provisions on gambling inapplicable or
Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was the power to “license, permit, or regulate” which inoperative to persons or entities issued permits to operate gambling establishments in the City of Manila.
would not amount to something meaningful unless the holder of the permit or license was also franchised Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Validity; The rule is that laws must be presumed valid,
by the national government to so operate.—It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate constitutional and in harmony with other laws.—We need not go to this extent, however, since the rule is
to the City of Manila the power “to franchise” wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for that laws must be presumed valid, constitutional and in harmony with other laws. Thus, the relevant
itself such power “to franchise.” What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with provisions of Rep. Acts Nos. 409 and 954 and Ordinance No. 7065 should be taken together and it should
respect to wagers or betting. was the power to ‘license, permit. or regulate” which therefore means that then be clear that the legislative powers of the Municipal Board should be understood to be regulatory in
a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity, such as the jai-alai nature and that Republic Act No. 954 should be understood to refer to congressional franchises, as a
where bets are accepted, would not amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of the permit or necessity for the operation of jai-alais.
license was also FRANCHISED by the national government to so operate. Moreover, even this power to Same; Same; Same; Legislative Franchise; Franchises to operate jai-alais are for the national
license, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed government (not local governments) to consider and approve.—On the other hand, it is noteworthy that
651 while then President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 169 revoking PD No. 810 (which granted a
franchise to a Marcos-crony to operate the jaialai), she did not scrap or repeal PD No. 771 which had
revoked all franchises to operate jai-alais issued by local governments, thereby reaffirming the Same; Same; Same; Fundamentally, intervention is never an independent action but is ancillary and
government policy that franchises to operate jai-alais are for the national government (not local supplemental to an existing litigation.—Fundamentally then, intervention is never an independent action
governments) to consider and approve. but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor unnecessarily
Same; Same; Same; Same; Police Power; A gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, yet
police power for the public welfare.—Onthe alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection having a certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could
clauses of the Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple assert or protect such right or interest.
contract but rather it is, more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the Same; Same; Same; Intervention may be properly filed only before or during the trial of the case—
government’s The grant of an intervention is left to the discretion of the court. Paragraph (b), Section 2, Rule 12 of the
653 Rules of Court provides: (b) Discretion of court.—In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the
court, in the exercise of discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 653
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor’s rights
Lim vs. Pacquing may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. It is thus clear that, by its very nature, intervention
power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling presupposes an existing litigation or a pending case, and by the opening paragraph of Section 2, Rule 12
franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare. of the Rules of Court, it may be properly filed only before or during the trial of the said case. Even if it is
Same; Same; PD No. 771; Legislative Franchise; Gambling; The purpose of PD No. 771 is to give to filed before or during the trial, it should be denied if it will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the national government the exclusive power to grant gambling franchises.—As earlier noted, ADC has not the rights of the original parties and if the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate
alleged ever applying for a franchise under the provisions of PD No. 771. And yet, the purpose of PD No. proceeding.
771 is quite clear from its provisions, i.e., to give to the national government the exclusive power to grant Same; Same; Same; The motion to intervene was filed on the 15th day after the First Division had
gambling franchises. Thus, all franchises ‘then existing were revoked but were made subject to reissuance promulgated the decision. Consequently, intervention herein is impermissible under the rules.—lt is not
by the national government upon compliance by the applicant with government-set qualifications and disputed that the motion to intervene was filed only on 16 September 1994, or on the fifteenth (15th) day
requirements. after the First Division had
Same; Same; Same; Same; PD No. 771 did not violate the equal protection clause since the decree 655
revoked all franchises issued by the local governments without qualification or exception.—There was no VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 655
violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree revoked all franchises issued by
local governments without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the equal protection Lim vs. Pacquing
clause simply because it was the only one affected by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the promulgated the decision, and after petitioner Mayor Alfredo Lim complied with or voluntarily
government, ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. Besides, it is too late in satisfied the judgment. The latter act brought to a definite end or effectively terminated G.R. No. 115044.
the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its constitutional rights for it could have raised Consequently, intervention herein is impermissible under the rules. To grant it would be a capricious
these issues as early as 1975, almost twenty (20) years ago. exercise of discretion. The decision of this Court in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals cannot be used
Same; Statutory Construction; Validity of Statute; Requirement that all laws should embrace only to sanction such capriciousness for such decision cannot be expanded further to justify a new doctrine on
one subject which shall be expressed in the title is sufficiently met if the title is comprehensive enough to intervention. In the first place, the motions to intervene in the said case were filed before the rendition by
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect.—Finally, we do not agree that Section 3 of PD this Court of its decision therein. In the second place, there were unusual and peculiar circumstances in
No. 771 and the requirement of a legislative franchise in Republic Act No. 954 are “riders” to the two (2) the said case which this Court took into account. Of paramount importance was the fact that the
laws and are violative of the rule that laws should embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the prospective intervenors were indispensable parties.
title, as argued by ADC. In Cordero v. Cabatuando (6 SCRA 418), this Court ruled that the requirement Same; Same; Same.—Considering then that the intervention in the case at bar was commenced
under the Constitution that all laws should embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title only after the decision had been executed, a suspension of the Rules to accommodate the motion for
is sufficiently met if the title is comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the intervention and the intervention itself would be arbitrary. The Government is not without any other
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the recourse to protect any right or interest which the decision might have impaired.
accomplishing of the objective. Criminal Law; Illegal Gambling; Administrative Law; City Ordinance; Betting an the results of jai-alai
654 games whether within or offfronton is illegal and the City of Manila cannot, under the present state of the
law, license such betting.—Pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 483, which was not repealed by P.D. No. 1602
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
since the former is not inconsistent with the latter in that respect, betting in jai-alai is illegal unless allowed
Lim vs. Pacquing by law. There was such a law, P.D. No. 810, which authorized the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement
Corporation. However, as stated in the ponencia, P.D. No. 810 was repealed by E.O. No. 169 issued by then
DAVIDE, JR., J., Separate Opinion: President Corazon C. Aquino. I am not aware of any other law which authorizes betting in jai-alai. It follows
then that while the private respondent may operate the jai-alai fronton and conduct jai-alai games, it can
do so solely as a sports contest. Betting on the results thereof. whether within or off-fronton, is illegal and
Remedial Law; Intervention; Pleadings and Practice; Intervention could not be allowed after the
the City of Manila cannot, under the present state of the law, license such betting. The dismissal of the
trial had been concluded or after the trial and decision of the original case.—The phrase “at any period of
petition in this case sustaining the challenged orders of the trial court does not legalize betting, for this
a trial” in Section 1, Rule 13 of the old Rules of Court has been construed to mean the period for the
Court is not the legislature under our system of government.
presentation of evidence by both parties. And the phrase “before or during the trial” in Section 2, Rule 12
of the present Rules of Court “simply means anytime before the rendition of the final judgment.”
Accordingly, intervention could not be allowed after the trial had been concluded or after the trial and KAPUNAN, J., Separate Opinion:
decision of the original case.
Constitutional Law; Legislative Franchise; Administrative Law;City Ordinance; While the City of restraint neither violates the impairment of contracts nor the equal protection clauses of the Constitution
Manila granted a permit to operate under Ordinance No. 7065, this permit or authority was at best only a if the purpose is ultimately the public good.
656 Same; Same; Same; Franchise and licensing regulations aimed at protecting the public from the
pernicious effects of gambling are extensions of the police power addressed to a legitimate public need.—
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Restraints on property are not examined with the same microscopic scrutiny as restrictions on liberty. Such
Lim vs. Pacquing restraints, sometimes bordering on outright violations of the impairments of contract principle have been
local permit to operate and could be exercised by the ADC only after it shall have obtained a made by this Court for the general welfare of the people. Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v. Haskel once
legislative franchise.—I find no incompatibility therefore, between P.D. 771, which revoked all authority expansively described the police power as “extending to all public needs.” Franchise and licensing
by local governments to issue franchises for gambling and gaming establishments on one hand, and the regulations aimed at protecting the public from the pernicious effects of gambling are extensions of the
municipal ordinance of the City of Manila, granting a permit or license to operate subject to compliance police power addressed to a legitimate public need.
with the provisions found therein, on the other hand, a legislative franchise may be required by the Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; City Ordinance; ADC, while possessing a permit to operate
government as a condition for certain gambling operations. After obtaining such franchise, the franchisee pursuant to Ordinance 7065 of the
may establish operations in any city or municipality allowed under the terms of the legislative franchise, 658
subject to local licensing requirements. While the City of Manila granted a permit to operate under 658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ordinance No. 7065, this permit or authority was at best only a local permit to operate and could be
exercised by the ADC only after it shall have obtained a legislative franchise. Lim vs. Pacquing
Same; Same; Constitutional Adjudication; Where a controversy may be settled on a platform other City of Manila, still has to obtain a legislative franchise, PD No. 771 being valid and constitutional.—
than one involving constitutional adjudication, the court should exercise becoming modesty and avoid the In Lim vs. Pacquing, I voted to sustain the ADC’s position on issues almost purely procedural. A thorough
constitutional question.—This skirts the constitutional issue. Both P.D. 771 and Ordinance 7065 can stand analysis of the new issues raised this time, compels a different result since it is plainly obvious that the
alongside each other if one looks at the authority granted by the charter of the City of Manila together ADC, while possessing a permit to operate pursuant to Ordinance 7065 of the City of Manila, still has to
with Ordinance No. 7065 merely as an authority to “allow” and “permit” the operation of jai-alai obtain a legislative franchise, P.D. 771 being valid and constitutional.
facilities within the City of Manila. While the constitutional issue was raised by the respondent corporation
in the case at bench, I see no valid reason why we should jump into the fray of constitutional adjudication QUIASON, J., Dissenting Opinion:
in this case, or on every other opportunity where a constitutional issue is raised by parties before us. It is
a settled rule of avoidance, judiciously framed by the United States Supreme Court in Ashwander v.
Constitutional Law; Non-Impairment Clause; A law may be voided when it does not relate to a
TVA that where a controversy may be settled on a platform other than one involving constitutional
legitimate end and when it reasonably infringes on contractual and property rights.—Under the
adjudication, the court should exercise becoming modesty and avoid the constitutional question.
