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This publication is available at
Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and
General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine
Digital Library at (www.train.army.mil).
* FM 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98)
Tactics in Counterinsurgency
Contents
Page
* This publication supersedes FM 90-8, 29 August 1986 and FM 7-98, 19 October 1992.
FM 3-24.2 i
Contents
Underground....................................................................................................... 2-4
Auxiliaries ........................................................................................................... 2-4
Mass Base.......................................................................................................... 2-4
Example.............................................................................................................. 2-5
Section IIIDYNAMICS .......................................................................................... 2-5
Leadership.......................................................................................................... 2-5
Objective............................................................................................................. 2-7
Ideology .............................................................................................................. 2-9
Environment and Geography ........................................................................... 2-10
External Support............................................................................................... 2-11
Internal Support ................................................................................................ 2-12
Phasing and Timing.......................................................................................... 2-15
Organizational and Operational Patterns ......................................................... 2-16
Section IVSTRATEGIES .................................................................................... 2-16
Urban Strategy ................................................................................................. 2-17
Military-Focused Strategy................................................................................. 2-17
Protracted Popular War Strategy ..................................................................... 2-17
Identity-Focused Strategy ................................................................................ 2-18
Conspiratorial Strategy ..................................................................................... 2-18
Section VTACTICS ............................................................................................ 2-20
Violent Tactics .................................................................................................. 2-20
Nonviolent Tactics ............................................................................................ 2-23
Section VISTRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES .......................................... 2-24
Strengths .......................................................................................................... 2-24
Vulnerabilities ................................................................................................... 2-25
Figures
Figure 1-1. Comparison of insurgent's and counterinsurgent's perspectives of time. ..............1-6
Figure 1-2. ASCOPE. ..............................................................................................................1-8
Figure 1-3. Civil considerations overlay. ................................................................................1-10
Figure 1-4. Taxonomy of culture............................................................................................1-19
Figure 1-5. Changes in cultural capability over time. .............................................................1-24
Figure 2-1. Insurgency.............................................................................................................2-1
Figure 2-2. Components of Malaysian Insurgency (circa 1950)...............................................2-2
Figure 2-3. Organizational elements of an insurgency. ...........................................................2-3
Figure 2-4. Example insurgent organization. ...........................................................................2-5
Figure 2-5. Range of popular support....................................................................................2-12
Figure 2-6. Shifts between strategies and phases.................................................................2-20
Figure 3-1. Full-spectrum operations.......................................................................................3-6
Figure 3-2. Example lines of effort for a counterinsurgency.....................................................3-8
Figure 3-3. Rheostat approach to the lines of effort.................................................................3-9
Figure 3-4. Example format for AO platoon requirements worksheet. ...................................3-15
Figure 3-5. Clear-hold-build framework. ................................................................................3-18
Figure 4-1. Lines of effort. .......................................................................................................4-8
Figure 4-2. COIN MDMP. ......................................................................................................4-16
Figure 4-3. Course of action analysis (wargame). .................................................................4-19
Figure 4-4. Example expanded synch(ronization) matrix.......................................................4-21
Figure 4-5. TLPs in COIN. .....................................................................................................4-22
Figure 4-6. Lethal and nonlethal targeting. ............................................................................4-26
Figure 4-7. Targeting and MDMP. .........................................................................................4-27
Figure 4-8. Targeting battle rhythm. ......................................................................................4-30
Figure 5-1. Infiltration by company. .........................................................................................5-7
Figure 5-2. Infiltration by squad/platoon. .................................................................................5-7
Figure 5-3. Comparison of cordon and search methods..........................................................5-8
Figure 5-4. Typical organization for cordon and search operations. ......................................5-11
Figure 5-5. Typical establishment of an urban cordon. ..........................................................5-13
Figure 5-6. Urban inner cordon..............................................................................................5-14
Figure 5-7. Example site exploitation sketch. ........................................................................5-17
Figure 5-8. Example raid concept. .........................................................................................5-23
Figure 5-9. Linear formation ambush.....................................................................................5-28
Figure 5-10. L-shaped formation ambush..............................................................................5-29
Figure 5-11. Satellite patrol movement. .................................................................................5-37
Figure 6-1. Example format for Vulnerability Prioritization Matrix. ...........................................6-3
Figure 6-2. Example completed CARVER-P Vulnerability Prioritization Matrix........................6-3
Figure 6-3. Criteria evaluation tool...........................................................................................6-4
Figure 6-4. Facility categories..................................................................................................6-6
Figure 6-5. Typical US combat outpost design. .....................................................................6-13
Figure 6-6. Organization of base command...........................................................................6-15
Figure 6-7. Base defense elements forces. ...........................................................................6-16
Figure 6-8. Key base defense structures. ..............................................................................6-16
Figure 6-9. Coordinates register. ...........................................................................................6-20
Figure 6-10. Example pattern-analysis plot sheet..................................................................6-21
Figure 6-11. Example activities matrix. ..................................................................................6-22
Figure 6-12. Example association matrix...............................................................................6-23
Figure 6-13. Example link diagram. .......................................................................................6-23
Figure 6-14. Types of snipers. ...............................................................................................6-27
Figure 7-1. Example BCT using LOEs.....................................................................................7-2
Figure 7-2. Well-equipped snap checkpoint layout. ...............................................................7-10
Figure 7-3. Typical enduring checkpoint layout......................................................................7-11
Figure 7-4. Legitimate governance. .......................................................................................7-15
Figure 8-1. Partnership benefits. .............................................................................................8-2
Figure 8-2. Host nation contributions. ......................................................................................8-2
Figure 8-3. Characteristics of well-trained HN security forces. ................................................8-5
Figure 8-4. Possible duties of the advisor team.......................................................................8-7
Figure 8-5. Seven framework tasks. ........................................................................................8-8
Figure 8-6. Example format for readiness assessment............................................................8-9
Figure 8-7. Augmentation of an example unit. .......................................................................8-18
Figure 8-8. Principles of advising...........................................................................................8-21
Figure 8-9. Team-building process. .......................................................................................8-22
Figure 8-10. Example Host Nation security force AARoperation summary. .......................8-24
Figure A-1. The steps of IPB. ................................................................................................. A-1
Figure A-2. Significant terrain characteristics common to COIN operations. .......................... A-4
Figure A-3. Societal considerations. ....................................................................................... A-6
Tables
Table 1-2. Example area matrix.............................................................................................1-11
Table 1-3. Example structures matrix. ...................................................................................1-12
Table 1-4. Example capabilities matrix. .................................................................................1-13
Table 1-5. Example organizations matrix. .............................................................................1-14
Table 1-6. Example people (means of communications) matrix. ...........................................1-15
Table 1-7. Example event matrix. ..........................................................................................1-16
Table 2-1. Insurgent strengths and countermeasures. ..........................................................2-24
Table 2-2. Insurgent vulnerabilities and considerations.........................................................2-26
Table 3-1. US governmental organizations. ............................................................................3-4
Table 4-1. COIN long-range planning cycle.............................................................................4-4
Table 4-2. COIN mid-range planning cycle..............................................................................4-4
Table 4-3. COIN short-range planning cycle............................................................................4-5
This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the
United States (ARNGUS), and the US Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.
The proponent for this publication is the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. The preparing agency is
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Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns may refer to either men or women.
Section IOVERVIEW
For more than two centuries, the United States military has been called upon to defeat insurgencies like the
Whiskey Rebellion in the eastern United States, the Native Americans on the western plains of the United
States, the Boxer Rebellion in China, Pancho Villa in Mexico, Augusto Sandino in Nicaragua, and the Viet
Cong in Vietnam. Although the Army does have historic examples of COIN operations, our doctrine and COIN
skills atrophied between Vietnam and the invasion of Afghanistan. In addition, the world is increasingly shaped
by population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, religious fundamentalism, resource demand,
climate change and natural disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The increasing
complexity of the world has made it more challenging for governments to maintain order and satisfy the rapidly
growing needs of their populations. As these governments try to maintain their tenuous hold on power,
dissatisfied portions of their population have, like dissatisfied groups for thousands of years, turned to violence
to achieve political goals. Using violence to achieve political goals is known as insurgency. As a result, US
forces have conducted counterinsurgency operations around the world in Colombia, Somalia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Iraq. Before developing a better understanding of the operational environment
(OE), it is important to understand what insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and the influences shaping the
OE are
INSURGENCY
1-1. This is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use
of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). The key distinction between an insurgency and other
movements is the decision to use violence to achieve political goals. An insurgency is typically an internal
struggle within a state, not between states. It is normally a protracted political and military struggle
designed to weaken the existing governments power, control, and legitimacy, while increasing the
insurgencys power, control, and legitimacy.
1-2. The majority of insurgencies have been limited to local regions or specific countries. However,
todays instant communications allow insurgent groups and leaders to communicate worldwide to find
support for their cause, and to support causes they view as compatible with their own goals. External
forces, including nation-states, may support an insurgency for their own benefit. They may also oppose a
competing nation-state that supports the existing government. As a result, modern insurgencies can often
cross multiple countries.
1-3. An insurgency is made up of components (the five insurgent elements, the eight dynamics,
and one or more of the six insurgent strategies) and manifestations (tactics, strengths and vulnerabilities).
(For a greater understanding of insurgencies, see Chapter 2.)
COUNTERINSURGENCY
1-4. COIN involves all political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions that
can be taken by a government to defeat an insurgency (JP 1-02). COIN operations include supporting a
Host Nations military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat
an insurgency. Avoiding the creation of new insurgents and forcing existing insurgents to end their
participation is vital to defeating an insurgency. COIN operations often include security assistance
programs such as foreign military sales programs, the foreign military financing program, and international
military training and education programs.
1-5. Counterguerrilla operations, on the other hand, focus on detecting and defeating the armed
insurgent or guerrilla, without solving the societys underlying problems. Military efforts alone, however,
cannot defeat an insurgency. (For a better understanding of counterinsurgency, see Chapter 3.)
POPULATION EXPLOSION
1-7. Population explosion is the rapid growth of the worlds population over the last six decades.
In 1950, the worlds population was 2.5 billion people; in 2008, the population is estimated at 6.5 billion
people; and in 2050, the population is expected to reach 9 billion. The population explosion provides more
opportunities for the insurgent to hide within the population and places a premium on winning the struggle
for the populaces support. As the population continues to grow, governments will struggle to provide their
people with food, water, and power, giving potential insurgent groups an opportunity to exploit a
vulnerable population.
URBANIZATION
1-8. Urbanization is the growth of urban areas due to both a population surge and migration. In 1950,
29 percent of the worlds population lived in urban areas; in 2008, almost 50 percent of the population
lives in urban areas; and by 2050, it is estimated that 60 percent of the population will live in urban areas.
This rapid growth of urban areas indicates that there is a greater potential that future insurgencies will be
fought in urban areas.
GLOBALIZATION
1-9. Globalization is a combination of the technological, economic, social, cultural, and political forces
that are bringing nation-states and the people of the world closer together. These forces are making the
world more interconnected and economically linked. Positively, it has reduced poverty in nations like
China and India. It has increased the gap between rich and poor nations, caused an increased demand
for resources, and may be affecting the climate.
TECHNOLOGY
1-10. Technological developments such as the computer, the internet, the digital camera, and satellite
television have transformed the world since 1950. Information can be exchanged around the world in less
than a second. This has also increased the reach, impact, and influence of the media to the insurgent
and the counterinsurgent. Additionally these same technologies, along with advanced weaponry, have
dramatically changed the battlefield. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents will continue to innovate
and adapt these technologies to the battlefield of today and the future.
RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM
1-11. Religious fundamentalism is defined as a belief in the infallibility of holy scriptures, absolute
religious authority, and strict adherence to a set of basic religious principles without any compromise with
modern life. As nation-states struggle to provide for their people, some of the dissatisfied population, as a
backlash against globalization, will turn to religious fundamentalism to provide those needs that the
nation-state cannot. (This is a primary insurgent ideology, and is further discussed in Chapter 2.)
RESOURCE DEMAND
1-12. Demand for energy, water, and food for growing populations will increase competition and,
potentially, conflict.
OPERATIONAL VARIABLES
1-15. Army doctrine uses eight interrelated operational variables to analyze the operational
environment. Known as PMESII-PT, the eight operational variables are
POLITICAL
1-16. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels
of government. Since an insurgency is fundamentally a struggle for political power, the political
environment in the HN country is critical. Attention should be paid not just to the formal political system
(such as political parties and elected officials) but also to informal political systems (such as tribes, ethnic
groups, and other centers of power). Long-term success in COIN is ultimately based on political efforts; all
counterinsurgents must focus on the political impact of their actions. Therefore, tactical leaders may be
expected to broker local political solutions.
1-17. Host Nation (HN), US and coalition political considerations drive the conduct of COIN
operations. This is especially true concerning the involvement of the US Government and US public
opinion. A major goal of most insurgencies is to influence US public opinion against US involvement as a
counterinsurgent force. Successful counterinsurgents must therefore not only prevent insurgents from
obtaining this goal, but also actively work to influence public opinion for the COIN mission.
1-18. Commanders must be prepared to operate within a broad range of political structures. The Host
Nations form of government may range from a despotic dictatorship to a struggling democracy.
Commanders at all levels, including platoon leaders and company commanders, need to recognize the
importance of establishing and reinforcing the HN as the lead authority for all operations. This reinforces
the legitimacy of the HN government.
MILITARY
1-19. This variable includes the military capabilities of all armed forces. Most COIN units will need
to analyze the insurgencys military forces (guerrillas), local militias, and the Host Nation security forces.
Commanders should consider qualitative aspects, such as conscription or recruitment systems, economic
basis (to include appropriations system), and position of forces in national and local government structure.
Additional qualitative considerations are general organization, training and doctrine, efficiency, rapport
with population, and the police role in the nations internal security. For example, a typical US brigade
in Iraq might have to analyze a Sunni guerrilla force, a Shia guerrilla force, an Iraqi National Police
brigade, an Iraqi Army brigade, the Iraqi local police, and a Sons of Iraq militia unit.
ECONOMIC
1-20. The economic variable consists of the general economic categories of an Area of Operations
(AO), such as energy; raw materials; government development policy; distribution of labor and labor
policies; income distribution; national food distribution; free market or socialist interface and functions;
consumption patterns; external investment, taxation policy; port authorities; movement of goods; consumer
issues; border controls; foreign trade; tariffs; and graft or corruption.
1-21. A low standard of living and a desire for economic reform may be a cause of resentment toward
the government. Generally, the counterinsurgents plan their operations to minimize damage to the
economic structure of an area to avoid causing adverse psychological and economic impacts and to support
economic development.
SOCIAL
1-22. The social variable describes societies within an operational environment. A society is a
population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a
common culture, and share a sense of identity. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents need the support
of the population to be successful. Most insurgencies attempt to increase friction between different groups
in a society and to gain or increase support from any group that shares common elements with the
insurgency. These groups may be aligned along racial, ethnic, religious, or social lines. Language
similarities or tradition can also be a reason for alignment. Religious influences often play a major role in
the sociological factors that affect the insurgent.
1-23. To be successful against insurgents in a particular area and to avoid alienating the populace,
counterinsurgents must understand the local environment. This includes local social issues and national
issues that effect the local environment. For instance, Afghanistan units may interact with groups
of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Nuristani across their AO.
INFORMATION
1-24. The information variable involves the collection, access, use, manipulation, rapid distribution,
and reliance on data, media, and knowledge systemsboth civilian and militaryby the global and local
communities. Insurgents seek to control and manipulate how the local, regional, national, and international
community perceives its cause and events within their operational environment. To achieve this, they try to
control, manipulate, and distribute information.
1-25. Understanding the existing communication system is important because it influences local,
regional, national, and international audiences. Media coverage, in particular, influences US political
decision-making, popular opinion, and the sensitivities of coalition members, while the local teahouse may
control the communitys opinion and the word on the street. Commanders must use information
engagements to fully achieve their tactical goals.
1-26. Insurgents observe the actions of both government and COIN forces. Insurgents often use
propaganda to gain creditability and legitimacy with the population, while simultaneously undermining
their opponents. Successful insurgents strive to seize the moral high ground on any counterinsurgent
mistakes, both real and perceived. This includes political, military, economic, social, religious, cultural,
or legal errors. They will use all available means, including the media, nongovernmental organizations,
and religious and civic leaders, to get their information out to all audiences.
