GUERRERO'S TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. vs.
BLAYLOCK TRANSPORTATION SERVICES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-
KILUSAN (BTEA-KILUSAN), LABORARBITER FRANCISCO M. DE LOS REYES
and JOSE CRUZ
FACTS
 1972, the US Naval Base authorities in Subic conducted a public
bidding for a 5-year contract for the right to operate and/or manage
the transportation services inside the naval base.
 Santiago Guerrero won.
 He refused to employ the incumbent consessionaire’s 395 workers,
who are all members BTEA-KILUSAN (the Union).
 Union filed a complaint w/ the NLRC against Guerrero to compel it
to employ its members, pursuant to Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the RP-US Base
Agreement.
o Article I, Section 6, of the RP-US Base Labor Agreement
provides: "Consistent with their military requirements, the
United States Armed Forces shall endeavor to provide
security for employment and, in the event certain activities
or services are contracted out, the United States Armed
Forces shall require the contractor or concessionaire to
give priority consideration to affected employees for
employment."
 Case dismissed by the NLRC since there was no employer-employee
relationship between the parties.
 Upon appeal, the Sec. of Labor remanded the case to the NLRC. The
NLRC issued a Resolution ordering Guererro to “absorb all
complainants who filed their applications on or before the deadline”
set by Guerrero, except those who may have derogatory records w/
the US Naval Authorities in Subic. The Sec. of Labor affirmed.
 Guerrero claims that it substantially complied w/ the decision of the
Sec. of Labor affirming the NLRC Resolution.
o Any non-compliance was attributable to the individual
complainants who failed to submit themselves for
processing & examination.
 The Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of 129 individuals. The
Union filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The order
wasn’t appealed so it was declared final & executory.
 Subsequently, the parties arrived at a Compromise Agreement
wherein they agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor the
determination of members of the Union who shall be reinstated by
Guerrero, w/c determination shall be final. The agreement is
deemed to have superseded the Resolution of the NLRC. The Sec.
of Labor ordered the absorption of 175 members of the Union
subject to 2 conditions.
ISSUE
Whether or not the said members of the Union were entitled to be reinstated
by Guerrero.
RULING YES.
 Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. I of the RP-US Labor Agreement, the US
Armed Forces undertook, consistent w/ military requirements, "to
provide security for employment, and, in the event certain services
are contracted out, the US Armed Forces shall require the contractor
or concessioner to give priority consideration to affected
employees for employment.
 A treaty has 2 aspects:
o International agreement between states
o Municipal law for the people of each state to observe. As
part of the municipal law, the aforesaid provision of the
treaty enters into and forms part of the contract between
Guerrero and the US Naval Base authorities.
 In view of said stipulation, the new contractor (Guerrero) is,
therefore, bound to give "priority" to the employment of the
qualified employees of the previous contractor (Blaylock). It is
obviously in recognition of such obligation that Guerrero entered
into the aforementioned Compromise Agreement.
 Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed to submit to
the Sec. of Labor the determination as to who of the members of
the Union shall be absorbed or employed by Guerrero, and that such
determination shall be considered as final. The Sec. of Labor issued
an Order directing the NLRC, through Labor Arbiter Francisco de los
Reyes, to implement the absorption of the 175 members into
Guerrero's Transport Services, subject to the following conditions:
o that they were bona fide employees of the Blaylock
Transport Service at the time its concession expired; and
o that they should pass final screening and approvalby the
appropriate authorities of the U.S. Naval Base concerned.
 For this purpose, Guerrero is ordered to submit to and secure from
the appropriate authorities of the U.S. naval Base at Subic,
Zambales the requisite screening and approval, the names of the
members of the Union.
 Compromise Agreement of the parties is more than a mere contract
and has the force and effect of any other judgment, it is, therefore,
conclusive upon the parties and their privies. For it is settled that a
compromise has, upon the parties, the effect and authority of res
judicata and is enforceable by execution upon approval by the
court.
 • The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would
Abbas v. COMELEC
FACTS:
• Petioner desires to
• (1) enjoin the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite and
• Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding
the Secretary of Budget and Management (SOB) from
releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2)
declare RA 6734 unconstitutional
• RA 6734 is entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao”
• Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli
• The petitioners allege that certain parts of (relevant to the topic) RA 6734
conflict with the Tripoli Agreement and the constitution
• Only a determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the
• The Tripoli Agreemen (the Agreement Between the government of the
Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines and Moro National
Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartite Ministerial
Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary
General of the Organization of Islamic Conference)
o Took effect on December 23, 1976.
o It provided for "the establishment of Autonomy in the
southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and
enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the
"areas of autonomy.
• When a new Constitution was ratified, Art. X thereof provides that “there
shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras…”. Sections 15-21 of said Article further provides guidelines
to effectuate this mandate
• Petitioners:
• Premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is
part of the law of the land, being a binding international
agreement.
• The SolGen:
• Asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not
having been entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a
sovereign state and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or
1987 Constitutions, nor a binding international agreement.
ISSUE:
1. W/N RA 6734 is in conflict with the Tripoli Agreement - MOOT
2. W/N it violates the Constitution? - no
HELD:
1.
• It is not necessary or determinative of the case to rule on the nature of
the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government
• In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for
the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao.
therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict
between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the
Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the
implementation of the Organic Act.
treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law
of the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734,
an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the
same class as the latter.
Agreement, being a subsequent law.
Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought.
2. K
 Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates
an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted
provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which
make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of
the plebiscite.
o cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which
declares that "[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces
and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the
purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution."
o He contends that the provision makes the creation of an
autonomous region such that even if only two provinces
vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region will still
be composed of the two provinces where the favorable
votes were made.
 RA 6734 itself refers to Sec. 18 Article X of the Constitution which
sets forth the conditions necessary for the creation of the
autonomous region.
 Sec. 13 of the act states that the creation of the autonomous
region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic
Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and
cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included
in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous
region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine
(9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734
shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the
Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of
(1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim
 Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those
enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
 the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on
the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the
majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso
underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes
cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as
that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation
of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."
 It is clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple
majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual
constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all
constituent units put together, as well as in the individual
constituent units.