“substantive due process” doctrine, a law may be voided when it does not relate to a legitimate end and
Same; Same; Police Power; The State has every legitimate right, under the police power, to regulate
when it unreasonably infringes on contractual and property rights. The doctrine as enunciated in Allgeyer
gambling operations by requiring legislative franchises for such operations.—The State has every
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) can be easily stated, thus: the government has to employ means
legitimate right, under the police power, to regulate gambling operations by requiring legislative franchises
(legislation) which bear some reasonable relation to a legitimate end (Nowak, Rotunda and Young,
for such operations. Gambling, in all its forms, unless specifically authorized by law and carefully regulated
Constitutional Law 436, 443 [2d ed]).
pursuant to such law, is generally proscribed as offensive to the public morals and the public good. In
Same; Same; The grant of franchise to PJAC exposed PD No. 771 as exercise of arbitrary power to
maintaining a “state policy” on various forms of gambling, the political branches of government are best
divest ADC of its property rights.—Themotivation behind its issuance notwithstanding, there can be no
equipped to regulate and control such activities and therefore assume
constitutional objection to P.D. No. 771 insofar as it removed the power to grant jai-alai franchises from
657
the local governments. We said so in Basco v. Pagcor, 197 SCRA 52 (1991). The constitutional objection
VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 657 arises, however, when P.D. No. 771 cancelled all the existing franchises. We search in vain to find any
reasonable relation between Section 3 of P.D. No. 771 and any legitimate ends of government intended to
Lim vs. Pacquing
be achieved by its issuance. Besides, the grant of a franchise to PJAC exposed P.D. No. 771 as an exercise
full responsibility to the people for such policy. Parenthetically, gambling, in all its forms, is of arbitrary power to divest ADC of its property rights.
generally immoral. Section 3 of PD No. 771 is violative of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.—Section 3 also violated
Same; Same; Same; The police power to establish all manner of regulation of otherwise illicit, Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provided: “Every bill shall embrace only one subject
immoral and illegal activities is full, virtually illimitable and plenary.—The disturbing implications of a grant which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” The title of P.D. No. 771 reads as follows: “Revoking all
of a “franchise,” in perpetuity, to the ADC militates against its posture that the government’s insistence powers and authority of local government to grant franchise, license or permit and regulate wagers or
that the ADC first obtain a legislative franchise violates the equal protection and impairment of contracts betting by the public on horse and dog races, jai-alai or basque pelota, and other forms of gaming.”
clauses of the Constitution. By their very nature, franchises are subject to amendment, alteration or 659
revocation by the State whenever appropriate. Under the exercise of its police power, the State, through
its requirement for permits, licenses and franchises to operate, undertakes to regulate what would VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 659
otherwise be an illegal activity punished by existing penal laws. The police power to establish all manner Lim vs. Pacquing
of regulation of otherwise illicit, immoral and illegal activities is full, virtually illimitable and plenary.
Same; Same; PD No. 771; Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention
Same; Same; Same; In its exercise of police power, the State may impose appropriate impositions
of the parties, necessarily impairs the contract itself.—Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner
or restraints upon liberty or property in order to foster the common good.—ln Edu v. Ericta we defined the
changes the intention of the parties, necessarily impairs the contract itself (U.S. v. Conde, 42 Phil. 766
police power as “the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
[1922]; Clemons v. Nolting, 42 Phil. 702 .[1922]). A franchise constitutes a contract between the grantor
property in order to promote the general welfare.” In its exercise, the State may impose appropriate
and the grantee. Once granted, it may not be invoked unless there are valid reasons for doing so (Papa v.
impositions or restraints upon liberty or property in order to foster the common good. Such imposition or
Santiago, 105 Phil. 253 [1959]). A franchise is not revocable at the will of the grantor after contractual or
property rights thereunder have become vested in the grantee, in the absence of any provision therefor
VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 661
in the grant or in the general law (Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U.S. 544). D. The Republic
hypothesized that the said Constitutional guarantees presuppose the existence of a contract or property Lim vs. Pacquing
right in favor of ADC. It claims that Ordinance No. 7065 is not a franchise nor is it a contract but merely a multiple-sala station.” The Republic does not claim that Administrative Circular No. 1 has been
privilege for the purpose of regulation. violated in the assignment of the case to respondent Judge. The presumption of regularity of official acts
Ordinance No. 7065 is a franchise that is protected by the Constitution.—Ordinance No. 7065 is not therefore prevails.
merely a personal privilege that can be withdrawn at any time. It is a franchise that is protected by the Same; Same; Same; Notice; The purpose of notice is to afford the parties a chance to be heard in
Constitution. the assignment of their cases and this purpose is deemed accomplished if the parties were subsequently
Same; Legislative Franchise; A privilege 18 bestowed out of pure beneficence on the part of the heard.—Going back to Section 7 of Rule 22, this Court has ruled in Commissioner of Immigration v.
government. In a franchise, there are certain obligations assumed by the grantee which make up the Reyes, 12 SCRA 728 (1964) that the purpose of the notice is to afford the parties a chance to be heard in
valuable consideration for the contract.—The distinction between the two is that a privilege is bestowed the assignment of their cases and this purpose is deemed accomplished if the parties were subsequently
out of pure beneficence on the part of the government. There is no obligation or burden imposed on the heard. In the instant case, Executive Secretary Guingona and GAB Chairman Cepeda were given a hearing
grantee except maybe to pay the ordinary license and permit fees. In a franchise, there are certain on the matter of the lack of notice to them of the raffle when the court heard on September 23, 1994 their
obligations assumed by the grantee which make up the valuable consideration for the contract. That is Motion to Recall Temporary Restraining Order, Urgent Supplemental Motion to Recall Temporary
why the grantee is first required to signify his acceptance of the terms and conditions of the grant. Once Restraining Order and Opposition to Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
the grantee accepts the terms and conditions thereof, the grant becomes a binding contract between the Injunction (G.R. No. 117263, Rollo p. 434).
grantor and the grantee. Same; Restraining Order; Injunction; The purpose of a temporary restraining order or preliminary
Same; Same; A franchise in which money has been expended assumes the character of a vested injunction is to preserve the status quo ante litem motam or the last actual, peaceable, noncontested
right.—Another test used to distinguish a franchise from a privilege is the big investment risked by the status.—Thepurpose of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, whether preventive or
grantee. In Papa v. Santiago, supra, we held that this factor should be considered in favor of the grantee. mandatory, is merely to prevent a threatened wrong and to protect the property or rights involved from
A franchise in which money has been expended assumes the character of a vested right (Brazosport further injury, until the issues can be determined after the hearing on the merits (Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway,
Savings and Loan Association v. American Savings and Loan Association, 161 Tex. 543, 342 S.W. 2d. 747). 279 U.S. 813, 73 L. Ed. 972, 49 S. Ct. 256; Gobbi v. Dilao, 58 Or. 14,111 p. 49, 113, p. 57). What is intended
660 to be preserved is the status quo ante litem motam or the last actual, peaceable, noncontested status
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED (Annotation, 15 ALR 2d 237).
Same; Same; Same; Status quo sought to be maintained was that ADC was operating the jai-alai
Lim vs. Pacquing pursuant to Ordinance No. 7065 of the City of Manila.—In the case at bench, the status quo which the
Same; Statutes; Construction and Interpretation; Republic Act No. 938 as amended by Republic Act questioned orders of Judge Reyes sought to maintain was that ADC was operating the jai-alai pursuant to
No. 1224 provides that night clubs, cabarets, pavilions, or other similar places are covered by the 200-lineal Ordinance No. 7065 of the City of Manila, the various decisions of the different courts, including the
meter radius.—The operative law on the siting of jai-alai establishments is no longer E.O. No. 135 of Supreme Court, and the licenses, permits and provisional authority issued by GAB itself. At times, it may
President Quirino but R.A. No. 938 as amended by R.A. No. 1224. Under said law only night clubs, cabarets, be necessary for the courts to take some affirmative act essential to restore the status quo (lowa Natural
pavilions, or other similar places are covered by the 200-lineal meter radius. In the case of all other places Resources Council v. Van Zee [Iowa] 158 N.W. 2d. 111).
of amusements except cockpits, the proscribed radial distance has been reduced to 50 meters. With 662
respect to cockpits, the determination of the radial distance is left to the discretion of the municipal council
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
or city board (Sec. 1).
Remedial Law; Raffle of Cases; Assignment of Cases; Assignment of cases to the different branches Lim vs. Pacquing
of the trial court need not always be by raffle.—At the outset, it should be made clear that Section 7 of
Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of Court does not require that the assignment of cases to the different PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
branches of a trial court should always be by raffle. The Rule talks of assignment “whether by raffle or
otherwise.” What it requires is the giving of written notice to counsel or the parties “so that they may be
Constitutional Law; Construction and Interpretation; The title of a law is a valuable intrinsic aid in
present therein if they so desire.” Section 7 of Rule 22 provides: “Assignment of cases. In the assignment
determining legislative intent.—The title of R.A. No. 954 does not show that it seeks to limit the operation
of cases to the different branches of a Court of First Instance, or their transfer from one branch to another
of jai-alai only to entities with franchise given by Congress. What the title trumpets as the sole subject of
whether by raffle or otherwise, the parties or their counsel shall be given written notice sufficiently in
the law is the criminalization of certain practices relating to jai-alai games. The title of a law is a valuable
advance so that they may be present therein if they so desire.”
intrinsic aid in determining legislative intent.
Same; Same; Same; Cases necessitating the issuance of a temporary restraining order can be
Same; Same; The Explanatory Note of House Bill 3204 reveals that the intent of the law is to
allowed through a special raffle.—There may be cases necessitating the issuance of a temporary
criminalize the practice of illegal bookies and game-fixing in jai-alai.—The Explanatory Note of House Bill
restraining order to prevent irreparable injury on the petitioner. To await the regular raffle before the
3204, the precursor of R.A. No. 954, also reveals that the intent of the law is only to criminalize the practice
court can act on the motion for temporary restraining order may render the case moot and academic.
of illegal bookies and game-fixing in jaialai. It states: “This bill seeks to prohibit certain anomalous practice
Hence, Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 was issued by this Court allowing a special
of ‘bookies’ in connection with the holding of horse races or ‘basque pelota’ games. The term ‘bookie’ as
raffle. Said Circular provides: “8.3. Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of
commonly understood refers to a person, who without any license therefor, operates outside the
the interested party who seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive
compounds of racing clubs and accepts bets from the public. They pay dividends to winners minus a
Judge that unless a special raffle is conducted irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The
commission, which is usually 10%. Prosecutions of said persons have been instituted under Act No. 4240
special raffle shall be conducted by at least two judges in a multiplesala station.”
