Ramnani v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 731 (1991) PDF

9/27/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 196
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 731

Ramnani vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 85494. May 7, 1991.
CHOITHRAM JETHMAL RAMNANI AND/OR

NIRMLA V. RAMNANI AND MOTI G.
RAMNANI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, SPOUSES ISHWAR JETHMAL
RAMNANI, SONYA JETHMAL RAMNANI
and OVERSEAS HOLDING CO., LTD.,
respondents.
*
G.R. No. 85496. May 7, 1991.
SPOUSES ISHWAR JETHMAL RAMNANI

AND SONYA JETHMAL RAMNANI,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, ORTIGAS & CO., LTD.
PARTNERSHIP, and OVERSEAS HOLDING
CO., LTD., respondents.
Mortgage; Considering that the purported

mortgage of the properties subject of this litigation
appears to be fraudulent and simulated, the same is
declared null and void.—This purported mortgage of
the subject properties in litigation appears to be
fraudulent and simulated. The stated amount of $3
Million for which it was mortgaged is much more
than the value of the mortgaged properties and its
improvements. The alleged mortgageecompany
(Overseas) was organized only on June 26, 1989 but
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016619c4eda85676cb9a003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/58
the mortgage was executed much earlier, on June

20, 1989, that is six (6) days before Overseas was
organized. Overseas is a “shelf” company worth only
$100.00. In the manifestation of spouses Ishwar
dated April 1, 1991, the Court was informed that
this matter was brought to the attention of the
Central Bank (CB) for investigation, and that in a
letter of March 20, 1991, the CB informed counsel
for spouses Ishwar that said alleged foreign loan
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
732
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
of Choithram, et al. from Overseas has not been

previously approved/ registered with the CB.
Obviously, this is another ploy of Choithram, et al.
to place these properties beyond the reach of spouses
Ishwar should they obtain a favorable judgment in
this case. The Court finds and so declares that this
alleged mortgage should be as it is hereby declared
null and void.
Agency; Power of Attorney, Revocation of; The
publication of the notice of revocation of the power of
attorney in the Manila Times, a newspaper of general
circulation, is sufficient warning to third persons,
including Ortigas.—The problem is compounded in
that respondent Ortigas is caught in the web of this
bitter fight. It had all the time been dealing with
Choithram as attorneyinfact of Ishwar. However,
evidence had been adduced that notice in writing

had been served not only on Choithram, but also on
Ortigas, of the revocation of Choithram’s power of
attorney by Ishwar’s lawyer, on May 24, 1971. A
publication of said notice was made in the April 2,
1971 issue of The Manila Times for the information
of the general public. Such notice of revocation in a
newspaper of general circulation is sufficient
warning to third persons including Ortigas. A notice
of revocation was also registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on March 29, 1971.
Indeed in the letter of Choithram to Ishwar of June
25, 1971, Choithram was pleading that Ishwar
execute another power of attorney to be shown to
Ortigas who apparently learned of the revocation of
Choithram’s power of attorney. Despite said notices,
Ortigas nevertheless acceded to the representation
of Choithram, as alleged attorneyinfact of Ishwar,
to assign the rights of petitioner Ishwar to Nirmla.
While the primary blame should be laid at the
doorstep of Choithram, Ortigas is not entirely
without fault. It should have required Choithram to
secure another power of attorney from Ishwar. For
recklessly believing the pretension of Choithram
that his power of attorney was still good, it must,
therefore, share in the latter’s liability to Ishwar.
Property; Implied Trust; As defendant Nirmla
Ramnani acquired the property subject matter of
litigation by means of fraud, the transfer of said
property in her favor should be considered to have
created an implied trust for the benefit of plaintiff
spouses.—In said amended complaint, spouses
Ishwar, among others, pray for payment of actual
damages in an amount no less than the value of the
properties in litigation instead of a reconveyance as
sought in the original complaint. Apparently they
opted not to insist on a reconveyance as they are
American citizens as alleged in the amended
complaint. The allegations of the amended complaint

above reproduced clearly spelled
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VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 733
out that the transfer of the property to Nirmla was

fraudulent and that it should be considered to be
held in trust by Nirmla for spouses Ishwar. As
abovediscussed, this allegation is welltaken and
the transfer of the property to Nirmla should be
considered to have created an implied trust by
Nirmla as trustee of the property for the benefit of
spouses Ishwar.”
Civil Procedure; Provisional Remedies;
Injunction; Evidence shows that the defendants have
committed and threaten to commit further acts of
disposition of the properties in litigation, apparently
designed to render ineffective any judgment in favor
of plaintiffspouses, hence, their motion to dissolve
the writ of preliminary injunction should be denied.
—The motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction filed by Choithram, et al. should be
denied. Its issuance by this Court is proper and
warranted under the circumstances of the case. x x x
As above extensively discussed, Choithram, et al.
have committed and threaten to commit further acts
of disposition of the properties in litigation as well as
the other assets of Choithram, apparently designed
to render ineffective any judgment the Court may
render favorable to spouses Ishwar. The purpose of
the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction is
to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the
litigation and to protect the rights of the spouses
Ishwar respecting the subject of the action during

the pendency of the suit, and not to obstruct the
administation of justice or prejudice the adverse
party. In this case for damages, should Choithram,
et al. continue to commit acts of disposition of the
properties subject of the litigation, an award of
damages to spouses Ishwar would thereby be
rendered ineffectual and meaningless.
Partnership; We have here a situation where two
brothers engaged in a business venture, with one
furnishing the capital, and the other contributing his
industry and talent. Justice and equity dictate that
the two share equally the fruit of their joint
investment and efforts.—Nevertheless, under the
peculiar circumstances of this case and despite the
fact that Choithram, et al., have committed acts
which demonstrate their bad faith and scheme to
defraud spouses Ishwar and Sonya of their rightful
share in the properties in litigation, the Court
cannot ignore the fact that Choithram must have
been motivated by a strong conviction that as the
industrial partner in the acquisition of said assets he
has as much claim to said properties as Ishwar, the
capitalist partner in the joint venture. The scenario
is clear. Spouses Ishwar supplied the capital of
$150,000.00 for the business. They entrusted the
money to Choithram to invest in a
734
profitable business venture in the Philippines. For

this purpose they appointed Choithram as their
attorneyinfact. Choithram in turn decided to invest
in the real estate business. He bought the two (2)

parcels of land in question from Ortigas as attorney
infact of Ishwar. Instead of paying for the lots in
cash, he paid in installments and used the balance of
the capital entrusted to him, plus a loan, to build
two buildings. Although the buildings were burned
later, Choithram was able to build two other
buildings on the property. He rented them out and
collected the rentals. Through the industry and
genius of Choithram, Ishwar’s property was
developed and improved into what it is now—a
valuable asset worth millions of pesos. As of the last
estimate in 1985, while the case was pending before
the trial court, the market value of the properties is
no less than P22,304,000.00. It should be worth
much more today. We have a situation where two
brothers engaged in a business venture. One
furnished the capital, the other contributed his
industry and talent. Justice and equity dictate that
the two share equally the fruit of their joint
investment and efforts. Perhaps this Solomonic
solution may pave the way towards their
reconciliation. Both would stand to gain. No one
would end up the loser. After all, blood is thicker
than water.
Damages; Since the defendants acted with
evident bad faith and malice, they are liable for
moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s
fees.—However, the Court cannot just close its eyes
to the devious machinations and schemes that
Choithram employed in attempting to dispose of, if
not dissipate, the properties to deprive spouses
Ishwar of any possible means to recover any award
the Court may grant in their favor. Since Choithram,
et al. acted with evident bad faith and malice, they
should pay moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees to spouses Ishwar.
PETITION for review from the judgment of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the

Court.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña and
Nolasco for petitioners Ishwar Jethmal
Ramnani & Sonya Ramnani.
Salonga, Andres, Hernandez & Allado
for Choithram Jethmal Ramnani, Nirmla
Ramnani & Moti Ramnani.
Rama Law Office for private respondents
in collaboration with Salonga, Andres,
Hernandez & Allado.
Eulogio R. Rodriguez for Ortigas & Co.,
Ltd.
735
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 735

