G.R. No.
L-4741 May 7, 1952 thereafter he returned home, still feeling insecure and in fact he told his son, Pedro Matundan,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIGIO CAMO and BUENAVENTURA MANZANIDO, defendants-appellants.
Ramon E. Saura for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
For the death of Patricio Matundan, Eligio Camo and Buenaventura Manzanido were accused
of the crime of murder with kidnapping, in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas (Quezon).
After trial, they were both found guilty of simple murder, Camo as principal and Manzanido as
accomplice, and they were sentenced to reclusion perpetua and an indeterminate penalty of
from 8 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor to 16 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal, respectively; to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the sum of P4,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. Both appealed from that decision.
That petitioner Matundan was killed in the evening of May 17, 1946 by gunfire as he was
being led from his home in the barrio of Conda to the barrio of Talaan, both of Sariaya, is not
questioned. What is disputed is the manner, by whom, and why, he was shot.
The theory of the defense is that appellant Camo since the year 1945, was a member of the
Hukbalahap organization in Sariaya, being in charge of the department of supplies; that
Patricio Matundan had all along been discrediting this organization, calling its members
"common cattle thieves and bandits", as a result of which adverse propaganda the Hukbalahap
organization was embarrassed and found it difficult to recruit and enlist new members as well
as get supplies not only in the barrio of Conda, but also in the other barrios of Sariaya, and so,
finally, to remove this thorn in the side of the Hukbalahap organization, it was decided to
arrest Patricio; that in the evening of May 17, 1946, appellant Camo accompanied by his
superior officers, Major Julie and Lt. Filemon de las Alas, and Antonio Once and Filemon
Ambat, all members of the organization and all armed with rifles, passed by the house of
defendant Manzanido and ordered him to join them which he did under compulsion; that the
group then proceeded to the house of Patricio Matundan, called him down and took him toward
the mountains; but on the way he tried to escape and on order of Mayor Julie the group fired at
him and he was killed; Camo obeying the order to shoot also wanted to shoot, but because of
his being clumsy with his gun, he failed to fire.
The story of the prosecution naturally differs, and radically, from the proceeding version.
According to the Government evidence, about a month prior to the night of the killing,
appellant Camo surprised his wife, Fortunata Rabano, in the lap of Patricio Matundan, the two
kissing and otherwise caressing each other; that he chased both to chastise them, but Patricio
was able to escape and Camo upon overtaking his wife in the house, beat her up; that since that
day Camo had decided to kill Patricio at the first opportunity in order to avenge the wrong
done to him, but Patricio fearing reprisal, absented himself from home for two weeks; that
that Camo planned to kill him because he suspected him of maintaining illicit relations with
Fortunata; that on the day of the killing, Camo requested his friend and co-appellant
Manzanido to join and help him in going after Patricio, a request which Manzanido because of
friendship could not well refuse; that in the evening of that day the two appellants passed by
the house of Antonio Once and Filemon Ambat both of whom they compelled by threats to
join them; that the four then went to the house of Patricio, and upon arrival there, at the
suggestion of Camo and to avoid suspicion, Manzanido called Patricio and asked him to come
down which the latter did upon which the group tied his hand and took him toward the barrio
of Talaan; that on the way Camo made himself known to Patricio by saying to him "Do you
know me, now you will pay to me"; that upon reaching a place near mangroves the group
stopped and Camo ordered Patricio to turn around and then seizing the spring field rifle of
Manzanido, Camo shot Patricio in the Back killing him; that thereafter, he untied the hands of
the dead man and then warned his companions under penalty of death not to tell anyone of
what had happened that night. This story is based not only on the testimony of the witness for
the prosecution, but also on the affidavits, Exhibits C and D which Camo and Manzanido,
respectively swore to and ratified before the Clerk of Court. According to the constabulary
officers and men in charge, the contents of said affidavits were based on the statements made
and given by the two appellants freely and voluntarily.
The decision in this case depends in great measure upon the credibility of witnesses, — which
set of witnesses told the truth and which version should be given credit. The trial court presided
by Judge Antonio Canizares has analyzed the testimony of the witnesses and carefully
observed their demeanor on the witness stand and is of the opinion that the witnesses for the
prosecution are more worthy of credit. We quote with favor the pertinent portion of the
decision of the trial court:
There is no dispute as to the death of Patricio Matundan, a fact which the
defendants themselves admit.
The question now for resolution is whether or not the defendants are criminally
liable for the death of Patricio Matundan. The testimonies of the two witnesses for
the prosecution, namely, Antonio Once and Filemon Ambat, are assailed by the
defense as being incredible and not trustworthy for the reason that they are co-
participants in the commission of the crime charged. Counsel for the defense
stresses the point that being co-participants in the commission of the offense
charged, their testimonies came from a polluted source and, therefore, should be
subjected to the most painstaking scrutiny and should be received with the greatest
caution on the part of the Court. It is for this reason that the Court has taken pains in
carefully scrutinizing the testimonies of the said witnesses, and taking into account
their interest and motive in so testifying against the defendants.