which was enacted in 1935. However, in a recent opinion released by the City Fiscal of Manila, he maintains
Same; Same; Same.—In a case where a verified application for special raffle is filed, the notice to
that Act No. 4240 has already been repealed, so that the present law regulating ordinary horse races
the adverse parties may be dispensed with but the raffle has to “be conducted by at least two judges in a
permits ‘bookies’ to ply their trade, but not on sweepstakes races and other races held for charitable
661
purposes. With the operation of ‘booking’ places in the City of Manila, the Government has been losing no Same; Same; Delegation of Power; The revocation of delegated power to local governments does
less than P600,000.00 a year, which amount represents the tax that should have been collected from bets not impair any right. Applicants to franchises have no right to insist that their applications be acted upon
made in such places. For these reasons, the approval of the bill is earnestly recommended” by local governments, Their right to a franchise is only in posse.—Part of the plenary power of Congress to
Same; Same; Nothing from the Explanatory Note suggests any intent of the law to revoke the power make laws is the right to grant franchises and permits allowing the exercise of certain privileges. Congress
of the City of Manila to issue permits to operate jai-alai games within its territorial jurisdiction.—As said can delegate the exercise of this innate power to grant franchises as it did to the City of Manila when it
Explanatory Note is expressive of the purpose of the bill, it gives a reliable keyhole on the scope and granted its charter on June 18, 1949 thru R.A. No. 409. Congress can also revoke the delegated power and
coverage of R.A. No. 954. Nothing from the Explanatory Note remotely suggests any intent of the law to choose to wield the power itself as it did thru then President Marcos who exercised legislative powers by
revoke the power of the City of Manila to issue permits to operate jaialai games within its territorial enacting P.D. No. 771. In the petitions at bench, Congress revoked the power of local governments to issue
jurisdiction. franchises and permits which it had priorly delegated, In doing so and in deciding to wield the power itself
Same; Same; Legislative debate is a good source to determine the intent of the law.—The Debates to meet the perceived problems of the time, the legislature exercised its distinct judgment and the other
in Congress likewise reject the reading of R.A. No. 954 by petitioners. Again, legislative debate is a good branches of government, including this Court, cannot supplant this judgment without running afoul of the
source principle of separation of powers. To be sure, this particular legislative method to regulate the problem of
663 mushrooming applications for jai-alai franchise cannot be faulted as bereft of rationality. In the hearing of
the petitions at bench, Executive Secretary Guingona established the fact that at the time of the enactment
VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 663
of P.D. No. 771, there were numerous applications to run jai-alai games in various cities and municipalities
Lim vs. Pacquing of the archipelago. To prevent the proliferation of these applications and minimize their ill effects, the law
to determine the intent of a law. centralized their screening by the national government alone. The law excluded local governments in the
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 954; R.A. No. 954 itself does not intimate that it is repealing any process. The revocation of the delegated power to local governments does not impair any
existing law, especially section 18(jj) of R.A. No. 409 otherwise known as the Charter of Manila.—To top it right. Applicants to franchises have no right to insist that their applications be acted upon by local
all, the text of R.A. No. 954 itself does not intimate that it is repealing any existing law, especially section governments. Their right to a franchise is only in posse.
18(jj) of R.A. No. 409, otherwise known as the Charter of Manila. Indeed, R.A. No. 954 has no repealing 665
provision. The reason is obvious—it simply prohibited certain practices in jai-alai then still unregulated by VOL. 240, JANUARY 27, 1995 665
the laws of the land. It did not regulate aspects of jai-alai already regulated by existing laws, like the matter
of whether it is the national government alone that should issue franchises to operate jai-alai games. Lim vs. Pacquing
Same; Same; PD No. 771; In clear and certain language, P.D. No. 771 recalled the power of local Same; Same; Same; Section 3 of P.D. No. 771 must be struck down as constitutionally infirmed.—
governments to issue jai-alai franchises and permits.—The subsequent enactment of P.D. No. 771 on Truth, however, has its own time of sprouting out. The truth behind the revocation of ADC’s franchise
August 20, 1975 further demolished the submission of petitioners. In clear and certain language, P.D. No. revealed itself when former President Marcos transferred ADC’s franchise to the Philippine Jai-Alai and
771 recalled the power of local governments to issue jai-alai franchises and permits. It also revoked existing Amusements Corporation then under the control of his brother-in-law, Mr. Alfredo “Bejo” Romualdez. The
franchises and permits issued by local governments. If R.A. No. 954 had already disauthorized local favored treatment was extended hardly two (2) months after the revocation of ADC’s franchise and it left
governments from granting franchises and permits, there would be no need to enact P.D. No. 771. No rule Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusements Corporation the sole jai-alai operator in the Philippines. The Court is
of statutory construction will consider any law a meaningless redundancy. not informed of any distinction of PJAC that will justify its different treatment. The evidence is thus clear
Same; Same; Same; If the City of Manila is empowered to license the ADC it is because the power and the conclusion is irresistible that section 3 of P D. No. 771 was designed with a malignant eye against
was delegated to it by Congress.—Thepassage of P.D. No. 771, also negates petitioners’ insistence that for ADC. In light of the established facts in field, section 3 of P.D. No. 771 must be struck down as
ADC to continue operating, it must show it has a franchise from Congress, not just a permit from the City constitutionally infirmed.
of Manila. The suggested dichotomy between a legislative franchise and city permit does not impress. If Same; Same; Same; P.D. No. 771 seeks merely to control the multiplication by restoring the
the City of Manila is empowered to license the ADC it is because the power was delegated to it by Congress. monopoly of national government in the dispensation of franchises.—There is no way to treat the self-
The acts of the City of Manila in the exercise of its delegated power bind Congress as well. Stated interest of a favored entity as identical with the general interest of the Filipino people. It will also be
otherwise, the permit given by the City to ADC is not any whit legally inferior to a regular franchise. Through repulsive to reason to entertain the thesis that the revocation of the franchise of ADC is reasonably
the years, the permit given by the City endows the grantee complete right to operate, Not once, except in necessary to enable the State to grapple to the ground the evil of jai-alai as a form of gambling. Petitioners
these cases, has the national government questioned the completeness of this right. For this reason, P.D. have not demonstrated that government lacks alternative options to succeed in its effort except to cancel
No. 771 has to revoke all existing franchises and permits without making any distinction. It treated permits the lone franchise of ADC. Well to stress, it is not the lofty aim of P.D. No. 771 to completely eradicate jai-
in the same class as franchises. alai games; it merely seeks to control its multiplication by restoring the monopoly of the national
664 government in the dispensation of franchises.
Same; Same; Same; Section 3 of P.D. No. 771 offends the Constitution which demands faithful
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
compliance with the requirements of due process, equal protection of the law, and non-impairment of
Lim vs. Pacquing contracts.—Prescinding from these premises, I share the scholarly view of Mr. Justice Quiason that Sec. 3
Same; Same; Police Power; Tests to determine validity of police measure.—But while the State is of P.D. No. 771 offends the Constitution which demands faithful compliance with the requirements of
bestowed near boundless authority to promote public welfare, still the exercise of police power cannot be substantive due process, equal protection of the law, and non-impairment of contracts. Capsulizing their
allowed to run riot in a republic ruled by reason. Thus, our courts have laid down the test to determine the essence, substantive due process exacts fairness; equal protection disallows distinction to the distinctless;
validity of a police measure as follows: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those and the guaranty of non-impairment of contract protects its integrity unless demanded otherwise by the
of particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the public good. Constitutionalism eschews the exercise of unchecked power for history demonstrates that a
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Deeper reflexion will reveal meandering, aimless power ultimately tears apart the social fabric of society. Thus, the grant of police
that the test reiterates the essence of our constitutional guarantees of substantive due process, equal power to promote public welfare cannot carry with it the privilege to be oppressive. The Constitution
protection, and nonimpairment of property rights. ordained the
666
3. 3.Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Development Corporation on 7 September 1971 in view of Executive Order No. 392 dated 1
Lim vs. Pacquing January 1951 which transferred from local governments to the Games and Amusements
State not just to achieve order or liberty but to attain ordered liberty,however elusive the balance Board the power to regulate Jai-Alai.”1
may be. Cognizant of the truism that in life the only constant is change, the Constitution did not design
that the point that can strike the balance between order and liberty should be static for precisely, the On 15 September 1994, respondent Associated Development Corporation (ADC) filed a petition for
process of adjusting the moving point of the balance gives government greater elasticity to meet the needs prohibition, mandamus, injunction and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ
of the time. of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner Guingona and then GAB
chairman Sumulong, docketed as Civil Case No. 94–71656, seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing the
PETITIONS for review of the decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 40 and Br. 4. provisional authority that had earlier been granted to ADC. On the same day, the RTC of Manila, Branch 4,
through presiding Judge Vetino Reyes, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the GAB from
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. withdrawing ADC’s provisional authority. This temporary restraining order was converted into a writ of
Chavez, Laureta & Associates and Cayanga, Zuñiga & Angel for private respondent. preliminary injunc-
Henry L. Domingo for movant-intervenors. _______________
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. x x x” 1. 1.The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949. Section 18
670 thereof provides:
III
On the issue of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes
in issuing the temporary restraining order (later converted to a writ of prelimi-
680
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lim vs. Pacquing
nary injunction) and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunc-tion, we hold and rule there was.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. While ADC could allege these grounds, respondent judge should have taken judicial notice of
Republic Act No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. These laws negate the
existence of any legal right on the part of ADC to the reliefs it sought so as to justify the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction. Since PD No. 771 and Republic Act No. 954 are presumed valid and constitutional
until ruled otherwise by the Supreme Court after due hearing, ADC was not entitled to the writs issued
and consequently there was grave abuse of discretion in issuing them.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, judgment is hereby rendered:
SO ORDERED.
CORONA, J.:
G.R. No. 149276. September 27, 2002.*
JOVENCIO LIM and TERESITA LIM, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 217, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, AND WILSON CHAM, The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by
respondents. increasing the penalties for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, is being challenged in this
petition for certiorari, for being violative of the due process clause, the right to bail and the provision
Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Judgments; Cruel and Excessive Punishment; Settled is the rule against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the Constitution.
that punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties’ pleadings and documentary proofs, follow.
offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the In December 1991, petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two postdated checks, namely,
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.—Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized Metrobank check no. 464728 dated January 15, 1992 in the amount of P365,750 and Metrobank check no.
by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and 464743 dated January 22, 1992 in the amount of P429,000. Check no. 464728 was dishonored upon
plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of presentment for
the community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty 196
to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this principle, the Court has consistently overruled 196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is
cruel and degrading. Lim vs. People
Same; Same; Same; Same; The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed having been drawn against insufficient funds while check no. 464743 was not presented for payment upon
at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of its duration or amount, and request of petitioners who promised to replace the dishonored check.
applies to punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or When petitioners reneged on their promise to cover the amount of check no. 464728, the private
obsolete.—In People vs. Tongko, this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment respondent filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charging
is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of its petitioner spouses with the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
duration or amount, and applies to punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment amended by PD 818.
regards as cruel or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or in the On February 16, 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause against
pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and the like. The fact that the petitioners and recommending the filing of an information for estafa with no bail recommended. On the
penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law unconstitutional and does not, by that same day, an information for the crime of estafa was filed with Branch 217 of the Regional Trial Court of
circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman. Quezon City against petitioners. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01-101574. Thereafter, the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decree 818; The increase in penalty in PD 818 is to trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of herein petitioners, thus:
effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the country’s commercial and economic growth, and “It appearing on the face of the information and from supporting affidavit of the complaining witness and
to serve as a necessary precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks.—Clearly, the its annexes that probable cause exists, that the crime charged was committed and accused is probably
______________ guilty thereof, let a warrant for the arrest of the accused be issued.
No Bail Recommended.
