Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 15

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

HEIRS OF PEDRO MANAGUITE,


Represented by: CLARITA M. ACIBAR &
DONATA M. ACEDERA,
Petitioners,

-versus- G.R. No._______________


CA-GR. CEB SP No. 06087

EDWIN ADALLA,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------x

PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI

Respondents, through counsel, unto this Honorable Court, respectfully


states that:

PREFATORY STATEMENT

This is an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision1
of the Court of Appeals of Cebu City, Special Former Twentieth (20th)
Division, dated November 10, 2016, in CA-GR. CEB SP No. 06087 entitled
“Edwin Adalla vs Heis of Pedro Managuite, represented by Clarita M. Acibar
& Donata M. Acedera, as well as the Order of the same court denying the
Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 24, 2018, filed by herein petitioners.

PARTIES

1
A certified true copy of which is attached as Annex “A”.
Petitioners are of legal age and the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 681, and
may be served with legal process through his counsel, Atty. Albert P. Yruma
at 419 Quirino St., Brgy JP Rizal, 6400, Catarman, Northern Samar.

Respondent is the defendant in Civil Case No. 681, of legal age, and
maybe served with legal process, through his counsel Atty. Ricardo E. Amos,
at Alvaniz, Amos, Arellano & Associates Law Office, Rizal St., 6400,
Catarman, Northern Samar.

NATURE OF PETITION

This Petition is an Appeal by Certiorari before the Supreme Court under


Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the review and reversal of the Court of
Appeals’ decision dated November 10, 2018, in a Petition for Review under
Rule 42 of the same Rules, in CA- GR. CEB SP No. 06087, entitled “Edwin
Adalla vs Heis of Pedro Managuite, represented by Clarita M. Acibar &
Donata M. Acedera.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals rendered judgement which


dispositive portion read and is herein quoted:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated


February 5, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19 of Catarman,
Northern Samar in Civil Case No. C-1299 is hereby set aside. The Decision
dated March 2, 2009 of the 5th Circuit Trial Court of Mondragon- San Roque,
Mondragon, Northern Samar in Civil Case No. 681 is hereby reinstated.”

In its Order, the Court of Appeals denied herein Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforementioned CA decision.

Petitioners respectfully submit that the Court of Appeals’ Decision and


Order were rendered in a way not in accord with the law and jurisprudence or
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court. Hence, this petition. Only
questions of law are raised, there being no factual issues involved
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL DATES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against the


respondents before the 5th MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT,
Mondragon- San Roque, Mondragon, Northern Samar. The said court
rendered judgment in favor of the respondent, the decretal portion of which is
quoted hereunder as follows:

“Accordingly, and in the light of the foregoing, this Court hereby


render judgement as this Court hereby declare and order:

a.) Declaring defendant as the lawful owner and possessor of the lot in
question (Lot 2662);
b.) Ordering the plaintiffs to respect the rights of the defendant over Lot
2622;
c.) Ordering the plaintiffs to vacate the portion of Lot 2622 which they
encroached upon;
d.) Plaintiffs to pay defendant jointly and severally the a mount of Ten
Thousand Pesos as attorney’s fees and the amount Six Thousand
Pesos (P 6,000) as actual litigation expenses; and
e.) To pay the cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED.”

The aforesaid Decision was appealed by herein petitioners to the


Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar, Branch 19 which reversed
and set aside the decision of the MCTC and declared the plaintiffs, herein
petitioners as the lawful possessor of the Lot in question (Lot 2622), and
ordered the defendants, herein respondents to respect the rights of the
plaintiffs over the subject lot and for them to vacate the portion of Lot 2622
which they encumbered upon.
The RTC decision was then elevated by the defendants, herein
respondents, via Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals, of Cebu City,
Special Former Twentieth (20th) Division, which granted the petition and set
aside the RTC decision and reinstated the MCTC decision.

The petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was


subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated May 24,
2018. It reads:

“As respondents did not submit any compelling argument to refute this
Court’s findings, we find no cogent reason to modify, much less, reverse the
Decision dated February 10, 2017. WHEREFORE, respondents Heirs of
Pedro Manguite’s, represented by Clara M. Acibar and Donata M. Acedera,
motion for reconsideration is denied.

So ordered.”

Hence, this petition.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioners Clarita M. Acebar and Donata M. Acedera are lawful Heirs


of Pedro Managuite which the latter also a successor to the decedent Leonisio
Mananguite.

