RENATO S. GATBONTON, G.R. NO.

146779
Petitioner,
Present:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN, C.J., (Chairman)

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
CALLEJO, SR., and
NAZARIO, JJ.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, MAPUA INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY and JOSE
CALDERON, Promulgated:
Respondents. January 23, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to set aside the
Decision[1] dated November 10, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57470, affirming the decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); and the CA Resolution dated January 16, 2001, denying the motion
for reconsideration.[2]

Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT), Faculty
of Civil Engineering. Some time in November 1998, a civil engineering student of respondent MIT filed a letter-
complaint against petitioner for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming of an
academician. Pending investigation of the complaint, respondent MIT, through its Committee on Decorum and
Investigation placed petitioner under a 30-day preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999. The committee
believed that petitioners continued stay during the investigation affects his performance as a faculty member, as well
as the students learning; and that the suspension will allow petitioner to prepare himself for the investigation and will
prevent his influences to other members of the community.[3]

Thus, petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension, damages and attorneys fees,[4] docketed as
NLRC-NCR Case No. 01-00388-99.

Petitioner questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the Regional Trial Court of Manila in
a petition for certiorari but the case was terminated on May 21, 1999 when the parties entered into a
compromise agreement wherein respondent MIT agreed to publish in the school organ the rules and regulations
implementing Republic Act No. 7877 (R.A. No. 7877) or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act; disregard the
previous administrative proceedings and conduct anew an investigation on the charges againstpetitioner. Petitioner
agreed to recognize the validity of the published rules
and regulations, as well as the authority of respondent to investigate, hear and decide the administrative case against
him.[5]

On June 18, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 Wherefore, premises considered, the thirty day preventive suspension of complainant is
hereby declared to be illegal. Accordingly, respondents are directed to pay his wages during the period
of his preventive suspension.

The rest of complainants claims are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Both respondents and petitioner filed their appeal from the Labor Arbiters Decision, with petitioner
questioning the dismissal of his claim for damages. In a Decision dated September 30, 1999, the NLRC granted
respondents appeal and set aside the Labor Arbiters decision. His motion for reconsideration having been denied by
the NLRC on December 13, 1999, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA.

On November 10, 2000, the CA promulgated the assailed decision affirming the NLRC decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
ORDERED DISMISSED, and the challenged decision and order of public respondent NLRC AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in its Resolution dated January 16, 2001.

Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE NLRC WAS NOT GUILTY OF GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RENDERING BOTH THE APPEAL DECISION AND THE NLRC RESOLUTION.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE NLRCS DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS CLAIM
FOR DAMAGES.[8]

Petitioner finds fault in the CAs decision, arguing that his preventive suspension does not find any justification in the
Mapua Rules and Regulations considering that at the time of his preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the rules
have not been promulgated yet as it was published only on February 23, 1999. Petitioner also contests the lack of
award of damages in his favor.[9]

The petition is partly meritorious.

Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the companys property pending
investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. The employer may place the
worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to
the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.[10] However, when it is determined that there is no sufficient
basis to justify an employees preventive suspension, the latter is entitled to the payment of salaries during the time of
preventive suspension.[11]
R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to promulgate rules and regulations in
consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of sexual harassment cases and the administrative
sanctions therefor.[12] Petitioners preventive suspension was based on respondent MITs Rules and Regulations for the
Implemention of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877. Rule II, Section 1 of the MIT Rules and
Regulations provides:

Section 1. Preventive Suspension of Accused in Sexual Harassment Cases. Any member of the
educational community may be placed immediately under preventive suspension during the pendency
of the hearing of the charges of grave sexual harassment against him if the evidence of his guilt is
strong and the school head is morally convinced that the continued stay of the accused during the
period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution or poses a
risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the educational community.