GANCAYCO, J.:
This case involves the bitter quarrel of two

brothers over two (2) parcels of land and its
improvements now worth a fortune. The bone
of contention is the apparently conflicting
factual findings of the trial court and the
appellate court, the resolution of which will
materially affect the result of the contest.
The following facts are not disputed.
Ishwar, Choithram and Navalrai, all
surnamed Jethmal Ramnani, are brothers of
the full blood. Ishwar and his spouse Sonya had
their main business based in New York.
Realizing the difficulty of managing their
investments in the Philippines they executed a
general power of attorney on January 24, 1966
appointing Navalrai and Choithram as

attorneysinfact, empowering them to manage
and conduct 1
their business concern in the
Philippines.
On February 1, 1966 and on May 16, 1966,
Choithram, in his capacity as aforesaid
attorneyinfact of Ishwar, entered into two
agreements for the purchase of two parcels of
land located in Barrio Ugong, Pasig, Rizal,
from Ortigas & Company, Ltd. Partnership
(Ortigas for short) with a total area 2
of
approximately 10,048 square meters. Per
agreement, Choithram paid the down payment
and installments on the lot with his personal
checks. A building was constructed thereon by
Choithram in 1966 and this was occupied and
rented by Jethmal Industries and a wardrobe
shop called Eppie’s Creation. Three other
buildings were built thereon by Choithram
through a loan of P100,000.00 obtained from
the Merchants Bank as well as the income
derived from the first building. The buildings
were leased out by Choithram as attorneyin
fact of Ishwar. Two of these buildings were
later burned.
Sometime in 1970 Ishwar asked Choithram
to account for the income and expenses relative
to these properties during the period 1967 to
1970. Choithram failed and refused to render
such accounting. As a consequence, on
February 4, 1971, Ishwar revoked the general
power of attorney. Choithram and Ortigas
were duly notified of such revocation on April
1, 1971
_______________
1 Exhibit A.
2 Exhibits B and C.
736
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
3
and May 24, 1971, respectively. Said notice
was also registered with the Securities4 and
Exchange Commission on March 29, 1971 and
was published in the April 2, 1971 issue of The
Manila Times5 for the information of the
general public.
Nevertheless, Choithram as such attorney
infact of Ishwar, transferred all rights and
interests of Ishwar and Sonya in favor of his
daughterinlaw, Nirmla Ramnani, on
February 19, 1973. Her husband is Moti, son of
Choithram. Upon complete payment of the lots,
Ortigas executed the corresponding
6
deeds of
sale in favor of Nirmla. Transfer Certificates
of Titlle Nos. 403150 and 403152 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal were issued in her
favor.
Thus, on October 6, 1982, Ishwar and Sonya
(spouses Ishwar for short) filed a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal against
Choitram and/or spouses Nirmla and Moti
(Choithram, et al. for brevity) and Ortigas for
reconveyance of said properties or payment of
its value and damages. An amended complaint
for damages was thereafter filed by said
spouses.
After the issues were joined and the trial on
the merits, a decision was rendered by the trial
court on December 3, 1985 dismissing the
complaint and counterclaim. A motion for
reconsideration thereof filed by spouses Ishwar
was denied on March 3, 1986.
An appeal therefrom was interposed by

spouses Ishwar to the Court of Appeals
wherein in due course a decision was
promulgated on March 14, 1988, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

reversing and setting aside the appealed decision of
the lower court dated December 3, 1985 and the
Order dated March 3, 1986 which denied plaintiffs
appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration from
aforesaid decision. A new decision is hereby
rendered sentencing defendantsappellees
Choithram Jethmal Ramnani, Nirmla V.
Ramnani, Moti C. Ramnani, and Orti
_______________
3 Exhibit 3.
4 Exhibit H.
5 Exhibit F.
6 Exhibits and J.
737
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 737

gas and Company Limited Partnership to pay,

jointly and severally, plaintiffsappellants the
following:
1. Actual or compensatory damages to the

extent of the fair market value of the
properties in question and all improvements
thereon covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 403150 and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 403152 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal, prevailing at the time of the
satisfaction of the judgment but in no case

shall such damages be less than the value of
said properties as appraised by Asian
Appraisal, Inc. in its Appraisal Report dated
August 1985 (Exhibits T to T14, inclusive).
2. All rental incomes paid or ought to be paid
for the use and occupancy of the properties
in question and all improvements thereon
consisting of buildings, and to be computed
as follows:
a) On Building C occupied by Eppie’s Creation

and Jethmal Industries from 1967 to 1973,
inclusive, based on the 1967 to 1973 monthly
rentals paid by Eppie’s Creation;
b) Also on Building C above, occupied by
Jethmal Industries and Lavine from 1974 to
1978, the rental incomes based on then rates
prevailing as shown under Exhibit ‘P’; and
from 1979 to 1981, based on then prevailing
rates as indicated under Exhibit ‘Q’;
c) On Building A occupied by Transworld
Knitting Mills from 1972 to 1978, the rental
incomes based upon then prevailing rates
shown under Exhibit ‘P’, and from 1979 to
1981, based on prevailing rates per Exhibit
‘Q’;
d) On the twoBays Buildings occupied by
SigmaMariwasa from 1972 to 1978, the
rentals based on the Lease Contract, Exhibit
‘P’, and from 1979 to 1980, the rentals based
on the Lease Contract, Exhibit ‘Q’,
and thereafter commencing 1982, to account for

and turn over the rental incomes paid or ought to be
paid for the use and occupancy of the properties and
all improvements totalling 10,048 sq. m., based on
the rate per square meter prevailing in 1981 as
indicated annually cumulative up to 1984. Then,

commencing 1985 and up to the satisfaction of the
judgment, rentals shall be computed at ten percent
(10%) annually of the fair market values of the
properties as appraised by the Asian Appraisal, Inc.
in August 1985 (Exhibits T to T14, inclusive.)
3. Moral damages in the sum of P200,000.00;

4. Exemplary damages in the sum of
P100,000.00;
5. Attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the
award herein made;
6. Legal interest on the total amount awarded
computed from first demand in 1967 and
until the full amount is paid and satisfied;
738

and
7
7. The cost of suit.”
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by

Choithram, et al. and Ortigas, the appellate
court promulgated an amended decision on
October 17, 1988 granting the motion for
reconsideration of Ortigas by affirming the
dismissal of the case by the lower court as
against Ortigas but denying the 8 motion for
reconsideration of Choithram, et al.
Choithram, et al. thereafter filed a petition
for review of said judgment of the appellate
court alleging the following grounds:
“1. The Court of Appeals gravely abused

its discretion in making a factual
finding not supported by and contrary

to the evidence presented at the Trial
Court.
2. The Court of Appeals acted in excess
of jurisdiction in awarding damages
based on the value of the real
properties in question where the cause
of action of private respondents is
recovery of a sum of money.
ARGUMENTS
THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN GRAVE

ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING A
FACTUAL FINDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT ISHWAR REMITTED THE
AMOUNT OF US$150,000.00 TO PETITIONER
CHOITHRAM IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF
SUCH REMITTANCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
MANIFEST PARTIALITY IN DISREGARDING
THE
_______________
7 Pages 80 to 82, Rollo of G.R. No. 85496; pages 55 to 57, G.R.

No. 85494; Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Nocon was the ponente,
concurred in separate opinions by Justices Ricardo P. Tensuan
and Manuel C. Herrera. Justices Felipe B. Kalalo and Venancio
D. Aldecoa, Jr., both dissented in separate the opinions and voted
to affirm the decision of the trial court.
8 The five justices wrote separate opinions.
739
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 739

TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS BASED ON THE

DIRECT DOCUMENTARY AND TESTIMONIAL
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY CHOITHRAM IN
THE TRIAL COURT ESTABLISHING THAT THE
PROPERTIES WERE PURCHASED WITH
PERSONAL FUNDS OF PETITIONER
CHOITHRAM AND NOT WITH MONEY
ALLEGEDLY REMITTED BY RESPONDENT
ISHWAR.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AWARDING
DAMAGES BASED ON THE VALUE OF THE
PROPERTIES AND THE FRUITS
9
OF THE
IMPROVEMENTS THEREON.”
Similarly, spouses Ishwar filed a petition for

review of said amended decision of the
appellate court exculpating Ortigas of liability
based on the following assigned errors—
“I
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR AND
HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND/OR WITH
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT—
A) IN PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED

AMENDED DECISION (ANNEX ‘A’)
RELIEVING RESPONDENT ORTIGAS
FROM LIABILITY AND DISMISSING
PETITIONERS’ AMENDED COMPLAINT
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 534P, AS AGAINST

SAID RESPONDENT ORTIGAS;
B) IN HOLDING IN SAID AMENDED
DECISION THAT AT ANY RATE NO ONE
EVER TESTIFIED THAT ORTIGAS WAS A
SUBSCRIBER TO THE MANILA TIMES
PUBLICATION OR THAT ANY OF ITS
OFFICERS READ THE NOTICE AS
PUBLISHED IN THE MANILA TIMES,
THEREBY ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDING
THAT FOR RESPONDENT ORTIGAS TO
BE CONSTRUCTIVELY BOUND BY THE
PUBLISHED NOTICE OF REVOCATION,
ORTIGAS AND/OR ANY OF ITS OFFICERS
MUST BE A SUBSCRIBER AND/OR THAT
ANY OF ITS OFFICERS SHOULD READ
THE NOTICE AS ACTUALLY PUBLISHED;
C) IN HOLDING IN SAID AMENDED
DECISION THAT
_______________
9 Pages 15 and 16, Rollo, G.R. No. 85494.
740

ORTIGAS COULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE

JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY WITH THE
DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES CHOITHRAM,
MOTI AND NIRMLA RAMNANI, AS
ORTIGAS RELIED ON THE WORD OF
CHOITHRAM THAT ALL ALONG HE WAS
ACTING FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HIS
BROTHER ISHWAR WHEN IT
TRANSFERRED THE RIGHTS OF THE