INFRASTRUCTURE
1-27. The infrastructure variable includes the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for a
community or society to function. The state of the infrastructure determines the resources required
for reconstruction. Typical key infrastructure includes sewers, water, electrical, academic, trash, medical
facilities, safety, and other considerations (also known as SWEAT-MSO). The degradation or destruction
of infrastructure will negatively affect both the Host Nation and its population. Thus, the degradation
or destruction of infrastructure often helps the insurgency, especially with respect to propaganda and the
populations perception of the HN.
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
1-28. The physical environment variable is often the most noticeable aspect of an operational
environment. Terrain affects people, equipment, trafficability, visibility, and the employment of many
weapons. The terrain aspects of each area of operations must be evaluated to determine the impact on both
insurgent and counterinsurgent forces. For COIN operations, terrain is categorized as either rural or urban.
Weather and climate influence insurgents, the population, and counterinsurgents, who analyze the weather
to determine its effect on the populations well-being and operations. They pay particular attention to
trafficability, visibility, and equipment. Despite weather extremes, most insurgents have an advantage,
since they are usually native to the climate.
TIME
1-29. Time affects everything and influences all decisions. However, the population, the
counterinsurgent, and the insurgent often view time differently. Insurgents may design operations with the
intent to influence the American political process or elections. In contrast, counterinsurgents must
understand that popular support for extended operations may diminish over time. Figure 1-1 shows the
difference between a western counterinsurgents and an insurgents perspective of time.
MISSION VARIABLES
1-30. While analysis, in terms of the operational variables, improves understanding of the operational
environment, it does not lend itself directly to mission accomplishment. For operations at the tactical level,
the Army uses the mission variables of METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops available,
time available, and civil considerations) to help a unit understand its mission within the context of its
specific OE. For COIN, civil considerations are especially important. When commanders and staff receive
a specific mission, or identify a particular problem, they can draw relevant information from their ongoing
analysis of their OE (using operational variables) to further complement their analysis of mission variables.
Use of the mission variables, combined with the knowledge of the operational variables, enables leaders
to understand the threat, act effectively, and anticipate the consequences of their operations before
and during mission execution.
MISSION
1-31. Mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the
reason therefore (FM 1-02). At the brigade, battalion, and company level, the COIN force conducts tactical
operations, across seven COIN lines of effort. These incorporate the five stability tasksestablish civil
security, establish civil control, support HN security forces, support to governance, restore essential
services, support to economic development, and conduct information engagement. These tasks are
described in detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Lethal efforts may include patrols, raids, and cordon
and searches. Nonlethal efforts may include attending council meetings, engaging tribal leaders,
or repairing damaged infrastructure.
ENEMY
1-32. COIN operations, by nature, involve a confusing enemy situation, since the enemy generally lacks
a traditional task organization (FM 34-130). Moreover, the enemy (insurgents) can have a varying level
of training, capability, commitment, involvement, and experience. In addition to analyzing the insurgents
disposition, composition, strengths, and weaknesses, counterinsurgents must identify and understand the
five elements of the insurgencyleaders, guerrillas, auxiliary, underground, and mass base. Furthermore,
it is important to understand the eight dynamics of the insurgencyits leadership, ideology, objectives,
environment and geography, external support, internal support, phasing and timing, organizational
and operational patterns. Finally, it is critical to identify which of the six strategiesurban, military
focused, protracted popular war, conspiratorial, identity, and composite and coalitionthe insurgent
is employing. (For more on insurgency, see Chapter 2.)
TIME AVAILABLE
1-36. For tactical operations, time available for planning and execution varies. Major operations need
prolonged periods of time for detailed planning. Stability operations that address political, economic,
and social issues usually take a considerable length of time to complete. As such, after the initial period
of planning, the time available for modified or future planning is often quite long.
1-37. When planning short-term actions such as offensive operations against fleeting insurgent targets,
planning time is usually short, and information is scarce. Commanders at all levels can use the time
available to them more efficiently by planning contingency missions. One method to reduce planning time
is to codify routine tasks common to similar missions in SOP. When the need to execute a contingency
mission arises, the basic plan can be reviewed and planning expedited by making minor adjustment
as required.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
1-38. In COIN operations, the population is vitalsince whoever the population supports has the
advantage. Consequently, civil considerations are normally the most important mission variable for COIN.
This variable comprises the influence of manmade infrastructure on the conduct of military operations.
METHODOLOGY
1-39. While analyzing civil considerations, counterinsurgents should develop both ASCOPE matrixes
and map overlays. Developing these products should be done in partnership with HN security forces
and local government officials. Effective civil considerations analysis facilitates understanding. Table 1-1
lists typical examples in each of the ASCOPE categories.
POPULATION OR POPULACE
1-42. This refers to the local community.
INSURGENT
1-43. This refers to any group illegally impeding the functions of the government, such as insurgents,
militias, gangs, criminals, foreign agents, and terrorists.
COUNTERINSURGENT
1-44. This refers to the perspective of the forces and groups conducting the counterinsurgency and those
supporting them. These elements can include HN security forces, local police, government leadership
and employees, US military, government agencies, Provincial reconstruction teams, and coalition
members.
AREAS
1-45. This term refers to the specific localities within an AO, where a particular demographic group s
lives, neighborhood by neighborhood and block by block. Unless a unit occupies an ethnically
homogenous area, it will have multiple areas within its AO. In addition, a single demographic area may
cross several unit boundaries. Examples of specific areas include
Those defined by political boundaries such as city districts or regional municipalities.
Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves.
1-46. Once a unit defines the geographic area occupied by a demographic group, then it should
complete the remainder of the ASCOPE for that area. They repeat this for other areas. Table 1-2 shows an
example area matrix. Columns in this matrix include
Area
1-47. This column names or describes each of the sub areas of a units AO, such as tribal, religious,
economic, or political districts.
Location
1-48. This column describes the location or boundaries of each group. These boundaries will rarely be
pure, since often groups overlap.
Population
1-49. This column describes how the population perceives and uses the area.
Insurgent
1-50. This column shows how the adversary perceives and uses the area.
Counterinsurgent
1-51. This column describes how counterinsurgents look at and use this area.
STRUCTURES
1-52. Existing structures can play many significant roles. Bridges, communications towers, power
plants, and dams are important infrastructure. Others, such as churches, mosques, national libraries,
and hospitals are cultural sites, play important roles in the community. Still others are facilities with
practical applications such as jails, warehouses, television/radio stations, and print plants. Some aspects
of the civilian infrastructure, such as the location of toxic industrial materials, may influence operations.
Analyzing a structure involves determining how its location, functions, and capabilities support an
operation. Commanders also consider the consequences of using a certain structure. Commanders must
carefully weigh the expected military benefits against costs to the community that will have to be addressed
in the future. Table 1-3 shows an example structures matrix. Considerations for each of the
columns include
Structure
1-53. This identifies, defines, and names the specific structures within the AO.
Location
1-54. This describes the specific location (grid coordinates) of each structure.
Population
1-55. This describes how the population perceives and uses the structure.
Insurgent
1-56. This describes how the insurgent perceives and uses the structure.
Counterinsurgent
1-57. This describes how counterinsurgents look at this structure.
CAPABILITIES
1-58. Capabilities refer to the ability of local authorities to provide citizens with key services such
as public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food. Capabilities include areas in which
the populace may need help after combat operations, such as public works and utilities, public health,
economics, and commerce. Capabilities also refer to resources and services that can be contracted
to support the military mission such as interpreters, laundry services, construction materials,
and equipment. The Host Nation or other nations might provide these resources and services. Commanders
and staffs analyze capabilities from different perspectives. They view capabilities in terms of those
required to save, sustain, or enhance life, in that priority.
1-59. Within each demographic group, identify who is responsible overall for each item that is required
to save, sustain, or enhance life. Include preexisting needs as well as the needs of the populace after
combat operations or disaster. This will play a large part identifying root causes of the insurgency. These
items are listed here as well but the focus is on who is responsible for each item. Table 1-4 shows an
example capabilities matrix. Considerations for each of the columns include
Capabilities
1-60. This, at a minimum, describes the SWEAT-MSO (sewer, water, electricity, academic, trash,
medical, safety, and other considerations) items.
Status
1-61. This lists the status of each of the SWEAT-MSO items, for example
Red
1-62. Nonexistent or nonfunctioning.
Yellow
1-63. Present but not fulfilling the requirements of the population, needs labor/parts/fuel
to maintain, expected to fail without support.
Green
1-64. Satisfactory to sustain population.
Population
1-65. This lists individuals that the population consider responsible for each specific
SWEAT-MSO item.
Insurgent
1-66. This shows the perspective of the insurgency.
Counterinsurgent
1-67. This lists the individual the local government considers responsible for each SWEAT-MSO item.
ORGANIZATIONS
1-68. Organizations are nonmilitary groups or institutions in the AO. They influence and interact with
the populace, military units, and each other. Organizations generally have a hierarchical structure, defined
goals, established operations, fixed facilities or meeting places, and a means of financial or logistic support.
Some organizations may be indigenous to the area such as tribes and ethnic based groupings. Other
organizations include church groups, fraternal, patriotic or service organizations, labor unions, criminal
organizations, political parties, and community watch groups. Other organizations may come from outside
the AO. Examples of these include multinational corporations, United Nations agencies, US governmental
agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Table 1-5 shows an example organizations matrix.
Considerations for each of the columns include
Organization
1-69. This identifies, defines, and names the specific organizations within the AO. Some may be
identified in the area matrix but this gives the details of the group where the area matrix identifies its
location.
Location
1-70. This shows the specific location (grid coordinates) of each organization.
Population
1-71. This shows how the population perceives and uses the organization.
Insurgent
1-72. This shows how the insurgent perceives and uses the organization.
Counterinsurgent
1-73. This tackles how the counterinsurgents look at this organization.
People
1-76. This column identifies, defines and names the specific methods people use to communicate in this
area or key communicators.
Location
1-77. This column shows the locations where people communicate or where key communicators live
and work.
Population
1-78. This column describes who the population perceives as being a key source of communication.
Insurgent
1-79. This column shows who the insurgents use to communicate with the population.
Counterinsurgent
1-80. This column shows who the HN uses to communicate with the population.
EVENTS
1-81. Events, both public and private, are routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that affect
organizations, people, and military operations. Examples include national and religious holidays,
agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles, elections, civil disturbances, and celebrations. Once tactical
units determine significant events, they must template the events and analyze them for their political,
economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications. Table 1-7 shows an example event matrix.
Event
1-82. This column identifies and lists all events important to the populace. This includes annual events
such as religious holidays; seasonal harvests or migration of insurgents; or more frequent events like
council meetings, religious services, and special shopping days.
Location
1-83. This column shows the location, normally in military format and includes a date-time-group
(DTG).
Population
1-84. This column describes the populations perception of the event.
Insurgent
1-85. This column comments on the insurgents perception of the event.
Counterinsurgent
1-86. This column comments on how the HN perceives the event.
Section IVEFFECTS
Describing the effects of the operational environment is the second step in IPB. It involves taking the facts
about an area of operations grouped by mission variables of terrain, weather, and civil considerations
and analyzing them to arrive at a conclusion about their effects on enemy and friendly courses of action.
In addition to the normal analytical tools, examining each of the prerequisites of an insurgency and the root
causes that lead to the insurgency have proved to be useful in identifying long-term societal problems. These
problems lie at the heart of the competition for the populations support between the insurgent
and counterinsurgent.
PREREQUISITES
1-87. There are three prerequisites for an insurgency to be successful in an areaa vulnerable
population, leadership available for direction, and lack of government control. When all three exist in an
area, an insurgency can operate with some freedom of movement, gain the support of the people,
and become entrenched over time.
VULNERABLE POPULATION
1-88. A population is vulnerable if the people have real or perceived grievances that insurgents can
exploit. The insurgents can exploit the population by offering hope for change as well as exploiting
political, economic, or social dissatisfaction with the current government. A gap between populations
expectations and the capability to meet these expectations may cause unrest within the population,
including turning to insurgency. The larger the gap, the greater the populations perceived, or relative,
sense of deprivation between what they have and what they perceive they should have. Similarly, the larger
the gap, the more susceptible the population is to insurgent influence through promises to close the gap.
ROOT CAUSES
1-91. There are five general categories of root causes for insurgencies. A root cause is the basis of a
grievance among the population. Some or all of these grievances may fuel an insurgency to varying
degrees. The importance of the root causes, or even their existence, can change over time. Additionally,
insurgents may be adept at manipulating or creating root causes and grievances to serve their purpose.
IDENTITY
1-92. Many factors impact a persons sense of identity, but membership in a socio cultural group may
have the deepest influence. Strong feelings based on identity can be in conflict with the group identity
of the majority of the members of the Host Nation government, potentially leading to insurgencies with
secession or political overthrow as goals. External nations with similar social identities as the insurgents
may assist.
RELIGION
1-93. While religion is often a primary identity, it can become important enough to be a considered a
separate identity unto itself. In this way, religious fundamentalism or extremism can become a root cause
of an insurgency in and of itself. External groups with similar extremist religious views as the insurgents
may assist.
OCCUPATION OR EXPLOITATION
1-94. Popular perception of outsiders either occupying the HN, or excessive HN pandering to outsiders,
can be a source of insurgency. For example, foreign businesses can dominate critical portions of the local
economy. This can occur to the point that some may feel that they or their country are being exploited.
An outside military presence or military treaty may offend national sentiment. The mere presence
or specific actions of foreigners may offend religious or cultural sensibilities as well.
ECONOMIC FAILURE
1-95. Pervasive and desperate poverty can often be a root cause of an insurgency. Starving young
people without jobs or hope are ripe for insurgent recruitment. A large gap between the vast poor majority
and a small extremely rich minority will exacerbate these issues.
CULTURE
1-97. Each society is composed of both a social structure and culture. Social structure refers to the
relations among groups of persons within a system of groups. Social structures persist over time. That is, it
is regular and continuous despite disturbances, and the relation between the parts holds steady even
as groups export contract. In an army, for example, the structure consists of the arrangement into groups
like divisions, battalions, and companies, and the hierarchy of ranks. In a society, the social structure
includes groups, institutions, organizations, and networks. Social structure involves the arrangement of the
parts that constitute society, the organization of social positions, and the distribution of people within those
positions. Some elements of the social structure are considered here:
SOCIAL GROUPS
What are the major groups both inside and outside their AO?
What are the formal relationships, such as treaties or alliances; and the informal relationships
such as tolerance or friction between groups? What are the cleavages between groups
and crosscutting ties, for example, religious alignments that cut across ethnic differences?
Do the insurgent leadership and their rank and file belong to separate groups? Does the
population belong to a different social group than the insurgents? Can seams among insurgents
or between insurgents and the population be widened?
How do people identify themselves (tribes, religions, ethnicity, provinces/regions, classes,
occupations, and common language)?
Are there a large number of homeless, refugees, squatters, internally displaced persons (IDPs)?
What do the people think of them?
What are the punishments (formal and informal) for role violations? What will the people
disapprove of? What are the requirements for revenge if honor is lost?
Interrelated Nature of Culture
1-98. Culture is learned, shared by members of a society, patterned, changeable, arbitrary,
and internalized, in the sense that it is habitual, taken for granted, and perceived as natural by people in
the society. Culture conditions the individuals range of action and ideas, including what to do and not do,
how to do or not do it, and whom to do it with or not to do it with. Culture also includes under what
circumstances the rules shift and change. Culture influences how people make judgments about what
is right and wrong, assess what is important and unimportant, categorize things, and deal with things that
do not fit into existing categories. Cultural rules are flexible in practice.
Taxonomy
1-99. One simple way to show a culture is to build a chart that systematically distinguishes, orders,
and names groupsa cultural taxonomy. In order to do this, leaders and staffs must define a cultures
influences, variations, and manifestations. Cultural influences and cultural variations explain why the
culture is the way it is. Cultural manifestations refer to what one may encounter in a culture. Figure 1-4
shows an example of a cultures taxonomy.
ELEMENTS OF CULTURE
1-100. The size of a nation, its diverse subcultures, different educational levels and geographic
backgrounds contribute to a great range of cultural variances amongst individuals and groups. Members
of the population view cultural influences differently depending on their geographic location or identifying
group. Some elements of culture should be identified and evaluated in a counterinsurgency operation. The
following questions can aid units in defining the different elements of culture:
History
What are the major wars, massacres, and conflicts that shaped the culture?