It must be noted however, that respondent published said rules and regulations only on February 23, 1999.
In Taada vs. Tuvera,[13] it was ruled that:

all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a
valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. (Emphasis supplied)

The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce
and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application.[14] In fact, the Mapua Rules itself explicitly required
publication of the rules for its effectivity, as provided in Section 3, Rule IV (Administrative Provisions), which states
that [T]hese Rules and Regulations to implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take effect fifteen (15)
days after publication by the Committee. Thus, at the time of the imposition of petitioners preventive suspension on
January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules were not yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had no legal basis.

Moreover, even assuming that the Mapua Rules are applicable, the Court finds that there is no sufficient basis to
justify his preventive suspension. Under the Mapua Rules, an accused may be placed under preventive suspension
during pendency of the hearing under any of the following circumstances:

(a) if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally convinced that the continued
stay of the accused during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal
operations of the institution; or

(b) the accused poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the educational
community.
 In petitioners case, there is no indication that petitioners preventive suspension may be based on the
foregoing circumstances. Committee Resolution No. 1 (Re: Preventive Suspension of Engr. Renato Gatbonton) passed
by the Committee on Decorum and Investigation states the reasons for petitioners preventive suspension, to wit:

Whereas, the committee believe[s] that the continued stay of the respondent during the
period of investigation,

1. Affects the respondents performance as a faculty member and laboratory head considering
the psychological effects depression and/or emotional stress during investigation;

2. Affects the student[s] learning and other members of the Mapua Institute of Technology
community.

Whereas, the committee believe[s] that this preventive suspension will allow the respondent
to prepare himself for the investigation and will prevent his influences to other members of the
community.[15]

Said resolution does not show that evidence of petitioners guilt is strong and that the school head is morally
convinced that petitioners continued stay during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal
operations of the institution; or that petitioner poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of
the educational community.

Even under the Labor Code, petitioners preventive suspension finds no valid justification. As provided in
Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code:

Sec. 8. Preventive Suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned under
preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious threat to the life or property of
the employer or of his co-workers.

As previously stated, there is nothing on record which shows that respondent MIT imposed the preventive
suspension on petitioner as his continued employment poses a serious threat to the life or property of the employer
or of his co-workers; therefore, his preventive suspension is not justified.[16] Consequently, the payment of wages
during his 30-day preventive suspension, i.e., from January 11, 1999 to February 10, 1999, is in order.

With regard to petitioners claim for damages, the Court finds the same to be without basis. While petitioners
preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this does not automatically mean that he is entitled to moral or
other damages. In Cocoland Development Corp. vs. NLRC,[17] the Court ruled:

In Primero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that " an award (of moral
damages) cannot be justified solely upon the premise (otherwise sufficient for redress under the Labor
Code) that the employer fired his employee without just cause or due process. Additional facts must
be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, to
repeat, that the act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy; and of course, that social
humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom." This was reiterated in Garcia
vs. NLRC, where the Court added that exemplary damages may be awarded only if the dismissal was
shown to have been effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.

This the private respondent failed to do. Because no evidence was adduced to show that
petitioner company acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the private
respondent, the labor arbiter did not award any moral and exemplary damages in his decision.
Respondent NLRC therefore had no factual or legal basis to award such damages in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
The records of this case are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent MIT acted in bad faith or in a wanton or
fraudulent manner in preventively suspending petitioner, thus, the Labor Arbiter was correct in not awarding any
damages in favor of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10, 2000 and Resolution
dated January 16, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57470 as well as the NLRC Decision dated September
30, 1999 together with its Resolution dated December 13, 1999, are hereby SET ASIDE and the Labor Arbiters Decision
dated June 18, 1999 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairman

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
GATBONTON vs NLRC Case Digest
[G.R. NO. 146779 January 23, 2006]

RENATO S. GATBONTON, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MAPUA INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY and JOSE CALDERON, Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT),
Faculty of Civil Engineering. Some time in November 1998, a civil engineering student of respondent MIT filed a letter-
complaint against petitioner for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming of an
academician. Pending investigation of the complaint, respondent MIT, through its Committee on Decorum and
Investigation placed petitioner under a 30-day preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999. The committee
believed that petitioner’s continued stay during the investigation affects his performance as a faculty member, as well
as the students’ learning; and that the suspension will allow petitioner to “prepare himself for the investigation and
will prevent his influences to other members of the community.” Thus, petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for
illegal suspension, damages and attorney’s fees.