LATTER TO NIRMLA V. RAMNANI;
D) IN IGNORING THE EVIDENCE DULY
PRESENTED AND ADMITTED DURING
THE TRIAL THAT ORTIGAS WAS
PROPERLY NOTIFIED OF THE NOTICE
OF REVOCATION OF THE GENERAL
POWER OF ATTORNEY GIVEN TO
CHOITHRAM, EVIDENCED BY THE
PUBLICATION IN THE MANILA TIMES
ISSUE OF APRIL 2, 1971 (EXH. F) WHICH
CONSTITUTES NOTICE TO THE WHOLE
WORLD; THE RECEIPT OF THE NOTICE
OF SUCH REVOCATION WHICH WAS
SENT TO ORTIGAS ON MAY 22, 1971 BY
ATTY. MARIANO P. MARCOS AND
RECEIVED BY ORTIGAS ON MAY 24, 1971
(EXH. G) AND THE FILING OF THE
NOTICE WITH THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON MARCH
29, 1971 (EXH.H);
E) IN DISCARDING ITS FINDINGS
CONTAINED IN ITS DECISION OF 14
MARCH 1988 (ANNEX B) THAT ORTIGAS
WAS DULY NOTIFIED OF THE
REVOCATION OF THE POWER OF
ATTORNEY OF CHOITHRAM, HENCE
ORTIGAS ACTED IN BAD FAITH IN
EXECUTING THE DEED OF SALE TO
THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION IN
FAVOR OF NIRMLA V. RAMNANI;
F) IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT ORTIGAS
VACUOUS REHASHED ARGUMENTS IN
ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
THAT IT WOULD NOT GAIN ONE
CENTAVO MORE FROM CHOITHRAM
FOR THE SALE OF SAID LOTS AND THE
SUBSEQUENT TRANSFER OF THE SAME
TO THE LATTER’S DAUGHTERINLAW,

AND THAT IT WAS IN GOOD FAITH
WHEN IT TRANSFERRED ISHWAR’S
RIGHTS TO THE LOTS IN QUESTION.
II
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDING WHEN IT HELD IN THE
QUESTIONED AMENDED DECISION OF 17
NOVEMBER 1988 (ANNEX A) THAT
RESPONDENT ORTIGAS & CO., LTD., IS NOT
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH
DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES
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VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 741

CHOITHRAM, MOTI AND NIRMLA RAMNANI IN

SPITE OF ITS ORIGINAL DECISION OF 14
MARCH 1988 THAT ORTIGAS ‘WAS DULY
NOTIFIED OF THE REVOCATION OF THE
POWER OF 10
ATTORNEY OF CHOITHRAM
RAMNANI.”
The center of controversy is the testimony of

Ishwar that during the latter part of 1965, he
sent the amount of US$150,000.00 to
Choithram in two bank drafts of US$65,000.00
and US$85,000.00 for the purpose of investing
the same in real estate in the Philippines. The
trial court considered this lone testimony
unworthy of faith and credit. On the other
hand, the appellate court found that the trial
court misapprehended the facts in complete
disregard of the evidence, documentary and

testimonial.
Another crucial issue is the claim of
Choithram that because he was then a British
citizen, as a temporary arrangement, he
arranged the purchase of the properties in the
name of Ishwar who was an American citizen
and who was then qualified to purchase
property in the Philippines under the then
Parity Amendment. The trial court believed
this account but it was debunked by the
appellate court.
As to the issue of whether of not spouses
Ishwar actually sent US$150,000.00 to
Choithram precisely to be used in the real
estate business, the trial court made the
following disquisition—
“After a careful, considered and conscientious

examination of the evidence adduced int he case at
bar, plaintiff Ishwar Jethmal Ramanani’s main
evidence, which centers on the alleged payment by
sending through registered mail from New York two
(2) US$ drafts of $85,000.00 and $65,000.00 in the
latter part of 1965 (TSN 28 Feb. 1984, p. 1011). The
sending of these moneys were before the execution
of that General Power of Attorney, which was dated
in New York, on January 24, 1966. Because of these
alleged remittances of US$150,000.00 and the
subsequent acquisition of the properties in question,
plaintiffs averred that they constituted a trust in
favor of defendant Choithram Jethmal Ramnani.
This Court can be in full agreement if the plaintiffs
were only able to prove preponderantly these
remittances. The entire record of this case is bereft
of even a shred of proof to that effect. It is
completely
_______________
10 Pages 23 to 24, Rollo, G.R. No. 85496.
742

barren. His uncorroborated testimony that he

remitted these amounts in the ‘later part of 1965’
does not engender enough faith and credence.
Inadequacy of details of such remittance on the two
(2) US dollar drafts in such big amounts is
completely not positive, credible, probable and
entirely not in accord with human experience. This
is a classic situation, plaintiffs not exhibiting any
commercial document or any document and/or paper
as regard to these alleged remittances. Plaintiff
Ishwar Ramnani is not an ordinary businessman in
the strict sense of the word. Remember his main
business is based in New York, and he should know
better how to send these alleged remittances. Worst,
plaintiffs did not present even a scum of proof, that
defendant Choithram Ramnani received the alleged
two US dollar drafts. Significantly, he does not know
even the bank where these two (2) US dollar drafts
were purchased. Indeed, plaintiff Ishwar Ramnani’s
lone testimony is unworthy of faith and credit and,
therefore, deserves scant consideration, and since
the plaintiffs’ theory is built or based on such
testimony, their cause of action collapses or falls
with it.
Further, the rate of exchange that time in 1966
was P4.00 to $1.00. The alleged two US dollar drafts
amounted to $150,000.00 or about P600,000.00.
Assuming the cash price of the two (2) lots was only
P530,000.00 (ALTHOUGH he said: ‘Based on my
knowledge I have no evidence,’ when asked if he even
knows the cash price of the two lots). If he were
really the true and bonafide investor and purchaser

for profit as he asserted, he could have paid the price
in full in cash directly and obtained the title in his
name and not thru ‘Contracts To Sell’ in
installments paying interest and thru an attorney
infact (TSN of May 2, 1984, pp. 1011) and, again,
plaintiff Ishwar Ramnani told this Court that he
does not know whether or not his late fatherinlaw
borrowed the two US dollar drafts from the Swiss
Bank or whether or not his late fatherinlaw had
any debit memo11from the Swiss Bank (TSN of May 2,
1984, pp. 910).
On the other hand, the appellate court, in

giving credence to the version of Ishwar, had
this to say—
“While it is true, that generally the findings of fact

of the trial court are binding upon the appellate
courts, said rule admits of exceptions such as when
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the
inferences made is manifestly mistaken, absurd and
impossible; (3) when
_______________
743
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 743

there is grave abuse of disretion; (4) when the

judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
and when the court, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee (Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 33;

Philippine American Life Assurance Co. vs. San
tamaria, 31 SCRA 798; Aldaba vs. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA 189).
The evidence on record shows that the trial court
acted under a misapprehension of facts and the
inferences made on the evidence palpably a mistake.
The trial court’s observation that ‘the entire
records of the case is bereft of even a shred of proof’
that plaintiffsappellants have remitted to defendant
appellee Choithram Ramnani the amount of
US$150,000.00 for investment in real estate in the
Philippines, is not borne by the evidence on record
and shows the trial court’s misapprehension of the
facts if not a complete disregard of the evidence, both
documentary and testimonial.
Plaintiffappellant Ishwar Jethmal Ramnani
testifying in his own behalf, declared that during the
latter part of 1965, he sent the amount of
US$150,000.00 to his brother Choithram in two
bank drafts of US$65,000.00 and US$85,000.00 for
the purpose of investing the same in real estate in
the Philippines. His testimony is as follows:
‘ATTY. MARAPAO:
Mr. Witness, you said that your attorney
infact paid in your behalf. Can you tell this
Honorable Court where your attorneyin
fact got the money to pay this property?
‘ATTY. CRUZ:
Wait. It is now clear it becomes
incompetent or hearsay.
‘COURT:
Witness can aswer.
‘A I paid through my attorneyinfact. I am the
one who gave him the money.
‘ATTY. MARAPAO:
‘Q You gave him the money?

‘A That’s right.
‘Q How much money did you give him?
‘A US$150,000.00.
‘Q How was it given then?
‘A Through Bank drafts. US$65,000.00 and
US$85,000.00 bank drafts. The total
amount which is $150,000.00 (TSN, 28
February 1984, p. 10; italics supplied.)
xx xxx xx
‘ATTY. CRUZ:
744

ANNOTATED
‘Q The two bank drafts which you sent I

assume you bought that from some banks
in New York?
‘A No, sir.
‘Q But there is no question those two bank
drafts were for the purpose of paying down
payment and installment of the two parcels
of land?
‘A Down payment, installment and to put up
the building.
‘Q I thought you said that the buildings were
constructed xxxx subject to our continuing
objection from rentals of first building.
‘ATTY. MARAPAO:
Your Honor, that is misleading.
‘COURT;
Witness (may) answer.

