G.R. No.

208314, August 23, 2017

ANTONIO B. MANANSALA, Petitioner, v. MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., INC./MARLOW NAVIGATION CO. LTD./CYPRUS, AND/OR EILEEN MORALES,
Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

As laypersons, seafarers cannot be expected to make completely accurate accounts of their state of health. Unaware of the nuances of medical conditions, they
may, in good faith, make statements that tum out to be false. These honest mistakes do not negate compensability for disability arising from pre-existing illnesses
shown to be aggravated by their working conditions. However, when a seafarer's proper knowledge of pre-existing conditions and intent to deceive an employer are
established, compensability is negated.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that the assailed April 10, 2013 Decision2 and July 18,
4013 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124546 be reversed and set aside.

The assailed Court of Appeals Decision affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission's December 13, 2011 Decision4 and February 28, 2012 Resolution,5
which, in turn, affirmed the Labor Arbiter's April 20, 2011 Decision.6 The Labor Arbiter dismissed Antonio B. Manansala's (Manansala) Complaint for payment of
total and permanent disability benefits. The assailed Court of Appeals Resolution denied Manansala's Motion for Reconsideration.7

On April 8, 2010, Manansalals services were engaged by Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc., for and on behalf of its principal, Marlow Navigation Co. Ltd./Cyprus, for
him to serve as a "fitter" on board the vessel M/V Seaboxer.8

Before boarding the vessel, Manansala underwent a Pre Employment Medical Examination (PEME) on March 23, 20109 at the EL ROI Medical Clinic and Diagnostic
Center, Inc.10 In his examination, Manansala was required to disclose information regarding all existing and prior medical conditions. The examination specifically
required information on 29 illnesses and/or conditions, among which were hypertension and diabetes. Manansala's examination certificate indicates that he denied
having hypertension and diabetes, specifically answering "NO" when asked about hypertension and diabetes mellitus. Following his examination, Manansala was
declared fit for sea duty and was cieployed.11

On May 30, 2010, while on board the M/V Seaboxer, Manansala suffered a stroke,12 "experienc[ing] moderate headache at the vertex associated with dizziness
and blurring of vision and right[-]sided weakness."13 He was, then, admitted to the ADK Hospital in the Maldives14 where a brain CT scan conducted on him showed
that he was suffering from an "[a]cute infarct at the left MCA territory."15 Because of this, Manansala was repatriated on June 8, 2010.16

Manansala was confined at the De Los Santos Medical Center from June 10, 2010 to June 23, 2010,17 under the primary care of company-designated physician,
Dr. Teresita Barrairo (Dr. Barrairo).18 While under Dr. Barrairo's care, he "repeatedly denied that he ha[d] any past history of diabetes and hypertension."19

On September 7, 2010,20 Dr. Barrairo issued to Manansala an interim Grade 10 disability rating.21 She issued a final Grade 10 Disability assessment on September
30, 2010.22

On October 21, 2010, Manansala filed a Complaint against the respondents for total and permanent disability benefits, as well as damages and attorney's fees.23
When the mandatory conferences failed, the parties were ordered to file their respective position papers and responsive pleadings.24

Two (2) months after he filed his Complaint, on December 20, 2010, Manansala's own doctor, Dr. Amado San Luis (Dr. San Luis), issued a medical opinion stating
that Manansala must be considered permanently disabled:
Medical Opinion

....

4. Patient should be permanently disabled (sic) because of the inherent risk of his work as a seaman that will predispose him to repeated stroke or other cardiovascular
attacks. Because of the presence of diabetes, hypertension, hyperlipidemia and stroke, he is considered a high risk of (sic) developing another stroke.25
The same opinion indicated that Manansala admitted to having had a long history of hypertension and diabetes, He even admitted to taking Enalapril and Metformin
as maintenance medications.26

On Apri1 20, 2011, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding that Manansala was suffering from pre-existing, rather than work-related, ailments. Therefore, he
was not entitled to disability benefits.27

On December 13, 2011, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered a Decision affirming that of the Labor Arbiter.28 In a Resolution dated February 28,
2012, the National Labor Relations Commission denied Manansala's Motion for Reconsideration.29

Manansala filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In its assailed April 10, 2013 Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission.30 In its assailed July 18, 2013 Resolution,31 the Court of Appeals denied Manansala's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, Manansala filed the present Petition. He now asserts that he properly disclosed his pre-existing illnesses during his medical examination and that his stroke
was work-related.32

For resolution is the sole issue of whether or not petitioner Antonio B. Manansala is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits occasioned by work-related
illnesses.

He is not.

Filipinos hired as seafarers are contractual employees whose employment is governed by their respective contracts with their employers: "[t]heir employment is
governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires."33

Seafarers must be registered with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).34 The POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) must
be executed by seafarers and their employers "as a condition sine qua non prior to the deployment for overseas work"35 and is "deemed incorporated in [seafarer]
employment contract[s]."36

The POEA-SEC37 requires the employer to compensate a seafarer for work-related illnesses.38 It defines "work-related illness" as follows:
Definition of Terms:

....
Work-Related Illness - any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions
set therein satisfied.39
The benefits that the employer must pay "when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract"40 are outlined in Section 20(B) of
the POEA-SEC.41

The compensation to be given to a seafarer depends on the severity of the disability suffered. Section 32 of the POEA-SEC provides a schedule of disabilities and
their corresponding impediment grades.42 The grades range from 1 to 14, with 1 being the most severe and entailing the highest amount of compensation.43
II

Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC provides a non-exhaustive list44 of diseases considered as occupational. The mere occurrence of a listed illness does not
automatically engender compensability. The first paragraph of Section 32-A requires the satisfaction of all of its listed general conditions "[f]or an occupational
disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable":
Section 32-A OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:

(1)
The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
(2)
The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
(3)
The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;
(4)
There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
To enable compensation, an occupational disease and ensuing death or disability must, thus, be "work-related";45 that is to say that there must be a "reasonable
linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work."46

Common sense dictates that an illness could not possibly have been "contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks"47 if it has been existing
before the seafarer's services are engaged. Still, pre existing illnesses may be aggravated by the seafarer's working conditions. To the extent that any such
aggravation is brought about by the work of the seafarer, compensability ensues:
Settled is the rule that for illness to be compensable, it is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the
seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his
work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had.48 (Emphasis supplied).
Consistent with the basic standard in labor cases and other administrative proceedings, the linkage between the disease or its aggravation and the working conditions
of a seafarer must be proven by substantial evidence. In Jebsens Maritime v. Undag:49
In labor cases as in other administrative proceedings, substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a
conclusion is required. The oft-repeated rule is that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial
evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-
causation or work-aggravation imposed by law is real and not merely apparent.50 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Compensability is not limited to Section 32-A's listed occupational diseases. For as long as seafarers are able to show by substantial evidence that they suffered
disabilities occasioned by a disease contracted on account of or aggravated by working conditions, compensation is availing:
Of course, the law recognizes that under certain circumstances, certain diseases not otherwise considered as an occupational disease under the POEA-SEC may
nevertheless have been caused or aggravated by the seafarer's working conditions. In these situations, the law recognizes the inherent paucity of the list and the
difficulty, if not the outright improbability, of accounting for all the known and unknown diseases that may be associated with, caused or aggravated by such working
conditions.

Hence, the POEA-SEC provides for a disputable presumption of work-relatedness for non-POEA-SEC-listed occupational disease and the resulting illness or injury
which he may have suffered during the term of his employment contract.

This disputable presumption is made in the law to signify that the non inclusion in the list of compensable diseases/illnesses does not translate to an absolute
exclusion from disability benefits. In other words, the disputable presumption does not signify an automatic grant of compensation and/or benefits claim; the seafarer
must still prove his entitlement to disability benefits by substantial evidence of his illness' work-relatedness.51
III

The POEA-SEC bars the compensability of disability arising from a pre-existing illness when attended by an employee's fraudulent misrepresentation. Section 20(E)
of the POEA-SEC states:
E.
A seafarer who knowingly conceals and does not disclose past medical condition, disability and history in the pre-employment medical examination constitutes
fraudulent misrepresentation and shall disqualify him from any compensation and benefits. This may also be a valid ground for termination of employment and
imposition of the appropriate administrative and legal sanctions.
The POEA-SEC's terminology is carefully calibrated: it does not merely speak of incorrectness or falsity, or of incompleteness or inexactness. Rather, to negate
compensability, it requires fraudulent misrepresentation.

To speak of fraudulent misrepresentation is not only to say that a person failed to disclose the truth but that he or she deliberately concealed it for a malicious
purpose. To amount to fraudulent misrepresentation, falsity must be coupled with intent to deceive and to profit from that deception.

Consequently, reasonable leeway may be extended for inability to make complete and fastidiously accurate accounts when this inability arises from venial human
limitation and frailty. This is a normal tendency for laypersons-such as seafarers-rendering accounts of their own medical conditions.

IV

Prospective seafarers undergo a pre-employment medical examination (PEME) to determine if they are fit to work. Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, tasks the Department of Health to regulate the operations of clinics conducting PEMEs for migrant
workers.52

Department of Health Administrative Order No. 2007-0025, which was in effect when petitioner took his PEME, articulated guidelines on PEMEs for seafarers.53 It
identified minimum test requirements, summarized as follows:54
TEST
PEME "A"
New Candidates
PEME "B"
Serving Seafarers
(below 40 years old)
PEME "C"
Serving Seafarers
(40 years old and above)
Audiometry
-
-
-
Blood Uric Acid
X
X
-
Chest X-ray
-
-
-
Color Perception
Test
-

-
Complete Blood
Count and Blood
Typing
-
-
-
Complete Physical
Examination and
Medical History
-
-
-
Dental Examination
-
-
-
ECG
-
X
-
Fasting Blood Sugar
X
X
-
Hepatitis B
Screening
-
-
-
HIV
OPTIONAL
Psychometric examinations
-
-
-
Routine Stool
-
-
-
Routine Urinalysis
-
-
-
RPR
-
-
-
Total Cholesterol
X
X
-
Triglyceride
X
X
-
Visual Acuity
-
-
-
As to their source, there are two categories of information obtained in PEMEs. First is information obtained from and colored by the prospective seafarer's opinion,
i.e., information on medical history gained from probing questions asked to prospective seafarers and answered by them to the best of their knowledge. Second is
information generated by procedures conducted by health professionals. From these, a determination is made on whether a prospective seafarer is fit, unfit, or
temporarily unfit for sea duty:55
C. On the Assessment of PEME Results

1. PEME recommendations shall be given as follows:

a.)
Fit for Sea Duty - The seafarer is assessed as able to perform safely the duties of his position aboard a ship in the absence of medical care, without danger to his
health or to the safety of the vessel, crew and passengers.
b.)
Unfit for Sea Duty - The seafarer is assessed to be not fit for sea duty.
c.)
Temporarily Unfit for Sea Duty - The seafarer is assessed to be temporarily unfit for sea duty when, at the time of PEME, the result shows an abnormal finding, a
suspected medical or surgical condition, or a disclosed significant past medical history which needs further investigation and reevaluation. The examinee shall be
given thirty (30) days to undergo further assessment in accordance with the established referral system of the accredited medical clinic. Within the said period, the
seafarer may either be medically upgraded to fitness or downgraded to unfitness indefinitely based on the results of the follow-up evaluation.56 (Emphasis in the
original)
Between the prospective seafarer and an examining physician, the latter is in a better position to assess fitness for the rigors of sea duty. Apart from one's literal
body, a prospective seafarer's only other contribution to a medical examination is a set of responses to questions. A seafarer's personal health assessment is home
by his or her amateur opinion, or otherwise unrefined understanding of nuanced medical conditions. In contrast, the procedures attendant to a PEME are conducted
and supervised by professionals with sGientific and technical capabilities. Their examinations generate verifiable empirical data, which are then evaluated by a
physician.

A PEME is not expected to be an in-depth examination of a seafarer's health.57 Still, it must fulfill its purpose of ascertaining a prospective seafarer's capacity for
safely performing tasks at sea. Thus, if it concludes that a seafarer, even one with an existing medical condition, is "fit for sea duty," it must, on its face, be taken to
mean that the seafarer is well in a position to engage in employment aboard a sea vessel "without danger to his health."58

A recommendation stating that a seafarer is "fit for sea duty" when standardized procedures would readily reveal that he or she is not can only mean that medical
examiners failed to diligently screen a seafarer. The persons responsible for the examination are then bound by their negligence. Ultimately, it is more appropriate
that the examining physician, a trained professional, and not the seafarer, who is a layperson, be faulted for discounting the presence of diseases even after
subjecting the seafarer to a series of procedures.

For its part, a recruiting employer is expected to know the physical demands of a seafarer's engagement. It is then equally expected to peruse the results of PEMEs
to ensure that, healthwise, its recruits are up to par. An employer who admits a physician's "fit to work" detennination binds itself to that conclusion and its necessary
consequences. This includes compensating the seafarer for the aggravation of negligently or deliberately overlooked conditions.

Essential hypertension is among the occupational diseases enumerated in Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC. Section 32-A, paragraph 2(20) of the POEA-SEC reads:
20. Essential Hypertension

Hypertension classified as primary or essential is considered compensable if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain,
resulting in permanent disability; Provided, that the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest x-ray report, (b) ECG report, (c) blood chemistry report, (d)
funduscopy report, and (e) C-T scan. (Emphasis supplied)
Primary or essential hypertension is the most common form of hypertension.59 It is a "conse uence of an interaction between environmental and genetic factors."60
Hypertension doubles the risk of cardio-vascular diseases,61 the most common cause of death in hypertensive patients.62 Hypertensive patients are also susceptible
to having a stroke.63

The following degrees of severity have been associated with identifying hypertension:64
Severity
SBP, mmHg
DBP, mmHg
Normal
<120
and <80
Prehypertension
120-139
or 80-89
Stage 1 hypertension
140-159
or 90-99
Stage 2 hypertension
>160
or >100
Literature on hypertension concedes a degree of ambiguity and acknowledges variance in its effects and incidents:
High blood pressure is a trait as opposed to a specific disease and represents a quantitative rather than a qualitative deviation from the norm. Any definition of
hypertension is therefore, arbitrary.

....
The cardiovascular risks associated with a given blood pressure are dependent upon the combination of risk factors in the specific individual. These include age,
gender, weight, physical inactivity, smoking, family history, serum cholesterol, diabetes mellitus and pre existing vascular disease. Effective management of
hypertension therefore requires a holistic approach that is based on the identification of those at highest cardiovascular risk and the adoption of multifactorial
interventions, targeting not only blood pressure but all modifiable cardiovascular risk factors.

In light of these observations[,] a practical definition of hypertension is 'the level of blood pressure at which the benefits of treatment outweigh the costs and
hazards'.65
Consistent with this, "most [hypertensive] patients remain asymptomatic";66 and frequently, patients only discover that they are hypertensive because of a routine
examination or because complications have arisen.67

The POEA-SEC's treatment of essential hypertension recognizes its gradations. To enable compensation, the mere occurrence of hypertension, even as it is work-
related and concurs with the four basic requisites of the first paragraph of Section 32-A, does not suffice. The POEA-SEC requires an element of gravity. It speaks
of essential hypertension only as an overture to the "impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain." This impairment must then be of
such severity as to be "resulting in permanent disability."68 Section 32-A, paragraph 2(20), thus, requires three successive occurrences: first, the contracting of
essential hypertension; second, organ impairment arising from essential hypertension; and third, permanent disability arising from that impairment.

In keeping with the requisite gravity occasioning essential hypertension, the mere averment of essential hypertension and its incidents do not suffice. In addition to
the substantive requirements of essential hypertension's being the cause of organ impairment leading to permanent disability, the POEA-SEC identifies documentary
requirements for considering a claim under Section 32-A, paragraph 2(20). As is evident from the use of the conjunctive word "and," this enumeration is inclusive
and cumulative, rather than alternative. Accordingly, all documentary requirements must be submitted and satisfied; otherwise, a claim for benefits should not be
entertained. These prerequisites are: first, a chest x-ray report; second, an electrocardiogram (ECG) report; third, a blood chemistry report; fourth, a funduscopy
report; and fifth, a C-T Scan.

The POEA-SEC also includes cardio-vascular diseases in its list of occupational diseases. They are compensable if, in addition to the requirements of the first
paragraph of Section 32-A, any of the conditions listed in Section 32-A, paragraph 2(11) are attendant:
11. Cardio-Vascular Diseases. Any of the following conditions must be met:
If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof thut an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual
strain by reasons of the nature ofhis work.

The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to
constitute causal relationship.

If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his
work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.
Diabetes is not among Section 32-A's listed occupational diseases. As with hypertension, it is a complex medical condition typified by gradations. Blood sugar levels
classify as normal, pre-diabetes, or diabetes depending on the glucose level of a patient.69
Normal
Pre-diabetes
Diabetes Mellitus
FPG
<5.6 mmol/L
5.6-6.9 mmol/L
>7.0 mmol/L
2-h PG
<7.8 mmol/L
7.8-11.0 mmol/L
>11.1 mmol/L
HbA1C
<5.6%
5.7-6.4%
>6.5%
Diabetes "is a clinical syndrome characterised by hyperclycaemia due to absolute or relative deficiency of insulin."70 It can cause several symptoms depending on
its type, Type 1 or Type 2.71 Patients with Type 1 diabetes show more prominent symptoms, while patients with Type 2 diabetes are mostly asymptomatic.72
However, the symptoms between these two types may overlap. Other symptoms may even be inexplicit such as fatigue.73 Diabetes can lead to several
complications, among which is suffering a stroke.74

Hypertension and diabetes are hardly elementary conditions that afflicted laypersons could handily grasp. Even the POEA-SEC's appreciation of essential
hypertension proceeds from an understanding that hypertension per se does not equate to disability warranting cessation of work and entailing compensation.
Rather, it concedes that hypertension is identified by degrees of severity.

Hypertension and diabetes can be difficult to recognize because of gradations whose demarcations are not readily perceptible and because they can be
asymptomatic. This is especially true in their mild stages. Even in relatively advanced stages, their symptoms may be generic that they are as ea sly mistaken to be
indicating other conditions.75

The greater possibility, then, is that a seafarer's self-assessment of personal medical conditions will fail to capture nuances that can make the difference between
fitness and unfitness for work As laypersons, they do not have the requisite medical knowledge to properly characterize their illnesses. Even if they are aware of
their own medical conditions, they may, in their non professional opinion but still in good faith, be convinced that their conditions are not so sey re and that they can
manage to perform work aboard a vessel. Seafarers cannot be held to account under an inordinate standard. The POEA-SEC takes exception to fraudulent
misrepresentation, not to honest mistakes.

VI

This Court finds petitioner to have knowingly and fraudulently misrepresented himself as not afflicted with hypertension or diabetes. He did not merely make
inaccuracies in good faith but engaged in serial dishonesty. Thus, this Court affirms the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

During his PEME, petitioner was recorded to have "categorically answered 'No' when asked whether he has ever suffered from or has been told to have hypertension
and diabetes."76 After repatriation and while being treated by Dr. Barrairo, the company-designated physician, he again "denied that he ha[d] any past history of
diabetes and hypertension."77

However, in the medical opinion and evaluation prepared by his own physician, Dr. San Luis, petitioner was indicated to not only have admitted that "he ha[d] a past
history of hypertension and diabetes,"78 but even that he was "regularly taking Enalapril and Metformin respectively to treat the said illnesses."79

Forced into a corner by his own conflicting declarations, petitioner attempted to extricate himself by disavowing the declarations he made in his PEME and claiming
that it was the examining physician who failed to accurately reflect his responses on his examination certificate.80

Petitioner's assertion is an admission that he fully knew of his conditions at the moment he was examined, rendering it pointless for this Court to consider whether
he was merely confused at the time of his examination. Additionally, his assertion burdens him with the task of proving his claims. As he was duty-bound to truthfully
answer questions during his examination, petitioner must show that despite his knowledge, he did not willfully or deceptively withhold information. Likewise, his
imputation of the examining physician's liability despite the examination certificate's indication that his responses were duly recorded is an affirmative defense or an
alternative version of events that becomes his burden to prove.

Petitioner failed to discharge his burden. On the contrary, the confluence of circumstances belies his claims.
Petitioner adequately understood the significance of the declarations attributed to him in his examination certificate. Petitioner's engagement aboard the MIV
Seaboxer was not his first stint as a seafarer. He had been a seafarer since 1994,81 although he worked for respondents, on and off, only since 2007.82 His
prolonged seafaring experience must have familiarized him with the conduct of PEMEs and the need for him to give truthful answers. He explicitly declared, too, that
he was "aware of the contents of Section 20.E [on misrepresentation] in the POEA [Standard Employment Contract]."83 Certainly, his awareness of Section 20(E)
must have impressed upon him not only the potentil complications of what he claims to be a false declaration foisted on him by the examining physician but also the
urgency of rectifying that error. Instead, he remained silent and did nothing. Petitioner's concession by omission militates against him.

This Court has nothing to rely on but petitioner's bare recollection. This does not satisfy, He should have actively endeavored to demonstrate that the false
declarations in his examination certificate were anomalous, stray errors. As a seafarer since 1994, he must have completed several other medical examinations. His
good faith could have ben substantiated by prior acts in analogous situations. He could have presented copies of the certificates for his previous medical
examinations, but he did not These would have shown that while the responses he otiered about his conditions in prior instances had been properly recorded, the
examining physician during his March 23, 2010 examination failed to render an accurate account.

It is, of course, possible that prior to his most recent medical examination on March 23, 2010, petitioner had not been diagnosed with hypertension or diabetes. This
would make it impossible for him to present evidence of countervailing prior declarations. However, even conceding this, petitioners good faith is belied by other
circumstances attending this case.

Petitioner's good faith could have been demonstrated by his subsequent acts. Knowing full well that a false declaration was made on his examination certificate,
petitioner should, at the very least, not have compounded it. Instead of this, however, he maintained before Dr. Barrairo upon repatriation that he had no history of
either hypertension or diabetes. It was only before his personally chosen physician did petitioner admit to not only a history of diabetes and hypertension but even
to the maintenance medications he had been taking to address those illnesses.

A measure of good faith can be appreciated on the part of a seafarer who is unable to grasp the nuances of his or her medical condition. This Court is unable to
appreciate this good faith here. Petitioner knew that his illnesses were of such severity that he needed to take maintenance medicine. Despite this, he consistently
maintained that he had no history of hypertension or diabetes. Finally confronted with his own discrepant statements he denied accountability by shifting the blame
to a person who was beyond the reach of the proceedings he had initiated.

We are not a trier of facts and only questions of law may be brought before this Court in Rule 45 petitions. Faced with nothing more than petitioner's self-serving,
unsubstantiated backtracking on his own inconsistencies, we see no need to deviate from the uniform findings of the Labor Arbiter, the National Labor Relations
Commission and the Court of Appeals. Petitioner's disavowals were not statements made in good faith but were part of a serial utterance of lies.

VII

It works no less in petitioner's favor that he failed to observe the procedure outlined by the POEA-SEC concerning disputed disability assessments by company-
designated physicians. Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC requires referral to a third physician in the event of diverging findings by a company-designated physician
and a seafarer's personally chosen physician:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

....

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work related injury or illness during the term of his contract arc as follows:

....
Upon sign off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the
degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon
his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure
of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly benveen the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's
decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
(Emphasis supplied)
INC Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Rosales84 explained the significance of this referral and emphasized that it is "mandatory":
This referral to a third doctor has been held by this Court to be a mandatory proc dure as a consequence of the provision that it is the company-designated doctor
whose sessment should prevail. In other words, the company can insist on its disability rating even against a contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer
expresses his disagreement by king for the referral to a third doctor who shall make his or her determination and whose decision is final and binding on the parties.
We have followed this rule in a string of cases, among them, Philippine Hammonia, Ayungo v. Beamko Shipmanagement Corp., Santiago v. Pacbasin
Shipmanagement, Inc., Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, and Masangkay v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. Thus, at this point, the matter of referral
pursuant to the provision of the POEASEC is a settled ruling.85 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner made no effort to comply with the required referral. He did not even consult a personally chosen physician before filing his Complaint. Upon repatriation,
the company-designated physician, Dr. Barrairo, assessed petitioner and twice rendered Grade 10 disability assessments in September 2010.86 Disagreeing with
these assessments, petitioner would proceed to file his Complaint on October 21, 2010.87 In need of support for his Complaint, only two months after would petitioner
pick a personal physician, Dr. San Luis, to seek another opinion. Only on December 70, 2010 would Dr. San Luis declare that petitioner "should be permanently
disabled (sic)."88 Beyond this, there is no indication that petitioner did more to ascertain his proper disability grade.

Petitioner's non-compliance constrains us to not lend credibility to his personal physicians assessment. In any event, the record demonstrates why this assessment
deserves no credence as against that of the company-designated physician. He was under the care and supervision of Dr. Barrairo throughout the more than four
months that intervened between his repatriation and the filing of his Complaint.89 For a period, he was kept under Dr. Barrairo's close observation as he was confined
at the De Los Santos Medical Center from June 10, 2010 to June 23, 2010.90 Dr. Barrairo's prolonged care and observation of him yielded two disability assessments:
first, an interim assessment on September 7, 2010; and another, a verified assessment on September 30, 2010.91 In contrast, petitioner's personal physician
examined him on only one occasion and only under such circumstances that petitioner needed backing for his Complaint.92

Jurisprudence holds that, in analogous cases, company-designated physicians' assessments are to be upheld.93 This could have entitled petitioner to Grade 10
disability benefits. However, his failure to observe Section 20(B)(3)'s requirements is not all that there is to this case. We cite his non-referral to a third physician, not
as a mitigating circumstance, but to emphasize how multi-layered exigencies militate against him. We have explained at length how petitioner engaged in fraudulent
misrepresentation, deceptively concealing his pre-existing hypertension and diabetes. This, in itself, is fatal to his cause. In keeping with Section 20(E) of the POEA-
SEC, petitioner is, thus, disqualified from receiving any compensation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed April 10, 2013 Decision and July 18, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 124546 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198097 July 30, 2014

STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION, MS. LOMA B. AGUIMAN, FAIRDEAL GROUP MANAGEMENT S.A., and MT FAIR JOLLY, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES MARGARITO B. DELALAMON and PRISCILA A. DELALAMON, Respondents.
DECISION

REYES, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assails the Decision2 dated May 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 108142 awarding permanent disability benefits and sickness allowance to Margarito Delalamon (Margarito).

The Facts

Margarito was hired by Status Maritime Corporation (Status Maritime), for and in behalf of its principal, Fairdeal Group Management S.A. (Fairdeal), as Chief Engineer
with a monthly basic salary of US$1,300.00. The employment contract was originally for a period of nine (9) months from July 26, 2005 to April 26, 2006 but Margarito
later on requested for, and was granted, extension until October 2006.3

Margarito left Manila to join the vessel, M/T Fair Jolly, on July 26, 2005 and forthwith discharged his duties.4 In September 2006, while the vessel was in United Arab
Emirates (UAE), Margarito complained of loss of appetite. He was sent to the National Medical Center at the Port of Fujairah, UAE, for diagnosis and treatment. Ina
Medical Report dated September 2, 2006, Margarito was diagnosed with "Renal Insufficiency: Diabetes Mellitus; IHD Blood+CBC+Anemia." He was medically
repatriated on September 6, 2006.5

On December 29, 2006, Margarito and his wife Priscila (respondents) filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) for the payment of permanent disability benefits,
sickness allowance, damages and attorney’s fees against Fairdeal, M/T Fair Jolly, Status Maritime and its President, Loma B. Aguiman (petitioners). The complaint
was docketed as NLRC NCR OFW Case No. (M) 06-12-03874-00.6

According to the respondents, Margarito was physically weak when he arrived in the Philippines. He thus sought to rest athome and failed to report to the petitioners.
Priscilla nonetheless notified the petitioners of Margarito’s condition through a certain Allan Lopez.7

When Margarito’s medical condition worsened, he was brought to Las Piñas Doctor’s Hospital where he underwent a series of clinical and laboratory tests. Based
on his 2DEchocardiography Results dated September 12, 2006, Margarito was found afflicted with "T/C RENAL INSUFFICIENCY, CORONARY ARTERY
DISEASE."8

He was again hospitalized from December 18, 2006 to January 4, 2007 at the Manila Doctor’s Hospital.Based on the medical certificate issued by Dr. Elizabeth B.
Salazar-Montemayor dated January 17, 2007, Margarito was found to be sufferingfrom "End Stage Renal Disease 2 Diabetic Nephropathy." He was likewise
diagnosed with a "Right Renal Cortical Cyst" on December 19, 2006. He thereafter underwent dialysis treatments three times a week and eventually became
bedridden.9

The respondents averred that the petitioners failed to provide any medical assistance the entire time thatMargarito was undergoing medical treatments for an illness
he acquired while in their employ.10

For their part, the petitioners denied any liability for Margarito’s monetary claims. They asserted that he failed to comply with Section 20(B), paragraph (3) of the
2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA-SEC) requiringhim to report
to the petitioners within three (3) working days from his arrival for a post-employment medical examination. He was only examined by the petitioners’ designated
physician on March 30, 2007 during the mandatory conference stage of the case.11

According to the petitioners, Margarito’s illness is not compensable based on the medical report dated May 17, 2007 of Dr. Wilanie Romero Dacanay of the Marine
Medical Services of Metropolitan Medical Center stating that "Chronic Kidney Disease secondary to DiabeticNephropathy" is NOT work-related.12 The petitioners
further averred that during initial evaluation by their physicians, Margarito claimed to have been diagnosed with diabetes 6 years ago and has,since then, been taking
500 mg of Metformin as maintenance medication.13 Based thereon, the petitioners argued that Margarito concealed his illness when he was subjected to a Pre-
Employment Medical Examination (PEME) hence disqualified from claiming disability benefits.

Pending the decision of the LA, Margarito died on September 11, 2007. His cause of death was "CVA" or Cardiovascular Accident.14

Ruling of the LA

In a Decision15 dated September 28, 2007, the LA found no merit in the respondents’ complaint for the reason that Margarito’s illness is not work-related, thus:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING this case for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED."16

Ruling of the NLRC

The NLRC affirmed the LA’s ruling and added that Margarito did not even bother to comply with the mandatory requirement of reporting to the petitioners’ office
within three (3) days from his disembarkation for post-employment medical examination pursuant to Section 20 (B)[3] of the POEA-SEC. The NLRC Resolution17
dated October 23, 2008 disposed as follows: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. The instant appeal is hereby,
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED."18

Ruling of the CA

The respondents elevated the case to the CA and, in support of their position that Margarito’s illness is work-related, proffered the June 25, 2007 medical evaluation
of Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo) of Philippine Heart Center, articulating thus:

This patient/seaman presented with history of nausea and anorexia noted on June 2006 for which he was seen in United Arab Emirates. He underwent blood
chemistry examination and abdominal ultrasound and was diagnosed as kidney disease. History revealed that he is also a known diabetic for six years now and
maintained on Metformin three times a day.

He was repatriated on September 8, 2006 and was subsequently confined at Las Piñas Doctor’s Hospital. He underwent creation of arterio-venous fistula on the left
arm as access to future hemodialysis. Since then he underwent regular hemodialysis at Manila Doctor’s Hospital two to three times a week on the average. Latest
laboratory exams done on June 19, 2007 showed significant elevation of his creatinine and potassium.

When seen at the clinic his blood pressure was 130/90 mmHg; PE of the heart and lungs were unremarkable and he presented with hemodialysis access on his left
arm (sic).

He is now unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity.

His illness is considered work aggravated/related.

He requires regular hemodialysisto maintain his creatinine level as well as his secrum electrolytes especially sodium and potassium.

Undergoing regular hemodialysisobviously impairs his quality of life. In general, patients with end stage renal disease have significant reduction in their life
expectancy.
He is not expected to land a gainful employment given his medical background.19

In its Decision20 dated May 27, 2011, the CA reversed the findings of the labor tribunals. The CA heldthat Margarito was exempt from complying with the 3-day
mandatory reporting requirement because when he arrived in the Philippines, his physical condition was already deteriorating and was in need of urgentmedical
attention. Thus, it could not be expected of him to prioritize the reporting requirementbefore attending to his medical needs. Also, his wife actually notified the
petitioners of his medical condition, through Allan Lopez.

The CA further ruled that Margarito’s cause of death is actually listed as an occupational disease under the POEA-SEC. While his renal disease is not similarly listed,
it is nonetheless disputably presumed work-related pursuant to Section 32-A (11) ofthe POEA-SEC. His employment contributed to the development and
exacerbation of his illness considering that he was on board the vessel for 14months during which he was exposed to stress, different climates and erratic time
zones. The CA declared Margarito’s illness as a total disability since he had to undergo dialysis three (3) times a week and was in need of regular medical aid that
prevented him from seeking gainful employment. Following Section 32 of the POEA-SEC which assigns a Grade 1 disability to "(s)evere residuals of impairment of
intra-abdominal organs which requires regular aid and attendance that will unable worker to seek any gainful employment’, Margarito’s disability due to ‘End Stage
Renal Disease 2 Diabetic Nephropathy’ was also given a Grade 1 rating. Accordingly, the respondents’ claims for sickness allowance and permanent disability
benefits were granted as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted and the Resolutions dated October 23, 2008 and January 23, 2009 of (the) NLRC are nullified and set aside. (Petitioners)
are ordered to pay the heirs of (respondent) Margarito Delalamon sickness allowance of US$5,200.00 and disability compensation of US$60,000.00

SO ORDERED."21

The petitioners moved for reconsideration22 but the motion was denied in the CA Resolution23 dated August 4, 2011. Hence, the present appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

The petitioners aver that Margaritois disqualified from claiming any illness benefit on three grounds: (1) his diabetes is a pre-existing illness which he concealed
during his PEME; (2) he failed to submit himself for post-employment medical examination to the petitioners’ designated physicians within three (3) days upon his
return; and (3) the respondents failed to specifically allegeor prove by substantial evidence that Margarito’s working conditions has causal relation to or increased
his risk of contracting his illness.24

The respondents, on the other hand,contend that the CA judiciously and correctly awarded Margarito with permanent disability benefits and sickness allowance.
They posit thatMargarito acquired his illness of "Renal Insufficiency; Diabetes Mellitus; IHD Blood + CBC +ANEMIA" during the term of his employment with the
petitioners. They further argued that Margarito was very sick when he arrived in the Philippines and thus physically incapable of reporting to the petitioners’ office for
post-employment medical examination.

They denied that Margarito concealed his illness and claimed that the petitioners’ physicians, who subjected him to rigid and rigorous PEME, actually found him fit
to work. They argued that the compensability of an illness does not depend on whether it was pre-existing but rather if it is work-related or work-aggravated which,
in this case, was found by the CA to have been substantially established.25

Ruling of the Court

We find merit in the petition.

Preliminarily, it must be emphasized that at the core of the foregoing arguments are factual questions which,generally, are outside the Court’s discretionary appellate
jurisdiction under Rule 45.
The Court is not a trier of facts hence, only questions of law, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. It is not the Court’s function to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again in view of the corollary legal precept that findings of fact of the CAare conclusive and binding on this Court. Nevertheless, the Court will
proceed to probe and resolve factual issues when any of these exceptional circumstances are present, viz: when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to
support the findings of the tribunal or the court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties
or,26 where the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the LA and the NLRC.27 Observably, the third exception is attendant in the present case hence, it is
imperative to review the records to determine which finding is more conformable to the evidentiary facts.

In view of the factual milieu of the case, the 3-day mandatory reporting requirement can be dispensed with.

As a general rule, a medically repatriated seafarer is required to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by the company’s designated physicians
withinthree (3) working days upon his return. This is extant from Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POEA SEC, viz:

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer whenthe seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board the vessel;

2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical
and hospital treatment, as well as board and lodging, until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.

However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such
time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work, or
the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon
his return, except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period isdeemed as compliance. Failure
of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s
decision shall befinal and binding on both parties. (Emphasis ours)

The purpose of the rule is to allow the employer’s doctors a reasonable opportunity to assess the seafarer’s medical condition in order to determine whether his
illness is work-related or not. As explained in Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Undag:28

The rationale behind the rule can easily be divined. Within three days from repatriation, it would befairly easier for a physician to determine if the illness was work-
related or not. After that period, there would be difficulty in ascertaining the real cause of the illness.

To ignore the rule would set a precedent with negative repercussions because it would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability
benefits. It would certainly be unfair to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant’s illness considering the passage of time. In such
a case, the employers would have no protection against unrelated disability claims.29

Equally outlined in the provision isthe single instance which exempts a medially repatriated seafarer from complying with the 3-day mandatory reporting rule that is
– when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice of such fact to the employer within the same period shall be deemed as sufficient
compliance.

We applied the exemption in Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC30 and excused the failure of the seafarer to report within the three-day period for the reason
that when he disembarked from the vessel, he was terminally ill and in need of urgentmedical attention. His employer manning agency was also found sufficiently
notified when his wife went to the office a month later to inquire about his husband’s sickness benefits.31

The very same circumstances exist in the present factual setting. When Margarito was repatriated on September 6, 2006 he was already suffering from "Renal
Insufficiency: Diabetes Mellitus; IHD Blood+CBC+Anemia." Less than a week thereafter, he was confined at the Las Piñas Doctor’s Hospital for the sameailment of
renal insufficiency but this time aggravated by coronary artery disease. He started undergoing hemodialysis treatments in December when his ailment worsened to
end stage renal disease due to a cyst at the right renal cortical. He became bedridden thereafter until he passed away on September 11, 2007.

The medical episodes that transpired after his disembarkation from the vessel show that he was already in a deteriorating physical condition when he arrived in the
Philippines. Thus, it cannot be reasonably expected of him to prioritize the errand of personally reporting to the petitioners’ office instead of yielding to the physical
strain caused by his serious health problems.

The petitioners were likewise put on sufficient notice about the failing health condition of Margarito because they knew very well that he was diagnosed with a serious
illness in UAE. Notwithstanding the fact that Priscila’s claim of notice to petitionersthrough a certain Allan Lopez was unsubstantiated by any documentary orother
corroborative evidence, the petitioners were nonetheless aware that Margarito was seriously ill as they are presumed furnished with a copy ofthe diagnosis made
on Margarito in UAE.

The strategic opportunity which the 3-day period grants to an employer within which to subject the seafarer to a post-employment medical examination was not
sullied since the findings of the doctors in UAE were merely confirmed by the findings ofthe petitioners’ physicians in the Philippines when Margarito was
finallyexamined by the latter on May 17, 2007. Certainly, the findings of Dr. Dacanay that Margarito was suffering from "Chronic Kidney Disease secondaryto Diabetic
Nephropathy" is merely confirmatory of the findings ofthe UAE doctors that he was afflicted with "Renal Insufficiency: Diabetes Mellitus." Although couched in different
medical terminologies, both findings carried the similar fundamental connotation that Margarito was afflicted witha kidney disease as a complication of his diabetes
mellitus. Such similarity negated any misgivings that the work-relatedness ofhis illness could not be truthfully determined. Work-relatedness can be competently
determined based either on the initial diagnosis in UAE or the medical report of petitioners’ physicians 253 days after Margarito’s medical repatriation.