Philip Morris, Inc., Benson & Hedges (Canada) Inc., and Fabriques
of Tabac Reunies, S.A., v. CA and Fortune Tobacco Corporation
The Treaty Power | July 16, 1993| Melo, J.
FACTS:
 Petitioners
o Philip Morris, Inc., a corporation (Virginia, USA), is the
registeredowner of the trademark “MARK VII” for cigarettes.
o Benson & Hedges (Canada), Inc., a subsidiary of Philip
Morris, Inc., is the registered owner of the trademark “MARK
TEN” for cigarettes.
o Fabriques de Tabac Reunies, S.A. (Switzerland), another
subsidiary of Philip Morris, Inc., is the assignee of the
trademark “LARK,”
 Respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation, a company organized in
the Philippines, manufactures and sells cigarettes using the
trademark “MARK.
 Petitioners filed a Complaint for Infringement and Damages against
respondent in the RTC of Pasig.
 The decision under review summarized what happened next, as
follows:
o Prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction,
[petitioners] alleged that they are foreign corporations NOT
DOING BUSINESS in the Philippines and are suing on an
isolated transaction.
 Countries in which they are domiciled grant to
corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines the
privilege to bringaction for infringement, without
need of a license to do business in those countries.
o Petitioners likewise manifested being registered owners of
the trademark “MARK VII” and “MARK TEN”
 registered the trademarks in their respective
countries of origin
 by virtue of the long and extensive usage of
the same, these trademarks have already
gained international fame and acceptance
 respondent, without consent from
petitioners, manufactured and sold
cigarettes bearing the identical and/or
confusingly similar trademark “MARK”
ISSUE:
 have caused and is likely to cause confusion
or mistake, or would deceive purchasers
and the public ingeneral into buying these
products under the impression and
mistaken belief that they are buying
petitioners’ products.
o Invoked provisions of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property
 Philippines is a signatory, petitioners pointed out
that upon the request of an interested party, a
country of the Union may prohibit the use of a
trademark which constitutes a reproduction,
imitation, or translation of a mark already belonging
to a person entitled to the benefits of the said
Convention.
 In accordance with Section 21-A in relation to
Section 23 of Republic Act 166, as amended, they
are entitled to relief in the form of damages and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which
should be made permanent.
o Respondent filed its Answer denying petitioners’ material
allegations and averred among other things that “MARK” is
a common word, which cannot particularly identify a product
to be the product of the petitioners
o After the termination of the trial on the merits trial court
rendered its Decision dated November 3, 1999 dismissing
the complaint and counterclaim after making a finding that
the respondent did not commit trademark infringement
against the petitioners.
o The issue of WON there was infringement of the
[petitioners’] trademarks by the[respondent] was likewise
answered in the negative. It expounded that “in order for a
name, symbol or device to constitute a trademark, it must,
either by itself or by association, point distinctly to the origin
or ownership of the article to which it is applied and be of
such nature as to permit an exclusive appropriation by one
person.”
 Maintaining to have the standing to sue in the local forum and that
respondent has committed trademark infringement, petitioners
went on appeal to the CA.
o CA decision on January 21, 2003 (while ruling for petitioners
on the matter of their legal capacity to sue in this
country for trademark infringement) affirmed the trial
court’s decision on the underlying issue of respondent’s
liability for infringement
 CA denied MR.
1. WON petitioners, as Philippine registrants of trademarks, are
entitled to enforce trademark right in this country.
a. Court ruled that petitioner, although not doing business in
the Philippines, has the legal right to sue for infringement
anyone who uses their duly registered mark.
b. Sec 2 of RA 166 provides that foreign corporations and
corporations domiciled in a foreign country are not disabled
 from bringing suit in Philippine courts to protect their rights domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a similar privilege to
as holders of trademarks registered in the Philippines. corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines. (As inserted by Sec. 7 of
c. It was further reinforced by the Paris Convention which Republic Act No. 638.)
affords foreign signatories to the said treaty the advantages
and protections which Philippine law grants to Philippine to drive home the point that they are not precluded from initiating a cause
nationals (Reciprocity Requirement). There is no legal of action in the Philippines on account of the principal perception that
requirement that the foreign registrant itself manufacture another entity is pirating their symbol without any lawful authority to do so.
and sell its products here. All the statute requires is the use Judging from a perusal of the aforequoted Section 21-A, the conclusion
in trade and commerce in the Philippines. reached by petitioners is certainly correct for the proposition in support
i. However, any protection accorded has to be made thereof is embedded in the Philippine legal jurisprudence.
subject to the limitations of Philippine laws.
ii. Under the doctrine of Incorporation as applied in
most countries, rules of IL are given a standing
equal, not superior, to national legislative
enactments.
2. WON respondent has committed trademark infringement
against petitioners by its use of the mark “MARK” for its
cigarettes, hence liable for damages.
. Registration of a trademark unaccompanied by actual use thereof in
the country accords the registrant only the standing to sue for infringement
in Philippine courts. Entitlement to protection of such trademark in the
country is entirely a different matter.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the

Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 14, 1989 and
November 29, 1989 are hereby AFFIRMED.

NOTE:

RA No. 166 “AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE REGISTRATION AND

PROTECTION OF TRADE-MARKS, TRADE-NAMES AND SERVICE-
MARKS, DEFINING UNFAIR COMPETITION AND FALSE MARKING
AND PROVIDING REMEDIES AGAINST THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES”

Section 2. What are registrable.—Trade-marks, trade-names and

service-marks may be registered in accordance with the provisions of this
Act.

TRADEMARK LAW

Sec. 21-A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or

trade-name has been registered or assigned under this act may bring an
action hereunder for infringement, for unfair competition, or false
designation of origin and false description, whether or not it has been
licensed to do business in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen
hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, otherwise known as the Corporation
Law, at the time it brings complaint: Provided, That the country of which
the said foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or in which it is

Tolentino v Secretary of Finance
Aug 25 1994 | Mendoza| Treaty Power
SUMMARY: Case is about the constitutionality of RA 7716. The Court
here characterized the treaty-ratifying power of the Senate as not an
exercise of legislative power, but a check on the executive.
DOCTRINE: The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the
exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the
executive power.
FACTS:
 The case is about the assailed constitutionality of RA 7716 which
widened the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the NIRC.
 Petitioners’ argument is that RA 7716 did not originate from the
House of Representatives – as mandated by the constitution for
revenue bills – because it is a result of two consolidated bills from
the House of Representatives and the Senate
o Art. VI, § 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments.
o Id., § 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a
law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
 Senate substituted the bill
Petitioners contend that said constitutional mandate is a limitation to the
treaty-making power of the Senate, and to equalize powers between the
two houses of Congress. They point out that although Art. VI, SS 24 was
adopted from the American Federal Constitution, 2 it is notable in two
respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine
Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on other bills" in
the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be
considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must
retain the essence of H. No. 11197.

