PEOPLE v. PANFILO M. LACSON, GR No.

149453, 2003-04-01

Facts:

the respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male
person... bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.

The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be
given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its... application are attendant.

It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for... its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases
already filed in court

In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-
bar in said rule should not be applied... retroactively.

The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential requirements for its application were not
present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of

March 29, 1999.

The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims were notified of the
respondent's motion before the hearing thereon and were... served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit... retroactively to the
criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and
unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the State's substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder.

They submit that in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former should prevail.
They also insist that the State had consistently relied on the prescriptive... periods under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it would forever be barred beyond the two-year period by a
retroactive application of the new rule.[

For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may be impaired by its
application to the criminal cases in question... since '[t]he State's witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide
their testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically expedient in April 2001 for
them to do so.'[29] According to the respondent, penal laws,... either procedural or substantive, may be retroactively
applied so long as they favor the accused.[30] He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29,
1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the State... to fairly indict him.[31]
In any event, the State is given the right under the Court's assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information
in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.

The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As applied to criminal law,
procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a crime is to be punished.

further

It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice or
would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court.

Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and implement the
constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively depending upon
several factors, such as the history of the new rule,... its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective
application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the
administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular

Issues:

whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapse... whether there is any... justification for the filing of the
cases beyond the 2-year period

Ruling:

In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the new rule should not be
applied retroactively against the State.

The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced
to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the... intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two
years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so.

If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until
March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases.

The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be
emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit
the accused. For to do so would cause an

"injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws
in particular.

the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.

Principles:

Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended party.

In a per curiam... decision in Stefano v. Woods,[49] the United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in
determining whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given retrospective or
prospective effect:

"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on
the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
standards."

PEOPLE vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003

FACTS: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures, and that these
should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner
asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional
guarantee to the right to speedy trial.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the Motion for Reconsideration given
they were only appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.

The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners’ contention that while Sec.8 secures the
rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If
a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive
application.

2. WON the application of the time-bar under Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive application without
reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused.

The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. The time-bar
under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State and
the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not
retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial
of the State’s right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust and oppressive
consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.

G.R. No. 168918, March 2, 2009

People, petitioner

v Hermenegildo Dumlao y Castiliano and Emilio La'o y Gonzales, respondents

Facts:

This is an appeal to the Sandiganbayan resolution which granted the motion to dismiss/quash of respondent Dumlao
and dismissed the case against him.

On July 1991 an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging respondents Dumlao and others with
violation of section 3 of republic act no. 3019 known as anti-graft and corrupt practices act.

The accused are members of the board of trustees of GSIS charged with unlawful entry to contract of lease-purchase
with La'o private person.

When arraigned, Dumlao pleaded not guilty, and as agreed a joint stipulation of facts and admission of exhibit was
submitted to the court on January 2005

After the pre-trial, Dumlao filed a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, that the alleged board resolution was not approved by the GSIS board of trustees because some signatures
did not appear in the minutes therefore concluding that there was no qourum. And was held meritorious.

But on September 2005, people of the Philippines represented by the office of the ombudsman and thru the office of
the prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Sandiganbayan resolution.

Issues: (1) whether or not the court acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence when it dismissed the criminal
case against dumlao and others? (2) whether or not the signatures of the majority of the GSIS board of trusteea are
necessary on the minutes of the meeting to give force and effect to resolution (3) whether or not the validity of the
contract is an essential element of violation of section (4) whether or not the court acted in accordance with law and
jurisprudence when it resolved to archive the case against respondent La'o?
On the other hand, Dumlao's contention were the following: (1) ombudsman's petition will place him in double
jeopardy (2) the Sandiganbayan could not be said to have gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction because it only followed the rule in pre-trial and decided the case on the basis of the facts stipulated in
the pre-trial (3) the facts agree by the prosecution and respondents Dumlao in the pre-trial was approved by the
Sandiganbayan showed that Dumlao did not commit any crime (4) continuing prosecution of Dumlao, excluding the
other GSIS trustees constitutes unfair discrimination and his right to equal protection of the law

Petitioner further contended that they were denied due process because Sandiganbayan has dismissed the case after
re-trial before they could present witnesses and offer exhibits.