‘A Yes, the first building was immediately put
up after the purchase of the two parcels of
land—that was in 1966 and the funds were
used for the construction of the building
from the US$150,000.00 (TSN, 7 March
1984, page 14; italics supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
‘Q These two bank drafts which you
mentioned and the use for it you sent them
by registered mail, did you send them from
New Your?
‘A That is right.
‘Q And the two bank drafts which were put in
the registered mail, the registered mail was
addressed to whom?
‘A Choithram Ramnani.’ (TSN, 7 March 1984,
pp. 1415).
On crossexamination, the witness reiterated

the remittance of the money to his brother
Choithram, which was sent to him by his
fatherinlaw, Rochiram L. Mulchandoni from
Switzerland, a man of immense wealth, which
even defendantsappellees’ witness Navalrai
Ramnani admits to be so (tsn., p. 16, S. Oct.
13, 1985). Thus, on crossexamination, Ishwar
testified as follows:
‘Q How did you receive these two bank drafts

from the bank the name of which you
cannot remember?
‘A I got it from my fatherinlaw.
‘Q From where did your fatherinlaw sent
these two bank drafts?
‘A From Switzerland.
‘Q He was in Switzerland.
745
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 745

‘A Probably, they sent out these two drafts from

Switzerland.’ (TSN, 7 March 1984, pp. 1617; italics
supplied.)
This positive and affirmative testimony of plaintiff

appellant that he sent the two (2) bank drafts
totalling US$150,000.00 to his brother, is proof of
said remittance. Such positive testimony has greater
probative force than defendantappellee’s denial of
receipt of said bank drafts, for a witness who
testifies affirmatively that something did happen
should be believed for it is unlikely that a witness
will remember what never happened (Underhill’s Cr.
Guidance, 5th Ed., Vol. I, pp. 1011).
That is not all. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff
appellant Ishwar Ramnani executed a General
Power of Attorney (Exhibit ‘A’) dated January 24,
1966 appointing his brothers, defendantsappellees
Navalrai and Choithram as attorneyinfact
empowering the latter to conduct and manage
plaintiffsappellants’ business affairs in the
Philippines and specifically—
‘No. 14. To acquire, purchase for us, real estates and

improvements for the purpose of real estate business
anywhere in the Philippines and to develop, subdivide,
improve and to resell to buying public (individual, firm or
corporation); to enter in any contract of sale in our behalf
and to enter mortgages between the vendees and the
herein grantors that may be needed to finance the real
estate business being undertaken.’
Pursuant thereto, on February 1, 1966 and May

16, 1966, Choithram Jethmal Ramnani entered into
Agreements (Exhibits ‘B’ and ‘C’) with the other
defendant. Ortigas and Company, Ltd., for the
purchase of two (2) parcels of land situated at Barrio
Ugong, Pasig, Rizal, with said defendantappellee
signing the Agreements in his capacity as Attorney
infact of Ishwar Jethmal Ramnani.
Again, on January 5, 1972, almost seven (7) years
after Ishwar sent the US$150,000.00 in 1965,
Choithram Ramnani, as attorneyinfact of Ishwar
entered into a Contract of Lease with Sigma
Mariwasa (Exhibit ‘P’) thereby reaffirming the
ownership of Ishwar over the disputed property and
the trust relationship between the latter as principal
and Choithram as attorneyinfact of Ishwar.
All of these facts indicate that if plaintiff
appellant Ishwar had not earlier sent the
US$150,000.00 to his brother, Choithram, there
would be no purpose for him to execute a power of
attorney appointing his brothers as his attorneyin
fact in buying real estate in the Philippines.
As against Choithram’s denial that he did not
receive the US$150,000.00 remitted by Ishwar and
that the Power of Attorney, as
746

well as the Agreements entered into with Ortigas &

Co., were only temporary arrangements, Ishwar’s
testimony that he did send the bank drafts to
Choithram and was received by the latter, is the
more credible version since it is natural, reasonable
and probable. It is in accord with the common
experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary
men (Gardner vs. Wentors, 18 Iowa 533). And in

determining where the superior weight of the
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider the probability or improbability of the
testimony of the witness (Sec. 1, Rule 133, Rules of
Court).
Contrary, therefore, to the trial court’s sweeping
observation that ‘the entire records of the case is
bereft of even a shred of proof’ that Choithram
received the alleged bank drafts amounting to
US$150,000.00, we have not only testimonial
evidence but also documentary and circumstantial
evidence proving said remittance of the money and
the fiduciary
12
relationship between the former and
Ishwar.”
The Court agrees. The environmental

circumstances of this case buttress the claim of
Ishwar that he did entrust the amount of
US$150,000.00 to his brother, Choithram,
which the latter invested in the real property
business subject of this litigation in his
capacity as attorneyinfact of Ishwar.
True it is that there is no receipt whatever
in the possession of Ishwar to evidence the
same, but it is not unusual among brothers and
close family members to entrust money and
valuables to each other without any formalities
or receipt due to the special relationship of
trust between them.
And another proof thereof is the fact that
Ishwar, out of frustration when Choithram
failed to account for the realty business despite
his demands, revoked the general power of
attorney he extended to Choithram and
Navalrai. Thereafter, Choithram wrote a letter
to Ishwar pleading that the power of attorney
be renewed or another authority to the same
effect be extended, which reads as follows:
“June 25, 1971
MR. ISHWAR JETHMAL

NEW YORK
_______________
747
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 747

(1) Send power of Atty. immediately, because

the case has been postponed for two weeks.
The same way as it has been send before in
favour of both names. Send it immediately
otherwise everything will be lost
unnecessarily, and then it will take us in
litigation. Now that we have gone ahead with
a case and would like to end it immediately
otherwise squaters will take the entire land.
Therefore, send it immediately.
(2) Ortigas also has sued us because we are
holding the installments, because they have
refused to give a rebate of P5.00 per meter
which they have to give us as per contract.
They have filed the law suit that since we
have not paid the installment they should
get back the land. The hearing of this case is
in the month of July. Therefore, please send
the power immediately. In one case DADA
(Elder Brother) will represent and in another
one, I shall.
(3) In case if you do not want to give power then
make one letter in favor of Dada and the
other one in my favor showing that in any
litigation we can represent you and your

wife, and whatever the court decide it will
be acceptable by me. You can ask any lawyer,
he will be able to prepare these letters. After
that you can have these letters ratify before
P.I. Consulate. It should be dated April 15,
1971.
(4) Try to send the power because it will be more
useful. Make it in any manner whatever way
you have confident in it. But please send it
immediately.
You have cancelled the power. Therefore, you have

lost your reputation everywhere. What can I further
write you about it. I have told everybody that due to
certain reasons I have written you to do this, that is
why you have done this. This way your reputation
have been kept intact. Otherwise if I want to do
something about it, I can show you that inspite of the
power you have cancelled you can not do anything.
You can keep this letter because my conscience is
clear. I do not have anything in my mind.
I should not be writing you this, but because my
conscience is clear do you know that if I had predated
papers what could you have done? Or do you know
that I have many paper signed by you and if I had
done anything or do then what can you do about it?
It is not necessary to write further about this. It does
not matter if you have cancelled the power. At that
time if I had predated and done something about it
what could you have done? You do not know me. I am
not after money. I can earn money anytime. It has
been ten months since I have not received a single
penny for expenses from Dada (elder brother). Why
there are no expenses? We can not draw a single
penny from knitting (factory). Well I am not going to
write you further, nor there is any need for it. This
much I am writing you because of the way you have
conducted yourself. But remember, whenever I have

the money I will not keep it
748

myself. Right now I have not got anything at all.

I am not going to write any further.
Keep your business clean with Naru. Otherwise
he will discontinue 13because he likes to keep his
business very clean.”
The said letter was in Sindhi language. It was

translated to English by the First Secretary of
the Embassy of Pakistan, which translation
was verified correct by the Chairman, 14
Department of Sindhi, University of Karachi.
From the foregoing letter what could be
gleaned is that—
1. Choithram asked for the issuance of

another power of attorney in their favor
so they can continue to represent
Ishwar as Ortigas has sued them for
unpaid installments. It also appears
therefrom that Ortigas learned of the
revocation of the power of attorney so
the request to issue another.
2. Choithram reassured Ishwar to have
confidence in him as he was not after
money, and that he was not interested
in Ishwar’s money.
3. To demonstrate that he can be relied
upon, he said that he could have ante
dated the sales agreement of the
Ortigas lots before the issuance of the
powers of attorney and acquired the

same in his name, if he wanted to, but
he did not do so.
4. He said he had not received a single
penny for expenses from Dada (their
elder brother Navalrai). Thus,
confirming that if he was not given
money by Ishwar to buy the Ortigas
lots, he could not have consummated
the sale.
5. It is important to note that in said
letter Choithram never claimed
ownership of the property in question.
He affirmed the fact that he bought the
same as mere agent and in behalf of
Ishwar. Neither did he mention the
alleged temporary arrangement
whereby Ishwar, being an American
citizen, shall appear to be the buyer of
the said property, but that after
Choithram acquires Philippine
citizenship, its ownership shall be
transferred to Choithram.
This brings us to this temporary arrangement

theory of Choithram.
The appellate court disposed of this matter
in this wise—
_______________
13 Exhibit R1; italics supplied.