What are some of the great leaders, heroes, or legends in the nation's history?
What are some of the villains (infamous) people in the nation's history?
What influence do local universities have, for example, do the professors promote radicalism
and do the schools serve as recruiting centers?
Art, Music, and Entertainment
How important is the national anthem to the populace? What do the lyrics mean?
What types of music do the most people listen like?
What types of movies do they like?
What are their favorite holidays, and how do they celebrate them? What types of food do they
eat during holidays and special occasions?
What are some of the most popular hobbies and recreations?
Literature
What types of stories do children read? What are the morals of these stories?
What stories, fables, and epics, oral or written, pass down through families or communities?
Do these help define the culture?
Who are the most famousor infamouscharacters in popular literature?
What are some the legends of the nation's past?
What are the popular books, and who are the controversial authors (past and present)?
Food and Drink
What is the local cuisine?
What are some typical or traditional foods and drinks?
How are they prepared?
How important is sharing a meal?
Is there any food or drink culturally forbidden?
Psychology
Who or what do people fear?
Rank the following from 1 (most important) to 7 (least important):
God
Family
Tribe
Neighborhood
Country
Political party
Ethnic group
Rank the following from 1 to 7 (most to least important):
Esteem needs (self-esteem and respect of others).
Safety needs (security and stability).
Self-actualization (meet ones potential).
Love needs (belonging).
Physiological needs (basics necessitieswater, food, shelter).
What could dishonor an individual, family, or group? How do you correct serious situations
between individuals, families, or groups or families?
Science and Technology
Does the country or area have Internet service? Satellite or hardwired?
Does the enemy use the Internet? How and why?
What Internet sites are forbidden or blocked?
What is the country recognized for inventing or discovering? What do the people generally
believe their country invented or discovered?
CULTURAL VARIATIONS
1-101. Cultural variations are the behaviors, values, and interests common to a culture. Understanding
these variations allows US and HN security forces to interact and thus to operate more effectively
in negotiations, advisory roles, population control, and daily interaction with the populace to gain better
cultural competence.
Behaviors
1-102. A cultures behavior consists of actions which can be sensed; specifically a groups language,
social mores, customs, structures, and institutions. Culturally competent units understand and train
to recognize these behaviors as a means to identify insurgent actions, anticipate the population actions,
and detect subtle changes within the population. Actions inconsistent with the populations behavioral
norms could be indicators of guerrilla activity, internal conflict, or the confirmation or denial
of intelligence. Living and operating among the population is essential to understanding population
behavior.
Values
1-103. Values are the principles the population uses to evaluate alternatives or consequences of decisions
and actions. A value is a concept that describes the beliefs of an individual or culture and is identity based,
for example, Army Values. Values are how people understand what they are and what they will and will
not tolerate. Values define their sense of honor and respect. Values are often unchangeable. Soldiers never
attempt to change the populations values, confuse its interests with its values, or use its interests in an
attempt to alter its values. During tactical operations, counterinsurgent forces prioritize the populations
values over its interests to demonstrate the Host Nation governments legitimacy in supporting the
population.
Interests
1-104. An interest is what the population wants or desires for a groups benefit or advantage (it is often
perceived as a right or legitimate claim). An interest may be flexible and can change. Interests are linked to
the situation, such as what people want at present. US perceptions should not dictate what the population
needs and wants. The insurgency likely understands these needs and wants and eagerly exploits them
to gain support, as well as to turn the population away from the HN government. A vulnerable population
gravitates towards who it feels best understands and satisfies its needs and wants. During tactical COIN
operations, the counterinsurgent must know the local populations difference between a need and a want
and not operate with a US cultural bias.
CULTURAL MANIFESTATIONS
1-105. Cultural manifestations are the concrete displays of a cultures thought and behavior measured by
the senses. It is how a population demonstrates its views on authority, legitimacy, negotiation style,
compromise, and other similar thoughts and behaviors.
CULTURAL CAPABILITY
1-106. Cultural capability has two major components:
CROSS-CULTURAL COMPETENCY
1-107. Cross-cultural competency (3C) includes general cultural knowledge, skills, and attributes. All
Soldiers must devote time to developing cross-cultural competency. It forms the foundation
for understanding any culture, and is developed by studying the humanities, including movies and other
media; traveling to other countries; and personally interacting with people from countries outside the US.
REGIONAL COMPETENCE
1-108. Regional competence includes culture-specific knowledge, skills, and attributes that pertain to a
given country or region. Regional competence is developed by lifelong study of a region and tailored
training during preparation for a deployment.
CULTURAL AWARENESS
1-110. This proficiency level describes Soldiers who demonstrate basic cross-cultural competence in all
three subcomponent areas: culture fundamentals, cultural self-awareness, and culture skills. They will have
a minimal level of regional competence necessary to perform assigned tasks in a specific geographic area.
These Soldiers will be able to describe key culture terms, factors, and concepts. Additional characteristics
of cultural awareness are
Cultural awareness sets the conditions to learn about foreign cultures and people.
Cultural awareness includes Soldiers who have an appropriate mind-set and a basic culture
capability.
CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING
1-111. This proficiency level describes Soldiers and leaders with well-developed cross-cultural
competence. They will have a comprehensive level of regional competence that allows them to accomplish
the mission in a specific geographic area. These Soldiers will be able to apply relevant terms, factors,
concepts, and regional information to their tasks and mission. Additional characteristics of cultural
understanding are
The proficiency category of cultural understanding includes Soldiers who are familiar with a
specific region and have the ability to identify economic, religious, legal, governmental,
political, and infrastructural features of a specific region.
Cultural understanding also includes Soldiers who are aware of regional sensitivities regarding
gender, race, local observances and local perception of the US and its allies.
CULTURAL EXPERTISE
1-112. Cultural expertise is a proficiency level that describes culture professionals and leaders who
possess an advanced level of cross-cultural competence. They will have an advanced and sophisticated
level of regional competence pertaining to a specific geographic area. These Soldiers will be able
to integrate and synthesize terms, factors, concepts, and regional information into plans, programs,
and advice to commanders. In addition
In most cases, cultural expertise entails some degree of proficiency in a language or a few
relevant languages; proficiency in the skills that enable effective cross-cultural persuasion,
negotiation, conflict resolution, influence, or leadership; and an understanding of the most
salient historic and present-day regional structural and cultural factors of a specific
geographic area.
Cultural expertise also describes Soldiers and leaders with the ability to advise commanders
of the region on military operations.
ASSESSMENT
1-114. A leader or Soldier has begun to achieve culturally influenced situational awareness when he/she
can ask and answer such questions accurately:
SUMMARY
Counterinsurgency can be extremely complex. At its core, COIN is a struggle for the populations support.
Understanding that struggle or becoming the world expert on your district (28 Articles, Kilcullen) is the
foundation for any unit. A unit that uses the four tools described in this chapter dramatically increases its
likelihood of success against an insurgency. These four tools are
Studies carefully its operational environment (OE) using the operational variables of PMESII-PT
(political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time).
Determines the root causes of the insurgency and analyzes the three prerequisites.
Develops cultural capability to increase their ability to understand and interact with the population.
Section IOVERVIEW
This section introduces the relationship between the components and the manifestations of an insurgency. If a
counterinsurgent understands both the components and manifestations of the insurgency, then the unit can
correctly apply pressure along the seven counterinsurgency lines of effort (Chapter 3) to defeat it.
COMPONENTS
2-1. The components of an insurgency are comprised of the five elements, the eight dynamics, and six
strategies. The elements are the five groups of peopleleaders, guerrillas, underground, auxiliary,
and mass basethat form the insurgencys organization. The dynamics are the eight categories that define
an insurgencyleadership, ideology, objectives, environment and geography, external support, internal
support, phasing and timing, organizational and operational patterns. Finally, the six insurgent strategies
are the urban, military focused, protracted popular war, identity focused, conspiratorial, and the composite
and coalition. Together, the componentsthe five elements, the eight dynamics, and the six strategiesare
tools of analysis that allow the counterinsurgent to fully grasp the nature of the insurgency.
MANIFESTATIONS
2-2. The manifestations are the visible outputs of the insurgency. Made up of the insurgents tactics,
strengths and vulnerabilities, the counterinsurgent will be able to track, categorize, and develop the
insurgencys pattern, and a means to defeat it. Figure 2-1 shows the relationship between the components
and manifestations of an insurgency.
HISTORICAL INSURGENCY
2-3. With an understanding of the components of an insurgency, a counterinsurgent unit can identify,
describe, and categorize any insurgency. Figure 2-2 shows the components of an historical insurgency.
Section IIELEMENTS
Insurgent organizations vary considerably, but are typically made up of five elements supported by a military
wing and a political wing. The proportions of each element depend upon insurgent strategy and the degree
of active support obtained from the populace. If the existing government presence is eliminated in any
particular area, these elements can exist openly. If the HN government presence is strong in a particular area,
the elements of an insurgency will maintain a clandestine existence. The five elements of an insurgency are
leaders, guerrillas, underground, auxiliaries, and mass base (Figure 2-3).
LEADERS
2-4. Leaders provide direction to the insurgency. They are the idea people and the planners.
They usually exercise leadership through force of personality, the power of revolutionary ideas,
and personal charisma. Generally, they convey the ideology of the insurgency into objectives and direct the
military efforts of the guerrillas. In some insurgencies, they may hold their position through religious, clan,
or tribal authority.
2-5. Leaders who form the political core of the insurgency are often called the political leaders.
They are actively engaged politically in the struggle to accomplish the goals of the insurgency. They may
also make up a formal political party to signify their political importance. These political leaders are the
driving force behind propaganda. Insurgencies based on religious extremism usually include religious
and spiritual advisors among their political cadre.
2-6. At a tactical level, units may identify leaders as IED cell leaders; political, religious, or social
leaders who direct the propaganda and nonviolent efforts of the insurgency; or as business leaders who
provide extensive resource support to the insurgency, and other roles.
GUERRILLAS
2-7. A guerrilla is any insurgent who uses a weapon of any sort and does the actual fighting for the
insurgency. They may conduct acts of terror, guerrilla warfare, criminal activities, or conventional
operations. They are often mistaken for the movement or insurgency itself; but they are merely the foot
soldiers of the movement or insurgency. Guerrillas vary widely in size, make-up, tactics, and methods from
one insurgency to another. They even vary widely within an insurgency, especially in each of the three
phases of an insurgency.
2-8. Guerrillas may continue in their normal positions in society and lead clandestine lives for the
insurgent movement. Guerrillas tend to organize themselves based upon the activity they will be
conducting. Those focused on using terrorism usually operate individually or in small cells and are often
armed with explosives instead of weapons. Guerrilla bands, historically, have lived in remote areas
and conducted raids on HN government infrastructure. Historical examples of guerrillas include the
Maquis in World War II France, the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War and the Mahdi Army in Iraq.
UNDERGROUND
2-9. The underground is a cellular organization of active supporters of the insurgency, which may
contain an element that works in the HN government. Keeping the nature of their work for the insurgency
secret is often paramount to them. They are more engaged than the auxiliaries are and may at times be
guerrillas, if they use weapons or conduct combat operations. They operate in all areas; especially in areas
denied to any established guerrilla force and where operations are not suitable for guerrilla forces.
They conduct clandestine, covert, and overt operations, sometimes infiltrating the HN government.
Members of the underground often continue in their normal positions in society, but lead second,
clandestine lives for the insurgent movement. Some insurgencies are unique in that they conduct most
of their political activities inside the underground while a different section trains recruits, maintains
propaganda, and helps in population control. The underground may
Spread propaganda.
Support sabotage, assassination and subversion.
Support intelligence and counterintelligence operations.
Run safe houses.
Provide transportation.
Manufacture and maintain arms and explosives.
AUXILIARIES
2-10. An auxiliary is the support element of the insurgency. Auxiliaries are active sympathizers who
provide important logistical services but do not directly participate in combat operations. If they participate
in guerrilla activities, they become guerrillas. Auxiliaries may work full time or part time for the
insurgency and generally conduct safer activities than the underground. They often include women,
children and other individuals that tend to be less scrutinized by counterinsurgent forces. Examples
of auxiliaries include shepherds or street merchants that may openly operate near a counterinsurgent base
and provide intelligence on that site. Examples of support that auxiliaries provide include
Store weapons and supplies.
Perform courier operations.
Provide passive intelligence collection.
Give early warning of counterinsurgent movements.
Acquire funds from lawful and unlawful sources.
Provide forged or stolen documents.
Promote and facilitate desertion of security forces.
Recruit and screen new members.
Create and spread propaganda.
Provide medical support.
Manufacture and maintain equipment.
MASS BASE
2-11. The mass base consists of the population of the state who are sympathetic to the insurgent
movement. This sympathy varies between the specific elements within the population such as religious
and ethnic groups and within those specific elements themselves. This mass base, by default, passively
supports the insurgency. As occasions arise, they may provide active support. Leaders often recruit
members of the mass base, who are more actively oriented, to serve as auxiliaries, underground
or guerrillas. Mass base members are the true silent supporters of the insurgency and are often the most
available for the HN government to positively influence.
EXAMPLE
2-12. Although no two insurgencies or insurgent organizations are alike, they still have elements that
can be identified and some form of hierarchy. Figure 2-4 shows an example insurgent organization with a
developed structure. In this insurgency, the underground finances the insurgency.
Section IIIDYNAMICS
Insurgencies are political movements that result from real or perceived grievances, or neglect that leads
to alienation from an established government. Eight dynamics are common to an insurgency. Knowing
and understanding these dynamics helps to understanding the insurgency. The eight dynamics are leadership,
objectives, ideology, environment and geography, external support, internal support, phasing and timing,
organizational and operational patterns.
LEADERSHIP
2-13. Insurgent leaders provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, organization for an insurgent
movement. Successful insurgent leaders use, interpret and shape the frustrations of a dissatisfied populace
into the insurgent strategy. They often provide solutions to grievances by advancing alternatives to existing
conditions that support the insurgency. Effective insurgent leaders make their cause and solutions known to
the people to gain popular support. Individual leaders of an insurgency are often members of the elite
of society who have been somehow alienated from the power structure. Their education, background,
family connections, social standing, and experiences contribute to their ability to organize and inspire the
people who makeup the insurgency. To be successful, they must break the ties between the people and the
government and establish credibility for their movement.
STRUCTURE
2-14. In general, there are three categories of leadership found in insurgencies. They are
Single person
2-15. One person may be the overall leader of an insurgency. This leadership structure has one person
who provides cohesion, motivation, and direction for the insurgency. Cubas Fidel Castro is an excellent
example of a single person leadership structure. However, this single leader may centralize power
or decentralize decision-making and execution, leaving decision-making and execution to subordinates. At
the local level, most units will see organizations controlled by a single person.
Group of groups
2-17. Different groups that have different concepts of how the country should be governed make up the
leadership. Under this kind of leadership, there will be many leaders, possibly unified only by their
opposition to the government. They compete with each other and the government. Example: The partisan
forces in Yugoslavia and Greece during World War II were united in their fight against the German
occupation, but ranged from monarchist to democratic to communist. Sometimes, they fought each other
more violently than they did the Germans.
2-18. As a group, insurgent leaders operate in either a decentralized or centralized manner.
Decentralized
2-19. The power base of some insurgencies is collective and does not depend on specific leaders
or personalities to be effective. These insurgencies are easier to penetrate, but recover rapidly when they
lose key personnel. Decentralization restricts an insurgency in its ability to function as a coherent body
and to create a viable counter state. However, decentralized insurgencies are very hard to destroy and can
continue to sow disorder, even when degraded. For example, Al Qaeda in 2008 is a loose, decentralized
organization held together by an ideal of re-establishing the Caliphate.
Centralized
2-20. Other organizations depend on a single, often charismatic personality to provide cohesion,
motivation, and direction. Centralized insurgencies make decisions and initiate new actions rapidly.
However, they are vulnerable to disruptions if key personalities are removed, co-opted, discredited,
or eliminated. These insurgencies are often led by traditional authority figures such as tribal sheikhs, local
warlords, and religious leaders. For example, Tecumseh was the major factor in the creation of Shawnee
confederation. After he was killed in battle, the confederation fell apart.