Ruling:

Insufficiency of evidence is not of the grounds of motion to quash. Insufficiency is ground for dismissal only after
the prosecution rests its case. In this case, Sandiganbayan deprived the prosecution to present its evidence in doing
so violated the rights to due process.

Sandiganbayan erred in confusing the resolution and the minutes of the meeting which allegedly approved the lease-
purchase agreement. A resolution is distinct and different from the minutes of the meeting.

In the issue of double jeopardy, the court did not agree with Dumlao because the first jeopardy has not yet attached
due to the premature dismissal.

In the issue of jurisdiction, in this case there was no error of judgment but a denial of due process resulting in loss of
jurisdiction.

In the issue of discrimination, the court is not convinced because Dumlao was the only one left to be prosecuted
because his co-conspirators are all dead.

The petition was granted.

People of the Philippines

vs
Hermenegildo Dumlao y Castiliano and Emilio Lao y Gonzales
GR No. 168918 March 2, 2009

Facts:
Before the Sandiganbayan, an information was filed charging Dumlao, La’o and others with violation of Sec. 3 (g)
of RA No. 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

It was alleged in the said information that the respondents, who were members of the GSIS Board of Trustees,
entered into a contract of lease-purchase with respondent La’o, a private person. The said contract provided the
concurrence of GSIS to sell La’o a property it had acquired, consisting of land and building known as the
Government Counsel Center for P2 million on an installment with annual interest and amortization. La’o was also
authorized to sub-lease the ground floor of the said building during the lease period, from which he collected yearly
rentals in excess of the yearly amortization, causing huge disadvantage to the government.

Considering the foregoing, Dumlao filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts alleged did not constitute an
offense. He averred that the prosecution’s main thrust against him was the alleged approval by the GSIS Board of
the said contract. He contended that it was never approved as the signatures of his fellow respondents did not appear
in the minutes of meeting therefor, proving their non-participation therein. Additionally, there was no board quorum
during that time to push through with the approval thereof. Hence, since the evidence of the prosecution was
insufficient, he should be deemed innocent.
The Sandiganbayan ruled in Dumlao’s favor, based on the said insufficiency of evidence.

Issue:
Whether the insufficiency of evidence is a ground for motion to quash.

Held:
No.

Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. The grounds, as enumerated in Section 3,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, are as follows:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case. Section 23,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for insufficiency of
evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it violated the
prosecution’s right to due process. It deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove
the accused’s culpability.

It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises. Not only did it not consider
the ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground not raised by him, and not at the
appropriate time. The dismissal was thus without basis and untimely.

Soriano vs People and BSP

G.R. No. 162336 February 1, 2010

Facts:
Soriano was charged for estafa through falsification of commercial documents for allegedly securing a loan of 48
million in the name of two (2) persons when in fact these individuals did not make any loan in the bank, nor did the
bank's officers approved or had any information about the said loan. The state prosecutor conducted a Preliminary
Investigation on the basis of letters sent by the officers of Special Investigation of BSP together with 5 affidavits and
filed two (2) separate information against Soriano for estafa through falsification of commercial documents and
violation of DORSI law.
Soriano moved for the quashal of the two (2) informations based on the ground:

1. that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, for the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ
constituted the complaint and was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Sec.
3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as statment of address of the petitioner and oath of subscription
and the signatories were not authorized persons to file the complaint; and
2. that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, for the commission of estafa uner par. 1(b) of Art. 315
of the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation of DORSI law (Sec. 83 or RA 337 as amended by
PD 1795), and therefore a person cannot be charged of both offenses.

Issue:
Whether or not the complaint filed complied with the mandatory requirements of law.
Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in an order denying a Motion to
Quash.

Ruling:
Yes, the letters transmitted were not intended to be the complaint but merely transmitted for preliminary
investigation. The affidavits and not the letter transmitting them initiated the preliminary investigation and therefore
is the complaint which substantially complied with the manadory requirements of law.

No. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to
present special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.