Except for the fact that "Chronic Kidney Disease secondary to Diabetic Nephropathy" is anaggravated version of "Renal Insufficiency: Diabetes Mellitus", the basic
connotation of both findings remained the same the entire 253 days that lapsed – Margarito is afflicted with a kidney disease as a complication of his diabetes
mellitus. As such, the difficulty which the 3-day mandatory reporting rule seeks to prevent did not happen.

Nevertheless, Margarito is disqualified from receiving compensation benefits for knowingly concealing his pre-existing illness of diabetes.

Notwithstanding that his failure to report within 3-days is excusable, Margarito is still disqualified from receiving any compensation or benefits for his illness because
he did not disclose during his PEME that he was suffering from diabetes. Section 20(E) of the POEA-SEC is clear on this matter, viz:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

xxxx

E. A seafarer who knowingly conceals and does not disclose past medical condition, disability and history inthe pre-employment medical examination constitutes
fraudulent misrepresentation and shall disqualify him from any compensation and benefits. This may also be a valid ground for termination of employment and
imposition of the appropriate administrative and legal sanctions. (Emphasis ours)
The following portions of Dr. Dacanay’s medical report dated May 17, 2007 show that Margarito knowingly concealed his pre-existing illness of diabetes when he
was subjected to PEME: "Based on patient’s Pre-Employment Medical Examination dated July 21, 2005, patient has unremarkable past medical history and was
pronounced fit to work as seaman during that time. However, during patient’s initial evaluation, he claimed to be diabetic for almost 6 years and was diagnosed in a
clinic in Parañaque and was maintained on Metformin 500mg since then.

He was seen by a Nephrologist during his initial evaluation who agreed with the diagnosis of Chronic Kidney Disease secondary to Diabetic Nephropathy."32
(Emphasis ours)

This is confirmed by the medicalevaluation of Margarito’s own physician, Dr. Vicaldo stating as follows:

This patient/seaman presented with history of nausea and anorexia noted in June 2006 for which he was seen in United Arab Emirates. He underwent blood
chemistry examination and abdominal ultrasound and was diagnosed as kidney disease (sic). History revealed that he is also a known diabetic for six years now
and maintained on Metformin three times a day.

x x x x33 (Emphasis supplied)

The fact that Margarito passed his PEME cannot excuse his willful concealment nor can it preclude the petitioners from rejecting his disability claims. PEME is not
exploratory and does not allow the employer to discover any and all pre-existing medicalcondition with which the seafarer is suffering and for which he may
bepresently taking medication. The PEME is nothing more than a summary examination of the seafarer’s physiological condition;34 it merely determines whether
one is "fit to work" at sea or "fit for sea service" and it does not state the real state of health of an applicant. The "fit to work" declaration in the PEME cannot be a
conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment.35

Thus, for knowingly concealing his diabetes during the PEME, Margarito committed fraudulent misrepresentation which under the POEA-SEC unconditionally barred
his right to receive any disability compensation or illness benefit.

This finding renders any issue on work-relatedness irrelevant since the premise which bars disability compensation is the fraudulent misrepresentation of a pre-
existing disease and not the fact that it was pre-existing.

Even if we were to disregard Margarito’s fraudulent misrepresentation, his claim will still fail.

It is evident from the foregoing medical reports of Drs. Dacanay and Vicaldo that when Margarito applied for and was given employment by the petitioners on July
26, 2005, he was already afflicted with diabetes. This means that he did not acquire his illness while working in the petitioner’s vessel and thus his diabetes is not
work-related.

A similar conclusion was arrived at in the recent Philman Marine Agency, Inc. v. Cabanban,36 involving a seafarer who concealed during his PEME that he had
hypertension, thus:

x x x We note that Dr. Ranjan of the Fujairah Port Clinic stated in his report that Armando was a "known case of HT, on atenolol 50 mg OD [for five years]." The
import of this statement cannot be disregarded as it directly points to Armando’s willfulconcealment; it also shows that Armando did not acquire hypertensionduring
his employment and is therefore not work-related.37

It is true that the pre-existence of an illness does not irrevocably bar compensability because disability lawsstill grant the same provided the seafarer’s working
conditions bear causal connection with his illness.38

These rules, however, cannot be asserted perfunctorily by the claimant as it is incumbent upon him to prove, by substantial evidence, as to how and why the nature
of his work and working conditions contributed to and/or aggravated his illness.39 The respondents failed to discharge this burden of proof.
No evidence is on record showing the specific essential facts on how and why Margarito’s working conditions exacerbated his diabetes which in turn gave rise to its
various complications, one of which led to his death. The respondents failed to particularly describe his working conditions while on sea duty. Also, no expert medical
opinion was presented regarding the causes of his diabetes.

On record are mere general statements presented as self-serving allegations which were not validated by any written document visibly demonstrating40 that the
working conditions on board the vessel served to worsen Margarito’s diabetes.

In their petition before the CA, the respondents vaguely claimed:

The work of the Chief Engineer, including the daily routines in the vessel’s engine department, necessarily expose[d] him to these factors emanating therefrom, in
all kinds of weather conditions. x x x.41

xxxx

[T]he job of a chief engineer is strenuous and stressful. Moreover, [Margarito] was exposed to hostile working condition and environment. He was exposed to
unhealthy diet on the board the vessel, extreme hot and cold weather and likewise he was exposed to hazardous chemicals and substances that are stored in the
engine room of the vessel. x x x.42

At the very least, these general statements surmise merepossibilities but not the probability required by law for disability compensation. Mere possibility will not
suffice and a claim will still fail if there is only a possibility that the employment caused or aggravated the disease.43 Even considering that the respondents have
shown probability, their basis is, nonetheless incompetent for being uncorroborated.Probability of work-connection must at least be anchored on credible
information44 and not on self-serving allegations.

Likewise deficient is Dr. Vicaldo’s one-line statement in his June 25, 2007 Medical Report that "[Margarito’s] illness is considered work aggravated/related"45 as it
did not supply the specific cause of Margarito’s diabetes.

Certainly, disability compensation cannot rest on mere allegations couched in conjectures and baseless inferences from which workaggravation or relatedness
cannot be presumed. "[B]are allegations do not suffice to discharge the required quantumof proof of compensability. Awards of compensation cannot rest on
speculations or presumptions. The beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a positive proposition."46

Moreover, the very nature of diabetes does not indicate workrelatedness. The World Health Organization defines diabetes mellitus as a metabolic disorder of multiple
etiology characterized by chronic hyperglycemia with disturbances of carbohydrate, fat and protein metabolism resulting from defects in insulin secretion, insulin
action, orboth.47 It is a metabolic and a familial disease to which one is pre-disposed by reason of heredity, obesity or old age."48

Definitely, work-relatedness cannot be deduced from heredity and old age. Neither can diabetes by reason ofobesity be compensable owing to the fact that obesity
is "excess body weight, defined as a body mass index (BMI) of ≥30 kg/m2," which ultimately results from a long-standing imbalance between energy intake and
energy expenditure. It does not indicate work-relatedness and by its nature, is more the result of poor lifestyle choices and health habits for which disability benefits
are improper.49

While cerebrovascular accident which was the proximate cause of Margarito’s death is listed as an occupational disease under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC and
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Title II, Book VI of the Labor Code, its compensability, however, must conform to following additional conditions, viz:

(a) There must be a history, which should be proved, or trauma at work (to the head specially) due to unusual and extraordinary physical or mental strain or event,
or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry.
(b) There must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of employment and the worker’s collapse.

(c) If the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage, the injury may be considered as arising from work.

Records do not show that these conditions were met. Also, Margarito’s CVA set in a year after hehas been medically repatriated. More importantly, CVA was actually
the resulting complication of his underlying illness of diabetes.

Diabetes mellitus is a chronic condition that has the potential to have significant adverse effects on the quality of life of the patient as a result of its microvascular
and macrovascular complications. The microvascular events include retinopathy, nephropathy and neuropathy. While these markedly increase the morbidity of
persons with DM, it is the macrovascular complications (cardiovascular disease) that account for the increased mortality in this population.50

It is recognized that people with diabetes have an increased prevalence of cardiovascular diseases and diabetes can be said to be a condition of premature
cardiovascular complications in the setting of chronic hyperglycemia. Cardiovasculardisease (refers to disease of the heart and circulatory system) is the leading
cause of death in people with DM.51

The same is true with respect to his chronic renal ailment.1âwphi1 The medical findings presented by both parties uniformly show that Margarito's renal ailment was
contracted as a complication of his diabetes from which he has been suffering for 6 years prior to his employment with the petitioners.

Thus, it cannot be said that his risk of contracting renal insufficiency or CVA was increased by his working conditions because irrespective thereof, his complications
would have set in because of his diabetic condition.

In sum, the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when the latter affirmed the LA's dismissal of Margarito's complaint for permanent
disability benefits and sickness allowance.

In as much as we commiserate with Margarito's widow, the Court's commitment to the cause of labor is not a lopsided undertaking. It cannot and does not prevent
us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right. The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers.
Justice, is, in every case for the deserving, and it must be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.52

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108142 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the respondents' complaint docketed as NLRC NCR OFW Case No. (M) 06-12-03874-00 before the Labor Arbiter is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 213679, November 25, 2015

JAY H. LICAYAN, Petitioner, v. SEACREST MARITIME MANAGEMENT, INC., CLIPPER FLEET MANAGEMENT, A/S AND/OR REDENTOR ANAYA,
Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the March 4, 2014 Decision2 and the July 23, 2014 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
130891, which reversed and set aside the March 27, 2013 Decision4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), affirming the August 31, 2012 Decision5
of the Labor Arbiter (LA), in a complaint for disability and claim for sickness benefits, damages and attorney's fees.
The Antecedents

Petitioner Jay H. Licayan (Licayan) was hired as Fitter for the vessel, MT Clipper Ann, by its local manning agent, respondent Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc.
(Seacrest), for and in behalf of its foreign principal Nordic Tankers Marine. They executed a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) -approved
Contract of Employment which provided for the Standard Terms and Conditions governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels.
Licayan underwent a pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and, thereafter, was declared fit for sea service.

On March 23, 2011, Licayan boarded the vessel for his duties as Fitter for a period of seven (7) months with a basic salary of US$698.

In addition to his main duties as Fitter, Licayan was also tasked to install water and oil separation fixtures and the safety equipment of the engine and the steel
platforms which served as the path walk of the crew whenever the vessel was loaded with chemicals.

On September 7, 2011, Licayan suddenly felt a severe headache. He called the attention of the Master who recommended that he be examined by a doctor at the
next port of call. For the time being, he was given Tylenol to relieve the pain. The Master also referred the matter to the health provider of the principal so that he
could be examined by a psychiatrist.

Upon reaching the port of Cartagena, Colombia, on September 15, 2011, he was brought to Medihelp Hospital where he underwent laboratory examinations. He
was initially diagnosed to be suffering from vertigo and anxiety disorder. Consequently, he was given medicines, Betazok and Zolpiden.

On September 16, 2011, the attending physician made a definitive finding that Licayan was suffering from Trastorno or Panic Disorder. Accordingly, he was
recommended to be repatriated.

Upon arrival in Manila on September 20, 2011, Licayan was advised by his agency to report to the company-designated doctor, Dr. Natalio Alegre (Dr. Alegre), for
treatment and management. He was directed to undergo a series of tests at St. Luke's Medical Center, to wit: blood test, hematology, x-ray on his cervical spine, 2D
echo with Doppler, stress test, and ECG.

On January 25, 2012, or after more than 120 days from his initial treatment, Dr. Alegre issued a certification with his conclusion that Licayan was suffering from
Panic Disorder, Muscular Spasm-Cervical and Hypertension and that he was "unfit to work."6

Licayan then underwent a more comprehensive treatment at the National Center for Mental Health. He was given medications for his illness, but his condition did
not improve.

In the hope of recovering from his mental illness, Licayan sought the opinion of Dr. Elias Adamos (Dr. Adamos), a clinical psychologist of the Perpetual Succor
Hospital in Manila, who certified, on July 2, 2012, that he was incapacitated to work permanently as a seafarer. Dr. Adamos' medical findings were as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxx

Axis I: Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Work-related); Anxiety Disorder associated with or secondary to toxic chemical exposure;

Axis II: None; Axis III; None;

Axis IV: Seafare job; Excessive anxiety and worry (apprehensive expectation) occurring in persistence over the last 10 months; Work stress;
Axis V: Clinical course and prognosis is unpredictable.
cralawlawlibrary

His serious medical, mental and psychological condition is equivalent to Grade l under the Standard Contract of POEA. He is therefore permanently incapacitated
to work as a seafarer.7

[Emphasis supplied]cralawlawlibrary

On account of the findings of the company-designated physician together with the above-mentioned findings of Dr. Adamos, Licayan filed a case for payment of total
and permanent disability benefits.

Seacrest rejected the said claims because the injury or illness sustained by Licayan was not the result of an accident and was not work-related.

On August 31, 2012, the LA granted Licayan's claim for permanent total disability in the amount of $89,100.00 as provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA).

Seacrest appealed to the NLRC.

On March 27, 2013, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the LA. In a Resolution, dated May 15, 2013, the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Seacrest.

Aggrieved, Seacrest filed with the CA a special action for certiorari assailing the decision of the NLRC.

On March 4, 2014, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC decision, stating that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing claimant to recover in
the absence of factual proof of entitlement. The CA found that Licayan failed to prove by substantial evidence that his illness could be attributed or closely connected
to his line of work. It wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

At this juncture, We would like to point out the utterly misplaced assumption of the Labor Arbiter and public respondent that private respondent's diagnosis of Panic
Disorder can be likened to that of the medical condition called schizophrenia or psychosis which the High Court declared to be compensable in Cabuyoc v. Inter-
Orient Navigation, et al. The NLRC and the Labor Arbiter exceeded their authority in similarly attributing private respondent's state to a special mental condition such
as schizophrenia when no declaration had ever been espoused by the company-designated physician and even by private respondent's own doctor who were both
in the dominance to posit a peculiar medical analysis such as psychosis. Also, there had been no indication in private respondent's position paper of particular
incidents on board the vessel which might have contributed to private respondent's head trauma and later on, the same developed as panic attacks, except for the
sweeping and general statements that he was constantly exposed to perilous chemicals in installing water and oil separation fixtures.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary

Accordingly, the CA disposed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 27, 2013 and the Resolution dated May 15, 2013 of
the National Labor Relations Commission, Sixth Division, in LAC No. OFW-M-11-001035-12 [NLRC-OFW-M-04-05890-12] are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint filed in the proceedings below for recovery of total permanent disability benefits is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.9cralawlawlibrary

After his motion for reconsideration was denied, Licayan filed this petition for review, submitting for consideration the following

GROUNDS:
I

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT LICAYAN HAS NOTHING TO SUPPORT
HIS CLAIM OF WORK RELATEDNESS;

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT
LICAYAN SUFFERED AN INCIDENT THAT CONTRIBUTED TO HIS PANIC ATTACK;

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING TO LICAYAN THE PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABILITY COMPENSATION AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.10cralawlawlibrary

Petitioner Licayan argues that between the findings of Dr. Adamos, a clinical pyschologist and that of Dr. Alegre, a general surgeon, the findings of work-relatedness
of Dr. Adamos deserve more credence; and his conclusion that Licayan suffered Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Work-related); Anxiety disorder associated with or
secondary to toxic chemical exposures is more credible and correct.11

Regarding the CA conclusion that he failed to show any incident that could have contributed to his illness, Licayan pointed out that, first, he was initially declared to
be fit to work when he boarded the vessel to work as Fitter. Second, due to the long hours of laborious and strenuous work and also homesickness, he felt stressed
and fatigued. Third, his regular stresses and fatigue were aggravated when he was given the special assignment of installing water and oil separation fixtures while
the vessel was on the high seas. It turned out to be very stressful since any movement of the vessel might endanger the seaworthiness of the vessel and consequently
the lives of the crew. The panic disorder was but a manifestation of the fact that his emotional makeup could no longer endure the stresses that the special assignment
entailed.12

Seacrest, in its Comment,13 countered that the CA did not err in concluding that the record was wanting of proof, even substantial at the very least, that Licayan's
mental/psychological condition was caused or aggravated by the performance of his functions on board the vessel. Seacrest pointed out that Licayan failed to
establish the reasonable linkage between his illness and his work so as to persuade a rational mind to conclude that his work could have contributed to the
establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any preexisting condition he might have had.

The Court's Ruling

The core issue for resolution of the Court is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Licayan's complaint for recovery of permanent total disability on the ground
that he failed to support his claim by substantial evidence.

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Panic disorder occurs when one lives in fear of having a panic attack; and one is suffering from panic attack when he feels a sudden, overwhelming terror that has
no obvious cause. Among the physical symptoms of panic attack are: a racing heart, breathing difficulties, and sweating.14 During the attack, the fear response is
out of proportion for the situation, which often is not threatening. Over time, the patient will develop a constant fear of having another panic attack, which can affect
daily functioning and general quality of life.15

In resolving the subject controversy, it is well to examine anew the 2000 POEA-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) which is deemed incorporated in the
contract of employment between Seacrest and Licayan. Section 20 (B) thereof provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxx

6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule
of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and rules of
compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.cralawlawlibrary

"Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, two elements must concur for an injury or illness to be compensable. First, that the injury or illness must be work-related;
and second, that the work-related injury or illness must have arisen during the term of the seafarer's employment contract."16

The 2000 POEA-SEC defines work-related injury as "injury resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment" and as "any sickness
resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." Section 32-
A thereof provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 32-A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;

2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;

3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and

4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.cralawlawlibrary

It must be borne in mind, however, that the list of illness/diseases in Section 32-A does not exclude other illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable.
The POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties."17 So much so that Section 20 (B) (4) of
the same explicitly provides that "[t]he liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
(t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related." In other words, a disputable presumption is created in favor of
compensability. Illnesses not listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. This means that even if the illness is not listed under Section 32-A of the
POEA-SEC as an occupational disease or illness, it will still be presumed as work-related, and it becomes incumbent on the employer to overcome the
presumption.18

This disputable presumption, however, does not signify an automatic grant of compensation and/or benefits claim.19 "Concomitant with this presumption is the
burden placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease and only a
reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required to establish compensability of illnesses not included in the list of occupational diseases."20

In the case at bench, Licayan was able to prove by substantial evidence that his work conditions caused his panic disorder. He stated in his position paper
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx

7. Complainant was always exposed to the harsh conditions of the elements, the perils at sea, severe stress while being away from his family and fatigue while doing
his duties and responsibilities on board the vessel.

8. This demanding nature of his job was his routine since he boarded the vessel. For this reason, he was not able to have proper rest. He has also an irregular sleep
pattern since he is on call by his supervisor 24 hours a day.

9. Notwithstanding the extraordinary work load, Mr. Licayan was given an overall assessment of a conscientious worker with good engineering knowledge and
experience on sea trade. A copy of the evaluation is hereto attached as ANNEX "C" and "C-i."

10. In addition to the principal functions and duties as Fitter, Mr. Licayan [would] perform and install the water and oil separation fixtures. This job can only be done
normally when the vessel is on dry dock so that the equipment are properly installed and fixed. However, due to excellence skill and dexterity of Mr. Licayan, he is
asked by his superiors to do the same while the vessel was on voyage.

11. He also would install the safe equipment of the engine. He would also install the steel platforms which serve as the path walk of the crew when the vessel is
loaded with chemicals.

12. This extraordinary difficult job [of] Mr. Licayan unduly put him into pressure resulting to loss of sleep, loss of appetite and emotional disorder.

xxxx21

[Emphases Supplied]
cralawlawlibrary

Licayan also presented Dr. Adamos' diagnosis to prove that his illness was work-related and, therefore, compensable. The reasonable connection between the
nature of his work and the medical condition he acquired during his stint as Fitter in the vessel was substantially proven. As such, pursuant to Section 20 (B) (4) of
the POEA-SEC, the disputable presumption that the panic disorder he contracted was work-related arose. This condition, although not listed under Section 32-A of
the POEA-SEC as an occupational disease or illness, is presumed to be work-related. It is now incumbent upon the employer to overcome this presumption.

A reexamination of the evidence presented by Seacrest, however, fails to overcome the presumption. This Court finds that the October 28, 2011 medical report of
Dr. Alegre, the company-designated doctor, was too sweeping and inadequate to support a conclusion. His assessment that Licayan's panic disorder was not work-
related was without basis. He did not consider the varied factors to which Licayan was exposed while on board the vessel. In fact, in the same report, he
alleged:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxx

Mr. Licayan is diagnosed with Panic Disorder. Panic disorder is a type of anxiety disorder in which one has repeated attacks of intense fear that something bad will
occur when not expected. The cause is unknown but genetics may play a role, xxx.22cralawlawlibrary

It can be deduced from the foregoing statement that the cause of panic disorder was not known and that genetics might only be one of the many causes. This finding
resonates the fact that researchers until now have not determined a specific cause of this condition. Many doctors believe that it is a combination of environmental
and genetic factors.23 Thus, the assessment of Dr. Alegre is not conclusive to defeat Licayan's claim for compensation.

There is the possibility that work stress may be a cause and Licayan presented substantial evidence to prove work-connection.
Jurisprudence is indeed replete with pronouncements that it is the company-designated physician's findings which should form the basis of any disability claim of
the seafarer.24 It is worthy to note, however, that neither the claimant nor the labor tribunals and the courts are automatically bound by the medical report issued by
the company-designated physician. The inherent merit of the said report would still have to be weighed and duly considered by the Court.25cralawred

In view of the above, the Court finds that the CA erred in declaring that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
declaring that the illness suffered by Licayan was not work-related.

Finally, anent the nature of disability caused by his work-related illness, the Court notes that Licayan was declared unfit to work by the company-designated physician,
Dr. Alegre. This finding was affirmed by the medical assessment made by Licayan's physician, Dr. Adamos, as he declared Licayan to be permanently incapacitated
to work as a seafarer. Thus, the Court is inclined to rule that Licayan suffered from a permanent total disability because he was unable to earn wages in the same
kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could
do.26

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 4, 2014 Decision and the July 23, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 130891 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 27, 2013 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 130772 November 19, 1999

WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC., and WALLEM SHIP MANAGEMENT, LTD., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELIZABETH INDUCTIVO, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and WALLEM SHIP MANAGEMENT LTD. in this petition for certiorari assail for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion the 30 June 1997 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dismissing their appeal for lack of merit, as well as its 29 August 1997 Resolution
denying reconsideration thereof. 1

Sometime in May 1993, Pan-Fil Co. Inc., as manning and crewing agent in the Philippines of Wallem Ship Management Ltd. (WALLEM MANAGEMENT), hired
Faustino Inductivo as utilityman for "MT Rowan," a vessel owned and operated by WALLEM MANAGEMENT, a Hongkong based shipping company. The employment
contract of Faustino Inductivo was good for ten (10) months with a compensation of US$360.00 monthly basic salary, US$201.00 fixed monthly overtime pay, and a
monthly vacation leave with pay for six (6) days. As was the standard procedure, Faustino Inductivo underwent pre-employment medical examination and was found
by his employer's doctors to be physically fit for work. So, on 13 May 1993, he was told to board as he did the "MT Rowan."

In November 1993 Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. (WALLEM SERVICES) took over as WALLEM MANAGEMENT's manning and crewing agent in the Philippines.
Faustino Inductivo, who was advised of the takeover, opted to remain on the vessel and to continue his employment under the m anning agency of WALLEM
SERVICES. Barely two (2) months before the expiration of his employment contract, or on 17 January 1994, he was discharged from the vessel. His Seaman's Book
2 and Wages Account 3 indicated that the cause of the discharge was "mutual consent, on completion of 8 months and 5 days." Accordingly, he disembarked in
Hong Kong, travelled to Manila alone and then returned to his hometown in Nueva Ecija.

On 19 January 1994, two (2) days after his arrival in the Philippines, he was hospitalized at the Yamsuan Medical Clinic in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, after complaining of
occasional coughing and chest pains. The clinical diagnosis was pneumonities, bilateral. As his condition worsened, Faustino Inductivo was rushed to the Lung
Center of the Philippines where a mass was found on his right lung and another on his right neck. His doctor advised him to undergo biopsy treatment, but since he
was scared he requested to go on medication at home instead. Two (2) days thereafter, Faustino Inductivo returned to the hospital, this time at the De Ocampo
Memorial Medical Center. Dr. Alfredo Sales, his attending physician, found on examination the presence of water in his lungs causing shortness of breath. For
insufficiency of medical facilities, however, he was transferred to the Makati Medical Center where his doctor finally abandoned all hopes for his recovery as his
disease was already in its advanced stage. He succumbed to his illness on 23 April 1994 and the autopsy report showed as cause of death disseminated intravascular
coagulations, septecalmia, pulmonary congestion and multiple intestinal obstruction secondary to multiple adhesions. 4

Before Faustino Inductivo's death, or sometime in February 1994, herein private respondent Elizabeth Inductivo went to petitioners to claim the balance of her
husband's leave wages. She also inquired about his sickness benefits as he was then very sick. Petitioners however informed her that her husband was not entitled
to sickness benefits because he was not sick at the time he was "offsigned" from the vessel; he was "offsigned" from the vessel on "mutual consent" and not on
medical grounds; and since he failed to advise or notify petitioners in writing within seventy-two (72) hours of his alleged sickness, his right to claim sickness benefits
was deemed forfeited. Consequently, at the instance of Faustino Inductivo, private respondent filed an affidavit-complaint against petitioners for the payment of
sickness and insurance benefits. After Faustino Inductivo died his complaint was amended by private respondent to include death benefits.

On 24 September 1996 the Labor Arbiter 5 rendered a decision in favor of private respondent ordering petitioners to pay complainant, for herself and in her capacity
as guardian of her two (2) minor children, as follows: US$50,000.00 as death benefits; US$14,000.00 as children's allowances; and US$1,000.00 as burial expenses.

On appeal the NLRC sustained the Labor Arbiter. In its Resolution of 30 June 1997 the NLRC held in part —

It may be true that the deceased failed to report to respondent Wallem Maritime within seventy two hours after arrival in the Philippines but it could not be denied
also that the deceased was sick when he arrived. Human mind dictates that a medical consultation at the nearest clinic is necessary before anything else. The wife
could not immediately advise the respondent due to the situation of her deceased husband . . . . The allegation of the complainant that her husband was repatriated
upon petition of the crew due to the deteriorating physical condition of Faustino Inductivo, was not denied by respondent. The defense of the latter that the repatriation
of the deceased was by "mutual consent" and not discharged medically deserves scant consideration. It is to be emphasized that the illness was contracted during
the deceased's employment on board "MT Rowan." Suffice it to say that the death of Faustino Inductivo is compensable under the circumstances.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC in its Resolution of 29 August 1997, petitioners are now before us imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC in: (a) totally disregarding the evidence on record; (b) ignoring and disregarding the existing law and jurisprudence on the matter;
and, (c) affirming in toto the Labor Arbiter's award of death compensation in favor of private respondent.

The pivotal issue to be resolved is whether the death of Faustino Inductivo is compensable as to entitle his wife and children to claim death benefits. Petitioners
insist that it is not compensable for two (2) principal reasons: first, Faustino Inductivo was offsigned from the vessel "MT Rowan" based on "mutual consent" and not
on medical grounds, and the cancer which caused his death was not contracted during his employment but was a pre-existing condition; and second, Faustino
Inductivo failed to comply with the mandatory seventy-two (72)-hour reporting requirement prescribed by the POEA standard employment contract, and therefore
his right to claim benefits was deemed forfeited.

Petitioners would want to impress upon this Court that Faustino Inductivo was still in good health when he disembarked from "MT Rowan," as shown in his Seaman's
Book indicating that the cause of his discharge was "mutual consent in writing" and not on medical grounds.

We disagree. From all indications, Faustino Inductivo was already in a deteriorating physical condition when he left the vessel. This is the only plausible reason why
with barely two (2) months away from the expiration of his employment contract he was all of a sudden and with no rational explanation discharged from the vessel.
This conclusion is buttressed by the events that transpired immediately upon his arrival in the Philippines, i.e., he was hospitalized two (2) days later and died three
(3) months after.

Thus, as succinctly observed by the Labor Arbiter —

While it's true that the seaman was offsigned from the vessel by "mutual consent," what could have been the compelling reason why only less than two (2) months
away before the expiration of his employment contract, he decided to disembark. Then there is the question about the true state of his health at the time he
disembarked. The puzzle of course is why two (2) days upon his disembarkation complainant's husband lapsed into his ordeal immediately serious at the onset
without any sign of relief until his last breath barely three months thereafter.

It is indeed unthinkable that the deceased seaman at the homestretch of his voyage would suddenly seek the end of his employm ent for no reason at all. There is
only one logical explanation for this given the circumstances that took place immediately after disembarkation. Complainant's husband was already seriously ill when
he (was) discharged from the vessel. This conclusion is supported by the fact that barely two (2) days upon his arrival in the Philippines, he was rushed to a local
medical clinic for some serious symptoms. There being no relief after six (6) days of medical attendance, the late seaman was transferred to the Lung Center of the
Philippines. Again, as there was likewise no relief obtained the family was constrained to seek further work-outs in two (2) other hospitals, the last of which was at
the Makati Medical Center where all clinical procedures and work-outs were ruled out as of no consequence since the deceased's condition at the time was already
irreversible.

There is likewise no merit in petitioners' theory that Faustino Inductivo died of cancer which was pre-existing and could not have been contracted during the eight
(8)-month period of his employment at the vessel. Primarily, both the Death Certificate 6 and Autopsy Report of Faustino Inductivo never mentioned that the cause
of death was cancer. What was mentioned was "septicemia," if we go by the Death Certificate, and "disseminated intravascular coagulations, septecalmia, pulmonary
congestion, multiple intestinal obstruction secondary to multiple adhesions," if we refer to the autopsy report. Ostensibly, cancer was not in the list.

Indeed, there was never any categorical or conclusive finding that Faustino Inductivo was afflicted with cancer. Petitioners' extensive discussion in support of their
"cancer theory" is nothing more than mere speculations cloaked in medical gibberish. Moreover, we agree with private respondent that opinions of petitioners' doctors
to this effect should not be given evidentiary weight as they are palpably self-serving and biased in favor of petitioners, and certainly could not be considered
independent. These medical opinions cannot prevail over the entries in the Death Certificate and Autopsy Report.

Furthermore, before Faustino Inductivo was made to sign the employment contract with petitioners he was required to undergo, as a matter of procedure, medical
examinations and was declared fit to work by no less than petitioners' doctors. Petitioners cannot now be heard to claim that at the time Faustino Inductivo was
employed by them he was afflicted with a serious disease, and that the medical examination conducted on the deceased seaman was not exploratory in nature such
that his disease was not detected in the first instance. Being the employer, petitioners had all the opportunity to pre-qualify, screen and choose their applicants and
determine whether they were medically, psychologically and mentally fit for the job upon employment. The moment they have chosen an applicant they are deemed
to have subjected him to the required pre-qualification standards.

But even assuming that the ailment of Faustino Inductivo was contracted prior to his employment on board "MT Rowan," this is not a drawback to the compensability
of the disease. It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits
provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death.

It is indeed safe to presume that, at the very least, the nature of Faustino Inductivo's employment had contributed to the aggravation of his illness — if indeed it was
pre-existing at the time of his employment — and therefore it is but just that he be duly compensated for it. It cannot be denied that there was at least a reasonable
connection between his job and his lung infection, which eventually developed into septicemia and ultimately caused his death. As a utilityman on board the vessel,
he was exposed to harsh sea weather, chemical irritants, dusts, etc., all of which invariably contributed to his illness.

Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employee must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he contracted the disease.
Every workingman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes them as
he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the employee's death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical
condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be had therefor independent of any pre-existing disease. 7

On the alleged failure of private respondent to comply with the seventy-two (72)-hour reporting requirement, the POEA Standard Employment Contract Governing
the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean Going Vessel, 8 provides in part —
. . . . the seaman shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by the company-designated physician within three working days upon his return,
except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the
seaman to comply with the mandatory requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits (Emphasis supplied).

Admittedly, Faustino Inductivo did not subject himself to post-employment medical examination within three (3) days from his return to the Philippines, as required
by the above provision of the POEA standard employment contract. But such requirement is not absolute and admits of an exception, i.e., when the seaman is
physically incapacitated from complying with the requirement. Indeed, for a man who was terminally ill and in need of urgent medical attention one could not
reasonably expect that he would immediately resort to and avail of the required medical examination, assuming that he was still capable of submitting himself to
such examination at that time. It is quite understandable that his immediate desire was to be with his family in Nueva Ecija whom he knew would take care of him.
Surely, under the circumstances, we cannot deny him, or his surviving heirs after his death, the right to claim benefits under the law.

Similarly, neither could private respondent Elizabeth Inductivo be expected to have thought of, much less had the leisure of time to travel all the way to Manila, to
notify petitioners of her husband's condition. Her primary concern then was to take care of her husband who was at the brink of death.

At any rate, it appears that in early February 1994 private respondent went to petitioners to claim the balance of her husband's leave wages. She then informed
petitioners of the condition of her husband as well as his confinement in a hospital, and inquired about the sickness benefits she intended to claim. This was more
than sufficient actual notice to petitioners.

It is relevant to state that the POEA standard employment contract is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their
employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor or for the benefit of the
seamen and their dependents. Only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect.

Finally, petitioner WALLEM SERVICES as manning agent is jointly and severally liable with its principal, WALLEM MANAGEMENT, for the claims of the heirs of
Faustino Inductivo in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations. 9

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 June 1997 and 29 August
1997, respectively dismissing petitioners' appeal for lack of merit and denying reconsideration thereof, are AFFIRMED. Petitioners are ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, the following amounts to private respondent for herself and in her capacity as guardian of her two (2) minor children: US$50,000.00 as death benefits;
US$14,000.00 as children's allowances; and US$1,000.00 as burial expenses. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., INTERORIENT ENTERPRISES, INC., and LIBERIA AND DOROTHEA SHIPPING CO., LTD., Petitioners
- versus -

LEONORA S. REMO,Respondent.

G.R. No. 181112

Present:
CARPIO, J. Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
June 29, 2010
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2]
dated September 26, 2007, which reversed and set aside the resolution[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated June 23, 2006.

This case stems from the claim for death benefits filed by respondent Leonora S. Remo (respondent), surviving spouse of Lutero Remo (Lutero), against petitioners
Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. (Interorient), Interorient Enterprises, Inc., and Liberia and Dorothea Shipping Co., Ltd. (petitioners).

Culled from the records, the facts are as follows:

Lutero was deployed by Interorient on November 10, 1998 to serve as Cook-Steward on board the foreign principals vessel, M/T Captain Mitsos L (the vessel),
under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract (SEC) with a duration of 12 months and a monthly salary of
US$400.00.[4]

Respondent alleged that Lutero was repeatedly contracted and deployed by Interorient for employment on board various vessels of its principals from September
1994 to April 1999;[5] that prior to his last employment contract on October 29, 1998, he underwent a pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was
declared fit to work; that on his fifth month of employment, while on board the vessel, Lutero experienced severe abdominal and chest pains, fainting spells and
difficulty in breathing; that he was brought to a hospital in Dubai where he was confined for one (1) week until his repatriation on April 19, 1999; that he was diagnosed
with atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure; that within 2-3 days from arrival, Lutero reported to Interorient and requested that he be given a post-employment
medical examination and assistance; that Interorient assured Lutero that he would be given a medical examination and assistance which did not, however,
materialize; that Lutero, after waiting for about two weeks for the examination, went home to his province but, two weeks thereafter, he was again confined in a
hospital after experiencing another episode of difficulty in breathing, abdominal and chest pains, dyspnea, and irregular cardiac breathing; that for the period of May
3 to December 9, 1999, he underwent treatment for the ailment he contracted during his overseas employment; that Lutero was diagnosed with Chronic Atrial
Fibrillation, Cardiomegaly, Essential Hypertension, and Schistosomiasis;[6] that sometime thereafter, he received notice from Interorient, requiring him to report as
there was supposedly a vessel available for him to join; that he tried to persuade his attending doctor, Dr. Efren Ozaraga (Dr. Ozaraga), to declare him fit to work
because he wanted to resume his work, but the doctor refused; that Lutero reported to Interorient, but failed in his PEME; that on August 28, 2000, he died at the
age of 47 of hypertensive cardio-vascular disease,[7] leaving behind respondent and their three (3) children;[8] that from the time of his discharge from the vessel,
Lutero did not receive any sickness benefit or medical assistance from petitioners; and that respondent is entitled to death compensation as the death of her husband
was due to an illness contracted during the latter's employment, as well as sickness benefit, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.

Petitioners denied liability and averred that, at the time of his application, Lutero expressly declared in his application form that he did not, in the past and at that
time, have any illness; that during his PEME, he answered no to the listed medical conditions and to the question if he was taking any medication;[9] that on the
basis of his representation, he was declared fit to work and subsequently commenced employment; that after his repatriation, Lutero reported to Interorients office
on April 20, 1999, and when asked about the circumstances of his illness, he admitted that he had a preexisting ailment at the time of his application and deployment,
and discharged petitioners from liabilities arising from said preexisting illness by virtue of his Acknowledgment[10] and Undertaking;[11] that thereafter, nothing was
heard from Lutero until February 2000, when he submitted to Interorient a medical certificate[12] of fitness to work issued by his private doctor, Dr. Ozaraga; that
respondent was not entitled to her claims because Lutero died after the expiration of the term of the contract; that Lutero failed to disclose his preexisting illness at
the time of his engagement; and that, following his repatriation, he acknowledged his preexisting illness.

On January 13, 2004, the Labor Arbiter (LA) denied respondent's claims, holding that she was not entitled thereto because Luteros death did not occur during the
term of the contract; that Lutero failed to disclose his medical condition prior to his deployment; and that he acknowledged his preexisting illness following his
repatriation. Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the NLRC which, however, affirmed the LA's ruling.