Role.
Activities.
Associates.
Personal background.
Personal beliefs, motivations, and ideology.
Education and training.
Temperament.
Position within the organization.
Public popularity.
OBJECTIVE
2-22. Insurgencies normally seek to achieve one of three objectives: to overthrow the existing
government in order to reallocate power, to expel whom they perceive to be outsiders or occupiers," or
to seek to create or maintain a region where there is little or no governmental control that they can exploit.
Insurgents objectives include struggles for independence against colonial powers; the rising up
of political, ethnic, or religious groups against their rivals; and resistance to foreign invaders. The central
issue in an insurgency is the reallocation of power. Usually, an insurgency mounts a political challenge to
the existing state through the formation of a counter state, which is promoted as an alternative to the
existing state.
2-23. Understanding the root causes of the insurgency is essential to analyzing the insurgents
objectives. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires knowing its strategic, operational, and tactical
objectives. These objectives can be psychological in nature, physical in nature or a combination of the two.
STRATEGIC
2-24. The insurgents overall political goals are their strategic objectives. The set of required conditions
that define achievement of the insurgents objectives are their desired end state. Examples of strategic
objectives include
Overthrow an established government.
Establish an autonomous national territory.
Cause the withdrawal of a foreign occupying power.
Extract political concessions.
OPERATIONAL
2-25. Insurgent operational objectives are those that insurgents pursue to destroy government legitimacy
and progressively achieve their political end state. These are the means they use to link tactical goals with
strategic end states. They often target the governments inability to address the root causes that lead to the
insurgency. The insurgents operational objectives define their overall plan, although most insurgents will
not have a formal plan. These objectives are based on the insurgents strategy across political, military,
economic, and social objectives. Examples of operational objectives include
Political
2-26. Disrupt elections; develop or strengthen an insurgencys political wing, attack government
legitimacy; gain recognition of their political party by the government; attack the legitimacy of the
government; or gain ability to run candidates for elected office
Military
2-27. Disrupt operational lines of communication and supply routes; force US or HN units out of an
area; keep government forces in their bases; draw US or HN forces into fight; or provoke over-reaction
from US or HN forces, which result in media-reported civilian casualties.
Economic
2-28. Disrupt reconstruction and attack infrastructure; thereby preventing the government from
addressing root causes; prevent government from addressing the populaces issues.
Social
2-29. Spark sectarian violence; subvert education system; cause population to question the government;
highlight corrupt or oppressive police; or establish a regular means for mass communication (radio
or paper).
TACTICAL
2-30. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts such as disseminating propaganda
such as posters, compact discs and handbills, killing individuals, or the attack and seizure of key facilities.
Tactical objectives can be both physical and psychological aspects. Counterinsurgents can often gain
insight into tactical goals by analyzing the insurgent propaganda. Examples of tactical objectives include
Political
2-31. Intimidation of a local official or the dissemination of propaganda products.
Military
2-32. Attack a US or HN government convoy or checkpoint or random indirect fire attacks on bases.
Economic
2-33. Attack manufacturing centers, stores and markets; sabotage roads, bridges, electrical lines
and pipelines. Threaten violence against storeowners, employees and customers.
Social
2-34. Attack a police station or directly interact with the population in order to communicate directly to
the populace.
amount of time. This can create the perception that the insurgency is increasing its control or the
government is losing control and legitimacy.
IDEOLOGY
2-46. Insurgents often use their ideology to show the population how they can address the root causes
that the government cannot provide or is not providing. Insurgent ideology attempts to provide a vision
of how a society, including a political and economic system, should be structured. Ideology should not be
confused with the insurgent strategy, which is the way that the insurgents intend to achieve their end state.
Two of the most identifiable insurgent ideologies have been communism and religious extremism.
2-47. Ideology is a motivating factor in insurgent activities. Insurgencies can gather recruits and amass
popular support through ideological appeal, which includes religious or other cultural factors. The
insurgencys ideology explains its followers difficulties and provides a means to remedy those ills. The
most powerful ideologies tap latent, emotional concerns of the populace. Tactical units could see ideology
expressed in the propaganda and recruitment techniques of local insurgents.
COMMUNISM
2-48. Communism is a political system where private property is eliminated and controlled by the state.
Historically, it has been advocated in countries where wealth is unevenly distributed among the classes.
Communism was once the most typical form of insurgent ideology and often experienced success. With the
fall of Soviet Union, communism has not been a successful motivation for insurgents, especially since
there is currently little or no external support for communist-based insurgency.
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM
2-49. Religious extremism, often a byproduct of religious fundamentalism, can be defined by strict
adherence to a set of religious principles and the rejection of compromise. These ideologies are often
energized by inequities in social, political or economic development and further helped by
counterinsurgent attempts to marginalize religious issues. Globalization creates opportunities for an
increase in religious extremism based on both real and perceived inequities. Insurgencies based on
religious extremism want their values incorporated into the nations governmental structure. This fulfills
the frustration and dissatisfaction of the religious extremists. Adherents often receive formal instruction on
the religions fundamentals and use adherence to these fundamentals as a recruiting tool. Religious leaders
are often leaders of the insurgency and nonextremist leaders are often replaced. Characteristics
of insurgencies motivated by religious extremism that differ from traditional insurgencies are
Individual duty with an indifference to popular support.
Use of violence that maximizes shock, awe, and casualties.
Disinterest with governance and lack of a practical political objective in organizations with
global reach or establishing a theocracy in local cases.
Ability to regenerate guerrillas without popular support.
NARRATIVE
2-50. The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is a narrative.
A narrative is when a story is used to display the benefits of a certain ideology. Narratives are often central
to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings, and tribal
elements. Stories about a communitys history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked.
Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others intentions. Insurgent
organizations use narratives and religious-based concepts very effectively in developing, spreading,
and mobilizing followers.
2-51. In the Al Qaeda narrative, Osama bin Laden shows himself as a man purified in the mountains
of Afghanistan who is gathering and inspiring followers and punishing infidels. In the collective
imagination of Bin Laden and his followers, they are agents of Islamic history who will reverse the decline
of the umma [Muslim community], reestablish the Caliphate, and bring about its inevitable triumph over
Western imperialism. This image mobilizes support for Al Qaeda among some of the most traditional
Muslims.
Root causes that lead to the insurgency within a rural population, such as lack of land
ownership, grazing rights, water rights, isolation or inclusion in political process, access
to markets, or schools.
Growing seasons, rainy/dry seasons, planting/harvest time (key events). These may influence
level and type of insurgent activity.
Use of structures and infrastructures by both the insurgent and population.
Tribal, religious, or other affiliations, which may have tremendous effect on the local
populaces willingness to support an insurgency, or where people and insurgents can expect
sanctuary or will avoid.
Proximity to international borders that may provide sanctuary or support.
Rugged, inaccessible terrain with often hostile populations to outsiders that may provide
sanctuary or support.
Economic enclaves, such as slums, market areas, middle class areas, and wealthy areas.
Geographic divisions along ethnic, tribal, religious, political or other factors.
EXTERNAL SUPPORT
2-53. External support includes moral support, political support, resource support, or sanctuary support.
External support can come from any entity outside of the Host Nationnot just neighboring states.
Countries from outside the region seeking political or economic influence can also support insurgencies.
Insurgencies may turn to transnational criminal elements for funding or use the Internet to create a support
network. Ethnic or religious communities in other states may also provide a form of external support
and sanctuary, particularly for transnational insurgencies. Access to external support influences the
effectiveness of insurgencies.
2-54. Accepting external support can affect the legitimacy of both insurgents and counterinsurgents.
The act of acceptance implies the inability to sustain oneself. In addition, the country or group providing
support attaches its legitimacy along with the insurgent group it supports. The consequences can affect
programs in the supporting nation wholly unrelated to the insurgent situation.
MORAL SUPPORT
2-55. Moral support is the acknowledgement that the insurgent or their cause is just and admirable. It
starts as outside popular approval and can manifest with negative media attention focused towards the
counterinsurgent or Host Nation. Moral support often leads to political, resource, and sanctuary support.
POLITICAL SUPPORT
2-56. Political support is the active promotion of insurgents strategic goals in international forums.
International forums such as the United Nations, trade sanctions and embargoes, and the creation
of political discussion in the Unites States can all provide political support, which negatively influences the
counterinsurgents effort. Another form of political support can come when a legitimate state actually
recognizes an insurgent group as a legitimate authority. Political support is the most dangerous form
of support as it can result in an insurgency gaining international legitimacy, forcing the counterinsurgent
to stop actively targeting them.
RESOURCE SUPPORT
2-57. Resource support is typically guerrillas, money, weapons, equipment, food, advisors, and training.
Resource support is often the most important form of support, such as, during the French experience
in Algeria. Although insurgents were numerous, weapons were not, because the French closed
international borders, preventing arms smuggling.
SANCTUARY SUPPORT
2-58. Sanctuary support is a secure site to train, obtain sustainment, rest and refit. Historically,
sanctuaries provided insurgents a place to rebuild and reorganize without fear of Host Nation
or counterinsurgent interference. Often these were in neighboring countries or remote areas difficult
to access. Sanctuaries may also include areas within a state, including neighborhoods where HN security
forces cannot or will not conduct operations. The meaning of the term sanctuary is evolving. Today,
insurgents can draw on virtual sanctuaries in the Internet, global financial systems, and the international
media. These virtual sanctuaries can be used to present insurgent actions as acceptable activities worthy of
internal and external support. Effective COIN operations work to eliminate all sanctuaries.
INTERNAL SUPPORT
2-59. Internal support is any support provided from inside the country. It is normally broken down into
the two general categories: popular and logistical support. Together, these two form the mass base. For the
purposes of this manual, one other category is addedinsurgent bases.
POPULAR SUPPORT
2-60. An insurgent movement requires popular support (Figure 2-5) to survive, and popular support
is even more essential for an insurgency to succeed. Typically, there is also a relationship between the
amount of popular support and the size of the insurgency. To grow, an insurgency needs an adequately
sized mass base that will support this growth. One of the best means of defeating insurgencies is to shrink
this mass bass by causing the local population to become hostile or at least apathetic toward the insurgents.
Types of Support
2-61. Popular support can be either active or passive and may come from only a small segment of the
population or from a broad base of the population. Supporters of an insurgency may also be overt
or clandestine.
Active Support
2-62. Active supporters provide open sympathy to the movement, participate in legal insurgent
activities, such as strikes, find new recruits, and may transition to being an active element of the insurgency
such as guerrillas, underground, or auxiliary. Active supporters are usually central to the insurgencys
propaganda efforts.
Passive Support
2-63. Passive supporters vary from those who are sympathetic yet inactive to those who are not
sympathetic, but who choose to remain silent about insurgent activities. Silence on the part of the populace
concerning insurgent activities provides passive insurgent support.
Recruitment
2-64. Local insurgent representatives address local grievances and conduct recruiting. Elements of the
population who are dissatisfied with existing conditions or those who have been marginalized through
psychological alienation are prone to insurgent recruitment. The cadre often gives credit to the insurgent
movement for all local successes and blames government forces for all failures and problems. Every
promise and appeal made by cadre members is associated with tangible solutions and deeds. Competent
insurgents and counterinsurgents both seek to mobilize and sustain popular support for their cause while
discouraging popular support for their adversaries. There are five common methods, used individually or
in various combinations, to mobilize popular support. Knowing these five means provides an opportunity
for the counterinsurgent to identify when they are being used and then counter them. The five common
methods are
Persuasion
2-65. Political, social, religious, security, and economic promises can often entice people to support one
side or the other.
Coercion
2-66. Through threat of violence or abuse, insurgents can force people to support them. Citizens seek
to ally with groups that can guarantee their safety.
Reaction to Abuses
2-67. Though firmness by security forces is often necessary to establish a secure operational
environment, a tyrannical government can generate resistance to its rule.
Foreign Support
2-68. Foreign governments can provide the expertise, international legitimacy, and money needed
to start or intensify a conflict.
Apolitical Motivations
2-69. Insurgencies attract foreign volunteers, criminals, and mercenaries who are often motivated by
money or extremism.
Measurement
2-70. The reality of insurgencies is that the support of the population fluctuates between the government
and the insurgency due to many factors, but no one side will ever possess the support of the total
population. Trying to quantify why the populace favors the government or the insurgency is difficult, but
evaluating the issue is important. Gauging aspects such as the reaction of a local populace to the presence
of troops or government leaders can help estimate popular support at the tactical level. Asking the
population directly or using surveys can produce valuable insight into popular support and attitudes.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
2-71. Modern warfare is inherently resource intensive. The insurgent needs to ensure continual access
to supplies, weapons, ammunition, and money, and this requires insurgents to maintain open supply lines.
While logistical support may be an insurgents greatest vulnerability, it can be difficult to interdict. As an
insurgency develops and expands, logistical support increasingly relies on external sources. In a
conventional war, insurgent forces often receive significant amounts of supplies from external sources
usually from one of the opposing nations involved in the conflict. The protracted popular war strategy
emphasizes mobilization of the masses and requires considerable resources to build and maintain a counter
state. The urban strategy requires significantly less support.
Supplies
2-72. Once the insurgents on-hand supplies are exhausted, supplies must come from the populace or an
external source. In most insurgencies, initial support comes from the populace (either voluntarily
or coerced). Identifying types of supplies the insurgency needs and then discovering how the insurgent
is obtaining these supplies are significant steps in the process of identifying insurgent supporters
and insurgent bases. Medical supplies are often the most critical supply that the insurgency requires.
Money
2-74. Money is essential to an insurgency for the purchase of critical supplies, especially high-tech
weapons and ammunition or bomb making materials. Money is also essential for the payment of guerrillas
and the bribery of corrupt officials. Money can be obtained through many sources and in todays electronic
world, it crosses all boundaries. While money is often shipped to insurgents just like other supplies, it may
also be moved and held by local financial institutions. In some cases, insurgencies develop an
underground banking system, sometimes known as hawala, which can be used to launder money. Just
like supply lines, the money path must be discovered, tracked, and disrupted. Funding greatly influences an
insurgencys character and vulnerabilities. Local supporters or international front organizations may
provide donations. Sometimes legitimate businesses are established to furnish funding. In areas controlled
by insurgents, confiscation or taxation might be used, especially in cases when insurgencies provide their
own essential services to the population. Another common source of funding is criminal activity, especially
the illegal trade of drugs.
Supply Lines
2-75. In all cases, either the insurgents must go to their suppliers, or the suppliers must come to the
insurgents. Discovering and tracking these supply lines can provide key information on insurgent forces
and support. Although rarely overt, all insurgent organizations will have some system of supply lines,
means of transportation, and storage facilities. Skillful counterinsurgents attempt to cut off the flow
of supplies, especially weapons and ammunition. Often, a nation neighboring an insurgent AO is used as a
depot.
INSURGENT BASES
2-76. In counterinsurgencies, there are two general types of insurgent bases: safe houses and guerrilla
base camps. Insurgents will normally establish multiple safe houses of guerrilla camps based upon
functioning groups or cells. Urban insurgents tend to use safe houses, while rural insurgents tend use
guerrilla base camps. Additionally, training camps may be established. These training camps may be
established within a safe house; however, they normally will be established either in a rural guerrilla base
camp or outside the territory controlled by the existing government, often in a foreign country.
Safe Houses
2-77. Many legitimate and illegitimate organizations use safe houses. A safe house is typically occupied
by a member of the auxiliary and temporarily used to hide insurgents. Normally a system of safe houses
have been carefully selected. The occupant of the safe house has procedures to move insurgents along
selected routes at the best times to avoid detection.
established bases, both semipermanent and temporary. Base camps must be relatively safe and secure
in areas where insurgents can rest, eat, and plan. More sophisticated guerrilla base camps have command
posts, training areas, communications facilities, medical stations, and sustainment centers. These base
camps, however, are not the same as conventional bases. They are usually small in overall scope, spread
out, and sometimes underground. Insurgents try to locate base camps within insurgent-controlled areas
where cover and concealment provide security against detection. In rural areas, base camps tend to be
in remote areas characterized by rough, inaccessible terrain. In urban areas, base camps tend to be located
in areas where the insurgent has popular support. Urban insurgents may rent houses for use as temporary
base camps. Insurgents will normally avoid battling over their base camp. Once detected, they will move
to an alternate location. Routes into a base camp will be constantly observed for security. Mines, booby
traps, special-purpose munitions, expedient devices, and ambushes are used as standard security
enhancements. If surprised and cornered, they will vigorously defend themselves with a delaying action
while evacuating key personnel and equipment.