Cerezo
vs
People of the Philippines

Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against respondents Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and
Vicente Afulugencia (respondents), as well as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo). Finding probable cause to indict
respondents, the Quezon City Prosecutors Office (OP-QC) filed the corresponding Information against them before
the RTC. Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecutions
Evidence before the OP-QC. In its resolution, the OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and recommended the
withdrawal of the Information. Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed before the
RTC on December 3, 2003. During the intervening period, specifically on November 24, 2003, respondents were
arraigned. All of them entered a not guilty plea. In deference to the prosecutor’s last resolution, the RTC ordered the
criminal case dismissed in its Order.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the OP-QC resolution has not yet
attained finality, considering that the same was the subject of a Petition for Review filed before the Department of
Justice (DOJ). The RTC deferred action on the said motion to await the resolution of the DOJ. The Secretary of
Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and setting aside the OP-QCs resolution, and directing the latter to
refile the earlier Information for libel. The RTC issued its first assailed Order granting petitioners motion for
reconsideration, conformably with the resolution of the DOJ Secretary and setting aside its last Order granting the
dismissal of the case against the respondents and order the reinstatement of the case.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied in the RTC.

The respondents elevated their predicament to the CA arguing that the RTC Orders violated their constitutional right
against double jeopardy. The CA found the RTC to have gravely abused its discretion in ordering the reinstatement
of the case. The CA annulled the impugned RTC Orders, ruling that all the elements of double jeopardy exist. There
was a valid Information sufficient in form and substance filed before a court of competent jurisdiction to which
respondents had pleaded, and that the termination of the case was not expressly consented to by respondents; hence,
the same could not be revived or refiled without transgressing respondents right against double jeopardy. The CA
further found that the DOJ Secretary improperly took cognizance of the Petition for Review because DOJ
Department Order No. 223 mandates that no appeal shall be entertained if the accused has already been arraigned or,
if the arraignment took place during the pendency of the appeal, the same shall be dismissed.

Petitioner interposed the instant appeal when his motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied.

Issue:
Whether there was a valid termination of the case so as to usher in the impregnable wall of double jeopardy.
Ruling:
The Court held that in resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not
rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the courts bounden
duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order
disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
The Court noticed that it is obvious from the Order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge
failed to make his own determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He
failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on
the manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor when he should have been more circumspect and judicious
in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be
uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict respondents. The same holds true with respect to the Order,
which reinstated the case. The RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of
the DOJ Secretary.
By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial
court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus
stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainant’s right to due process. They were void, had no
legal standing, and produced no effect whatsoever.

The Court remanded the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the case to determine if a prima
facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information anew.
The Court also held that double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are
present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a
second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
Since the Court have held Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then
respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. The fifth
requisite which requires the conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval
of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in. The petition was granted and the Supreme Court
remanded the case to QC-RTC for evaluation on whether probable cause exists to hold respondents for trial.

Cerezo v. People, 650 SCRA 222 (2011) There is no double jeopardy where the judge did not make an independent
assessment of the meritsof the motion to withdraw information filed by the prosecutor. “Well-entrenched is the rule
that oncea case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. In thusresolving
a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solelyand merely on the
findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the court’s boundenduty to assess independently the
merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a writtenorder disposing of the motion. While the
recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretaryof Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.”
In this case, the Court found that the RTC judge,in issuing his Order dismissing the criminal case, he failed to make
his own determination of whetheror not there was a prima facie case to hold accused for trial. “He failed to make an
independentevaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the
manifestationand recommendation of the prosecutor when he should have been more circumspect and judicious
inresolving the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appearedto be
uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict respondents. The same holds true withrespect to the
October 24, 2006 Order, which reinstated the case. The RTC judge failed to make aseparate evaluation and merely
awaited the resolution of the DOJ Secretary.” What then? “By relying solely on the manifestation of the public
prosecutor and the resolution of theDOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform
a positive dutyenjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated
thecomplainant’s right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced no effectwhatsoever.” The
Court then remanded the case to the RTC “so that the latter can rule on the merits ofthe case to determine if a prima
faciecase exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Dismiss andWithdraw Information anew.”Anyway, for
clarity, the Court said that since it has held that the Order granting the motion to dismisswas committed with grave
abuse of discretion, then the accused were not acquitted nor was there a validand legal dismissal or termination of the
case. In short, double jeopardy did not set in.