*
EN BANC. SO ORDERED.”1
195 On July 18, 2001, petitioners filed an “Urgent Motion to Quash Information and Warrant of Arrest” which
was denied by the trial court. Likewise, petitioners’ motion for bail filed on July 24, 2001 was denied by
VOL. 390, SEPTEMBER 27, 2002 195 the trial court on the same day. Petitioner Jovencio Lim was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest
Lim vs. People issued by the trial court and was detained at the Quezon City Jail. However, petitioner Teresita Lim
remained at large.
increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose,
On August 22, 2001, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of
namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the country’s commercial and economic
discretion on the part of the lower court and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, arguing that
growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that
PD 818 violates the constitutional provisions on due process, bail and imposition of cruel, degrading or
PD 818 did not increase the amounts corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount is
inhuman punishment.
immaterial and inconsequential. What the law sought to avert was the proliferation of estafa cases
______________
committed by means of bouncing checks. Taking into account the salutary purpose for which said law was
decreed, we conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution.
1
Same; Same; Same; The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it.— Rollo, p. 29.
When a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. To justify 197
its nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and VOL. 390, SEPTEMBER 27, 2002 197
argumentative one. The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it. In this
case, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality Lim vs. People
of PD 818. In a resolution dated February 26, 2002, this Court granted the petition of Jovencio Lim to post bail
pursuant to Department of Justice Circular No. 74 dated November 6, 2001 which amended the 2000 Bail
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Bond Guide involving estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d), and qualified theft. Said Circular specifically
provides as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. 3) Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over in which the imposable penalty is reclusion
Puno & Associates Law Office for petitioners. temporal to reclusion perpetua, bail shall be based on reclusion temporal maximum, pursuant to Par. 2 (a)
Rodante D. Marcoleta for private respondent.
of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, multiplied by P2,000.00, plus an additional of P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 ing on the wheel, disemboweling and the like. The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient basis
in excess of P22,000.00; Provided, however, that the total amount of bail shall not exceed P60,000.00. to declare a law unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman.
In view of the aforementioned resolution, the matter concerning bail shall no longer be discussed. Thus, Petitioners also argue that while PD 818 increased the imposable penalties for estafa committed
this decision will focus on whether or not PD 818 violates Sections 1 and 19 of Article III of the Constitution, under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, it did not increase the amounts corresponding to
which respectively provide: the said new penalties. Thus, the original amounts provided for in the Revised Penal Code have remained
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any the same notwithstanding that they have become negligible and insignificant compared to the present
person be denied the equal protection of the laws. value of the peso.
xxx This argument is without merit. The primary purpose of PD 818 is emphatically and categorically
Section 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment stated in the following:
inflicted. x x x. WHEREAS, reports received of late indicate an upsurge of estafa(swindling) cases committed by means of
We shall deal first with the issue of whether PD 818 was enacted in contravention of Section 19 of Article bouncing checks;
III of the Constitution. In this regard, the impugned provision of PD 818 reads as follows: WHEREAS, if not checked at once, these criminal acts would erode the people’s confidence in the use
SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as of negotiable instruments as a medium of commercial transaction and consequently result in the
defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, retardation of trade and commerce and the undermining of the banking system of the country;
shall be punished by: WHEREAS, it is vitally necessary to arrest and curb the rise in this kind of estafa cases by increasing
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed the existing penalties provided therefor.
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the later sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a laudable
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty purpose, namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the country’s commercial and
which may be economic growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks.
198 The fact that PD 818 did not increase the amounts corresponding to the new penalties only proves that
the amount is immaterial and inconsequential. What the law sought to avert was the proliferation
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
of estafa cases committed by means of bouncing checks. Taking into account the salutary purpose for
Lim vs. People which said law was decreed, we conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of Article III of the
imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties Constitution.
which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua; Moreover, when a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its
2nd. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the Consti-
pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos. 200
3rd. The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not 200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By prision mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos. Lim vs. People
Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the amount of the subject check is P365,750, they can be penalized tution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.4 The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those
with reclusion perpetuaor 30 years of imprisonment. This penalty, according to petitioners, is too severe who challenge it. In this case, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the
and disproportionate to the crime they committed and infringes on the express mandate of Article III, presumption of constitutionality of PD 818.
Section 19 of the Constitution which prohibits the infliction of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. With respect to the issue of whether PD 818 infringes on Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution,
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate petitioners claim that PD 818 is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution as it was not
to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to published in the Official Gazette. This claim is incorrect and must be rejected. Publication, being an
the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being indispensable part of due process, is imperative to the validity of laws, presidential decrees and executive
harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution.2 Based on orders.5 PD 818 was published in the Official Gazette on December 1, 1975.6
this principle, the Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or With the foregoing considerations in mind, this Court upholds the constitutionality of PD 818.
imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and degrading. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
In People vs. Tongko,3 this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is SO ORDERED.
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of its
duration or amount, and applies to punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment
regards as cruel or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or in the
pillory, to burning at the stake, break-
______________
6
Comment of the Solicitor General, Rollo, pp. 128-129; 135-136.
46
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of
conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a
device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the
innocent.
Call it what it may—but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the
final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign
depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a
national and victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as
it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar
circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil
Case No. 89-3214, Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to
RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would
satisfy the judgment.
SO ORDERED.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
G.R. No. 112099. February 21, 1995.*
ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF
PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
respondents. Muñoz Law Office for petitioner.
Antonio B. Betito for private respondent.
Statutory Construction; Repealing clause of Section 530(f), R.A. No. 7160 is not an express repeal of
Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18.—The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section QUIASON, J.:
6 of Administrative Order No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws or executive orders that
are intended to be repealed. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for
mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued
_______________ with grave abuse of discretion. Said Orders directed the stay of execution of the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan suspending the Mayor of Tiwi, Albay from office.
19 See, e.g., People v. Ocampo, 206 SCRA 223 (1992) and People v. Sayat, 223 SCRA 285 (1993),
I
where the Court had awarded moral damages on account of the perversity of the offense, the offenders Petitioner filed two administrative cases against respondent Naomi C. Corral, the incumbent Mayor of
being the stepfather and the half-brother, respectively, of the rape victim. Tiwi, Albay with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay, to wit:
* EN BANC.
540
1. (1)Administrative Case No. 02-92 for abuse of authority and/or oppression for non-payment of
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED accrued leave benefits due the petitioner amounting to P36,779.02.
Berces, Sr. vs. Guingona, Jr. 2. (2)Administrative Case No. 05-92 for dishonesty and abuse of authority for installing a water
pipeline which is being operated, maintained and paid for by the municipality to service
Same; Repeal by implication is not favored.—If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18
respondent's private residence and medical clinic.
by R.A. No. 7160, it is through implication though such kind of repeal is not favored (The Philippine
American Management Co., Inc. v. The Philippine American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA
194 [1973]). There is even a presumption against implied repeal. On July 1, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disposed the two Administrative cases in the following
Same; In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a manner:
prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws.—An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict
1. "(1)Administrative Case No. 02-92
must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law
cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists
in the terms of the new and old laws (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA ACCORDINGLY, respondent Mayor Naomi C. Corral of Tiwi, Albay, is hereby ordered to pay Achilles Costo
377 [1965]). The two laws must be absolutely incompatible (Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector of Berces, Sr. the sum of
Customs, 46 Phil. 8 [1924]). There must be such a repugnancy between the laws that they cannot be made 542
to stand together. 542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are
not irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant.—We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 Berces, Sr. vs. Guingona, Jr.
and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant and the THIRTY-SIX THOUS AND AND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE PESOS and TWO CENTAVOS (P36,779.02)
two laws must in fact be read together. per Voucher No. 352, plus legal interest due thereon from the time it was approved in audit up to final
Same; If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could payment, it being legally due the Complainant representing the money value of his leave credits accruing
have used more direct language expressive of such intention.—The first sentence of Section 68 merely for services rendered in the municipality from 1988 to 1992 as a duly elected Municipal Councilor. IN
provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory." As worded, there ADDITION, respondent Mayor NAOMI C. CORRAL is hereby ordered SUSPENDED office as Municipal Mayor
is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of of Tiwi, Albay, for a period of two (2) months, effective upon receipt hereof for her blatant abuse of
the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority coupled with oppression as a public example to deter others similarly inclined from using public
authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of office as a tool for personal vengeance, vindictiveness and oppression at the expense of the Taxpayer"
Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention. (Rollo, p. 14).
Same; The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory.—The term "shall" may be
read either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the entire provision in which it 1. "(2)Administrative Case No. 05-92
is found, its object and the consequences that would follow
541
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Mayor NAOMI C. CORRAL of Tiwi, Albay, is hereby
VOL. 241, FEBRUARY 21, 1995 541 sentenced to suffer the penalty of SUSPENSION from office as Municipal Mayor thereof for a period of
Berces, Sr. vs. Guingona, Jr. THREE (3) MONTHS beginning after her service of the first penalty of suspension ordered in Administrative
from construing it one way or the other (c/! De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case Case No. 02-92. She is likewise ordered to reimburse the Municipality of Tiwi One-half of the amount the
at bench, there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory. latter have paid for electric and water bills from July to December 1992, inclusive" (Rollo, p. 16),
Consequently, respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and at appealed decision at any time during the pendency of the appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which
the same time prayed for the stay of execution thereof in accordance with Section 67(b) of the Local took effect on January 1, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 5-6).
Government Code, which provides: The petition is devoid of merit.
"Administrative Appeals.—Decision in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section 530(f), R.A. No. 7160, which provides:
thereof, be appealed to the following: "All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, administrative regulations, part
xxx xxx xxx or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code, are hereby repealed or
(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the modified accordingly."
sangguniang panglungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities." The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 because it
Acting on the prayer to stay execution during the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the President issued failed to identify or designate the laws or executive orders that are intended to be repealed (cf. I
an Order on July 28, 1993, the pertinent portions of which read as follows: Sutherland, Statutory Construction 467 [1943]).
xxx xxx xxx If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18 by R.A. No. 7160, it is through implication though
543 such kind of repeal is not favored (The Philippine American Management Co., Inc. v. The Philippine
American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 [1973]). There is even a presumption against
VOL. 241, FEBRUARY 21, 1995 543
implied repeal.
Berces, Sr. vs. Guingona, Jr. An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must
"The stay of execution is governed by Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot
No. 18 dated 12 February 1987, quoted below: be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the
'SEC. 68. Execution Pending Appeal.—An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or terms of the new and old laws (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377
executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during [1965]). The two laws must be absolutely incompatible (Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector of
the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an Customs, 46 Phil. 8 [1924]). There must be such a repugnancy between the laws that they cannot be made
exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal to stand
(R.A. No. 7160). 545
'SEC. 6. Except as otherwise provided by special laws, the execution of the decision/resolution/order VOL. 241, FEBRUARY 21, 1995 545
appealed from is stayed upon the filing of the appeal within the period prescribed herein. However, in all
cases, at any time during the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the President may direct or stay the Berces, Sr. vs. Guingona, Jr.
execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from upon such terms and conditions as it may deem together (Crawford, Construction of Statutes 631 [1940]).
just and reasonable (Adm. Order No. 18).'" We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No.
xxx xxx xxx 18 are not irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together.
"After due consideration, and in the light of the Petition for Review filed before this Office, we find The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision from
that a stay of execution pending appeal would be just and reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to public becoming final or executory." As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to
interest. the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby orders the suspension/stay of execution of: that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the
intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more
direct language expressive of such intention.
