7.
LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES REGALIAN DOCTRINE (Jura Regalia)
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
Art XII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided
by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.
The Concept of Jure Regalia (Regalian Doctrine)
This principle means that all natural wealth -
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral lands of
the public domain and all other natural resources
belong to the State. Thus, even if the private person
owns the property where minerals are discovered,
his ownership for such does not give him the right to
extract or utilize said minerals without permission
from the state to which such minerals belong.
The abovementioned provision provides that except
for agricultural lands for public domain which alone
may be alienated, forest or timber, and mineral lands,
as well as all other natural resources must remain
with the State, the exploration, development and
utilization of which shall be subject to its full control
and supervision albeit allowing it to enter into
coproduction, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements, or into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization
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All lands of whatever classification and other natural
resources not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land (Republic v. Sin, GR No. 157485,
March 26, 2014).
Jure Regalia means that the State is the original
proprietor of all lands and is the general source of all
private titles. All claims of private title to land, save
those acquired from native title, must be traced from
some grant, whether express or implied, from the
state. Absent a clear showing that the land had been
into private ownership through the State’s
imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to State
(Republic v. Santos, G.R. No. 180027, July 18, 2012).
NOTE: To prove that the subject property is alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, applicant
must :
1. Present a Community Environment and
Natural Resourtces Office Certificate (CENRO);
2. Prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of
the public domain as alienable and disposable
; and
3. That the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records.
NOTE: The Regalian Doctrine does not negate native
title to lands held in private ownership since time
immemorial (Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6,
2000).
Q: On March 1980, Cornelio filed an application for
land registration involving a parcel of agricultural
land. During the trial, Cornelio claimed that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than
thirty (30) years. He likewise introduced in evidence
a certification, dated February 1981 citing a
presidential declaration that on June 1980, the
subject matter of the application, were declared
alienable and disposable agricultural land.
If you are the judge, will you grant the application for
land registration of Cornelio? (2014 BAR)
A: NO, I will not grant the application. To be entitled
to register the parcel of land, the applicant must show
that the land being applied for is an alienable land. At
the time of the filing of the application, the land has
not yet been declared alienable by the state (Republic
v. CA, G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005).
---
Q: Can Cornelio acquire said agricultural land
through acquisitive prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary? (2014 BAR)
A: Cornelio can acquire the land by acquisitive
prescription only after it was declared part of
alienable land by the state by possession for the
required number of years for ordinary prescription,
ten years possession in good faith with just title; or
extraordinary prescription by possession for thirty
years without need of any other condition (NCC, Art.
1134).
Q: Eljay donated a parcel of land to Kristoffer by
virtue of a Deed of Donation executed in his favor. At
the time of donation, Eljay is yet to be the registered
owner but only a lawful possessor. And it was only
after two years when Eljay caused the registration of
the land pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted
by the President. Upon Eljay’s death, his heirs
partitioned the lands and claimed that the land
donated to Kristoffer belongs to them. Was the
donation valid?
A: NO. The donation is void. At the time the Deed of
Donation was executed by Eljay the subject property
waspart of the inalienable public domain. It was only
almost after two years later that the State ceded its
right over the land in favor of Eljay by virtue of its
issuance of the OCT pursuant to the Homestead
Patent granted by the President of the Philippines.
Prior to such conferment of title, Eljay possessed no
right to dispose of the land which, by all intents and
purposes, belongs to the State.
The classification of public lands is an exclusive
prerogative of the executive department of the
government and not the Courts. In the absence of
such classification, the land remains as an unclassified
land until it is released therefrom and rendered open
to disposition (Heirs of Gozo v. PUMCO, G.R. No.
195990, August 05, 2015) (Bersamin, J.).
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Q: Filomena allegedly bought a parcel of
unregistered land from Hipolito. When she had the
property titled and declared for tax purposes, she
sold it. The Mapili’s question the transfer, saying that
Filomena falsely stated in her Affidavit of Transfer of
Real Property that Hipolito sold it to her in 1949,
since by that time, he is already dead. Filomena
maintains that she is the lawful owner of such by
virtue of the issuance of the Torrens certificate and
tax declarations in her name. Is Filomena the lawful
owner of such property?
A: NO. Torrens certificate pertaining to the disputed
property does not create or vest title, but is merely an
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title
to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. Land registration under the Torrens
system was never intended to be a means of acquiring
ownership.
Neither does the existence of tax declarations create
or vest title. It is not a conclusive evidence of
ownership, but a proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property (Larena v. Mapili, et. al., G.R.
No. 146341, August 7, 2003).
Q: In 1929, an OCT covering the lot in controversy
was issued in the name of Maria Ramos, Heirs of
Maligaso’s aunt. In 1965, Maria sold it to the Spouses
Encinas which led to the issuance of a TCT in favor of
the latter.