Originally, the land is owned by Leonisio Managuite as early as year


1947 with an area of 1,404 covered by Tax Declaration No. 101252 which
has the following boundaries:

1. On the North: Seashore


2. East: Emelio Aguilando
3. South: Provincial Road
4. West; Consuelo Ochondra

2
ANNEX “2”
Later, it was partitioned by the Heirs of Leonisio’s children, as follows:

1. Rita Managuite who got 234 square meters covered by Tax


declaration No. 12903;
2. Rufina Managuite who got 234 square meters covered by ax
declaration No. 12902; and
3. Pedro Managuite who got 234 square meters covered by tax
declaration 12900.

The remaining 468 square meters remained to Leonisio Mananguite


and covered by tax declaration No. 12901.

Accordingly, TDN 12900 which was declared in the name of Pedro


Managuite. The NORTHERN PART of said lot remained to be a seashore
receded and portion of it dried up and he occupied it. He planted trees, root
crops and fruits thereon. As riparian owner, he declared the same for taxation
purposes in year 1962 and the same was designated as Lot 2622 during the
time it was surveyed.

Since then, petitioners and their predeccesor-in-interest have been in


prior lawful, open, adverse and continuous physical possession in the concept
of an owner of the subject property.

On the other hand, respondent’s predecessor-in-interest Ernesto


Adalla’s house was clearly erected across the provincial road which is
opposite to that of the property owned by Leonisio and Pedro Managuite. The
documents appearing in the name of Ernesto Adalla were just only in
documents but they never actually and physically possessed the lots
purportedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 2331 with an area of 3,750
Square Meters. The actual and physical possession of Ernesto Adalla as
shown by his house opposite to the property of Pedro Mananguite which is
across the provincial road is not that much as big as 3,750 Square Meters.
Such of Ernesto Adalla was just bought from a certain Juan Galit.

On October 21, 2006 Edwin Adalla, entered the homelot of the


petitioners and forcibly made an erected wooden posts purportedly a boundary
markers of the lot based on an alleged order by the Court to delineate the
boundaries of the Lot based on a mediation proceeding.

Hence, the petitioners brought an action for forcible entry in this case.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF


APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE
RESPONDENT AS LAWFUL POSSESSOR OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF


APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE ACTS
OF PUTTING WOODEN POSTS AS BOUNDARY
MARKERS BY THE RESPONDENT ACCOMPANIED BY
HIRED PERSONS, ARE NOT ACTS OF FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION.

SUBMISSIONS
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN DECLARING THE RESPONDENT AS LAWFUL
POSSESSOR OF THE SUBJECT PORPERTY,
CONSIDERING THAT HE WAS NOT OR HIS
PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST IN ACTUAL AND/OR
PRIOR PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY


ERRED WHEN IT DELARED THE ACTS OF
RESPONDENTS OF ERECTING WOODEN POSTS IN THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY ACTUALLY OCCUPIED BY THE
PETITIONERS AS NOT ACTS OF FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION, CONSIDERING THAT THE COURT
ORDER IN THE MEDIATION PROCEEDINGS CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED LAWFUL.
ARGUMENT AND/ OR DISCUSSION

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED


WHEN IT HELD THE RESPONDENT AS THE LAWFUL
POSSESSOR OF THE SUBJECT PORPERTY, CONSIDERING
THAT HE WAS NEVER OR HIS PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST
IN ACTUAL OR PRIOR PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.
‘’In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer,
the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual
possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties
to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to
invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the
question of ownership. It is obviously just the person who has first
acquired possession [who] should remain in possession…”3
This Honorable Court have time and time again ruled in number
of cases that the word "possession," as used in forcible entry, meant
nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession in the
sense contemplated in civil law.4 When the law would speak of
possession in forcible entry cases, it is prior physical possession or
possession de facto, as distinguished from possession de Jure.5
Here, the respondent, Edwin Adalla or his predecessor-in-interest,
Ernesto Adalla was NEVER in a single occasion in actual physical
possession of the subject property and no improvement was
introduced in the property, despite the presentation of an earlier tax
declaration, dated 1961.