Undaunted, respondent went to the CA on certiorari,[13] alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in not ruling that Lutero's death was due to an
illness contracted during his employment, or that said employment contributed to the development of his illness.
On September 26, 2007, the CA decided in favor of respondent, finding that the nature of Lutero's employment contributed to the aggravation of his illness. Invoking
our rulings in Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC[14] and Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC,[15] the CA disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private
respondents are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the following amounts to petitioner for herself and in her capacity as guardian of her minor children:
US$50,000.00 as death benefit; US$7,000.00 to each child under the age of twenty-one (21), as allowances; and US$1,000.00 as burial expenses. Costs against
the private respondents. SO ORDERED.[16]

On October 15, 2007, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,[17] which was, however, denied by the CA in its Resolution[18] dated December 20, 2007.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

1) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO DEATH BENEFITS UNDER THE POEA
STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR THE DEATH OF HER HUSBAND OCCUR[R]ING ONE YEAR AFTER THE TERM OF HIS CONTRACT;

2) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO DEATH BENEFITS UNDER THE POEA
STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR THE DEATH OF HER HUSBAND AS THE LATTER'S DEATH WAS DUE TO [A] PRE-EXISTING ILLNESS[; and]

3) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO DEATH BENEFITS UNDER THE
POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR THE DEATH OF HER HUSBAND AS THE LATTER ADMITTED CONCEALING HIS TRUE MEDICAL
CONDITION AT THE TIME OF HIS PRE- EMPLOYMENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION.[19]

Petitioners rely on the findings of both the LA and the NLRC that the death of Lutero is not compensable because it happened outside the term of his contract.
Petitioners claim that the medical certificate issued by Dr. Ozaraga, certifying that Lutero was already fit to resume work, belies respondent's assertion that Lutero
continued to be ill after his repatriation until his death. Petitioners also rely on the undertaking executed by Lutero, stating that, before he joined the vessel, he already
had hypertension, and that he took medication prior to his medical examination. Thus, petitioners submit that Lutero committed material misrepresentation,
disqualifying him from claiming the benefits provided for under the POEA-SEC.[20]

On the other hand, respondent argues that petitioners failed to attach the pertinent documents and pleadings to the Petition, and that the petition raises factual
issues in violation of Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent asseverates that petitioners' stance that the employer is liable only if the death of the
seafarer occurs exactly during the term of the contract violates the nature of the POEA-SEC and is contrary to the avowed policy of the State to accord utmost
protection and justice to labor. Invoking our ruling in Wallem,[21] respondent maintains that it is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree,
to the development of the disease and in bringing about (the seafarers) death. Respondent stresses that this Court allowed the award of death benefits in Wallem
even if the seafarer therein died after the contract term. In the instant case, Lutero suffered a heart ailment while on board the vessel the illness manifested itself
during the term of the contract and was the very reason of his repatriation. Respondent submits that Lutero died of a heart ailment which he incurred during the term
of the contract, thus, making his death compensable. Respondent also denies that the heart ailment of Lutero was a preexisting illness because, while it is true that
the PEME is not exploratory, the ailment would have been easily detected because Lutero had been continuously under petitioners' employ for almost four years.
Lastly, respondent highlights her claim that Lutero, after his repatriation, immediately reported to Interorient and asked for post-medical examination and assistance,
but none was given to him. She bewails the fact that, instead of the conduct of said examination, petitioners induced Lutero to execute the Acknowledgment and
Undertaking, releasing petitioners from any liability.[22]

The ultimate issue in this case is whether the CA committed a reversible error in rendering the assailed Decision.

The Petition is bereft of merit.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in and resolved by this Court on petitions brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, because the Court,
not being a trier of facts, is not duty-bound to reexamine and calibrate the evidence on record. In exceptional cases, however, we may delve into and resolve factual
issues when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced
from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties, or when the lower courts come up with conflicting positions.[23] This case constitutes an exception
inasmuch as the CA's findings contradict those of the LA and the NLRC.

Section 20(B)1 of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels made pursuant to POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 and Department Order No. 33, Series of 1996, clearly provides:

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:x x x x

2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental,
surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.

However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such
time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.[24]

For disability claims, the post-employment medical examination is meant to verify the medical condition of the seafarer when he signs off from the vessel.[25] On
the other hand, in the cases involving death compensation, our rulings in Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin[26] and Rivera v. Wallem Maritime Services, Inc.[27]
stressed the importance of a post-employment medical examination or its equivalent, i.e., it is a basis for the award of death compensation. In these cited cases,
however, death benefits were not awarded because the seafarers and/or their representatives failed to abide by the POEA-SEC wherein it was stated that the
seafarer must report to his employer for a post-employment medical examination within three working days from the date of arrival, otherwise, benefits under the
POEA-SEC would be nullified.[28]

In light of this ruling, the following questions may be asked: What if the seafarer reported to his employer but despite his request for a post-employment medical
examination, the employer, who is mandated to provide this service under POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96, did not do so? Would the absence of a post-
employment medical examination be taken against the seafarer?

Both parties in this case admitted that Lutero was confined in a hospital in Dubai for almost one week due to atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure. Undeniably,
Lutero suffered a heart ailment while under the employ of petitioners. This fact is duly established. Respondent has also consistently asserted that 2-3 days
immediately after his repatriation on April 19, 1999, Lutero reported to the office of Interorient, requesting the required post-employment medical examination.
However, it appears that, instead of heeding Lutero's request, Interorient conveniently prioritized the execution of the Acknowledgment and Undertaking which were
purportedly notarized on April 20, 1999, thus leaving Lutero in the cold. In their pleadings, petitioners never traversed this assertion and did not meet this issue head-
on. This self-serving act of petitioners should not be condoned at the expense of our seafarers. Therefore, the absence of a post-employment medical examination
cannot be used to defeat respondents claim since the failure to subject the seafarer to this requirement was not due to the seafarers fault but to the inadvertence or
deliberate refusal of petitioners.

Moreover, we attach little evidentiary value to the Acknowledgment and Undertaking purportedly executed by Lutero, which is in the nature of a waiver and/or
quitclaim. As a rule, quitclaims, waivers, or releases are looked upon with disfavor and are largely ineffective to bar claims for the measure of a worker's legal
rights.[29]

To be valid, a Deed of Release, Waiver and/or Quitclaim must meet the following requirements: (1) that there was no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties;
(2) that the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (3) that the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.[30] Courts have stepped in to annul questionable transactions, especially where there is clear
proof that a waiver, for instance, was obtained from an unsuspecting or a gullible person; or where the agreement or settlement was unconscionable on its face. A
quitclaim is ineffective in barring recovery of the full measure of a worker's rights, and the acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel. Moreover,
a quitclaim in which the consideration is scandalously low and inequitable cannot be an obstacle to the pursuit of a worker's legitimate claim.[31]
Based on the foregoing disquisition, we find the Acknowledgment and Undertaking to be void, as contrary to public policy. Other than the fact that the
Acknowledgment and Undertaking did not provide for any consideration given in favor of Lutero, it is likewise evident that the terms thereof are unconscionable and
that petitioners merely wangled them from the unsuspecting Lutero who, at that time, just arrived in the country after having been confined in a hospital in Dubai for
a heart ailment.

It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his employer, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or from the interpretation of
agreements and writings should be resolved in the former's favor in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.[32]
This principle gives us even greater reason to affirm the findings of the CA which aptly and judiciously held:

It was established on record that before the late Lutero Remo signed his last contract with private respondents as Cook-Steward of the vessel M/T Captain Mitsos
L, he was required to undergo a series of medical examinations. Yet, he was declared fit to work by private respondents company designated-physician. On April
19, 1999, Remo was discharged from his vessel after he was hospitalized in Fujairah for atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure. His death on August 28, 2000,
even if it occurred months after his repatriation, due to hypertensive cardio-vascular disease, could clearly have been work related. Declared as fit to work at the
time of hiring, and hospitalized while on service on account of atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure, his eventual death due to hypertensive cardio-vascular
disease could only be work related. The death due to hypertensive cardio-vascular disease could in fact be traced to Lutero Remos being the Cook-Steward. As
Cook-Steward of an ocean going vessel, Remo had no choice but to prepare and eat hypertension inducing food, a kind of food that eventually caused his
hypertensive cardio-vascular disease, a disease which in turn admittedly caused his death.

Private respondents cannot deny liability for the subject death by claiming that the seafarers death occurred beyond the term of his employment and worsely, that
there has been misrepresentation on the part of the seafarer. For, as employer, the private respondents had all the opportunity to pre-qualify, thoroughly screen and
choose their applicants to determine if they are medically, psychologically and mentally fit for employment. That the seafarer here was subjected to the required pre-
qualification standards before he was admitted as Cook-Steward, it thus has to be safely presumed that the late Remo was in a good state of health when he boarded
the vessel.[33]

In sum, we find no reversible error on the part of the CA in rendering the assailed Decision which would warrant the reversal and/or modification of the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97336 dated September 26, 2007 is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO
ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202114, November 09, 2016

ELMER A. APINES, Petitioner, v. ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC., AND/OR DANILO F. VENIDA, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Elmer A. Apines (Apines) to assail the Decision2 rendered on
January 26, 2012 and Resolution3 issued on May 30, 2012 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 114221. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the NLRC Decision dated December 14, 2009 and Resolution dated April 14, 2010 are SET ASIDE.
The Complaint for total and permanent disability benefits, reimbursement of medical, hospital and transportation expenses, moral and exemplary damages, sickwage
allowance, attorney's fees and legal interest is hereby DISMISSED. In view of the payment made to [Apines] by petitioners Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc.
and Danilo F. Venida in satisfaction of NLRC Decision dated December 14, 2009 and Resolution dated April 14, 2010, [Apines] is hereby directed to return to
petitioners Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc. and Danilo F. Venida the amount of Three Million Twenty[-]Nine Thousand Eighty[-]Eight Pesos [and] 92/100
(P3,029,088.92).

SO ORDERED.4
The assailed Resolution5 dated May 30, 2012 denied Apines' motion for reconsideration.6

Antecedent Facts

Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc. (ESPI) is a local manning agency, with Danilo F. Venida as representative (collectively, the respondents). Emirates Trading
Agency LLC (ETAL) is among ESPI's foreign principals.7

On September 11, 2007, Apines boarded ETAL's ship, M/V Bandar TBN Trans Gulf, for an eight-month engagement as bosun.8

Apines claimed that sometime in the third week of September, a British surveyor was on board the ship to inspect the cargo hold. Captain Glicerio Castañares (Capt.
Castañares) and Chief Mate Edgardo Llevares instructed Apines to put an apparatus on the top tank of the cargo hold to check for possible leaks. Apines promptly
complied with the order. On his way up from the cargo hold, he accidentally stepped on scattered iron ore pellets causing his left knee to strongly hit the steel railings
of the ladder, and for him to slip and fall.9

According to Apines, despite a sprain and swollen ankle, he was able to stand up and walk. When the pain eventually became intolerable, Apines informed Capt.
Castañares about his condition. Apines was given analgesics. However, his request to be brought to the nearest port for medical attention remained unheeded since
the ship was still on voyage. Further, whenever the ship reached a port, Apines was assigned as a crane driver.10

On November 10, 2007, Apines consulted with an orthopedic surgeon named Dr. Abraham George (Dr. George) when the ship reached the Port of Bahrain. Dr.
George's Medical Report11 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Symptoms: PAIN ON THE LEFT KNEE (SWELLING)

When did the sym[p]toms start: 1 MONTH+

Diagnosis: LATERAL COLLATERAL LIGAMENT SPRN

? MEDIAL MENISCAL INJU

Is declared: FIT Yes No

UNFIT Yes No

1) The patient must attend the Doctor again on: WITH MRI REPORT

2) The seaman must go to Hospital for MRI SCAN-LEFT KNEE

3) Special Remarks: MEDICATIONS AND HINGED KNEE BRACE GIVEN

xxxx

Present History
[P]ain Left Knee since 45 days after a fall on ship at work. Now has pain on climbing at work
Management Plan
Ref to Ortho consult
Bland diet/
Advised MRI scan of the left knee

Diagnosis
5355 GASTRITIS. MAIN*
844 SPRAIN OF KNEEA LEG*, MAIN,*
Left?? OA
8440 SPRAIN LATERAL COLL LIG, MAIN,*
LEFT KNEE
7171 DERANG ANT MED MENISCUS,zClinical,*
LEFT KNEE

Orders

xxxx

Elmetacin solution 50 ml.12 Qty = 1, Verified

Celebrex 200 Mg. Cap,13 Qty = 20, Verified

x x x x14 (Emphasis ours)

In February of 2008, Apines once again complained of pain in his left knee and requested for a medical check-up when the ship reached Jubail, Saudi Arabia.15 Dr.
Vicar Hussain's (Dr. Hussain) Medical Report16 dated February 5, 2008 indicates the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sym[p]toms: PAIN ON THE LEFT KNEE (M.R.I. SCAN - LEFT KNEE RECOMMEND).

When did the sym[p]toms start: Pain & swells 14 [left] knee - 4 mth

Diagnosis: O.A. 14 [left] knee x x x

Is declared: FIT Yes No but Pt needs rest for couple of days

UNFIT Yes No

1) The patient must attend the Doctor again on: after 7 days

2) The seaman must go to Hospital for [MRI SCAN - LEFT KNEE]

3) Special Remarks: Medical & Pt needs MRI 14 [left] knee. Pt needs medication for long time

x x x x17 (Emphasis ours)

Apines claimed that since the pain in his left knee even worsened, he requested for immediate repatriation.18

In Capt. Castañares' e-mail message19 sent to ESPI and Capt. Nicolo Terrei on February 5, 2008, it was stated that for a week already, Apines had been unable to
work due to severe pain on his left knee. Per request, Apines had a medical check up in Jubail, Saudi Arabia. The doctor diagnosed Apines to be suffering from
arthritis. Apines insisted that it was not merely arthritis, but the doctor was not able to determine any other ailment. Consequently, the doctor assessed Apines to be
fit for sea duty. However, due to the worsening pain and inability to work, Apines requested to be promptly sent home to be able to consult with a doctor on his own
account. Thus, Capt. Castañares sought Apines' repatriation to be arranged even if there was still no reliever to take the latter's place.

ESPI, however, denied that Apines had an accidental injury while on board the ship. In the Affidavit20 dated May 4, 2008 and e-mail message21 sent to ESPI on
November 4, 2008, Capt. Castañares stated that in the duration of Apines' stay in the ship from September 15, 2007 to February 6, 2008, there was no report that
the latter had figured in an accident or had sustained an injury.22

Apines disembarked from the ship on February 7, 2008. The next day, Apines reported to ESPI's office.23 Teresa Mendoza (Mendoza) conducted an exit interview,
and her report is partly quoted below:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Accdg. to crew:cralawlawlibrary

- [D]uring an inspection on[ ]board, [he] had an accident when he slid and his knee had a strong contact against [the] steel railing of the ladder. He had a sprain and
his ankle went swollen for four days (Sept.) His knee started to be painful on November. However, he can perform job on[ ]board but he [cannot] fully work and he
is already moving slowly. [He] [f]inds [it] difficult to climb on cranes due to pain in the ankle.

- attached report (No report was given by the master regarding the incident, no evidence from Master's logbook)

xxxx

- was given pain reliever by the doctor (for arthritis and paracetamol)

- and was recommended to see doctor again after seven days but he [was] repatriated after x x x a day.

- was reported FIT TO WORK by the doctor.24

The Crew De-briefing Checklist25 signed by Apines also indicated that his disembarkation was "for medical grounds (on his own request)."

ESPI claimed that it referred Apines to a company-designated doctor, but the latter consulted his own physicians instead.26

On the other hand, Apines alleged that when he reported to ESPI's office right after his repatriation, Mendoza and Angela Padre (Padre) informed him that since he
was declared fit to work, no assistance can be offered to him. Moreover, his unpaid salaries shall be offset against the cost of his airfare ticket in returning to Manila.
Apines, thus, explained that he sought repatriation to undergo Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and obtain medical treatment pursuant to the recommendations
of the doctors in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. ESPI, however, stood its ground in denying to provide Apines with assistance.27

Apines felt aggrieved by ESPI's lack of support, but his primary concern then was to obtain prompt medical attention. Upon his inquiry, ESPI referred him to
Metropolitan Hospital, which at that time had no MRI machine. Apines thereafter proceeded to Chinese General Hospital (CGH), where he underwent MRI scanning
under the supervision of Dr. Celestina L. Cejoco (Dr. Cejoco).28 Dr. Cejoco's Consultation Report,29 dated February 14, 2008, included the following impressions:
(1) "no acute bony trabecular injury or fracture"; (2) "oblique inferior surface tear involving the posterior horn of the medial meniscus"; (3) "small to moderate amount
of joint effusion"; and (4) "findings are consistent with osteoarthritis."

On February 20, 2008, Apines also consulted Dr. Patrick O. Leh (Dr. Leh), an orthopedic surgeon in CGH. The Medical Certificate30 issued by Dr. Leh indicated
that Apines had "degenerative osteoarthritis" and "medial meniscal tear" in his left knee. Dr. Leh assessed that Apines "may return to work after 30 [to] 45 days," but
"needs continued medical treatment for osteoarthritis." Apines was likewise advised to undergo meniscectomy31 and to consult with a company-accredited
orthopedic surgeon.32

On June 6, 2008, Apines filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a Complaine33 for total and permanent disability benefits, reimbursement
of medical, hospital and transportation expenses, moral and exemplary damages, sickness allowance, attorney's fees and legal interest.
On June 17, 2008, Apines was admitted at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) and underwent arthroscopic meniscectomy on July 1, 2008. He was confined for
17 days and was finally discharged on July 4, 2008.34

The Clinical Abstract35 and Discharge Summary36 signed by Dr. Patrick M. Dizon (Dr. Dizon) stated that Apines had Medial Meniscal Tear. Apines complained of
pain in his left knee and difficulty in ambulation. Apines had informed the doctors that about nine or ten months before, he had slipped and twisted his left knee while
walking or going down the stairs. Thereafter, he had persistent pain in his left knee, with associated locking symptoms. He only took Alaxan which gave him mere
partial relief. The symptoms, however, progressed. Apines then underwent x-ray and MRI scans, and consulted with doctors at the CGH, before having been referred
to the PGH for further management. After Apines' arthroscopic meniscectomy, he was still advised to continue with his rehabilitation, and was prescribed to take
Cephalexin for seven days.

In their Position Paper37 filed before the NLRC, the respondents contended that Apines was not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits based on the
following grounds: (1) Apines did not suffer any accident or injury while on board the ship as proven by Capt. Castañares' affidavit and the e-mail exchanges between
the latter and Mendoza; (2) the medical reports issued abroad showed that Apines was fit to work; (3) Apines disembarked from the ship on his own accord as
indicated in the Exit Interview Report and Crew De-briefing Checklist; (4) Apines failed to submit himself for post-employment medical examination and treatment by
company-designated doctors; and (5) Apines' own physician, Dr. Leh, assessed that the former may return to work after 30 to 45 days.

Several conferences were held, but the parties failed to arrive at any settlement.38

Rulings of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC

In the Decision39 dated April 21, 2009, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Apines' complaint citing the following as reasons:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is not enough for [Apines] to allege and prove that his injury was work-related.

He must likewise allege and prove compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement.

[Apines] never alleged, in his position paper, that he observed the mandatory reporting requirement. He simply states that, upon his repatriation, he reported to
[ESPI] and was informed by [Padre] and [Mendoza] that he cannot be offered of [sic] an assistance as he was declared fit to work.

There is nothing in the position paper and further papers of [Apines] indicating compliance with the post-employment medical examination [under the 2nd and 3rd
paragraphs of Section 20(8)(3)40 of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency's Amended Standard

Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels].41
Apines appealed the foregoing before the NLRC.42

On December 14, 2009, the NLRC promulgated a Decision,43 the fallo of which is quoted below:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the appeal impressed with merit. [The respondents] are hereby directed to pay [Apines]
US$62,800.00 [as] total and permanent disability compensation and sickness allowance or its peso equivalent at the prevailing exchange rate at the time of payment
plus ten percent (10%) of such aggregate amount representing attorney's fees (US$6,280.00). Accordingly, the decision of the [LA] dated April [21], 2009 is hereby
VACATED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.44
In holding Apines to be entitled to total and permanent disability benefits and sickness allowance, the NLRC ratiocinated that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[Apines] was operated upon on July 1, 2008 at the PGH x x x. Since his repatriation on February 2008 until such date, he has not been able to return to work and x
x x more than 120 days [had elapsed]. x x x
We do not subscribe to [the respondents'] assertions that [Apines] has to prove that he suffered an accident while on board and that the repatriation was of his own
accord[,] which bars his entitlement. x x x

xxxx

It does not state in [Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency's Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment
of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels] that repatriation be upon the employer's instructions, [but] it merely mentions that it be for medical reasons.
There is also no requirement of proof of occurrence of an accident to be made by the employee for disability to attach. What is required is that he suffered injury or
illness and in this case[,] there is [a] concrete showing that [Apines] was complaining of pain in his knee[,] and that he made it known to his employers for which he
was brought to 2 doctors for assessment on November 2007 and February 2008.

It is noteworthy that these doctors recommended that he undergo MRI x x x[,] but it appears that these recommendations were unheeded. It is apparent from the
records that the [respondents] chose to ignore the complaints of the seafarer [about] the pain he was suffering [from] and the doctors' recommendations[,] and
decided not to order his medical repatriation presumably in order to avoid paying disability compensation to him.

While it may be true that there was no compliance with the procedural requirements under [Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency's
Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels], this is not of [Apines'] own doing. x x
x He was informed that he will not be accorded any medical assistance as he [was] declared fit to work. Thus, he was constrained to consult with other doctors [who
assessed Apines] to be suffering from a meniscal tear on his knee and required menis[c]ectomy x x x. [Apines'] assertions [sic] that he was denied medical assistance
[has] credence because it is illogical that he will seek treatment from other doctors immediately after his disembarkation when he [can] avail of the services of the
company[-]designated physician. He arrived on February 8, 2008 and he consulted with 2 doctors for medical treatment on February 14 and 20, 2008. The proximity
of such dates further proves that he was indeed denied of medical assistance despite his suffering and even when the [respond nts] knew that he sought repatriation
to seek medical treatment x x x.

Having suffered the injury/illness during the term of his contract, [Apines] is also entitled to his sickness allowance and to be reimbursed [for] the expenses incurred
for his treatment. In this case, [Apines] failed to present receipts or other proofis] of his medical expenses[, hence,] we cannot grant the same. Thus[,] he is entitled
only to his sickness allowance of US$700.00/per month for four (4) months or US$2,800.00 in addition to his permanent and total disability compensation of
US$60,000.00.45
In the Resolution46 dated April 14, 2010, the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration47 of the respondents.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Proceedings before the CA

The respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari48 before the CA. During its pendency, Apines sought the execution of the NLRC Decision and Resolution, dated
December 14, 2009 and April 14, 2010, respectively. On August 10, 2010, the respondents, with the intent of preventing further execution proceedings, paid Apines
the sum of Three Million Twenty-Nine Thousand Eighty-Eight Pesos and 92/100 (P3,029,088.92) as full and complete satisfaction of the NLRC's judgment award.
The payment was subject to the condition that in case of reversal or modification of the NLRC decision and resolution by the CA, Apines shall return to the respondents
whatever amount may be due and owing.49

Subsequently, the CA, through the herein assailed decision and resolution, reversed the NLRC ruling. The CA explained that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[Apines] was unable to establish his allegation that he suffered an injury on board [ETAL's] vessel by reason of an accident. x x x [I]t was clear that other persons
were present at the time the alleged incident transpired and who should have witnessed the same. x x x [H]e neither reported the alleged incident to the officers on
board the vessel for documentation purposes nor did he present any other evidence to substantiate his allegation. Not even the evaluation of the doctors who
examined [Apines] corroborated his claim that his condition was an injury caused by an accidental fall. [Apines] himself declared that Dr. Hussain gave him medicine
for pain allegedly caused by arthritis. His own doctor seemed to agree with Dr. Hussain's findings when he categorically pronounced [Apines'] diagnosis to be
"Degenerative osteoarthritis." Moreover, contrary to Apines' claim, his doctor did not recommend his "immediate operation." In fact, Dr. Leh suggested that [Apines]
consult with [a] company-accredited orthopedic surgeon for opinion. In other words, a perusal of the medical certificates submitted by [Apines] will tend to support a
finding that Apines was suffering from arthritis rather than a conclusion that his medical condition was brought about by an accident as to qualify as work-related
injury compensable under the POEA-SEC.

xxxx

[Apines] affirms that [the respondents] "referred him to Metropolitan Hospital. He proceeded there immediately but upon inquiry, they do not conduct MRI test, instead
he was referred to [CGH]." It appears that [Apines] conveniently subjected himself to medical assistance of his own choice solely because Metropolitan Hospital was
unable to conduct the MRI. Noticeably, there is nothing on record to show that he intended to submit himself to a medical evaluation by the company-designated
physician. [Apines] clearly has not complied with the post-employment reporting requirements under the POEA-SEC.

xxx

[Apines] failed to present any justification [for] his inability to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician. Glaringly,
despite claiming that his doctor recommended his immediate operation when he went for consultation on February 20, 2008, it was only on June 17, 2008 that
[Apines] was admitted for confinement at the PGH and the operation done on July 1, 2008. x x x

xxxx

x x x [I]n between his consultation with his doctor on February 20, 2008 and his confinement for medical attention on June 17, 2008, [Apines] found time to file the
instant case before the [LA] on June 5, 2008. x x x [Apines] appeared well enough to consult his own doctors, file a case x x x and undergo medical attention more
than three (3) months from his repatriation but was unjustifiably unable to submit himself for examination by a company-designated physician.

xxxx

x x x [Apines] has not presented any disability grading even from his own doctors who examined and operated on him. It seems to this Court then that [Apines]
basically aims to capitalize on his employer's failure to assess his disability grade when, as a matter of fact, he has never submitted himself to the examination of
the company-designated physician before or after his operation. Plainly, there is no disability grading by any doctor in this case. x x x.50 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)
Issues

Aggrieved, Apines now presents before the Court the Issues of whether or not the CA erred in:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) holding that failure to comply with the 72-hour reporting requirement is fatal and shall automatically result in the forfeiture of disability benefits;51

(2) denying to grant Apines total and permanent disability benefits despite his clear inability to resume performance of active sea duties within 120 days from
repatriation;52 and

(3) negating Apines' entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.53
In support thereof, Apines reiterates his claims offered in pnor proceedings. He emphasizes that the respondents cannot feign ignorance about his ailment, which
started while he was on board the ship. He insists that there should be no automatic forfeiture of disability benefits even sans compliance with the 72-hour reportorial
requirement in cases when the seafarer has been rendered incapable of pursuing his customary shipboard employment. Anent the respondents' persistent stance
that the company-designated doctor must examine the seafarer's medical condition, Apines avers that such assessment must be done within a 120-day period from
repatriation, otherwise, the injury or illness shall be deemed to be total and permanent. He also laments the respondents' utter refusal to render any medical
assistance and pay their contractual obligations. Accordingly, the respondents should be liable for moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees. Apines
manifests, too, that he currently remains jobless and unfit to render sea duties.

In the respondents' Comment,54 they contend that the 72-hour reportorial requirement is mandatory, and Apines' failure to comply therewith bars the filing of his
claims for disability benefits.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Ruling of the Court

"As a rule, only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45."55 The Court is, thus, generally bound by
the CA's factual findings. There are, however, exceptions to the foregoing, among which is when the CA's findings are contrary to those of the trial court or
administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated.56 The instant petition falls under the aforementioned exception in view of
the divergent factual findings of the LA and the CA, on one hand, and the NLRC, on the other.

After a thorough re-examination of the parties' evidence, the Court finds merit in the instant petition warranting the reinstatement of the NLRC's decision.

The issues, being inter-related, will be discussed jointly.

Review of the Facts

To properly dispose of the issues raised herein, the Court should resolve the conflicting factual assertions of the parties anent the following: (1) occurrence of the
accident, which Apines claimed had caused his injury; (2) cause of and circumstances surrounding Apines' repatriation; (3) conclusiveness of the medical findings
of the two doctors whom Apines had consulted in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia; (4) referral of Apines to company-designated doctors; (5) failure of Apines to comply
with the 72-hour reportorial requirement; (6) necessity, reason and timeliness of the medical treatment rendered by Apines' own doctors; and (7) lack of disability
rating made by both the company-designated doctors and those consulted by Apines on his own accord.

Occurrence of the accidental injury on board the ship

The respondents insist that Apines had not sustained any injury while on board ETAL's ship. As proof thereof, Capt. Castañares' affidavit and e-mail message
negating the occurrence of an accident involving Apines were submitted. The respondents also point out that Apines had not offered any corroborating statements
anent the incident from his colleagues who were then on board the ship. Hence, the respondents conclude that since no documentary evidence from ESPI and its
staff support Apines' factual claim of having sustained an injury while on board the ship, then, no accident actually happened.57

The evidence point to the contrary.

While no record of the injury was reflected in the ship's logbook and other documents, the following constitute as substantial evidence to support the conclusion that
Apines, in fact, figured in an accident while he was on board.

First. In the Medical Report58 dated November 10, 2007, Dr. George declared Apines to be fit to work. It is, however, clear from the same report that Apines
complained of pain and swelling in his left knee, which started after a fall while he was at work about 45 days before such consultation. Dr. George also made a
conditional diagnosis of Medial Meniscal Injury, prescribed two pain relief medications, and gave Apines a hinged knee brace. Dr. George further advised the conduct
of MRI scanning and consultation with an orthopedic doctor.

In February of 2008, Apines requested for a medical check-up.59 Dr. Hussain indicated in his report that Apines had pain and swelling for four months prior to the
consultation. Dr. Hussain once again recommended MRI scanning, rest for a couple of days, and medications for a long time. Nonetheless, he assessed that Apines
was fit to work.60

In Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, Apines was consistent in informing the doctors about when and how he sustained his injury. On the other hand, despite rendering fit-
to-work assessments, Dr. George and Dr. Hussain's similar recommendations for MRI scanning were implied admissions that Apines had a medical condition, albeit
still undefined. Without MRI, Dr. George and Dr. Hussain cannot make conclusive assessments of what really ailed Apines. Note that despite the doctors'
recommendations in November of 2007 and February of 2008, no MRI scan was conducted and paid for abroad by the respondents.
Second. The day after Apines' repatnation, he reported to ESPI's office. In the Exit Interview61 conducted by Mendoza, Apines once again claimed that while on
board the ship, his knee hit the steel railings of the ladder. His ankle swelled in September of 2007 and by November of 2007, the pain had worsened, making it
difficult for him to move and climb cranes.

Further, the Crew De-briefing Checklist62 signed by Apines likewise indicated that his disembarkation was "for medical grounds (on his own request)." Whether the
repatriation was upon Apines' own initiative or not, the unalterable fact remains that he had a medical condition, which required treatment.

Third. In the Discharge Summary63 dated July 5, 2008, Dr. Dizon stated that according to Apines, he slipped and twisted his left knee about nine months before
meniscectomy. Dr. Dizon confirmed the prior diagnosis of Dr. George, Dr. Cejoco and Dr. Leh that Apines had Medial Meniscal Tear in the latter's left knee.

In precis, Apines' consistent claims about what occurred while he was on board the ship, and the medical records showing that he had Medial Meniscal Tear
substantially lend credence to the factual assertion that indeed, he sustained an accidental injury prior to his repatriation. Capt. Castañares' mere statements pale
in comparison to the foregoing.

Fit-to-work assessments, reporting after repatriation, consultations with doctors, surgery, and compliance with the requirements of the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of
Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency's Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers
On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (2000 POEA-SEC)

The Court shall now proceed to discuss the bearing of Dr. George and Dr. Hussain's uniform assessment that Apines was fit to work.

As mentioned above, Dr. George and Dr. Hussain both recommended MRI scanning of Apines' left knee. Note that Dr. George made a conditional diagnosis that
Apines had osteoarthritis, albeit entertained the possibility of Medial Meniscal Tear. Hence, Capt. Castañares' declaration that the doctors did not find any other
ailment in Apines apart from osteoarthritis deserves short shrift. The fit-to-work assessment made by Dr. George and Dr. Hussain remained inconclusive pending
the conduct of the MRI scan. Unfortunately, the same fit-to-work assessment was used by the respondents against Apines in denying the latter's plea for medical
assistance after his repatriation. Later, the MRl scanning was performed only after repatriation about five months from the time Apines had sustained the accidental
injury. Apines himself even paid for the scan.

Within three days from repatriation, Apines reported to ESPI's office. Mendoza conducted an Exit Interview and made Apines sign the Crew De-briefing Checklist.
The parties now disagree as to what transpired after.

Apines claims that Mendoza and Padre infonned him that since he was declared fit to work by the doctors abroad, ESPI cannot offer him any assistance. Further,
his unpaid salaries shall be offset against the cost of his airfare ticket in going back to Manila. Apines insisted that he sought repatriation due to the recommendations
of the doctors abroad for him to undergo MRI scanning and obtain medical treatment. ESPI, however, stood its ground in denying to provide Apines with assistance.64

The respondents, on their part, allege that they referred Apines to a company-designated doctor. However, Apines consulted his own physicians instead.65 Ann
Suzette B. Ong Pe (Ong Pe), Senior Patient Processor at the Marine Medical Services, executed an affidavit attesting to the foregoing.66

In the herein assailed decision, the CA declared that Apines "conveniently subjected himself to medical assistance of his own choice solely because Metropolitan
Hospital was unable to conduct the MRI."67 The CA also stated that "there is nothing on record to show that [Apines] intended to submit himself to a medical
evaluation by the company-designated physician."68

The Court disagrees.

It bears stressing that nowhere in the pleadings did the respondents specifically name the company-designated doctor to whom Apines was referred to. Moreover,
apart from Ong Pe's affidavit, the respondents did not present any other document to establish that Apines was actually and specifically instructed to report for a
post-employment medical examination. Apines vaguely admitted having been referred to Metropolitan Hospital, but it was upon his insistence for medical assistance.
What remains unrefuted is that back then, the said hospital did not have MRI machines. Consequently, Apines proceeded to the CGH, underwent MRI scanning and
consulted Dr. Cejoco and Dr. Leh. Apines paid for the medical services with his own money.

Indeed, the records do not show that Apines consulted a company-designated doctor either for a post-employment medical assessment or treatment. However,
there is likewise no substantial evidence conclusively, proving that Apines was in fact referred to a company-designated physician. Besides, after suffering for about
five months with an untreated injury on board ETAL's ship, securing the services of CGH for the MRI scanning was not a matter of convenience, but of necessity.
Apines merely wanted to obtain prompt medical attention, but was repeatedly given the runaround by the respondents even after repatriation. As aptly observed by
the NLRC, "it is illogical that [Apines] will seek treatment from other doctors immediately after his disembarkation when he [can] avail of the services of the company[-
]designated physician" and "the proximity of [the dates of repatriation and consultations with Dr. Cejoco and Dr. Leh] further proves that he was indeed denied of
medical assistance."69

As indicated in the Exit Interview and Crew De-briefing Checklist, Apines promptly reported to ESPI's office within 72-hours from repatriation. He was informed that
the cost of his fare going home shall be offset against his unpaid salaries, anthat no medical assistance can be offered to him as he was declared fit to work by the
doctors abroad. Admittedly, Apines failed to offer documentary proofs of the respondents' denial to assist him in his medical needs. However, Apines cannot be
faulted for the said lack since the custody of the documents, if there were any at all, pertains more to the respondents. It would be illogical to impose upon Apines
the burden to prove with documentary evidence the negative fact that he was not referred to a company-designated doctor.

In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Remo,70 the Court emphatically ruled that "the absence of a post-employment medical examination cannot be used
to defeat respondent's claim since the failure to subject the seafarer to this requirement was not due to the seafarer's fault but to the inadvertence or deliberate
refusal of petitioners."71

Considering the above, the Court finds that Apines' failure to comply with the 72-hour reportorial requirement for the conduct of a post-employment medical
examination under the 2nd paragraph of Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC cannot result in the automatic forfeiture of his disability benefits.

Island Overseas Transport Corporation/Pine Crest Shipping Corporation/Capt. Emmanuel L. Regio v. Armando M. Beja,72 on the other hand, is instructive anent
when a seafarer may be exempt from compliance with the procedure laid down in the 3rd paragraph of Section 20(B)(3) on the requirement of consultation with a
third doctor, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A seafarer's compliance with such procedure presupposes that the company-designated physician came up with an assessment as to his fitness or unfitness to work
before the expiration of the 120-day or 240-day periods. Alternatively put, absent a certification from the company-designated physician, the seafarer had nothing to
contest and the law steps in to conclusively characterize his disability as total and permanent.73 (Emphasis ours)
In the case at bar, ESPI's records relative to the occurrence of the injury and the events leading to and following Apines' repatriation are conspicuously scarce.
Apines claims that he was outrightly denied medical assistance on the pretext that the doctors abroad had found him fit to work. There was unfortunately no document
to establish that denial. Similarly, no convincing paper trail exists to prove that there was in fact a referral to a company-designated doctor either for assessment or
treatment. Sans referral to a company-designated doctor, no post-employment medical examination can be performed on Apines by ESPI. No written fit to work or
disability grading certificate was also issued. Without the assessment of the company-designated doctor, there was nothing for Apines' own physicians to contest
rendering consultation with a third doctor agreed upon by the parties as superfluous.

Perforce, compliance with the requirements of the 3rd paragraph of Section 20(B)(3) on obtaining the assessment of a third doctor in case of divergent opinions of
the company-designated doctor, on one hand, and the seafarer's own physician, on the other, cannot be imposed upon Apines.

Entitlement to total and permanent disability benefits arising from a conclusive presumption

Having sustained an accidental injury on board the vessel, Apines is entitled to disability benefits. To what extent, the Court shall discuss below.

At the outset, it bears noting that Apines filed his Complaint before the NLRC on June 6, 2008, 121 days from his repatriation. Before that date, no disability rating
of any kind had been issued by the respondents.

In Beja,74 the Court clarified that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[I]f the maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to October 6, 2008, the rule on the 120-day period, during which the disability assessment should have been
made in accordance with Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, that is, the doctrine then prevailing before the promulgation of Vergara on October 6, 2008, stands; if,
on the other hand, the com.fslaint was filed from October 6, 2008 onwards, the 240-day rule applies.75 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
In the instant case, Apines filed his Complaint on June 6, 2008. Hence, the 120-day period rule stands. Due to ESPI's failure to issue a disability rating within the
120-day period, the presumption of Apines' entitlement to total and permanent disability benefits arose.

The Court shall, nonetheless, tackle the necessity and timeliness of the medical services rendered by Apines' three doctors.

After repatriation, Apines consulted Dr. Cejoco and Dr. Leh in February of 2008. Later, Apines underwent meniscectomy at the PGH under the care of Dr. Dizon.

The respondents point out that Dr. Leh indicated in the Medical Certificate, which he issued, that Apines can return to work after 30 to 45 days. According to the
respondents, this should cast doubt upon Apines' claim for total and permanent disability benefits. Moreover, none of Apines' own doctors issued a disability rating.