Petitioner questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the Regional Trial Court of Manila in a
petition for certiorari but the case was terminated on May 21, 1999 when the parties entered into a compromise
agreement wherein respondent MIT agreed to publish in the school organ the rules and regulations implementing R.A.
No. 7877 or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act; disregard the previous administrative proceedings and conduct anew an
investigation on the charges against petitioner. Petitioner agreed to recognize the validity of the published rules and
regulations, as well as the authority of respondent to investigate, hear and decide the administrative case against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension of petitioner was valid.

HELD: The SC held that preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the company’s property
pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. The employer may
place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent
threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers. However, when it is determined that there is no
sufficient basis to justify an employee’s preventive suspension, the latter is entitled to the payment of salaries during
the time of preventive suspension.

R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to “promulgate rules and regulations in
consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of sexual harassment cases and the administrative
sanctions therefor.” Petitioner’s preventive suspension was based on respondent MIT’s Rules and Regulations for the
Implementation of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877. Rule II, Section 1 of the MIT Rules and
Regulations provides:

Section 1. Preventive Suspension of Accused in Sexual Harassment Cases. Any member of the educational community
may be placed immediately under preventive suspension during the pendency of the hearing of the charges of grave
sexual harassment against him if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally convinced that the
continued stay of the accused during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of
the institution or poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the educational community.

However, the same is still not effective since it was still to be published as ruled in Tañada vs. Tuvera:

… all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.

The SC agreed that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the contents of the laws.

The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce
and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application.[14] In fact, the Mapua Rules itself explicitly
required publication of the rules for its effectivity, as provided in Section 3, Rule IV (Administrative Provisions), which
states that “[T]hese Rules and Regulations to implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take effect
fifteen (15) days after publication by the Committee.” Thus, at the time of the imposition of petitioner’s preventive
suspension on January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules were not yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had no
legal basis.

Moreover, even assuming that the Mapua Rules are applicable, the Court finds that there is no sufficient basis to
justify his preventive suspension. Under the Mapua Rules, an accused may be placed under preventive suspension
during pendency of the hearing under any of the following circumstances:

(a) if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally convinced that the continued stay of the accused
during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution; or

(b) the accused poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the educational community.

In petitioner’s case, there is no indication that petitioner’s preventive suspension may be based on the foregoing
circumstances. Committee Resolution No. 1 passed by the Committee on Decorum and Investigation states the
reasons for petitioner’s preventive suspension.

Said resolution does not show that evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong and that the school head is morally
convinced that petitioner’s continued stay during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal
operations of the institution; or that petitioner poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of
the educational community.

Even under the Labor Code, petitioner’s preventive suspension finds no valid justification. As provided in Section 8,
Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code:

Sec. 8. Preventive Suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his
continued employment poses a serious threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.

As previously stated, there is nothing on record which shows that respondent MIT imposed the preventive suspension
on petitioner as his continued employment poses a serious threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-
workers; therefore, his preventive suspension is not justified. Consequently, the payment of wages during his 30-day
preventive suspension, i.e., from January 11, 1999 to February 10, 1999, is in order.

Petition is partially granted.

Gatbonton v. NLRC and Mapua

G.R. NO. 146779 January 23, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Publication must be in full, Preventive suspension, damages

Laws Applicable: Art. 2 Civil Code, Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code

FACTS:

· November 1998: A civil engineering student of respondent Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT) filed a letter-
complaint against Renato S. Gatbonton, an associate professor of the Faculty of Civil Engineering for unfair/unjust
grading system, sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming of an academician.
· Pending investigating, MIT, through its committee on Decorum and Investigation placed him under a 30-day
preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999.
o The committee believed that his continued stay during the investigation will affect his performance as a faculty
member, as well as the student’s learning and that the suspension will allow petitioner to “prepare himself for the
investigation and will prevent his influence to other members of the community.
· He filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal suspension, damages and attorney’s fees
· He questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the RTC in a petition for certiorari but was
terminated since MIT agreed to publish in the school organ the rules and regulations implementing Republic Act No.
7877 (R.A. No. 7877) and disregard the previous administrative proceedings
· Labor Arbiter: 30-day preventive suspension is illegal and directed MIT to pay his wages during the said period
· NLRC: set aside the Labor Arbiter’s decision
· CA on special civil action for certiorari: affirming the NLRC

Issues:

Whether Mapua’s Rules and Regulations is effective as of January 11, 1999 when it was published only on February 23,
1999 (persons)
W/N there is a valid justification for the 30-day preventive suspension under the Labor Code (labor)
Whether damages should be awarded

Held: Petition is partially granted. CA, NLRC set aside and Labors Arbiter reinstated

1. NO
· R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to "promulgate rules and regulations in
consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of sexual harassment cases and the administrative
sanctions therefor
· Taňada vs. Tuvera:
o all statutes, including those of local application and private laws shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity is fixed by the legislative.(especially penal laws)
o Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
· publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of
the laws
· Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce
and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application
o Mapua Rules Section 3 Rule IV (Administrative Provisions) states that it shall take effect 15 days after publication by
the committee.

2. NO.
· Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the company’s property pending
investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. The employer may place the
worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to
the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers. However, when it is determined that there is no sufficient
basis to justify an employee’s preventive suspension, the latter is entitled to the payment of salaries during the time of
preventive suspension
· Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Ominibus Rules, there is no valid justification
o does not show that evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong and that the school head is morally convinced that
petitioner’s continued stay during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the
institution; or that petitioner poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the educational
community
3. No.
· While petitioner’s preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this does not automatically mean that he is
entitled to moral or other damages
 No showing of bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in preventively suspending petitioner

Why put an employee to preventive suspension

According to Supreme court: Gatbonton vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 146779, January 23, 2006)
“Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the company’s property pending investigation of
any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. The employer may place the worker concerned
under preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property
of the employer or of his co-workers. However, when it is determined that there is no sufficient basis to justify an
employee’s preventive suspension, the latter is entitled to the payment of salaries during the time of preventive
suspension.”

According to Omnibus Rules in Implementing Labor Code

“Section 8. Preventive suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension only if
his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-
workers” (Rule XXIII, Book V).
This kind of suspension shall last longer than 30 days (In JRS Business Corp. v. NLRC, et. al., 246 SCRA 445 [1995], the
Supreme Court penalized the employer to pay indemnity in the amount of P1,000 when it violated the maximum 30-
day preventive suspension.) The employer shall thereafter, reinstate the worker in his former or in a substantially
equivalent position (actual reinstatement) or the employer may extend the period of suspension provided that during
the period of extension, he pays the wages and other benefits due to the worker (payroll reinstatement). In such case,
the worker shall not be bound to reimburse the amount paid to him during the extension if the employer decided,
after completion of the hearing, to dismiss the worker.

How to put an employee to a preventive suspension

You may include the notice of preventive suspension on the notice to explain

Can abuse of this be a ground for constructive dismissal?

Yes ,When preventive suspension exceeds the maximum period allowed without reinstating the employee either by
actual or payroll reinstatement (see Hyatt Taxi Services Inc. vs. Rustom M. Catinoy, G.R. No. 143204, June 26, 2001), or
when preventive suspension is for indefinite period (see Pido vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
169812, Feb. 27, 2007), constructive dismissal will set in.
What violations are not covered by this kind of suspension?
The Court held that it is improper for the employer to place under preventive suspension employees charged of
violation of school rules and regulations on the wearing of uniform, tardiness or absence, and maliciously spreading
false accusations against the school. (See Woodridge School vs. Pe Benito, G.R. No. 160240, October 29, 2008.)
For preventive suspension to be legal, there should be an imminent threat to life and property.