14 See Exhibit R to R3.
749
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 749

“Choithram’s claim that he purchased the two

parcels of land for himself in 1966 but placed it in
the name of his younger brother, Ishwar, who is an
American citizen, as a `temporary arrangement,’
because as a British subject he is disqualified under
the 1935 Constitution to acquire real property in the
Philippines, which is not so with respect to American
citizens in view of the Ordinance Appended to the
Constitution granting them parity rights, there is
nothing in the records showing that Ishwar ever
agreed to such a temporary arrangement.
During the entire period from 1965, when the
US$150,000.00 was transmitted to Choithram, and
until Ishwar filed a complaint against him in 1982,
or over 16 years, Choithram never mentioned of a
temporary arrangement nor can he present any
memorandum or writing evidencing such temporary
arrangement, prompting plaintiffappellant to
observe:
‘The properties in question which are located in a prime

industrial site in Ugong, Pasig, Metro Manila have a
present fair market value of no less than P22,364,000.00
(Exhibits T to T14, inclusive), and yet for such valuable
pieces of property, Choithram who now belatedly claims
that he purchased the same for himself did not document
in writing or in a memorandum the alleged temporary
arrangement with Ishwar’ (pp. 441, Appellant’s Brief).
Such verbal allegation of a temporary

arrangement is simply improbable and inconsistent.
It has repeatedly been held that important contracts
made without evidence are highly improbable.
The improbability of such temporary arrangement
is brought to fore when we consider that Choithram
has a son (Haresh Jethmal Ramnani) who is an
American citizen under whose name the properties in
question could be registered, both during the time the
contracts to sell were executed and at the time
absolute title over the same was to be delivered. At

the time the Agreements were entered into with
defendant Ortigas & Co. in 1966, Haresh, was
already 18 years old and consequently, Choithram
could have executed the deeds in trust for his minor
son. But, he did not do this. Three (3) years,
thereafter, or in 1968 after Haresh had attained the
age of 21, Choithram should have terminated the
temporary arrangement with Ishwar, which
according to him would be effective only pending the
acquisition of citizenship papers. Again, he did not
do anything.
‘Evidence to be believed, said Vice Chancellor Van Fleet of

New Jersey, must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but it must be credible in itself—such as
the common
750

experience and observation of mankind can approve as

probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the
truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is
outside of judicial cognizance.’ (Daggers vs. Van Dyek, 37
M.J. Eq. 130, 132).
Another factor that can be counted against the

temporary arrangement excuse is that upon the
revocation on February 4, 1971 of the Power of
Attorney dated January 24, 1966 in favor of
Navalrai and Choithram by Ishwar, Choithram
wrote (tsn, p. 21, S. July 19, 1985) a letter dated
June 25, 1971 (Exhibits R, R1, R2 and R3)
imploring Ishwar to execute a new power of attorney
in their favor. That if he did not want to give power,

then Ishwar could make a letter in favor of Dada and
another in his favor so that in any litigation
involving the properties in question, both of them
could represent Ishwar and his wife. Choithram tried
to convince Ishwar to issue the power of attorney in
whatever manner he may want. In said letter no
mention was made at all of any temporary
arrangement.
On the contrary, said letter recognize(s) the
existence of principal and attorneyinfact
relationship between Ishwar and himself. Choithram
wrote: ‘x x x do you know that if I had predated
papers what could you have done? Or do you know
that I have many papers signed by you and if I had
done anything or do then what can you do about it?’
Choithram was saying that he could have repudiated
the trust and ran away with the properties of Ishwar
by predating documents and Ishwar would be
entirely helpless. He was bitter as a result of
Ishwar’s revocation of the power of attorney but no
mention was made of any temporary arrangement or
a claim of ownership over the properties in question
nor was he able to present any memorandum or
document to prove the existence of such temporary
arrangement.
Choithram is also estopped in pais or by deed from
claiming an interest over the properties in question
adverse to that of Ishwar. Section 3(a) of Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court states that whenever ‘a party has,
by his own declaration, act, or omission intentionally
and deliberately led another to believe a particular
thing true and act upon such belief, he cannot in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or
omission be permitted to falsify it.’ While estoppel by
deed is a bar which precludes a party to a deed and
his privies from asserting as against the other and
his privies any right of title in derogation of the
deed, or from denying the truth of any material fact

asserted in it (31 C.J.S. 195; 19 Am. Jur. 603).
Thus, defendantsappellees are not permitted to
repudiate their admissions and representations or to
assert any right or title in deroga
751
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 751

tion of the deeds or from denying the truth of any

material fact asserted in the (1) power of attorney
dated January 24, 1966 (Exhibit A); (2) the
Agreements of February 1, 1966 and May 16, 1966
(Exhibits B and C); and (3) the Contract of Lease
dated January 5, 1972 (Exhibit P).
‘x x x The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of

public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its
purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act,
representations, or commitments to the injury of one to
whom they were directed and who reasonably relied
thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable
principles and the equities in the case. It is designed to aid
the law in the administration of justice where without its
aid injustice might result. It has been applied by this court
wherever and whenever special circumstances of a case so
demands’ (Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals,
94 SCRA 357, 368 [1979]).
It was only after the services of counsel has been

obtained that Choithram alleged for the first time in
his Answer that the General Power of Attorney
(Annex A) with the Contracts to Sell (Annexes B and
C) were made only for the sole purpose of assuring
defendants’ acquisition and ownership of the lots
described thereon in due time under the law; that
said instruments do not reflect the true intention of
the parties’ (par. 2, Answer dated May 30, 1983),

seventeen (17) long years from the time he received
the money transmitted to him by his brother, Ishwar.
Moreover, Choithram’s ‘temporary arrangement,’
by which he claimed purchasing the two (2) parcels
in question in 1966 and placing them in the name of
Ishwar who is an American citizen, to circumvent the
disqualification provision of aliens acquiring real
properties in the Philippines under the 1935
Philippine Constitution, as Choithram was then a
British subject, show a palpable disregard of the law
of the land and to sustain the supposed ‘temporary
arrangement’ with Ishwar would be sanctioning the
perpetration of an illegal act and culpable violation
of the Constitution.
Defendantsappellees likewise violated the Anti
Dummy Law (Commonwealth Act 108, as amended),
which provides in Section 1 thereof, that:
‘In all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision

requires Philippine or any other specific citizenship as a
requisite for the exercise or enjoyment of a right, franchise
or privilege, x x x x x x any alien or foreigner profiting
thereby, shall be punished x x x by imprisonment x x x and
of a fine of not less than the value of the right, franchise or
privileges, which is
752

enjoyed or acquired in violation of the provisions hereof x x

x.’
Having come to court with unclean hands,

Choithram must not be permitted to foist his
‘temporary arrangement’ scheme as a defense before
this court. Being in delicto, he does not have any
right whatsoever from being shielded from his own

wrongdoing, which is not so with respect to Ishwar,
who was not a party to such an arrangement.
The falsity of Choithram’s defense is further
aggravated by the material inconsistencies and
contradictions in his testimony. While on January
23, 1985 he testified that he purchased the land in
question on his own behalf (tsn, p. 4, S. Jan. 23,
1985), in the July 18, 1985 hearing, forgetting
probably what he stated before, Choithram testified
that he was only an attorneyinfact of Ishwar (tsn,
p. 5, S. July 18, 1985). Also in the hearing of
January 23, 1985, Choithram declared that nobody
rented the building that was constructed on the
parcels of land in question (tsn, pp. 5 and 6), only to
admit in the hearing of October 30, 1985, that he
was in fact renting the building for P12,000.00 per
annum (tsn, p. 3). Again, in the hearing of July 19,
1985, Choithram testified that he had no knowledge
of the revocation of the Power of Attorney (tsn, pp.
2021), only to backtrack when confronted with the
letter of June 25, 1971 (Exhibits R to R3), which he
admitted to be in ‘his own writing,’ indicating
knowledge of the revocation of the Power of
Attorney.
These inconsistencies are not minor but go into
the entire credibility of the testimony of Choithram
and the rule is that contradictions on a very crucial
point by a witness, renders his testimony incredible
(People vs. Rafallo, 80 Phil. 22). Not only this, the
doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is fully
applicable as far as the testimony of Choithram is
concerned. The cardinal rule, which has served in all
ages, and has been applied to all conditions of men,
is that a witness willfully falsifying the truth in one
particular, when upon oath, ought never to be
believed upon the strength of his own testimony,
whatever he may assert (U.S. vs. Osgood, 27 Feb.
Case No. 15971a, p. 364); Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 52
Phil. 728), for what ground of judicial relief can

there be left when the party has shown such gross
insensibility to the difference between right and
wrong, between truth and falsehood? (The Santisima
Trinidad, 7 Wheat, 283, 5 U.S. [L. ed.] 454).
True, that Choithram’s testimony finds
corroboration from the testimony of his brother,
Navalrai, but the same would not be of much help to
Choithram. Not only is Navalrai an interested and
biased witness, having admitted his close
relationship with Choithram and that whenever he
or Choithram had problems, they ran to each other
(tsn, pp. 1718, S. Sept. 20, 1985), Navalrai has a
pecuniary interest in the success of Choithram in the
case in question. Both he and Choithram
753
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 753