In the herein assailed decision, the CA, relying on the medical certificates issued by the doctors, found that Apines was merely suffering from osteoarthritis, and not
from the effects of an accidental injury. The CA likewise concluded that Apines "aims to capitalize on his employers failure to assess his disability grade when, as a
matter of fact, he has never submitted himself to the examination of the company-designated physician before or after his operation."76 The CA also noted that
Apines consulted Dr. Leh on February 20, 2008, but it was only on July 1, 2008 when the meniscectomy was performed. In the intervening period, Apines did not
consult with the company-designated doctor, but found the time to see his own physicians and file his Complaint before the NLRC.77

In Dr. Cejoco's Consultation Report78 dated February 14, 2008, it was stated that Apines had "no acute bony trabecular injury or fracture," but diagnosed the latter
to be suffering from "Osteoarthritis," "oblique inferior surface tear involving the posterior horn of the medial meniscus," and "small to moderate amount of joint
effusion." Dr. Leh confinned Dr. Cejoco's impressions, and suggested meniscectomy, with further consultation with a company-accredited orthopedic surgeon.79 Dr.
Dizon's final diagnosis was Medial Meniscal Tear of the left knee, which required arthroscopic meniscectomy.80

A meniscus, which is a cartilage disk found in the knee, functions as a shock absorber or cushion to minimize the stress on the articular cartilage. The articular
cartilage coats the ends of the bones, so it is present at the bottom of the femur and on top of the shinbone or the tibia. There are two menisci. If they are not present
or torn, the articular cartilage sees an increase in stress and can trigger the onset of osteoarthritis. That is by no means the only cause of osteoarthritis. However, it
is certainly a significant contributor.81

Likewise useful are the distinctions between acute, sub-acute and stress fractures. An acute fracture "will often include an emergency room visit the day the trauma
occurred and are clearly evident on an x-ray." On the other hand, "a sub-acute fracture usually means that the patient had pain for some time," and "the fracture
occurred weeks or months prior but now is in the healing stage." There are also stress fractures, which occur mainly in the lower extremities due to impact activity
or repetitive activities. Stress fractures and healing fractures become painful with weight bearing.82

The Court, thus, concludes that no real incompatibility exists between the doctors' findings of osteoarthritis and absence of acute trabecular injury, on one hand, with
Apihes' having sustained an accidental Medial Meniscal Injury in his left knee while aboard the ship, on the other. Dr. Cejoco's impression that an acute trabecular
injury was absent did not rule out the possibility of a sub-acute or stress fracture. Further, a tom meniscus can trigger the onset of osteoarthritis.

In Apines' case, his Medial Meniscus Tear was left undiagnosed and untreated for almost five months from the time he had sustained an accidental injury. It took
another five months from his repatriation before he underwent arthroscopic meniscectomy. Apines cannot be faulted for the delay. The Court takes judicial notice of
the long queues in governmental hospitals.83 The Court also finds it logical that without any financial assistance for medical expenses lent by ESPI, it took Apines
sometime to save up for what the surgical procedure required.
Further, the possibility that Apines' Medial Meniscal Tear triggered the onset of osteoarthritis cannot be discounted. Under Section 32-A(16)(b) of the 2000 POEA-
SEC, for osteoarthritis to be considered as an occupational disease, the same must have been contracted in any occupation involving minor or major injuries to the
joint. Apines' case falls within the qualification.

Relative to Dr. Leh's assessment that Apines can return to work after 30 to 45 days, the Court finds the same as premature. Dr. Leh suggested meniscectomy and
further consultation with an orthopedic surgeon. Without having gone through the surgery yet, Apines' fitness to return to work cannot be ascertained.

The Court likewise finds specious the CA's ruling that the lack of disability rating issued by Apines' doctors negates his disability claims.

Due to ESPI's failure or refusal to issue a medical rating within 120 days from repatriation, in legal contemplation, Apines' disability is conclusively presumed to be
total and permanent. Besides, in the Court's mind, it is enough that Apines obtained medical certificates and copies of hospital records whenever he consulted with
his doctors and underwent medical procedures. The Court cannot impose upon him the burden of knowing what the labor laws require relative to the matters which
should be explicitly stated in the medical certificates. The lack of express disability ratings even shows that Apines did not premeditate the filing of his Complaint and
that he only procured legal services after his medical treatment.

In disability compensation claims, "what is important is that [the seafarer] was unable to perform his customary workfor more than 120 days which constitutes
permanent total disability," since "an award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee
in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work."84

Apines underwent meniscectomy on July 1, 2008. Upon his discharge from the PGH on July 4, 2008, Dr. Dizon prescribed home medications and recommended
his continued rehabilitation. Clearly, more than 120 days from repatriation, Apines' medical condition remained unresolved, and he cannot yet perform, without
serious discomfort and inconvenience, the customary duties of a crane operator, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Arranging; attaching; carrying; checking (ground condition and that crane is level on the outriggers before attempting to lift and place a load; air, water and fuel
gauges); cleaning; climbing; connecting; controlling; converting; depressing (pedals); driving (to work sites); ensuring (the setting and securing of the crane); following
(directions of signal men); inserting; inspecting; lifting; loading and unloading; locating; lowering; lubricating (cables, pulleys, etc.); maintaining; moving (loads);
observing; operating; placing (the correct equipment under the outrigger pads of the crane); planning; positioning; pulling and pushing; raising; repairing; replacing;
rotating; securing x x x; stacking; starting; supplying; transferring; verifying (correctness of load)85
Generally, in every complaint, "opposing parties would stand poles apart and proffer allegations as different as chalk and cheese;" hence, it is "incumbent upon the
Court to determine whether the party on whom the burden to prove lies was able to hurdle the same."86

Apines hurdled the burden. The medical records, consistency of his claims, and the circumstances before and after his repatriation overshadow the respondents'
averments anent the non-occurrence of the accidental injury and alleged unjustified non-compliance with the 72-hour and third-doctor requirements.

In sum, the Court finds favor in Apines' claims for total and permanent disability benefits, sickness allowance and attorney's fees. The NLRC's judgment award to
Apines in the total amount of US$69,080.00,87 which the respondents' had conditionally satisfied, is in order. The Court further agrees with the NLRC, which found
no ample basis to grant Apines' claims for moral and exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated January 26, 2012 and May 30, 2012, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 114221, which dismissed Elmer A. Apines' complaint for disability benefits and damages, are SET ASIDE. The Decision rendered by the National
Labor Relations Commission on December 14, 2009 in NLRC LAC No. 06-000338-09, which awarded Elmer A. Apines the total amount of US$69,080.00 as total
and permanent disability benefits, sickness allowance and attorney's fees, is REINSTATED. Legal interest is no longer imposed on the award of US$69,080.00 in
view of the satisfaction of the amount already made on August 10, 2010.

SO ORDERED.

July 12, 2017 G.R. No. 217345

WILMER 0. DE ANDRES, Petitioner
vs.
DIAMOND H MARINE SERVICES & SHIPPING AGENCY, INC., WU CHUN HUA and RUBEN J. TURINGAN, Respondents

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the July 31, 2014 Decision1 and the March 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 124862, which affirmed the January 18, 2012 Decision3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in NLRC LAC No. OFW-(M)-
09-000825-11, which, in turn, reversed and set aside the May 20, 2011 Decision4 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC OFW Case No. (M) 02-02844-10, a case for
total and permanent disability benefits of a seafarer.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Wilmer O. De Andres (De Andres) was hired by respondent agency Diamond H Marine Services & Shipping Agency, Inc. (Diamond H) for and in behalf
of its Taiwanese principal, Wu Chun Hua. On February 1, 2008, he entered into an Employment Contract,5 wherein it was stipulated that he would be working in the
fishing vessel, Yi Man En No. 2; that he would receive a monthly salary of NT$17 ,280.00; and that the duration of the contract was for two years.

De Andres claimed that before he departed for Taiwan, he was made to sign a Contract of Agreement.6 At the vessel, he was tasked to work as a wiper, messman
and bosun, and was also required to throw the fishnet, dive in the sea, and repair the nets. De Andres added that he and his Filipino crewmates were made to work
for almost twenty-four hours a day. They later discovered that the document they signed before leaving for Taiwan set aside the POEA-approved contract. He
averred that this agreement reduced their salaries, increased their workload, and showed that the Filipino crewmates were abused and taken advantage of.

On February 27, 2009, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, De Andres was tasked by the master to lower the nets for the shipping operation. While he was
lowering the nets, he was accidentally hit by big waves, which caused him to be thrown out of the vessel together with the fishing nets. While struggling from the big
waves, De Andres was pulled by the moving vessel with his left leg entangled by the fishing nets. As a consequence, he sustained an open fracture of the distal tibia
and fibula.

De Andres was brought to Keelong Hospital in Taiwan and underwent surgical operation. The medical findings of the said hospital are as follows:

Left Tibial shaft lower third fracture, open type III

Left Tibial shaft lower third fracture, open type III S /P ESF & K-PIN

Painful disability of left lower leg with active bleeding and bone exposure was noted

He sustained injury over left lower leg when he work on a fishboat

Deformity of left lower leg with an 8 cm in size open wound with bone exposure and active bleeding was noted. He was sent to ER and was admitted for further
treatment

An 8 cm in size open wound over left lower leg

Active bleeding (+)

Active bleeding (+)

Visible bone exposure (+)

Limited range of left ankle and knee due to pain

Palpable pulsation over left ankle.7

After twenty (20) days of confinement at the Keelong Hospital, De Andres was transferred to the nearest lodge. On March 23, 2009, he was brought to Zueifang
Hospital due to pain and swelling over his left leg. Moreover, his exterior fixator had to be readjusted.

De Andres averred that after the operation, he was placed in a dormitory, instead of a hospital. There, he was left alone with no one to assist him in his recovery. On
September 4, 2009, De Andres underwent another operation because of the non-union of his tibia. Buttress plating with autonomous bone grafting harvested from
the left iliac was done on the tibia to unite the fractured tibia. He said that he repeatedly asked for repatriation as no one would attend to his needs in Taiwan, but
his plea fell on deaf ears.

On February 4, 2010, almost a year after his accident, De Andres was informed by the respondents that he was free to go home.1âwphi1 He was surprised by this
decision because he had been requesting for his repatriation since his injury. De Andres later discovered that his repatriation was not due to his medical condition,
but due to the expiration of his employment contract.

Before he was repatriated, De Andres was made to sign a Memorandum of Agreement8 (MOA), stipulating that the respondents agreed to pay him NT$40,000.00
and gave him a plane ticket back to the Philippines, and that, in return, he would not file any complaint against the respond ents in the future. De Andres claimed,
however, that he was forced to sign the agreement as he would not be able to return to the Philippines if he would not sign it. On February 5, 2010, he arrived in
Manila, but no representatives from Diamond H fetched him.

On February 8, 2010, the next working day, De Andres reported to Diamond H where he was met by Ellen Purification (Purification), Operations Manager. He averred
that Purification invited him to go to the nearest fast-food restaurant to discuss his predicament. There, she told him that Diamond H would not entertain any claim
and that he should find a lawyer instead. De Andres could not believe what he heard from Purification because the company could not simply declare that he had
no claim against them.

On February 23, 2010, De Andres filed the subject complaint against the respondents before the LA for permanent and total disability benefits, sickness allowances,
salary differentials, labor insurance as provided in the contract, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. In his Position Paper,9 he attached the
Medical Assessment,10 dated March 5, 2010, of Dr. Renato P. Runas (Dr. Runas), his physician of choice, which stated:

The patient is unable to stand with the left foot in plantigrade position. In this case, he will not be able to assume good balance and cannot ambulate properly because
of the inability of the ankle to dorsiflex. The presence of calcifications around the ankle joint will hinder its normal movement that will be hard to correct or improve
even with extended physical therapy.

Since the patient is working on a fishing vessel, the above condition is no longer suitable on his working environment. He can no longer withstand the strenuous
activities onboard which require that both feet can assume a plantigrade position in order to maintain his balance and support his body particularly during ship rolling
when the vessel will enter rough seas. In this regard, [I] recommend that he shall not be allowed to work on board permanently since he is already physically unfit
for sea duties. In addition, he may already qualify for permanent total disability.11 [Boldface omitted]

For their part, the respondents countered that the injury sustained by De Andres was due to his negligence; that he was paid his salaries in full during his period of
medication; that he voluntarily signed a valid MOA which stated that he would no longer file any case against them in exchange for the amount of NT$40,000.00;
that the MOA was notarized by the Manila Economic Cultural Office (MECO) in Taiwan; and that before he was repatriated to the Philippines, he was declared fit to
work by Dr. Chien Hua Huang (Dr. Huang) as indicated in the Certificate of Diagnosis,12 dated January 21, 2010. They also asserted that De Andres forfeited his
claim for disability benefits when he failed to subject himself to the respondents for the mandatory medical examination within three working days upon his arrival in
the Philippines.

The LA Ruling

In its Decision, dated May 20, 2011, the LA ruled in favor of De Andres. It explained that even though his contract expired, the respondents still had the obligation to
provide medical attention because he suffered permanent and total disability. The LA was of the view that De Andres was forced to sign the MOA so he could be
repatriated. Hence, there was no valid quitclaim. The LA likewise awarded De Andres insurance compensation based on the terms of the employment contract;
sickness allowance because the respondents did not pay the same; salary differential due to the smaller amount of salary received in Taiwan; and 10% attorney's
fees. The LA disposed the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Diamond H Marine Services & Shipping Agency Inc./Wu Chun Hua/Ruben
J. Turingan to pay jointly and severally complainant Wilmer O. De Andres, the following:

1. SIXTY THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$60,000.00) representing his total permanent disability benefits;

2. SIX THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$6,000.00) - attorney's fees;

3. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND NEW TAIWAN DOLLARS (NT$300,000.00) - compensation benefits (Clause 10 of his contract);

4. SIXTY NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY NEW TAIWAN DOLLARS (NT$69,120.oo)- sickness allowance;

5. EIGHTY THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY NEW TAIWAN DOLLARS (NT$80,320.00) - salary differential; and

6. FORTY FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR NEW TAIWAN DOLLARS (NT$44,944.00)- attorney's fees. or the equivalent in Philippine Peso at
the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.13

Aggrieved, the respondents elevated an appeal to the NLRC.

The NLRC Ruling

In its January 18, 2012 Decision, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling. It stated that De Andres failed to comply with the mandatory reportorial requirement.
The NLRC observed that although he went to Diamond H on the next working day of his repatriation, he did not submit himself to the medical examination of the
company-designated physician. Thus, the NLRC concluded that he was barred from demanding disability benefits. The other awards granted by the LA were also
deleted by the NLRC due to insufficient basis. The fallo reads:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the respondents' appeal is GRANTED and the appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint is DISMISSED for
lack of cause of action.

SO ORDERED.14
The CA Ruling

In its assailed July 31, 2014 Decision, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling. It wrote that De Andres indeed failed to comply with the mandatory reportorial requirement.
The CA stressed that the failure of the seafarer to report to the company-designated physician within three (3) working days upon return shall forfeit his right to claim
any benefit. It also opined that the MOA, wherein De Andres waived all claims against the respondents, was valid and binding because it was duly explained and
notarized by the MECO to him. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.15

De Andres moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its assailed March 12, 2015 Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION ON THE GROUND THAT THE PETITIONER
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REPORTORIAL REQUIREMENT PROVIDED UNDER THE POEA CONTRACT.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION ON THE GROUND THAT THE PETITIONER
WAIVE[D] HIS RIGHT BY RECEIVING THE SUM OF NT$40,000 (MORE OR LESS PHP 50,000 IN PHILIPPINE CURRENCY) WHICH IS HIGHLY
UNCONSCIONABLE AND UNREASONABLE COMPARED TO US$60,000 WHICH HE [WAS] SUPPOSED TO RECEIVE UNDER THE POEA CONTRACT.16

De Andres argued that the mandatory reportorial requirement should not be strictly applied in his case because it was the respondents who prevented him from
complying with the same. He underscored that on the next working day from his repatriation, he immediately reported to Diamond H. Its Operations Manager,
however, directly told him that the respondents would not entertain any of his claims. De Andres emphasized that such incident was never denied by the respondents.

De Andres also claimed that the MOA was an invalid quitclaim because its consideration was unreasonable. He explained that from the gravity of his condition,
·which necessitated almost a year of medical treatment and operation, it could be shown that the amount of NT$40,000 or more or less ₱50,000, was insufficient
consideration for disability compensation. Moreover, De Andres pointed out that the MOA was neither notarized nor explained by the MECO, which simply stamped
it.

Position of Respondents

In their Comment,17 the respondents argued that De Andres failed to comply with the mandatory reportorial requirement because he did not present himself to a
company-designated physician for medical examination within three (3) working days from his repatriation. They also stressed that while De Andres was in Taiwan,
he was declared fit to work by Dr. Huang, as indicated in the certificate of diagnosis, dated January 21, 2010.

The respondents pointed out that the medical assessment of Dr. Runas was insignificant because his medical diagnosis was not referred to a third doctor, which
was required under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). They also underscored that the MOA was valid as there was a reasonable consideration
of NT$40,000.00 in addition to the monthly salary received by De Andres while he was under medical treatment in Taiwan.

Reply of Petitioner

In his Reply,18 De Andres stressed that it was the respondents' primary responsibility to immediately repatriate him when he sustained a severe injury. He opined
that the evil sought to be avoided by the reportorial requirement did not exist in his case because the respondents were fully aware of his medical condition while he
was in Taiwan. De Andres reiterated that the MOA was an invalid quitclaim because it did not provide for a reasonable compensation and it was not signed in front
of a MECO official.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The present controversy involves the claim of permanent and total disability benefits of a seafarer. De Andres avers that he reported on time to the respondents with
respect to his disability claims upon repatriation but they refused to acknowledge his claim and failed to subject him to medical examination. On the other hand, the
respondents counter that it was De Andres who neglected to submit himself to the post-medical examination through the company-designated physician. As this
case involves the reportorial requirement under the POEA-SEC, the said requirement must be scrutinized.

Compliance with the

reportorial requirement;
Exceptions

Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 Amended POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels
(Section 20 (B) (3)), which was incorporated in the POEA-SEC, lays down the procedure to be followed by a seafarer in claiming disability benefits, to wit:

COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

xxxx

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or
the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon
his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure
of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. If a doctor appointed by the
seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and
binding on both parties. [Emphases supplied]

The rationale for this requirement is that reporting the illness or injury by the seafarer within three (3) working days from repatriation fairly makes it easier for a
physician to determine the cause of the illness or injury. Ascertaining the real cause of the illness or injury beyond the period may prove difficult. To ignore the rule
might set a precedent with negative repercussions, like opening floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits, or causing unfairness to
the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant's illness because of the passage of time. The employer would then have no protection
against unrelated disability claims.19
Moreover, the provision mandated a period of three (3) working days within which the seafarer should report so that the company-designated physician can promptly
arrive at a medical diagnosis. It must be underscored that the company-designated physician has either 120 or 240 days, depending on the circumstances, within
which to complete the medical assessment of the seafarer; otherwise, the disability claim shall be granted.20 Due to the express mandate on the reportorial
requirement, the failure of the seafarer to comply with the same shall result in the forfeiture of his right to claim the above benefits.

In Musnit v. Sea Star Shipping Corporation,21 the seafarer therein only submitted himself to the company-designated physician after seven (7) months from
repatriation. As he failed to comply with the mandatory three working day-period, the Court denied his claim for permanent and total disability benefits.

Similarly, in Cootauco v. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc.,22 the seafarer therein only submitted himself to a post-employment medical examination after fifteen
(15) months from repatriation. The Court ruled that the seafarer's explanation was insufficient to justify an exemption from the application of the reportorial requirement
rule.

Nevertheless, while the requirement to report within three (3) working days from repatriation appears to be indispensable in character, there are some established
exceptions to this rule.

First, Section 20 (B) (3) expressly provides that a seafarer is not required to submit himself to post-employment medical examination by a company-designated
physician within three (3) working days from repatriation when he is physically incapacitated to do so. In such event, a written notice to the agency within the same
period is deemed as compliance.

This exception was applied in Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,23 where the repatriated seafarer was terminally ill. The Court
ruled that it could not be expected that the seafarer would immediately submit himself to post-employment medical examination due to his condition and it was
understandable that he would first go home to his family. Moreover, the seafarer's wife sufficiently notified the employer therein about the condition and confinement
of the seafarer.

Second, another exception is when the seafarer failed to timely submit himself to post-employment medical examination due to the employer's fault. In lnterorient
Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Remo24 (lnterorient), the Court recognized and addressed the unscrupulous practice of employers of deliberately or inadvertently
refusing to refer the seafarer to the company-designated physician to deny his disability claim. In lnterorient, the seafarer therein reported to the employer for post-
employment medical examination within three (3) working days from repatriation. The employer, however, did not refer him to a company-designated physician
because he already signed a quitclaim, releasing it from liability. The Court ruled that the absence of post-employment medical examination should not be taken
against the seafarer because the employer declined to provide the same. Likewise, the quitclaim therein was declared void due to lack of consideration and
unconscionable terms. Hence, the Court granted full disability benefits to the seafarer's family.

Recently, in Apines v. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc.25 (Apines), the repatriated seafarer reported to the employer. He was, however, not referred to the
company-designated physician. The Court emphasized that the employer, and not the seafarer, has the burden to prove that the seafarer was referred to a company-
designated doctor. It was also stated that without the assessment of the said doctor, there was nothing for the seafarer's own physician to contest, rendering the
requirement of referral to a third doctor superfluous. The seafarer therein was granted total and permanent disability benefits.

To recapitulate, a seafarer claiming disability benefits is required to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician
within three (3) working days from repatriation. Failure to comply with such requirement results in the forfeiture of the seafarer's claim for disability benefits. There
are, however, exceptions to the rule: (1) when the seafarer is incapacitated to report to the employer upon his repatriation; and (2) when the employer inadvertently
or deliberately refused to submit the seafarer to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician.

Accordingly, the issue at hand is whether De Andres sufficiently complied with the reportorial requirement under Section 20 (B) (3). After a judicious scrutiny of the
records, the Court answers in the affirmative.

The respondents failed to

provide a post-employment
medical examination by a
company-designated physician

In this case, De Andres' accident occurred on February 27, 2009. He sustained an open fracture injury over his left lower leg with an 8 cm. open wound, which
resulted in .bone exposure and active bleeding. Instead of immediately repatriating him when his condition permitted, the respondents kept him in Taiwan for almost
a year and they waited for his contract to expire. Obviously, the delayed repatriation was intended to show that he returned due to his expired contract, and not for
medical reasons. Nonetheless, even if a seafarer's contract expired, it does not release the employer from its obligations under the POEA-SEC when there is a claim
for disability benefits due to an injury suffered during the term of the employment contract.26 Accordingly, Section 20 (B) (3) must still be complied with.

De Andres was repatriated on February 5, 2010. On the next working day, February 8, 2010, he reported to the office of Diamond H where he met Ellen Purification,
the Operations Manager. This is an undisputed fact as uniformly found by the LA, the NLRC and the CA.

De Andres claims that Purification invited him to go to the nearest fast-food restaurant to discuss his claim. There, she told him that Diamond H would not entertain
any of his claims and that he should find a lawyer instead. Thus, he left the meeting. On the other hand, the respondents assert that while De Andres reported to
Diamond H and met with its Operations Manager, he did not submit himself to post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician. The LA
upheld the position of De Andres; while the NLRC and the CA sided with the respondents. As the findings of fact are conflicting, the Court can entertain a question
of fact.27

The Court is of the view that the account of De Andres is more credible. The fact that he reported to Diamond H on the next working day from his repatriation and
met Purification show that he was sincere in asserting his claim against the respondents for disability benefits. Before he could even commence the procedure laid
down under Section 20 (B) (3), however, Purification pre-empted him and bluntly told him that Diamond H would not entertain any of his claims and that he should
find a lawyer instead. Thus, De Andres was no longer given an opportunity to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated
physician.

The assertion of the respondents that De Andres merely reported to Diamond H but did not submit himself to a post-employment medical examination is highly
dubious. It is quite absurd for a seafarer, who has a legitimate disability claim, to immediately report to his employer within three (3) working days from repatriation,
only to leave the said place without any demand and without even requesting a referral from a company-designated physician. Evidently, the purpose of De Andres'
reporting to Diamond H was to seek medical examination and treatment from the company-designated physician in order to initiate his claim for disability benefits.
As stated in Apines, it is illogical that a seafarer would seek treatment from other doctors immediately after his disembarkation when he could avail of the services
of the company-designated physician.

Moreover, the onus of establishing that the seafarer was referred to a company-designated physician is on the employer. The Court in Apines declared that the
burden to prove with evidence whether the seafarer was referred to a company-designated doctor rests on the employer as the latter has custody of the documents,
and not the seafarer. Here, the respondents could have easily presented proof that they referred De Andres to a company-designated physician, but they did not.
Interestingly, they could not even cite the name of their company-designated physician who would have assessed the medical condition of De Andres. Thus, it is
clear that it was the respondents who prevented the submission of De Andres to a postemployment medical examination.

Indeed, De Andres did his part when he immediately reported to Diamond H within three (3) working days from repatriation. Consequently, it was the duty of the
employer to refer him to a company-designated physician for a post-employment medical examination knowing fully well that he had a claim for disability benefits.
The respondents, however, failed to do so. Instead, they outrightly denied his claims because of the quitclaim he signed. The validity of the said quitclaim shall be
discussed infra.

In fine, the exception to the reportorial requirement applies in this case because the seafarer was prevented by the employer from submitting himself to a post-
employment medical examination by a company-designated physician. Thus, the disability claim of De Andres is not forfeited.
The quitclaim presented by
the respondents is invalid

The primary reason for the respondents' upfront denial of De Andres' disability claims was the MOA signed by the latter which, to them, constituted as a quitclaim. It
stated that the respondents agreed to pay De Andress NT$40,000.00 and gave him a plane ticket back to the Philippines; and that, in return, he would not file any
complaint or sue the respondents in the future. De Andres asserted, however, that he was forced to sign the agreement.

To be valid, a Deed of Release, Waiver and/or Quitclaim must meet the following requirements: (1) that there was no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties;
(2) that the consideration for the quitclaim is sufficient and reasonable; and (3) that the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. Courts have stepped in to invalidate questionable transactions, especially where there is
clear proof that a waiver, for instance, was obtained from an unsuspecting or a gullible person, or where the agreement or settlement was unconscionable on its
face. A quitclaim is ineffective in barring recovery of the full measure of a worker's rights, and the acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel.
Moreover, a quitclaim in which the consideration is scandalously low and inequitable cannot be an obstacle to the pursuit of a worker's legitimate claim.28

The Court finds that the MOA is not a valid quitclaim.

First, the MOA had an unreasonable consideration which was greatly disproportionate to the injury that De Andres suffered. To recall, he sustained an open fracture
injury on his left lower leg with an 8 cm in size open wound which had bone exposure and active bleeding. Due to the seriousness of his injury, he was subjected to
three (3) separate operations. The gravity of his injury left him incapacitated for almost a year until he was repatriated on February 5, 2010. Even in the Philippines,
De Andres continued to suffer from his injury and his physician of choice, Dr. Runas, concluded that he was permanently unfit for sea duty.

In spite of the severity and prolonged injury of De Andres, the respondents gave him only NT$40,000.00, or its equivalent of ₱57,000.00.29 The said amount is even
smaller than the lowest disability benefit granted to a seafarer under the POEA-SEC in the amount of US$ l,870.00, or its equivalent of ₱87,220.15.30 Manifestly,
the meager consideration provided by the MOA is not commensurate to the grave and protracted injury endured by De Andres.

Second, De Andres was not given any other option aside from signing the MOA. He claims that he was required to execute the MOA; otherwise, he would not be
allowed to return home. On the other hand, the respondents did not categorically state that De Andres could return to the Philippines even without signing the MOA.
They could not argue that the execution of the MOA was optional and that De Andres had the bargaining power to disregard the agreement or any provisions therein.
In other words, he was not given any freedom to decline the execution of the MOA, and he could not be faulted for signing it as it was the only way for him to go
home. Thus, the execution of the MOA was a precondition before De Andres could be repatriated.

Lastly, the respondents claim that the MOA was explained to De Andres by a MECO representative and was duly notarized therein. A reading of the MOA, however,
reveal that the same merely contained a stamp at the blank space provided for the MECO.31 The one (1) page document did not bear any signature or the name of
the alleged MECO representative. In addition, there was nothing in the MOA which stated that the contents thereof had been explained to De Andres. Alone in the
dormitory, De Andres was guileless as to the contents of the MOA and he had no other option but to sign the same. Again, this renders suspect the legitimacy of its
execution.

Accordingly, the MOA cannot be considered as a valid quitclaim because it lacks a reasonable consideration; De Andres was not given any freedom to reject it; and
the document was not properly explained and notarized by any Philippine government representative. The present case is similar with Interorient where the employer
declined to refer the seafarer to the company-designated physician upon repatriation due to a quitclaim which was declared null and void by the Court.

It is a time-honored rule that, in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or in the interpretation of agreements
and writings should be resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to extend the applicability to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under
the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.32

The respondents failed to

provide a medical assessment of
a company-designated physician

Under Section 20 (B) (3), the first procedure to determine the validity of a seafarer's claim for disability benefits is to refer him to a company-designated physician of
the employer who shall conduct the medical examination. As earlier mentioned, the respondents did not comply with the initial stage because they failed to refer De
Andres to a company-designated physician despite his timely reporting. They blindly relied on the MOA to cast away De Andres even though he was clearly asserting
his disability claim. As discussed earlier, the MOA was an invalid quitclaim. Thus, the respondents cannot shield themselves from liability. Moreover, they could not
present any medical assessment of a company-designated physician. The respondents have no legitimate means to refute his claim for permanent and total disability
benefits.

The respondents insist that De Andres was declared fit to work by Dr. Huang as indicated in the Certificate ofDiagnosis,33 dated January 21, 2010. A reading of the
said certification, however, shows that there was nothing therein which stated that De Andres was fit to work. It simply stated that the fracture had been healing, but
there was neither a categorical declaration that he was fit for sea duty nor a disability grading for his injury.

Further, under Section 20 (B) (3), only upon repatriation may the

company-designated physician examine the seafarer. Dr. Huang could not be considered as a company-designated physician because he was a doctor who
assessed De Andres in Taiwan, before his repatriation. The medical diagnosis of Dr. Huang could not be considered as that of a company-designated physician.

On the other hand, De Andres proved that he sustained the injury on February 27, 2009 while on board the vessel. He suffered a severe open fracture leg injury
which had bone exposure and active bleeding. He was incapacitated for almost a year and he underwent three (3) surgeries. Moreover, De Andres presented a
medical assessment of his physician of choice, Dr. Runas, who found that he is unable to stand with the left foot in plantigrade position and the presence of
calcifications around the ankle joint hindered its normal movement, which would be hard to correct or improve even with extended physical therapy. As such, Dr.
Runas concluded that he was permanently unfit for sea duty.

Between the non-existent medical assessment of a company-designated physician of the respondents and the medical assessment of De Andres' physician of
choice, the latter evidently stands. The permanent and total disability claim of De Andres remains unchallenged and must be granted by the Court. The respondents
had the opportunity to refer De Andres to a company-designated physician, but they chose to escape their responsibility by relying on an illegal quitclaim.

Further, there was no need to refer the medical assessment of De Andres to a third doctor. Absent a certification from the company-designated physician, the
seafarer had nothing to contest and the law steps in to conclusively characterize his disability as total and permanent.34

Claims for sickness allowance,

salary differentials, insurance
compensation, and attorney's fees
not raised on appeal

In its Decision, dated May 20, 2011, the LA granted De Andres sickness allowance, payment for salary differentials, insurance compensation, and attorney's fees.
The said decision, however, was set aside by the NLRC. Notably, when the petition for certiorari was filed before the CA, these deleted awards were not included in
the issues.35 When the case eventually reached this Court, De Andres no longer raised the issue of whether he was entitled to these benefits. Thus, these matters
cannot be tackled as only issues raised on appeal may be entertained by the appellate court. Basic is the rule that issues or grounds not raised below cannot be
resolved on review by the Supreme Court, for to allow the parties to raise new issues is antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play, justice and due process.36

The only issues raised by De Andres in this petition are whether the MOA was a valid quitclaim and whether he is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits
under the POEA-SEC. As the Court finds in the affirmative, De Andres is entitled to the amount of US$60,000.00 as permanent and total disability benefits.
Final Note

The Court laments that the employer of a seafarer resorted to insensitive quitclaims to avoid any disability claims.1âwphi1 Section 20 (B) (3) specifically outlines the
procedure in determining the proper compensation of a seafarer's disability. The rigorous process therein aims to provide a fair and definitive assessment on the
seafarer's medical condition and to ensure that they will receive a just compensation for their injuries. At the same time, it protects the interest of the employer by
ensuring that only genuine disability or injuries shall be entitled to compensation.

Although there is nothing in the law which prevents the employer and the seafarer from entering into a quitclaim to avoid legal controversies, the same must be fair,
reasonable, and properly explained to the seafarer. To frustrate the provisions of the POEA-SEC by forging erroneous and prejudicial quitclaims would defeat its
expedient and systematic processes and lead to protracted litigation. The Court will not think twice in striking down invalid agreements in order to uphold the
constitutional obligation of the State to give fullest aid and protection to labor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 31, 2014 Decision and the March 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. SP No. 124862 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The May 20, 2011 Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC OFW Case No. (M) 02- 02844-10 is hereby REINSTATED but
MODIFIED to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Diamond H Marine Services & Shipping Agency Inc., Wu Chun Hua, Ruben J. Turingan to pay
jointly and severally complainant Wilmer O. De Andres SIXTY THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$60,000.00), or the equivalent in Philippine Peso at the prevailing rate
of exchange at the time of actual payment, representing his total and permanent disability benefits.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154798

CRYSTAL SHIPPING, INC., and/or A/S STEIN LINE BERGEN, Petitioners
- versus -
DEO P. NATIVIDAD. Respondent.

Present:
Davide Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.

Promulgated: October 20, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari are the Resolutions[1] dated July 2, 2002 and August 15, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71293 which denied petitioners
motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari and their motion for reconsideration, respectively.

Petitioner A/S Stein Line Bergen, through its local manning agent, petitioner Crystal Shipping, Inc., employed respondent Deo P. Natividad as Chief Mate of M/V
Steinfighter for a period of ten months.[2] Within the contract period, respondent complained of coughing and hoarseness and was brought to shore for examination.
He was diagnosed with swelling neck and lymphatic glands right side in neck, declared unfit for duty, and advised to see an ear-nose-throat specialist.[3] He was
repatriated to Manila on August 18, 1998.
Shortly after his arrival, respondent was referred to ClinicoMed Inc., the company-designated clinic, for check-up and later thoroughly examined at the Manila Doctors
Hospital. He was diagnosed with papillary carcinoma, metastatic to lymphoid tissue consistent with thyroid primary and reactive hyperplasis, lymph node. On
September 11, 1998, he underwent a total thyroidectomy with radial neck dissection. After the operation, respondent developed chest complications and pleural
effusion, and had to undergo a thoracenthesis operation. On the basis of all these, his attending physician diagnosed him permanently disabled with a grade 9
impediment, with grade 1 as the most serious.[4]

A second opinion by Marine Medical Services and Metropolitan Hospital attending physician, Dr. Robert D. Lim, likewise concurred that respondent was disabled
with a grade 9 impediment.[5] Under the care of Dr. Lim, respondent underwent various treatments, one of which was the radioactive iodine therapy at the Philippine
General Hospital. While his treatment with Dr. Lim was ongoing, respondent sought the opinion of Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, who opined that he was totally and
permanently disabled for labor with a grade 1 impediment.[6] On February 22, 1999, respondent underwent a whole body scan which revealed no trace of radio
iodine on his body to indicate metastasis or residual thyroid tissue. The attending physician, Dr. Wilson D. Lim, confirmed the earlier assessments of disability with
a grade 9 impediment.[7]

All expenses incurred in respondents examination and treatments were shouldered by the petitioners. Respondent was also paid the allowable illness allowances,
commensurate to a grade 9 impediment.

On June 25, 1999, petitioners offered US$13,060 as disability benefits which respondent rejected. Respondent claimed that he deserves to be paid US$60,000 for
a grade 1 impediment. Failing to reach an agreement, respondent filed, with the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB), a complaint for disability benefits, illness
allowance, damages and attorneys fees.

The Labor Arbiter ruled for respondent and ordered petitioners to pay respondent US$60,000 as disability benefits, P100,000 as moral damages, and ten percent of
the total monetary award as attorneys fees.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) initially reversed the ruling of the RAB on the ground that findings of the company-designated doctors
were binding, as stipulated in the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Standard Employment Contract.[8] However, upon respondents motion for
reconsideration, citing jurisprudence that findings of company-designated doctors are self-serving, the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the RAB with respect only to the
award of disability benefits.

Petitioners seasonably filed a motion for extension of time to file their petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On July 2, 2002, the appellate court denied the
motion on the ground that pressure of work is not a compelling reason for the grant of an extension.

In view of the foregoing, petitioners motion for extension is DENIED and the instant case is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Prior to the receipt of the appellate courts denial, petitioners filed the petition. It was noted without action in view of the July 2, 2002 Resolution.[10] Subsequently,
petitioners moved for reconsideration of the resolution, but it was denied.[11]

Hence, this appeal by certiorari ascribing error to the Court of Appeals,

I. WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE THEIR PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, FAILING TO
GIVE DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONERS THEREIN;

II. WHEN IT MERELY NOTED PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 WITHOUT PERUSING THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN AND
THE ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT THEREOF WHICH, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IS CLEARLY INIQUITOUS AND UNJUST.[12]
Here, we are asked to resolve the procedural issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred when it denied petitioners motion for extension of time to file a petition;
and the substantive issue of the proper disability benefits that respondent is entitled to.

Anent the procedural issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erroneously applied the ruling in Velasco v. Ortiz,[13] because the factual circumstances
therein were different from the present case. In Velasco, the parties sought for the admission of their appeal that was filed beyond the reglementary period. In the
present case, however, petitioners filed their motion for extension of time within the reglementary period. They maintain that they have a valid and compelling reason
in asking the appellate court for extension. Moreover, petitioners posit that technical rules of procedure should give way to substantive justice.

On the other hand, respondent argues that there should be more than a mere claim of extreme pressure of work to justify an extension of time to file a petition for
certiorari. He calls attention to the fact that petitioners never moved for the reconsideration of the NLRC decision, which is a prerequisite for the filing of a petition for
certiorari. Likewise, respondent counters petitioners plea for liberality by indicating their failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision.

Jurisprudence abounds on the subject that a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.[14] A literal interpretation
of this prerequisite would require a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision, which granted a previous motion for reconsideration and reversed a prior
decision. After all, the second decision is considered as entirely new.

We cannot fault the appellate court for faithfully complying with the rules of procedure which it has been mandated to observe.[15] Save for the most persuasive of
reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.[16]

Indeed, on several occasions, we relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties opportunity to fully ventilate the merits of their cases.
This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality
and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions.[17]

The reason for requiring a motion for reconsideration is to make sure that administrative remedies have been exhausted before a case is appealed to a higher court.
It allows the adjudicator a second opportunity to review the case, to grapple with the issues therein, and to decide anew a question previously raised.[18] It is
presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in
its forum.[19]

With the first motion for reconsideration which the NLRC granted, there is no need for the parties to file another motion for reconsideration before bringing up the
matter to the Court of Appeals. The NLRC was already given the opportunity to pass upon and correct its mistakes. Moreover, it would be absurd to ask the NLRC
to keep on reversing itself.