After carefully studying the testimonies of the said witnesses in connection with the
extra-judicial confessions, Exhibits C and D, of the defendants, and their demeanor
and manner of testifying, the Court is convinced as to the truthfulness of the
testimonies of the said witnesses, because their testimonies find sufficient
corroborations not only from the testimony of Pedro Matundan, the son of the
deceased, but also from the contents of the extra-judicial confessions of the
 defendants themselves. The fact that the said witnesses for the prosecution have
guilty knowledge and had participated in the commission of the crime charged, does
not necessarily render their testimonies incredible and untrustworthy. Nor the fact
too that they had not been indicted along with the defendants in this case, makes
their testimonies inadmissible. (See 16 C.J., Sec. 1928, p. 654.)
And, if there is any further doubt as to the guilt of the appellants and as to which version, that
of the prosecution or that of the defense, is to be accepted by the court, there is fact that at the
preliminary investigation when the two appellants were arraigned, they both pleaded guilty.
Realizing that they (two appellants) had practically convicted themselves by the statements and
admissions contained in their affidavits, Exhibits C and D, particularly Camo who had a
motive for the killing, namely, his consuming desire to take revenge upon Patricio for
alienating the affections of his wife and maintaining illicit relations with her, both appellants
repudiated their affidavits, claiming that they were involuntary and were obtained through
intimidation and torture. These claims were flatly and successfully denied and refuted by the
Constabulary authorities.
In a last ditch defense, appellant Camo invokes the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation 76
issued in favor of the leaders and members of the Hukbalahap organization.
where the victim was taken directly from his home to the placed where he was killed,
kidnapping was not considered to raise the offense to the category of a complex crime.
That the killing was committed with treachery under which may be included night time and the
fact that Patricio was shot in the back and while his hands were tied, is clear. The crime is
therefore that of murder. The trial court found that the killing was aggravated by the
circumstances of evident premeditation. This finding is correct. For about a month previous to
the killing, appellant Camo had been planning to kill Patricio. If he could not carry out his plan
earlier, it was because Patricio sensing the reprisal and vengeance coming to him, purposely
absented himself from his home. To offset this aggravating circumstance as regards Camo, we
may consider in his favor the mitigating circumstance of outraged feeling or passion behind the
tragedy. The penalty as to Camo should therefore be imposed in the medium degree, namely
reclusion perpetua. As a mere accomplice, Manzanido is entitled to a penalty of one degree
lower.
The indemnity of P4,000 fixed by the trial court should be raised to P6,000. With this
modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.

The trial court correctly found that he was not entitled to the benefits of said Amnesty
Proclamation for the simple reason that at the time of the killing, he was not a Hukbalahap.
According to the evidence, the Hukbalahap association or branch in Sariaya where Camo
resided, was organized only in 1948, and at that time Camo was already in jail for he had been
captured in a raid conducted by the Constabulary in 1947. He and Manzanido were captured as
common bandits operating in and around Sariaya. But even supposing for a moment that this
claim that he was a member of the Hukbalahap organization were true, it has been
satisfactorily proven that the killing of Patricio Matundan was not done in furtherance of the
dissident movement but for purely personal reason, namely, that Camo wanted to avenge the
dishonor brought upon him and his family by the deceased.

The Solicitor-General contends that Manzanido should be liable as principal and not a mere
accomplice as found by the trial court. Considering the role played by Manzanido in the
tragedy, from a liberal point of view, we are inclined to agree with the trial court. He had no
motive in harming Patricio. According to his affidavit he joined Camo only out of friendship,
and all his participation was his calling Patricio down from his house and then accompanying
the group to the scene of the killing. It is true that it was his Springfield rifle that was used by
Camo in shooting Patricio to death but according to the evidence for the prosecution, he did not
offer this rifle but it was grabbed from him by Camo.

The Solicitor-General next contends that the offense committed was the complex crime of
kidnapping with murder. Again we are inclined to agree with the trial court that the crime
committed was simple murder. It is true that Patricio was taken from his home but it was only
for the purpose of killing him not for detaining him illegally for any length of time or for the
purpose of obtaining ransom for his release. In quite a number of cases decided by this Court
G.R. Nos. L-29535- 29536 November 26, 1928
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL LOJO, JR., defendant-appellant.
Jose Perez Cardenas for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Manuel Lojo, Jr. appeals to this court from two judgments of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, the first in criminal case No. 35810 of said court (G. R. No. 29535) wherein, in
accordance with the information, he was found guilty of the crime of homicide and sentenced
to fourteen years, eight months and one day reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to
indemnify the deceased's heirs in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs; and the other in
criminal case No. 35902 of the same court (G. R. No. 29536), finding him guilty of violation of
section 1139 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila, and sentencing him to six
months' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P200, with the proper subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and the costs of both instances.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the folowing alleged errors as committed by the
court below, in said judgments, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding as a fact that the deceased, whom the appellant
ran over, was in the middle of the street with one hand raised, with the evident
desire that the defendant should stop his automobile.