2-84. Not all insurgencies progress through all three phases, and linear progression through all three
phases is certainly not a requirement for success. Insurgent success can occur in any phase. Also,
insurgencies can revert to an earlier phase and resume development when favorable conditions return.
Insurgent success can occur in any phase.
2-85. Movement from one phase to another phase does not end the operational and tactical activities
of earlier phases; it incorporates them. Therefore, it is difficult to determine when an insurgency moves
from one phase to another. In addition, a single insurgency may be in different phases in different parts of
the country. Advanced insurgencies can rapidly shift, split, combine, or reorganizethey are dynamic
and adaptive.
Section IVSTRATEGIES
Even if modern insurgencies use more than one doctrinal model or theory for their strategy, aspects of these
strategies and recognizable characteristics do exist. The six common insurgent strategies are urban,
military-focused, protracted popular war, identity-focused, conspiratorial, and composite and coalition. At the
tactical level, a counterinsurgent will deal usually only with the urban, military-focused, and protracted popular
war strategies. These insurgent strategies provide a common frame of reference for the counterinsurgent. The
savvy counterinsurgent can identify if an insurgency is using one or a combination of the strategies. Knowing
what strategy the insurgents are using facilitates the anticipation of insurgent courses of action (COAs).
URBAN STRATEGY
2-88. In the urban strategy, the insurgents attack government targets with the intention of causing
government forces to overreact against the population. The insurgents want the governments repressive
measures to enrage the people so they will rise up, support the insurgency and overthrow the government.
This strategy can be initiated without popular support. Its success relies almost exclusively on a
spontaneous uprising sparked by rage at government oppression. However, an insurgency occurring in an
urban area does not necessarily mean that it uses the urban strategy. On November 1, 1954, the National
Liberation Front in Algeria used a form of the urban strategy when they launched a series of bombings
and attacks, causing significant civilian casualties, in order to shock the French into negotiations. The
urban strategy actions are often predictable and possess these characteristics
Insurgents often use terrorist attacks, which they hope are highly visible and produce high
casualties. Their true intention may not necessarily be to cause fear or terror, but to provoke the
government into overreaction.
Insurgent propaganda tends to focus on government brutality, calling attention to specific harsh
government actions such as massacres, torture of political prisoners, disappearances
of individuals, and brutal responses to peaceful demonstrations.
Insurgent political organization is minimal with no sustained effort to indoctrinate political
cadre or the masses.
Insurgents make little or no effort to subvert the government from within (however, infiltration
of HN government and security forces still possible.
Insurgents require only a small amount of popular support.
MILITARY-FOCUSED STRATEGY
2-89. The military-focused strategy believes that military action can create the conditions needed
for success. Military-focused insurgents often believe that a small group of guerrillas operating in an area
where grievances exist can eventually gather enough support to achieve their aims. The success of this
small group depends upon successful military action and popular uprising. The most iconic examples
of military-focused strategy are Che Guevara and Fidel Castro; both proposed attacks on military
and government targets until they gathered the support necessary to seize power. Military-focused strategy
actions include
Attacks on Host Nation targets to gain popular support.
Propaganda that incites people to join the insurgency and rise up against the government
and that focuses on demonstrating the Host Nation Governments weakness and illegitimacy.
Little evidence of long-term efforts at building a political base.
Little effort to building the political wing or infiltrating legitimate organizations.
Ability to shift phases at the direction of its leadership; including return to previous phase
if necessary.
Attacks on infrastructure and attacks designed to wear down the government
and counterinsurgents.
Continuous operations along multiple lines of effort, although some phases will emphasize
different lines of effort.
IDENTITY-FOCUSED STRATEGY
2-91. The identity-focused strategy mobilizes support based on the common identity of religious
affiliation, clan, tribe, or ethnic group. In this strategy, legitimacy and popular support are tied to their
identity and, often, no effort is made to garner popular support outside their identity. Rather, communities
often join the insurgent movement as a whole, bringing with them their existing social or military
hierarchy. External support is garnered from international elements of the same identity. In Sri Lanka, the
Tamil Tigers have fought an insurgency against the government for decades in order to establish an ethnic
Tamil state and, at times, have received support from India. Contemporary characteristics of the
identity-focused strategy include
Attacks on those who threaten the traditions and social structure of the identity.
Little or no need to establish a shadow government; already established.
Protects what it considers the interest of the identity.
Willingness to use tactics of other strategies.
Mass base easily aligns with insurgency objectives.
CONSPIRATORIAL STRATEGY
2-92. The conspiratorial strategy attempts to subvert the government from within and often involves a
few leaders and a militant cadre. Although subversive activities may take place in other strategies,
particularly in the protracted popular war or urban strategies, conspiratorial strategies often attempt to have
its illegal political party become a legitimate political party, enter the government legitimately and then
take control of the government. Insurgents using the conspiratorial strategy do not intend to integrate into
the national government, but to overthrow the government. Once the insurgency succeeds in gaining
legitimate political representation, the newly legitimized politicians, who may have been previously
targeted by counterinsurgents, must be re-evaluated to see if they are still legitimate targets. In the Russian
Revolution in 1917, the Bolshevik Party actively worked to break existing government, while being elected
to serve in the administration. Distinguishing characteristics of this strategy include
Insurgents seeking meetings with HN government to discuss ceasefires.
Attacks on infrastructure designed to wear down and reduce the credibility of government.
Political cadre distancing itself from the insurgency by making public statements denouncing
violence, yet the insurgent leadership still controls the cadre.
A public breach between militant and political elements of the insurgency, although this
is often a deception.
Formation of new alliances, often with groups that seem to have little in common with the
insurgency or its ideology apart from the desire for governmental change.
An end or reduction in guerrilla activity with an increase in political activity.
Intensive efforts to gain international moral and political support.
Using sophisticated propaganda, aimed at specific target audiences.
Insurgent political wing seeks recognition and entry into politics, including election to local,
district, departmental, regional, or national offices.
Section VTACTICS
Insurgencies employ both violent and nonviolent tactics to achieve their objectives. Nonviolent tactics attempt
to achieve political goals without the use of force. Insurgent violent tactics are often accompanied by a variety
of nonviolent tactics. Used together, these tactics, along with supporting propaganda, can assist in recruiting
and gathering popular support. Historically insurgencies have fielded dedicated personnel to foment nonviolent
action such as strikes and protests to supplement violent action. Insurgents are by nature an asymmetric threat.
Asymmetric Warfare is a conflict in which a weaker opponent uses unorthodox or surprise tactics to attack
weak points of a stronger opponent, especially if the tactics include terrorism, guerrilla warfare, criminal
activity, subversion, or propaganda. Violent tactics by insurgents can include terrorism, guerrilla warfare,
sabotage, or conventional operations. Insurgents often use terrorism and guerrilla tactics to achieve their goals,
because they do not have the capability to contest the government or counterinsurgency forces in conventional
operations.
VIOLENT TACTICS
2-97. Violent insurgent tactics are normally characterized by elusiveness, surprise, and brief, violent
action. These tactics are often divided between terrorism and guerrilla warfare early in the insurgency.
In Phase III of the insurgency, it is common to see more conventional operations. There are three general
tactics available to insurgents that use violenceterrorism, guerrilla tactics, conventional tactics
and criminal activity. The challenge is that at any given time the insurgent could use any of them. For
clarity, the term guerrilla applies to any insurgent forces performing any of these four types of violence.
2-98. Although violence can alienate the population when not linked to a vision of a better life or the
violence is indiscriminant, the commitment to use violence is a potent insurgent weapon. Targets
of violence can be anything insurgents deem to be obstructions to their cause. Host nation security forces,
foreign forces, aid workers, members of the population who do not accept insurgent claims,
and infrastructure are typical insurgent targets.
2-99. Normally, organized groups of insurgents using terrorism or guerrilla warfare use violent tactics.
The differences between these two can become blurred, especially within an urban environment or where
the government exerts strong control. Although potentially nonviolent, criminal activity provides a ready
source of income for an insurgency and, for the purposes of this FM, has a violent nature. Violent tactics
include, but are not limited to (for more see FM 3-24):
Ambushes.
Assassination.
Arson.
Bombing and high explosives.
Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.
Hijacking and skyjacking.
Hostage taking.
Indirect fire.
Kidnapping.
Raids or attacks on facilities.
Sabotage.
Seizure.
TERRORISM
2-100. A terrorist is an individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result (DOD).
Insurgents may use terrorism. Terrorist attacks employ violence primarily against noncombatants as a way
to increase the population's vulnerability and decrease their perception of security. Insurgent terrorism
techniques include assassination, arson, blackmail, bombings, hijacking, kidnapping, threats, murder,
mutilation, and torture. The insurgent using terrorism often targets economic and political symbols
to undermine the legitimacy of the government. Any overreaction by government forces or other
authorities adds to the population's resentment toward the government and turns its support to the
insurgency.
2-101. Insurgents using terrorism generally require fewer personnel than guerrilla warfare
or conventional operations. Inherently, these activities have greater security and lower support
requirements. Insurgents using terrorism often select targets for their political and psychological impact.
Their attacks can be effective in generating popular support within one faction when used against a
competing faction. They can also be effective in forcing government reaction that alters government
policies to benefit insurgent objectives.
GUERRILLA TACTICS
2-102. Guerrilla tactics are typified by hit-and-run attacks by lightly armed, small groups. The guerrilla is
the combat element of the insurgency. Guerrilla tactics emphasize ambushes, raids, snipers, rocket
and mortar attacks, and the use of explosive devices. Guerrilla tactics may also include assassination,
coercion, and kidnapping to achieve support or eliminate opposition.
Principles
2-103. The principles of guerrilla tactics as stated by Mao Zedong are still valid: Enemy advances, we
retreat. Enemy halts, we harass. Enemy tires, we attack. Enemy retreats, we pursue.
2-104. Guerrilla operations are generally offensive, not defensive, and are often harassing in nature.
Guerrillas seldom attempt to seize and defend physical objectives and, in general, avoid decisive
engagement. Their overall aim is often to cause confusion, to destroy infrastructure or security forces,
and to lower public morale. Guerrilla harassment attempts to keep government forces on the defensive
and weaken the Host Nation, which can include destroying resources and disrupting lines
of communication. One advantage of harassment is that it may create the perception that the guerrilla can
strike anywhere and that the Host Nation cannot prevent it. Because of this, counterinsurgents the must not
only win small battles, but also win the battle of public perception. In rural areas, guerrillas may seize a
remote area or conduct raids and small-scale attacks on remote targets and lines of communications.
Numerical Superiority
2-105. While government forces outnumber the guerrilla, the guerrilla seeks to attain local numerical
superiority. If guerrillas can successfully concentrate against counterinsurgents, they can attain victory over
small elements of government forces. Guerrillas often use simple techniques of speed, surprise, maneuver,
and especially infiltration. Near the target area, small guerrilla elements will often mass in order to conduct
a specific, larger-scale operation. The baited ambush is a favorite guerrilla technique. Guerrillas often
create incidents, such as arsons, bombings, and hoaxes, as the bait. These baited ambushes can attempt
to lure small government forces of all types into a mechanical or manned ambush.
CONVENTIONAL TACTICS
2-106. Conventional operations are not always necessary for success; however, guerrillas may engage
in conventional operations after an insurgency develops extensive popular and logistical support. When
they feel the conditions are set, insurgents may generate a conventional military force that can directly
confront HN security forces. These conventional operations may vary from a small regional operation
to general conventional warfare. Large conventional operations are usually an attempt to obtain the
strategic or operational objectives.
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
2-107. Sustainment requirements, especially funding, often bring insurgents into relationships with
organized crime or insurgents may turn to criminal activity themselves. Reaping windfall profits
and avoiding the costs and difficulties involved in securing external support makes illegal activity
attractive to insurgents. Taxing a mass base usually yields low returns and alienates the population,
especially in cases where the insurgency provides essential services to the population. In contrast,
kidnapping or hostage taking, extortion, armed robbery, and trafficking (drug, human, black market goods,
and so on)four possible insurgent criminal activitiesare very lucrative, although they also alienate the
population. The activities of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) are a perfect
example. The FARC often receives millions of US dollars from a single high-profile kidnapping. Similarly,
failed and failing states with rich natural resources like oil or poppies are particularly lucrative areas
for criminal activity.
2-108. Devoting exceptional amounts of time and effort to fund-raising requires insurgents
to shortchange ideological or armed action. Indeed, the method of raising funds is often at the heart
of internal debates within the insurgency. For example, the FARCs involvement in the drug trade has made
it the richest self-sustaining insurgent group in history; yet it continues to claim to pursue Bolivarian
and socialist or Marxist-Leninist ends. FARC activities have increasingly been labeled
narco-terrorist or, simply "criminal," by a variety of critics.
2-109. Many insurgencies have degenerated into criminality. This occurred as the primary movements
disintegrated and the remaining elements were cast adrift. Such disintegration is desirable for the
counterinsurgent. It replaces a dangerous, ideologically inspired body of disaffiliated individuals with a
less dangerous but more diverse body. This transition would mean the counterinsurgency would also
transition to more of a law-and-order approach. Successful counterinsurgents must recognize that the ideal
approach eliminates both the insurgency and any criminal threats.
NONVIOLENT TACTICS
2-110. Successful insurgents use nonviolent tactics in conjunction with violent tactics. Subversion
and propaganda are the two most prevalent forms of nonviolent warfare. Although some subversive
activities can bleed over to violent activities, for the purposes of this FM, subversion will emphasize the
nonviolent activities that define the nonviolent nature of subversion. Nonviolent tactics include, but are not
limited to (for more see FM 3-24):
Demonstrations
Denial and Deception
Hoaxes
Infiltration
Strikes
SUBVERSION
2-111. Subversion is action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political
strength or morale of a regime (DOD). In addition, Subversive activity is anyone lending aid, comfort,
and moral support to individuals, groups, or organizations that advocate the overthrow of incumbent
governments by force and violence (DOD). All willful acts that are intended to be detrimental to the best
interests of the government that do not fall into the categories of treason, sedition, sabotage, or espionage
are subversive activity.
2-112. Insurgents use various subversive techniques in their attempt to convince the populace to resist the
government and COIN forces and support their insurgency. These techniques include demonstrations,
boycotts, clandestine radio broadcasts, newspapers, and pamphlets. In addition, movement leaders organize
or develop cooperative relationships with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, and trade
unions. This approach develops popular support for later political and military activities. Subversive
activities often openly challenge, in an organized pattern and just short of violence, the control
and legitimacy of the established government and COIN forces.
2-113. One of the most visual forms of subversion is civil unrest. The fomenting of riots, organizing
of strikes, and staging of demonstrations can drain the power, presence, and capabilities of the government
and conversely increase the power and prestige of the insurgency. Another means of subversion
is infiltration of government organizations, political parties, labor unions, community groups, universities,
and charitable organizations.
2-114. To increase public credibility, attract new supporters, generate revenue, and acquire other
resources, insurgent groups may establish their own front groups. Front groups are organizations that
purport to be independent, but are in fact created and controlled by the leaders of the insurgency. A historic
example of a front group is the Sinn Fein. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) used Sinn Fein, their
political wing made up of political cadre, to serve as the IRAs respectable public face.
PROPAGANDA
2-115. Insurgent groups commonly use propaganda to increase their base of support or reduce support
for COIN forces. The joint definition of propaganda is any form of communication in support of national
objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order
to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly (JP 1-02). In this case, the insurgents use propaganda
to further their own ends.
2-116. The insurgents propaganda efforts use activities such as clandestine radio broadcasts, the
Internet, newspapers, graffiti and pamphlets that openly challenge the control and legitimacy of the
established government. Insurgents will search for any leverage they can use in their propaganda. This
includes seeking support based on the common identity of religious affiliation, clan, tribe, or ethnic group.
Additionally, insurgents often create new problems and reinforce existing problems they then can exploit.
Insurgents will arrange for the coincidental presence of photographers or cameras where planned events
occur. If the government is unwilling or unable to address these problems successfully, the insurgency can
claim they will solve them. Common insurgent propaganda efforts include the following:
Encouraging the HN populace or specific neutral parties to avoid supporting HN or other
friendly governments forces.