Considering that property rights of both parties are involved here, we will give due course to the instant petition. Remanding the case to the court a quo will only
frustrate speedy justice and, in any event, would be a futile exercise, as in all probability the case would end up with this Court. [20] Thus, we shall bring the present
controversy to rest by deciding on the appropriate disability benefits that respondent is entitled to.

On the substantive issue, petitioners assert that the NLRC erred when it said that findings of company-designated doctors are self-serving. They point out that there
were three doctors who came up with the same findings. They argue that these findings were more credible than the findings of respondents doctor. In addition,
petitioners claim that the award of a grade 1 impediment/disability benefit was wrong considering that respondent subsequently gained employment as chief mate
of another vessel.

In resolving the merits of the case, we find pertinent Section 30 of the POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, Series of 1996,[21] which provides the schedule of
disability or impediment for injuries suffered and illness contracted. The particular illness of the respondent is not within those enumerated. But, the same provision
supplies us with the guideline that any item in the schedule classified under grade 1 constitutes total and permanent disability.

Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.[22]
As gleaned from the records, respondent was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the least, or more than 120 days, due to his medical
treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was permanent.

Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.[23] It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability
compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity.[24]

Although the company-designated doctors and respondents physician differ in their assessments of the degree of respondents disability, both found that respondent
was unfit for sea-duty due to respondents need for regular medical check-ups and treatment which would not be available if he were at sea. There is no question in
our mind that respondents disability was total.

Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001.[25] Nonetheless, this information
does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. It is of no consequence that respondent
was cured after a couple of years. The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary
work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability.[26] An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose
of the benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolutions dated July 2, 2002 and August 15, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71293,
as well as the Resolution dated April 9, 2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 23333-2000 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

JESUS E. VERGARA, Petitioner,

- versus -
HAMMONIA MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and ATLANTIC MARINE LTD., Respondents.

G.R. No. 172933

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ.

Promulgated: October 6, 2008

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:

Seaman Jesus E. Vergara (petitioner) comes to us through this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] with the plea that we set aside for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence the Decision[2] promulgated on March 14, 2005 and the Resolution[3] promulgated on June 7, 2005 by the Court of Appeals (CA), both issued in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 85347 entitled Jesus E. Vergara v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 4, 2000, petitioner was hired by respondent Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. (Hammonia) for its foreign principal, respondent Atlantic Marine Ltd., (Atlantic
Marine). He was assigned to work on board the vessel British Valour under contract for nine months, with a basic monthly salary of US$ 642.00.
The petitioner was a member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamans Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP). AMOSUP had a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) with Atlantic Marine, represented in this case by Hammonia.

The petitioner left the Philippines on April 15, 2000 to rendezvous with his ship and to carry out therein his work as a pumpman. In August 2000, while attending to
a defective hydraulic valve, he felt he was losing his vision. He complained to the Ship Captain that he was seeing black dots and hairy figures floating in front of his
right eye. His condition developed into a gradual visual loss. The ships medical log entered his condition as internal bleeding in the eye or glaucoma.[4] He was
given eye drops to treat his condition.

The petitioner went on furlough in Port Galveston, Texas and consulted a physician who diagnosed him to be suffering from vitreal hemorrhage with small defined
area of retinal traction. Differential diagnosis includes incomplete vitreal detachment ruptured macro aneurism and valsulva retinopathy.[5] He was advised to see
an ophthalmologist when he returned home to the Philippines.

He was sent home on September 5, 2000 for medical treatment. The company-designated physician, Dr. Robert D. Lim of the Marine Medical Services of the
Metropolitan Hospital, confirmed the correctness of the diagnosis at Port Galveston, Texas. Dr. Lim then referred the petitioner to an ophthalmologist at the Chinese
General Hospital who subjected the petitioners eye to focal laser treatment on November 13, 2000; vitrectomy with fluid gas exchange on December 7, 2000; and a
second session of focal laser treatment on January 13, 2001.

On January 31, 2001, the ophthalmologist pronounced the petitioner fit to resume his seafaring duties per the report of Dr. Robert D. Lim, Medical Coordinator.[6]
The petitioner then executed a certificate of fitness for work in the presence of Dr. Lim.[7] Claiming that he continued to experience gradual visual loss despite the
treatment, he sought a second opinion from another ophthalmologist, Dr. Patrick Rey R. Echiverri, who was not a company-designated physician. Dr. Echiverri gave
the opinion that the petitioner was not fit to work as a pumpman because the job could precipitate the resurgence of his former condition.

On March 20, 2001, the petitioner submitted himself to another examination, this time by Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, a physician who was not also designated by the
company. Dr. Vicaldo opined that although the petitioner was fit to work, he had a Grade X (20.15%) disability which he considered as permanent partial disability.

Armed with these two separate diagnoses, the petitioner demanded from his employer payment of disability and sickness benefits, pursuant to the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of all Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-going Vessels (POEA
Standard Employment Contract), and the existing CBA in the company. The company did not heed his demand, prompting the petitioner to file a complaint for
disability benefits, sickness allowance, damages and attorneys fees, docketed as NLRC NCR OFW Case No. (M) 01-050809-00.

On January 14, 2003, Labor Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan rendered a decision in the petitioners favor.[8] The Arbiter ordered Hammonia and Atlantic Marine to pay the
petitioner, jointly and severally, sickness allowance of US$ 2,568.00 and disability benefits of US$ 60,000.00 under the CBA, and 10% of the monetary award in
attorneys fees.

The respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which rendered a decision on March 19, 2004 reversing the Labor Arbiters ruling.[9]
It dismissed the complaint on the ground that the petitioner had been declared fit to resume sea duty and was not entitled to any disability benefit. By resolution, the
NLRC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.[10]

The petitioner thereafter sought relief from the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed the petition in a Decision
promulgated on March 14, 2005,[11] and likewise denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.[12] Hence, the present petition.

THE PETITION
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in denying him disability benefits contrary to existing jurisprudence, particularly the ruling of this Court in Crystal Shipping
Inc., A/S Stein Line Bergen v. Deo P. Natividad,[13] and, in strictly interpreting the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA between the parties on the
matter of who determines a seafarers disability.
The petitioner particularly questions the CA decision for giving credit to the certification by the company-designated physician, Dr. Robert Lim, that declared him fit
to work.[14] On the assumption that he was indeed fit to work, he submits that he should have been declared to be under permanent total disability because the fit-
to-work declaration was made more than 120 days after he suffered his disability.

The petitioner laments that the CA accorded much weight to the company-designated physicians declaration that he was fit to work.[15] He considers this a strict
and parochial interpretation of the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA. While these documents provide that it is the company doctor who must certify
a seafarer as permanently unfit for further sea service, this literal interpretation, to the petitioner, is absurd and contrary to public policy; its effect is to deny and
deprive the ailing seaman of his basic right to seek immediate attention from any competent physician. He invokes in this regard our ruling in German Marine
Agencies, Inc. et al., v. National Labor Relations Commission.[16]

In a different vein, the petitioner impugns the pronouncement of Dr. Robert Lim, the company-designated physician, that he was fit to resume sea duties as of
January 31, 2001 since Dr. Lim did not personally operate on and attend to him when he was treated; he had been under the care of an ophthalmologist since
September 6, 2000. The petitioner points out that there is nothing in the record to substantiate the correctness of Dr. Lims certification; neither did the attending eye
specialist issue any medical certification, progress report, diagnosis or prognosis on his eye condition that could be the basis of Dr. Lims certification. The petitioner
stresses that Dr. Lims certification was not based on his first hand findings as it was
issued in his capacity as the Medical Coordinator of the Metropolitan Hospital.[17] He also points out that Dr. Lim is not an eye specialist.

To the petitioner, it is the competence of the attending physician and not the circumstance of his being company-designated that should be the key consideration in
determining the true status of the health of the patient/seaman. He seeks to rebut Dr. Lims certification through the opinion of his private ophthalmologist, Dr. Patrick
Rey R. Echiverri that he would not advise him to do heavy work; he would not also be able to perform tasks that require very detailed binocular vision as the right
eyes visual acuity could only be corrected to 20/30 and near vision to J3 at best.[18] The petitioner likewise relies on the assessment and evaluation of Dr. Efren R.
Vicaldo that he suffers from partial permanent disability with a Grade X (20.15%) impediment and is now unfit to work as a seaman.[19]

The petitioner disputes the respondent companies claim that he is no longer disabled after his visual acuity had been restored to 20/20; it is fallacious because it
views disability more in its medical sense rather than on its effect on the earning capacity of the seaman. Citing supporting jurisprudence, the petitioner posits that
in disability compensation, it is the inability to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity that is compensated, not the injury itself. He maintains that
even if his visual acuity is now 20/20 as alleged by the company-designated physician, he can nevertheless no longer perform his customary work as pumpman on
board an ocean-going vessel since the job involves a lot of strain that could again cause his vitreous hemorrhage. This limitation impairs his earning capacity so that
he should be legally deemed to have suffered permanent total disability from a work-related injury. In this regard, the petitioner cites as
well his unions CBA[20] whose paragraph 20.1.5 provides that:

20.1.5 Permanent Medical Unfitness - A seafarer whose disability is assessed at 50% or more under the POEA Employment Contract shall, for the purpose of this
paragraph is regarded as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity and entitled to 100% compensation, i.e., US$ 80,000 for officers and US$ 60,000
for ratings. Furthermore, any seafarer assessed at less than 50% disability under the Contract but certified as permanently unfit for further sea services in any
capacity by the company doctor, shall also be entitled to 100% compensation.

Finally, the petitioner contends that because there is doubt as to the accuracy of the medical opinion of the company-designated physician, the doubt should be
resolved in his favor, citing Sy v. Court of Appeals,[21] as well as Article 4 of the Labor Code.[22]

THE CASE FOR RESPONDENTS

In a memorandum[23] filed on December 20, 2007, respondents Hammonia and Atlantic Marine entreat this Court to dismiss the petition under the following
arguments:

1. The provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA between the parties clearly provide that the assessment of the company-designated
physician should be accorded respect.
2. There are no legal or factual bases for the petitioners claim of total and permanent disability benefits as he was declared fit to work.
3. The petitioners reliance on the Crystal Shipping v. Natividad[24] case is misplaced.
4. The petitioner is not entitled to attorneys fees.

The respondents anchor their case on their compliance with the law and the existing CBA as applied to the petitioners circumstances.

They point out that upon the petitioners repatriation, he was immediately referred to an ophthalmologist who scheduled him for observation and regular monitoring
preparatory to possible vitrectomy. He was prescribed medication in the meantime.

On November 13, 2000, the petitioner underwent laser treatment of the right eye, which he tolerated well. His vitrectomy, scheduled on November 22, 2000, was
deferred because he was noted to have accentuated bronchovascular marking on his chest x-ray, and mild chronic obstructive pulmonary disease as revealed by
his pulmonary function test. He was given medication for his condition and was advised to stop smoking.

The petitioner was cleared for surgery on November 29, 2000. He underwent vitrectomy with fluid gas exchange and focal laser treatment of his affected eye on
December 7, 2000. He tolerated the procedure well. His condition stabilized and he was discharged for management as an outpatient on December 9, 2000.

On December 13, 2000, the petitioners vision was 20/40 (r) and 20/20 (l) with correction and slight congestion observed in his right eye. His vision improved to 20/25
(r) and 20/20 (l) by December 20, 2000 although a substantial lesion was observed and contained by laser markings. This remained constant and by January 11,
2001, no sign of vitreous hemorrhage was noted on fundoscopy.

On January 13, 2001, petitioner underwent his second session of laser treatment and he again tolerated the procedure well. By January 31, 2001, his visual acuity
was improved to 20/20 for both eyes, with correction. He was prescribed eyeglasses and was found fit to resume his sea duties. The petitioner executed a certificate
of fitness for work under oath, witnessed by Dr. Robert Lim, the company-designated physician who had declared the petitioner fit to work based on the opinion of
the handling eye specialist.[25]

The respondents anchor their objection to the grant of disability benefits on Dr. Lims certification. They dispute the petitioners contention that the medical certifications
and assessments by the petitioners private physicians - Dr. Echiverri and Dr. Vicaldo - should prevail.

The respondents object particularly to the petitioners claim that Dr. Lims assessment is not authoritative because Dr. Lim does not appear to be an eye specialist.[26]
They point out that the issue of Dr. Lims qualifications and competence was never raised at any level of the arbitration proceedings, and, therefore, should not be
entertained at this stage of review. They submit that if the petitioner truly believed that the company-designated physician was incompetent, he should have raised
the matter at the earliest possible opportunity, or at the time he accepted Dr. Lims assessment. On the contrary, they point out that the petitioner concurred with the
assessment of the company-designated physician by executing a certificate of fitness to work.[27]

The respondents likewise question the petitioners reliance on Art. 20.1.5 of the CBA for his claim that he is entitled to 100% disability compensation since his doctors,
Echiverri and Vicaldo, declared him unfit to work as a seaman although his disability was determined to be only at Grade X (20.15%), a partial permanent disability.
They contend that the petitioners position is contrary to what the cited provision provides as the CBA[28] specifically requires a company doctor to certify a seafarer
as permanently unfit for service in any capacity.

The respondents bewail the petitioners attempt to have this Court find him permanently disabled because he was under the medication and care of the company-
designated physician for over four (4) months or more than 120 days. They cite Section 20 B of petitioners POEA Standard Employment Contract whose relevant
portion states: [29]

3. Upon sign-off from vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the
degree of his permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
xxx
In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of
benefits enumerated in Section 30 of his Contract.

The respondents then point out that Section 30 provides a schedule of disability for injuries, disease or illness contracted. Any item in the schedule classified under
Grade I constitutes total and permanent disability entitled to a disability allowance equivalent to US$60,000 (US$50,000 x 120%). They consider reliance on this
Courts ruling in Crystal Shipping v. Natividad;[30] Government Service Insurance System v. Cadiz;[31] and Ijares v. Court of Appeals,[32] to be misplaced with
respect to the advocated conversion of the petitioners medical condition from temporary to permanent disability.

The respondents stress that in the present case, the petitioner had been accorded the necessary medical treatment, including laser treatment by company-designated
physicians, that restored his visual acuity to 20/20. He was declared fit to work upon his return to the full possession of all his physical and mental faculties and after
he was cleared of all impediments. They contend as well that all that the petitioner could present in support of his claim for total permanent disability was the Grade
X disability assessment issued by his private physician, Dr. Vicaldo, that he is now unfit to work as seaman. They point out that Dr. Vicaldo himself is not an eye
specialist.

Finally, the respondents insist that neither factual nor legal basis exists for petitioners claim of Grade I total and permanent disability benefits. Factually, the petitioner
was declared fit to work by the company-designated physician. Legally, only blindness or total and permanent loss of vision of both eyes is considered a Grade I
disability under the terms of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Under its Section 30 on the portion on Eyes, only total and permanent loss of vision of both
eyes can be considered as Grade I disability, not the petitioners claimed impairment of vision in the right eye.

THE COURTS RULING

We find no merit in the petition.

The Governing Law and Rules.

Entitlement to disability benefits by seamen on overseas work is a matter governed, not only by medical findings but, by law and by contract. The material statutory
provisions are Articles 191 to 193 under Chapter VI (Disability Benefits) of the Labor Code, in relation with Rule X of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book
IV of the Labor Code. By contract, Department Order No. 4, series of 2000 of the Department of Labor and Employment (the POEA Standard Employment Contract)
and the parties CBA bind the seaman and his employer to each other.

By way of background, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through the POEA, has simplified the determination of liability for work-related death,
illness or injury in the case of Filipino seamen working
on foreign ocean-going vessels.[33] Every seaman and the vessel owner (directly or represented by a local manning agency) are required to execute the POEA
Standard Employment Contract as a condition sine qua non prior to the deployment for overseas work. The POEA Standard Employment Contract is supplemented
by the CBA between the owner of the vessel and the covered seamen.

A notable feature of the POEA Standard Employment Contract is Section 31 its provision on the Applicable Law. It provides:

Any unresolved dispute, claim or grievance arising out of or in connection with this Contract, including the annexes shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and convenants where the Philippines is a signatory.

Through this provision, the DOLE skirted any possible issue regarding the law that should govern the terms and conditions of employment of Filipino seamen working
in ocean-going vessels that have no significant Philippine presence and that hardly see Philippine waters. Thus, with the POEA Standard Employment Contract,
there is no doubt that in case of any unresolved dispute, claim or grievance arising out of or in connection with the contract, Philippine laws shall apply.
In real terms, this means that the shipowner an employer operating outside Philippine jurisdiction does not subject itself to Philippine laws, except to the extent that
it concedes the coverage and application of these laws under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. On the matter of disability, the employer is not subject to
Philippine jurisdiction in terms of being compelled to contribute to the State Insurance Fund that, under the Labor Code, Philippine employers are obliged to support.
(This Fund, administered by the Employees Compensation Commission, is the source of work-related compensation payments for work-related deaths, injuries, and
illnesses.) Instead, the POEA Standard Employment Contract provides its own system of disability compensation that approximates (and even exceeds) the benefits
provided under Philippine law.[34] The standard terms agreed upon, as above pointed out, are intended to be read and understood in accordance with Philippine
laws, particularly, Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code and the applicable implementing rules and regulations in case of any dispute, claim or grievance.

In this respect and in the context of the present case, Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code provides that:

x x x The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules; x x x

The rule referred to - Rule X, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing Book IV of the Labor Code - states:

Period of entitlement. (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer
than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability
in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at anytime after 120 days of
continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.
[Underscoring ours]

These provisions are to be read hand in hand with the POEA Standard Employment Contract whose Section 20 (3) states:

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the
degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for
diagnosis and treatment.[35] For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable
to work.[36] He receives his basic wage during this period[37] until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be
permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws.[38] If the 120
days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period
may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already
exists.[39] The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.

Thus, upon petitioners return to the country for medical treatment, both he and the respondent company acted correctly in accordance with the terms of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract and the CBA; he reported to the company-designated doctor for treatment and the latter properly referred him to an ophthalmologist
at the Chinese General Hospital. No dispute existed on the medical treatment the petitioner received, to the point that the petitioner executed a certificate of fitness
for work based on the assessment/certification by the company-designated physician.

Problems only arose when despite the certification, the petitioner sought second and third opinions from his own doctors, one of whom opined that he could no
longer resume work as a pumpman while the other recognized a Grade X (20.15%) partial permanent disability. Based on these opinions, the petitioner demanded
that he be paid disability and sickness benefits; when the company refused, the demand metamorphosed into an actual case before the NLRC Arbitration Branch.
As we outlined above, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so,
or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. In
the present case, while the initial 120-day treatment or temporary total disability period was exceeded, the company-designated doctor duly made a declaration well
within the extended 240-day period that the petitioner was fit to work. Viewed from this perspective, both the NLRC and CA were legally correct when they refused
to recognize any disability because the petitioner had already been declared fit to resume his duties. In the absence of any disability after his temporary total disability
was addressed, any further discussion of permanent partial and total disability, their existence, distinctions and consequences, becomes a surplusage that serves
no useful purpose.

A twist that directly led to the filing of this case is the issue of whose medical pronouncement should be followed given that the company-designated physician had
declared the petitioner fit for work with a certification of fitness duly executed by the latter, while the petitioners physicians gave qualified opinions on his medical
situation.

The POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA clearly provide that when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his
fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the company-
designated physicians assessment, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer to be the decision final and binding
on them.[40]

Thus, while petitioner had the right to seek a second and even a third opinion, the final determination of whose decision must prevail must be done in accordance
with an agreed procedure. Unfortunately, the petitioner did not avail of this procedure; hence, we have no option but to declare that the company-designated doctors
certification is the final determination that must prevail. We do so mindful that the company had exerted real effort to provide the petitioner with medical assistance,
such that the petitioner finally ended with a 20/20 vision. The company-designated physician, too, monitored the petitioners case from the beginning and we cannot
simply throw out his certification, as the petitioner suggested, because he has no expertise in ophthalmology. Under the facts of this case, it was the company-
designated doctor who referred the petitioners case to the proper medical specialist whose medical results are not essentially disputed; who monitored the petitioners
case during its progress; and who issued his certification on the basis of the medical records available and the results obtained. This led the NLRC in its own ruling
to note that:

x x x more weight should be given to the assessment of degree of disability made by the company doctors because they were the ones who attended and treated
petitioner Vergara for a period of almost five (5) months from the time of his repatriation to the Philippines on September 5, 2000 to the time of his declaration as fit
to resume sea duties on January 31, 2001, and they were privy to petitioner Vergaras case from the very beginning, which enabled the company-designated doctors
to acquire a detailed knowledge and familiarity with petitioner Vergaras medical condition which thus enabled them to reach a more accurate evaluation of the degree
of any disability which petitioner Vergara might have sustained. These are not mere company doctors. These doctors are independent medical practitioners who
passed the rigorous requirements of the employer and are more likely to protect the interest of the employer against fraud.

Moreover, as between those who had actually attended to petitioner Vergara throughout the duration of his illness and those who had merely examined him later
upon his recovery for the purpose of determining disability benefits, the former must prevail.

We note, too, as the respondent company aptly observed, that the petitioner never raised the issue of the company-designated doctors competence at any level of
the arbitration proceedings, only at this level of review. On the contrary, the petitioner accepted his assessment of fitness and in fact issued a certification to this
effect. Under these circumstances, we find the NLRC and the CAs conclusions on the petitioners fitness to work, based on the assessment/certification by the
company-designated physician, to be legally and factually in order.

As a last point, the petitioner has repeatedly invoked our ruling in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[41] apparently for its statement that the respondent in the case
was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. This declaration of a permanent total disability after
the initial 120 days of temporary total disability cannot, however, be simply lifted and applied as a general rule for all cases in all contexts. The specific context of the
application should be considered, as we must do in the application of all rulings and even of the law and of the implementing regulations.

Crystal Shipping was a case where the seafarer was completely unable to work for three years and was undisputably unfit for sea duty due to respondents need for
regular medical check-up and treatment which would not be available if he were at sea.[42] While the case was not clear on how the initial 120-day and subsequent
temporary total disability period operated, what appears clear is that the disability went beyond 240 days without any declaration that the seafarer was fit to resume
work. Under the circumstances, a ruling of permanent and total disability was called for, fully in accordance with the operation of the period for entitlement that we
described above. Viewed from this perspective, the petitioner cannot cite the Crystal Shipping ruling as basis for his claim for permanent total disability.

Additionally and to reiterate what we pointed out above regarding the governing rules that affect the disability of Filipino seafarers in ocean-going vessels, the POEA
Standard Employment Contract provides its own Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases Including Occupational Diseases or Illness
Contracted (Section 32); Disability Allowances (a subpart of Section 32); and its own guidelines on Occupational Diseases (Section 32-A) which cannot be
disregarded in considering disability compensation and benefits. All these read in relation with applicable Philippine laws and rules should also be taken into account
in considering and citing Crystal Shipping and its related line of cases as authorities.

In light of the above conclusions, we see no need to discuss the petitioners other submissions that the lack of disability has rendered moot, particularly the existence
of doubt that the petitioner insists should be resolved in his favor.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198501 January 30, 2013

KESTREL SHIPPING CO., INC./ CAPT. AMADOR P. SERVILLON and ATLANTIC MANNING LTD., Petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO D. MUNAR, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated January 28, 2011 and Resolution2 dated September 6, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 110878.

The facts leading to the filing of this petition are undisputed.

On March 23, 2006, petitioner Kestrel Shipping, Inc. (Kestrel), on behalf of its principal, petitioner Atlantic Manning, Ltd., and respondent Francisco Munar (Munar)
forged a six (6)-month employment contract designating Munar as pump man for M/V Southern Unity. As pump man, his duties include: (a) operating, maintaining
and repairing power-driven pumps, valves and related machinery; (b) transferring materials to and from vessels and terminal storages; (c) transferring liquids by
siphoning; (d) installing hoses and pipes between pumps and containers that require filling or emptying; (e) maintenance of pump rooms and similar spaces; (f)
assisting in the cleaning of tanks, crude oil washing, gas inerting, purging of tanks and wage sampling of cargo; (g) checking and recording cargo temperature; and
(h) operating tank heating equipment.3

On October 12, 2006, after Munar assisted in manually lifting the ship’s anchor windlass motor that weighs about 350 kilograms, he started to limp and experience
severe pain in his lumbar region. On October 18, 2006, Munar was admitted at the Entabeni Hospital in Durban, South Africa. According to his attending physician,
Dr. Soma T. Govender (Dr. Govender), the x-ray and magnetic resonant image (MRI) of Munar’s lumbar spine showed degenerative changes, which required him
to take pain medication, use pelvic traction, and undergo physiotherapy. In his medical report4 dated October 19, 2006, Dr. Govender stated that:
I arranged for him to have lumbar spine x-rays and this showed that he had degenerative changes especially of the lower lumbar spine in the L3/4 and L5/S1 region
with degenerative changes noted bilaterally. I proceeded to do a MRI of the lumbar spine to exclude an acute prolapsed disc and this confirmed degenerative
changes of the lumbar spine extending from the L2/3 region and L3/4 and the worst affected levels appeared to be L4/5 and L5/S1.

xxxx

I have admitted him for a course on intensive conservative management in hospital. He has been commenced on pelvic traction and been given pain medication,
which includes Narcotic analgesia, muscle relaxants, and anti-inflammatories. I have also commenced him on a course of physiotherapy and hopefully with this
conservative mode of treatment he should show sufficient improvement to obviate any spinal surgery.5

On October 24, 2006, Dr. Govender issued another medical report6 where he stated that while Munar’s improved condition allowed him to travel, he would require
assistance in carrying his things and should be lying down for the entire duration of the trip. Munar should undergo further treatment and management in a spine
rehabilitation facility but if he would not register a positive response thereto, he must undergo surgery. Specifically:

Mr. Munar is currently recovered from the acute pain syndrome that he first presented with. Although he has not recuperated completely he has progressed to the
state were he will be able to travel back to the Phillipines (sic) with assistance. He will require assistance with regard to his baggage transfers and he should also be
accommodated on the aircraft so that he can lie down, as this would minimize the amount of pressure on his lumbar inter-vertebral disc and minimize the nerve root
compression. It is reasonable to assume that the heavy lifting that forms part of his daily work duties has contributed significantly to the abnormalities demonstrated
on his lumbar spine MRI scans. x x x.

Mr. Munar will require further treatment and management in the Philippines. I would recommend a further course of conservative treatment for a few more weeks. If
this does not settle he may then require surgical intervention with decompression of the areas of stenosis (narrowing) and removal of the disc fragments that are
compressing the nerve roots and a possible fusion of his lower back. However, this will depend on the response to the conservative treatment and his recovery after
such surgery may take up to 3 months.7

Dr. Govender also declared Munar unfit to perform his usual sea duties:

Whether he has further surgery or not, it will not be possible for Mr. Munar to continue performing the "heavy manual duties" that hisjob requires any longer, as this
could exacerbate his lumbar spine problem. From this perspective he is medically unfit to continue such duties. x x x8

On October 28, 2006, Munar was repatriated.

On October 30, 2006, Munar was admitted at the Chinese General Hospital. For two (2) weeks, he underwent intensive physiotherapy and was attended to by the
following doctors: Dr. Tiong Sam Lim (Dr. Lim), a spine surgeon; Dr. Antonio Periquet (Dr. Periquet), a specialist on physical rehabilitation medicine; and Dr. Fidel
Chua (Dr. Chua) of Trans Global Health Systems, Inc. to whom Kestrel referred his case for evaluation.9

On November 17, 2006, Dr. Chua issued a medical report,10 stating that Munar did not respond positively to the treatment and recommending that he undergo
laminectomy and dissectomy, procedures which would entail a recovery period from four (4) to six (6) months:

The above patient had 2 weeks intensitive (sic) physiotherapy but no improvement. I had conference with Dr. Tiong Sam Lim (spinal surgeon) and Dr. Antonio
Periquet (rehabilitation medicine) and strongly suggest patient to undergo Laminectomy & dissectomy which will approximately cost PHP 120,000.00 to PHP
150,000.00 barring complication.

Recuperation will take 4-6 months from date of operation.11

On December 2, 2006, Munar had surgical intervention.

On December 20, 2006, he was discharged from the hospital. In his medical report12 of even date, Dr. Chua diagnosed Munar as suffering from herniated disc and
that while the surgery was successful, Munar should continue physiotherapy:

The above patient discharged today from Chinese General Hospital. He underwent Laminectomy and Dissectomy last December 2, 2006. Since he is from La Union,
he may continue his physiotherapy in his hometown.

At present, the prognosis is good and recuperation will take 4-6 months from date of operation.13

Munar continued his physiotherapy sessions at Lorma Medical Center at Carlatan, San Fernando City, La Union.14

On February 27, 2007, Munar was physically examined by Dr. Lim and Dr. Periquet. The following observations were noted in the medical report Dr. Chua issued:

Patient was re-evaluated by Dr. Tiong Sam Lim with finding of right lower extremities has improved but there is still pain on straight leg raise of left and weak extensor
hallis longes.

He was also evaluated by Dr. Antonio Periquet with following finding

1. there is a decrease in pain

2. tenderness – lumbar paravertebral

3. weakness left lower extremity

4. decrease in sensation from T 10 down

5. SLR – 30o left; full – right

6. decrease ankle jerk left

7. pain on all trunk motion15

On April 11 and 12, 2007, Munar was once again examined by Dr. Periquet and Dr. Lim, respectively. On May 3, 2007, Dr. Chua issued a medical report16 where
he enumerated the findings of Dr. Periquet and Dr. Lim and rated Munar’s impediment as Grade 8.

The above patient was re-evaluated by Dr. Antonio Periquet on April 11, 2007 with report of pain level is 5/10

- SLR-45o bilateral, weakness left foot muscle, decrease sensation below mid-thigh

- Tenderness-lumbo sacral process and left lumbar area

- Pain on side bending and forward flexion

He is advised to continue physiotherapy.

He was also seen by Dr. Tiong Sam Lim on April 12, 2007 and advised to continue physiotherapy and recommended disability assessment.
After thorough evaluation, the report of Dr. Antonio Periquet; Dr. Tiong Sam Lim and Dr. Edward Lingayo, patient will take a long time to fully recovered.

Therefore, he may be given disability.

Based on Amended POEA Contract Section 32-CHEST-TRUNK-SPINE # 5-disability grade 8.17

Meantime, on April 17, 2007, Munar filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits. His complaint was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. OFW-07-04-
00970-00 and raffled to Labor Arbiter Veneranda Guerrero (LA Guerrero). Munar claimed that the mere fact that his medical condition, which incapacitated him to
engage in any gainful employment, persisted for more than 120 days automatically entitles him to total and permanent disability benefits.

During the mandatory mediation and conciliation conferences, petitioners invoked Dr. Chua’s assessment per his medical report dated May 3, 2007 and offered to
pay Munar the benefit corresponding to Grade 8 disabilities or $16,795.00. Munar rejected petitioners’ offer and maintained that his disability should be rated as
Grade 1. Munar relied on the following assessment made by Dr. Edward L. Chiu (Dr. Chiu), an orthopedic surgeon at Lorma Medical Center, in a medical certificate18
the latter issued on May 21, 2007:

At present, he could tolerate walking for short distances due to his low back pain. There is weakness of his left foot.

Due to his back injury and pain, he could not go back to work. He could not tolerate stren[u]ous physical activities.19

In a Decision20 dated May 30, 2008, LA Guerrero awarded Munar with total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00 and attorney’s fees
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the former. As between the assessment of Dr. Chua and that of Dr. Chiu, LA Guerrero gave more weight to the latter:

Assessing the parties’ respective averments and documents adduced in support thereof, this Office finds that the complainant is entitled to the maximum
compensation benefit as provided under the POEA Standard Employment Contract in the amount of US$60,000.00.

The medical certificate issued by Dr. Edward L. Chiu dated May 21, 2007 categorically states that complainant cannot go back to work due to his back injury and
that he cannot tolerate strenuous physical activities. Given the nature of his shipboard employment, it is logical to conclude that the complainant cannot resume
shipboard employment. This conclusion is borne out by the respondents’ own medical certificate showing that after the complainant underwent surgery in December,
2006 he was expected to recuperate for a period of 4-6 months, and on May 3, 2007 the respondents’ designated physician determined that the complainant "will
take a long time to fully recovered (sic)". And, while he was assessed with Impediment Grade 8, the assessment is not accompanied by any justification, other than
the vague qualification on the length of time of recovery.

Evidently, such ambiguous assessment, vis-à-vis that made by the complainant’s independent physician who had taken over the complainant’s therapy, cannot be
a basis for the grant of the assessed disability grading. The determination of the company designated physician cannot prevail over the specific assessment made
by the independent physician.

Verily the illness sustained by the complainant has rendered him unfit to continue his employment as seafarer. Accordingly, he is entitled to the maximum
compensation benefit of US$60,000.00.

It is well-settled that:

"disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee
to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that (he) was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of (his)
mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, We likewise held, it is not the injury which is compensated,
but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity." (Philippine Transmarine, Inc., vs. NLRC 353 SCRA 47)21
On appeal by petitioners, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed LA Guerrero’s Decision dated May 30, 2008. In a Decision22 dated June 30,
2009, the NLRC ruled that Dr. Chiu’s categorical and definite assessment should prevail over that of Dr. Chua, which failed to approximate the period needed by
Munar to fully recover and lacked clear basis.

Given the report of the company-designated physician who is unsure how much time complainant needs in order to fully recover, and the report of complainant’s
physician who is certain in his own findings that complainant cannot go back to work given his present condition, this Commission has no other obvious choice than
to place its confidence and accordingly uphold the findings of complainant’s physician.23

The NLRC denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in a Resolution24 dated August 28, 2009.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari25 with the CA, alleging that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in characterizing Munar’s disability as total and
permanent. The NLRC should have upheld Dr. Chua’s findings over those of Dr. Chiu whose knowledge of Munar’s case is questionable. Apart from the fact that it
is Dr. Chua, being the company designated physician, who is tasked under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC) to determine the nature and degree of a seafarer’s disability or his fitness to perform sea duties, the reliability of his assessment springs from his
undisputed familiarity with Munar’s medical condition. As one of Munar’s attending physicians from the time he was repatriated, Dr. Chua is in a position to give a
more accurate appraisal of Munar’s disability. Moreover, Dr. Chua’s assessment is based on the findings of Dr. Lim and Dr. Periquet who are both specialists in the
treatment and management of spine injuries. Furthermore, under the POEA-SEC, herniated disc is not one of the disabilities that are classified as Grade 1. Munar’s
herniated or slipped disc only resulted to partial loss of motion of his lower extremities, which is classified as Grade 8 im pediment under Section 32 of the POEA-
SEC. Petitioners claim that for a spine injury to be considered as Grade 1 disability, it should have brought forth incontinence or rendered walking impossible even
with the aid of crutches.

By way of the assailed decision, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC and ruled that Munar’s con tinued inability to perform his usual
sea duties, which is attributable to his medical condition that is work-related, despite surgery and seven (7) months of physical therapy, conclusively indicate that he
is totally and permanently disabled. The CA noted that while the company-designated doctors did not categorically state that Munar is unfit for sea duties, this is
easily inferable from their statement that he continues to experience pain, weakness and tenderness and would take a long time to recover.

In the case at bar, despite his having undergone surgeries, treatment and physical therapy of more than seven months from the injury, Munar is still found by all
physicians involved to continue to suffer from weakness, tenderness and pain that prevent him from doing strenuous activities. In fact, Kestrel’s own designated
physicians have stated this in their last report and found that Munar was entitled to disability benefits as he "(would) take a long time to fully recover." Though they
did not state it, it is clear from these findings that Munar is still unable to return to his customary work as a seafarer in an ocean-going vessel, due to the strenuous
nature of the work demanded by it. No profit-motivated ship owner will employ Munar because of his condition. Munar’s private physician’s statement of this fact in
his own report merely confirms what is already obvious. Should he even try, Munar is certain to get disqualified as seafarer since such an employment will require
him to undergo rigorous physical examinations which he is sure to fail because of the sorry state of his physical health.

Thus, it is not even necessary to address Kestrel et al.’s arguments as to the persuasive or binding nature of the findings of the company-designated physicians
since, as earlier stated, they have been ruled to be not binding nor conclusive on the courts. In fact, the findings of Kestrel’s company-designated doctors themselves
do not categorically state that Munar is fit to return to work; on the contrary, they state that Munar still suffers from weakness, tenderness and pain and is entitled to
disability benefits. Thus, the only issue left for resolution is the amount of disability payments due to Munar.26 (Citations omitted)

Nonetheless, while the CA agreed with the NLRC that Munar’s spine injury is a Grade 1 disability, it deemed proper to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees to two
percent (2%) of his disability benefits.

We find, however, that the grant by public respondent of 10% of $60,000 as attorney’s fees is exorbitant and without any stated basis, since it was not proven that
Kestrel[,] et al. acted in gross and evident bad faith in denying Munar’s claim of Impediment Grade 1 compensation. The records bear that Kestrel in fact offered to
pay Impediment Grade 8 compensation, or $16,795.00, to Munar in good faith, which the latter refused. But since the instant case is an action for recovery of
compensation by a laborer, attorney’s fees are still due based on Article 2208(8) of the Civil Code, albeit on a reduced amount of two percent (2%) of the main
award, which We deem to be the reasonable fee under the circumstances.27

In a Resolution28 dated September 6, 2011, the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Issue

There is no dispute that Munar’s spine injury is work-related and that he is entitled to disability benefits. The bone of contention is how to classify such injury in order
to determine the amount of benefits due to him. There is a conflict between the disability ratings made by the company-designated physician and Munar’s doctor-of-
choice and petitioners claim that holding the latter’s determination to be more credible is contrary to the provisions of the POEA-SEC and prevailing jurisprudence.
Absent any substantial challenge to the competence and skill of the company-designated doctors, there is no reason why their assessment should not be given due
credence.

Petitioners insist on the correctness of the grade assigned by their doctors on Munar’s disability. According to petitioners, Munar’s herniated disc is not a Grade 1
impediment as it did not disable him from walking or rendered him incontinent. Munar suffers from "moderate rigidity or two thirds (2/3) loss of motion or lifting power
of the trunk" and under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, this is a Grade 8 and not a Grade 1 impediment.

Munar cannot claim, petitioners further posit, that he is totally and permanently disabled and claim the benefits corresponding to Grade 1 disabilities simply because
he has not yet fully recovered after the lapse of 120 days from the time he signed-off from M/V Southern Unity. The nature of disability and the benefits attached
thereto are determined by the manner they are graded or classified under the POEA and not by the number of days that a seafarer is under treatment. If a seafarer
has an injury or medical condition that is not considered a Grade 1 impediment under the POEA-SEC, then he cannot claim that he is totally or permanently disabled.
To allow the contrary would render naught the schedule of disabilities under the POEA-SEC.