2. The lower court erred in finding the defendant guilty of the crime of
consummated homicide, and in sentencing him to fourteen years, eight months and
one day reclusion temporal; and to indemnity the deceased's heirs in the sum of
P1,000.
3. The court below erred in sentencing the defendant to six months' imprisonment
and a fine of P600 for having violated section 1139 of Revised Ordinances No.
1600 of the City of Manila.
The following facts were proven at the hearing, beyond a reasonable doubt:
At about 3.30 a. m. of the 18th of January 1928, the dancers Maria Lingat and Natalia
Tanchico, having finished their services as such in Lerma Cabaret for the night contracted with
the herein accused, Manuel Lojo, Jr., to take them in his car to Manila to eat. The defendant
made his passengers seat themselves beside him placing Maria Lingat in the middle. After
having started his engine, Manuel Lojo, Jr., drove with his right hand while he put his left arm
around his two passengers. Before going up Pretil Bridge on Juan Luna Street and towards the
City of Manila, as the car was running very fast and had one of the front lights off, Policeman
Nicanor Constantino, standing in the middle of the road, raised his club as a signal to the
defendant to stop his automobile. The defendant, far from paying any attention to the order of
the agent of authority, headed straight for the policeman without diminishing his speed,
dashing into him so that the unfortunate policeman sprawled upon the radiator of the car, then
fell on the left running board and was thence hurled to the ground dying instantly as a result of
a fracture of the skull and several internal and external injuries sustained in different parts of
his body. When the dancer Maria Lingat saw that the car had run over the policeman she
shouted to the defendant to stop, but the latter, instead of doing so, speeded it up and said to
her: "Shut up, and don'n tell anybody." On reaching the corner of Solis Street, in the City of
Manila, Policeman Pelagio C. de las Alas, who was on duty there, signalled the defendant to
stop his car, but again the latter paid no heed and sped dizzily.
The defendant, testifying in his own behalf, admitted that he ran over the deceased Nicanor
Constantino with his car and alleged by way of defense that on coming to the Pretil Bridge, and
seeing a policeman in the middle of the street he tried to go to the right, but said policeman
went in the same direction, thus resulting in the accident; that he did not stop his automobile
for fear of being roughly treated by the people of the place.
This alleged defense of the defendant's is untenable, for when he saw the policeman signalling
him to stop, the traffic regulations obliged him to slacken his speed and to obey the order. The
fact that the defendant continued to speed, with the policeman ahead of him in the middle of
the road signalling to him to stop, and the fact that he did not obey the order, show that he did
not care whether he ran over that agent of authority or not. That he was conscious of his guilt is
shown, moreover, by the fact that having violated the Revised Ordinances of the City of
Manila, not only did he not report the incident to the first policeman he met on the road, that is
Pelagio C. de las Alas, but he also disobeyed the latter's order to stop. All of this contradicts his
statement that he tried to avoid the accident by turning aside. lawphi1.net
A chauffeur who, going at great speed, sees in the middle of the road directly in his path a
policeman signalling to him with the hand to stop, pays no attention to the order nor lessens the
speed of his car, but goes straight for said policeman, runs over him, and kills him instantly,
cannot pretend that he did not intend to cause the evil that he did; because, even within the
limits of human foresight such an act could not produce any other result than what took place.
The fact that the policeman moved, doubtless impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, and
that the driver attempted to run aside his car, cannot be construed to show a lack of intention to
cause the injury, because at that psychological moment, the movement of the defendant's hand
turning the car from one side to another was not voluntary, but purely automatic — a mere
reflection of the policeman's movement.
For the foregoing considerations, we arrive at the conclusion, and so hold, that in running over
the policeman and causing his death, the defendant acted with full knowledge of his act and its
consequences, and with malice, being therefore criminally liable as a principal by direct
participation in the crime of homocide.
The act committed by the defendant constitutes, furthermore, the crime of assault upon an
agent of authority, defined and penalized in article 249, paragraph 2, in connection with article
250, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, the deceased policeman being actually engaged in the
performance of his official duties when the accident occurred. The act committed by the
defendant constituting two crimes, homicide and assault upon an agent of authority, according
to article 89 of the same Code, the penalty for the more serious crime, which in this case is
homocide, must be imposed on the defendant in its maximum degree. In virtue whereof, the
appealed judgment in criminal case No. 35810 (G. R. No. 29535) is modified, and the
defendant is found guilty of the complex crime of assault on an agent of authority with
homocide, and sentenced to eighteen years' reclusion temporal, the said appealed judgment
being affirmed in all other respects, with costs against the appellant.

The appealled judgment in criminal case No. 35902 (G. R. No. 29536) is affirmed in its
entirety, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.