are business partners in Jethmal and Sons and/or

Jethmal Industries, wherein he owns 60% of the
company and Choithram, 40% (p. 62, Appellant’s
Brief). Since the acquisition of the properties in
question in 1966, Navalrai was occupying 1,200
square meters thereof as a factory site plus the fact
that his son (Navalrai’s) was occupying the
apartment on top of the factory with his family rent
free except the amount of P1,000.00 a month to pay
for taxes on said properties (tsn, p. 17, S. Oct. 3,
1985).
Inherent contradictions also marked Navalrai’s
testimony. While the latter was very meticulous in
keeping a receipt for the P10,000.00 that he paid
Ishwar as settlement in Jethmal Industries, yet in
the alleged payment of P100,000.00 to Ishwar, no
receipt or voucher15
was ever issued by him (tsn, p. 17,
S. Oct. 3, 1983).”
We concur.
The foregoing findings of facts of the Court
of Appeals which are supported by the evidence
is conclusive on this Court. The Court finds
that Ishwar entrusted US$150,000.00 to
Choithram in 1965 for investment in the realty
business. Soon thereafter, a general power of
attorney was executed by Ishwar in favor of
both Navalrai and Choithram. If it is true that
the purpose only is to enable Choithram to
purchase realty temporarily in the name of
Ishwar, why the inclusion of their elder brother
Navalrai as an attorneyinfact?
Then, acting as attorneyinfact of Ishwar,
Choithram purchased two parcels of land
located in Barrio Ugong, Pasig, Rizal, from
Ortigas in 1966. With the balance of the money
of Ishwar, Choithram erected a building on
said lot. Subsequently, with a loan obtained
from a bank and the income of the said
property, Choithram constructed three other
buildings thereon. He managed the business
and collected the rentals. Due to their
relationship of confidence it was only in 1970
when Ishwar demanded for an accounting from
Choithram. And even as Ishwar revoked the
general power of attorney on February 4, 1971,
of which Choithram was duly notified,
Choithram wrote to Ishwar on June 25, 1971
requesting that he execute
16
a new power of
attorney in their favor. When Ishwar did not
respond
_______________
15 Pages 45 to 50, Rollo, G.R. No. 85494; italics supplied.
16 Exhibits R to R3.
754

ANNOTATED
thereto, Choithram nevertheless proceeded as

such attorneyinfact to assign all the rights
and interest of Ishwar to his daughterinlaw
Nirmla in 1973 without the knowledge and
consent of Ishwar. Ortigas in turn executed the
corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Nirmla
after full payment of the purchase price of the
lots.
In the prefatory statement of their petition,
Choithram pictured Ishwar to be so motivated
by greed and ungratefulness, who squandered
the family business in New York, who had to
turn to his wife for support, accustomed to
living in ostentation and who resorted to
blackmail in filing several criminal and civil
suits against them. These statements find no
support and should be stricken from the
records. Indeed, they are irrelevant to the
proceeding.
Moreover, assuming Ishwar is of such a low
character as Choithram proposes to make this
Court to believe, why is it that of all persons,
under his temporary arrangement theory,
Choithram opted to entrust the purchase of
valuable real estate and built four buildings
thereon all in the name of Ishwar? Is it not an
unconscious emergence of the truth that this
otherwise wayward brother of theirs was on the
contrary able to raise enough capital through
the generosity of his fatherinlaw for the
purchase of the very properties in question? As

the appellate court aptly observed if truly this
temporary arrangement story is the only
motivation, why Ishwar of all people? Why not
the own son of Choithram, Haresh, who is also
an American citizen and who was already 18
years old at the time of purchase in 1966? The
Court agrees with the observation that this
theory is an afterthought which surfaced only
when Choithram, Nirmla and Moti filed their
answer.
When Ishwar asked for an accounting in
1970 and revoked the general power of attorney
in 1971, Choithram had a total change of heart.
He decided to claim the property as his. He
caused the transfer of the rights and interest of
Ishwar to Nirmla. On his representation,
Ortigas executed the deeds of sale of the
properties in favor of Nirmla. Choithram
obviously surmised Ishwar cannot stake a valid
claim over the property by so doing.
Clearly, this transfer to Nirmla is fictitious
and, as admitted by Choithram, was intended
only to place the property in her
755
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 755

name until17 Choithram acquires Philippine

citizenship. What appears certain is that it
appears to be a scheme of Choithram to place
the property beyond the reach of Ishwar should
he successfully claim the same. Thus, it must
be struck down.
Worse still, on September 27, 1990 spouses
Ishwar filed an urgent motion for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment and to

require Choithram, et al. to submit certain
documents, inviting the attention of this Court
to the following:
a) Donation by Choithram of his 2,500

shares of stock in General Garments
Corporation in favor 18
of his children on
December 29, 1989;
b) Sale on August 2, 1990 by Choithram of
his 100 shares in Biflex
19
(Phils.), Inc., in
favor of his children; and
c) Mortgage on June 20, 1989 by Nirmla
through her attorneyinfact,
Choithram, of the properties subject of
this litigation, for the amount of $3
Million in favor of Overseas Holding,
Co. Ltd., (Overseas for brevity), a
corporation which appears to be
organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of Cayman Islands,
with a capital of only $100.00 divided
into 100 shares of $1.00 each, and with
address at P.O. Box 1790, 20
Grand
Cayman, Cayman Islands.
An opposition thereto was filed by Choithram,

et al. but no documents were produced. A
manifestation and reply to the opposition was
filed by spouses Ishwar.
All these acts of Choithram, et al. appear to
be fraudulent attempts to remove these
properties to the detriment of spouses Ishwar
should the latter prevail in this litigation.
On December 10, 1990 the court issued a
resolution that substantially reads as follows:
“Considering the allegations of petitioners Ishwar

Jethmal Ramnani and Sonya Ramnani that
respondents Choithram Jethmal Ramnani, Nirmla

Ramnani and Moti G. Ramnani have fraudulently
executed a simulated mortgage of the properties
subject of this litigation
_______________
17 TSN, July 18, 1985, page 12; and July 19, 1985, pages 8 to 9.
18 Annex A to Urgent Motion, etc; pages 438 to 450, Rollo, G.R.
No. 85494.
19 Annex B, supra; page 451, supra.
20 Annex C, supra; pages 452 to 456, supra.
756

dated June 20, 1989, in favor of Overseas Holding

Co., Ltd. which appears to be a corporation
organized in Cayman Islands, for the amount of
$3,000,000.00, which is much more than the value of
the properties in litigation; that said alleged
mortgagee appears to be a “shell” corporation with a
capital of only $100.00; and that this alleged
transaction appears to be intended to defraud
petitioners Ishwar and Sonya Jethmal Ramnani of
any favorable judgment that this Court may render
in this case;
Wherefore the Court Resolved to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining and prohibiting
said respondents Choithram Jethmal Ramnani,
Nirmla V. Ramnani, Moti G. Ramnani and the
Overseas Holding Co., Ltd. from encumbering,
selling or otherwise disposing of the properties and
improvements subject of this litigation until further
orders of the Court. Petitioners Ishwar and Sonya
Jethmal Ramnani are hereby required to post a bond
of P100,000.00 to answer for any damages said
respondents may suffer by way of this injunction if

the Court finally decides the said petitioners are not
entitled thereto.
The Overseas Holding Co., Ltd. with address at
P.O. Box 1790 Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands, is
hereby IMPLEADED as a respondent in these cases,
and is hereby required to SUBMIT its comment on
the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment and Motion for Production
of Documents, the Manifestation and the Reply to
the Opposition filed by said petitioners, within Sixty
(60) days after service by publication on it in
accordance with the provisions of Section 17, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court, at the expense of petitioners
Ishwar and Sonya Jethmal Ramnani.
Let copies of this resolution be served on the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal, and the Provincial
Assessor of Pasig, Rizal, both in Metro Manila, for
its annotation on the Transfer Certificates of Titles
Nos. 403150 and 403152 registered in the name of
respondent Nirmla V. Ramnani, and on the tax
declarations of the said properties 21
and its
improvements subject of this litigation.”
The required injunction bond in the amount of

P100,000.00 was filed by the spouses Ishwar
which was approved by the Court. The above
resolution of the Court was published in the
Manila Bulletin issue of December
22
17, 1990 at
the expense of said spouses. On December 19,
1990 the said resolution and
_______________
21 Pages 438 to 442, rollo, G.R. No. 85496; pages 413 to

417, rollo, G.R. No. 85494.
22 Page 450, rollo, G.R. No. 85496.
757
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 757

petition for review with annexes in G.R. Nos.