Increasing insurgent will to resist by fanning hatreds, biases, and predispositions.
Inciting riots or organizing rallies, which may include honoring martyred insurgents.
Causing or exacerbating a dislocated civilian crises.
Creating or fostering public distrust of the HN security forces.
Undermining the support of specific HN local leaders or businessmen.
Creating or intensifying general ethnic or religious unrest or friction.
Supporting or revitalizing dissident or opposition organizations.
Linking local groups with similar groups in neighboring countries or regions.
Discrediting or ridiculing specific HN or counterinsurgent officials.
Characterizing government leaders as puppets and tools of foreign COIN forces.
Spreading hostile coverage of COIN personnel, especially counterinsurgent mistakes.
2-117. Effective counterinsurgents must counter insurgent propaganda. This can be accomplished by
conducting information engagement (IE) to exploit inconsistencies in the insurgents propaganda and their
excessive use of force or intimidation. Additionally, counterinsurgents must have a coherent and unified
information engagement plan. This IE plan must be planned, prepared, and executed with input from all
appropriate civil and military agencies, especially the HN.
STRENGTHS
2-118. The recognized strengths of insurgent warfare provide a base to analyze the specific insurgent
threat. No two insurgent forces are identical. Known strengths are applied against a specific situation the
COIN force encounters, and are refined because of local analysis. Regardless, identified insurgent strengths
must be reduced or circumvented. Table 2-1 presents insurgent strengths and countermeasures for analysis
during COIN operations.
Insurgents do not have the responsibility to maintain Counterinsurgent forces can use the insurgents
normal governmental obligations toward society. This frees lack of provisions for the society, as a tool
their efforts to conduct focused operations in support to increase government support
of their goals. However, they often provide some aid of counterinsurgent operations and to decrease
and services to the local community, especially where populaces insurgent support. In addition, they
government services fall short and they highly advertise can show that the insurgents have acted
this fact. irresponsibly. Increasing the HN governments
ability to provide services to the population may
marginalize insurgent efforts.
The insurgent can use a broad range of tactics, from The counterinsurgents must remain flexible
conventional warfare to terrorism. They can escalate and adaptive to engage and, if possible, disband,
or deescalate their activity in reaction to government defeat or destroy the insurgent force while at the
or counterinsurgent activity almost at will. same time preventing the insurgent force from
having tactical successes. They must also learn
and adapt quickly.
Insurgents often come from impoverished backgrounds, The counterinsurgent force must therefore
are young, and are in good shape. They can make do with establish controls and eliminate resource support.
less by both design and background. Successful Tight security and control on arms
insurgents are innovative in their tactics, techniques and ammunition must be maintained, to include
and procedures. They learn and adapt to changes in the thorough destruction of unused, abandoned,
operational environment. discarded equipment. Hardships are still
hardships, and the harder life is for the insurgent,
the more likely they are to quit.
VULNERABILITIES
2-119. The vulnerabilities of insurgents also provide a base for analysis. To gain the advantage over the
insurgent and enhance effectiveness, these weaknesses must be targeted and exploited. Table 2-2 displays
insurgent vulnerabilities and considerations for analysis during COIN operations.
Because of their covert nature, insurgents must rely on Insurgent equipment losses are not easily
resources that are stolen or clandestinely delivered from replaced, and methods of re-supply can be
friendly entities such as internal or external supporters. This discovered, severed, or tracked to sources
is especially true for sophisticated equipment, cash, and destinations.
replacement parts and expendable supplies.
The insurgents normally lack the combat power for a Insurgents will usually break off
sustained fight. As a result, insurgents typically avoid decisive engagements when they become too
engagements with government forces. By their own design, intense, as the potential for higher losses
insurgent operations are usually limited in scope and are is not usually worth the risk. However, they
driven by both engagement and disengagement plans. may conduct a stand up fight if they have a
large base of expendable guerrillas; they
think they can manipulate a large political
gain; or in some cases a rites of passage
event.
The insurgent endures a life of physical danger, privation Counterinsurgent forces can exploit these
and many types of stress. Stresses include combat and the stresses. Offering insurgents, a pardon,
fear of combat, the need to live covertly (constantly fearing to include food, shelter and protections from
discovery by the government) recognizing the numeric both the government and insurgent,
superiority of the government forces they face; fear of criminal is sometimes enough incentive to induce
treatment if captured by the government; and fear of violence insurgent desertions.
to self and family (often imposed by the insurgent organization
to ensure cooperation). Besides a belief in the cause, the
insurgent may remain an insurgent due to fear of government
reprisal or reprisals from the insurgent organization.
The dependence of the insurgent on popular support is a If the popular support is withdrawn, the
major weakness. This popular support includes direct aid insurgent will not be able to operate
and active intelligence reporting. effectively. If the populace turns against the
insurgent, the government can reap
significant benefits. Willing locals can help
locate, capture, or kill once popular
insurgents.
Insurgent operational weaknesses can include security The counterinsurgent force can exploit these
(requiring extensive resources that may slow down insurgent weaknesses by interdicting supply
responsiveness); bases and safe houses (that are difficult routes and facilities, following the supply
to acquire and operate); a lack of sophisticated trail, forcing desertion because of hardships,
communications (requiring insurgents to spend excessive and inflicting combat losses that are hard
amounts of time preparing to launch operations); and a lack to replace.
of technology (including the ability to maintain captured
high-technology items).
SUMMARY
The central struggle of the majority of insurgencies is to gain and maintain the support of the population.
However, the five elements of each insurgency, the eight dynamics, the strategy, the tactics, and the
specific strengths and vulnerabilities are each unique to an individual insurgent group. For the tactical
leader, from the platoon to the brigade, it is imperative that they first identify and understand the insurgent
group or groups that they are fighting, before determining potential insurgent COAs and friendly COAs.
Section IOVERVIEW
A counterinsurgency is a complex subset of warfare. This section defines counterinsurgency, explains the
concepts of foreign internal defense (FID) and internal defense and development (IDAD), and describes the
scores of units, agencies, organizations that units could work with in their area of operations. This discussion
also covers full-spectrum operations and their applications in counterinsurgency. Finally, it introduces the
seven counterinsurgency lines of effort (LOEs) to help units achieve unity of effort.
DEFINITION OF COUNTERINSURGENCY
3-1. Counterinsurgency is those military, paramilitary, economic, psychological and civil actions taken
by a government to defeat an insurgency (JP 1-02). In a counterinsurgency, Host Nation forces
and partners operate to defeat armed resistance, reduce passive opposition, and establish or reestablish the
legitimacy of the Host Nation's government (FM 3-0). Counterinsurgency is a proactive approach
involving all elements of national power; even down to the tactical level. COIN operations strive to achieve
unity of effort amongst many joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational organizations. COIN
includes tactical planning; intelligence development and analysis; training; materiel, technical,
organizational assistance; advice; infrastructure development; tactical-level operations; and information
engagement. US forces often lead the US governments counterinsurgency efforts because the US military
can quickly project a counterinsurgent force and sustain not only its force but also other agencies.
Operations should be initiated from the HN governments area of strength against areas under
insurgent control.
Regaining control of the insurgents areas requires the HN government to expand operations
to secure and support the population.
Information engagements favorably influence perceptions of HN legitimacy, obtain local
support for COIN operations, publicize insurgent violence, and discredit insurgent propaganda.
TERMS
3-7. Leaders must understand the terminology between joint, interagency, intergovernmental,
and multinational operations.
Joint
3-8. Between military services (Army, Navy, USAF, and USMC).
Interagency
3-9. Between other government agencies, for example, Department of State, Central Intelligence
Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, USAID.
Intergovernmental
3-10. Between international government organizations, for example, United Nations, European Union,
NATO, African Union.
Multinational
3-11. Between foreign government organizations, for example, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Poland.
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
3-12. When working with interagency, intergovernmental, nongovernmental and multinational groups,
Army commanders have inherent responsibilities that include clarifying the militarys mission; determining
controlling legal and policy authorities; and sustaining and caring for these organizations and individuals.
Information sharing between the elements is essential to establish ground truth. Not all agencies may agree
on the nature or scope of support required or on the operations progress.
3-13. Gaining and maintaining popular support presents a formidable challenge that the military cannot
accomplish alone. Achieving these aims requires synchronizing the efforts of many nonmilitary and HN
agencies in a coordinated approach. Coordination at the lowest level is essential for unity of effort. Likely
participants in COIN operations include the following:
US military forces.
Multinational (including HN) military forces.
US governmental organizations.
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs).
Multinational corporations and contractors.
Indigenous population and institutions (IPI).
US MILITARY FORCES
3-14. The militarys contribution is vital for COIN efforts. Demanding and complex, COIN draws
heavily on a broad range of the forces capabilities and requires a different mix of offensive, defensive,
and stability operations from that expected in major combat operations. Air, land, and maritime
components all contribute to successful operations and to the vital effort to separate insurgents from the
people. The Army and Marine Corps usually furnish the principal US military contributions to COIN
forces.
3-15. The most important military assets in COIN are disciplined Soldiers and Marines with adaptive,
self-aware, and intelligent leaders. Tactical units may have specially trained or attached personnel who
bring certain capabilities such as
Civil affairs.
PSYOP.
Language specialists.
Human intelligence.
Logistic support.
Contractors.
Medical units.
Military police.
Engineers.
Legal affairs.
US GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
3-17. Commanders situational awareness includes being familiar with other US governmental
organizations participating in the COIN effort and their capabilities. Commanders and leaders of other US
governmental organizations should collaboratively plan and coordinate actions to avoid duplication
or conflicting purposes. Within the US Government, key organizations that tactical units may work with
are shown in Table 3-1.
Department of State
Office of the Coordinator for
Stabilization and Reconstruction
US Agency for International Development
(USAID)
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of Justice
Drug Enforcement Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Agriculture
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
3-18. An intergovernmental organization is an organization created by a formal agreement, for
example, a treaty, between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional,
or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. IGOs are formed to protect and promote
national interests shared by member states (JP 1-02). The most notable IGO is the United Nations.
Depending on the situation and HN needs, tactical units can expect to encounter any number of UN
organizations in their AOs, such as the following:
Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
World Food Program.
UN Refugee Agency (the UN High Commissioner for Refugees).
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
3-19. Joint doctrine defines a nongovernmental organization as a private, self-governing, not-for-profit
organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; or promoting education, health care, economic
development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; or encouraging the
establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 1-02). There are several thousand NGOs
of many different types. NGO activities are governed by their organizing charters and their members
motivations. Typical NGOs that tactical units may encounter include
Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders).
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE).
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM).
Save the Children.
teams can conduct concurrent operations to capitalize on gains made through security operations.
In Afghanistan on 2002, USAID representatives embedded with units were able to render immediate aid
to returning families whose homes were damaged during combat operations.
3-28. Like any Army operation, at the tactical level, counterinsurgency operations are a combination
of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Counterinsurgent offensive operations focus on
eliminating the insurgents. Counterinsurgent defensive operations focus on protecting the populace
and infrastructure from insurgent attacks. Stability operations focus on addressing the root causes that
allowed to insurgency to come into existence. Determining the combination is not easy, since it varies
depending on the situation, the mission, and the commanders desired end-state. All three of these
operations may be ongoing within different parts of the area of operations at the same time.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-29. These are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain,
resources and population centers. They impose the commanders will on the enemy. This active imposition
of land power potentially makes the offense the decisive type of military operation, whether undertaken
against irregular forces or the armed forces of a nation-state supporting the insurgency. The physical
presence of land forces also enhances stability operations through the threat of offensive action in areas
they occupy. During an insurgency, offensive operations aim at destroying the guerrilla, underground
or leader in order to establish a secure environment for the establishment or the re-establishment of the rule
of law, legitimate government, and economic development. The successful counterinsurgent unit designs
their offensive operations to complement their other defensive and stability operations. Chapter 5 further
discusses offensive operations.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-30. These are combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces,
and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. They defeat attacks, destroying
as many attackers as necessary. The defense preserves physical dominance over land, resources,
and populations. Defensive operations retain terrain, as well as protecting the HN population and key
resources. Defensive operations during an insurgency aim at securing the population, protecting
counterinsurgent forces, securing key sites, and securing key personnel. The successful counterinsurgent
unit designs its defensive operations to complement its other offensive and stability operations. Chapter 6
further discusses defensive operations.
STABILITY OPERATIONS
3-31. These encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United
States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure
environment, provide essential government, services, emergency infrastructure, reconstruction,
and humanitarian relief. Most stability operations are both multiagency and multinational. Forces engaged
in stability operations may have to conduct offensive and defensive operations to defend themselves
or destroy forces seeking to undermine the effectiveness or credibility of the stability mission.
3-32. Stability operations consist of five primary tasksestablish civil security, establish civil control,
support to governance, restore essential services, and support to economic and infrastructure development.
At the tactical level, the primary stability tasks may serve as lines of effort or simply as guideposts
to ensure broader unity of effort. In this manual, they become the nucleus for the seven COIN lines
of effort.
3-33. The degree to which Army forces engage in stability operations is dependent on the specific
circumstances of any given operation. In some operations, the Host Nation can carry out most security
operations and Army forces are engaged in stability operations to offset any negative impact of military
presence on the populace. In other operations, Army forces within a failed state may be responsible for the
well-being of the local population, to include providing basic civil functions, while working with other
agencies to restore essential services to the area or region. An example of this was Operation Restore Hope
in Somalia in 1992 and 1993. Chapter 7 further discusses stability operations.
3-38. These lines can be customized, renamed, changed altogether, or simply not used. Commanders
may combine two or more of the listed LOEs or split one LOE into several. For example, some
commanders may combine the LOEs, restore essential services, and support to economic and infrastructure
development into one LOE. Likewise, other commanders may split out rule of law from the civil
control LOE.
3-39. Tactical units, HN security forces and the HNs government can only accomplish a limited
number of tasks at any one time. The seven COIN LOEs help prioritize and synchronize efforts along all
of the LOEs. One useful construct is the rheostat approach with LOEsincreased effort along the establish
civil security LOE usually means less effort along the other LOEs. Units may see this during operations
against a powerful insurgency or during the clear phase of a clear-hold-build operation. In most cases,
restoring security to an AO enables units and the HN government to rapidly meet objectives along the
other lines of effort. In other AOs, units may increase effort along the support to governance and support
to economic and infrastructure development LOEs, while seeing a reduction in effort along the establish
civil control LOE. This occurs during operations against a weak insurgency or during the build phase of a
clear-hold-build operation. Figure 3-3 shows the rheostat approach to the LOEs.
3-40. Operations designed using LOEs typically employ an extended, event-driven timeline with short-,
mid-, and long-term goals. These operations combine the effects of long-term operations, such
as neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure, with cyclic and short-term events, like regular trash collection
and attacks against insurgent bases. Chapter 4 discusses considerations for planning LOEs and horizons.
TERRAIN
3-44. As with any type military operation, terrain plays a key role in counterinsurgency operations.
Insurgencies are fought in either urban or a rural terrain, each with its own characteristics.
URBAN AREAS
3-45. The urbanization of the world population continues to increase. The concealment and anonymity
that was once only provided by remote rural areas to the insurgent is now available in urban areas. The
transient nature and size of urban populations increasingly hinder a counterinsurgents ability to detect
and identify insurgents. Insurgents use urban centers for freedom of movement, easy access to their mass
base and proximity to targets. Popular support at the outset of this kind of insurgency is not necessary, but
can be gained through intimidation and attacking basic services provided by the government. With a
greater population density, urban areas need more government functions and services than rural areas. This
requires more government organizations for operations and a balanced approach using all LOEs.
3-46. Insurgencies thrive in an urban environment. Operations against urban insurgents vary from
operations designed to control the population to operations that involve seeking out and killing or capturing
the insurgent. In these urban areas, counterinsurgency forces may have to emphasize intelligence
and police operations to counter clandestine organizational, intelligence, logistic, and terrorist activities.
Counterinsurgency forces may be required to reinforce HN police forces in combating riots and disorders
provoked by the insurgents as well as conducting raids and cordon and searches. Military
counterinsurgency forces must be able to communicate with HN police forces and other agencies involved
in operations.