CO v NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTSGR No. 183994June 30, 2014Peralta, J.

FACTS: Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy, filed a complaint for
violation of B.P 22 against petitioner William Co. in the absenceo f U y a n d t h e p r i v a t e c o u n s e l , t h e
cases were provisionally dismissed on June9,2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8,
R u l e 1 1 7 o f t h e R e v i s e d R u l e s o f Criminal Procedure. Uy received a copy of the June 9, 2003
Order on July 2, 2003,wh i l e h e r c o u n s e l - o f - r e c o r d r e c e i v e d a c o p y a d a y a ft e r . O n J u l y 2 ,
2 0 0 4 , U y , through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases which was granted. Co filed a
petition challenging the revival of the criminal cases. He argues that the June9, 2003 Order provisional ly
dismissing the criminal cases should be considered as afinal dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial
was denied. A s s u m i n g t h a t t h e c r i m i n a l c a s e s w e r e o n l y p r o v i s i o n a l l y d i s m i s s e d , C o further
posits that such dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance ofthe June 9, 2003 Order, not after
notice to the offended party. He also insists that b o th the filing o f the mo tio n to revive and the trial
co urt’s issuance o f the ord er granting the revival must be within the one -year period. Even
assuming that theo n e - y e a r p e r i o d t o r e v i v e t h e c r i m i n a l c a s e s s t a r t e d o n J u l y 2 , 2 0 0 3
w h e n U y received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004
was a leap year.

ISSUE:Whether or not the motion to revive was filed within the one-year period.

HELD:Yes. Granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into account 2004as a leap year and that the
one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional
dismissal by Uy, We still hold thatt h e m o t i o n t o r e v i v e t h e c r i m i n a l c a s e s a g a i n s t C o w a s
t i m e l y f i l e d . A y e a r i s equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a
leap year.E q u a l l y s o , u n d e r t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e C o d e o f 1 9 8 7 , a y e a r i s c o m p o s e d o f
12c a l e n d a r m o n t h s . T h e n u m b e r o f d a y s i s i r r e l e v a n t . T h i s w a s o u r r u l i n g
i n Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,40 which was s u b s e q u e n t l y
r e i t e r a t e d i n C o m m i s s i o n e r o f I n t e r n a l R e v e n u e v . A i c h i F o r g i n g Company of Asia, Inc.A
c a l e n d a r mo n t h i s " a mo n t h d e s i g n a t e d i n t h e c a l e n d a r wi t h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e number of days it
may contain." It is the "period of time running from the beginningof a certain numbered day up to, but not
including, the corresponding numberedday of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient
number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month."Petition denied.

PEOPLE vs. DE LEON, G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376 October 8, 1926
PEOPLE vs. DE LEON, G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376 October 8, 1926

Facts: Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de Leon y Flora entered the yard of Vicente Magat's
house on Domingo Santiago Street, Manila, and without violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon
things, took, with intent to gain, two game roosters which were in the yard, one with colored plumage valued at P8
belonging to Diego Magat, and the other with white plumage and black spots, valued at P10, belonging to Ignacio
Nicolas.
Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal court for two crimes of theft, on the theft of Magat's
rooster and the other that of Nicolas'. Upon being arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the
municipal court in each to suffer the penalty of three years, six months and one day presidio correcional, to return
the stolen roosters to their respective owners and to pay the costs in both cases. The accused appealed from this
judgment to the Court of First Instance, and, upon being arraigned upon the same informations, pleaded not guilty in
both cases, which were tried jointly by agreement of the parties approved by the court.

Issue: WON the defendant-appellant committed two crimes of theft.

Held: Under sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters, in response to the unity of thought in the criminal
purpose on one occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the accidental circumstance that the article
unlawfully belonged to two distinct persons. There is no series of acts here for the accomplishment of different
purposes, but only one of which was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one crime. The act
of taking the roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an
independent existence of their own, because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a thing belonging to another on one occasion
and in the same place, constitutes the commission of only one crime of theft; and fact that the things taken belong to
different persons does not produce a multiplicity of crimes, which must be punished separately.