Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
by the one who paid [See Article 1217, Civil Code]. It is with respect to
this right of reimbursement that petitioners can find support in the aforecited
PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. contractual stipulation and Wage Order provision. "That Wage Orders are
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and ODIN SECURITY explicit that payment of the increases are `to be borne’ by the principal or
AGENCY, as representative of its Security Guards, Respondents. client.’To be borne’, however, does not mean that the principal, PTSI in this
case, would directly pay the security guards the wage and allowance
Franklin J. Andrada for Petitioner. increases because there is no privity of contract between them. The security
guards’ contractual relationship is with their immediate employer, EAGLE. As
Ramon Encarnacion and Reynato V. Siozon for Private Respondents. an employer, EAGLE is tasked, among others, with the payment of their
wages [See Article VII Sec. 3 of the Contract for Security Services, supra and
Bautista v. Inciong, G.R. No. 52824, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 556]. . . .
SYLLABUS The Wage Orders are statutory and mandatory and can not be waived. The
petitioner can not escape liability since the law provides the joint and solidary
liability of the principal and the contractor for the protection of the laborers.
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; PRINCIPAL AND CONTRACTOR;
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR PAYMENT OF UNPAID WAGES; 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS OBSERVED IN CASE AT BAR. — The
TERM ‘EMPLOYER’ CONSTRUED. — Notwithstanding that the petitioner is contention that it was deprived due process because no hearing was
a government agency, its liabilities, which are joint and solidary with that of conducted does not deserve merit. A decision on the merits is proper where
the contractor, are provided in Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. the issues raised by the parties did not involve intricate questions of law.
This places the petitioner’s liabilities under the scope of the NLRC. Moreover, (See Blue Bar Coconut Phils. Inc. v. Minister of Labor, 174 SCRA 25 [1989])
Book Three, Title II on Wages specifically provides that the term "employer" There can be no question that the security guards are entitled to wage
includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer adjustments. The computation of the amount due to each individual guard
in relation to an employee and shall include the Government and all its can be made during the execution of the decision where hearings can be
branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities, all government-owned or held. (See Section 3, Rule VIII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC).
controlled corporation and institutions as well as non-profit private
institutions, or organizations (Art. 97 [b], Labor Code; Eagle Security Agency, 4. ID.; INDIRECT EMPLOYER; ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING
Inc. v. NLRC, 173 SCRA 479 [1989]; Rabago v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 158 CONTRACT. — Petitioner assail the contract for security services for being
[1991]). Settled is the rule that in job contracting, the petitioner as principal is void ab initio on the ground that it did not comply with the bidding
jointly and severally liable with the contractor for the payment of unpaid requirements set by law. Undeniably, services were rendered already and
wages. The statutory basis for the joint and several liability is set forth in the petitioner benefitted from said contract for two (2) years now. The
Articles 107, and 109 in relation to Article 106 of the Labor Code. petitioner is therefore estopped from assailing the contract.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAGE ORDERS, MANDATORY AND CANNOT BE WAIVED. 5. ID.; PHIL. ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY
— In the case at bar, the action instituted by the private respondent was for OPERATORS (PADPAO); PURPOSE FOR ITS CREATION. — In the
the payment of unpaid wage differentials under Wage Order No. 6. The complaint filed, the private respondent alleged that it requested the Regional
liabilities of the parties were very well explained in the case of Eagle Security Director, NCR Region of the Department of Labor and Employment for their
v. NLRC, supra where the court held: . . . "The solidary liability of PTSI and intercession in connection with the illegal bidding and award made by the
EAGLE, however, does not preclude the right of reimbursement from his co- petitioner in favor of Triad Security Agency which was below the minimum
7. ID.; SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL AND CONTRACTOR; 1. For and in consideration of the services to be rendered by the AGENCY to
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT TO the FISHING PORT COMPLEX, the latter shall pay to the former per month
EITHER PRINCIPAL OR DIRECT EMPLOYER AS WARRANTED. — We for eight (8) hours work daily as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The Security Group of the AGENCY will be headed by a detachment On October 24, 1987, and during the effectivity of the said Security
commander whose main function shall consist of the administration and Agreement, the private respondent requested the petitioner to adjust the
supervision control of the AGENCY’s personnel in the FISHING PORT contract rate in view of the implementation of Wage Order No. 6 which took
COMPLEX. There shall be one supervisor per shift who shall supervise the effect on November 1, 1984.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
guards on duty during a particular shift.
The private respondent’s request for adjustment was anchored on the
The above schedule of compensation includes among others, the provision of Wage Order No. 6 which states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 9. In the case of contracts for construction projects and for
(a) Minimum wage (Wage Order No. 5) security, janitorial and similar services, the increases in the minimum wage
and allowance rates of the workers shall be borne by the principal or client of
(b) Rest Day Pay the construction/service contractor and the contracts shall be deemed
amended accordingly, subject to the provisions of Section 3(c) of this Order.
(c) Night Differential Pay (Rollo, p. 49)
(d) Incentive Leave Pay Section 7, par. c of the Security Services Contract which calls for an
automatic escalation of the rate per guard in case of wage increase also
(e) 13th Month Pay reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(f) Emergency Cost of Living Allowance (up to Wage Order No. 5) The terms and conditions herein set forth shall be modified by the applicable
provisions of subsequent laws or decrees, especially as they pertain to
(g) 4% Contractor’s Tax increases in the minimum wage and occupational benefits to workers. (Rollo,
p. 46)
(h) Operational Expenses
Requests for adjustment of the contract price were reiterated on January 14,
(i) Overhead (Rollo, pp. 197-198) 1988 and February 19, 1988 but were ignored by the petitioner.
The contract for security services also provided for a one year renewable Thus on June 7, 1988, the private respondent filed with the Office of the Sub-
period unless terminated by either of the parties. It reads:chanrob1es virtual Regional Arbitrator in Region VI, Iloilo City a complaint for unpaid amount of
(1) The Commission has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case; (2) Granting the award of the National Labor Relations Commission is valid,
reliefs granted are not legal.