1. a)the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay in Administrative Case No. 02-92
The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the absence of a clear legislative intent
dated 1 July 1993 suspending Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a period of two (2)
to remove from the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of execution, such authority can be
months, and
provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals of elective officials in administrative cases.
2. b)the Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay in Administrative Case No. 05-92
The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the
dated 5 July 1993 suspending Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a period of three (3)
entire provision in which it is found, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it
months" (Rollo, pp. 55-56).
one way or the other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case at bench, there is no basis
to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the aforesaid Order of the Office of the The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of the decision of the Sangguniang
President. Panlalawigan suspending respondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial to the public interest. Thus,
On September 13, 1990, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied. in order not to disrupt the rendition of service by the mayor to the public, a stay of the execution of the
Hence, this petition. decision is in order.
544 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED SO ORDERED.
Statutes; Administrative Code of 1987; Implied repeal.—In the case of the two Administrative PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Commission on Audit.
Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the
old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads: 502
“Sec. 27. Repealing Clause.—All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof,
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.” The question that should be
asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because Mecano vs. Commission on Audit
it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of
a general repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the CAMPOS, JR., J.:
intended repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law,
Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. This
Audit (COA, for brevity) embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16, 1992, denying his claim for
latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.
reimbursement under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, in the total
Same; Same; Same.—There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where
amount of P40,831.00.
provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for
extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers
cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and
the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
earlier law. Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim (Director Lim, for brevity), he
same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot
requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section
be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced
6991 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
without nullifying the other. Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover
“Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty.—When a person
nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the
in the service of the national government or in the service of the government of a province, city,
old Code which are not found
municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual
_______________
physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any period of
disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he
*EN BANC. may in his discretion also authorize the payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation,
501 subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged
VOL. 216, DECEMBER 11, 1992 501 first against vacation leave, if any there be.
xxx xxx
Mecano vs. Commission on Audit “In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of
in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees.”
military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others. Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, in a 1st Indorsement dated June 22, 1990, to the Secretary
Same; Same; Same.—Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of of Justice,
statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the ________________
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes. This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows: “Repeals by implication 1As amended by R.A. No. 1232 dated June 7, 1955.
are not favored, and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are
503
presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but
reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any VOL. 216, DECEMBER 11, 1992 503
former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but
Mecano vs. Commission on Audit
also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully
along with the comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief, LED of the NBI, “recommending
embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure
favorable action thereof.” Finding petitioner’s illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical
renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction,
Examination of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioner’s claim.
they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a 4th Indorsement dated November
Administrative Code of 1917; Allowances in case of injury, death or sickness incurred in performance
21, 1990, returned petitioner’s claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman
of duty; Payment of compensation under Employees’ Compensation Program does not bar recovery under
of the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September 1990, to the effect that the RAC being relied upon
Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code.—Regarding respondent’s contention that recovery under this
was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
subject section shall bar the recovery of benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program, the same
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 19912 dated
cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees’
April 26, 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for brevity) stating that “the
Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly
provides that “the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as
issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised “Sec. 27. Repealing Clause.—All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof,
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter.” inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.”
On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to then The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an
Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2, 1991, Secretary express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be
Drilon forwarded petitioner’s claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA repealed.5 Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It
Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January 16, 1992, however, denied petitioner’s is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be
claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC has been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was
solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of
1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees’ Compensation the new and old laws.6 This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.
Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an
Administrative Code of 1987. intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given
Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro to effect.7 Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker
Director Lim under a 9th Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that petitioner “elevate the that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear
matter to the Supreme Court if he so and manifest;8 otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of,
_______________ and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from
_________________
2Rollo, pp. 26-30
504 5 Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377(1965).
6
CRAWFORD, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE 631 (1940 ed.).
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 7
Posadas vs. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 80 L. Ed. 351 (1936)
8 Maceda vs. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 (1991).
Mecano vs. Commission on Audit
desires.” 506
On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
699 of the RAC, this petition was brought for the consideration of this Court.
Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as amended, and on the aforementioned Mecano vs. Commission on Audit
Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the event that a claim is filed with the time of the first enactment.9
the Employees’ Compensation Commission, as suggested by respondent, he would still not be barred from There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the
filing a claim under the subject section. Thus, the resolution of whether or not there was a repeal of the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 would decide the fate of petitioner’s claim for reimbursement. an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier
The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.10
1987 (Exec. Order No. 292) operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same
of 1917. The COA claims that from the “whereas” clauses of the new Administrative Code, it can be gleaned subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be
that it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old Code. Moreover, the COA questions the reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced
applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the Secretary of Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA without nullifying the other.11
contends that employment-related sickness, injury or death is adequately covered by the Employees’ Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover not attempt to cover the
Compensation Program under P.D. 626, such that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not
laws on account of the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the Government. found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law,
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.
legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the
which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision
be repealed.3 A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative
identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals.4 Code of 1987. However, the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated
________________ in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. It further maintained
that to allow the particular provisions not restated in the new Code to continue in force argues against the
3School Dist. No. 45 vs. Board of County of Comira, 141 Kan. 108. Code itself. The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:
4AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 289 (1986). “WHEREREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code which
505 incorporates in a
______________
VOL. 216, DECEMBER 11, 1992 505
9 Supra, note 7.
Mecano vs. Commission on Audit
10 Supra, note 4.
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the
11
intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971).
repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the 507
Administrative Code of 1987 which reads: VOL. 216, DECEMBER 11, 1992 507
19 Philippine Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova, 145 SCRA 385 (1986).
Mecano vs. Commission on Audit 20 National Power Corporation vs. Hon. Zain B. Angas, G.R. Nos. 60225-26, May 8, 1992; Maceda vs.
unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; and
Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 (1991); Maddumba vs. Government Service Insurance System, 182 SCRA
x x x x x x”
281 (1990); Larga vs. Ranada, Jr., 164 SCRA 18 (1988); De Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760 (1983).
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code—the Administrative Code of 1987. This 21 U.S. vs. Palacio, 33 Phil. 208 (1916).
contention is untenable.
509
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is
not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be VOL. 216, DECEMBER 11, 1992 509
cumulative or a continuation of the old one.12 What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative
Mecano vs. Commission on Audit
purpose to repeal.13
reconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the
We come now to the second category of repeal—the enactment of a statute revising or codifying the
later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond
former laws on the whole subject matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended
peradventure renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable
to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent
construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.22
statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of the former
Regarding respondent’s contention that recovery under this subject section shall bar the recovery of
statute.14 When both intent and scope clearly evince the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of
benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence
the prior act that are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed.15 Furthermore, before there can
of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV
be an implied repeal under this category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that the later act be
of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that “the payment of compensation under
the substitute to the prior act.16
this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to
Code x x x whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of
cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure,
the government.”
understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the government structure since the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby
enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the weight that this opinion carries in the
ordered to give due course to petitioner’s claim for benefits. No costs.
determination of this
SO ORDERED.
________________
Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
12 Valera vs. Tuason, 80 Phil. 823 (1948). Gutierrez, Jr., J., In the result.
13
Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261 (1974). Petition granted.
14 People vs. Almuete, 69 SCRA 410, 414 (1976).
15 People vs. Benuya, 61 Phil. 208 (1916).
16
Supra, note 9.
508
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mecano vs. Commission on Audit
controversy inasmuch as the body which had been entrusted with the implementation of this particular
provision has already rendered its decision. The COA relied on the rule in administrative law enunciated in
the case of Sison vs. Pangramuyen17 that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion, the
Court would be loathe to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency entrusted with
the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not hold water. This principle is subject to
limitations. Administrative decisions may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that the decision is
vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake.18 It has been held that Opinions of the Secretary and
Undersecretary of Justice are material in the construction of statutes in pari materia.19
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored.20 The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to
know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.21
This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows: “Repeals by implication are not favored,
and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be
passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to
conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating
to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only ir-
_______________
17
84 SCRA 364 (1978).
18
Jaculina vs. National Police Commission, 200 SCRA 489 (1991); Greenhills Mining Co. vs. Office of
the President, 163 SCRA 350 (1988).
ceedings established by law, and after the decisions granting such rights have become final and
G.R. No. 147192. June 27, 2006.*
executory. The enactment of the new GSIS Charter cannot be applied in a retroactive manner as to divest
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. THE CITY ASSESSOR OF ILOILO CITY, THE
the private respondent[s] of [their] ownership.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOILO CITY and ROSALINA FRANCISCO, represented by her attorney-in-fact,
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
SALVADOR PAJA I,**respondents.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
City Legal Office and Pedro B. Gellada for respondents City Assessor and City Treasurer.
Taxation; Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); The tax-exempt status of the GSIS could not
prevent the accrual of the real estate tax liability on properties conveyed by it to private persons.—Even if
the charter of the GSIS generally exempts it from tax liabilities, the prescription is not so encompassing as CORONA, J.:
to make the tax exemption applicable to the properties in dispute here. In the early case of City of Baguio
v. Busuego, 100 SCRA 116 (1980), we held that the tax-exempt status of the GSIS could not prevent the Assailed in this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the decision1 and
accrual of the real estate tax liability on properties transferred by it to a private buyer through a contract resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing a petition for annulment of judgment3filed by
to sell. In the present case, GSIS had already conveyed the properties to private persons thus making them petitioner, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), in Cadastral Case No. 84 and another
subject to assessment and payment of real property taxes. The unnumbered cadastral case decided by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branches 36 and 31, of Iloilo City,
_______________ respectively. In the two cadastral cases, private respondent Rosalina Francisco petitioned for the issuance
of new transfer certificates of title (TCTs) in her name over two parcels of land, to wit:
*
SECOND DIVISION. TCT No. 41681
** The Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branches 36 and 31, both of Iloilo City, were
impleaded as public respondents. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the appeal therein may be filed A parcel of land known as Lot No. 6, Block 2, of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-184005 being a portion of
without impleading the lower courts or the judges thereof, either as petitioners or respondents. Lot 2214-B, Jaro Cadastre, LRC (GLRO) Record No. 8 situated in the District of Jaro, Iloilo City,
170 _______________
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
1
Penned by Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and
Government Service Insurance System vs. City Assessor of Iloilo City Remedios Salazar-Fernando of the 11th Division of the Court of Appeals; Rollo, pp. 31-35.
alienation of the properties sold by GSIS was the proximate cause and necessary consequence of 2 Penned by Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and
the delinquent taxes due. Remedios Salazar-Fernando of the Former 11th Division of the Court of Appeals; Rollo, pp. 37-38.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The abrogation or repeal of a law cannot be assumed—the 3 CA-G.R. SP No. 51149.
intention to revoke must be clear and manifest.—The abrogation or repeal of a law cannot be assumed; 172
the intention to revoke must be clear and manifest. RA 8291 made no express repeal or abrogation of the
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
provisions of RA 7160, particularly Section 234 (a) thereof. Repeal by implication in this case is not at all
convincing either. To bring about an implied repeal, the two laws must be absolutely incompatible. They Government Service Insurance System vs.City Assessor of Iloilo City
must be clearly repugnant in a way that the later law (RA 8291) cannot exist without nullifying the prior Island of Panay, registered in the name of GSIS c/o Baldomero Dagdag, of legal age, Filipino citizen and
law (RA 7160). Indeed, there is nothing in RA 8291 which abrogates, expressly or impliedly, that particular resident of Jaro, Iloilo City, Philippines on June 28, 1991.
provision of the LGC. The two statutes are not inconsistent on that specific point, let alone so irreconcilable
as to compel us to uphold one and strike down the other.