Support to Governance
3-52. Establish or convene local or tribal council meetings to identify and solve the underlying issues
of the insurgency.
RURAL AREAS
3-56. Much of the guerrilla warfare in the 20th Century occurred in a rural settingthe mountains
of Yugoslavia in WWII, the jungles of South Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s, and the jungles of Columbia
in the 1980s and 1990s. The reduced potential for collateral damage, limited infrastructure, and the lack of
urban development, and the characteristics of the rural setting itself influence both insurgent
and counterinsurgent operations.
Purpose
3-60. Their purpose is to
Destroy the insurgent force and its base complexes.
Expand controlled areas.
Isolate guerrillas from their support.
Demonstrate support for the government and for the populace in the local area.
Harass the insurgent to prevent the buildup of personnel and logistical resources.
Lines of Effort
3-61. All rural operations must address all LOEs. Examples along each LOE to consider include
Support to Governance
3-65. Establish or convene a village, district, provincial or tribal council to identify and solve
underlying issues.
BORDER AREAS
3-69. In addition to the typical external support, usually supplies, that an insurgent group may receive
from across a border, insurgents may also establish sanctuary base camps and conduct cross-border
operations from adjacent countries.
3-70. Host nation police, customs, or paramilitary border forces should be responsible for border
security. However, the guerrilla threat may force the military to conduct border operations, particularly
in rural areas. US forces advise and assist Host Nation security forces to interdict the infiltration
of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries with the intent of isolating the
insurgent forces from their external support and sanctuaries. Border operations normally require restrictive
measures for tribal and ethnic groups who do not recognize the international boundary.
3-71. Border operations require close coordination and cooperation between the armed forces,
paramilitary forces, and government agencies involved. Physically sealing the border may be impossible,
since doing so could increase the requirement for forces and materiel beyond available resources. Placing
forces or barriers at every crossing and entry site may also be impossible. Commanders should prioritize
where to place their forces or barriers.
Routes
3-72. Based on detailed terrain analysis and intelligence, commanders can determine infiltration
and exfiltration routes, support sites, frequency and volume of traffic, type of transportation, number
and type of personnel, amount and type of materiel, terrain and traffic conditions, and the probable location
of base areas and sanctuaries. Continuous and detailed surveillance is required.
Zones
3-73. Restricted zones or friendly population buffer zones can be established if needed. Either of these
operations, which could require relocating many persons, must be carefully planned. Although armed
forces may assist, civil authorities normally are responsible for planning and carrying out a relocation
program. Forced relocation is held to a minimum. The 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibit forced
population resettlement unless there is clear military necessity.
Restricted Zone
3-74. This is a carefully selected area, varied in width and contiguous to the border. Authorities
normally relocate all persons living in this zone. Authorities give public notice that they will regard all
unauthorized individuals or groups encountered in the restricted zone as infiltrators or insurgents.
to establish information nets and employ loyal citizens in paramilitary units. The operation denies
insurgents potential civilian contacts and base areas for border-crossing activities.
Lines of Effort
3-76. Border operations must use actions across all LOEs. One or two examples along each LOE are
Support to Governance
3-80. Establish or convene a village or tribal council from both sides of the border to identify
and solve issues.
TROOPS
3-84. Counterinsurgency operations typically involve actions that combine joint, interagency,
multinational, and nongovernmental organizations efforts. The increased number of military
and nonmilitary participants and their divergent missions and methods are a coordination and unity
of effort challenge. Achieving unity of effort requires the greatest possible common purpose and direction
among all agencies. One means of achieving this is using a long-range plan designed around the seven
COIN lines of effort.
TASK ORGANIZATION
3-85. The organization for, and conduct of, counterinsurgency operations depends on the mission
variables and the OE. However, COIN operations place a premium on boots on the ground. Task
organization is the temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission (FM 3-0).
Task organization for counterinsurgency operations is often substantially different from how units are task
organized in conventional operations. During counterinsurgency operations, many units do not perform
their traditional role. For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan, many artillerymen have served in infantry, civil
affairs, military police, or intelligence roles.
TROOPS-TO-TASK ANALYSIS
3-86. Given the extended nature of COIN, tactical units must maximize all available assets to
accomplish missions in each of the COIN LOEs and sustain Soldier proficiency, physical fitness, and
emotional and psychological well-being. A means to maximize the employment of all assets is referred to
as troops-to-task analysis. This process enables units to correctly assign tasks to units of appropriate size
and capabilities.
3-87. Often conducted during MDMP, staffs and tactical units begin troops-to-task analysis by
determining a standard size element to use as a baseline (Infantry platoon, Armor platoon, Cavalry platoon,
company, or others). The staff determines the forces available (often including HN security forces). Then,
the staff or tactical unit lists and prioritizes each task and determines the forces required to accomplish each
task using the baseline unit as a measure,. Finally, the tactical unit and staff uses the commanders planning
guidance to array forces and assign tasks.
3-88. Figure 3-4 shows an example format for a troops-to-task analysis worksheet. It identifies specified
and implied tasks, a baseline number of unit or units, including HN security forces, required to accomplish
a task, and assigned them higher headquarters. The troops-to-task process is also useful for establishing
unit AOs.
with higher military headquarters, Host Nation government officials, HN security forces, NGOs, or US
agencies.
3-90. Once a BCT is given an AO, they, along with the Host Nation, should be the controlling
headquarters for all other elements in their AO. This should include the temporary attachment for control,
if not command, of any element that is physically within their AO. Examples would include the United
States Agency for Internal Development (USAID), Corps of Engineers, Military Police, advisor teams,
reconstruction teams, Host Nation security forces, or private contracting security firms, since these
elements may not completely understand the intricacies in the BCTs assigned AO.
3-91. The military force conducting counterinsurgency operations will not always consist of maneuver
forces. Counterinsurgency operations are manpower intensive and therefore infantry, armor, artillery,
reconnaissance, and military police battalions are the primary tactical building blocks for combat in a
counterinsurgency environment. The composition of the tactical force in counterinsurgency operations
depends upon these available forces and the threat that is faced. Aviation, engineers, military working dog
teams, special operations forces, and reconstruction teams are key force multipliers for the
counterinsurgency force. In deciding how to use these forces, leaders assess the factors of METT-TC.
Normally, most ground combat elements are organized to fight as maneuver forces. However, the proper
use of other forces can provide the counterinsurgency force with many advantages.
CAPABILITIES
3-93. Units conducting counterinsurgency operations have identified the need for additional capabilities
beyond their standard task organization. Human terrain teams, document and media exploitation teams,
personal security detachments, detainee holding areas, Host Nation security force advisor teams, base
commanders and base defense commanders, explosive ordnance disposal teams, company intelligence
support teams, and tactical site exploitation teams have all proved useful during recent operations.
3-94. A human terrain team is a group of civilian anthropologists attached to brigades and battalions.
This team helps the unit understand local cultures. These social scientists aid leaders in better
understanding relevant cultural history, engaging locals in a positive way, and incorporating knowledge of
tribal traditions to help resolve conflicts.
3-95. Document and media exploitation teams (DOMEX) process, translate, analyze, exploit, and share
hard copy documents and electronic media collected during operations. This capability increases
in importance as the rule of law is re-established and insurgents go to trial, rather than long term detention.
3-96. Due to the organization of brigade and battalion headquarters, commanders and sergeant majors
lack the combat power needed to move freely around the battlefield. In recent operations, units have either
built ad hoc organizations or tasked platoons to serve as escorts so that they can reconnoiter the AO, attend
meetings, engage locals, check on Soldiers, and better visualize the fight. These are often called personal
security detachments. Most theaters have implemented a three or four vehicle rule for convoys, which
make this units strength at least twelve Soldiers strong.
3-97. A detainee holding area (DHA) is a temporary location used to field process and house any
person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force, and provide resources for intelligence
exploitation. Detainees are kept here for a short period of time before being released or being sent to a
theater internment facility. The DHA generally consists of a semipermanent structure designed to house
detainees. Basic infrastructure includes shelter, latrines, basic hygiene facilities, medical care, interrogation
facilities, and evidence holding areas. For more see FM 3-19.40.
3-98. Host nation security force advisor teams conduct operations to train HN military individuals
and units in tactical employment, sustainment and integration of land, air, and maritime skills; provide
advice and assistance to military leaders; and provide training on tactics, techniques, and procedures. These
teams can be resourced by the BCT or battalion, or provided by DA. Their size and capability varies on the
size of the HN security force being advised. (For more information, see Chapter 8.)
3-99. Base commanders and base defense commanders are typically internally resourced personnel
and units of the brigade, battalion, and company level who command and control the base and supervise
the defense of the base. (For more information, see Chapter 6.)
3-100. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support provides the capability to neutralize domestic
of foreign conventional explosive hazards, which include unexploded ordnance (UXO), booby traps,
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), captured enemy ammunition, and bulk explosive. EOD units detect,
mark, identify, render safe, and dispose of explosive hazards. Also, EOD specialists work with intelligence
personnel to conduct explosive forensics to help identify the makers of the devices, as well as their ever
evolving methods of construction, placement, concealment, and detonation.
3-101. Human intelligence collection teams (HCTs) are teams with trained HUMINT collectors that
collect information for people and their associated documents and media sources to identify elements,
intentions, capability, strength, disposition, tactics, and equipment. The team uses human sources as tools
and a variety of collection methods to satisfy the commanders intelligence requirements.
They can conduct source operations and interrogate detainees.
3-102. A PSYOP team is a team that reinforces the effects of tactical and nontactical operations, as well
as discrediting and demoralizing the insurgency. Their actions enhance the probability of accomplishing
the units mission.
3-103. A civil affairs team (CAT) is a team that helps a unit establish, maintain, influence, or exploit
relations between the unit and civilian organizations, governments, authorities, and populace in an area
of operations. Civil affairs core tasks include populace and resource control (PRC), foreign humanitarian
assistance, civil information management, nation assistance, and support to civil administration.
3-104. Company operations teams sometimes referred to as company intelligence support teams are a
group of two to six individuals at the company level who enhance the company commanders situational
awareness of their area of operations by producing intelligence at the company level. They collect
and analyze patrol reports, human intelligence reports, and battalion intelligence reports. As a result, they
are able to conduct link analysis, conduct pattern analysis, create target folders, and enemy situation
templates.
3-105. Site exploitations teams are teams at the company or battalion level that execute systematic
actions with the appropriate equipment, to ensure that personnel, document, electronic data, and other
material at any site are identified, evaluated, collected, and protected to gather information to be developed
into intelligence and facilitate future operations. They may collect biometric, physical, digital, and spoken
data. (See also Chapter 5 of this manual or CALL product 07-26.)
Offense Offense
Offense Defense
Defense Stability Defense
Stability
Stability
OVERVIEW
3-106. This pattern of operation is to clear, hold, and build one village, area, or city at a timeand then
expand into another area. In previous conflicts, this was known as the "Oil Spot Strategy." This type
of operation was used successfully in Algeria and Indochina by the French, who called it tache dhuile;
in Malaysia by the British, who referred to it as "The Briggs Plan"; and in Tal Afar by the Americans, who
named it "clear-hold-build." This operation aims to develop a long-term, effective Host Nation government
framework and presence in the area, which secures the people and facilitates meeting their basic needs,
and provides legitimate governance.
3-107. The purpose of Americas ground forces is to fight and win the Nations wars. Throughout
history, however, the Army has been called on to perform many tasks beyond pure combat; this has been
particularly true during the conduct of COIN operations. COIN operations will continue to require Soldiers
to be ready both to fight and to builddepending on the security situation and a variety of other factors.
RESOURCES
3-108. Clear-hold-build operations require a substantial commitment of resources, time and a clear unity
of effort by civil authorities, other agencies, and security forces. Counterinsurgent commanders must first
plan and prepare for a long-term effort. Before conducting a clear-hold-build operation, units must ensure
that they have identified or coordinated for
Adequate troops, US and HN, to clear the insurgents from a designated area.
Interagency cooperation and unity of effort.
Sufficient resources, expertise, and labor to restore essential services.
A local government that will support the operation.
Means for US and HN security (military, police, and paramilitary) forces to share intelligence.
OBJECTIVES
3-109. Actual operations begin by controlling access to the area and then by controlling key points within
the area. Security and influence can then spread out from these areas. Often, the steps of clear-hold-build
operations will overlap, especially between hold and build, where activities are often conducted
simultaneously. Clear-hold-build operations have the following objectives:
Create a secure physical and psychological environment.
Provide continuous security for the local populace.
Eliminate the insurgent presence.
Reinforce political primacy.
Enforce the rule of law.
CLEAR
3-110. Clear is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces
and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area (FM 3-90). The force does this by destroying,
capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of insurgent combatants and leaders. This task is most effectively
initiated by a clear-in-zone or cordon-and-search operation, as well as patrolling, ambushes,
and targeted raids.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-111. Offensive operations predominate during the clear phase; however, defensive and stability
operations are still conducted. Eliminating guerrilla forces does not remove the entrenched insurgent
infrastructure. While leaders and the underground exist, insurgents will continue to recruit among the
population, undermine the Host Nation government, receive supplies, and coerce the populace through
intimidation and violence. After guerrilla forces have been eliminated, removing the insurgent
infrastructure such as leaders, underground, and auxiliaries begins. This should be done in a way that
minimizes the impact on the local populace.
3-112. If insurgent forces are not eliminated, but are expelled or have broken into smaller groups instead,
they must be prevented from reentering the area. Once counterinsurgent units have established their bases,
platoons and companies cannot become static. They should be mobile and should patrol throughout the
area. The local populace should be compensated for damages that occur while clearing the area of
insurgents.
LINES OF EFFORT
3-114. Although the clear phase emphasizes establishing civil security, operations across the other LOEs
must happen. Examples of complimentary actions across all LOEs include
Support to Governance
3-118. Identify key government and local leaders that can support the re-establishment of local
government that can administer the area. Identifying the underlying issues of the population.
HOLD
3-122. After clearing the area of guerrillas, the counterinsurgent force must then assign sufficient troops
to the cleared area to prevent their return, to defeat any remnants, and to secure the population. This is the
hold task. Ideally, Host Nation security forces execute this part of the clear-hold-build operation. Success
or failure depends on effectively and continuously securing the populace and on reestablishing an HN local
government. Although offensive and stability operations continue, in this phase, uses defensive operations
to secure the population.
BASES
3-123. Cleared areas are best held by establishing counterinsurgent forces in bases among or adjacent to
the area. From these bases, the counterinsurgent forces can then concentrate on two primary purposes:
to disrupt, identify, and ultimately eliminate the insurgents, especially their leadership and infrastructure;
and to end popular support for the insurgency and to gain popular support for the government
3-124. Exactly where these bases are established and their actual force composition is a key
counterinsurgent decision. The main consideration should be towards the desired effect on the population,
especially increasing their security. If a area is supportive of the insurgency, then a base established
in known insurgent strongholds may sever the relationships between insurgents and the populace.
However, if the area is neutral or has pockets of support for the government, then the base should be
established where it can best help in developing the area.
is twofold: to gain a better picture of the actual situation and to turn the populations support toward the
government.
3-127. Another consideration is to secure key physical infrastructure. Because resources are always
limited, parts of the infrastructure vital for stability and vulnerable to attack must receive the priority
of protection. This can be accomplished by analyzing the risk and likelihood of attack on various sites in
the AO. (Chapter 7 discusses one technique for this.)
LINES OF EFFORT
3-128. Although the hold phase emphasizes defensive actions, operations across all LOEs must be
employed. Examples of complimentary actions along multiple LOEs include
Support to Governance
3-132. Establish or reestablish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus.
BUILD
3-136. The build phase of clear-hold-build operations consists of carrying out programs designed
to remove the root causes that led to the insurgency, improve the lives of the inhabitants, and strengthen the
Host Nations ability to provide effective governance. Stability operations predominate in this phase, with
many important activities being conducted by nonmilitary agencies. During this phase, the Host Nation
security forces should have primary responsibility for security. Progress in building support for the Host
Nation government requires protecting the local populace. People who do not believe they are secure from
insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals will not risk overtly supporting counterinsurgent efforts.
END STATE
3-138. During the build phase, Host Nation government representatives reestablish government offices
and normal administrative procedures. National and international development agencies rebuild
infrastructure and key facilities. Local leaders are developed and given authority. Life for the areas
inhabitants begins the return to normal.