(2) Assuming it has jurisdiction, the security guards of Odin Security Agency
have no legal personality to sue or be sued; and (3) Assuming the award complies with the requirements of due process, the
National Labor Relations Commission erred when it failed to declare the
(3) Assuming the individual guards have legal personality the action involves contract for security services void. (Rollo, pp. 201-202)
interpretation of contract over which it has no authority. (Rollo, p. 75)
The petitioner is a government-owned or controlled corporation with a special
On August 19, 1988, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order dismissing the charter. This places it under the scope of the civil service (Art. XI [B] [1] and
complaint stating that the petitioner’s being a government-owned or [2], 1987 Constitution); Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. NLRC, 196 SCRA
controlled corporation would place it under the scope and jurisdiction of the 176 [1991]; PNOC-Energy Development Corp. v. NLRC, 201 SCRA 487
Civil Service Commission and not within the ambit of the NLRC. [1991]). However, the guards are not employees of the petitioner. The
contract of services explicitly states that the security guards are not
This Order of dismissal was raised on Appeal to the NLRC and on January considered employees of the petitioner (Rollo, p. 45). There being no
17, 1989 the NLRC issued the questioned resolution setting aside the order employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the security
and entered a decision granting reliefs to the private Respondent. guards, the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission may not be invoked
in this case.
A motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed raising among others
that the resolution is:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary The contract entered into by the petitioner which is merely job contracting
makes the petitioner an indirect employer. The issue, therefore, is whether or
(1) In violation of the right of the respondent to due process under the not an indirect employer is bound by the rulings of the NLRC.
Constitution;
Notwithstanding that the petitioner is a government agency, its liabilities,
(2) Granting arguendo that the due process clause was observed, the which are joint and solidary with that of the contractor, are provided in
resolution granting relief is without any legal basis; and Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. This places the petitioner’s
liabilities under the scope of the NLRC. Moreover, Book Three, Title II on
(3) Granting arguendo that there is legal basis for the award, the stipulation Wages specifically provides that the term "employer" includes any person
under the contract allowing an increase of wage rate is void ab initio. (Rollo, acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
p. 86) employee and shall include the Government and all its branches,
subdivisions and instrumentalities, all government-owned or controlled
Petitioner filed its Reply alleging that review of the decision of public We do not agree with the finding that private respondents had rendered
respondent is proper if there is a conflict in the factual findings of the labor services from June 16, 1992 to March 18, 1993 so as to entitle them to
arbiter and the NLRC and when the evidence is insufficient and insubstantial payment of wages. Public respondent based its conclusion on the following:
to support NLRCs factual findings; that public respondents findings that (a) the letter dated April 7, 1993 of Pedrito L. Leyson, Office Manager of
private respondents rendered compensable services were merely based on AKELCO addressed to AKELCOs General Manager, Atty. Leovigildo T.
private respondents computation of claims which is self-serving; that the Mationg, requesting for the payment of private respondents unpaid wages
alleged unnumbered board resolution dated February 11, 1992, directing all from June 16, 1992 to March 18, 1993; (b) the memorandum of said Atty.
employees to report to Lezo Office was never implemented because it was Mationg dated 14 April 1993, in answer to the letter request of Pedrito
not a valid action of AKELCOs legitimate board. Leyson where Atty. Mationg made an assurance that he will recommend
such request; (c) the private respondents own computation of their unpaid
The sole issue for determination is whether or not public respondent NLRC wages. We find that the foregoing does not constitute substantial evidence to
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or want of support the conclusion that private respondents are entitled to the payment
jurisdiction when it reversed the findings of the Labor Arbiter that private of wages from June 16, 1992 to March 18, 1993. Substantial evidence is that
respondents refused to work under the lawful orders of the petitioner amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
AKELCO management; hence they are covered by the "no work, no pay" adequate to justify a conclusion.[14] These evidences relied upon by public
principle and are thus not entitled to the claim for unpaid wages from June respondent did not establish the fact that private respondents actually
16, 1992 to March 18, 1993. rendered services in the Kalibo office during the stated period.
We find merit in the petition. The letter of Pedrito Leyson to Atty. Mationg was considered by public
respondent as evidence that services were rendered by private respondents
At the outset, we reiterate the rule that in certiorari proceedings under Rule during the stated period, as the recommendation and request came from the
65, this Court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon office manager who has direct knowledge regarding the services and
which the labor arbiter and public respondent NLRC based their resolutions. performance of employees under him. We are not convinced. Pedrito Leyson
Our query is limited to the determination of whether or not public respondent is one of the herein private respondents who are claiming for unpaid wages
NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of and we find his actuation of requesting in behalf of the other private
discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions. [10] While administrative respondents for the payment of their backwages to be biased and self-
findings of fact are accorded great respect, and even finality when supported serving, thus not credible.
by substantial evidence, nevertheless, when it can be shown that
administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature as to On the other hand, petitioner was able to show that private respondents did
compel a contrary conclusion, this court had not hesitated to reverse their not render services during the stated period. Petitioners evidences show that
factual findings.[11] Factual findings of administrative agencies are not on January 22, 1992, petitioners Board of Directors passed a resolution
infallible and will be set aside when they fail the test of temporarily transferring the Office from Lezo, Aklan to Amon Theater, Kalibo,
arbitrariness.[12] Moreover, where the findings of NLRC contradict those of Aklan upon the recommendation of Atty. Leovigildo Mationg, then project
the labor arbiter, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may look supervisor, on the ground that the office at Lezo was dangerous and unsafe.
into the records of the case and reexamine the questioned findings.[13] Such transfer was approved by then NEA Administrator, Rodrigo E. Cabrera,
"On January 22, 1991 by way of a resolution of the Board of Respondents acts and payment of complainants salaries
Directors of AKELCO it allowed the temporary holding of and again from March 1993 is an unequivocal recognition on
office at Amon Theater, Kalibo, Aklan, per information by the part of respondents that the work of complainants is
their project supervisor, Atty. Leovigildo Mationg that their continuing and uninterrupted and they are therefore entitled
head office is closed and that it is dangerous to hold office to their unpaid wages for the period from June 1992 to
thereat. March 1993."