ISSUE/S & RATIO: (relevant to class discussion only.)
Characterization of the treaty making power of the Senate
 Petitioners’ contentions are wrong.
 It is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the
Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives.
 A bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference
committee will be discussed later.
 What is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action,
a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute —
and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be
the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power
not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose
amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative
power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House
superior to the Senate.
 The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the
Senate's power in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate
for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power and
thereby equalize its powers and those of the House overlooks the
fact that the powers being compared are different. We are dealing
here with the legislative power which under the Constitution is
vested not in any particular chamber but in the Congress of the
Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of
Representatives." 4 The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is
not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check
on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for
comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the Senate
on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative power by the
Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate 5 has
never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the
House of Representatives.
 Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld
pending receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot, therefore,
understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1,
1993, eight months before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No.
1129 had been filed in the Senate. After all it does not appear that
the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the Senate had
received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of
legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the Senate
Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the
submission by the Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630.
For that matter, if the question were simply the priority in the time
of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H.
No. 253) to amend the VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992.
Several other bills had been filed in the House before S. No. 1129
was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only a substitute of
those earlier bills.

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion
FACTS: (Copied and tweaked facts from an online digest)
 1977, Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes in a Foreign Country". Founded on
o The doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution
o The mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in
the state where it was committed and the state where the
criminal may have escape
o The extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and
the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties
with other interested countries
o The need for rules to guide the executive department and
the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.
 1994, Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government
of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-
US Extradition Treaty).
 Senate ratified the treaty
o Expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes
correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the
admissibility of the documents accompanying an
extradition request upon certification by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state
resident in the Requesting State). K
 1999 The Department of Justice received a request from the
Department of Foreign Affairs for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S.
 The grand jury indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other
supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with
the request.
 Jimenez was charged with:
o Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
o Attempt to evade or defeat tax
o Fraud by wire, radio, or television
o False statement or entries
o Election contribution in name of another
 DOJ proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Panel found that "official English
translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the
request and that there are some other matters that needed to be
addressed"
 Jimenez requested for copies of all the documents included in the
extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it
 The Secretary of Justice denied such request on the following
grounds:
o It was premature to secure Jimenez with copies prior to
the completion of the evaluation. The DOJ was still
evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under
the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and
treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with
by the Requesting Government. (Article 7 of the extradition
treaty and Sec. 4 of PD no 1069
o Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a
preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making
the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in
criminal prosecution inapplicable
o The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized
disclosure of the information in the documents
o The department is not in position to hold in abeyance
proceedings in connection with an extradition request, as
Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties
such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
 Mark Jimenez then filed a petition for mandamus, certiorari, and
prohibition against the Secretary of Justice with the RTC of Manila.
Respondent Judge Lantion ordered the Secretary of Justice
to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as refrain
from conducting further proceedings.
ISSUE: W/N private respondent is entitled to the due process right
to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process » YES. Private respondent’s due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional
guarantees.
 PD 1069, the implementing law of the RP-US Extradition Treaty,
provides when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition
for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing
of the petition for extradition in the extradition court. It is of
judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition
which will be answered by the extraditee.
o There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in
PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from
the Secretary of Justice the said documents while the
request is still undergoing evaluation and is not yet filed in
court.
 MAIN TOPIC - DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION
The Court makes a discussion on this doctrine because the Secretary of
Justice asserts that since the treaty and our law are both silent as to the
availability of due process rights while the extradition is being evaluated, it
must be concluded that due process rights do not apply.
  The rule of pacta sunt servanda requires the parties to a treaty to to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been
country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered
2, Article II of the Constitution dismissed.
o Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international *The Court later REVERSED its ruling in the Motion for
law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative Reconsideration and ruled that, since an extradition proceeding is
action is needed to make such rules applicable in the sui generis, due process rights will not apply*
domestic sphere NOTES
 The doctrine of incorporation is applied when there appears to be a PD 1069, Sec. 6
conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the “Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Service of Notices. 1)
constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court
exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer
it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order…
regard for the generally accepted principles of international law. 2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued,
o In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having
and a choice has to be made between a rule of international charge of the case.”
law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal
courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez; Gonzales vs. Hechanova; In
re: Garcia)
o Because such courts are organs of municipal law and
are accordingly bound by it in all
 The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees
that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
o Under the principle of lex posterior derogat priori, a treaty
may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty.
