OABEL, JEAN MONIQUE C.

LEGAL WRITING

IC-JD5

The Case of the Speluncean Explorers

Parties:

The four defendants are members of the Speluncean Society, an organization of amateurs interested in
the exploration of caves.

Facts:

Group of cave explorers who are members of the Speluncean Society, in the company of Roger
Whetmore, penetrated into the interior of a limestone cavern of the type found in the Central Plateau of this
Commonwealth. While they were in a position remote from the entrance to the cave, a landslide occurred.
Heavy boulders fell in such a manner as to block completely the only known opening to the cave. On the
twentieth day of their imprisonment it was learned for the first time that they had taken with them into the cave a
portable wireless machine capable of both sending and receiving messages. The engineers in charge of the
project answered that at least ten days would be required even if no new landslides occurred. Whetmore asked
whether they would be able to survive for ten days longer if they consumed the flesh of one of their number. On
the twenty-third day after their entrance into the cave Whetmore had been killed and eaten by his companions.
After they were rescued on the basis of verdict, the trial judge ruled that the defendants were guilty of
murdering Roger Whetmore. The judge then sentenced them to be hanged, the law of our Commonwealth
permitting him no discretion with respect to the penalty to be imposed.

History:

"The Case of the Speluncean Explorers" is an article by legal philosopher Lon L. Fuller first published
in the Harvard Law Review in 1949. It presents a legal philosophy puzzle to the reader and five possible
solutions in the form of judicial opinions that are attributed to judges sitting on the fictional "Supreme Court of
Newgarth" in the year 4300.

Procedures:

After the release of the jury, its members joined in a communication to the Chief Executive asking that
the sentence be commuted to an imprisonment of six months. The trial judge addressed a similar communication
to the Chief Executive.

Issue:

Whether or not the parties are had the intention to kill Whetmore , thus they should be guilty of murder.

Holding:

Yes. The defendants had the intention to kill Whetmore, thus they should be guilty of murder. By
definition of murder, they have clearly satisfied all the elements required.
Reasoning:

The language of our statute is well known: "Whoever shall willfully take the life of another shall be
punished by death." N. C. S. A. (N. S.) § 12-A. This statute permits of no exception applicable to this case,
however our sympathies may incline us to make allowance for the tragic situation in which these men found
themselves. Executive clemency seems admirably suited to mitigate the rigors of the law. Justice will be
accomplished without impairing either the letter or spirit of our statutes and without offering any encouragement
for the disregard of law.

Disposition:

The Supreme Court being evenly divided, the conviction and sentence of the Court of General Instances
is affirmed. It is ordered that the execution of the sentence shall occur at 6 a.m., Friday, April 2, 4300, at which
time the Public Executioner is directed to proceed with all convenient dispatch to hang each of the defendants by
the neck until he is dead.

Comments:

Chief Justice Truepenny stated that statute is unambiguous and must be applied by judiciary
notwithstanding personal views. Clemency is a matter for the executive, not the judiciary. For him, Court should
joint petition to Chief Executive for clemency. In short, he affirms convictions but recommends clemency.
Justice Foster wants to set aside conviction stating that when a situation arises in which the coexistence of men
becomes impossible, then a condition that underlies all of precedents and statutes has ceased to exist. When that
condition disappears, positive law disappears with it. This has the consequence that the law applicable to them
is not the enacted and established law, but the law derived from those principles that were appropriate to their
condition. He said that under those principles they were guiltless of any crime.

According to Justice Tatting, the natural law under the posited "state of nature" prioritises freedom of
contract above the right to life. He also said that the statute concerning murder requires a "willful" act. The man
who acts to repel an aggressive threat to his own life does not act "willfully," but in response to an impulse
deeply ingrained in human nature. Excuse of self-defense just expounded obviously cannot be applied by
analogy to the facts of this case.On the other hand, Justice Keen wishes to go farther in the direction of
clemency than the pleas addressed to him propose. He would pardon these men altogether, for believing that
they have already suffered enough to pay for any offense they may have committed. He withdraws from case
and makes no decision.

Justice Handy stated that Court should take account of public opinion and "common sense". It is too
clear for argument that this case does not fall within the scope of the exception, since it is plain that Whetmore
made no threat against the lives of these defendants.
 Picart vs. Smith
G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918
Parties:
Amando Picart, plaintiff, and Frank Smith, Jr., the defendant.

Facts:

On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union wherein Amando Picart who was
riding in his pony was hit by the automobile driven by Smith. Defendant blew his horn to give warning. Plaintiff
moved the horse to the right instead of moving to the left, reasoning that he had no sufficient time to move to the
right direction. Defendant continued to approach, and when he had gotten quite near, he quickly turned to the
left. The horse was frightened that it turned his body across the bridge. His limb was broken and the rider was
thrown off and got injured. The horse died. An action for damages was filed against the defendant.

Prior Proceedings:

From a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union, Frank Smith, Jr. was absolved from
liability resulting to the appeal of the plaintiff.

Issues :

Whether or not Smith is liable for damages to Picart; 2) Whether or not Picart also liable for damages to Smith;
and 3) Whether or not the doctrine of “LAST CLEAR CHANCE” is applicable
Holding:
The court ruled that Smith is liable for damages to Picart, and the same with Picart, he is contributory
Liable. That the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting
himself on the wrong side of the road. The defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is
to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. In this case, the “last clear chance” doctrine is
applicable.
Reasoning:
It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval.Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do
so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. The
negligent act of the interval of time, and that at the moment the plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid the
accident. Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is applicable”.
Disposition:
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment
is hereby rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of
other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the
plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date of
this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as not to be
recoverable.
Comments:
MALCOLM, J:
This rule cannot be invoked where the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the
defendant. Again, if a traveler when he reaches the point of collision is in a situation to extricate himself and
avoid injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a recovery.