Nevertheless, majority of the employees including the herein The admission is detrimental to private respondents cause. Their excuse is
complainants, continued to report for work at Lezo, Aklan that the transfer to Kalibo was illegal but we agree with the Labor Arbiter that
and were paid of their salaries. it was not for private respondents to declare the managements act of
temporarily transferring the AKELCO office to Kalibo as an illegal act. There
xxx is no allegation nor proof that the transfer was made in bad faith or with
malice. The Labor Arbiter correctly rationalized in its decision as follows: [18]
Bankard took the position, however, that there was no obligation on the
SO ORDERED. part of the management to grant to all its employees the same increase in an
across-the-board manner.
The Second Division of the NLRC, by Order of May 31, 1995, finding no Normally, a company has a wage structure or method of determining the
wage distortion, dismissed the case for lack of merit. wages of its employees. In a problem dealing with wage distortion, the basic
assumption is that there exists a grouping or classification of employees that
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case was,
establishes distinctions among them on some relevant or legitimate bases.[6]
by Resolution of July 28, 1995, denied.
Involved in the classification of employees are various factors such as
Petitioner thereupon filed a petition for certiorari before this Court,
the degrees of responsibility, the skills and knowledge required, the
docketed as G.R. 121970. In accordance with its ruling in St. Martin Funeral
complexity of the job, or other logical basis of differentiation. The differing
Homes v. NLRC,[1] the petition was referred to the Court of Appeals which, by
wage rate for each of the existing classes of employees reflects this
October 28, 1999, denied the same for lack of merit.
classification.
Hence, the present petition which faults the appellate court as follows:
Petitioner maintains that for purposes of wage distortion, the
(1) It misapprehended the basic issues when it concluded that classification is not one based on levels or ranks but on two groups of
under Bankards new wage structure, the old salary gaps employees, the newly hired and the old, in each and every level, and not
between the different classification or level of employees were between and among the different levels or ranks in the salary structure.
still reflected by the adjusted salary rates[2]; and
Public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) refutes
(2) It erred in concluding that wage distortion does not appear to petitioners position, however. It, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
exist, which conclusion is manifestly contrary to law and essays in its Comment of April 12, 2000 as follows:
jurisprudence.[3]
To determine the existence of wage distortion, the historical classification of
Upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6727 (WAGE RATIONALIZATION
the employees prior to the wage increase must be established. Likewise, it
ACT, amending, among others, Article 124 of the Labor Code) on June 9,
must be shown that as between the different classification of employees,
1989, the term wage distortion was explicitly defined as:
there exists a historical gap or difference.
The wordings of Article 124 are clear. If it was the intention of the Petitioner cites Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. NLRC[13] to support its
legislators to cover all kinds of wage adjustments, then the language of the claim that the obligation to rectify wage distortion is not confined to wage
law should have been broad, not restrictive as it is currently phrased: distortion resulting from government decreed law or wage order.
Article 124 is entitled Standards/Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixing. It Wage distortion is a factual and economic condition that may be brought
is found in CHAPTER V on WAGE STUDIES, WAGE AGREEMENTS AND about by different causes. In Metro Transit, the reduction or elimination of the
WAGE DETERMINATION which principally deals with the fixing of minimum normal differential between the wage rates of rank-and-file and those of
wage. Article 124 should thus be construed and correlated in relation to supervisory employees was due to the granting to the former of wage
minimum wage fixing, the intention of the law being that in the event of an increase which was, however, denied to the latter group of employees.
increase in minimum wage, the distinctions embodied in the wage structure
based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation will
be preserved.
Respondent (petitioner herein) insist assiduously that the commission should Thus, the commissions earned by private respondents in selling
be included in the computation of actual wages per agreement. We will not softdrinks constitute part of the compensation or remuneration paid to
fall prey to this fallacious argument. An employee should receive the
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners submit that their allowances are
3. Bislig Allowance - included in the definition of "facilities" in Art. 97, par. (f), of the Labor Code,
being necessary and indispensable for their existence and
The Bislig Allowance is given to Division Managers and corporate officers subsistence. Furthermore they claim that their availment of the monetary
assigned in Bislig on account of the hostile environment prevailing equivalent of those "facilities" on a monthly basis was characterized by
therein. But once the recipient is transferred elsewhere outside Bislig, the permanency, regularity and customariness. And to fortify their arguments
allowance ceases. they insist on the applicability of Santos,[8] Soriano,[9] The Insular Life
Assurance Company,[10] Planters Products, Inc.[11] and Songco[12] which are
DECISION However, in a Resolution No. 95-01 dated February 24, 1995, the
RTWPB denied petitioners consolidated application for extension of
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
exemption. In justifying its denial, the RTWPB relied on Section 7 of the
NWPC Revised Guidelines No. 1, Series of 1992, thus:
Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which seeks
Establishments shall be granted full exemption of one (1) year from effectivity
to set aside the Decision[1] dated July 3, 1996 and Resolution[2] dated
of the Order for all categories of exemption.
November 27, 1996 of the National Wages and Productivity Commission
(NWPC) in the consolidated NWPC Case Nos. E-95-099, E-95-100 and E-
From the said Resolution, petitioners interposed an appeal to the
95-101, entitled In Re: Application for Extension of Exemption from Wage
NWPC.