o In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the
land, like the PH, both statutes and treaties may be
invalidated if they are in conflict with the
Constitution.
 Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and PD 1069 are silent as to the
rights to due process prior to the filing of the petition in court.
Reference to U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
o In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply
the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due
process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the
treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the
Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective
extraditee.
 The Court considered that they needed to look at similar situations
in our jurisprudence for applications by analogy. Thus, they
looked at the nature of an administrative proceeding, where the twin
requirements of notice and hearing are applicable, and the nature
of non-litigous summary proceedings which also uphold due process
rights of a respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and
Lim V. Executive Secretary (2002)
Lessons Applicable: Locus Standi, International Law v. Muncipal Law,
Certiorari, Incorporation Clause, Treaties
Laws Applicable: Constitution
FACTS:
 Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999,
personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America
started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1” on
January 2002.
 The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a
bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the
United States in 1951.
 The exercise is rooted from the international anti-terrorism
campaign declared by. Bush in reaction to the highjacking in New
York
 Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking
the constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and
Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu
directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.
o Only in case of armed attack
o Abu sayaff are not external armed forces
o VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soliers to engage
in combat operations in the Philippines
 The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as
it is based only on a fear of future violation of the Terms of
Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a
question of fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it is
covers "Balikatan 02-1” and no question of constitutionality is
involved. Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not
involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct personal
injury.
ISSUE: W/N Balikatan 02-1 is covered by the VFA?
HELD: prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form
and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court
is not a trier of facts
 MDT – Core of the defense relationship between Philippines and
the US to enhance the strategic and technologival capabilities of
our armed forces through joing training.
 VFA – provides the regulatory mechanism by which the US military
and civilian personne; may visit temporarily in the Philippines in
connetion with activities by the Philippine Government. ontains
provisions relative to entry and departure of American personnel,
driving and vehicle registration, criminal jurisdiction, claims,
importation and exportation, movement of vessels and aircraft, as
well as the duration of the agreement and its termination. It is the
VFA which gives continued relevance to the MDT despite the
passage of years. Its primary goal is to facilitate the promotion of
optimal cooperation between American and Philippine military
forces in the event of an attack by a common foe.
 The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an
impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of which was
left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide
scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine
government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is
couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must
"abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this
agreement, and in particular, from any political activity." All other
activities, in other words, are fair game.
 To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article
31 SECTION 3 and Article 32 contains provisos governing
interpretations of international agreements.
o Article 31
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and
annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between
all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the
other parties as an instrument related to the party.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established
that the parties so intended.
o Article 32
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances
of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from
the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31:
 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
 It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of
interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is
presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention
likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning
of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as
other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid
context. According to Professor Briggs, writer on the Convention,
the distinction between the general rule of interpretation and the
supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to
ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute an
alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from
the general rule.
 The meaning of the word “activities" was deliberately made that
way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. Thus, the
VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. Both the
history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA
support the conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed
to combat itself -such as the one subject of the instant petition,
are indeed authorized.
 The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section
I stipulates that US exercise participants may not engage in
combat "except in self-defense." ." The indirect violation is
actually petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is
actually a war principally conducted by the United States
government, and that the provision on self-defense serves only as
camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear
pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial.
 In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow
foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine
territory. Under the salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
o 4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nation
 Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces
Agreement, as in all other treaties and international agreements to
which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the
1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2:
Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this case.
 The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the
Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate."
 Sec. 25 on Transitory Provisions which shows antipathy towards
foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in
general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the
Philippines only by way of direct exception.
International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws
 Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our
obligations arising from international agreements.
 Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: “Withal, the fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not by any means imply the primacy of international law over
national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of
incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international
law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national
legislation.”
 From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored
over municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt
servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."
Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions
of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
 Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5
of Article VIII: “The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.”
 Ichong v. Hernandez: “provisions of a treaty are always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is
subject to the police power of the State”
Gonzales v. Hechanova: “our Constitution authorizes the
nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congress.”
 The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are
prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine
territory.
 Whether or not Americans are actively engaging in combat
alongside Filpino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training
and assistance exercise is a question of fact, and therefor cannot
be answered by the court.

Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary
Brief Facts: The Philippines has signed the Rome Statute. The Executive
Branch has not yet submitted the signed treaty text to the Senate for its
concurrence. Hence, the petitioners filed a writ of mandamus to compel
the transmittal of the treaty to the Senate.
FACTS:
- Dec. 28, 2000: The Philippines signed the Rome Statute (which
establishes the International Criminal Court), though Charge d’Affairs
Enrique Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the UN.
o The provisions of the Rome Statute, however, required that it
was subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval of the signatory
states.
- Since the signed text of the treaty was not yet transmitted to the Senate
for ratification, the following petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to
compel the Executive Secretary and the DFA to transmit the said treaty
text:
o Sen. Pimentel o Rep. Rosales
o Phil. Coalition for the Establishment of the ICC o Civil society
organizations o Bianca and Harrison
o Students from UP Law
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have standing (NO, except Sen. Pimentel)
2. WON mandamus will lie (NO)
RATIO:
1. NO. Only Sen. Pimentel has proper standing for this suit.
- The other petitioners have not alleged that they will sustain a direct
injury from the non-transmittal of the treaty text.
o Also, their contention that the non-ratification of the treaty will
deprive them of their remedies for the protection and enforcement of
their rights is untenable
o Supreme Court: The Rome Statute is intended to complement national
criminal laws and courts. There are enough remedies available under
our national laws.
- Sen. Pimentel derives his standing from his position as a
legislator, particularly being a Senator.
o The petition at bar invokes the power of the Senate to grant or
withhold its concurrence to a treaty entered into by the Executive
Branch. o Sen. Pimentel invokes this power as his basis to compel the
transmittal of the treaty text to the Senate.
2. NO. There is no ministerial duty for the Executive Branch to
transmit the treaty text of the Rome Statute. Hence, mandamus
will not lie.
- It is the President who is vested with the sole authority to deal with our
State’s foreign affairs: maintain diplomatic relations, negotiate and enter
into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.
- However, the Constitution provides a limitation to this power: Art. VII,
Sec. 21 provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.” o This was deemed as a check on the power of the
Executive Branch in the field of foreign relations, as is proper ensuring a
“healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nation’s pursuit
of political maturity and growth.”
- SC: However, Art. VII, Sec. 21 should NOT be interpreted to mean
that the power to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate.
- The Court, citing the book of Justice Isagani Cruz explains the treaty
process, step by step:
o Negotiation – while the head of state is empowered to do this, it is
usually his authorized representatives who carry out this process
o Signature – the treaty is opened for signing by the parties once terms
had been decided. This, however, does NOT
indicate final consent of the State IN cases where ratification of the
treaty is required; it is intended only as a means of authentication and
symbol of good faith. o Ratification – the formal act by which a State
consents to the treaty signed by its representative. It gives the State
the opportunity to examine the terms of the treaty more closely, and
gives it an opportunity to refuse it should it find the terms to be against
its interest. o Exchange of Instruments of the Ratification – usually
signifies the effectivity of the treaty, unless a different date has been
agreed upon by the parties
- SC: In asking for the transmittal of the treaty text, the petitioners’
argument would equate signing with ratification, which are two distinct
steps.
- EO 459, Issued by Pres. Ramos, provides the guidelines in the
negotiation and ratification of international agreements:
o The signed treaty is transmitted to the DFA who shall prepare the
ratification papers and forwards them to the President.
o The President may then choose to ratify the treaty or not.
o If the President ratifies the instrument, then the DFA shall submit the
same to the Senate for their concurrence.
- SC: Petitioners’ argument that the Philippines was already bound to ratify
the treaty once it has signed is without basis.
o The President has discretion, even after the signing of the treaty,
whether or not to ratify the treaty.
o “The VCLOT does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this
power of the heads of States.”
- SC: It should be emphasized that the power to ratify is vested
with the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate.
o “Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit
a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its
ratification, refuse to ratify it.”
o Such prerogative of the President cannot be encroached by a
writ of mandamus.

HELD: Petition dismissed.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. deemed part of the law of the land and therefore may be implemented
Duque III by the DOH in the RIRR.

Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari

Petitioner: Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines
Respondents: DOH Sec. Francisco Duque III, DOH Undersecretaries Dr.
Ethelyn Nieto, Dr. Margarita Galon, Atty. Alexander Padilla and Dr. Jade Del
Mundo; and Asst. Secretaries Dr. Mario Villaverde, Dr. David Lozada and Dr.
Nemesio Gako
Issue: W/n the RIRR is unconstitutional?
Sub-issue(s): W/n the RIRR is in accord with TMC? W/n pertinent
international agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the law
of the land and may thus be implemented through an RIRR, if so, is the
RIRR in accord with such international agreements?

Note: I focused on the parts on international law. The other matters (in case
Facts: ma’am asks) are at the bottom of the digest.

- Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by Pres.
Aquino on Oct. 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to
her under the Freedom Constitution. Held: No. However what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk
(1) One of the preambular clauses of TMC – the law seeks to give Code which in turn is based on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law
effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of of the land. The other WHA Resolutions however cannot be imposed as they
Breastmilk Substituttes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the WHA are not deemed part of the law of the land.
(World Health Assembly) in 1981.
- In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Art. 24 of the instrument mandates that States
should take measure to diminish infant mortality and should ensure Ratio:
that all segments of society are informed of the advantages of
1. Are the international instruments referred to by the respondents part of
breastfeeding.
the law of the land?
- From 1982 – 2006, the WHA adopted several resolutions to the effect
- The various international instruments invoked by respondents are:
that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected,
(1) The UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child
hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
(2) The International Convenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
Rights
- May 15, 2006 – DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing
(3) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Rules and Regulations of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to
Against Women
take effect on July 7, 2006. – The RIRR imposes a ban on all
- These instruments only provide general terms of the steps that States
advertisements of breastmilk substitutes
must take to prevent child mortality. Hence, they do not have anything
- June 28, 2006 – Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and
about the use and marketing of breastmilk substitutes
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary
injunction.
- The ICMBS and other WHA Resolutions however, are the international
- August 15, 2006 – the Court issued a Resolution granting the TRO,
instruments which have specific provisions on breastmilk substitutes
enjoining the respondents from implementing the assailed RIRR.
- Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of
- Petitioner assails the RIRR for going beyond the provisions of TMC
domestic law in 2 ways:
thereby amending and expanding the coverage of the said law.
(1) Transformation – an international law is transformed into a
- DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
also various international instruments regarding infant and young child
legislation
nutrition. They posit that the said international instruments are
  Treaties become part of law of the land through this method,
pursuant to Art 7, Sec 21 – wherein “no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid.. unless concurred by at least 2/3 of
Senate”
 The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are NOT treaties as they
haven’t been concurred in by the required 2/3 vote.
 HOWEVER, the ICMBS has been transformed into domestic law
through local legislation that is TMC.
 Therefore, it is not the ICMBS per se that has the force
of law but it’s TMC.
o While TMC is almost a verbatim reproduction of the
ICMBS, it did not adopt the latter’s provision on the
absolute prohibition on advertising of products within
the scope of the ICMBS. Instead the MC provides that
advertising promotion or other marketing materials
may be allowed if such materials are approved by a
committee.
(2) Incorporation – by mere constitutional declaration, international
law is deemed to have the force of domestic law
 This is found under Art 2, Sec 2 – The Philippines… adopts
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land
 In Mihares v. Ranada: International law becomes customary
rules accepted as binding as a result of two elements:
1.) Established, widespread, and consistent practice on part of
the state
2.) Opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity.
 Generally accepted principles of international law refer to
norms of general or customary international law which are
binding on all states, valid through all kinds of human societies,
and basic to legal systems generally
 Fr. Bernas has a definition similar to the one above. Customary
international law has two factors:
1.) Material factor – how states behave
 The consistency and the generality of the practice
2.) Psychological or subjective factor – why they behave the
way they do
 Once state practice has been established, now
determine why they behave they do. Is it ouor of
courtesy or opinio juris (the belief that a certain type of
behavior is obligatory)
 When a law satisfies the two factors it becomes part of
customary international law which is then incorporated into
our domestic system
2. Since the WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local
legislation, have they attained the status of customary law and hence
part of our law of the land?
- The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international
specialized agencies of the UN.
- According to the WHO Constitution, it’s the WHA which determines the
policies of the WHO, the former also has the power to “adopt
regulations concerning advertising and labeling of pharmaceutical and
similar products” and “to make recommendations to members on any
matter within the Organization’s competence”
- Note that the legal effect of a regulation as opposed to
recommendation is quite different
(1) Regulations which are duly adopted by the WHA are binding on
member states
(2) On the other hand, recommendations of the WHA do not come into
force for its members unlike regulations. Rather, they carry moral
and political weight as they constitute the judgment on a health
issue of the collective membership of the highest body in the field
of health.
- The WHA resolution adopting the ICMBS and the subsequent WHA
resolutions urging states to implement the ICMBS are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding.
- Hence, unlike the ICMBS which has become TMC through legislative
enactment, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, which provide for
exclusive breastfeeding and prohibition on advertisements and
promotions of breastmilk have not been adopted as domestic law.
- WHA Resolutions have been viewed to constitute “soft law” or non-
binding norms, which influence state behavior. Soft law has been noted