Our Ruling

This Court resolves to DENY the petition.

Indeed, under Section 3229 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are classified as Grade 1 may be considered as total and permanent. However,
if those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties
for a period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation, totally and permanently
disabled. In other words, an impediment should be characterized as partial and permanent not only under the Schedule of Disabilities found in Section 32 of the
POEA-SEC but should be so under the relevant provisions of the Labor Code and the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation (AREC) implementing Title II,
Book IV of the Labor Code. That while the seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he is not precluded from earning doing the same work he had before his injury or
disability or that he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful employment for more than 120 or 240
days, as the case may be, he shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.

Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability within the period
of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer’s medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently
disabled.

It is settled that the provisions of the Labor Code and AREC on disabilities are applicable to the case of seafarers such that the POEA-SEC is not the sole issuance
that governs their rights in the event of work-related death, injury or illness. As ruled in Remigio v. NLRC:30

Second. Is the Labor Code’s concept of permanent total disability applicable to the case at bar? Petitioner claims to have suffered from permanent total disability as
defined under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, viz:
Art. 192 (c). The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules; x x x

Petitioner likewise cites Vicente v. ECC and Abaya, Jr. v. ECC, both of which were decided applying the Labor Code provisions on disability benefits. Private
respondents, on the other hand, contend that petitioner erred in applying the definition of "permanent total disability" under the Labor Code and cases decided under
the ECC as the instant case involves a contractual claim under the 1996 POEA SEC.

Again, we rule for petitioner.

The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to "secure the best terms and conditions
of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas." Section 29
of the 1996 POEA SEC itself provides that "all rights and obligations of the parties to the Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory." Even without this provision, a contract of
labor is so impressed with public interest that the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to "the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,
closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects."

Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. In Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. NLRC, seaman
Carlos Nietes was found to be suffering from congestive heart failure and cardiomyopathy and was declared as unfit to work by the company-accredited physician.
The Court affirmed the award of disability benefits to the seaman, citing ECC v. Sanico, GSIS v. CA, and Bejerano v. ECC that "disability should not be understood
more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind
of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of hismentality and attainment could do. It
does not mean absolute helplessness." It likewise cited Bejerano v. ECC, that in a disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is
the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.31 (Citations omitted)

In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.,32 this Court read the POEA-SEC in harmony with the Labor Code and the AREC in interpreting in holding that: (a)
the 120 days provided under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC is the period given to the employer to determine fitness to work and when the seafarer is deemed
to be in a state of total and temporary disability; (b) the 120 days of total and temporary disability may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days should the seafarer
require further medical treatment; and (c) a total and temporary disability becomes permanent when so declared by the company-designated physician within 120
or 240 days, as the case may be, or upon the expiration of the said periods without a declaration of either fitness to work or permanent disability and the seafarer is
still unable to resume his regular seafaring duties. Quoted below are the relevant portions of this Court’s Decision dated October 6, 2008:

In real terms, this means that the shipowner―an employer operating outside Philippine jurisdiction―does not subject itself to Philippine laws, except to the extent
that it concedes the coverage and application of these laws under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. On the matter of disability, the employer is not subject
to Philippine jurisdiction in terms of being compelled to contribute to the State Insurance Fund that, under the Labor Code, Philippine employers are obliged to
support. (This Fund, administered by the Employees’ Compensation Commission, is the source of work-related compensation payments for work-related deaths,
injuries, and illnesses.) Instead, the POEA Standard Employment Contract provides its own system of disability compensation that approximates (and even exceeds)
the benefits provided under Philippine law. The standard terms agreed upon, as above pointed out, are intended to be read and understood in accordance with
Philippine laws, particularly, Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code and the applicable implementing rules and regulations in case of any dispute, claim or grievance.

In this respect and in the context of the present case, Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code provides that:

xxxx

The rule referred to – Rule X, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing Book IV of the Labor Code – states:
xxxx

These provisions are to be read hand in hand with the POEA Standard Employment Contract whose Section 20 (3) states:

xxxx

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for
diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to
work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent,
either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period
is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up
to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman
may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.

xxxx

As we outlined above, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so,
or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. In
the present case, while the initial 120-day treatment or temporary total disability period was exceeded, the company-designated doctor duly made a declaration well
within the extended 240-day period that the petitioner was fit to work. Viewed from this perspective, both the NLRC and CA were legally correct when they refused
to recognize any disability because the petitioner had already been declared fit to resume his duties. In the absence of any disability after his temporary total disability
was addressed, any further discussion of permanent partial and total disability, their existence, distinctions and consequences, becomes a surplusage that serves
no useful purpose.33 (Citations omitted)

Consequently, if after the lapse of the stated periods, the seafarer is still incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties and the company-designated physician had
not yet declared him fit to work or permanently disabled, whether total or permanent, the conclusive presumption that the latter is totally and permanently disabled
arises. On the other hand, if the company-designated physician declares the seaman fit to work within the said periods, such declaration should be respected unless
the physician chosen by the seaman and the doctor selected by both the seaman and his employer declare otherwise. As provided under Section 20-B(3) of the
POEA-SEC, a seafarer may consult another doctor and in case the latter’s findings differ from those of the company-designated physician, the opinion of a third
doctor chosen by both parties may be secured and such shall be final and binding. The same procedure should be observed in case a seafarer, believing that he is
totally and permanently disabled, disagrees with the declaration of the company-designated physician that he is partially and permanently disabled.

In Vergara, as between the determinations made by the company-designated physician and the doctor appointed by the seaman, the former should prevail absent
any indication that the above procedure was complied with:

The POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA clearly provide that when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his
fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the company-
designated physician’s assessment, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer to be the decision final and binding
on them.

Thus, while petitioner had the right to seek a second and even a third opinion, the final determination of whose decision must prevail must be done in accordance
with an agreed procedure. Unfortunately, the petitioner did not avail of this procedure; hence, we have no option but to declare that the company-designated doctor’s
certification is the final determination that must prevail. x x x.34 (Citation omitted)

In this case, the following are undisputed: (a) when Munar filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits on April 17, 2007, 181 days had lapsed from
the time he signed-off from M/V Southern Unity on October 18, 2006; (b) Dr. Chua issued a disability grading on May 3, 2007 or after the lapse of 197 days; and (c)
Munar secured the opinion of Dr. Chiu on May 21, 2007; (d) no third doctor was consulted by the parties; and (e) Munar did not question the competence and skill
of the company-designated physicians and their familiarity with his medical condition.

It may be argued that these provide sufficient grounds for the dismissal of Munar’s complaint. Considering that the 240-day period had not yet lapsed when the
NLRC was asked to intervene, Munar’s complaint is premature and no cause of action for total and permanent disability benefits had set in. While beyond the 120-
day period, Dr. Chua’s medical report dated May 3, 2007 was issued within the 240-day period. Moreover, Munar did not contest Dr. Chua’s findings using the
procedure outlined under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC. For being Munar’s attending physicians from the time he was repatriated and given their specialization
in spine injuries, the findings of Dr. Periquet and Dr. Lim constitute sufficient bases for Dr. Chua’s disability grading. As Munar did not allege, much less, prove the
contrary, there exists no reason why Dr. Chiu’s assessment should be preferred over that of Dr. Chua.

It must be noted, however, that when Munar filed his complaint, Dr. Chua had not yet determined the nature and extent of Munar’s disability. Also, Munar was still
undergoing physical therapy and his spine injury had yet been fully addressed. Furthermore, when Munar filed a claim for total and permanent disability benefits,
more than 120 days had gone by and the prevailing rule then was that enunciated by this Court in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad35 that total and permanent
disability refers to the seafarer’s incapacity to perform his customary sea duties for more than 120 days. Particularly:

Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. As
gleaned from the records, respondent was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the least, or more than 120 days, due to his medical
treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was permanent.

Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability
compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.

xxxx

Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001. Nonetheless, this information does
not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. It is of no consequence that respondent was
cured after a couple of years. The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work
for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the
benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.36 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

Consequently, that after the expiration of the 120-day period, Dr. Chua had not yet made any declaration as to Munar’s fitness to work and Munar had not yet fully
recovered and was still incapacitated to work sufficed to entitle the latter to total and permanent disability benefits.

In addition, that it was by operation of law that brought forth the conclusive presumption that Munar is totally and permanently disabled, there is no legal compulsion
for him to observe the procedure prescribed under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC. A seafarer’s compliance with such procedure presupposes that the company-
designated physician came up with an assessment as to his fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration of the 120-day or 240-day periods. Alternatively put,
absent a certification from the company-designated physician, the seafarer had nothing to contest and the law steps in to conclusively characterize his disability as
total and permanent.

This Court’s pronouncements in Vergara presented a restraint against the indiscriminate reliance on Crystal Shipping such that a seafarer is immediately catapulted
into filing a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits after the expiration of 120 days from the time he signed-off from the vessel to which he was assigned.
Particularly, a seafarer’s inability to work and the failure of the company-designated physician to determine fitness or unfitness to work despite the lapse of 120 days
will not automatically bring about a shift in the seafarer’s state from total and temporary to total and permanent, considering that the condition of total and temporary
disability may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days.
Nonetheless, Vergara was promulgated on October 6, 2008, or more than two (2) years from the time Munar filed his complaint and observance of the principle of
prospectivity dictates that Vergara should not operate to strip Munar of his cause of action for total and permanent disability that had already accrued as a result of
his continued inability to perform his customary work and the failure of the company-designated physician to issue a final assessment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 28, 2011 and Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 110878 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 210634 January 14, 2015

NORIEL R. MONTIERRO, Petitioner,

vs.
RICKMERS MARINE AGENCY PHILS., INC., Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari1 seeking to nullify the Decision dated 8 August 20132 and the Resolution dated 6 January 20143 issued by
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 126618.

FACTS

On 26 February 2010, respondent Rickmers Marine Agency Phils., Inc. (Rickmers ), on behalf of its foreign principal, Global Management Limited, hired petitioner
Noriel Montierro as Ordinary Seaman with a basic monthly salary of USD420. He was assigned to work on board the vessel MIV CSAV Maresias.4

Sometime in May 2010, while on board the vessel and going down from a crane ladder, Montierro lost his balance and twisted his legs, thus injuring his right knee.5
Thereafter, on 31 May 2010, he was examined in Livorno, Spain by Dr. Roberto Santini, who recommended surgical treatment at home and found him unfit for duty.6
Thus, on 2 June 2010, Montierro was repatriated to the Philippines for further medical treatment.7

On 4 June 2010, two days after his repatriation, Montierro reported to Dr. Natalio G. Alegre II, the company-designated physician. He underwent a magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) scan of his right knee. The MRI showed he had "meniscal tear, posterior horn of the medical meniscus, and minimal joint fluid." Upon the
recommendation of Dr. Alegre, Montiero underwent arthroscopic partial medical meniscectomy of his right knee on 29 July 2010 at St. Luke’s Medical Center.8 On
20 August 2010, Montierro had his second check-up with Dr. Alegre, who noted that the former’s surgical wounds had healed, but that there was still pain and
limitation of motion on his right knee on gaits and squats. The doctor advised him to undergo rehabilitation medicine and continue physical therapy.9

On 3 September 2010, the 91st day of Montierro’s treatment, Dr. Alegre issued an interimdisability grade of 10 for "stretching leg of ligaments of a knee resulting in
instability of the joint." He advised Montierro to continue with the latter’s physical therapy and oral medications.10

Montierro further underwent sessions of treatment and evaluation between 17 September 2010 and 28 December 2010.11

On 3 January 2011, the 213th day of Montierro’s treatment, Dr. Alegre issued a final assessment as follows:

Subjective Complaints:
Cannot flex the knee to 100%
No swelling noted
Limited range of motion of right knee

Assessment:

Medial Meniscal Tear, Knee Right

S/P Arthroscopic Meniscectomy

Plan:

Disability Grade of 10 is given

based on section 32 of the POEA
contract. Lower Extremities #20,
stretching leg of the ligaments of
a knee resulting in instability
of the joint. x x x12

Meanwhile, on 3 December 2010, one month before Dr. Alegre’s issuance of the final disability grading, Montierro filed with the labor arbiter a complaintfor recovery
of permanent disability compensation in the amount of USD89,000, USD2,100 as sickness allowance, plus moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.13
To support his claim for total permanent disability benefits, Montierro relied on a Medical Certificate dated 3 December 2010 issued by his physician of choice, Dr.
Manuel C. Jacinto, recommending total permanent disability grading, and explaining the former’s medical condition as follows:

Patient’s condition started at work when he accidentally fell from a ladder causing his (R) knee to be twisted. Patient’s symptoms of pain and limited flexion of (R)
knee persisted, thus he was assessed to be physically unfit to go back to work.14

LA AND NLRC RULINGS

In a Decision dated 29 June 2011, the LA held that Montierro was entitled to permanent total disability benefits under the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). The LA relied on the 120-day rule introduced by the 2005 case Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad.15 The rule equates
the inability of the seafarer to perform work for more than 120 days to permanent total disability, which entitles a seafarer to full disability benefits.16 The LA also
awarded one-month sickness allowance and attorney’s fees.

On 26 October 2011, Rickmers elevated the case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),17 which affirmed the Decision of the LA on 5 June 2012.
Rickmers filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the NLRC denied.18 This denial prompted Rickmers to file a Rule 65 Petition with the CA.19

CA RULING

On 8 August 2013, the CA rendered a Decision partially granting the Petition. It affirmed the NLRC ruling insofar as the latter awarded Montierro one-month sickness
allowance.20 The CA held, however, that he was entitled merely to "Grade 10" permanent partial disability benefits.21 It also dropped the award of attorney’s fees
granted to him earlier.22

In its Decision downgrading the claim of Montierro to "Grade 10" permanent partial disability benefits only, the CA ruled that his disability could not be deemed total
and permanent under the 240-day rule established by the 2008 case Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.23 Vergara extends the period to 240 days when,
within the first 120-day period (reckoned from the first day of treatment), a final assessment cannot be made because the seafarer requires further medical attention,
provided a declaration has been made to this effect.24
The CA pointed out that only 215 days had lapsed from the time of Montierro’s medical repatriation on 2 June 2010 until 3 January 2011, when the company-
designated physician issued a "Grade 10" final disability assessment. It justified the extension of the period to 240 days on the ground that Dr. Alegre issued an
interim disability grade of "10" on 3 September 2010, the 91st day of Montierro’s treatment, which was within the initial 120-day period.

Further, the CA upheld the jurisprudential rule that, in case of conflict, it is the recommendation issued by the company-designated physician that prevails over the
recommendation of the claimant’s physician of choice.

On the deletion of the award of attorney’s fees, the CA reasoned that there was no sufficient showing of bad faith in Rickmer’s persistence in the case other than an
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of its cause based on the recommendation of the company-designated physician.

RULE 45 PETITION

Hence, Montierro filed a Rule 45 Petition with this Court.1âwphi1 He contends in the main that he is entitled to full disability benefits. To support this thesis, he raises
two arguments.

First, Montierro insists that the 120-day rule laid down in the 2005 case Crystal Shipping, and not the 240-day rule introduced by the 2008 case Vergara, applies to
this case. Montierro cites the more recent cases Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., v. Tanawan,25 Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Mesina,26 and Valenzona v. Fair
Shipping Corp.,27 all of which applied the Crystal Shipping doctrine despite the fact that they were promulgated after Vergara.

Second, he claims that the medical assessment of his personal physician, to the effect that the former’s disability is permanent and total, should be accorded more
weight than that issued by the company-designated physician.28

Montierro also raises in his petition the issue of attorney’s fees, which he believes he is entitled to ashe was compelled to litigate.

ISSUES

The issues to be resolved are the following: (1) whether it is the 120-day rule or the 240-day rule that should apply to this case; (2) whether it is the opinion of the
company doctor or of the personal doctor of the seafarer that should prevail; and (3) whether Montierro is entitled to attorney’s fees.

OUR RULING

120 day rule vs. 240 day rule

The Court has already delineated the effectivity of the Crystal Shipping and Vergara rulings in the 2013 case Kestrel Shipping Co. Inc. v. Munar,29 by explaining as
follows:

Nonetheless, Vergarawas promulgated on October 6, 2008, or more than two (2) years from the time Munar filed his complaint and observance of the principle of
prospectivity dictates that Vergara should not operate to strip Munar of his cause of action for total and permanent disability that had already accrued as a result of
his continued inability to perform his customary work and the failure of the company-designated physician to issue a final assessment.

Thus, based on Kestrel, if the maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to 6 October 2008, the 120-day rule applies; if, on the other hand, the complaint was
filed from 6 October 2008 onwards, the 240-day rule applies.

In this case, Montierro filed his Complaint on 3 December 2010, which was after the promulgation of Vergara on 6 October 2008. Hence, it is the 240-day rule that
applies to this case, and not the 120-day rule.
Montierro cannot rely on the cases that he cited, a survey of which reveals that all of them involved Complaints filed before6 October 2008. Wallem Maritime
Services30 involved a Complaint for disability benefits filed on 26 November 1998. InMaersk Filipinas Crewing,31 while the Decision did not mention the date the
Complaint was filed, the LA’s Decision was rendered on 14 April 2008. Lastly, in Valenzona,32 the Complaint was filed sometime before 31 January 2003. It thus
comes as no surprise that the cases Montierro banks on followed the 120-day rule.

Applying the 240-day rule to thiscase, we arrive at the same conclusion reached by the CA. Montierro’s treatment by the company doctor began on 4 June 2010. It
ended on 3 January 2011, when the company doctor issued a "Grade 10" final disability assessment. Counting the days from 4 June 2010 to 3 January 2011, the
assessment by the company doctor was made on the 213th day, well within the 240-day period. The extension of the period to 240 daysis justified by the fact that
Dr. Alegre issued an interimdisability grade of "10"on 3 September 2010, the 91st day of Montierro’s treatment, which was within the 120-day period.

Thus, the CA correctly ruled thatMontierro’s condition cannot be deemed a permanent total disability.

Company doctor vs. personal doctor

Vergara also definitively settled the question how a conflict between two disability assessments —the assessment of the company-designated physician and that of
the seafarer’s chosen physician — should be resolved.33 In that case, the Court held that there is a procedure to be followed regarding the determination of liability
for work-related death, illness or injury in the case of overseas Filipino seafarers. The procedure is spelled out in the 2000 POEA-SEC,the execution of which is a
sine qua nonrequirement in deployments for overseas work.34

The procedure is as follows: when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness for work shall be determined by the
company-designated physician. The physician has 120 days, or 240 days, if validly extended, to make the assessment. If the physician appointed by the seafarer
disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated physician, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer,
whose decision shall be final and binding on them.35

Vergara ruled that the procedure in the 2000 POEA-SEC must be strictly followed; otherwise, if not availed of or followed strictly by the seafarer, the assessment of
the company-designated physician stands.36

In this case, Montierro and Rickmers are covered by the provisions of the same 2000 POEA-SEC. It is the law between them. Hence, they are bound by the
mechanism for determining liability for a disability benefits claim. Montierro, however, preempted the procedure when he filed on 3 December 2010 a Complaint for
permanent disability benefits based on his chosen physician’s assessment, which was made one month before the company-designated doctor issued the final
disability grading on 3 January 2011, the 213th day of Montierro’s treatment. Hence, for failure of Montierro to observe the procedure provided by the POEA-SEC,
the assessment of the company doctor should prevail.

Moreover, Rickmers exerted real efforts to provide Montierro with medical assistance. The company-designated physician monitored Montierro’s case from beginning
to end. Upon the former’s recommendation, Montierro even underwent arthroscopic partial medical meniscectomy of his right knee. The company-doctor likewise
gave him physical therapy. Lastly, he issued his certification on the basis of the medical records available and the results obtained.

Further, a juxtaposition of the two conflicting assessments reveals that the certification of Montierro’s doctorof choice pales in comparison with that of the company-
designated physician. Fitting is the following discussion of the CA:

To contest the company-designated physician's disability assessment of "Grade 10", Montierro relied on the total permanent disability assessment of his physician
of choice. In contrast to his physician's assessment embodied in a one-page medical certificate dated December 3, 2010 which did not even indicate any test or
procedure that may have been performed or conducted when he examined and determined Montierro's disability, however, the company-designated physician's
finding isentitled to greater weight and respect because it was arrived at after Montierro was regularly examined in coordination with other doctors, prescribed with
medications, and given physical therapy and rehabilitation sessions from June 4, 2010 until January 3, 2011. In the face of these well-defined facts, We find it only
reasonable, if not logical, to give credence to the company physician's finding rather than that of Montierro's physician of choice.

Having extensive personal knowledge of the seafarer's actual medical condition, and having closely, meticulously and regularly monitored and treated his injury for
an extended period, the company designated physician is certainly ina better position to give a more accurate evaluation of Montierro's health condition. The disability
grading given by him should therefore be given more weight than the assessment of Montierro's physician of choice.37

Attorney’s fees

On the premise that there was no showing of bad faith on the part of the employer, forcing Montierro to litigate, the CA dropped the award of attorney’s fees. We
arrive at the same conclusion by using another route.

Indeed, the general rule is that attorney's fees may not be awarded where there is no sufficient showing of bad faith in a party's persistence in a case other than an
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of one’s cause.38 The rule, however, takes a turn when it comes to labor cases.

The established rule in labor law is that the withholding of wages need not be coupled with malice or bad faith to warrant the grant of attorney’s fees under Article
111 of the Labor Code.39 All that is required is that lawful wages be not paid without justification, thus compelling the employee to litigate.40

The CA thus relied on a wrong consideration in resolving the issue of attorney’s fees. Be that as it may, Montierro is not entitled to attorney’s fees, even if we apply
the correct rule to this case. Montierro, as earlier mentioned, jumped the gun when he filed his complaint one month before the company-designated doctor issued
the final disability grading. Hence, there was no unlawful withholding of benefits to speak of. Precisely because Montierro was still under treatment and awaiting the
final assessment of the company-designated physician, the former’s act was premature.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The CA Decision dated 8 August 2013 and Resolution dated 6 January 2014 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100579 - June 6, 2001

LEANDRO P. GARCIA, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY GOVERNING BOARD, and
JOSEFEL P. GRAJEDA, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

The instant petition is one of the old cases recently re-raffled, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC, dated 27 February 2001, to the herein ponente. The case involves
a petition for review of the decision, dated 17 September 1990, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20384, entitled "Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), et
al., vs. Honorable Pedro Santiago, et al.," setting aside the orders, dated 29 June 1989 and 25 September 1989, of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City,
Branch 101, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2695 and the subsequent resolution of 16 May 1991 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On 18 October 1988, the PCA Governing Board (the "Board" for brevity) passed Resolution No. 109-88, creating an "Investigation Committee" which would look into
the complaint made by one Antonio Pua against petitioner, then administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority, for supposed irregularities committed by him. On
07 February 1989, the Board passed its Resolution No. 011-89, amending Resolution No. 109-88, that changed the composition of the members of the Investigation
Committee.1 On 14 February 1989, further changes were made on the composition of the Investigation Committee.2

On 28 February 1989, the Investigation Committee, after conducting formal hearings on the charges against petitioner by complainant Antonio Pua, submitted its
findings which, among other things, stated thusly:
"After a cursory perusal of the records on hand and the testimonies of all aforenamed witnesses, this Board finds:

"1. A prima facie case against respondent Garcia with respect to the first issue. Complainant Pua presented the original copy of the certification dated July 24, 1987
in favor of Westmont, the genuineness and due execution of which respondent does not dispute as in fact said document is being adopted as part of his defense.
Photocopy of the same is hereto attached and made a part hereof as Annex `A'. Director Joaquin Roces likewise presented to the Committee a photocopy of another
certification also dated July 24, 1987 in favor of Westmont which, as testified to under oath, he secured from the Board of Foreign Trade. Director Roces further
testified that he actually saw the original of this latter document at the Board of Foreign Trade in Taiwan on 21 February 1989 - the day he had this photocopied; that
this was the very document his Office authenticated on 17 August 1987; that he is certain that what he saw was the original copy of the authenticated certificate
taking into account the signature of respondent Garcia (of which he is familiar) affixed therein in blue ink, the seal on the left bottom portion, the heading of PCA with
the distinct color of yellow. Photocopy of the document is hereto attached as part hereof and marked as Annex `B'.

"2. A prima facie case against respondent Garcia as regards the second issue in view of the categorical testimony of Mr. Jesus Cabalza that he (Cabalza) and
Director Rodriguez met only on July 27, 1987 or thereafter - thereby negating the claim of respondent Garcia that it was Director Rodriguez who designated I.Q. as
importer on suggestion of Mr. Cabalza when the two allegedly met in his (Garcia) office on 24 July 1987 - the day the certification in favor of Westmont was first
issued.

"x x x - x x x - x x x

"In view of the foregoing, this Committee recommends:

"1. That formal charges be filed against Administrator Leandro Garcia for dishonesty, falsification of official document, grave misconduct and violation of RA 3019,
Sec. 3e, f and j.

"2. That respondent Garcia be placed under preventive suspension upon the filing of the formal charge until such time that the case shall have been terminated and
a decision on the case has become final and executory."3

On 01 March 1989, the PCA, through its then Acting Board Chairman, Apolonio B. Bautista, filed an administrative complaint, docketed Special PCA Administrative
Case No. 01-89, against herein petitioner Leandro P. Garcia for dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct and violation of Republic Act No.
3019 in connection with his grant of export quota for "fresh young coconuts" or "buko."

The Board, pursuant to its Resolution No. 021-89 of 28 February 1989, placed petitioner under preventive suspension effective upon receipt, or on 06 March 1989,
of notice thereof.

On 08 March 1989, petitioner, through counsel, requested a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes of the preliminary
investigation within which to file his answer. On 30 March 1989, petitioner, through counsel, again requested a further extension of thirty (30) days within which to
submit his answer. Both requests for extension were granted; the grant, however, of the second request carried the caveat that no further extension would be given.

On 20 April 1989, the Investigation Committee scheduled hearings on the administrative case for 04, 05, 09, 10, 17, 18, 26 May and 01 and 02 June 1989. Petitioner
was duly notified of these settings. On 03 May 1989, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Narciso Tadeo, requested a resetting of the hearings on the ground that he was not
available. On the same date, however, he submitted petitioner's answer. The Investigation Committee granted Atty. Tadeo's request for postponement, and it reset
the hearings to 09, 15, 18, 19, 26 May, then 05 and 06 June 1989.

On 09 May 1989, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared. The Investigation Committee received, instead, a letter from petitioner's counsel, through one Asteria
Felicen, informing the committee that Atty. Tadeo was physically indisposed and could not attend that day's hearing. At the scheduled hearing on 15 May 1989, Atty.
Tadeo appeared without petitioner. Again, he moved for the deferment of the proceedings pending resolution of a motion, which he meanwhile filed, requesting the
Board to create a new investigating committee to hear his case. The request was denied. Atty. Tadeo forthwith left and did not participate in the day's scheduled
hearing. Similarly, at the scheduled hearings on 18 May 1989 and subsequent dates, neither petitioner nor counsel appeared despite notice.

On 30 May 1989, the Board issued Resolution No. 046-89, the dispositive portions of which read:

"RESOLVED, that consistent with the pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 807, the recommendation of the Board Investigation Committee that the period
of delay in the disposition of the case resulting from the petitions/requests for extension of time, postponement/cancellation of the scheduled hearings and related
requests filed by the counsel of respondent Administrator Leandro P. Garcia, shall not be counted in computing the period of preventive suspension, be and is hereby
approved;

"RESOLVED FURTHER, that Administrator Leandro P. Garcia who is under preventive suspension, shall be advised that his re-assumption of office as Administrator
of PCA shall require prior notice of reinstatement as may be issued by the Governing Board."4

On 07 June 1989, following receipt of the above resolution, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, docketed Civil Case No. Q-89-2625, wherein petitioner sought to enjoin -

(a) Public respondent Josefel P. Grajeda and his committee from proceeding with the hearing of the administrative charges against him;

(b) The Board and all persons acting in its behalf from implementing its Resolution No. 046-89; and

(c) The Board and persons acting in its behalf to defer its action/decision on the charges against petitioner pending hearing on the merits of his petition.

On 09 June 1989, the trial court issued a status quo order enjoining the Board and all persons acting in its behalf from "implementing its Resolution No. 046-89
extending petitioner's preventive suspension."

On 29 June 1989, after respondents had submitted their opposition and after a hearing on the incidents relative to petitioner's petition, the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the PCA Governing Board from implementing its Resolution No. 046-89.

"The decisive question therefore is whether the postponements sought by petitioner before the PCA Board is devoid of merit and merely intended to delay the
proceedings before that body. This question hinges around the provisions of PD No. 807, Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42, which states that:

"x x x - x x x - x x x

"The ultimate justice springs from the heart and mind of a judge. It is he who determines from conflicting evidence what are the facts of a case; what and how the
laws are to be interpreted and applied. Thus, it can not be lightly brushed aside that when a party raises the question of impartiality of a judge, as in this case the
investigating committee headed by respondent Josefel P. Grajeda, that it only unduly and unnecessarily delays a case.

"Moreover, for the petitioner to continue being suspended after the reglementary 90-day suspension would tantamount to already penalizing him even when the
charges against him are yet being heard. The constitutional mandate and statutory juris tantum is that a person is presumed innocent until his guilt is proved."5

Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion, dated 04 July 1989, praying for the creation of a new investigating committee and that, pending resolution thereof, the
Investigation Committee be prevented from conducting further proceedings.

On 14 July 1989, the trial court issued an order to the following effect:

"After an exhaustive discussion on petitioner's prayer for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order, the Court, in respect to the Investigating Committee
of the PCA, will not grant the same but rather evidence of petitioner will be received on whether a temporary restraining order shall issue.
"By agreement, the reception of such evidence on the incident is scheduled on July 20, 1989, at 8:30 A.M. Parties are notified of this order in open Court."6

At the scheduled hearing on 20 July 1989, petitioner submitted various documents in support of his motion. PCA and Josefel P. Grageda submitted their comment
thereon on 25 July 1989.

On 26 July 1989, the trial court issued an order enjoining the Investigation Committee from further conducting investigation "within a period of twenty (20) days from
receipt (of the order) and until (after) respondents (would have been) heard," and setting the reception of respondents' evidence on 03 August 1989 at 8:30 in the
morning.

On 08 August 1989, respondents filed their Submission of Evidence (With Ex-parte Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order).

On 21 August 1989, the Grageda Investigation Committee submitted to the Board its resolution finding petitioner guilty as charged and so recommended the penalty
of forced resignation. Acting thereon, on 25 August 1989, the Board passed Resolution No. 070-89, adopting and approving the Committee's recommendation and
imposing, effective 31 August 1989, the penalty of forced resignation on petitioner.

On 28 August 1989, petitioner filed a supplemental petition with the trial court praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to stop the Board from implementing
Resolution No. 070-89 and, after hearing on the merits, to annul the resolution of the Investigation Committee of 21 August 1989, as well as PCA Board Resolution
No. 070-89, and to order the Board to create a new investigating body to hear the formal charges against him.

Respondents filed their comment on the supplemental petition on 02 September 1989.

On 11 September 1989, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order stopping respondent Board from implementing its resolution of 21 August 1989 for a
period of twenty (20) days from receipt thereof until the question of whether or not the issue of petitioner's alleged deprivation of due process would have been
resolved. The same order set the reception of respondents' evidence on 19 September 1989. At the scheduled hearing on 19 September 1989, respondents sought
a reconsideration of the court order, on the ground, among other things, that the resolution sought to be enjoined had, in fact, been already implemented.

On 25 September 1989, the trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the PCA Governing Board from enforcing
its Resolution No. 070-89. The Board moved for a reconsideration of the order, as well as the writ of preliminary injunction of 02 October 1989, which the trial court
denied in its order of 14 December 1989.

Respondents elevated the aforesaid orders to this Court via a petition, docketed G.R. No. 92435, for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order. In its
resolution of 27 March 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of the trial court's questioned orders and referred the case
to respondent Court of Appeals, therein docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 20384, for proper disposition.

On 17 September 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision, its dispositive portion reading -

"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and the assailed Orders of June 29, 1989 and September 25, 1989 granting the writ of preliminary injunction in favor
of respondent Garcia are hereby SET ASIDE."7

Petitioner moved for reconsideration; the appellate court denied the motion in its resolution of 16 May 1991.

Hence, the instant petition, petitioner submitting that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors, viz:

"1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT RTC JUDGE PEDRO SANTIAGO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY HIS
ISSUANCE OF THE QUESTIONED ORDERS;
"2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING RESPONDENT PCA'S VIOLATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS;

"3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING RESPONDENT PCA'S PATENT ILLEGAL ACTS AS EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES."8

The petition is not meritorious. Particularly, the Court finds no cogent reason for deviating from the rule on the primacy of administrative jurisdiction.

The records would show that petitioner filed the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with the trial court even while the administrative investigation was
yet ongoing. Petitioner's immediate recourse to the trial court was premature and precipitate. From the decision of the PCA Board, once rendered, an administrative
remedy of appeal to the Civil Service Commission would still be available to him.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action, cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies would have
first been exhausted. The doctrine does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve, or interfere in, a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
lodged initially with an administrative body, like the PCA Board and its Investigation Committee, of special competence.9 The rule is an element of petitioner's right
of action, and it is too significant a mandate to be just waylaid by the courts.

The Court seconds the appellate court in its observation that the trial court, indeed, gravely abused its discretion in issuing its assailed orders. Thus:

"The records show that on July 26, 1989, the court issued a temporary restraining order restraining Grajeda and his committee from further conducting an investigation
of the petitioner. The temporary restraining order was good for 20 days. On August 21, 1989, respondent Grajeda and his committee finalized their resolution in
Special Case No. 01-89, finding petitioner guilty of the charges filed against him; the committee's recommendation was approved by the Board on August 25, 1989.
The petitioner sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin the respondents from implementing the said Board Resolution, which was granted by the court in its
order dated September 11, 1989, which also set for September 19, 1989, the reception of respondents' evidence or explanation why a preliminary injunction should
not issue. The court directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in its order dated September 25, 1989, wherein respondent judge stated:

"`The question before this Court is whether due process was violated by respondents in the course of arriving at their resolution. The power of the Court on this
question is explicit in Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution that, `Judicial power includes whether or not these has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.'

`The factual synopsis of the incidents are: On July 26, 1989 the Court issued a TRO, `restraining the respondent Josefel P. Grajeda and his Investigating Committee
from further conducting an investigation of herein petitioner within 20 days from receipt hereof'. Respondents received this Order on July 25, 1989. The evidence of
the respondents was scheduled for reception on August 3, 1989.

`On August 3, 1989, respondents manifested that their evidence are documentary and they were given until August 7, 1989 to submit the same and petitioner was
given until August 11, 1989 to submit his comment as the 20-day TRO would expire on September 18, 1989. Respondents submitted their documentary exhibits on
August 8, 1989 and mailed the same to petitioner. What with the mail service, petitioner received respondents' evidence only on August 21, 1989. There was no
more time for the petitioner to comment; there was also no more time for the Court to resolve and worse, the TRO already expired on September 18, 1989.

`It was within these interregnum periods when the above incident was pending before this Court that respondent Grajeda and his Investigating Committee issued on
August 21, 1989 their resolution finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty, etc. and imposing a penalty of Forced Resignation and the respondent PCA Board approved
said resolution on August 25, 1989. This is now the subject of petitioner's supplemental Petition.

`There is much to be asked on the question of due process of law on the proceedings in the investigation conducted by respondent. WAS THE PETITIONER
ACCORDED HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS WITNESSES; WAS HE ABLE TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE?
`These were not answered by the respondent. Instead, they claim that their resolution has already been implemented. The resolution seemed to be hurriedly arrived
at. It was done at a time when the case was still before the Court. Respondents' claim that their resolution was already implemented cannot defeat the paramount
constitutional mandate that due process should be accorded the petitioner.'

"We agree with the Solicitor-General that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued a writ of
preliminary injunction on September 25, 1989 despite the fact that the temporary restraining order dated July 26, 1989 bearing on the same subject matter had long
become functus oficio.

"The temporary restraining order issued on July 26, 1989, which enjoined the petitioners from proceeding with the administrative case involving private respondent,
had a limited life of twenty days (Section 5, BP Blg. 224) and automatically expired on August 15, 1989, not September 18, 1989, as found by the respondent judge.
When the Grajeda committee submitted their Resolution to the Board on August 21, 1989, and the Board approved the same in its Resolution No. 0070-89, dated
August 25, 1989, there was no longer any legal restraint from proceeding with the investigation. Accordingly, the allegation of [respondent] Garcia that the
investigating Committee committed grave abuse of discretion in finalizing and submitting its resolution to the PCA Board while the court's resolution on the prayer
for preliminary injunction against the said Committee was pending is without merit. To say that the Committee and the Board cannot act despite the lapse of the
restraining order and before the preliminary injunction is heard and granted, is to extend the life of the temporary restraining order beyond its statutory life.

"The respondent court admits that the merits of the questioned Resolutions of August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989 are not in issue, as `the question is within the
ambit of respondents' authority and if petitioner is not in accord therewith, his proper recourse is an appeal before the Civil Service'."10

This Court has also said in a number of cases11 that -

"When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the government, but nevertheless, a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same,
the judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on convenience but likewise on respect: convenience of the party litigants
and respect for a coequal office in the government. If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made
to (the) courts."12

Petitioner would insist that the Grageda Investigation Committee defied the restraining order ("TRO") issued by the trial court when it submitted to the Board on 21
August 1989 its resolution finding petitioner guilty of the administrative charges and recommending the penalty of forced resignation, later adopted and approved by
the Board in its Resolution No. 070-89 on 25 August 1989. There was no such defiance. The trial court issued the TRO on 26 July 1989, and it became functus oficio
after 15 August 1989. Thus, when the Grageda Investigation Committee submitted its recommendation to the Board on 21 August 1989, which the latter adopted
and approved on 25 August 1989 in its Resolution No. 070-89, respondents were no longer under any legal restraint.

The second issue of alleged violation by the PCA of administrative due process must also be dealt with against petitioner. The factual scenario of the case, heretofore
narrated, would indicate that petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to submit his case at the administrative level. He filed an answer to the administrative
complaint and his refusal to attend the scheduled hearings, despite due notice, was at his own peril. The essence of due process to him was that opportunity to be
heard.13

The Court quotes with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals, rejecting petitioner's claim of denial of due process, viz:

"Exhibits `9' and `10' in particular will show that the committee reluctantly granted Garcia's requests for postponement in view of his `right to due process and in the
interest of substantial justice'. There is no question that petitioner was accorded the right to confront his witnesses; and that he was able to present his defense.
Respondent Garcia actually filed his answer but he refused to attend the scheduled hearings on the case despite due notice when the Grajeda Committee refused
his request for the creation of a new committee that would hear his case. As enunciated in Tajonera vs. Lamaroza (110 SCRA 438), what due process abhors is the
absolute lack of an opportunity to be heard, a vice We cannot impute to the proceedings before the Committee. Respondent was given full opportunity to be heard
on his defense, and his failure to appear before the committee was due to his own desistance."14
Petitioner imputes violation by the PCA of administrative due process for having conducted a hearing to determine a "prima facie case" against him when no such
hearing is required. The proceedings, he asseverates, reflects PCA's departure from the administrative procedures set forth in Section 38, paragraph (b) of P.D.
807, which provides:

"SEC. 38. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. - (a) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate
officer or employee by the head of department or office of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn,
written complaint of any other persons.