Order No. RX-03 of Applicants-Appellants Nasipit Lumber Company,
Philippine Wallboard Corporation and Anakan Lumber Company. On July 3, 1996, the NWPC rendered a Decision denying the appeal for
lack of merit. The NWPC ratiocinated as follows:
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
On November 19, 1993, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Thus, the principal issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the
Board (RTWPB) of Region X, Northern Mindanao, Cagayan de Oro City, period of exemption under Wage Order RX-03 can be extended for more
issued Wage Order No. RX-03.[3] This Wage Order mandated a P7.00 than one (1) year.
increase in the minimum daily wage of all workers and employees in the
private sector in Region X receiving a daily wage of not more than P130.00 We rule in the negative.
per day and an additional P10.00 allowance per day.
Section 7 of the NWPC Revised Guidelines on Exemption, which is the
Subsequently or on March 17, 1994, Nasipit Lumber Company,
applicable rule on this matter, provides for the duration and extent of
Philippine Wallboard Corporation and Anakan Lumber Company (herein
exemption that can be granted to a qualified applicant establishment, to wit:
petitioners) filed their separate application for exemption from compliance
with Wage Order No. RX-03, claiming they are distressed establishments
whose paid-up capital has been impaired by at least twenty-five percent Establishments shall be granted full exemption of one (1) year from effectivity
of the Order for all categories of exemption.
(25%).
After finding that the petitioners indeed sustained financial losses which xxx
impaired their respective paid-up capital, the RTWPB, in a consolidated
Order dated December 3, 1994, granted petitioners a full exemption from As set forth by the aforecited rule, the maximum period of exemption that can
be accorded to a qualified applicant is only for one (1) year from the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED (c) To prescribe rules and guidelines for the determination of appropriate
for lack of merit. Board Resolution No. 95-01, Series of 1995 dated 24 minimum wage and productivity measures at the regional, provincial or
February 1995 is AFFIRMED. industry levels;
SO ORDERED. (d) To review regional wage levels set by the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Boards to determine if these are in accordance with prescribed
Unswayed, petitioners filed on August 14, 1996, a consolidated motion guidelines and national development plans;
for reconsideration.
xxx
However, the NWPC remained steadfast with its earlier Decision and
denied petitioners motion in its Resolution dated November 27, 1996.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court through Justice Artemio V.
Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioners contend they are entitled to Panganiban, in Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. vs. National Wages and
an extension for another year of their full exemption as distressed Productivity Commission,[5] held:
establishments on the basis of paragraph 4, Section 3 of Wage Order No.
RX-03 which expressly provides: (D)istressed establishments, as defined by The foregoing clearly grants the NWPC, x x x, the power to prescribe the
the Board upon due and proper application with the Board, may also be rules and guidelines for the determination of minimum wage and productivity
exempted either partly or fully for a period of one year renewable for measures. x x x, the NWPC has the power not only to prescribe guidelines to
another year provided the conditions still persist and warrant the exemption, govern wage orders, but also to issue exemptions therefrom, x x x. In short,
provided further that they qualify under the implementing guidelines issued the NWPC lays down the guidelines which the RTWPB implements.
by the Board.
More specifically, petitioners claim that the NWPC exceeded its In affirming the RTWPBs Resolution denying petitioners application for
jurisdiction (1) in deleting the phrase renewable for another year provided the extension for another year of their full exemption from compliance with Wage
conditions still persist and warrant the exemption from paragraph 4, Section Order No. RX-03, the NWPC did not act with grave abuse of discretion. On
3 of Wage Order No. RX-03 issued by the RTWPB; (2) in overriding the clear the contrary, it merely applied its own Guideline No. 01, Series of 1992
intention of the RTWPB to extend the exemption of distressed limiting the duration of exemption to only one (1) year.
establishments; and (3) in applying Section 7 of the NWPC Guideline No. 01, It is noteworthy that the RTWPB, for its part, implemented to the letter
Series of 1992, limiting the duration of exemption to one (1) year, contrary to the said Guideline.
Republic Act No. 6727.[4]
After finding that the petitioners indeed sustained financial losses which
[G.R. No. 128296. September 8, 2003] impaired their respective paid-up capital, the RTWPB, in a consolidated
Order dated December 3, 1994, granted petitioners a full exemption from
compliance with the said Wage Order for a period of one (1) year or from
December 8, 1993 to December 7, 1994.
NASIPIT LUMBER COMPANY, PHILIPPINE WALLBOARD
CORPORATION AND ANAKAN LUMBER On December 8, 1994, petitioners, citing the continuous business
COMPANY, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL WAGES AND decline in the wood processing industry, filed a consolidated petition for
PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, UNITED LUMBER AND extension of their full exemption from compliance with Wage Order No. RX-
GENERAL WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES and WESTERN 03 for another year or from December 8, 1994 to December 8, 1995.
AGUSAN WORKERS UNION, respondents.
However, in a Resolution No. 95-01 dated February 24, 1995, the
RTWPB denied petitioners consolidated application for extension of
DECISION
exemption. In justifying its denial, the RTWPB relied on Section 7 of the
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: NWPC Revised Guidelines No. 1, Series of 1992, thus:
Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a Establishments shall be granted full exemption of one (1) year from effectivity
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which seeks of the Order for all categories of exemption.
to set aside the Decision[1] dated July 3, 1996 and Resolution[2] dated
November 27, 1996 of the National Wages and Productivity Commission From the said Resolution, petitioners interposed an appeal to the
(NWPC) in the consolidated NWPC Case Nos. E-95-099, E-95-100 and E- NWPC.
95-101, entitled In Re: Application for Extension of Exemption from Wage
On July 3, 1996, the NWPC rendered a Decision denying the appeal for
Order No. RX-03 of Applicants-Appellants Nasipit Lumber Company,
lack of merit. The NWPC ratiocinated as follows:
Philippine Wallboard Corporation and Anakan Lumber Company.
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows: Thus, the principal issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the
period of exemption under Wage Order RX-03 can be extended for more
On November 19, 1993, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity
than one (1) year.