While it holds true that in ejectment cases, possession of the


land does not only mean actual or physical possession or occupation
but also by the fact that a land is subject to the action of one's will
or by proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such
right, such as the juridical acts of donation, succession, execution
and registration of public instruments, and the inscription of

3
Valeriana Villondo vs. Quijano, G.R. No. 173606, December 3, 2012
4
Tirona vs. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285, 298 (2001)
5
Gonzaga vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130841, February 26, 2008
possessory information.6 The respondents failed to show, aside
from the tax declaration, any evidence that he, Edwin Adalla or his
father Ernesto Adalla was in actual physical possession of Lot 2622,
prior to the possession of the petitioners, Heirs of Pedro Managuite
or their predecessor- in- interest who occupied the land before 1962
when the seawater in the seashore receded and dried up leaving the
same to be vacant. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, as
riparian owner, showed adverse possession of the dried up lot,
planted root crops and fruit bearing fruits therein, and declared the
same for tax purposes in 1962. Since then, respondent and their
predecessor-in-interest were in actual, adverse, open and continuous
physical possession of the subject lot.

The Court of Appeals, was in error in citing the case the case
of Bunyi vs. Factor. In the said case, the Court ruled in favor of the
respondent Fe S. Factor who is the co-owner of an 18 hectare land
located in Almanza, Las Pinas. While she was not in actual
possession of the land, her ownership of which originated from the
respondent’s paternal grandparents Constantino Factor and Maura
Factor who had been in actual, continuous, public, adverse and
exclusive possession of the property and from the children of
Spouses Factor, who was granted the certificate of title in a Petition
for Original Registration and Confirmation of Imperfect Title. The
Court ruled that while the respondent was not in actual possession
of the property, she acquired her right of possession through
juridical act of succession from her predecessors-in-interest who
occupied the same for more than 30 years and was granted a
certificate of title, long before the petitioners occupied the property.

Hence, in that case, the Court ruled that such juridical acts
were sufficient to establish the respondent's prior possession of the
subject property.

6
Quizon vs. Juan, G.R. No. 171442, June 17, 2008
In contrast, in herein case subject of the Petition for Review,
the respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, Ernesto Adalla had never
actually occupied or possessed the lot prior to 1962, as the lot
remained to be a seashore. When the seawater finally receded and
the portion of it dried up, the respondent’s predecessor-in- intere st
cannot and did not occupy the same as he was not the riparian owner,
and the property he actually occupied was located farther in distance
from the portion of the seashore (now Lot2622).

Further, In Bunyi vs. Factor, the respondent’s possession was


anchored on a certificate of title which she acquired by succession,
aside from the actual possession of the property by his predecessors-
in- interest. On the other hand, in this case, the only evidence of the
respondent is a tax declaration which is not a conclusive proof of
possession. They are merely good indicia of possession in the
concept of an owner based on the presumption that no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or constructive possession.7 Neither tax receipts nor tax
declaration are sufficient evidence of the right of possession over
realty, unless supported by other effective proof, as decided by the
Court in Elumbaring vs Elumbaring, (12 Phil 324).

In the case of De Grano v. Lacaba8 the Court ruled in favor of


the petitioner and adverse to the respondent who tried to prove prior
possession, by presenting only his tax declarations, tax receipt and
a certification from the municipal assessor attesting that he had paid
real property tax from previous years. The Court did not give
credence to his claim because tax declarations and realty tax
payments are not conclusive proof of possession.

7
Ganila vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150755, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 435
8
G.R. No. 158877, June 16, 2009
Returning to the case, the situation is the same because aside
from presenting his tax declarations, the herein respondents did not
submit any evidence from where his right to possession arises.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED


WHEN IT DELARED THE ACTS OF RESPONDENTS OF
ERECTING WOODEN POSTS IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
ACTUALLY OCCUPIED BY THE PETITIONERS AS NOT
ACTS OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION, CONSIDERING
THAT THE COURT ORDER IN THE ALLEGED MEDIATION
PROCEEDINGS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED LAWFUL.

Under Republic Act 9285, otherwise known as Alternative


Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 and the Consolidated and Revise
Guidelines To Implement The Expanded Coverage of Court
Annexed Mediation (CAM) and Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR)
or AM. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA, the purpose of Court Annexed
Mediation and Judicial Dispute Resolution is “to put an end to
pending litigation through compromise agreement of the parties
and thereby help solve the ever pressing problem of court docket
congestion”.

Court diversion is a “three-stage process”. The first stage is


Court Annexed Mediation “where the judges refers the parties to the
Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) for the mediation of their
dispute by trained and accredited mediators”. Upon failing to secure
a settlement of dispute during the first stage, “a second attempt is
made at the JDR stage”, where the JDR judge becomes a “mediator-
conciliator-early neutral evaluator in a continuing effort to secure a
settlement”. Still failing that second attempt, “the mediator-judge
must turn over the case to another judge (a new one by raffle or
nearest/pair judge0 who will try the unsettled case”. The trial judge
shall continue with the pre-trial proper and, thereafter, proceed to
try and decide the case. The third stage is during appeal where the
covered cases are referred to the PMC-Appeals Court Mediation
(ACM) unit for mediation.