TCT No. 48580
Same; Same; Same; The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with
other laws in a way that will form a uniform system of jurisprudence.—The rule is that every statute must
be interpreted and brought into accord with other laws in a way that will form a uniform system of A parcel of land known as Lot No. 22, Block 2, of the Subdivision Record No. 8 situated in the District
jurisprudence. The legislature is presumed to have known existing laws on the subject and not to have of Jaro, Iloilo City, Island of Panay, registered in the name of GSIS c/o Rodolfo Ceres, of legal age, Filipino
enacted conflicting laws. Thus, the legislature cannot be presumed to have intended Section 234 (a) to run Citizen and a resident of Iloilo City, Philippines, with an area of Two Hundred Ninety Four (294) square
counter to Section 39 of RA 8291. meters, more or less.
Same; Same; Same; Vested Rights; Even if we were to construe that R.A. No. 8291 abrogated Private respondent Francisco purchased the subject properties in the auction sales held for the satisfaction
Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, still it cannot be made to apply retroactively if it will impair of delinquent real property taxes. After the lapse of the one-year redemption period and the failure of the
the vested rights of private persons.—Even if we were to construe that RA 8291 abrogated Section 234(a) registered owner or any interested person to redeem the properties, the Iloilo City Treasurer issued the
of the LGC, still it cannot be made to apply retroactively without impairing the vested rights of private corresponding final bill of sale to private respondent. The sales were later on duly annotated on the
respondent. The appellate court thus correctly stated: x x x it has been the courts’ consistent ruling that a certificates of title on file with the Register of Deeds. However, the final bill of sale could not be registered
repealing statute must not interfere with vested rights or impair the obligation of contracts; that if any because the owner’s duplicate certificate of title was unavailable at that time.
other construction is possible, the act should not be construed so as to affect rights which have vested To effect registration in her name, private respondent instituted separate petitions for the entry of
under the old law. Private respondent[s], we reiterate, have become the private owner[s] of the properties title in her name over the two lots with the RTCs of Iloilo City. Both petitions were unopposed.
in question in the regular course of pro- Finding merit in her petitions, the RTCs, in separate orders issued on separate dates, directed the
171 issuance of new duplicate TCTs. The dispositive portion of the April 29, 1993 order of RTC Branch 36 in
Cadastral Case No. 84 read:
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 171 “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo is hereby ordered to issue
Government Service Insurance System vs. City Assessor of Iloilo City new owner’s duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41681 in the name of GSIS c/o Baldomero
Dagdag, upon payment of the required legal fees.
173 7Id.
175
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 173
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 175
Government Service Insurance System vs. City Assessor of Iloilo City
Accordingly, the lost copy of the subject title is hereby declared as NULL and VOID.”4 Government Service Insurance System vs. City Assessor of Iloilo City
On the other hand, RTC Branch 31 also issued an order, dated November 8, 1994, in the other laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions, or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this
(unnumbered) cadastral case, the dispositive portion of which read: provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and
“WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the Register of Deeds, City of Iloilo is hereby directed to issue a new owner’s effect.
duplicate certificate of Title No. T-48580 in the name of the G.S.I.S. C/O RODOLFO CERES, the registered xxx xxx xxx
owner, basing the same on the Original Certificate of Title found intact and existing in the Office of the The funds and/or properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding
Register of Deeds and the latter to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-48580 together with the to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other
encumbrances therein and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of ROSALINA FRANCISCO processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including the Commission
of legal age, single, Filipino Citizen and resident of Brgy. Tacas, Jaro, Iloilo City, Philippines. The owner’s on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary
duplicate certificate of title No. T-48580 which was not surrendered is hereby declared null and void.”5 accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions
No appeal was made from both orders of the courts aquo, hence, they became final and executory. or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or otherwise, is in favor of GSIS.8 (italics
In a petition to annul the judgment of the trial court, petitioner, as the alleged previous owner of the supplied)
parcels of land sold at public auction, assailed the orders of the RTCs of Iloilo City before the CA. It claimed We find no reversible error in the decision and resolution of the CA.
that the assessment of real property taxes on it (GSIS) was void since, under its charter (RA 8291), it was Even if the charter of the GSIS generally exempts it from tax liabilities, the prescription is not so
exempt from all forms of taxes (including real property taxes on the properties held by it) that were due encompassing as to make the tax exemption applicable to the properties in dispute here.
to the local governments where such properties were located. Furthermore, it claimed that the In the early case of City of Baguio v. Busuego,9 we held that the tax-exempt status of the GSIS could
proceedings in the assessment and levy of said taxes, as well as the sale of the properties at public auction, not prevent the accrual of the real estate tax liability on properties transferred by it to a private buyer
were held without notice to it, hence, its right to due process was violated. through a contract to sell. In the present case, GSIS had already conveyed the properties to private persons
_______________ thus making them subject to assessment and payment of real property taxes.10 The alienation of the
properties sold by GSIS was the proximate cause and necessary consequence of the delinquent taxes due.
4
Decided by Judge Quiaico G. Defensor. _______________
5Decided by Judge Nicolas Sian Monteblanco.
8
174 Rollo, pp. 10-11.
9No. L-29772, 18 September 1980, 100 SCRA 116.
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 10
The property with TCT 41681 was previously conveyed to Baldomero Dagdag, while the property
Government Service Insurance System vs. City Assessor of Iloilo City with TCT No. 48580 was conveyed to Rodolfo Ceres. Supra at p. 2.
The appellate court gave no credence to the arguments of petitioner and dismissed its petition. According 176
to the CA, the exemption of GSIS under its charter was not applicable pur-suant to Section 234(a) of RA 176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). Under that law, the tax-exempt
status of GSIS cannot be invoked where the actual use or beneficial ownership of the properties under its Government Service Insurance System vs. City Assessor of Iloilo City
title has been conveyed to another person.6 The CA added that there was also no basis for GSIS’s claim The doctrine laid down in City of Baguio is reflected in Section 234 (a) of the LGC,11 which states:
that it was denied due process.7 Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax.—The following are exempted from payment of the real
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA, hence, it brought this case property tax:
to us via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except
In this petition, petitioner essentially faults the CA for ruling that its properties were not exempt from when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable
all forms of taxes under its charter (RA 8291) and that the proceedings on the assessment and levy of its person.(emphasis supplied)
properties were legal. Petitioner, however, claims that RA 8291, which took effect in 1997, abrogated Section 234 (a) of the LGC
In support of its position, petitioner points to Section 39 of RA 8291 which reads: of 1991.
Section 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien.—It is hereby declared that the actuarial solvency We disagree.
of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times and that the contribution rates are The abrogation or repeal of a law cannot be assumed; the intention to revoke must be clear and
necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept low as possible in order not to burden the manifest.12 RA 8291 made no express repeal or abrogation of the provisions of RA 7160, particularly
member of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency Section 234 (a) thereof.
of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, Repeal by implication in this case is not at all convincing either. To bring about an implied repeal, the
notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues, including all accruals thereto, and two laws must be absolutely incompatible. They must be clearly repugnant
benefits paid shall be exempt from all taxes, assessment fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These _______________
exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS
as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all 11
Section 40 of the Real Property Tax Code, which took effect in 1974, also carries the same provision.
_______________ The case of City of Baguio quoted:
“Sec. 40. Exemptions from Real Property Tax.—The exemption shall be as follows: (a) Real property owned
6 Rollo, pp. 31-35. by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions and government-owned or controlled
corporations so exempt by its charter; Provided, however, that this tax exemption shall not apply to real construed so as to affect rights which have vested under the old law. Private respondent[s], we reiterate,
property of the above-named entitles the beneficial use of which has been granted, for consideration or have become the private owner[s] of the properties in question in the regular course of proceedings
otherwise to a taxable person.” established by law, and after the decisions granting such rights have become final and executory. The
12 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Agpalo, Fifth Edition (2003) (REX Printing Company, Inc., Quezon City, enactment of the new GSIS Charter cannot be applied in a retroactive manner as to divest the private
Philippines); citing City of Manila v. Reyes, 99 Phil. 986 (1957). respondent[s] of [their] ownership.”19 (citations omitted)
177 _______________
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 177
18330 Phil. 392; 261 SCRA 667 (1996).
Government Service Insurance System vs. City Assessor of Iloilo City 19
Rollo, p. 38.
in a way that the later law (RA 8291) cannot exist without nullifying the prior law (RA 7160).13 179
Indeed, there is nothing in RA 8291 which abrogates, expressly or impliedly, that particular provision
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 179
of the LGC. The two statutes are not inconsistent on that specific point, let alone so irreconcilable as to
compel us to uphold one and strike down the other. Trinidad vs. Acapulco
The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other laws in a way WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
that will form a uniform system of jurisprudence.14 The legislature is presumed to have known existing No costs.
laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting laws.15 Thus, the legislature cannot be presumed SO ORDERED.
to have intended Section 234 (a) to run counter to Section 39 of RA 8291. Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
This conclusion is buttressed by the Court’s 2003 decision in National Power Corporation v. City of Petition denied.
Cabanatuan16 where we declared that the tax provisions of the LGC were the most significant provisions
therein insofar as they removed the blanket exclusion of instrumentalities and agencies of the national
government (like petitioner) from the coverage of local taxation. In that case, petitioner National Power
Corporation (NPC) claimed that it was an instrumentality of the government exempt under its charter from
paying franchise tax. The Court overruled NPC and upheld the right of respondent city government to
impose the franchise tax on its privilege to transact business in its area.
Again, in the 2004 case of Rubia v. Government Service Insurance System,17 the Court declared that
any interpretation that gave Section 39 an expansive construction to exempt all GSIS assets and properties
from legal processes was unwar-
_______________
13
Id., pp. 399, 404-405.
14 Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, 321 Phil. 604; 251 SCRA 242 (1995).
15 Id.
16 449 Phil. 233; 401 SCRA 259 (2003).
17
G.R. No. 151439, 21 June 2004, 432 SCRA 529.
178
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Government Service Insurance System vs. City Assessor of Iloilo City
ranted. These processes included the levy and garnishment of its assets for taxes or claims enforced against
it. The Court there ruled that the exemption under Section 39 of the GSIS Charter should be read
consistently with its avowed purpose—the maintenance of its actuarial solvency to finance the retirement,
disability and life insurance benefits of its members. The Court meant that the tax-exempt properties and
assets of GSIS referred to those that remained at its disposal and use, either for investment or for income-
generating purposes. Properties whose actual and beneficial use had been transferred to private taxable
persons, for consideration or otherwise, were excluded and were thus taxable.