30 years from the time they purchased the lot,
Spouses Encinas issued 2 demand letters to the Heirs
of Maligaso asking them to vacate the contested
area but they refused to leave. Hence, the Spouses
Encinas filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against them. According to the Heirs, however, their
occupation remained undisturbed for more than 30
years and the Spouses’ failure to detail and specify
the Heirs’ supposedly tolerated possession suggest
that they are aware of their claim over the subject
area. Decide with reason.
A: The validity of Spouses’ certificate of title cannot be
attacked by the Heirs in this case for ejectment. Under
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled,
except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in
accordance with law. Whether or not petitioner has
the right to claim ownership over the property is
beyond the power of the trial court to determine in an
action for unlawful detainer.”
As ruled in Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants
Association, Inc., laches does not operate to deprive
the registered owner of a parcel of land of his right to
recover possession thereof (Heirs of Jose Maligaso,
Sr., etc. v. Sps. Simon D. Encinas and Esperanza E.
Encinas; G.R. No. 182716, June 20, 2012).
Q: Spouses Pinoy and Pinay, both natural-born
Filipino citizens, purchased property in the
Philippines. However, they sought its registration
when they were already naturalized as Canadian
citizens. Should the registration be denied on the
ground that they cannot do so being foreign
nationals?
A: NO. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition
of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant
whether they are no longer Filipino citizens at the
time they purchased or registered the parcels of land
in question. What is important is that they were
formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and
as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of
Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution which states
that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of
this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations
provided by law (Republic v. CA and Lapina, G.R. No.
108998, August 24, 1994).
Q: Joe, an alien, invalidly acquired a parcel of land in
the Philippines. He subsequently transferred it to
Jose, a Filipino citizen.
a) What is the status of the transfer?
b) If Joe had not transferred it to Jose but he,
himself, was later naturalized as a Filipino
citizen, will his acquisition thereof remain
invalid?
A:
a. If a land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen
or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and
the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Since the ban on aliens is intended to
preserve the nation’s land for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved
by making lawful the acquisition of real estate
by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization or those transfers made by
aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in
dispute is already in the hands of a qualified
person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no
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more public policy to be protected. The
objective of the constitutional provision to
keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved (Borromeo v. Descallar, G.R. No.
159310, February 24, 2009).
b. NO. If a land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen,
the flaw in the original transaction is also
considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid (Borromeo v.
Descallar, G.R. No. 159310, February 24,
2009).
Q: Rosario filed her application for land registration
of a rice land that she had inherited, owning and
possessing it openly, publicly, uninterruptedly,
adversely against the whole world, and in the
concept of owner since then. This was opposed by
the Republic claiming that Rosario failed to occupy
and possess the land for at least 30 years
immediately preceding the filing of the application;
and that the land applied for, being actually a
portion of a river control system that could not be
subject of appropriation or land registration. Is land
subject of application susceptible of private
acquisition?
A: NO. The land of the public domain, to be the
subject of appropriation, must be declared alienable
and disposable either by the President or the
Secretary of the DENR. Unless public land is shown to
have been reclassified or alienated to a private person
by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title (Republic vs. De
Joson, G.R. No. 163767, March 10, 2014) (Bersamin,
J.). ---
Q: Mario applied for registration of his land. He
claims that he bought the land from Eduardo who
also claims that his great grandfather owned the
land. Mario submitted a CENRO from DENR stating
that the land is alienable and disposable in 1982.
However, the Republic appealed claiming that Mario
did not adhere to the requirements of time required
by the law and he failed to proof that the land is an
alienable and disposable land. The Court ruled in
favor of the Republic stating that the possession of
the land before it is declared alienable and
disposable cannot be included in the computation of
possession of the land, thus, Mario did not adhere to
the period required by law. Can Mario register his
land?
A: NO. Mario failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in possession of the land since June 12,
1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and
period of possession - possession and occupation that
is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since
June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be
considered ipso jure converted to private property
even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to
run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the
national wealth (Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No.
179987, September 3, 2013) (Bersamin, J.).
---
Q: Alma applied for the original registration of title
over her parcel of land in Aklan. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for
original registration of title, contending that the
respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had not
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question
since June 12, 1945. Did the respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the land in question?
A: NO. Alma did not satisfactorily demonstrate that
his or his predecessors-in-interest's possession and
occupation were of the nature and character
contemplated by the law. The general statements of
his witnesses on the possession and occupation were
mere conclusions of law that did not qualify as
competent and sufficient evidence of his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation. The respondent did not competently
account for any act of occupation, development,
cultivation or maintenance of the lands subject of his
application, either on his part or on the part of his
predecessors-in-interest for the entire time that they
were supposedly in possession of the lands. The
respondent's claim of ownership on the basis of the
tax declarations alone did not also suffice (Republic v.