Board (RTWPB) of Region X, Northern Mindanao, Cagayan de Oro City,
issued Wage Order No. RX-03.[3] This Wage Order mandated a P7.00
We rule in the negative.
increase in the minimum daily wage of all workers and employees in the
LABOR LAW (20 October 2018 Cases) Page 29
Section 7 of the NWPC Revised Guidelines on Exemption, which is the provided further that they qualify under the implementing guidelines issued
applicable rule on this matter, provides for the duration and extent of by the Board.
exemption that can be granted to a qualified applicant establishment, to wit:
More specifically, petitioners claim that the NWPC exceeded its
jurisdiction (1) in deleting the phrase renewable for another year provided the
Establishments shall be granted full exemption of one (1) year from effectivity
conditions still persist and warrant the exemption from paragraph 4, Section
of the Order for all categories of exemption.
3 of Wage Order No. RX-03 issued by the RTWPB; (2) in overriding the clear
intention of the RTWPB to extend the exemption of distressed
xxx
establishments; and (3) in applying Section 7 of the NWPC Guideline No. 01,
Series of 1992, limiting the duration of exemption to one (1) year, contrary to
As set forth by the aforecited rule, the maximum period of exemption that can Republic Act No. 6727.[4]
be accorded to a qualified applicant is only for one (1) year from the
effectivity of the Wage Order. This non-extendable one year period of Article 121 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6727,
exemption, which had been consistently applied to all analogous cases in the partly provides:
past involving companies seeking extension of the period of their exemption,
remains and continues to be the existing policy on the matter.Precisely, the ART. 121. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall
rationale behind this policy is to afford protection to workers who may be have the following powers and functions:
unfairly affected by the deleterious effect of a prolonged exemption which is
not in accord with the very purpose of the issuance of a Wage Order. xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED (c) To prescribe rules and guidelines for the determination of appropriate
for lack of merit. Board Resolution No. 95-01, Series of 1995 dated 24 minimum wage and productivity measures at the regional, provincial or
February 1995 is AFFIRMED. industry levels;
SO ORDERED. (d) To review regional wage levels set by the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Boards to determine if these are in accordance with prescribed
Unswayed, petitioners filed on August 14, 1996, a consolidated motion guidelines and national development plans;
for reconsideration.
xxx
However, the NWPC remained steadfast with its earlier Decision and
denied petitioners motion in its Resolution dated November 27, 1996.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court through Justice Artemio V.
Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioners contend they are entitled to Panganiban, in Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. vs. National Wages and
an extension for another year of their full exemption as distressed Productivity Commission,[5] held:
establishments on the basis of paragraph 4, Section 3 of Wage Order No.
RX-03 which expressly provides: (D)istressed establishments, as defined by The foregoing clearly grants the NWPC, x x x, the power to prescribe the
the Board upon due and proper application with the Board, may also be rules and guidelines for the determination of minimum wage and productivity
exempted either partly or fully for a period of one year renewable for measures. x x x, the NWPC has the power not only to prescribe guidelines to
another year provided the conditions still persist and warrant the exemption,
It is noteworthy that the RTWPB, for its part, implemented to the letter
the said Guideline. Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, challenging the
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed November 6, 1997 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No.
Decision dated July 3, 1996 and Resolution dated November 27, 1996 of the 42525. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:
National Wages and Productivity Commission (NWPC) are
hereby AFFIRMED. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Voluntary Arbitration Committee dated June 18, 1996 is hereby REVERSED
SO ORDERED. and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, and a new judgment is
rendered finding that no wage distortion resulted from the petitioners
separate and regional implementation of Wage Order No. VII-03 at its Cebu,
Mabolo and P. del Rosario branches.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Facts
Subsequently on November 23, 1993, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Productivity Board of Region VII issued Wage Order No. RB VII-03, which
directed the integration of the COLA mandated pursuant to Wage Order No.
RO VII-02-A into the basic pay of all workers. It also established an increase In ruling that there was no wage distortion, the Court of Appeals held
in the minimum wage rates for all workers and employees in the private that the variance in the salary rates of employees in different regions of the
sector as follows: by Ten Pesos (P10.00) in the cities of Cebu, Mandaue and country was justified by RA 6727. It noted that the underlying considerations
Lapulapu; Five Pesos (P5.00) in the municipalities of Compostela, Liloan, in issuing the wage orders are diverse, based on the distinctive situations
Consolacion, Cordova, Talisay, Minglanilla, Naga and the cities of Davao, and needs existing in each region. Hence, there is no basis to apply the
Toledo, Dumaguete, Bais, Canlaon, and Tagbilaran. salary increases imposed by Wage Order No. VII-03 to employees outside of
Region VII. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that the distinctions
The petitioner then granted a COLA of P17.50 to its employees at its Naga between each employee group in the region are maintained, as all
Branch, the only branch covered by Wage Order No. RB 5-03, and integrated employees were granted an increase in minimum wage rate.[5]
the P150.00 per month COLA into the basic pay of its rank-and-file
employees at its Cebu, Mabolo and P. del Rosario branches, the branches
The Issues
covered by Wage Order No. RB VII-03.
Order VII-03. xxx What it simply argues is that it is wrong for the Bank to
peremptorily abandon a national wage structure and replace the same with a
regionalized structure in violation of the principle of equal pay for equal Petitioner further contends that the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting
work. And, it is wrong to say that its act of abandoning its national wage the meaning of establishment in relation to wage distortion. It quotes the RA
structure is mandated by law. 6727 Implementing Rules, specifically Section 13 thereof which speaks of
workers working in branches or agencies of establishments in or outside the
As already discussed above, we cannot sustain this National Capital Region. Petitioner infers from this that the regional offices of
argument. Petitioner contradicts itself in not objecting, on the one hand, to the Bank do not themselves constitute, but are simply branches of, the
the right of the regional wage boards to impose a regionalized wage scheme; establishment which is the whole bank. In effect, petitioner argues that wage
while insisting, on the other hand, on a national wage structure for the whole distortion covers the pay scales even of employees in different regions, and
Bank. To reiterate, a uniform national wage structure is antithetical to the not only those of employees in the same region or branch. We disagree.
purpose of RA 6727.