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos,18the Court ruled that the exemption of a
government-owned or controlled corporation from taxes and other charges was not absolute and could
be withdrawn, as in fact certain provisions of the LGC, including Section 234 (a), were deemed to have
expressly withdrawn the tax-exempt privilege of petitioner as a government-owned corporation.
Lastly, even if we were to construe that RA 8291 abrogated Section 234(a) of the LGC, still it cannot
be made to apply retroactively without impairing the vested rights of private respondent. The appellate
court thus correctly stated:
“x x x it has been the courts’ consistent ruling that a repealing statute must not interfere with vested rights
or impair the obligation of contracts; that if any other construction is possible, the act should not be
no doubt then that petitioner NTC is authorized to collect such fees. However, the amount thereof
G.R. No. 141667. July 17, 2006.*
must be reasonably related to the cost of such supervision and/or regulation.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC),
Statutory Construction; An implied repeal is predicated on a substantial conflict between the new
petitioner, vs. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (ICC), respondent.
and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a
prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; A recourse to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review must be
Courts of justice should endeavor to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the validity of one as
filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of
against the other.—NTC is correct in saying that there is no showing of legislative intent to repeal, even
the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the
impliedly, Section 40(g), supra, of the Public Service Act, as amended. An implied repeal is predicated on a
judgment.—Under Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a recourse to this Court by way of a petition
substantial conflict between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent
for review must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time
exist in the terms of the new and old laws. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible such that they
after notice of the judgment. While a motion for reconsideration ordinarily tolls the period for appeal, one
cannot be made to stand together. Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes
that fails to point out the findings or conclusions which were supposedly contrary to law or the
or provisions, should endeavor to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the validity of one as
_______________
against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is for the judge to harmonize such
statutes or provisions if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the same
*
SECOND DIVISION. legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time also according due respect to a coordinate
193 department of the government. It is this policy the Court will apply in arriving at the interpretation of the
VOL. 495, JULY 17, 2006 193 laws and the conclusions that should follow therefrom.
Same; Repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is
Republic vs. International Communications Corporation (ICC) convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently
evidence does not have such an effect on the reglementary period as it is merely a pro inconsistent with each other that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the
forma motion. legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation.—It is a rule of
Same; Motions for Reconsideration; The mere fact that a motion for reconsideration reiterates statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed
issues already passed upon by the court does not, by itself, make it a pro forma motion. Among the ends unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and
to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is patently inconsistent with each other that they cannot coexist. This is based on the rationale that the will
erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or evidence; the movant has to dwell of necessity on issues of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation. Courts
already passed upon.—Under established jurisprudence, the mere fact that a motion for reconsideration cannot take the place of Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as
reiterates issues already passed upon by the court does not, by itself, make it a pro forma motion. Among possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence.
the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed is precisely to convince the court that its ruling 195
is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or evidence; and in so doing, the movant has to dwell of
necessity on issues already passed upon. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss those issues, the VOL. 495, JULY 17, 2006 195
consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only Republic vs. International Communications Corporation (ICC)
motions for reopening and new trial. PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Where there is no apparent intent to employ dilatory tactics, courts should be slow in The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
declaring outright a motion for reconsideration as pro forma.—Where there is no apparent intent to The Solicitor General for petitioner.
employ dilatory tactics, courts should be slow in declaring outright a motion for reconsideration as pro Raoul R. Angangco and Laxmi J. Rosell for respondent.
forma. The doctrine relating to pro forma motions has a direct bearing upon the movant’s valuable right
to appeal. Hence, if petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was indeed pro forma, it would still be in the
GARCIA, J.:
interest of justice to review the Amended Decision a quo on the merits, rather than to abort the appeal
due to a technicality, especially where, as here, the industry involved (telecommunications) is vested with
public interest. All the more so given that the instant petition raises some arguments that are well-worth In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic, through the National
resolving for future reference. Telecommunications Commission (NTC), seeks the annulment and setting aside of the Amended
Commercial Law; Public Public Service Act; Police Power; Taxation; Section 40(g) of the Public Decision1 dated September 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA), setting aside the orders dated June 4,
Service Act is not a tax measure but a simple regulatory provision for the collection of fees imposed 1996 and June 25, 1997 of the NTC insofar as said orders required respondent International
pursuant to the exercise of the State’s police power.—Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act is not a tax Communications Corporation (ICC) to pay the amount of P1,190,750.50 by way of permit fee as a condition
measure but a simple regulatory provision for the collection of fees imposed pursuant to the exercise of for the grant of a provisional authority to operate an international telecommunications leased circuit
the State’s police power. A tax is imposed under the taxing power of government principally for the service, and the Resolution2 dated January 24, 2000, denying NTC’s motion for reconsideration.
purpose of raising revenues. The law in question, however, merely authorizes and requires the collection There is no dispute as to the facts:
of fees for the reimbursement of the Commission’s expenses in the authorization, supervision and/or On April 4, 1995, respondent ICC, holder of a legislative franchise under Republic Act (RA) No. 7633
regulation of public services. There can be to operate domestic telecommunications, filed with the NTC an application for a Certificate of Public
194 Convenience and Necessity to install, operate, and maintain an international telecommunications leased
circuit service between the Philippines and other countries, and to charge rates therefor, with provisional
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED authority for the purpose.
Republic vs. International Communications Corporation (ICC) In an Order3 dated June 4, 1996, the NTC approved the application for a provisional authority subject,
among others, to the condition:
_______________ 1. 1.NTC has arrogated upon itself the power to tax an entity;
2. 2.Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act has been amended by Section 5(g) of R.A. 7925;6
1 Penned by former Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, with Associate Justices Ramon A. 3. 3.The imposition of permit fees is no longer authorized by R.A. 7925; and
Barcelona (ret.) and Martin S. Villarama, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 34-53. 4. 4.The imposed permit fee in the amount of P1,190,750.50 for respon-dent’s provisional
2 Rollo, p. 55. authority is exorbitant.
3 Rollo, p. 65.
196 Before addressing the issues raised, we shall first dwell on the procedural matter raised by respondent
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ICC, namely, that the present petition should be dismissed outright for having been filed out of time. It is
respondent’s posture that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed with the CA vis-a-vis the latter’s
Republic vs. International Communications Corporation (ICC) Amended Decision is a pro forma motion and, therefore, did not toll the running of the reglementary
period to come to this Court via this petition for review.
1. 2.That applicant [ICC] shall pay a permit fee in the amount of P1,190,750.00, in accordance with Under Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a recourse to this Court by way of a petition for
section 40(g) of the Public Service Act,4 as amended; review must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
appealed
_______________
Respondent ICC filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Order insofar as the same required the
payment of a permit fee. In a subsequent Order dated June 25, 1997, the NTC denied the motion. 6
Republic Act No. 7925, “An Act to promote and govern the development of Philippine
Therefrom, ICC went to the CA on a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order
telecommunications and the delivery of public telecommunications services,” otherwise known as the
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, questioning the NTC’s imposition against it of a permit fee of
Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines, March 1, 1995.
P1,190,750.50 as a condition for the grant of the provisional authority applied for.
198
In its original decision5 dated January 29, 1999, the CA ruled in favor of the NTC whose challenged
orders were sustained, and accordingly denied ICC’s certiorari petition, thus: 198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. In view thereof, the assailed orders dated 4 June
Republic vs. International Communications Corporation (ICC)
1996 and 25 June 1997, requiring the payment of permit fees in the amount of One Million One Hundred
from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice
Ninety Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty and 50/100 Pesos (P1,190,750.50) as a condition for the grant of a
of the judgment. While a motion for reconsideration ordinarily tolls the period for appeal, one that fails to
Provisional Authority to operate an International Circuit service, are hereby AFFIRMED. ACCORDINGLY, the
point out the findings or conclusions which were supposedly contrary to law or the evidence does not have
International Communications Corporation is hereby ordered to pay the amount of One Million One
such an effect on the reglementary period as it is merely a pro forma motion.7
Hundred Ninety Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty and 50/100 Pesos (P1,190,750.50) to the National
In arguing for the outright dismissal of this petition, respondent ICC claims that the motion for
Telecommunications Commission.
reconsideration filed by petitioner NTC in connection with the CA’s Amended Decision failed to point out
SO ORDERED.”
specifically the findings or conclusions of the CA which were supposedly contrary to law. Respondent
In time, ICC moved for a reconsideration. This time, the CA, in its Amended Decision dated September 30,
contends that the issues raised by the petitioner in its motion for reconsideration were mere reiterations
1999, reversed itself, to wit:
of the same issues which had already been considered and passed upon by the CA when it promulgated
“WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
its Amended Decision. On this premise, respondent maintains that petitioner’s aforementioned motion
29 January 1999 including the
for reconsideration is a mere pro forma motion that did not toll the period for filing the present petition.
_______________
Under established jurisprudence, the mere fact that a motion for reconsideration reiterates issues
4 Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, “An Act to reorganize the Public Service Commission,
already passed upon by the court does not, by itself, make it a pro forma motion.8 Among the ends to
which a motion for reconsideration is addressed is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is
prescribe its powers and duties, define and regulate public services, provide and fix the rates and quota of erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or evidence; and in so doing, the movant has to dwell of
expenses to be paid by the same and for other purposes.” necessity on issues already passed upon. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss those issues, the
5
Rollo, pp. 71-79. consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only
197 motions for reopening and new trial.9
VOL. 495, JULY 17, 2006 197 _______________
Republic vs. International Communications Corporation (ICC) 7 Section 2, Rule 37 of The Rules of Court; Luzon Stevedoring Company, Inc. v. Court of Industrial
imposition by the public respondent of permit fees with respect to [ICC’s] international leased circuit
Relations, G.R. No. L-16682, July 26, 1963, 8 SCRA 447.
service is hereby REVERSED. Judgment is hereby rendered, setting aside the questioned orders dated 04 8 Cruz v. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-41684, February 21, 1979, 88 SCRA 506; People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No.
June 1996 and 25 June 1997, insofar as they impose upon petitioner ICC the payment of the amount of
32657, September 1, 1992, 213 SCRA 171; Marina Properties Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125447,
One Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty and Fifty Centavos (P1,190,750.50) by
August 14, 1998, 294 SCRA 273.
way of permit fees as a condition for the grant of a provisional authority to operate an International Leased 9 Guerra Enterprises Co., Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur, G.R. No. L-28310, April 17,
Circuit Service. No costs.
1970, 32 SCRA 314.
SO ORDERED.” (Word in bracket added).