to be a rapid means of norm creation, in order to reflect and respond
to the changing needs and demands of constituents (of the UN.)
- As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered
customary law, it must be established that such rule is followed by
states because it is considered obligatory (opinio juris).
- In the case at bar, respondents have not presented any evidence to
prove that the WHA Resolutions are in fact enforced or practice by
member states. Further, they failed to establish that provisions of
pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law that may
be deemed part of law of the land.
- Hence, legislation is necessary to transform the WHA resolutions into
domestic law. They cannot thus be implemented by executive agencies
without the need of a law to be enacted by legislature.
On other issues:
W/n the petitioner is the real party in interest? Yes.
 - An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack
of direct interest of its members are affected by the action. An
organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.
(Exec Sec vs CA)
- The Court has rules that an association has the legal personality to
represent its members because the results of the case will affect their
vital interests. (Purok Bagong Silang Association Inc. vs. Yuipco)
- In the petitioner’s Amended Articles of Incorporation, it states that the
association is formed “to represent directly or through approved
representatives the pharmaceutical and health care industry before the
Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the medical professions
and the general public.”
- Therefore, the petitioner, as an organization, has an interest in fulfilling
its avowed purpose of representing members who are part of the
pharmaceutical and health care industry. Petitioner is duly authorized
to bring to the attention of the government agencies and courts any
grievance suffered by its members which are directly affected by the
assailed RIRR.
- The petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused with its members,
should be considered as a legal party-in-interest which stands to be
benefited or injured by any judgment in the case.
W/n the DOH has the power to implement the WHA Resolutions under the
Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law? Only
the provisions of the Milk Code. (as per the discussion above)
- Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the RAC of 1987 provides that the DOH
shall define the national health policy and can issue orders and
regulations concerning the implementation of established health
policies.
- A.O. No 2005 -0014 which provides the national policy on infant and
young child feeding, does not declare that as part of its policy, the
advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be
absolutely prohibited.
- Only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of the subsequent
WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the
subject RIRR.
W/n the provisions of the RIRR being in accordance with the Milk Code? Not
all of them
- Assailed provisions: [1] extending the coverage to young children; [2]
imposing exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months; [3]
imposes an absolute ban on advertising and promotion for breastmilk
substitutes; [4] requiring additional labeling requirements; [5]
prohibits the dissemination of information on infant formula; [6]
forbids milk manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in
research and continuing education Although the DOH has the power
under the Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-à-
vis breastmilk substitutes, this power is not absolute because it has no
power to impose an absolute prohibition in the marketing, promotion
and advertising of breastmilk substitutes. Several provisions of the
Milk Code attest to the fact that such power to control information is
not absolute.
- Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code
because such provisions impose an absolute prohibition on advertising,
promotion and marketing of breastmilk substitutes, which is not
provided for in the Milk Code. Section 46 is violative of the Milk Code
because the DOH has exceeded its authority in imposing such fines or
sanctions when the Milk Code does not do so. Other assailed provisions
are in accordance with the Milk Code.
W/n Section 13 of the RIRR providing a sufficient standard? Yes.
- Questioned provision, in addition to Section 26 of Rule VII provide
labeling requirements for breastmilk substitutes  found to be in
consonance with the Milk Code
- The provisions in question provide reasonable means of enforcing
related provisions in the Milk Code.
W/n Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws?
- Section in question only repeals orders, issuances and rules and
regulations, not laws. The provision is valid as it is within the DOH’s
rule-making power.
- An administrative agency has quasi-legislative or rule-making power.
However, such power is limited to making rules and regulation
subjected to the boundaries set by the granting statute and the
Constitution. The power is also subject to the doctrine of non-
delegability and separability of powers. The power, which includes
amending, revising, altering or repealing, is granted to allow for
flexibility in the implementation of the laws.
W/n On Section 4, 5(w), 11, 22, 32, 47 and 52 violates the due process
clause of the Constitution (Article III Section 1)?
 - Despite the fact that the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise
as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to
intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare… free
enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations. It
must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just
exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of
trade.
- Section 4 – proscription of milk manufacturers’ participation in any
policymaking body; Section 22 – classes and seminars for women and
children; Section 32 – giving of assistance, support and logistics or
training; Section 52 – giving of donations
- In the instant case, petitioner failed to show how the aforementioned
sections hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes. They also failed
to establish that these activities are essential and indispensable to their
trade.

Disposition: The Petition is Partially Granted. Only sections 4(f), 11

and 46 of A.O. 2006-0014 are declared null and void for being ultra
vires. The TRO is lifted insofar as the rest of the provisions of A.O.
2006-0012 is concerned.