Section 13 provides that the minimum wage rates of workers working in
The objective of the law also explains the wage disparity in the example branches or agencies of establishments in or outside the National Capital
cited by petitioner: Armae Librero, though only in Pay Class 4 in Mabolo, Region shall be those applicable in the place where they are sanctioned. The
was, as a result of the Wage Order, receiving more than Bella Cristobal, who last part of the sentence was omitted by petitioner in its argument. Given the
was already in Pay Class 5 in Subic.[12] RA 6727 recognizes that there are entire phrase, it is clear that the statutory provision does not support
different needs for the different situations in different regions of the petitioners view that establishment includes all branches and offices in
country. The fact that a person is receiving more in one region does not different regions.
necessarily mean that he or she is better off than a person receiving less in
another region. We must consider, among others, such factors as cost of Further negating petitioners theory is NWPC Guideline No. 1 (S. 1992)
living, fulfillment of national economic goals, and standard of living. In any entitled Revised Guidelines on Exemption From Compliance With the
event, this Court, in its decisions, merely enforces the law. It has no power to Prescribed Wage/Cost of Living Allowance Increases Granted by the
pass upon its wisdom or propriety. Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board, which states that
What the records show is that the respondent corporation deducted the SO ORDERED.
amount due to petitioner from the amount receivable from him for the unpaid
subscriptions. 3 No doubt such set-off was without lawful basis, if not
premature. As there was no notice or call for the payment of unpaid
subscriptions, the same is not yet due and payable.
Lastly, assuming further that there was a call for payment of the unpaid G.R. No. 87449 January 23, 1990
subscription, the NLRC cannot validly set it off against the wages and other
benefits due petitioner. Article 113 of the Labor Code allows such a SOUTH MOTORISTS ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
deduction from the wages of the employees by the employer, only in three vs.
instances, to wit: ROQUE TOSOC, ET AL., and HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, respondents.
At issue in this special civil action for Certiorari is the jurisdiction of the SOUTH MOTORISTS moved for reconsideration of the Order, which was
Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment to act on denied. On 11 July 1988, the Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed
money claims. Petitioner South Motorists Enterprises (SOUTH MOTORISTS) the appealed Order. On 28 July 1988, SOUTH MOTORISTS moved for
maintains that said officials are bereft of authority to act on such claims as reconsideration but this proved unsuccessful. A Second Motion for
this falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. Reconsideration was filed, which was likewise denied in an Order dated 7
Respondents maintain otherwise. March 1989.
The facts are as follows: Hence, this certiorari Petition questioning the monetary award by the
Regional Director and, in general, his jurisdiction to validly award money
Sometime in January of 1983, complaints for non-payment of emergency claims.
cost of living allowances were filed by 46 workers, Tosoc, et als., against
SOUTH MOTORISTS before the Naga City District Office of Regional Office The Court resolved to give due course to the Petition and to decide the case.
No. 5 of the then Ministry of Labor. On 10 January 1983 a Special Order was
issued by the District Labor Officer directing its Labor Regulation Officers to SOUTH MOTORISTS contends that only the Labor Arbiter, who is a trier of
conduct an inspection and verification of SOUTH MOTORISTS' employment facts, may determine after hearing such questions as whether or not an
records. employer-employee relationship exists; whether or not the workers were
project workers; whether or not the employees worked continuously or
On the date of the inspection and verification, SOUTH MOTORISTS was whether or not they should receive emergency cost of living allowances and
unable to present its employment records on the allegation that they had if entitled, how much each should receive. Thus, SOUTH MOTORISTS
been sent to the main office in Manila. The case was then set for conference submits that this case should be referred to the Labor Arbiter for proper
on 25 January 1983 but had to be reset to 8 February 1983 upon the request proceedings.
of SOUTH MOTORISTS to enable it to present all the employment records
on such date. However, on 7 February 1983 SOUTH MOTORISTS asked for Two provisions of law are crucial to the issue—Article 129 and Article 217 of
another deferment to 16 February 1983 due to its lawyer's tight schedule. On the Labor Code, as recently amended by Republic Act No. 6715, approved
16 February 1983, SOUTH MOTORISTS again requested for a resetting to 3 on 2 March 1989. Said amendments, being curative in nature, have
March 1983 because of the alleged voluminous records it had to locate and retroactive effect and, thus, should apply in this case (BRIAD AGRO vs. DE
its desire to submit a memorandum regarding complainants' claims. On 2 LA CERNA, G.R. No. 82805, and CAMUS ENGINEERING vs. DE LA
March 1983, SOUTH MOTORISTS once again requested an extension of 30 CERNA, G.R. No. 83225, 9 November 1989). At this juncture, it should be
days on the ground that the documents were still being prepared and collated pointed out in the light of these Briad-Agro cases, including the modificatory
and that a formal manifestation or motion would follow. Nothing did. Resolution thereon of 9 November 1989, petitioner's invocations of the
rulings in Zambales Base Metals, L-73184-88, 26 November 1986, and
On 7 March 1983, the assigned Labor Regulation Officers submitted an kindred cases, is now out-dated.