"(b) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit sworn statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together
with his documentary evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima
facie case exists, he shall notify the respondent in writing, of the charges against the latter, to which shall be attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements and
other documents submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing
under oath, together with supporting sworn statements and documents, in which he shall indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not
considered satisfactory. If the answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case."

Petitioner's stance is patently bereft of merit. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the conduct of a formal hearing or investigation to ascertain whether or not
a "prima facie case indeed exists to warrant the filing of a formal administrative charges."

Nor could petitioner rightly claim that the Investigation Committee was biased against him. It should be noted that the composition of the Investigation Committee
was repeatedly changed, per PCA Board Resolution No. 039-89, No. 109-88, No. 011-89 and No. 017-89, all because of petitioner's claim of partiality. The PCA
demonstrated its objectivity in proceeding with the investigation by accommodating petitioner to the fullest. An endless request for the recomposition of the Committee
would be to unduly prolong the investigation and the PCA should not be faulted when it finally denied the subsequent like requests of petitioner.

Parenthetically, evidence submitted by respondents consisted almost exclusively of documentary evidence, the authenticity of which had not been questioned by
petitioner before the trial court or before the Court of Appeals, nor even at this stage of the proceedings.

Petitioner, lastly, would fault the Court of Appeals for not viewing the instant case as an exception from the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

As already foretold, the conduct of administrative disciplinary cases are outlined in the Civil Service Law or P.D. 807 vesting it in the heads of agencies subject to
appeal to the Civil Service Commission under the circumstances outlined in the law. The Court is in complete agreement in its observation that -

"x x x. There is no question that the petitioner Committee and PCA Board acted in the exercise of their jurisdiction in conducting the administrative investigation of
private respondent Garcia. Under Civil Service Law and Rules exclusive original jurisdiction is lodged in the administrative agency, and appeal is available to the
Commission on Civil Service. The rule is that where a law has delineated the procedure by which administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the same
should be followed before recourse to judicial action can be initiated (Pascual vs. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 and several other cases). While there are recognized
exceptions to this rule (Cortes, Philippine Administrative Law, pp. 394-395), We find none of the reasons for excepting this case from the rule."15

In MPSTA vs. Laguio, Jr.,16 this Court has laid down the proper recourse in cases of this nature; thus:

"x x x. The petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings but, on the contrary, to take part, assert and vindicate their rights therein,
see those proceedings through to judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal to the Civil Service Commission."17

PCA Board Resolution No. 046-89 has expressed that "the period of delay in the disposition of the case, resulting from petitioner's requests for extension of time,
postponement/cancellation of the scheduled hearings and related requests filed by counsel of respondent Administrator Leandro P. Garcia, shall not be counted in
computing the period of preventive suspension." This holding accords with the provisions of Section 42 of P.D. 807; thus:
"SEC. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive
suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a
presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided."

In the case at bar, petitioner cannot deny that he has been able to effectively, if not deliberately, delayed the resolution of the administrative case against him due to
his repeated requests for extension of time to file answer and his inexcusable refusal to attend the scheduled hearings thereon despite due notice. Petitioner's
invocation that his failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be EXCEPTED by the fact that irreparable damage would ensue upon his overdue suspension
and illegal ouster from office cannot thus be countenanced.

The observance of the mandate regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is a sound practice and policy which should not be ignored. The doctrine insures
an orderly procedure and withholds judicial interference until the administrative process would have been allowed to duly run its course. Even comity dictates that
unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and appropriate authorities given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum, judicial recourse must be held to be inappropriate and impermissible.18

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 17 September 1990 and its resolution of 16 May 1991 are
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 211882, July 29, 2015

ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILS., INC., ENTERPRISE SHIPPING AGENCY SRL AND/OR EVANGELINE RACHO, Petitioners, v. ERNESTO S. QUIOGUE,
JR., Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the July 5, 2013 Decision1 and the March 25, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 125064, which affirmed the February 16, 2012 and March 30, 2012 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), in LAC No. 01-000014-12, a case where the certification of the company-designated physician on the claimed disability of the seafarer was issued beyond
the 120-day period.

The Facts:

Respondent Ernesto S. Quiogue Jr. (Quiogue) was hired by Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., for and on behalf of its principal Enterprise Shipping Agency
SRL (petitioners), to work as Able Bodied Seaman on board the vessel MT Filicudi M with a basic salary of US$363.00. The employment contract was governed by
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) and the International Transport Workers Federation Total Crew
Cost Collective Bargaining Agreement (ITF TCC CBA), providing for higher benefits in the event of disability or death of a worker.

On November 11, 2010, while Quiogue was on duty transferring the fire wire, his co-worker accidentally dropped it on his left foot. He was immediately given first
aid and thereafter sent to a hospital in Tarragona, Spain. The x-ray examination on his injured foot showed that one of his metatarsal bones was fractured. On
November 19, 2010, as his injury prevented him from performing his duties on board, he was repatriated and immediately referred to the Metropolitan Medical Center
where he was diagnosed to have sustained "non-displaced Fracture of the Cuneiform Bone, Left Foot."
Quiogue underwent treatment and therapy with the company-designated physician from November 2010 to April 2011. On April 13, 2011, he was certified as "fit to
work" by the company-designated physician. Notwithstanding the treatment procedures, Quiogue continued to feel pain and discomfort. Consequently, he sought a
second opinion from Dr. Nicanor Escutin (Dr. Escutin), an orthopedic surgeon. After a battery of tests, the latter concluded that the extent of his injury rendered him
permanently and totally incapable to perform his work as a seafarer. The medical certificate issued by Dr. Escutin reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"FINAL DIAGNOSIS:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

- FRACTURE, CUNEIFORM, LEFT FOOT

- TRAUMATIC ARTHRITIS, LEFT FOOT

He is given a PERMANENT DISABILITY. He is UNFIT FOR SEADUTY in whatever capacity as a SEAMAN."3

Quiogue sought compensation based on total permanent disability from petitioners, but the latter refused, insisting that he was not entitled to total permanent disability
benefits because he was declared as fit to work by the company-designated physician. This prompted Quiogue to file a complaint before the NLRC.

On September 26, 2011, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in Quiogue's favor on the ground that his left foot injury affected his dexterity and flexibility in walking and
enduring weights. This became a liability to Quiogue's employment as he could no longer endure the manual and laborious work required of him as a seafarer. The
dispositive portion of the LA decision4 reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents, jointly and severally, to pay complainant the amount of USD89,000.00
representing his permanent and total disability benefit in accordance with the existing CBA and 10% of this total award as attorney's fees.

Other claims are hereby denied for want of sufficient evidence hereof.

SO ORDERED.5
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the above decision and later denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.6 According to the NLRC, a seafarer was not
precluded from engaging the services of the physician of his own choice as it was clear from Section 20 B (3)7 of the POEA-SEC. In work-related injury or illness
during the term of the contract of a seafarer, the concerned seafarer was required to have himself examined by the company-designated physician for purposes of
confirmatory medical evaluation to determine the gravity of the illness and injuries. Nonetheless, the NLRC stated that it was the competence of the attending
physician, not the designation, which determined the true health status of the patient-seafarer and what was needed for the purpose of the grant of compensation.
In situations where the certification of the company-designated physician would clash with the findings of the doctors of the seafarer, it would be the findings favorable
to the complainant that must be adopted. Moreover, from the time that Quiogue had been injured until the time that he was allegedly certified to be fit to work by the
company-designated physician on April 13, 2011, more or less five (5) months had already transpired. His disability was already considered permanent and total in
accordance with the ruling in Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. v. Bastol.8redarclaw

In their petition for certiorari with the CA, petitioners insisted that Quiogue was not entitled to receive permanent and total disability benefits because he was assessed
as "fit to work" by the company-designated physician, whose evaluation was more accurate for having treated him for almost five (5) months. Petitioners claimed
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it gave greater weight to the diagnosis of Dr. Escutin than to that of the company-designated physician
who was in a better position to determine Quiogue's physical fitness. They also pointed out that the NLRC should not have awarded attorney's fees in favor of
Quiogue as its basis was not discussed in the LA decision.

For his part, Quiogue insisted that he was entitled to permanent and total disability benefits since he was not able to pursue his usual work and earn therefrom for
more than 120 days.

In its Reply, petitioners informed the CA that Quiogue had previously filed a complaint where he was also claiming permanent disability benefits against his previous
employer for injuries he sustained when he accidentally slipped from the vessel's stairway while on duty. The favorable findings of the labor tribunal pertaining to his
entitlement to permanent disability benefits were affirmed by the CA, thus, showing Quiogue's propensity to make legal processes a money-making venture.

In the assailed decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC that Quiogue was entitled to permanent and total disability benefits but deleted the award of attorney's
fees. It held that notwithstanding the company-designated physician's assessment private respondent is already fit to work, his disability is considered permanent
and total because he was only certified fit to work after the lapse of more than 120 days from the time he was repatriated on November 19, 2010.9 Further, the fact
the Quiogue had already received permanent disability benefits from his former employer for an injury he had sustained in the past did not nullify his claim against
his succeeding employers. The CA disposed the case as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The judgment of the NLRC in LAC NO. 01-000014-12 sustaining the decision of the Labor
Arbiter is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of attorney's fees is hereby DELETED for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis.

SO ORDERED.10
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed this petition for review, presenting the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
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ARGUMENTS

1] Quiogue had previously filed a claim for total and permanent disability benefits for which he was found to be suffering from permanent disability.

2] The fact that Quiogue was awarded permanent total disability benefits in the amount of US$150,000.00 plus attorney's fees of US$15,000.00 in 2007 must bar
the claim for disability benefits against petitioners.

3] Dr. Escutin's disability report cannot prevail over the company-designated physician's findings, absent any showing that the declaration of fitness to work was
tainted with fraud or irregularity. The ruling in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.,11 shows that more weight should be given to the assessment made by
company doctors because they were the ones who attended and treated the seafarer throughout his illness than to the findings by those who had merely examined
him upon recovery and only for the purpose of determining the degree of disability. While the seafarer is entitled to seek second or third opinion from his private
doctors, this does not automatically set aside the findings of the company-designated physician.

4] It is of no moment that petitioners never objected to Quiogue's pre-employment medical examination (PEME), declaring him fit to work. A PEME is not exploratory
in nature. It is not indicative of a seafarer's complete and whole medical condition.

5] The award of total and permanent disability benefits to Quiogue would have the effect of establishing a dangerous precedent.

6] Quiogue is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits on the pretext that his medical treatment lasted for more than 120 days or he was unable to return
to seafaring duties for the same period.
In his Comment,12 Quiogue countered that his previous receipt of disability compensation from his former employer was irrelevant to his present claim for permanent
disability benefits against petitioners. He argued that the two claims for total and permanent disability came from different employment contracts which were years
apart and not simultaneous. Also, the injuries were different and it was plain bad luck that he was injured in both employment contracts. He posited that under the
POEA-SEC, the seafarer may object to the company-designated physician's assessment by securing a second opinion from a doctor of his choice. Thus, the
company-designated physician's declaration of fitness, despite recurring pains in his left injured foot, could not be considered as absolute determination of his health
condition. Dr. Escutin's assessment of permanent total disability as he was already incapable to perform his work as seaman due to his injury deserved full credence.

Quiogue further asserted that there was no basis for petitioners' allegation that the permanent disability claim of Quiogue was only due to his inability to work for 120
days. He claimed that he suffered permanent disability due to a work-related injury which prevented him from returning to his sea duties until the present time.
According to him, it was not the period that was being compensated but the fact that he was rendered incapable to work due to disability. Thus, the fear of petitioners
that the Court, in affirming the award of disability compensation to Quiogue, would set a dangerous precedent should not be given any credence.
In their Reply,13 petitioners reiterated their arguments and prayer that the petition be given due course and that the assailed decision and resolution of the CA be
reversed and set aside.

It should be noted that the LA found that Quiogue's left foot injury had rendered him incapable to return to his seafaring occupation, hence, entitled him to permanent
total disability as substantiated by the assessment of Dr. Escutin. Such finding was affirmed by the NLRC which regarded Quiogue's disability as permanent and
total due to his inability to perform his job for more than 120 days. In sustaining the award of permanent and total disability benefits to Quiogue, the CA
ratiocinated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Quitoriano v. Jebsens Maritime, Inc. (624 Phil. 523 [2010]), the High Court held that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers, xxx

xxxx

There are three kinds of disability benefits under the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 626: (1) temporary total disability, (2) permanent total disability, and (3)
permanent partial disability. Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code differentiates the disabilities as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 2. Disability, xxx

(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period
exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.

xxxx
In Vicente v. ECC (G.R. No. 85024, January 23, 1991, 193 SCRA 190, 195):
xxx the test of whether or not an employee suffers from 'permanent total disability' is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work
notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to perform his customary job for more
than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in more detailed manner, describes
what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from 'permanent total disability' regardless of whether or not he loses the
use of any part of his body.

xxxx
In Quitoriano, the Supreme Court held that the disability of petitioner therein is considered permanent and total by reason of the fact that it was only after more than
five months from the time petitioner therein was medically repatriated that the "fit to work" certification was issued by the company-designated physician. This ruling
finds application in the present case. Herein private respondent had medical treatment and physical therapy under the company designated physician from the time
he was repatriated on November 19, 2010 but it was only on April 13, 2011 or after a period of 145 days that the company physician declared him fit to work. Hence,
similar with the pronouncement in Quitoriano, the disability of herein private respondent should be considered permanent and total since the "fit to work" certification
was issued by the company physician only on April 13, 2011 or more than 120 days after he was repatriated in the Philippines on November 19, 2010.14
The Court's Ruling

The 120/240-day medical treatment or assessment period of permanent and total disability claims of seafarers

The law that defines permanent and total disability of laborers would be Article 192(c)(l) of the Labor Code, which provides that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 192. Permanent Total Disability, xxx

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules;
On the other hand, the rule referred to - Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which implemented Book IV of the Labor Code
(IRR) - states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 2. Period of entitlement. - (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid
longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of
disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at anytime after 120
days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or m ental functions as determined by the
System.
The 120-day rule under the Labor Code on permanent and total disability of seafarers was initially discussed in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad15 (Crystal
Shipping). It was stated therein that "permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses
the use of any part of his body. As gleaned from the records, respondent was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the least, or more than
120 days, due to his medical treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was permanent."16redarclaw

Consequently, Crystal Shipping was cited by litigant-seafarers to claim permanent and total disability due to the mere fact that they were not able to work for 120
days.17 The ruling in Crystal Shipping was, however, modified by Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. (Vergara).18redarclaw

Vergara was the first case that harmonized Section 20 of POEA-SEC,19 Article 192(c)(l) of the Labor Code, and Rule X, Section 2 of the IRR. In the said case, it
was written:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
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As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for
diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to
work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent,
either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period
is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up
to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman
may of course also be declared fit to work at any time if such declaration is justified by his medical condition.20redarclaw

[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

Thus, in Vergara, the Court clarified that even though the 120-day period for medical evaluation was exceeded, the seafarers could not automatically claim permanent
and total disability because it was possible to extend the evaluation or treatment period to 240 days.

Cases of medical treatment exceeding 240 days

Following Vergara, the Court ruled in subsequent cases that if the medical treatment exceeded 240 days, then the seafarer should receive permanent and total
disability benefits. In Philasia Shipping Agency v. Tomacruz,21 the seafarer was granted permanent and total disability benefits. "[F]rom the time Tomacruz (seafarer)
was repatriated on November 18, 2002, he submitted himself to the care and treatment of the company-designated physician. When the company-designated
physician made a declaration on July 25, 2003 that Tomacruz was already fit to work, 249 days had already lapsed from the time he was repatriated."22redarclaw

Likewise, in Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Lobusta,23 the seafarer was granted permanent and total disability benefits because the medical treatment lasted for
more than 240 days. The seafarer therein was examined by the company-designated physician on May 22, 1998. On February 16, 1999, however, the seafarer was
still prescribed medications for his lumbosacral pain and was advised to return for reevaluation. From May 22, 1998 to February 16, 1999, 264 days elapsed or 6
days short of 9 months.

Thus, it is a well-settled rule that if the medical treatment or evaluation exceeds 240 days, the seafarer is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. The
doctrine recognizes that, in awarding disability benefits to the seaman, disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning
capacity.24redarclaw

The rules on permanent and total disability of seafarers, however, becomes confusing when the medical treatment or assessment of the company-designated
physician exceeds 120 days but not 240 days. Citing the Vergara case, some decisions declared that the seafarer could not claim such benefits, while others held
that the seafarer was entitled to the said benefits.

Medical treatment exceeded 120 days but not 240 days; no entitlement to permanent and total disability benefits

Millan v. Wallem Maritime Services, Inc.25 held that the seafarer was not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits despite the lapse of the 120-day period.
In the said case, from the time the seafarer was repatriated, 129 days had lapsed when he last consulted with the company-designated physician. Concededly, the
said period already exceeded the 120-day period under Section 20(B) of the POEA-SEC and Article 192 of the Labor Code. It cannot be denied, however, that the
company-designated physician had determined that the petitioner's condition required further medical treatment in the form of physical therapy sessions, which he
had subsequently completed, thus, justifying the extension of the 120-day period to 240 days.

In Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. NLRC,26 the company-designated physician issued her last progress report after 197 days from the seafarer's date of
repatriation. Hence, the seafarer was legally under temporary total disability, since the 240-day period had not yet lapsed. There was no assessment yet because
the seafarer was still undergoing treatment and evaluation by the company doctors, especially the orthopedic surgeon, within the 240-day maximum period. The
seafarer was supposed to see the orthopedic surgeon for re-evaluation, but he did not honor the appointment. Thus, the permanent and total disability benefits being
sought were denied.

Likewise in Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Simbajon,27 the seafarer's claim of permanent and total disability was not upheld. A finding by the company-designated
doctor that the seafarer would need further treatment beyond the initial 120-day period resulted in the extension of the period for the declaration of the existence of
a permanent partial or total disability to 240 days. Thus, contrary to the seafarer's claim in the said case, his inability to resume work after the lapse of more than
120 days from the time he suffered his illness did not by itself automatically entitle him to permanent and total disability benefits.

In that case, the seafarer's consultation with the company-designated doctors revealed that his DM Type II was asymptomatic. Because of this finding, the company-
designated doctors had to conduct further treatments and prescribe his continuous medication before finally concluding that he was fit to return to work after 172
days from his disembarkation. The period was 68 days short of the 240 days provided in Vergara. Within this period, the company-designated doctor could continue
to treat the employee or conduct an observation period, before the Vergara deadline was reached.

In Dalusong v. Eagle Clark Shipping,28 the Court said that "[j]ust because the seafarer is unable to perform his job and is undergoing medical treatment for more
than 120 days does not automatically entitle the seafarer to total and permanent disability compensation."29 In that case, the seafarer's medical treatment lasted
more than 120 days but less than 240 days, after which the company-designated doctor gave him a Grade 11 - final disability grading.

Recently, in INC Shipmanagement, Incorporated v. Rosales30 (INC Shipmanagement), the Court held that it was the doctor's findings which should prevail over the
simple lapse of the 120-day period. It added that the extent of a seafarer's disability was determined, not by the number of days that he could not work, but by the
disability grading the doctor recognized based on his resulting incapacity to work and earn his wages. Further, the Court stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is the doctor's findings that should prevail as he/she is equipped with the proper discernment, knowledge, experience and expertise on what constitutes total or
partial disability. His declaration serves as the basis for the degree of disability that can range anywhere from Grade 1 to Grade 14. Notably, this is a serious
consideration that cannot be determined by simply counting the number of treatment lapsed days.

In light of these distinctions, to confuse the concepts of permanent and total disability is to trigger a situation where disability would be determined by simply counting
the duration of the seafarer's illness. This system would inevitably induce the unscrupulous to delay treatment for more than one hundred twenty (120) days to avail
of the more favorable award of permanent total disability benefits.31
Medical treatment exceeded 120 days but not 240 days; Seafarers entitled to total disability benefits

In APQ Shipmanagement v. Caseñas,32 the Court granted total and permanent disability benefits to a seafarer when the medical diagnosis and treatment exceeded
120 days, but not 240 days. The Court held:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx From the time of Caseñas' diagnosis by the company-designated physician, he was under the state of temporary total disability, which lasted for at least 120
days as provided by law. Such period could be extended up to 240 days, if further medical attention was required.

There was, however, no showing of any justification to extend said period. As the law requires, within 120 days from the time he was diagnosed of his illness, the
company-designated physician must make a declaration as to the fitness or unfitness of Caseñas. As correctly observed by the CA, however, the 120 day period
lapsed without such a declaration being made. Caseñas is now deemed to be in a state of permanent total disability and, thus, clearly entitled to the total disability
benefits provided by law.33
In Krestel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar (Krestel),34 the Court clarified that under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that were classified
as Grade 1 might be considered as total and permanent. However, if those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent,
would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment,
then he was, under legal contemplation, totally and permanently disabled.

Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period
of 120 or 240 days. Should he fail to do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.

Recently, in Carcedo v. Maine Marine Philippines, Inc. (Carcedo),35 which cited Krestel and Vergara, the seafarer was discharged from the hospital after 137 days
from repatriation. Nine days later, the seafarer returned to the hospital for a follow-up consultation, where the company-designated physician noted that the seafarer's
wound was still open and that he was to continue his medications. That was 146 days from repatriation, and the company-designated physician still had nearly 100
days within which to give the final disability assessment, yet none was issued. The Court concluded that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The company-designated physician failed to give a definitive impediment rating of Carcedo's disability beyond the extended temporary disability period, after the
120-day period but less than 240 days. By operation of law, therefore, Carcedo's total and temporary disability lapsed into a total and permanent disability.36redarclaw

[Emphasis Supplied]
Harmonizing the decisions

An analysis of the cited jurisprudence reveals that the first set of cases did not award permanent and total disability benefits to seafarers whose medical treatment
lasted for more than 120 days, but not exceeding 240 days, because (1) the company-designated physician opined that the seafarer required further medical
treatment or (2) the seafarer was uncooperative with the treatment. Hence, in those cases, despite exceeding 120 days, the seafarer was still not entitled to permanent
and total disability benefits. In such instance, Rule X, Section 2 of the IRR gave the company-designated physician additional time, up to 240 days, to continue
treatment and make an assessment on the disability of the seafarer.

The second set of cases, on the other hand, awarded permanent and total disability benefits to seafarers whose medical treatment lasted for more than 120 days,
but not exceeding 240 days, because the company-designated physician did not give a justification for extending the period of diagnosis and treatment. Necessarily,
there was no need anymore to extend the period because the disability suffered by the seafarer was permanent. In other words, there was no indication that further
medical treatment, up to 240 days, would address his total disability.

If the treatment of 120 days is extended to 240 days, but still no medical assessment is given, the finding of permanent and total disability becomes conclusive.

The above-stated analysis indubitably gives life to the provisions of the law as enunciated by Vergara. Under this interpretation, both the 120-day period under Article
192 (2) of the Labor Code and the extended 240-day period under Rule X, Section 2 of its IRR are given full force and effect. This interpretation is also supported
by the case of C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Taok,37 where the Court enumerated a seafarer's cause of action for total and permanent disability, to
wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a)
The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and
there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days;
(b)
240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued by the company-designated physician;
xxxx
Certainly, the company-designated physician must perform some significant act before he can invoke the exceptional 240-day period under the IRR. It is only fitting
that the company-designated physician must provide a sufficient justification to extend the original 120-day period. Otherwise, under the law, the seafarer must be
granted the relief of permanent and total disability benefits due to such non-compliance.

On the contrary, if we completely ignore the general 120-day period under the Labor Code and POEA-Contract and apply the exceptional 240-day period under the
IRR unconditionally, then the IRR becomes absolute and it will render the law forever inoperable. Such interpretation is contrary to the tenets of statutory construction.

Summation

In summary, if there is a claim for total and permanent disability benefits by a seafarer, the following rules (rules) shall govern:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer
reported to him;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes
permanent and total;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical
treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the
company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and
total, regardless of any justification.
The Court is not unmindful of the declaration in INC Shipmanagement that "[t]he extent of his disability (whether total or partial) is determined, not by the number of
days that he could not work, but by the disability grading the doctor recognizes based on his resulting incapacity to work and earn his wages."38 Indeed, the disability
benefits granted to the seafarer are not entirely dependent on the number of treatment lapsed days. The treatment period can be extended to 240 days if the
company-designated physician provided some sufficient justification. Equally eminent, however, is the Court's pronouncement in the more recent case of Carcedo
that "[t]he determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is the province of the company-designated physician, subject to the periods prescribed by
law."39redarclaw

Thus, to strike a balance between the two conflicting interests of the seafarer and its employer, the rules methodically took in consideration the applicability of both
the 120-day period under the Labor Code and the 240-day period under the IRR. The medical assessment of the company-designated physician is not the alpha
and the omega of the seafarer's claim for permanent and total disability. To become effective, such assessment must be issued within the bounds of the authorized
120-day period or the properly extended 240-day period.

Likewise, the Court's concern in INC Shipmanagement to avoid a system which would "[i]nevitably induce the unscrupulous to delay treatment for more than one
hundred twenty (120) days to avail of the more favorable award of permanent total disability benefits" is agreeably addressed herein. The rules clearly provide that
the company-designated physician can extend the original 120-day period only if a sufficient justification exists, such as that the seafarer required further medical
treatment or that the seafarer was uncooperative. Thus, the devious cannot simply delay the treatment for more than 120 days and acquire the loot, for the seafarer's
uncooperativeness is a good reason to apply the extended 240-day period.

The Present Case

In this case, the records show that despite the medication and therapy with the company-designated physician, Quiogue still experienced recurring pains in his
injured left foot. The company-designated physician, however, even with the recurring pains, declared him as fit to work. Thus, Quiogue sought the opinion of his
own physician, Dr. Escutin, who after the necessary tests and examination declared him unfit for sea duty in whatever capacity as a seaman.

The right of a seafarer to consult a physician of his choice can only be sensible when his findings are duly evaluated by the labor tribunals in awarding disability
claims.40redarclaw

Here, the credibility of the findings of Quiogue's private doctor was properly evaluated by the NLRC when it found that the findings of Dr. Escutin who gave Grade 1
disability rating was more appropriate and applicable to the injury suffered by Quiogue. With these medical findings and the fact that Quiogue failed to be re-deployed
by petitioners despite the fit to work assessment, Dr. Escutin's assessment should be upheld.

Even in the absence of an official finding by Dr. Escutin, Quiogue is deemed to have suffered permanent total disability pursuant to the following guidelines,
thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.

Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.

A total disability does not require that the employee be completely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee
cannot pursue his or her usual work and earn from it. A total disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days.41
To recapitulate/from the time Quiogue was medically repatriated on November 19, 2010, he was unable to work for more than 120 days. The company-designated
physician was silent on a need to extend the period of diagnosis and treatment to 240 days. Hence, it is the 120-day period under Article 192 (c) (1) of the Labor
Code that shall apply in the present case.

The fact that Quiogue was declared "fit to work" by the company-designated physician (with whom he underwent treatment and therapy from November 2010 to
April 2011) on April 13, 2011 does not matter because the certification was issued beyond the authorized 120-day period.42 As aptly ruled by the CA, the assessment
of fitness to return to work by the company-designated physician notwithstanding, his disability was considered permanent and total as the said certification was
issued after the lapse of more than 120 days from the time of his repatriation.

Similarly, there is no merit in petitioners' argument that Quiogue's entitlement to permanent total disability benefits was merely based on his inability to return to work
for 120 days. He was entitled to permanent and total disability benefits not solely because of his incapacity to work for more than 120 days, but also because the
company-designated physician belatedly gave his definite assessment on Quiogue medical condition, without any justifiable reason therefor.

Moreover, as correctly noted by Quiogue, his entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, as determined by the LA, the NLRC and the CA, was due to
his inability to work/return to his seafaring occupation after 120 days until the present time. Significantly, as aptly found by the NLRC, he remained unemployed even
after the time he filed the complaint to recover permanent total disability compensation. In the aforecited case of Carcedo, it was stated that should the company-
designated physician fail to give his proper medical assessment and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled.43redarclaw

The Court likewise finds no basis for petitioners' contention that Quiogue's previous award of permanent disability benefits bar his present claim for disability benefits
against petitioners. As suitably concluded by the CA, the fact that Quiogue had previously received permanent disability benefits from his former employer for an
injury he sustained during the said employment was immaterial and did not nullify a similar claim against his succeeding employers. As held in Micronesia Resources
v. Cantomayor:44
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The possibility that petitioner could work as a drummer at sea again does not negate the claim for permanent total disability benefits. In the same case of Crystal
Shipping, Inc., we held:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioners tried to contest the above findings [of permanent total disability] by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001.
Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. The law
does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes
permanent total disability.
[Emphasis Supplied]
Considering that Quiogue had not been able to resume his work for more than 120 days and that his disability did not fall within the exception provided for by the
Rules, the CA cannot be faulted for sustaining the award of permanent disability benefits.

The CA was also correct when it deleted the award for attorney's fees for failure of the LA to explain Quiogue's entitlement thereto. It must be stressed, as correctly
observed by the CA, that there must always be a factual basis for the award of attorney's fees. In fine, the factual, legal or equitable justification for the award must
be set forth in the text of the decision. The matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the fallo of the decision or else, the award should be thrown
out for being speculative and conjectural. In the absence of a stipulation, the attorney's fees are ordinarily not recoverable; otherwise a premium shall be placed on
the right to litigate.45redarclaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 215471, November 23, 2015

MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILIPPINES INC., MARLOW NAVIGATION CO. LTD./ CYPRUS, LIGAYA C. DELA CRUZ AND ANTONIO GALVEZ, JR., Petitioners, v.
BRAULIO A. OSIAS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the December 3, 2013 Decision1 and the November 24, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125554, which annulled and set aside the February 28, 2012 Decision3 and the April 30, 2012 Resolution4 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in a case involving a claim for permanent and total disability benefits of a seafarer.

The Facts

Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. (Marlow Navigation) is a domestic corporation and local manning agency. On the other hand, petitioner Braulio Osias (Osias)
was a chief cook in the container vessel of Marlow Navigation for seven (7) years.

On September 23, 2009, Osias entered in a contract of employment5 with Marlow Navigation. He was to work as a chief cook on board M/V OOCL MUMBAI for a
period of nine (9) months and earn a basic monthly salary of US$698.00. Thereafter, Osias boarded the vessel and commenced his work.
On February 12, 2010, while working in the gallery and preparing breakfast, Osias fainted and hit his head and shoulder on the garbage bin. There were no injuries
found on him, but he experienced shivers. When the ship arrived in Virginia, U.S.A., he was treated by Dr. Kevin P. Murray and was advised to return home.

Accordingly, Osias was medically repatriated. He arrived in the Philippines on February 15, 2010 and immediately reported to Marlow Navigation. He was referred
to the company-designated physician, Dr. Michael Tom J. Arago (Dr. Arago) of the Manila Doctor's Hospital (MDH). On February 16, 2010, an x-ray examination6
revealed that Osias was suffering from "degenerative osteoarthropathy of both knees." He was advised to undergo 10 sessions of physical therapy at the MDH
Department of Rehabilitation Medicine and was prescribed medicines for his condition.

On March 31, 2010, Dr. Arago issued a medical report7 stating that Osias was diagnosed with "left shoulder contusion, lumbar strain and osteoarthritis, right and
left knees." Osias was then required to undergo 10 more physical therapy sessions every Monday, Tuesday and Thursday, starting April 5, 2010. After four (4)
physical therapy sessions, Osias suddenly failed to comply with his treatment without any previous notice.

On May 14, 2010, or more than a month after he last reported to the company-designated physician, Osias appeared for the continuation of his physical therapy. On
even date, Dr. Arago issued another medical report8 noting the prolonged absence of Osias. It was stated therein that Osias did not follow up his treatment because
he went to La Union. Nevertheless, Dr. Arago continued Osias' therapy.

On July 14, 2010, Dr. Arago issued a final medical report9 stating that Osias underwent physical capacity evaluation and that he was already "fit to return to work
effective 13 July 2010." Further, a certification of fitness to work10 was issued to Osias.

Unconvinced, Osias sought the medical opinion of Dr. Li-Ann Lara Orencia (Dr. Orencia). In her medical certificate, dated September 14, 2010, Dr. Orencia opined
that the osteoarthritis of Osias would prevent him from returning to his former work as chief cook.

Consequently, Osias filed a complaint for permanent and total disability benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against Marlow Navigation,
Marlow Navigation Co. Ltd., and its officers Ligaya Dela Cruz and Antonio Galvez, Jr. (petitioners) before the Labor Arbiter (LA).

In his position paper,11 Osias asserted that his incapacity to work for more than 120 days entitled him to permanent and total disability benefits. Conversely, in their
position paper,12 petitioners countered that Osias was not entitled to the said benefits because the company-designated physician found and certified that he was
fit to return to work. Moreover, he himself caused the delay in his treatment.

The LA Ruling

In its Decision,13 dated May 2, 2011, the LA ruled that Osias was not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. The LA gave weight to the findings of the
company-designated physician because the latter had the authority to proclaim whether a seafarer suffered from a permanent and total disability, based on an
extensive medical treatment. Further, the LA found that Osias was remiss in his obligation to promptly report to the company-designated physician because he went
to his province in La Union and dispensed with his treatment. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the claim for disability benefits.

All other claims are likewise denied for being bereft of merit.

SO ORDERED.14cralawlawlibrary

Aggrieved, Osias appealed the case before the NLRC.

The NLRC Ruling

In its Decision, dated February 28, 2012, the NLRC denied the appeal of Osias. The commission was of the view that the evaluation of the company-designated
physician gained precedence over that of the seafarer's personal doctor who issued a belated medical opinion solely based on the prior findings of the company-
designated physician and without conducting her own examination of Osias. Also, the NLRC added that if Osias only complied with the schedule of the physical
therapy, then he could have been declared fit to work in less than 120 days. The decretal portion of the decision states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 2, 2011 is AFFIRMED and the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.15cralawlawlibrary

Osias filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the NLRC in its April 30, 2012 Resolution.

Undaunted, Osias filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, dated December 3, 2013, the CA annulled and set aside the February 28, 2012 Decision and the April 30, 2012 Resolution of the NLRC.
The CA found that from the time Osias was medically repatriated to the Philippines on February 16, 2010, it was only on July 14, 2010, or after a period of 147 days,
that he was declared fit to work by the company-designated physician. As the said period was beyond the 120-day rule provided by law, the CA opined that he must
be entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. The appellate court concluded that the medical examination conducted by the company-designated physician
should not have extended beyond the 120-day period. The fallo of the decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision dated February 28, 2012 and Resolution dated April 30, 2012 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondents are ordered to jointly and severally pay petitioner Braulio Osias, the amount of US$60,000.00
representing his total disability benefits, plus attorney's fees of US$6,000.00, in Philippine currency, at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of actual payment.
All other claims are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.16cralawlawlibrary

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the CA in its assailed resolution, dated November 24, 2014.

Hence, this petition raising the following

ISSUES

I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GLARINGLY FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE DELAY IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE ASSESSMENT OR
CERTIFICATION OF FITNESS TO WORK BY THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN WAS DUE TO THE FAULT OF RESPONDENT. IN ANY EVENT, THE
FACT THAT THE FITNESS TO WORK CERTIFICATION WAS ISSUED AFTER 147 DAYS FROM REPATRIATION OF RESPONDENT DOES NOT NECESSARILY
RENDER HIM TOTALLY AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED. THE MERE LAPSE OF THE 120-DAY PERIOD OF INITIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT DOES NOT
TANTAMOUNT TO PERMANENT DISABILITY BASED ON THE RECENT RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.

II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE ASSESSMENT OF RESPONDENT'S OWN PERSONAL DOCTOR OVER
THE CERTIFICATION OF FITNESS TO WORK ISSUED BY THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN. BOTH THE LOWER LABOR TRIBUNALS
CATEGORICALLY FOUND THAT THE ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN WAS A RESULT OF A MORE ELABORATE
EXAMINATION AND TREATMENT. ON THE CONTRARY, THE ONE (1) DAY EXAMINATION OF RESPONDENT'S PERSONAL DOCTOR WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY ANY MEDICAL EXAMINATION AS IT WAS MERELY BASED ON WHAT THE RESPONDENT SEAFARER RELAYED REGARDING HIS
TREATMENT WITH THE COMPANY DOCTOR AND HIS COMPLAINT OF PAIN DURING THE SAID 1-DAY CONSULTATION WITH HIS PERSONAL DOCTOR.

III.
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS IMPROPER IN THIS CASE CONSIDERING THAT THERE WAS NO BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF
PETITIONERS.17cralawlawlibrary

Petitioners argue that the 120-day rule only applies when a seafarer's treatment went beyond such period without any assessment from the company-designated
physician or when the delay in the issuance of the assessment was not due to the fault of the seafarer; that the 120-day rule should not operate in this case as the
extended treatment of 147 days was due to Osias' absence; that the 240-day period should be applied because not all diseases of seafarers could be treated within
120 days; and that the findings of the company-designated physician should prevail as the said findings were based on extensive analysis and treatment.

Petitioners further pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction claiming that Osias filed a motion for issuance of a writ
of execution before the LA and that the execution of the CA decision would cause grave injustice to them.

In his Comment,18 Osias countered that the medical findings of Dr. Orencia was more reliable than the findings of company doctor, Dr. Arago, because he was still
not well; that at present, he could barely walk and had not been engaged in any gainful employment from the time he was medically repatriated; and that jurisprudence
declared that neither the 120-day nor the 240-day period was a categorical determinant of total and permanent disability.

In their Reply,19 petitioners averred that Osias did not refute that the delay in the issuance of the certificate of fitness to work was due to his fault; and that the said
certificate issued by Dr. Arago, the company-designated physician, should overcome the one-day assessment of Dr. Orencia, Osias' own doctor.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Laws and jurisprudence

relating to the 120-day
and 240-day rule

As early as 1972, the Court has defined the term permanent and total disability in the case of Marcelino v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of the Phil,20 in this wise:
"[permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed
to perform, or any other kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do."21

The present controversy involves the permanent and total disability claim of a specific type of laborer—a seafarer. The substantial rise in the demand for seafarers
in the international labor market led to an increase of labor standards and relations issues, including claims for permanent and total disability benefits. To elucidate
on the subject, particularly on the propriety and timeliness of a seafarer's entitlement to permanent and total disability benefits, a review of the relevant laws and
recent jurisprudence is in order.