Nothing in the Rules states that a mediation proceeding may be


done without a pending case before the court. A mediation proceeding
may only be ordered by the Court when there is already a pending case
before it which is under the expanded coverage of the Court Annexed
Mediation and Judicial Dispute Resolution proceedings, including but
not limited to:

xxxxxx………“(1) All civil cases and the civil liability of


criminal cases covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, including the civil liability for violation of B.P.
22, except those which by law may not be compromised;

(2) Special proceedings for the settlement of estates;

(3) All civil and criminal cases filed with a certificate to


file action issued by the Punong Barangay or the Pangkat
ng Tagapagkasundo under the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.

(8) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer


brought on appeal from the exclusive and original
jurisdiction granted to the first level courts under Section
33, par. (2) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980…..” xxxxxxx

It is clear from the mentioned provision that only those cases which has
already been filed be in court may be submitted for mediation. Hence, the
court proceeding appearing as mediation proceeding which ordered the
relocation survey and served as a basis of the respondents in putting wooden
posts in the subject lot is not valid and legal. It was not based on a pending
case before said court. Further, a party may not initiate a mediation proceeding
and the court to take cognizance of the matter for the purpose of determining
the metes and bounds of the property. The appointment of a court
commissioner was not made during the pendency of the case but an ex parte
proceeding allegedly a mediation proceeding. Thus, the relocation survey of
the said court commissioner having been derived from unlawful and
illegitimate proceeding which is not in accordance with the established rules
of procedure is patently void and there is no right that can be accorded thereto.
The integrity of impartiality is already tainted with bias when the presiding
judge took cognizance of the mediation proceeding without any valid
complaint filed by the respondents against petitioners which would have been
the basis for the court take cognizance of the matter.

Hence, in so far as the petitioners are concerned, the acts of the


respondents of putting and erecting wooden posts as boundary markers were
acts of force and intimidation, depriving them of the possession of the portion
of Lot 2622 which they and their predecessor-in-interest before them,
occupied and possessed in open, adverse, continuous and in the concept of an
owner.

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove:
(a) that they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that they were
deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
and, (c) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the time the owners
or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of
the property.

The foregoing elements were present in the instant case, the petitioners
are clearly in prior physical possession of the subject property, Lot 2622, and
were deprived of physical possession thereto by force and intimidation, as
thoroughly discussed above, and the action was filed on October 26, 2006
which is within one year from the date the unlawful deprivation of subject
property on October 21, 2006 occurred.

Therefore, the petitioners should prevail over the petitioner in the


instant case.
PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this


Honorable Court that a decision be granted in favor of the petitioner and for
the grant of the following:

1. That the petition be given due course;


2. That after due proceedings, judgment be rendered setting aside and
reversing the questioned DECISION of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on November 10, 2016 and its Resolution dated May
24, 2018 in the Motion for Reconsideration, and a new one be
rendered.

Other reliefs which are just and equitable under the premises are likewise
prayed for.

Catarman, Northern Samar for Manila, August 13, 2018.

ATTY. ALBERT P. YRUMA


Counsel for Respondents
419 Quirino Street, Brgy J.P. Rizal
Catarman, Northern Samar
PTR No.
IBP Lifetime No.
Roll No.
MCLE Compliance No.

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION

We, CLARITA M. ACEBAR & DONATA M. ACEDERA, both of


legal age, Filipino and a residents of Mondragon, Northern Samar, under
oath depose and state:

We are the Petitioners in the above captioned case; we have caused


the preparation of the same; we have read the allegations contained therein;
and we certify that they are all true and correct to the best of our own
knowledge.

We further certify under oath that we have not commenced any similar
action before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or before any court,
tribunal or agency concerned, and should we of learn similar cause of action
filed before any of the aforesaid bodies, we will undertake to notify this
Honorable Court with five (5) days from notice.

In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hand this August ___,
2018 Catarman, Northern Samar.

CLARITA M. ACEDERA DONATA M. ACEDERA


Petitioner Petitioner

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ___day of


__________ at Catarman, Northern Samar, affiant exhibited to
me____________ issued on__________, at_____________.
s