Inspection Report on the basis of which an Order dated 14 April 1983 was
LABOR LAW (20 October 2018 Cases) Page 39
The aforesaid Articles, as amended, respectively read as follows: Clearly, Regional Directors are empowered to hear and decide, in a
summary proceeding, claims for recovery of wages and other monetary
Art. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other claims and benefits, including legal interest, subject to the concurrence of the
benefits.— Upon complaint of any interested party, the Regional following requisites:
Director of the Department of Labor and Employment or any of the
duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is empowered, 1) the claim is presented by an employee or person employed in
through summary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and domestic or household service, or househelper under the Code;
decide cases involving the recovery of wages and other monetary
claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an employee or 2) the claim arises from employer-employee relations;
person employed in domestic or household service and househelper
under this Code, arising from employer-employee 3) the claimant no longer being employed, does not seek
relations: Provided, That such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement; and
reinstatement: Provided, further, That the aggregate claim of each
employee or househelper does not exceed five thousand pesos 4) the aggregate money claim of each employee or househelper
(P5,000.00). . . . does not exceed P5,000.00 (Art. 129, Labor Code, as amended by
R.A. 6715).
and
But where these requisites do not concur, the Labor Arbiters shall have
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) exclusive original jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee
Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters relationship except claims for employees' compensation, social security,
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, medicare and maternity benefits (parag. 6, Art. 217, Labor Code as amended
within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by by R.A. 6715).
the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of
stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, The records of this case show that the award of One Hundred Eighty Four
whether agricultural or non-agricultural: Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Nine and 12/100 Pesos (P l84,689.12) given
by the District Labor Officer on 14 April 1983 is itemized as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Anatalio Cado P 3,203.20
(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social 2. Macario Gavino 6,332.48
security, medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims 3. Vito T. Euste 6,073.76
arising from employer-employee relations, including those of 4. Domingo Ricafort 3,843.84
persons in domestic or household service, involving an 5. Roger Paulo 4,176.48
amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000), whether or 6. Elias Clarianes 4,201.12
not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. 7. Ernesto Brequillo 4,176.48
8. Santiago Asares 4,114.88
xxx xxx xxx 9. Marcelito Verdadero 4,127.20
10. Elias Pascua 4,348.96
As to respondent So, petitioner maintains that there can be a set-off or WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 29,
legal compensation between them. Consequently, it can withhold his 1999 and Resolution dated May 8, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
13th month pay and other benefits. SP No. 50957 are hereby AFFIRMED.
For legal compensation to take place, the requirements set forth in SO ORDERED.
Articles 1278 and 1279 of the Civil Code, quoted below, must be present.
"ARTICLE 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their
own right, are creditors and debtors of each other.
1. Wage increase of 25% of gross monthly wage from January 1985 A February 19, 1986 Central Bank report on Manilabanks financial
to December 1988; condition as of December 31, 1985 disclosed, among other things, that the
banks operations for the preceding year resulted in a net loss of P362.4
2. Christmas Bonus of one and one-half (1-1/2) months pay from
million. It likewise revealed that the banks financial condition continued to
December 1985 to December 1987;
deteriorate.[4]
3. Mid-year Bonus of one (1) month pay from 1985 to 1988,
Consequently, on May 22, 1987, the Monetary Board issued Resolution
inclusive;
No. 505 prohibiting Manilabank from doing business in the Philippines. The
4. Profit Sharing of 5% of net profit for 1985 and 1986; said resolution reads:
5. Differentials on accrued leaves, retirement benefits and Christmas Finding to be true the statements of the Assistant to the Governor
and Mid-year bonuses; and Officer-in-Charge, Supervision and Examination Sector (SES)
Department I, in his memorandum dated April 28, 1987 submitting
6. Longevity pay, Loyalty Bonus and Medical, Dental and Optical a report on the financial condition of the Manila Banking
Benefits; Corporation (TMBC) as of March 31, 1987, that the financial
7. Uniform allowance of P600.00 per year from January 1985 to condition of TMBC is one of insolvency and its continuance in
January 1988, inclusive; business would involve probable loss to its depositors and creditors
and considering, among other things, that:
LABOR LAW (20 October 2018 Cases) Page 46
1. During the 3-month period January 1 to March 31, 2. To designate the Assistant to the Governor and Officer-in-
1987, TMBC incurred losses of 62.3 million , before Charge, SES Department I, as Receiver of TMBC, to immediately
interest on Central Bank overdraft and penalties on take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible
reserve deficiencies (242.9 million for the three months); collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the
benefit of its creditors exercising all the powers necessary for these
2. Prior notices had been made to TMBC of a condition
purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing
which may be considered as one indicating insolvency as
mortgages in its name.[5]
defined under Sec. 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended, in
various letters of Mr. Antonio T. Castro, Jr., Special Thereafter, Feliciano Miranda, Jr. was designated as receiver. He
Assistant to the Governor and Head, SES Department I, immediately took charge of the banks assets and liabilities. He likewise
dated December 9, 1985, December 13, 1985 and terminated the employment of about 343 officers and top managers of the
October 16, 1986 and in a letter of the Governor, dated bank. All these officers and top managers, who are private respondents
February 27, 1987; herein, were paid whatever separation and/or retirement benefits were due
them.
3. Mr. Vicente G. Puyat, in response to his request
conveyed by Mrs. Reyes to the Monetary Board, for a On November 11, 1988, the Monetary Board issued Resolution No.
chance to appear before the Monetary Board in 1003 ordering the liquidation of Manilabank on account of insolvency. The
representation of the majority stockholders of TMBC, in resolution reads as follows:
connection with the rehabilitation plan for TMBC, had
Having determined and confirmed on the basis of the memorandum
been invited three times to appear before the Board: first,
of the Special Assistant to the Governor and Head, Supervision
on May 13, 1987, then on May 18, 1987 upon his request,
and Examination Sector (SES) Department I, and Receiver, The
and on May 22, 1987, which invitations he did not respond
Manila Banking Corporation (TMBC), dated November 4, 1988,
to himself and neither did he attend the Board meetings
submitting a report on the financial condition of TMBC as of July 31,
held on May 18, 1987 and May 22, 1987;
1988, that the financial condition of the bank continues to be one of
4. TMBC has not submitted a rehabilitation plan accepted insolvency and it can no longer resume business with safety to its
to the Central Bank; and depositors, creditors and the general public, considering the
opinion of the Central Bank legal counsel that, with the Supreme
5. The said Assistant to the Governor, who was present
Courts decision dated March 10, 1988 (a) setting aside the decision
during the Monetary Board meeting held on May 22, 1987,
of the Court of Appeals sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial
had categorically confirmed that, after considering all the
Court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction dated July 14, 1987
adjustments, TMBC would still be insolvent even with an
against the enforcement of Monetary Board Resolution No. 505
additional capital infusion of P500 million.