85494 and 85496 were transmitted to
respondent Overseas, Grand Cayman Islands
at its address c/o Cayman Overseas Trust Co.
Ltd., through
23
the United Parcel Services Bill of
Lading, and it was actually 24delivered to said
company on January 23, 1991.
On January 22, 1991, Choithram, et al., filed
a motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction alleging that there is no basis
therefor as in the amended complaint what is
sought is actual damages and not a
reconveyance of the property, that there is no
reason for its issuance, and that acts already
executed cannot be enjoined. They also offered
to file a counterbond to dissolve the writ.
A comment/opposition thereto was filed by
spouses Ishwar that there is basis for the
injunction as the alleged mortgage of the
property is simulated and the other donations
of the shares of Choithram to his children are
fraudulent schemes to negate any judgment the
Court may render for petitioners.
No comment or answer was filed by
Overseas despite due notice, thus it is and
must be considered to be in default and to have
lost the right to contest the representations of
spouses Ishwar to declare the aforesaid alleged
mortgage null and void.
This purported mortgage of the subject
properties in litigation appears to be fraudulent
and simulated. The stated amount of $3 Million
for which it was mortgaged is much more than
the value of the mortgaged properties and its
improvements. The alleged mortgageecompany
(Overseas) was organized only on June 26,

1989 but the mortgage was executed much
earlier, on June 20, 1989, that is six (6) days
before Overseas was organized. Overseas
25
is a
“shelf” company worth only $100.00. In the
manifestation of spouses Ishwar dated April 1,
1991, the Court was informed that this matter
was brought to the attention of the Central
Bank (CB) for investigation, and that in a
letter of March 20, 1991, the CB informed
counsel for spouses Ishwar
______________
23 Annexes C, C1 and C2 to Manifestation and

Complaint of petitioners Ishwar & Sonya filed on January
26, 1991.
24 Annex D to Manifestation, etc.
25 Annex A to Reply to Opposition filed by petitioners on
December 7, 1990; Pages 383 to 384, Rollo; See also
Manifestation of petitioners, December 11, 1990, pages 438
to 443 rollo, G.R. 85494.
758

ANNOTATED
that said alleged foreign loan of Choithram, et

al. from Overseas has not been 26
previously
approved/registered with the CB.
Obviously, this is another ploy of Choithram,
et al. to place these properties beyond the reach
of spouses Ishwar should they obtain a
favorable judgment in this case. The Court
finds and so declares that this alleged
mortgage should be as it is hereby declared

null and void.
All these contemporaneous and subsequent
acts of Choithram, et al., betray the weakness
of their cause so they had to take all steps,
even as the case was already pending in Court,
to render ineffective any judgment that may be
rendered against them.
The problem is compounded in that
respondent Ortigas is caught in the web of this
bitter fight. It had all the time been dealing
with Choithram as attorneyinfact of Ishwar.
However, evidence had been adduced that
notice in writing had been served not only on
Choithram, but also on Ortigas, of the
revocation of Choithram’s power of attorney 27
by
Ishwar’s lawyer, on May 24, 1971. A
publication of said notice was made in the April
2, 1971 issue of The Manila Times 28
for the
information of the general public. Such notice
of revocation in a newspaper of general
circulation is sufficient warning
29
to third
persons including Ortigas. A notice of
revocation was also registered with the
Securities30 and Exchange Commission on March
29, 1971.
Indeed in the letter of Choithram to Ishwar
of June 25, 1971, Choithram was pleading that
Ishwar execute another power of attorney to be
shown to Ortigas who apparently learned of the 31
revocation of Choithram’s power of attorney.
Despite said notices, Ortigas nevertheless
acceded to the representation of Choithram, as
alleged attorneyinfact of Ishwar, to assign the
rights of petitioner Ishwar to Nirmla. While the
primary blame should be laid at the doorstep of
Choithram, Ortigas is not entirely without
fault. It should have required Choithram to
_______________
26 See pages to of Rollo.

27 Exhibit B.
28 Exhibit F.
29 Article 1922, Civil Code.
30 Exhibit H.
31 Exhibit R1; supra.
759
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 759

secure another power of attorney from Ishwar.

For recklessly believing the pretension of
Choithram that his power of attorney was still
good, it must, therefore, share in the latter’s
liability to Ishwar.
In the original complaint, the spouses
Ishwar asked for a reconveyance of the
properties and/or
32
payment of its present value
and damages. In the amended complaint they
asked, among others, for actual damages of not
less than the present value of the real
properties in litigation, moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, costs of the suit and
further prayed for “such other reliefs as may be
33
deemed just and equitable in the premises.
The amended complaint contain the following
positive allegations:
“7. Defendant Choithram Ramnani, in

evident bad faith and despite due notice
of the revocation of the General Power
of Attorney, Annex “D” hereof, caused
the transfer of the rights over the said
parcels of land to his daughterinlaw,
defendant Nirmla Ramnani in
connivance with defendant Ortigas &

Co., the latter having agreed to the said
transfer despite receiving a letter from
plaintiffs’ lawyer informing them of the
said revocation; copy of the letter is
hereto attached and made an integral
part hereof as Annex “H”;
8. Defendant Nirmla Ramnani having
acquired the aforesaid property by fraud
is, by force of law, considered a trustee
of an implied trust for the benefit of
plaintiff and is obliged to return the
same to the latter:
9. Several efforts were made to settle the
matter within the family but
defendants (Choithram Ramnani,
Nirmla Ramnani, and Moti Ramnani)
refused and up to now fail and still
refuse to cooperate and respond to the
same; thus, the present case;
10. In addition to having been deprived of
their rights over the properties
(described in par. 3 hereof), plaintiffs,
by reason of defendants’ fraudulent act,
suffered actual damages by way of lost
rental on the property which defendants
(Choithram Ramnani, Nirmla
Ramnani, and Moti Ramnani)34
have
collected for themselves;”
In said amended complaint, spouses Ishwar,

among others, pray for payment of actual
damages in an amount no less than
_______________
32 Annex C to Petition in G.R. No. 85494; pages 88 to 92,

rollo.
33 Annex D, supra; Pages 93 to 97, Rollo.

34 Supra, pages 95 to 96, Rollo; italics supplied.
760

ANNOTATED
the value of the properties in litigation instead

of a reconveyance as sought in the original
complaint. Apparently they opted not to insist
on a reconveyance as they are American
citizens as alleged in the amended complaint.
The allegations of the amended complaint
above reproduced clearly spelled out that the
transfer of the property to Nirmla was
fraudulent and that it should be considered to
be held in trust by Nirmla for spouses Ishwar.
As abovediscussed, this allegation is well
taken and the transfer of the property to
Nirmla should be considered to have created an
implied trust by Nirmla as trustee of 35 the
property for the benefit of spouses Ishwar.”
The motion to dissolve the writ of
preliminary injunction filed by Choithram, et
al. should be denied. Its issuance by this Court
is proper and warranted under the
circumstances of the case. Under Section 3(c),
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a writ of
preliminary injunction may be granted at any
time after commencement of the action and
before judgment when it is established:
“(c) that the defendant is doing, threatens, or is

about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act probably in violation of plaintiffs’s rights
respecting the subject of the action, and tending to

render the judgment ineffectual.”
As above extensively discussed, Choithram, et

al. have committed and threaten to commit
further acts of disposition of the properties in
litigation as well as the other assets of
Choithram, apparently designed to render
ineffective any judgment the Court may render
favorable to spouses Ishwar.
The purpose of the provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
quo of the things subject of the litigation and to
protect the rights of the spouses Ishwar
respecting the subject36 of the action during the
pendency of the suit, and not to obstruct the
administation of justice or preju
_______________
35 Annex C to Petition in G.R. No. 85494; pages 88 to 92,

Rollo.
36 Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445 (1946); De los Reyes v.
Elepaño, G.R. L5282, May 29, 1959; De la Cruz vs. Tan
Torres, G.R. L14925, April 30, 1960.
761
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 761

37
dice the adverse party. In this case for
damages, should Choithram, et al. continue to
commit acts of disposition of the properties
subject of the litigation, an award of damages
to spouses Ishwar would thereby
38
be rendered
ineffectual and meaningless.
Consequently, if only to protect the interest

of spouses Ishwar, the Court hereby finds and
holds that the motion for the sissuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment filed by spouses
Ishwar should be granted covering the
properties subject of this litigation.
Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
provides that at the commencement of an
action or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff or
any proper party may have the property of the
adverse party attached as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered, in, among others, the following
cases:
“(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty

of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the
obligation upon which the action is brought, or in
concealing or disposing of the property for the
taking, detention or conversion of which the action is
brought;
(e) In an action against a party who has removed
or disposed of his property, or is about to do so, with
intent to defraud his creditors; x x x.”
Verily, the acts of Choithram, et al. of disposing

the properties subject of the litigation disclose
a scheme to defraud spouses Ishwar so they
may not be able to recover at all, given a
judgment in their favor, thus requiring the
issuance of the writ of attachment in this
instance.
Nevertheless, under the peculiar
circumstances of this case and despite the fact
that Choithram, et al., have committed acts
which demonstrate their bad faith and scheme
to defraud spouses Ishwar and Sonya of their
rightful share in the properties in litigation,
the Court cannot ignore the fact that
Choithram must have been motivated by a

strong conviction that as the industrial partner
in the acquisition of said assets he has as
_______________
37 Yu Tiong Tay vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 597 (1947).