Alba, G.R. No. 169710, August 19, 2015) (Bersamin, J.)
Q: Respondents are the grantees of agricultural
public lands in General Santos City through
Homestead and Fee patents sometime in 1986 and
1991. Negotiations were made by Petitioner
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sometime in 1995 and eventually a Deed of
Conditional Sale of the properties in question was
executed in favour of Petitioner Filinvest Land Inc. A
few days after the execution of the aforestated
deeds, respondents came to know that the sale was
null and void because it was done within the period
they were not allowed to do so and that the sale did
not have the approval of the secretary of DENR.
Thus, they filed a case for declaration of nullity of the
deeds of conditional and absolute sale of the
questioned properties. Will the action prosper?
A: The five-year prohibitory period following the
issuance of the homestead patent is provided under
Section 118 of the Public Land Act. It bears stressing
that the law was enacted to give the homesteader or
patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his
family the land that the State had gratuitously given
to him as a reward for his labour in cleaning and
cultivating it.
In the present case, the negotiations for the purchase
of the properties covered by the patents issued in
1991 were made in 1995 and, eventually, an undated
Deed of Conditional Sale was executed. Petitioner
raises the issue whether by a deed of conditional sale
there was “alienation or encumbrance” within the
contemplation of the law. The prohibition does not
distinguish between consummated and executory
sale. The conditional sale entered into by the parties is
still a conveyance of the homestead patent; that the
formal deed of sale was executed after the expiration
of the said period did not and could not legalize a
contract that was void from its inception.
Nevertheless, petitioner does not err in seeking the
return of the down payment as a consequence of the
sale having been declared void. The rule is settled that
the declaration of nullity of a contract which is void ab
initio operates to restore things to the state and
condition in which they were found before the
execution thereof (Filinvest Land, Inc., Efren C.
Gutierre v. Abdul Backy, Civil Law
470
Persons qualified for registration under Public Land
Act or CA No. 141
Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, except
when prevented by war or force majeure.
REQUISITES :
a. The applicant must be a Filipino citizen;
b. He must have, by himself or through his
predecessors in-interest, possessed and
occupied an alienable and disposable
agricultural portion of the public domain;
c. Such possession and occupation must have
been open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
and in the concept of owner, since June, 12,
1945; and
d. The application must be filed with the proper
court.
Public land
The term is uniformly used to describe so much of the
national domain under the legislative power of the
Congress as has not been subjected to private right or
devoted to public use.
A person deemed to possess an Imperfect title over
property when :
The applicant for confirmation of imperfect title has
shown possession and occupation that is :
1. Open,
2. Continuous,
3. Exclusive and
4. Notorious
5. In the concept of an owner
---
Factors to consider the applicant in an open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession in
the concept of an owner (OCENPO) :
OPEN- when it is patent, visible apparent notorious
and not clandestine;
CONTINUOUS- when uninterrupted, unbroken and
not intermittent or occasional;
EXCLUSIVE- when the adverse possessor can show
exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefits;
NOTORIOUS- when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or the
people in the neighborhood (Tan v. Republic, G.R. No.
193443, April 16, 2012).
Effect of possession of an Imperfect title
When the conditions set by law are complied with,
the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of the title being issued.
Page 5 of 6
Q : In an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title filed by Naguit, the OSG argues that
the property xxx must first be alienable. Since the
subject land was declared alienable only on 1980,
Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since
prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or
disposable. Is it necessary under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree (now Sec. 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act) that the subject land be first
classified as alienable and disposable before the
applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could start ?
A: NO. Section 14(1) merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration
of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application
is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving
the right to utilize the property ; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified
as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then
there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property
(Republic v. CA and Naguit, G.R. No. 144057, January
17, 2005).
---
NOTE: This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v.
CA, where the claimant had been in possession of the
land since 1908 and had filed his application in 1963,
or nine (9) years before the property was declared
alienable and disposable in 1972. Hence, registration
was denied. The Bracewell ruling will not apply in this
case because here, the application was made years
AFTER the property had been certified as alienable
and disposable.
A different rule obtains for forest lands, such as those
which form part of a reservation for provincial park
purposes, the possession of which cannot ripen into
ownership. It is elementary in the law governing
natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. As held in Palomo v. CA, forest land is
not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how
lengthy, cannot convert it into private property,
unless such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable. In the case at bar, the
property in question was undisputedly classified as
disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo
is inapplicable (Palomo v. CA, G.R. No. 95608, January
21, 1997).

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