199
Petitioner NTC filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the CA in its equally
challenged Resolution dated January 24, 2000. Hence, NTC’s present recourse claiming that the CA erred VOL. 495, JULY 17, 2006 199
in ruling that:
Republic vs. International Communications Corporation (ICC)
Where there is no apparent intent to employ dilatory tactics, courts should be slow in declaring outright a 10 Philippine Long Distance Telephone v. Public Service Commission, G.R. No. L-26762, August 29,
motion for reconsideration as pro forma. The doctrine relating to pro formamotions has a direct bearing 1975, 66 SCRA 341, 351.
upon the movant’s valuable right to appeal. Hence, if petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was 201
indeed pro forma, it would still be in the interest of justice to review the Amended Decision a quo on the
VOL. 495, JULY 17, 2006 201
merits, rather than to abort the appeal due to a technicality, especially where, as here, the industry
involved (telecommunications) is vested with public interest. All the more so given that the instant petition Republic vs. International Communications Corporation (ICC)
raises some arguments that are well-worth resolving for future reference. and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.11 The two laws must be absolutely incompatible
This brings us to the substantive merits of the petition. such that they cannot be made to stand together.12
In its Amended Decision, the CA ruled that petitioner NTC had arrogated upon itself the power to tax Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes or provisions, should endeavor
an entity, which it is not authorized to do. Petitioner disagreed, contending the fee in question is not in to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the validity of one as against the other. Such alacrity
the nature of a tax, but is merely a regulatory measure. should be avoided. The wise policy is for the judge to harmonize such statutes or provisions if this is
Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act provides: possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect to
Sec. 40. The Commission is authorized and ordered to charge and collect from any public service or both while at the same time also according due respect to a coordinate department of the government. It
applicant, as the case may be, the following fees as reimbursement of its expenses in the authorization, is this policy the Court will apply in arriving at the interpretation of the laws and the conclusions that should
supervision and/or regulation of the public services: follow therefrom.13
xxx xxx xxx It is a rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will
g) For each permit, authorizing the increase in equipment, the installation of new units or authorizing not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly
the increase of capacity, or the extension of means or general extensions in the services, twenty centavos repugnant and patently inconsistent with each other that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the
for each one hundred pesos or fraction of the additional capital necessary to carry out the permit. rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and
(Emphasis supplied) interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to
Clearly, Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act is not a tax measure but a simple regulatory provision for harmonize, as much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity
the collection of fees imposed pursuant to the exercise of the State’s police power. A tax is imposed under and co-existence.14
the taxing power of government principally for the purpose of raising revenues. The law in question, Here, there does not even appear to be a conflict between Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act, as
however, merely authorizes and requires the collection of fees for the reimbursement of the Commission’s amended, and Section 5(g) of R.A. 7925. In fact, the latter provision directs petitioner NTC to “continue to
expenses in the authorization, supervision and/or regulation of public services. There can be no doubt impose such fees and charges as may be necessary to cover reasonable costs and expenses for the
then that petitioner NTC is regulation and supervision of telecommunications entities.” The absence alone of the word “authoriza-
200 _______________
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
11
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, G.R. No. L-24022, March 3, 1965, 13
Republic vs. International Communications Corporation (ICC) SCRA 377.
authorized to collect such fees. However, the amount thereof must be reasonably related to the cost of 12 Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8 [1924].
such supervision and/or regulation.10 13 Gordon v. Meridiano, G.R. No. L-55230, November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 51, 58-59.
Petitioner NTC also assails the CA’s ruling that Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act had been 14 Ty v. Trampe, G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995, 250 SCRA 500.
amended by Section 5(g) of R.A. No. 7925, which reads: 202
Sec. 5. Responsibilities of the National Telecommunications Commission.—The National
Telecommunications Commission (Commission) shall be the principal administrator of this Act and as such 202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
shall take the necessary measures to implement the policies and objectives set forth in this Act. Republic vs. International Communications Corporation (ICC)
Accordingly, in addition to its existing functions, the Commission shall be responsible for the following: tion” in Section 5(g) of R.A. No. 7921 cannot be construed to mean that petitioner NTC had thus been
xxx xxx xxx deprived of the power to collect such fees. As pointed out by the petitioner, the words “authorization,
g) In the exercise of its regulatory powers, continue to impose suchfees and charges as may be supervision and/or regulation” used in Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act are not distinct and
necessary to cover reasonable costs andexpenses for the regulation and supervision of the operations of completely separable concepts which may be taken singly or piecemeal. Taken in their entirety, they are
telecommunications entities. (Emphasis supplied) the quintessence of the Commission’s regulatory functions, and must go hand-in-hand with one another.
The CA ratiocinated that while Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act (CA 146, as amended), supra, allowed In petitioner’s own words, “[t]he Commission authorizes, supervises and regulates telecommunications
NTC to impose fees as reimbursement of its expenses related to, among other things, the “authorization” entities and these functions. . . cannot be considered singly without destroying the whole concept of the
of public services, Section 5(g), above, of R.A. No. 7921 no longer speaks of “authorization” but only of Commission’s regulatory functions.”15 Hence, petitioner NTC is correct in asserting that the passage of R.A.
“regulation” and “supervision.” To the CA, the omission by Section 5(g) of R.A. No. 7921 of the word 7925 did not bring with it the abolition of permit fees.
“authorization” found in Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act, as amended, meant that the fees which However, while petitioner had made some valid points of argument, its position must, of necessity,
NTC may impose are only for reimbursement of its expenses for regulation and supervision but no longer crumble on the fourth issue raised in its petition. Petitioner itself admits that the fees imposed are
for authorization purposes. precisely regulatory and supervision fees, and nottaxes. This necessarily implies, however, that such fees
We find, however, that NTC is correct in saying that there is no showing of legislative intent to repeal, must be commensurate to the costs and expenses involved in discharging its supervisory and regulatory
even impliedly, Section 40(g), supra, of the Public Service Act, as amended. An implied repeal is predicated functions. In the words of Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act itself, the fees and charges which
on a substantial conflict between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent petitioner NTC is authorized to collect from any public service or applicant are limited to the
law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency “reimbursement of its expenses in the authorization, supervision and/or regulation of public services.” It
_______________ is difficult to comprehend how the cost of licensing, regulating, and surveillance could amount to
P1,190,750.50. The CA was correct in finding the amount imposed as permit fee exorbitant and in complete
disregard of the basic limitation that the fee should be at least approximately commensurate to the
expense. Petitioner itself admits that it had imposed the maximum amount possible under the Public
Service Act, as amended. That is hardly taking into consideration the actual costs of fulfilling its regulatory
and supervisory functions.
Independent of the above, there is one basic consideration for the dismissal of this petition, about
which petitioner NTC did not bother
_______________
SO ORDERED.
the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996.*
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
149
Statutory Construction; Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and VOL. 256, APRIL 10, 1996 149
the evils sought to be remedied—the court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal
Ursua vs. Court of Appeals
meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers.—Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.
enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The reason for the principle that a penal statute should be
scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused is the tenderness of the law for the rights of
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and
Same; Names; Aliases; Criminal Law; C.A. No. 142; The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have the discretion of the court limited.—Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed
their origin and basis in Act No. 3883.—The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the
basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind
Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition
Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him.
amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which
created tremendous confusion in the field of trade.—For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner.
different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice
almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious BELLOSILLO, J.:
______________
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of
*FIRST DIVISION. petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by
148 R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases.”1
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in
Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the
Ursua vs. Court of Appeals Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of
reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of
they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, Environment and
unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. _______________
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; ”Alias” and ”Name,” Defined.—Clearly
therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and 1
Rollo, pp. 24-37.
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or
150
baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply
the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him 150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases.
Ursua vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to
Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a
another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this
resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting
name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition in C.A. No. 142.—
of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area.2
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman
without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name
in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones
from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in
then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law
the case at bench.
firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is
for the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised
fairly susceptible is favored which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and
him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt
injurious consequences.—While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does
of the complaint.3
not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted.
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the
The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to
security officer to register in the visitors’ logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the
prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by
name “Oscar Perez” after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the
complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate
Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
writing the name “Oscar Perez.”4 Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute
also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name
person who introduced himself as “Oscar Perez” was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of and one or two surnames.
Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in
_______________ proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate
proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and the
2 Id., p. 26. alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been obtained, specifying the proceedings and
3
Records, p. 7. the date on which such authority was granted. Judicial
4 Rollo, p. 26. _______________
151
5
Id., p. 12.
VOL. 256, APRIL 10, 1996 151 6
People v. Purisima, Nos. L-42050-66, 28 November 1978, 86 SCRA 542.
7
Ursua vs. Court of Appeals Gregorio, Antonio L., Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1985 Ed., p. 9; People v. Manantan, No.
the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. L-14129, 31 July 1962, 5 SCRA 684.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, 153
petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution VOL. 256, APRIL 10, 1996 153
to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal
to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the Ursua vs. Court of Appeals
registered name of accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register x x x x
conviction. The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended,
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as C.A. No. 142 now reads:
amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment
of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person
maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs. shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized
by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil
of P5,000.00. registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name
that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any aliasname; neither and one or two surnames.
is “Oscar Perez” his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those
name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as “Oscar Perez” and that legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure
he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person’s
his position that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant’s name,
has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the
from his registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the christian name and
considering the defense theory that he the alien immigrant’s name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any
152 name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper
local civil registry.
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate
Ursua vs. Court of Appeals the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director
was charged under the wrong law.5 of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof,
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No.
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment 154
should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and 154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
purpose.6 The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead
to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.7 Ursua vs. Court of Appeals
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated 4147, approved on 28 November 1934.8 The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow—
by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including
provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any
written or printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection with
his business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition
where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
business name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar Perez,”
style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any other person having a joint which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in
or common interest with him in such contract, agreement, business transaction, or business x x x x the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that “Oscar Perez”
practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use
confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name “Oscar Perez” was made
which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity.
wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be
an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse
civil register.9 him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects anyone under the proper circumstances.
of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled— While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an
_______________ offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and
fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not
8Aquino, Ramon C., The Revised Penal Code, 1961 Ed., Vol. II, pp. 1008-1009. present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in
9Francisco, Vicente J., The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1954 Ed., Vol. II, p. 331; Guevarra, enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were
Guillermo B., Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1946 Ed., p. 359. never intended
10
106 Phil. 762 (1959). _______________
155
11
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. III, West Publishing Co., p. 139.
VOL. 256, APRIL 10, 1996 155
157
Ursua vs. Court of Appeals
VOL. 256, APRIL 10, 1996 157
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner’s use of alias ‘Kheng Chiau Young’ in addition to his real
name ‘Yu Kheng Chiau’ would add to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of the Ursua vs. Court of Appeals
Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which
admitted that he is known to his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain consequences.12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the
difficulties in his transactions with government offices which required him to explain why he bore two State and in favor of the accused.13 The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights
names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe,
sticking only to his real name ‘Yu Kheng Chiau.’ and the discretion of the court limited.14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having filed petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him.
a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the above-mentioned court, argues the more against the grant WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial
of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity for his further Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime
using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in charged.
ordinary as well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after SO ORDERED.
he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name following the Occidental method, ‘he
can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the name ‘Yu Kheng Chiau,’ he can,
abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau Young.’
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory
proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the
Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or
baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply
the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him
but sometimes a man is known by several
156
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ursua vs. Court of Appeals
different names and these are known as aliases.11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name
belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be