38 Calo vs. Rolda. supra.
762

ANNOTATED
much claim to said properties as Ishwar, the

capitalist partner in the joint venture.
The scenario is clear. Spouses Ishwar
supplied the capital of $150,000.00 for the
business. They entrusted the money to
Choithram to invest in a profitable business
venture in the Philippines. For this purpose
they appointed Choithram as their attorneyin
fact.
Choithram in turn decided to invest in the
real estate business. He bought the two (2)
parcels of land in question from Ortigas as
attorneyinfact of Ishwar. Instead of paying for
the lots in cash, he paid in installments and
used the balance of the capital entrusted to
him, plus a loan, to build two buildings.
Although the buildings were burned later,
Choithram was able to build two other
buildings on the property. He rented them out
and collected the rentals. Through the industry
and genius of Choithram, Ishwar’s property
was developed and improved into what it is
now—a valuable asset worth millions of pesos.
As of the last estimate in 1985, while the case

was pending before the trial court, the market
value of the 39properties is no less than
P22,304,000.00. It should be worth much more
today.
We have a situation where two brothers
engaged in a business venture. One furnished
the capital, the other contributed his industry
and talent. Justice and equity dictate that the
two share equally the fruit of their joint
investment and efforts. Perhaps this Solomonic
solution may pave the way towards their
reconciliation. Both would stand to gain. No
one would end up the loser. After all, blood is
thicker than water.
However, the Court cannot just close its eyes
to the devious machinations and schemes that
Choithram employed in attempting to dispose
of, if not dissipate, the properties to deprive
spouses Ishwar of any possible means to
recover any award the Court may grant in their
favor. Since Choithram, et al. acted with
evident bad faith and malice, they should pay
moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees to spouses Ishwar.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No.
85494 is DENIED, while the petition in G.R.
No. 85496 is hereby given due course
_______________
39 Exhibits T to T14.
763
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 763

and GRANTED. The judgment of the Court of

Appeals dated October 18, 1988 is hereby
modified as follows:
1. Dividing equally between respondents

spouses Ishwar, on the one hand, and
petitioner Choithram Ramnani, on the
other, (in G.R. No. 85494) the two
parcels of land subject of this litigation,
including all the improvements thereon,
presently covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 403150 and
403152 of the Registry of Deeds, as well
as the rental income of the property
from 1967 to the present.
2. Petitioner Choithram Jethmal
Ramnani, Nirmla V. Ramnani, Moti C.
Ramnani and respondent Ortigas and
Company, Limited Partnership (in G.R.
No. 85496) are ordered solidarily to pay
in cash the value of said onehalf (1/2)
share in the said land and
improvements pertaining to
respondents spouses Ishwar and Sonya
at their fair market value at the time of
the satisfaction of this judgment but in
no case less than their value as
appraised by the Asian Appraisal, Inc.
in its Appraisal Report dated August
1985 (Exhibits T to T14, inclusive).
3. Petitioners Choithram, Nirmla and
Moti Ramnani and respondent Ortigas
& Co., Ltd. Partnership shall also be
jointly and severally liable to pay to
said respondents spouses Ishwar and
Sonya Ramnani onehalf (1/2) of the
total rental income of said properties
and improvements from 1967 up to the
date of satisfaction of the judgment to

be computed as follows:
“a. On Building C occupied by Eppie’s

Creation and Jethmal Industries from
1967 to 1973, inclusive, based on the
1967 to 1973 monthly rentals paid by
Eppie’s Creation;
“b. Also on Building C above, occupied by
Jethmal Industries and Lavine from
1974 to 1978, the rental incomes based
on then rates prevailing as shown
under Exhibit ‘P’; and from 1979 to
1981, based on then prevailing rates as
indicated under Exhibit ‘Q’;
“c. On Building A occupied by Transworld
Knitting Mills from 1972 to 1978, the
rental incomes based upon then
prevailing rates shown under Exhibit
‘P’, and from 1979 to 1981, based on
prevailing rates per Exhibit ‘Q’;
“d. On the twoBays Buildings occupied by
SigmaMariwasa from 1972 to 1978, the
rentals based on the Lease Contract,
Exhibit ‘P’, and from 1979 to 1980, the
rentals based on the Lease Contract,
Exhibit ‘Q’.
764

ANNOTATED
and thereafter commencing 1982, to

account for and turn over the rental
incomes paid or ought to be paid for the
use and occupancy of the properties and

all improvements totalling 10,048 sq.
m., based on the rate per square meter
prevailing in 1981 as indicated
annually cumulative up to 1984. Then,
commencing 1985 and up to the
satisfaction of the judgment, rentals
shall be computed at ten percent (10%)
annually of the fair market values of
the properties as appraised by the
Asian Appraisals, Inc. in August 1985.
(Exhibits T to T14, inclusive.)”
4. To determine the market value of the
properties at the time of the satisfaction
of this judgment and the total rental
incomes thereof, the trial court is
hereby directed to hold a hearing with
deliberate dispatch for this purpose
only and to have the judgment
immediately executed after such
determination.
5. Petitioners Choithram, Nirmla and
Moti, all surnamed Ramnani, are also
jointly and severally liable to pay
respondents Ishwar and Sonya
Ramnani the amount of P500,000.00 as
moral damages, P200,000.00 as
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
equal to 10% of the total award to said
respondents spouses.
6. The motion to dissolve the writ of
preliminary injunction dated December
10, 1990 filed by petitioners Choithram,
Nirmla and Moti, all surnamed
Ramnani, is hereby DENIED and the
said injunction is hereby made
permanent. Let a writ of attachment be
issued and levied against the properties
and improvements subject of this

litigation to secure the payment of the
above awards to spouses Ishwar and
Sonya.
7. The mortgage constituted on the subject
property dated June 20, 1989 by
petitioners Choithram and Nirmla, both
surnamed Ramnani in favor of
respondent Overseas Holding, Co. Ltd.
(in G.R. No. 85496) for the amount of
$3M is hereby declared null and void.
The Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal, is
directed to cancel the annotation of said
mortgage on the titles of the properties
in question.
8. Should respondent Ortigas Co., Ltd.
Partnership pay the awards to Ishwar
and Sonya Ramnani under this
judgment, it shall be entitled to
reimbursement from petitioners
Choithram, Nirmla and Moti, all
surnamed Ramnani.
765
VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 765

People vs. Godines
9. The above awards shall bear legal rate

of interest of six percent (6%) per
annum from the time this judgment
becomes final until they are fully paid
by petitioners Choithram Ramnani,
Nirmla V. Ramnani, Moti C. Ramnani
and Ortigas, Co., Ltd. Partnership. Said
petitioners Choithram, et al. and
respondent Ortigas shall also pay the

costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Griño

Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Petition in G.R. No. 85494 denied; petition in

G.R. No. 85496 granted. Judgment modified.
Note.—An action for reconveyance of realty,

based upon a constructive or implied trust
resulting from fraud may be barred by
prescription. The prescriptive period is
reckoned from the issuance of title which
operates as a constructive notice. (Sinoan vs.
Soroñgan, 136 SCRA 407)
——o0o——
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Ramnani v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 731 (1991) PDF

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9/27/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 196

VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 731

CHOITHRAM JETHMAL RAMNANI AND/OR

SPOUSES ISHWAR JETHMAL RAMNANI

Mortgage; Considering that the purported

the mortgage was executed much earlier, on June

732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ramnani vs. Court of Appeals

of Choithram, et al. from Overseas has not been

evidence had been adduced that notice in writing

complaint. The allegations of the amended complaint

VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 733

Ramnani vs. Court of Appeals

out that the transfer of the property to Nirmla was

Ishwar respecting the subject of the action during

734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ramnani vs. Court of Appeals

profitable business venture in the Philippines. For

in the real estate business. He bought the two (2)

PETITION for review from the judgment of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the

VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 735

This case involves the bitter quarrel of two

appointing Navalrai and Choithram as

736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

An appeal therefrom was interposed by

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 737

gas and Company Limited Partnership to pay,

1. Actual or compensatory damages to the

satisfaction of the judgment but in no case

a) On Building C occupied by Eppie’s Creation

and thereafter commencing 1982, to account for

indicated annually cumulative up to 1984. Then,

3. Moral damages in the sum of P200,000.00;

738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by

“1. The Court of Appeals gravely abused

finding not supported by and contrary

THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN GRAVE

THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH

7 Pages 80 to 82, Rollo of G.R. No. 85496; pages 55 to 57, G.R.

VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 739

TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS BASED ON THE

THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN

Similarly, spouses Ishwar filed a petition for

THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF

A) IN PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED

IN CIVIL CASE NO. 534­P, AS AGAINST

9 Pages 15 and 16, Rollo, G.R. No. 85494.

740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ORTIGAS COULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE

TRANSFERRED THE RIGHTS OF THE

TO THE LATTER’S DAUGHTER­IN­LAW,

THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF

VOL. 196, MAY 7, 1991 741

CHOITHRAM, MOTI AND NIRMLA RAMNANI IN

The center of controversy is the testimony of

disregard of the evidence, documentary and

“After a careful, considered and conscientious

10 Pages 23 to 24, Rollo, G.R. No. 85496.

742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

barren. His uncorroborated testimony that he

IN CIVIL CASE NO. 534P, AS AGAINST

TO THE LATTER’S DAUGHTERINLAW,

appellee (Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 33;

On crossexamination, the witness reiterated

This positive and affirmative testimony of plaintiff

13 Exhibit R1; italics supplied.