Article 192(c) (1) of the Labor Code, which defines permanent and total disability of laborers, provides that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ART. 192. Permanent Total Disability.

xxx
(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules; [Emphasis
supplied]cralawlawlibrary

The rule referred to is Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, implementing Book IV of the Labor Code (IRR), which
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 2. Period of entitlement. — (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be
paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from
onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at anytime after
120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by
the System.

[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]cralawlawlibrary

These provisions should be read in relation to the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC)22 whose
Section 20 (B) (3) states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the
degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

[Emphasis supplied]cralawlawlibrary

In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,23(Crystal Shipping) the Court ruled that "[permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120
days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body."24 Thereafter, litigant-seafarers started citing Crystal Shipping to demand permanent
and total disability benefits simply because they were incapacitated to work for more than 120 days.

The Court in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.25(Vergara), however, noted that the doctrine expressed in Crystal Shipping — that inability to perform
customary work for more than 120 days constitutes permanent total disability — should not be applied in all situations. The specific context of the application should
be considered in light of the application of all rulings, laws and implementing regulations. It was provided therein that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for
diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to
work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent,
either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period
is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up
to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman
may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.

[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

cralawlawlibrary

In effect, by considering the law, the POEA-SEC, and especially the IRR, Vergara extended the period within which the company-designated physician could declare
a seafarer's fitness or disability to 240 days. Moreover, in that case, the disability grading provided by the company-designated physician was given more weight
compared to the mere incapacity of the seafarer therein for a period of more than 120 days.
The apparent conflict between the 120-day period under Crystal Shipping and the 240-day period under Vergara was observed in the case of Kestrel Shipping Co.,
Inc. v. Munar (Kestrel).26 In the said case, the Court recognized that Vergara presented a restraint against the indiscriminate reliance on Crystal Shipping. A
seafarer's inability to work despite the lapse of 120 days would not automatically bring about a total and permanent disability, considering that the treatment of the
company-designated physician may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days. In Kestrel, however, as the complaint was filed two years before the Court
promulgated Vergara on October 6, 2008, then the seafarer therein was not stripped of his cause of action.

To further clarify the conflict between Crystal Shipping and Vergara, the Court in Montierro v. Rickmers Marine Agency Phils., Inc.27 stated that "[i]f the maritime
compensation complaint was filed prior to October 6, 2008, the 120-day rule applies; if, on the other hand, the complaint was filed from October 6, 2008 onwards,
the 240-day rule applies."

Then came Carcedo v. Maine Marine Phils., Inc. (Carcedo).28 Although the said case recognized the 240-day rule in Vergara, it was pronounced therein that "[t]he
determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is the province of the company-designated physician, subject to the periods prescribed by law." Carcedo further
emphasized that "[t]he company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within
the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled."29

Finally, in Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr.30(Elburg), it was affirmed that the Crystal Shipping doctrine was not binding because a seafarer's
disability should not be simply determined by the number of days that he could not work. Nevertheless, the pronouncement in Carcedo was reiterated — that the
determination of the fitness of a seafarer by the company-designated physician should be subject to the periods prescribed by law. Elburg provided a summation of
periods when the company-designated physician must assess the seafarer, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer
reported to him;

If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes
permanent and total;

If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical
treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the
company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and
total, regardless of any justification.
cralawlawlibrary

In essence, the Court in Elburg no longer agreed that the 240-day period provided by Vergara, which was sourced from the IRR, should be an absolute rule. The
company-designated physician would still be obligated to assess the seafarer within the original 120-day period from the date of medical repatriation and only with
sufficient justification may the company-designated physician be allowed to extend the period of medical treatment to 240 days. The Court reasoned
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Certainly, the company-designated physician must perform some significant act before he can invoke the exceptional 240-day period under the IRR. It is only fitting
that the company-designated physician must provide a sufficient justification to extend the original 120-day period. Otherwise, under the law, the seafarer must be
granted the relief of permanent and total disability benefits due to such non-compliance.

On the contrary, if we completely ignore the general 120-day period under the Labor Code and POEA-Contract and apply the exceptional 240-day period under the
IRR unconditionally, then the IRR becomes absolute and it will render the law forever inoperable. Such interpretation is contrary to the tenets of statutory construction.

xxx

Thus, to strike a balance between the two conflicting interests of the seafarer and its employer, the rules methodically took into consideration the applicability of both
the 120-day period under the Labor Code and the 240-day period under the IRR. The medical assessment of the company-designated physician is not the alpha
and the omega of the seafarer's claim for permanent and total disability. To become effective, such assessment must be issued within the bounds of the authorized
120-day period or the properly extended 240-day period.cralawlawlibrary

Hence, as it stands, the current rule provides: (1) that mere inability to work for a period of 120 days does not entitle a seafarer to permanent and total disability
benefits; (2) that the determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is within the province of the company-designated physician, subject to the periods
prescribed by law; (3) that the company-designated physician has an initial 120 days to determine the fitness or disability of the seafarer; and (4) that the period of
treatment may only be extended to 240 days if a sufficient justification exists such as when further medical treatment is required or when the seafarer is uncooperative.

For as long as the 120-day period under the Labor Code and the POEA-SEC and the 240-day period under the IRR co-exist, the Court must bend over backwards
to harmoniously interpret and give life to both of the stated periods. Ultimately, the intent of our labor laws and regulations is to strive for social justice over the
diverging interests of the employer and the employee.

The 240-day extended

period applies in the
present case

In its assailed decision, the CA explained that Osias was entitled to permanent and total disability because the medical treatment of the company-designated
physician lasted for 147 days, or more than the 120-day period. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the delay in the medical treatment of Osias was due to
his own fault and that the 120-day period must be extended to 240 days.

After a judicious scrutiny of the records, the Court finds that a sufficient justification exists to extend the period of medical treatment and assessment of the company-
designated physician to 240 days.

It was enunciated in Elburg that a company-designated physician may have some justifiable ground to necessarily extend the 120-day period to 240 days. For
instance, when the company-designated physician opined that a seafarer's illness or injury would require further medical treatment, then the 120-day period may be
extended. As advanced by petitioners, there may be some illnesses that could not be completely addressed within a span of 120 days; thus, in such cases, an
extended period of 240 days or 6 months of treatment would be reasonable.

In the case at bench, the sufficient justification to apply the 240-day extended period would be the uncooperativeness of Osias. Based on the evidence presented,
it is clear that he did not fully comply with the prescribed medical therapy. In his medical report,31 dated March 31, 2010, Dr. Arago, as company-designated
physician, required Osias to undergo 10 sessions of physical therapy every Monday, Tuesday and Thursday, starting on April 5, 2010. After four (4) sessions,
however, Osias failed to appear for the continuation of his physical therapy without any prior notice for his sudden non-attendance. It was only on May 14, 2010, or
after more than a month, that Osias returned to see Dr. Arago after coming back from La Union. Osias neither denied nor attempted to justify his abrupt absence.
His disregard of the doctor's orders was duly noted by Dr. Arago in his medical report,32 dated May 14, 2010.

The manifest non-compliance of Osias with the prescribed therapy by the company-designated physician demonstrates that he was uncooperative with the treatment.
Osias utterly disregarded the limited amount of time the company-designated physician had to finalize his medical assessment by ignoring the scheduled therapy
sessions. The LA correctly ruled that, by going to La Union, Osias capriciously and wittingly dispensed with the treatment of the company-designated physician.33
Likewise, the NLRC observed that it would be unfair to award disability benefits to Osias due to the lapse of 120-day period because the extended period of the
treatment was attributable to him.34
Thus, the Court agrees that the period for medical treatment and assessment was properly extended to 240 days. It was duly established that Dr. Arago issued his
final medical report35 and his certification36 that Osias was fit to work on July 14, 2010, or after 147 days from the date of medical repatriation, which is well within
the properly extended period of 240 days.

The medical assessment

of the company-designated
physician was not
validly challenged

Given that the medical report of the company-designated physician was suitably issued within the extended 240-day period, then the same should be fully appreciated
by the courts. The company-designated doctor found that Osias was physically fit to return to work after conducting an extensive treatment and diagnosis of the
latter. Nonetheless, Section 20 (B) (3) of the POEA-SEC provides for a mechanism to challenge the validity of the company-designated physician's assessment as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's
decision shall be final and binding on both parties.cralawlawlibrary

Based on the above-cited provision, the referral to a third doctor is mandatory when: (1) there is a valid and timely assessment by the company-designated physician
and (2) the appointed doctor of the seafarer refuted such assessment.

In Carcedo, the Court held that "[t]o definitively clarify how a conflict situation should be handled, upon notification that the seafarer disagrees with the company
doctor's assessment based on the duly and fully disclosed contrary assessment from the seafarer's own doctor, the seafarer shall then signify his intention to resolve
the conflict by the referral of the conflicting assessments to a third doctor whose ruling, under the POEA-SEC, shall be final and binding on the parties. Upon
notification, the company carries the burden of initiating the process for the referral to a third doctor commonly agreed between the parties."37

In this case, Osias' doctor of choice, Dr. Orencia, issued a medical certificate which conflicted with the assessment of the company-designated physician. Dr. Orencia
opined that the osteoarthritis of Osias prevented him from returning to his work. Osias, however, never signified his intention to resolve the disagreement with
petitioners by referring the matter to a third doctor. It is only through the procedure provided by the POEA-SEC, in which he was a party, can he question the timely
medical assessment of the company-designated physician and compel petitioners to jointly seek an appropriate third doctor. Absent proper compliance, the final
medical report and the certification of the company-designated physician declaring him fit to return to work must be upheld. Ergo, he is not entitled to permanent and
total disability benefits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 3, 2013 Decision and the November 24, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
125554 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 28, 2012 Decision and the April 30, 2012 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission are hereby
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195832 October 1, 2014

Formerly INC SHIPMANAGEMENT, INCORPORATED (now INC NAVIGATION CO. PHILIPPINES, INC.), REYNALDO M. RAMIREZ and/or INTERORIENT
NAVIGATION CO., L TD./LIMASSOL, CYPRUS, Petitioners,
vs.
BENJAMIN I. ROSALES, Respondent.
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal of the decision1 dated December 6, 2010 and the resolution dated February 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 107271.
The appealed decision reversed the resolution dated November 21, 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and reinstated the June 26, 2007
decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA) finding Benjamin Rosales (Rosales) entitled to Grade 1 disability benefits.

The Antecedent Facts

On October 12, 2005, INC Shipmanagement Incorporated (INC, now known as INC Navigation Co., Philippines, Inc.), in behalf of its foreign principal (Interorient
Shipping Co., Ltd.) hired Rosales for a period of ten (10) months as Chief Cook for the vessel MIV Franklin Strait. Their Administration Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC).Rosales was to receive a monthly salary of FiveHundred Fifty United States dollars (US$550.00). His primary function was to prepare, cook, and
process food for the ship’s officers and crew with the corresponding responsibility of maintaining the general cleanliness of the working area.2

Sometime in February 2006, while on board the vessel, Rosales experienced severe chest pain and breathing difficulties, coupled with numbness on his left arm.
On February 13, 2006, a physician at Mount Sinai Medical Center in Miami, Florida, USA examined him. He underwent a coronary angiogram and also an
angioplastyin the left anterior artery of his heart. All these were provided by the company at its own expense. Rosales was thereafter declared unfit to work and was
advised to continue treatment in his home country.3

On February 20, 2006, after repatriation to the Philippines, Rosales was confined at the Manila MedicalCenter where the company-designated physician, Dr.
Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz) examined him. Rosales was diagnosed to be suffering from acute myocardial infarction secondary to coronary artery disease,
hypertension and diabetes mellitus.4

On April 7, 2006, Rosales consulted Dr. Paterno Dizon, Jr. (Dr. Dizon), an interventional cardiologist at the Cardinal Santos Medical Center, who certified that he
was suffering from coronary artery disease and severe stenosis in his heart. Consequently, he underwent a Coronary Artery ByPass Graft Surgery at the Philippine
Heart Center.5

On October 10, 2006, Dr. Cruz gave Rosales a partial permanent disability assessment equivalent to Grade 7 (moderate residuals of disorder)under the POEA-
SEC. The assessment took into account the marked improvement of his condition.6

On November 9, 2006, Rosales sought the medical advice of Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo), a cardiologist at the Philippine Heart Center for a second opinion.
Dr. Vicaldo found him still suffering from hypertensive cardiovascular and coronary artery diseases in his heart. He assessed Rosales to be unfit to workas a seaman
in any capacity and considered his illness to be work-related.He thus gave Rosales a permanent total disability rating of Grade 1 under the POEA-SEC.7

On the strength of Dr. Vicaldo’s more favorable finding, Rosales claimed permanent total disability benefits from INC. The company denied the claim. Following the
denial, Rosales filed a complaint8 on December 7, 2006 for disability benefits, illness allowance, reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and attorney’s
feesagainst INC before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.9

Rosales asserted that he is entitled to permanent total disability benefits under the POEA-SEC based on Dr. Vicaldo’s Grade 1 disability rating; that this assessment
is based on the finding that his illness was acquired in the performance of his duties, and that his illness rendered him unfit for sea duties. Rosales further stated that
he was incapacitated to work for more than one hundred twenty (120) days. He also questioned Dr. Cruz’s competency since Dr. Cruz did not actually perform the
medical procedures, but based it only on the report of Dr. Dizon. Moreover, Rosales argued that Dr. Cruz is not a cardiologist but a general and cancer surgeon and
who could not render an impartial assessment since he was a company designated physician.10

For its part, INC emphasized that Dr. Cruz only gave a Grade 7 disability rating based on his post-treatment evaluation of Rosales; that under the POEA-SEC, it is
the company-designated physician who is tasked to assess the fitness of a seafarer and to give the corresponding disability benefits rating. INC also pointed out that
the award of disability benefits is not dependent on the impairment of the seafarer’s earning capacity but on the gravity of the injury he had sustained.

The Compulsory Arbitration Decisions

In his decision of June 26, 2007,11 the LA found the complaint meritorious and ordered INC to pay Rosales Sixty Thousand United Stated dollars (US$60,000.00)
as permanent total disability benefits, plus three percent (3%) of this amount as attorney’s fees.

The LA noted that Rosales is entitled to Grade 1 disability benefits because his illness prevented him from working for more than one hundred twenty (120) days
reckoned from the time he was repatriated in February 2006 until his disability rating was issued in October 2006.

INC appealed the ruling to the NLRC. The latter, in its resolution of January 4, 2008, affirmed the LA’s decision. The NLRC, however, subsequently reversed its
ruling.12 It opined in this reversal that Rosales should only be entitled to a partial disability benefit amounting to Twenty Thousand United States dollars
(US$20,900.00) in accordance with Dr. Cruz’ assessment.

The NLRC reasoned out that Dr. Cruz’ assessment should prevail over Dr. Vicaldo’s finding because Dr. Cruz, as the company-designated doctor, had thoroughly
examined and had overseen the treatment of Rosales from the time of repatriation until the date of the issuance of his disability grading, while Dr. Vicaldo only
attended to Rosales once on November 9, 2006. Rosales challenged the NLRC ruling by filing with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. He contended that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the assessment of the company-designated physician and in finding that he is not
entitled to full disability benefits.

The Assailed CA Decision

The CA granted the petition in its decision of December 6, 2010,13 thereby reinstating the LA’s decision finding Rosales entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
The appellate court found that from the time Rosales was repatriated until the disability grading was issued, a period of eight (8) months or more than one hundred
twenty (120) days, had lapsed and Rosales had not been able to work during this period. The CA also considered that despite medical treatment, Dr. Cruz still found
that Rosales’ illness persisted; that this declaration, coupled with Rosales’ two (2) major heart operations, should be more than sufficient to conclude that he could
no longer perform his duties as Chief Cook.For this reason, Rosales’ earning capacity was grossly impaired, warranting the award of Grade 1 permanent total
disability benefits.

INC moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its resolution of February 24, 2011;14 hence, the petition.

The Issues

INC raises the following assignment of errors:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT ROSALES IS ENTITLED TO FULL DISABILITY COMPENSATION BENEFITS BECAUSE HE WAS UNABLE TO WORK FOR ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY (120) DAYS.

II.

WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN FINDING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE NLRC IN FAVORING THE FINDINGS OFROSALES’
PHYSICIANS OVER THAT OF THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN.
INC primarily argues that the CA erred in finding that there had been grave abuse of discretion in the ruling ofthe NLRC; that (1) the disability is measured in terms
of gradings, not by the number of days of actual inability to work; and (2) in a conflict of findings between the company-designated physician and the private
physician,it is the company-designated physician’s findings that should prevail.

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition meritorious. The CA gravely abused its discretion when it totally disregarded the governing contract between the parties – a situation that this
Court cannot disregard without risking instability in maritime labor relations involving Filipino seamen.

It is the doctor’s findings which should prevail over the simple lapse of the 120-day period

Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code provides that:

xxxx

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules[.][Emphasis ours]

This provision should be read in relation with Rule X, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing Book IV of the Labor Code [Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation Commission],15 and with Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC.16 We had the occasion to explain the interplay of these provisions in Vergara v.
Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., et al.,17 under these terms:

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for
diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disabilityas he is totally unable to
work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent,
either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period
is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up
to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman
may of course also be declared fit to work at any time if such declaration is justified by his medical condition. [Emphasis supplied]

The law and this pronouncement make it clear that INC is obligated to pay for the treatment of Rosales, plus his basic wage, during the 120-day period from
repatriation while he is undergoing treatment; he could not work during this period and hence was on temporary total disability.

Permanent disability transpires when the inability to work continues beyond one hundred twenty (120) days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any
part of his body. In comparison with the concept of permanent disability, total disability means the incapacity of an employee to earn wages in the same or similar
kind of work that he was trained for, or is accustomed to perform, or in any kind of work that a person of his mentality and attainments can do. It does not mean
absolute helplessness.

In disability compensation, it is not the injury that is compensated; it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.18

Thus, while Rosales was entitled to temporary total disability benefits during his treatment period (because he could not totally work during this whole period), it does
not follow thathe should likewise be entitled to permanent total disabilitybenefits when his disability was assessed by the company-designated physician after his
treatment. He may be recognized to be have permanent disabilitybecause of the period he was out of work and could not work[in this case, more than one hundred
twenty (120) days], but the extent of his disability (whether total or partial) is determined, not by the number of days that he could not work, but by the disability
grading the doctor recognizes based on his resulting incapacity to work and earn his wages.
It is the doctor’s findings that should prevail as he/she is equipped with the proper discernment, knowledge, experience and expertise on what constitutes total or
partial disability. His declaration serves as the basis for the degree of disability that can range anywhere from Grade 1 to Grade 14.19 Notably, this is a serious
consideration that cannot be determined by simply counting the number of treatment lapsed days.

In light of these distinctions, to confuse the concepts of permanent and total disability is to trigger a situation where disability would be determined by simply counting
the duration of the seafarer’s illness. This system would inevitably induce the unscrupulous to delay treatment for more than one hundred twenty (120) days to avail
of the more favorable award of permanent total disability benefits.

Non-referral to a third physician, whose decision shall be considered as final and binding, constitutes a breach of the POEA-SEC

After establishing the importance of the physician’s assessment of disability claims, the present case should have already been resolved had it not been for the
conflicting findings of Dr. Cruz and Dr. Vicaldo.

In the settlement of this conflict, we need not provide a lengthy discussion as we have resolved this matter in Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag,20
citing Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC:

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the [e]mployer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s
decision shall befinal and binding on both parties. (Emphasis ours)

This referral to a third doctor has been held by this Court to be a mandatory procedure as a consequence of the provision that it is the company-designated doctor
whose assessment should prevail. In other words, the company can insist on its disability rating even against a contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the
seafarer expresses his disagreement by asking for the referral to a third doctor who shall make his or her determination and whose decision is final and binding on
the parties. We have followed this rule in a string of cases, among them, Philippine Hammonia,21 Ayungo v. Beamko Ship management Corp.,22 Santiago v.
Pacbasin Ship management, Inc.,23 Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency,24 and Masangkay v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc.25 Thus, at this point, the matter
of referral pursuant to the provision of the POEA-SEC is a settled ruling.

Since Rosales signed the POEA-SEC,he bound himself to abide by its conditions throughout his employment.1âwphi1 The records show that after obtaining a
medical certificate from Dr. Vicaldo classifying his illness as Grade 1 (contrary to Dr. Cruz’ Grade 7 assessment that the company insisted on), Rosales immediately
proceeded to secure the services of a counsel and forthwith filed a complaint for disability benefits.26

By so acting, Rosales proceeded in a manner contrary to the terms of his contract with INC in challenging the company doctor’s assessment; he failed to signify his
intent to submit the disputed assessment to a third doctor and to wait for arrangements for the referral of the conflicting assessments of his disability to a third doctor.

Significantly, no explanation or reason was ever given for the omission to comply with this mandatory requirement; no indication whatsoever is on record that an
earnesteffort to secure compliance with the law was made; Rosales immediately filed his complaint with the LA. As we recently ruled in Bahia Shipping Services,
Inc.,et al. v. Crisante C. Constantino,27 when the seafarer challenges the company doctor’s assessment through the assessment madeby his own doctor, the
seafarer shall so signify and the company thereafter carries the burden of activating the third doctor provision.

To definitively clarify how a conflict situation should be handled, upon notification that the seafarer disagrees with the company doctor’s assessment based on the
duly and fully disclosed contrary assessment from the seafarer’s own doctor, the seafarer shall then signify his intention to resolve the conflict by the referral of the
conflicting assessments to a third doctor whose ruling, under the POEA-SEC,shall be final and binding on the parties. Upon notification, the company carries the
burden of initiating the process for the referral to a third doctor commonly agreed between the parties. In Bahia, we said:

In the absence of any request fromhim (as shown by the records of the case), the employer-company cannot be expected to respond. As the party seeking to impugn
the certification that the law itself recognizes as prevailing, Constantino bears the burden of positive action to prove that his doctor’s findings are correct, aswell as
the burden to notify the company that a contrary finding had been made by his own physician. Upon such notification, the company must itself respond by setting
into motion the process of choosing a third doctor who, as the POEA-SEC provides, can rule with finality on the disputed medical situation.

In the absence of a third doctor resolution of the conflicting assessments between Dr. Lim and Dr. Almeda, Dr. Lim’s assessment of Constantino’s health should
stand.28 Thus, the CA’s conclusion that Constantino’s inability to work for more than 120 days rendered him permanently disabled cannot be sustained.

Thus, as matters stand in the present case, the complaint was premature; it should have been dismissed as early as the LA’s level since the fit-to-work certification
and grading by the company-designated physician prevails unless a third party doctor, soughtby the parties, declares otherwise.

Significantly, no reason was ever given why the LA and the NLRC both disregarded the third-doctor provision under the POEA-SEC. For similarly ruling, the CA fell
into the same error.29 Once again, it appears to us, thatthe third-doctor-referral provision of the POEA-SEC, has been honored more in the breach than in the
compliance. This is unfortunate considering that the provision is intended to settle disability claims at the parties’ level where the claims can be resolved more
speedily than if they were to be brought to court.30

Even granting that the complaint should be given due course, we hold that the company-designated physician’s assessment should prevail over that of the private
physician. The company-designated physician had thoroughly examined and treated Rosales from the time of his repatriation until his disability grading was issued,
which was from February 20, 2006 until October 10, 2006. In contrast, the private physician only attended to Rosales once, on November 9, 2006.31 This is not the
first time that this Court met this situation.Under these circumstances, the assessment of the company-designated physician is more credible for having been arrived
at after months of medical attendance and diagnosis, compared with the assessment of a private physician donein one day on the basis of an examination or existing
medical records.

We are thus compelled to dismiss the present complaint, as we had similarly done in Philippine Hammonia,32 to impress upon the public the significance of a binding
obligation. This pronouncement shall not only speed up the processing of maritime disability claims and decongest court dockets; more importantly, our ruling would
restore faith and confidence in obligations that have voluntarily been entered upon. As an institution tasked to uphold and respect the law, it is ourprimary duty to
ensure faithful compliance with the law whether the dispute affects strictly private interests or one imbued with public interest. We shall not hesitate to dismiss a
petition wrongfully filed, or to hold any persons liable for its malicious initiation.

tasked to uphold and respect the law, it is our primary duty to ensure faithful compliance with the law whether the dispute affects strictly private interests or one
imbued with public interest. We shall not hesitate to dismiss a petition wrongfully filed, or to hold any persons liable for its malicious initiation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. The complaint is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180343 July 9, 2014

BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. and FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINES LIMITED, Petitioners,
vs.
CRISANTE C. CONSTANTINO, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the February 26, 2007 Decision2 and September 28, 2007 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 94260.

The Antecedents

On February 27, 2002, respondent Crisante C. Constantino (Constantino) entered into a nine-month contract of employment4 as utility (at a basic monthly salary of
US$261.00) with petitioners· Bahia Shipping, Services, Inc. and its principal, Fred Olsen Cruise Lines, Limited (petitioners), for the vessel MIS Braemar. The contract
had been verified and approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Constantino boarded the vessel on March 26, 2002.

Sometime in April 2002 while at work onboard the vessel, Constantino complained of low back pain radiating to his right thigh after allegedly lifting several pieces of
heavy luggage. The ship doctor gave him medications and advised him to rest. When the vessel arrived at the Barbados, he was referred to a shore-based physician,
orthopedic surgeon Dr. Jerry A.W. Thorne, for examination and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). The MRI revealed mild to moderate desiccation of Constantino’s
lumbar intervertebral disc at L3L4, L4L5 and L5S1. Dr. Thorne diagnosed Constantino to besuffering from an acute exacerbation of a pre-existing lumbar disc
syndromeand declared him unfit to work for 10 days.5

On April 25, 2002, Constantino was repatriated and referred to petitioners’ physician, Dr. Robert D. Lim (Dr. Lim) of the Metropolitan Hospital, who placed him under
the care of an orthopedic surgeon. Constantino underwent an excision biopsy of a mass in his right flank and was subjected to medication, treatment, rehabilitation
and therapy for several months starting early May 20026 until October 2, 2002 when Dr. Lim issued a report7 on his medical condition, stating that "patient is now
asymptomatic." The orthopedic surgeon opined that "patient is now fit to work."8 Accordingly, Dr. Lim pronounced Constantino fit to work as of October 2, 2002.9
On the same day, Constantino accepted and concurred with a Certificate ofFitness for Work.10

Despite these developments, Constantino engaged the services of a lawyer to claim disability compensation from the petitioners and, to explore a possible settlement
with them.11 On May 31, 2003, Constantino consulted a physician of his choice, Dr. Marciano Almeda (Dr. Almeda), an occupational medicine and
orthopedicsspecialist. Dr. Almeda assessed Constantino to have suffered from permanent partial disability with a Grade 11 impediment under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) and declared him unfit for further sea duties.12 The petitioners denied the claim, prompting Constantino to file on June 12, 2003
a complaint for disability benefits, illness allowance, reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees against them.

Constantino alleged before the labor arbiter that despite the treatment given to him by the company-designated physicians, his ailment had not improved. He claimed
that his back pain continued. He argued that he had a valid claim for disability benefits as hehad been assessed by his physician of choice to have suffered from
permanent partial disability with a declaration that he was unfit for sea duty. The certificate of fitness for work he executed, he emphasized, should have no effect
on his claim because he only signed it after the petitioners assured him of re-deployment; since they failed to rehire him, they cannot be released from any liability
to him. He rejected Dr. Lim’s medical report on his condition, particularly his fit to work assessment,as he considered it self-serving.

In defense, the petitioners argued that Constantino’s claim should fail considering that immediately on his repatriation, he underwent regular and rigorous examination
and was subjected to specialized treatments, tests and procedures, including surgery and therapy sessions, administered or supervised by its accredited doctors
and specialists, at their expense. They stressed that for a period of almost six months, Constantino was seen by their doctors at least twelve (12) times, and on every
occasion, the doctors issued a report on Constantino’s medical condition, the particular treatment administered and medicines prescribed. Thus, when he executed
the certificate of fitness for work on October 2, 2002, he isestopped, they argued, from questioning the findings of their accredited doctors.

The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings

On October 14, 2003, Labor Arbiter Veneranda C. Guerrero (LA Guerrero) rendered a decision13 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. She held that Constantino
is not entitled to disability benefits in view of the fit-to-work declaration by petitioners’ coordinating physician Dr. Lim, after an exhaustive medical examination,
treatment, surgical procedure and therapy sessions administered on Constantino for several months, as substantiated by the documents on recordand corroborated
by the certificate of fitness for work signed by Constantino.

LA Guerrero believed that except for their duty to provide him sickness wages during the period he was under treatment, the petitioners had complied with their
obligations under the POEA-SEC with respect to the injury sustained by Constantino on board the vessel. LA Guerrero brushed off Constantino’s allegation of bad
faith against the petitioners for not redeploying him as it was unsubstantiated and cannot overcome Dr. Lim’s fitto-work certification. LA Guerrero awarded Constantino
sickness allowance for 120 days for failure of the petitionersto present proof that he had been paid. The labor arbiter likewise awarded him attorney’s fees because
he was compelled to file a complaint to enforce his rights.

Both parties appealed. Constantino insisted that he is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits based on Dr. Almeda’s assessment of his medical condition
arrived at withcandidness and sincerity compared with Dr. Lim’s fit-to-work pronouncement which was issued so that petitioners could avoid liability. The petitioners,
on the other hand, disputed the award to Constantino of sickness allowance and attorney’s fees, presenting check vouchers as proof of payment14 of the allowance.
Also, they argued that Constantino was not entitled to attorney’s fees because he should not have filed the complaint in the first place.

In its October 28, 2005 resolution,15 the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), set aside the appealed decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. It agreedwith LA Guerrero’s opinion that Dr. Lim’s fit-to-work certification for Constantino should prevail over Dr. Almeda’s medical report which merely
interpreted the initial diagnosis of Dr. Lim. It set aside the sickness allowance award to Constantino in view of the proof of payment presented by the petitioners.
Constantino moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC deniedthe motion, leaving him no option but to file a petition for certiorari with the CA, charging the NLRC with
grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the complaint.

The CA Decision

In its decision under review,16 the CA partially granted the petition. It refused to give credit to the fit-to-work assessment issued to Constantino by Dr. Lim. The
assessment, the CA stressed, was not based on Dr. Lim’s own findings but on the opinion of an orthopedic surgeon (or other specialist) that Constantino was already
fit to work, but whose medical report was not even shown by the petitioners. It dismissed Dr. Lim’s medical report as "selfserving and biased in favor of the
respondents," citing an earlier ruling of this Court17 in support of its opinion.

The CA found the medical report of Dr. Almeda, Constantino’s chosen physician, more credible as it was based on his own personal assessment of Constantino’s
ailment and he is more qualified than Dr. Lim, who is not a specialist in orthopedics. Further, the appellate court noted that even after Constantino was declared fit
to work, he was still unable to work and neither was it shown that he was re-deployed or efforts were made by the petitioners to have him re-deployed. Additionally,
it believed that Constantino’s failure to perform his work for 120 days is another indicator that Constantino suffered from permanent disability.

The CA held that it cannot rely onthe certification of fitness for work signed by Constantino to absolve petitioners from liability as it was in the nature of a quitclaim
where it was not even shown that he received anything in signing the document. The CA sustained the denial of sickness allowance because Constantino had
already been paid. It likewise denied his claim for damages for lack of basis. But the appellate upheld the grant of attorney’s fees to him considering that he was
compelled to litigate to enforce his rights. The petitioners moved for, but failed to secure, a reconsideration of the CA decision.

The Petition

The petitioners are now before the Court to seek the reversal of the CA rulings on grounds that the court gravely erred when it set aside the NLRC’s denial of
Constantino’s claim for disability benefits and awarded him permanent partial disability compensation, plus attorney’s fees. They submit that the evidence on record
supports their position that Constantino is not entitled to his claim and, for thisreason, he is likewise not entitled to attorney’s fees.

They bewail the CA’s reliance on Dr. Almeda’s conclusion that Constantino suffered from a permanent partial disability with a Grade 11 impediment when he
examined him only once and without any indication that the doctor subjected Constantino toany treatment at all. The petitioners decry the appellate court’s refusal
to give any weight to the evidence they submitted consisting of (1) medical reports which chronicled the medical management of Constantino’s condition undertaken
by their accredited doctors and, (2) the certificate of fitness for work executed by Constantino himself. They are at a loss, they submit, how the CA could have arrived
at its sweeping conclusions.

On the award of attorney’s fees, the petitioners maintain that the CA decision in favor of Constantino is nota sufficient reason for the award. They argue that their
refusal to pay disability compensation to Constantino was based on sound medical advice and the provisions of the POEA-SEC. They believe their refusal to grant
Constantino’s disability claim cannot be said to be in bad faith as to entitle him to attorney’s fees.

The Case for Constantino

By way of his Comment18 and Memorandum,19 Constantino asks the Court that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit, contending that the CA correctly
disregarded the fit-to-work declaration of Dr. Lim, the companydesignated physician, because "he is not a specialist in the field of orthopedics and he is therefore
not specially trained to examine and treat the respondent’s injury;"20 whereas, his chosen physician, Dr. Almeda, "is a specialist in occupational medicine and
orthopedics and arthroscopic and ankle surgery x x x" and "is in a better position to examine and evaluate the injury of the respondent."21 He adds that the company-
designated physician does not have the exclusive authority to determine the disability of the seafarer as he is, "more often than not, bias (sic) in favor of their (sic)
employer."22 Lastly, Constantino maintains that as he was unable to perform his customary work for more than five months or for more than 120 days (from April
25, 2002 when he was repatriated to October 2, 2002 when he was declared fit to work by Dr. Lim), he should be considered as suffering from permanent disability.

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition meritorious.

First. The employment relationship between Constantino and the petitioners is governed by the POEA-SEC, otherwise known as the Amended Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels.23 Thus, when the seafarer enters into an individual contract with the
employer, as Constantino did in February 2002,24 the terms and conditions of the contract must be in accordance with the POEA-SEC and shall be strictly and
faithfully observed.25 It is customary therefore that the individual contract between the seafarer and the employer (such as the contract between Constantino and
the petitioners) is verified and approved by the POEA. Ashad been declared by the Court in an earlier ruling, the POEA-SEC is the law between the parties, together
with their CBA, if there any.26

Under the POEA-SEC, it is the company-designated physician who declares the fitness to work of a seafarer who sustains a work-related injury/illnes or the degree
of the seafarer’s disability. Section 20 (B) 3 of the POEA-SEC provides:

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer shall be entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work
or the degree of his permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundredtwenty (120
days) (emphasis and underscoring ours).

We cannot fault VA Guerrero and the NLRC for dismissing the complaint as it was in accordance with the above-cited provision of the POEA-SEC. Dr. Lim, the
company-designated physician, declared Constantino fit to work after almost six months of extensive examination, treatment and rehabilitation (therapy sessions)
by the company-accredited specialists, including an orthopedic surgeon, upon his repatriation.

The CA rejected Dr. Lim’s declaration, holding that it was not based on his own personal assessment but on the opinion of an orthopedic surgeon whose medical
report was not even presented. It also questioned Dr. Lim’s competence in making the declaration considering, as it observed, he is not a specialist in orthopedics.
It gave more credence to the unfit-to-work assessment of Dr. Almeda, Constantino’s physician of his choice, as he is more qualified to make the assessment since
he specializes in occupational medicine and orthopedics.

We find the CA’s conclusion flawed. It lost sight of the fact that Dr. Almeda examined Constantino only once(at most for several hours) and he only interpreted the
medical findings of the company-accredited doctors. In short, he applied his expertise on existing medical findings of other physicians. It also totally disregarded the
petitioners submission that its team of doctors examined and treatedConstantino 12 times for a period of almost six months and, each time they treated him, they
issued a report of Constantino’s medical condition, the particular treatment administered and medicines prescribed, which eventually became the basis of Dr. Lim’s
fit-towork declaration.
We thus find no merit on Constantino’s objections on Dr. Lim’s qualification or the lack of it when Dr. Lim declared him fit to work.1âwphi1 Since Constantino failed
to showany bad faith that attended the company doctors’ medical reports, or that the reports were self-serving and were issued to allow the petitioners to avoid
liability, we rule that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in its ruling; in short, the NLRC ruling is in accord with the facts and the law.

In Philippine Hammonia,27 where we encountereda similar disability claim, we said: "Dumadag cannot insist that the ‘favorable’ reports of his physicians be chosen
over the certification of the company-designated physician, especially if we were to consider that the physicians he consulted examined him for only for a day (or
shorter) on four different dates x x x Moreover, we point out that they merelyrelied on the same medical history, diagnoses and analyses provided by the company-
designated specialists. Under the circumstances, we cannot simply say that their findings are more reliable than the conclusions of the company-designated
physicians"28 (underscoring ours).

Second. There is no dispute that under the POEA-SEC, Constantino was not precluded from seeking a second opinionon his medical condition or disability. The
third paragraph of the Section 20 (B)3 of the POEA-SEC states that "If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment (of the company-designated
physician), a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties
(underscoring, emphasis and phrase in parentheses ours).

Constantino did consult on May 31, 200329 with Dr. Almeda whose assessment of his medical condition and disability disagreed with that of Dr. Lim. Dr. Almeda
found Constantino unfit to work, although he gave him a POEA-SEC Grade 11 impediment equivalent to permanent partial disability as compared with the fit-to-work
assesssement of Dr. Lim who managed the petitioners’ medical team handling Constantino’s treatment and rehabilitation.

The disagreement should have been referred to a third doctor for final determination, jointly by Constantino and the petitioners. There was no such referral. To our
mind, the non-referral cannot be blamed on the petitioners. Since Constantino consulted with Dr. Almeda without informing the petitioners, he should have actively
requestedthat the disagreement between his doctor’s assessment and that of Dr. Lim be referred to a final and binding third opinion.

In the absence of any request from Constantino (as shown by the records of the case), the employer-company cannot be expected to respond. As the party seeking
to impugn the certification that the law itself recognizes as prevailing, Constantino bears the burden of positive action to prove that his doctor’s findings are correct,
as well as the burden to notify the company that a contrary finding had been madeby his own physician. Upon such notification, the company must itself respond by
setting into motion the process of choosing a third doctor who,as the POEA-SEC provides, can rule with finality on the disputed medical situation.

In the absence of a third doctor resolution of the conflicting assessments between Dr. Lim and Dr. Almeda, Dr. Lim’s assessment of Constantino’s health should
stand.30 Thus, the CA’s conclusion that Constantino's inability to work for more than 120 days rendered him permanently disabled cannot be sustained.

Third. In light of the above discussion, the Certificate of Fitness for Work executed by Constantino cannot be a quitclaim that should be looked upon with disfavor. It
signified, as earlier pointed out, his concurrence with the Dr. Lim's fit-to-work declaration. Moreover, nothing in the records substantiates his submission that he
signed the document only because the petitioners assured him of re-deployment or that he applied for redeployment but was refused. WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE and the October 28,
2005 resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is reinstated. The complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.