dated May 22, 1987, (b) dissolving the said writ of preliminary
the Board decided as follows: injunction, and (c) making permanent the temporary restraining
order issued by the Supreme Court on February 16, 1988, the
1. To prohibit TMBC to do business in the Philippines and place its liquidation of TMBC may now be ordered by the Monetary Board
assets and affairs under receivership in accordance with the and that its authority to order such liquidation is not affected by the
provisions of Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended; and pendency of Civil Case No. 87-40659 nor of the Supreme Courts
resolution of March 10, 1988 (enjoining the Court of Appeals from
WHEREFORE, except for the modification we provided on the Wherefore, premises considered, order is hereby issued:
manner medical, dental and optical benefits should be
claimed/paid, and our awarding annual interest of 12% to whatever 1. denying respondents motion for reconsideration;
has been awarded below, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed
and respondents appeal is hereby dismissed. 2. directing the NLRC Cashier to hold in her custody re-
submitted Certificate of Time Deposit No. 890530-D
dated October 27, 1992 with maturity date on December
SO ORDERED.[9]
28, 1992;
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration from the aforequoted 3. directing the respondents to post an additional bond,
resolution. either in cash, surety, or certificate of time deposit drawn
in the name of the Cashier, NLRC, in the amount
On October 14, 1992, private respondents filed an ex parte motion for
of P76,572,000.00 to cover, the additional award detailed
the issuance of a writ of execution. Petitioners opposed the same, reasoning
in our September 9, 1992 resolution;
that the assets of Manilabank are exempt from execution and that the NLRC
resolution had not become final and executory. 4. directing, accordingly, the Executive Clerk to cause the
personal service of this Order upon the parties,
On October 22, 1992, the NLRC issued an order directing petitioners,
particularly the respondents and their counsel; and
under pain of contempt, to renew the certificate of time deposit and to have
the same issued in the name of , and deposited with, the cashier of the 5. holding in abeyance the execution of our September 9,
NLRC. 1992 resolution (despite its finality now) for a period of
ten (10) calendar days from respondents receipt of this
In response, petitioners Manilabank and Arnulfo Aurellano filed petition
Order, with the warning, however, that should this
for certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107487, to set aside
Commission not receive a restraining order from the
said order alleging that the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion
Supreme Court within said period of ten (10) calendar
because it (as re-phrased):
days, then a writ of execution will be issued to enforce
a. violated an existing statute.[10] our now final judgment.
a. Public respondents, in grave abuse of discretion, effectively f. The award of attorneys fees is unconscionable, especially in light
violated petitioners right due process because- of its dissipative effect of the remaining assets of the insolvent
Manilabank and its prejudicial consequences on Manilabanks
(1) The monstrous award totaling about P212 million was
stockholders and creditors.[20]
decided based purely on private respondents worthless
papers which were never identified nor supported by any g. The NLRCs award of legal interest on the amount awarded by
single affidavit. the labor arbiter and its order to deposit an additional bond to cover
such interest have no legal basis and give an undue advantage to
(2) The Labor Arbiter proceeded to decide the case
other creditors of the insolvent Manilabank.[21]
solely on the bases of the pleadings filed, despite the
enormity of the claims and the reapeted demands for a h. The NLRCs threat to execute the judgment would be unlawful if
full-dress trial (which, ironically, were initially granted by carried out, because Manilabanks assets are legally exempt from
the Office of the Labor Arbiter), made necessary by the execution.[22]
conflicting factual allegations of the parties and the
On December 9, 1992, this Court ordered that G.R. No. 107902 be
worthless papers passed off by private respondents as
consolidated with G.R. No. 107487.[23]
their evidence.[15]
On December 16, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution temporarily
b. Public respondents unlawfully arrogated unto themselves the
enjoining public respondent NLRC from enforcing and/or carrying out the
jurisdiction to pass upon the question of Manilabanks insolvency,
decision of the labor arbiter dated November 14, 1989 and its resolution
despite the pleaded pendency of that prejudicial question before
dated September 9, 1992 and order dated November 26, 1992, all issued in
the RTC of Manila which had aquired exclusive jurisdiction to rule
NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-04624-88.[24]
on the issue to the exclusion of all others.[16]
G.R. No. 107902 is impressed with merit.
c. The money award adjudged against the insolvent Manilabank
violates all notions of justice and equity, considering that the Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC opted to award all the additional
beneficiaries thereof are former officers and top managers of benefits claimed by the 343 private respondents who had already been duly
Manilabank who, being part of management, were partly to blame paid separation pay and/or retirement benefits upon termination of their
for the banks financial decline.[17] employment. The NLRC erroneously adopted the findings of the labor arbiter,
misapplying the time-honored rule that factual findings of quasi-judicial
d. A statutory receiver has the power to adopt and implement
agencies are accorded not only respect but even finality if supported by
prudent policies aimed at preserving the assets of an insolvent
substantial evidence. It declared that the additional benefits sought are in the
bank including regulating, according to his own discretion and
nature of bonuses which when made part of the wage or salary or
judgment, all aspects of employment.[18]
compensation of an employee become demandable and enforceable.[25]
e. Public respondents arbitrary findings that salary increases,
Both the Labor Arbiters and the NLRCs findings and conclusions are
Christmas and mid-year bonuses and other benefits have been
flawed.
regularly and unconditionally paid by Manilabank to private
respondents, and that Manilabank earned profits in 1984, 1985 and
The next issue is whether petitioner was able to perfect his appeal to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code
clearly provides that the appeal bond must be "in the amount equivalent to
the monetary award in the order appealed from." The records show that
petitioner failed to post the required amount of the appeal bond. His appeal
was therefore not perfected.
SO ORDERED.