LINES OF EFFORT
3-139. Although the build phase continues to secure the population and separate them from the
insurgents, the focus will shift to the other LOEs. Examples of complimentary actions along multiple LOEs
include
Support to Governance
3-143. Continue to support and enhance the local government.
In 1962, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) launched the Strategic Hamlet Program
to compliment its advisory efforts with the Republic of Vietnams military. The Strategic Hamlet Program
was an extremely ambitious program designed to build fortified hamlets, relocate the population to the
hamlets, and train paramilitary forces, known as the Regional or Provincial Forces, across South Vietnam.
Together this would increase security and quality of life for the population. With the goal of fortifying half
the countrys hamlets in only 18 months, the program struggled with providing governance and solving
bureaucratic issues, ensuring security for all the villages, and limiting corruption. Additionally, the program
met resistance from locals, who felt an ancestral connection to their original hamlets.
Although the program was abandoned in 1964, after the war, the North Vietnamese Army acknowledged
that the well-run hamlets forced their guerrilla forces to relocate to other, insurgent controlled areas. The
South Vietnamese Strategic Hamlet program failed to meet all five prerequisites for a clear-hold-build
operation, especially obtaining an adequate number of troops, securing sufficient resources, and providing
a local government up to the task.
STRIKE OPERATIONS
3-147. Strike operations are short duration (generally one day to several weeks) offensive, tactical
operations conducted in contested or insurgent controlled urban or rural areas to find, fix and destroy
insurgent forces. Small, highly mobile combat forces operate in dispersed formations to locate and fix the
insurgents. Upon locating the insurgents, commanders direct their forces to attack, pursue, and destroy
them. If contact is lost, the units resume aggressive patrolling to reestablish contact and destroy insurgent
forces before they can rest, reorganize, and resume operations. Strike operations seek to destroy insurgent
forces and base areas, isolate insurgent forces from their support, and interdict insurgent infiltration routes
and lines of communications (LOCs). Strike forces are organized as self-sufficient task forces capable
of operating in areas remote from logistical bases. Ground or water borne means of entry may be used,
as well as air assault or parachute deliveries. Strike operations use offensive tactics such as raids,
reconnaissance in force, cordons and attacks, hasty or deliberate attacks, and pursuits. It is often a
complementary operation to a clear-hold-build operation.
3-148. Speed and surprise are important in strike operations. The sudden and unexpected delivery
of combat forces into an insurgent-held or contested area provides significant advantages to the forces
conducting these operations. Speed and surprise can be achieved by using air assaults to insert the first
forces into the area of operations. Subsequent forces can be delivered on later airlifts or by other modes
of transportation. Fires can also be used to block escape routes or areas that are not secured by
ground forces.
3-149. A strike on an insurgent force normally requires superior combat power. COIN forces attempt
to immediately engage and destroy insurgents before they can disperse. Depending on the situation, hasty
or deliberate attacks are made on bases that contain fortifications. After a successful attack on insurgent
forces, troops thoroughly search the area for insurgent personnel, supplies, equipment, and documents. All
captured enemy documents must be placed into intelligence channels as soon as possible to ensure that it
is properly exploited by DOMEX personnel. Pursuit operations are undertaken to destroy or capture forces
attempting to flee. Artillery, air support, and air assault forces support ground pursuit.
PURPOSE
3-150. Strike operations may also be used as a means to encourage reconcilable insurgents to the
negotiation table. Strike operations are conducted to
Harass the insurgent to prevent the buildup of personnel and logistical resources.
Destroy the insurgent force and its base complexes.
Demonstrate government resolve and garner support from the populace in the local area.
Set the conditions to expand clear-hold-build operations.
LINES OF EFFORT
3-151. Along the LOEs in a strike operation, tactical units should examine
Support to Governance
3-155. Establish or convene local or tribal council meetings to identify and solve the underlying issues
of the insurgency.
order within an area or entire nation. PRC operations are normally nontactical, police-type operations and a
responsibility of HN governments. However, US forces may be required to conduct PRC operations until
HN security forces possess the will and capability. PRC operations may be conducted independently
of clear-hold-build operations or Strike operations or as an integrated part in each of these operations.
3-160. In peacetime, police forces protect the population and resources of a state from criminal activity
by both armed and unarmed criminals. During an insurgency, however, the number of armed insurgents,
the willingness of insurgents to use violence against the police and the populace, and the potential
for civilians to become displaced or refugees, often creates a situation where police forces and their
operations cannot successfully curtail the insurgents nor protect the population and resources.
OBJECTIVES
3-161. Typical objectives for populace and resources control operations include
Establish and maintain a secure physical and psychological environment for the population.
Limit insurgent freedom of movement and initiative.
Sever relationships between the population and insurgents.
Identify and neutralize insurgent support activities.
Establish and maintain security of resources.
CATEGORIES
3-162. Populace and resources control measures can be classified into four general categories:
Surveillance and intelligence measures.
Establish control measures.
Enforce control measures.
Protection measures.
Surveillance and Intelligence Measures
3-163. Surveillance and intelligence measures include both overt and covert surveillance of known, likely
or potential insurgents, their targets, and the creation of a QRF to exploit intelligence or conduct greater
surveillance of insurgent targets. Expanded police intelligence and surveillance operations, to include
police informants and agent networks, may link criminal acts from robberies, kidnappings, terrorism,
and extortion to insurgent activities.
3-164. Surveillance must be established and maintained over key individuals, groups, and activities
of interest. Increased surveillance must be maintained over critical locations, especially government
and civilian sources of weapons and ammunition. This includes maximum use of sensors, cameras
and other electronic surveillance equipment to provide continuous coverage of suspected areas and routes
used by insurgents. An additional means of gathering intelligence is to monitor local media (radio,
newspaper) both for rumor control and counterpropaganda purposes as well as intelligence tip-offs.
In addition, the public and private actions of influential local leaders provide additional insight. It
is important to live forward with the local people and listen to what they are saying. Still other intelligence
and surveillance measures include
Establish general covert surveillance measures at marketplace and stores.
Use HUMINT collection teams (HCTs) or the HN police to recruit locals for surveillance
and intelligence.
Establish a system of block or village wardens with reporting procedures as well as incentives.
Hold the wardens accountable for knowing what is going on in their block or village.
Establish Control Measures
3-165. Successful counterinsurgency operations typically use increased control measures to limit
insurgent activities and their ability to hide within the population. Normal security functions must be
performed efficiently and effectively, which is especially true if they are in any way part of the root causes
of the insurgency. However, due to the insurgency, additional security measures and operational techniques
must be implemented. Two such considerations are increasing the size of police/border patrols due to the
threat and establishing QRFs to rapidly reinforce any patrol or site.
3-166. Combating an insurgency requires increased control measures to limit the insurgents freedom
of movement and their supporters. Control measures should be well planned and coordinated to ensure
rapid and efficient operations, with a minimum of delay and inconvenience to the people. All control
measures must be authorized by national laws and regulations, as well as be enforceable. Each control
measure should be tailored to fit the situation and used to establish or reinforce the credibility of the Host
Nation government.
3-167. The Host Nation government should explain and justify all control measures to the HN
population. They should be the least restrictive to accomplish the purpose. Local civilians must understand
that these measures are necessary to protect them from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals.
Ideally, the local population and their leaders should accept the needed measures before implementation
and that their support will minimize the inconvenience of the measures. These restrictions must be lifted
as soon as the situation permits.
3-168. Once control measures are in place, the Host Nation government should implement a system
of punishments for offenses related to them. These punishments should be announced and enforced
equally. All inconveniences and discomforts these measures cause should be blamed squarely upon the
insurgents. PSYOP products, widely disseminated to the population, can help ensure the measures have the
intended effect and undermine popular support for the insurgency. Control measures fall under the
populace control or resource control categories.
Populace Controls
3-169. Population control measures include
Curfews.
Travel permits and passes.
Movement restrictions.
Restricted areas.
Census or registration of residents.
Block committee.
National or regional identification system or ID cards.
Licensing for jobs such as medical, security, construction, and drivers.
Immigration restrictions
Resource Controls
3-170. Resource control measures include control of select resources to include foodstuffs, medical
supplies, and key equipment through:
Rationing or purchase permits
Registration of firearms.
Registration of automobiles and trucks.
Export and import restrictions.
Techniques
3-171. Enforcement operations must be conducted both day and night. Checkpoints and roadblocks are
set up to check and control the movement of personnel, vehicles, and material, and prevent actions that aid
the insurgency. During counterinsurgency operations, checkpoints and roadblocks assist the government
and counterinsurgent forces in maintaining the initiative against the insurgents by disrupting, interfering
with, and deterring insurgent operations and disrupting the insurgents decision-making cycle. It
is important to conduct checkpoints and roadblocks with interpreters, HN police, or other HN security
forces. Checkpoints and roadblocks used together can channel vehicles and personnel into a checkpoint
or a search.
Roadblock
3-172. A barrier or obstacle (usually covered by fire) used to block or limit the movement of vehicles
along a route.
Checkpoint
3-173. Checkpoints are manned locations used to control movement that may be established from 1 to 72
hours depending on the purpose of the operation.
Inspections
3-174. This includes random cordons and searches, both day and night, of homes, shops and buildings
for arms, propaganda material and insurgents. The use of military working dog teams can be very effective
in intercepting contraband. To decrease population resentment, it is important to ensure intelligence
supports the inspections. An inspection can also be used as a subterfuge for a meeting with key people.
Section VIPHASES
Major counterinsurgency tactical operations are long-term population security operations conducted in territory
generally under Host Nation government control to establish, regain, or maintain control of those areas
and to provide adequate security and control to the populace to allow restoration of essential services
and improvements to the economy. They typically move through three phases. They combine offensive,
defensive, and stability operations to achieve the stable and secure environment needed for effective
governance, essential services, and economic development to flourish. At the operational level, the phases
arethe initial response phase, the transformation phase, and the fostering sustainability phase. At the tactical
level, these three phases may resemble the three parts of a clear-hold-build operation. Understanding this
evolution and recognizing the relative maturity of the AO are important for the proper planning, preparation,
execution, and assessment of COIN operations. It is also important to recall that the insurgent also operates
in three stageslatent and incipient, guerrilla warfare, and war of movement. This knowledge allows
commanders to ensure that their activities are appropriate to the current situation.
to be similar to the clear phase of a clear-hold-build operation. Units may also incorporate strike operations
and PRC operations during this phase. Against a determined insurgency, the initial response may last
months or years.
TRANSFORMATION PHASE
3-178. The transformation phase represents a broad range of post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization,
and capacity-building. The transformation phase may be executed in either crisis or vulnerable states.
Counterinsurgent forces are most active here, working aggressively along all lines of effort (LOEs). The
desire in this stage is to develop and build enduring capability and capacity in the HN government
and security forces. As civil security is assured, focus expands to include the development of legitimate
governance, provision of essential services, and stimulation of economic development. Relationships with
HN counterparts in the government and security forces and with the local populace are developed
and strengthened. These relationships increase the flow of intelligence. This intelligence facilitates
measured offensive operations in conjunction with the HN security forces. The Host Nation increases its
legitimacy through providing security, expanding effective governance, providing essential services,
and achieving incremental success in meeting public expectations.
3-179. At the tactical level, the transformation phase may look a lot like the hold phase of a
clear-hold-build operation. Units may use Strike operations and PRC operations that complement their
holding efforts. Once again, a tenacious insurgency may cause the transformation or hold phase to last
months or even years.
SUMMARY
The foundations of COIN are the guiding principles for any unit conducting counterinsurgency operations.
Once understood and applied they enable commanders to craft a coherent plan that achieves unity
of effort amongst all organizations in the area of operations.
Section IOVERVIEW
The battlefield of the Twenty-First Century has proven to be complex due to increasing urbanization,
globalization, and religious fundamentalism; multiple enemy, friendly, and neutral actors; and ambiguous
guidance and direction. It is through planning that the commander is able to see the desired outcome, lay out
effective ways to achieve it, and communicate his vision, intent, and decisions to his subordinates, focusing on
the results he wants to achieve (FM 5-0). Progress in counterinsurgencies is slow and difficult to measure.
It can continue for weeks, months, even years. With the complexity of counterinsurgency operations,
commanders and staff have relied upon end states, the seven COIN lines of effort, measures of effectiveness
and performance and tight planning horizons to impose order on the chaos and craft functional plans to guide
counterinsurgent efforts to increase the legitimacy of the Host Nation government along multiple lines of effort.
END STATE
4-1. At the tactical level, this is the set of conditions that, when achieved, accomplish the mission.
4-2. A condition is a specific existing circumstance, framed in military terms. that, when achieved,
describes one aspect of the desired end state. Achievement of all of the conditions obtains the end state. For
tactical commanders, the end state is typically a set of required conditions, usually for each LOE, that
defines the achievement of the commanders tactical objective.
4-3. Historically, successful counterinsurgencies commonly focus on the political end state, unified
in their approach, and flexible in addressing the core insurgency issues. They secure the people, enhance
the legitimacy of the Host Nation government and, above all, show patience.
4-4. A military operation must be linked to a political end state, composed of various conditions that
the populace supports.
UNITY OF ACTION
4-5. Close coordination and effective cooperation between the Host Nation (civil, police, and military),
the US counterinsurgency force and all other coalition partners, allows the full strength of each to engage
all levels of the insurgency. Unity of effort is key.
ROOT CAUSES
4-6. Root causes are the grievances of the people. Ultimately, for an insurgency to be successful, it
must provide a solution to the key issues of the people. At the same time, for a counterinsurgency to be
successful, it too must address these key issues.
PATIENCE
4-9. There is no decisive battle in counterinsurgency operations. Often, it takes years to create an
environment where a Host Nation government can and will defend itself and its people.
MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE
4-12. An MOP is criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment
(JP 1-02). MOPs confirm or deny that the task has been correctly performed. An example of a MOP
is How many people registered to vote at the school this week?
MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
4-13. An MOE is criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational
environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective,
or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). An example of a MOE is Did the well project provide clean drinking
water to the village?
PURPOSES
4-14. Measures of effectiveness and of performance help commanders determine when all or part of the
mission has been accomplished. The criteria used depend on the situation. Many times the MOP and MOE
must be determined and evaluated by the HN government or security forces. They often require
readjustment as the situation changes and objectives evolve. If an effect cannot be measured directly, then
indicators of achieving the effect are measured. A measure of effectiveness or a measure of performance
has four characteristics. They are
Measurable
4-15. They require quantitative or qualitative standards that can be used to measure them.
Discrete
4-16. Each criterion measures a distinct aspect of the operation. Excessive numbers of MOEs and MOPs
become unmanageable. At that point, the cost of collection efforts outweighs the value of assessing.
Relevant
4-17. Each MOE and MOP must be relevant to the result or outcome. The key is visualizing the desired
result or outcome and identifying the most accurate and simplest indicator of it.
Responsive
4-18. MOEs and MOPs must detect changes quickly enough for commanders to respond immediately
and effectively.
4-19. Commanders and staffs also develop a standard or baseline as a comparison and identify trends.
From this information and analysis of why a trend is up or down, staffs can identify trouble spots and plan
operations to reverse negative trends. They can also capitalize on positive trends by determining what
is causing the positive increases and apply those tactics, techniques, and procedures more broadly.
4-20. Measures of effectiveness and measures of performance are included in the approved plan
or order and reevaluated continuously throughout preparation and execution. Higher echelon staffs should
ensure that the number of MOEs and MOPs do not overly burden lower echelonsespecially battalion
and below. Well-devised MOEs and MOPs, supported by effective management of available information,
help commanders and staffs understand links between tasks, end state, and lines of effort.
PLANNING HORIZONS
4-21. During operations, a headquarters sends a tactical unit an operations plan or operations order.
Tactical units must then consider the scope of their mission and determine the planning horizons.
A planning horizon is a point in time commanders use to focus the organizations planning efforts to shape
future events. Planning horizons, which in major combat operations are measured in hours and days
for tactical commanders may, in COIN operations, be measured in weeks, months, and years.
4-22. In contrast, tactical commanders, who have responsibility for terrain and a mission covering
multiple objectives that must be achieved systematically, require extended planning horizons. Managing
extended planning horizons have an impact on a tactical unit. The staff processes must be organized
to facilitate multiple outlooks, as an extended outlook does not relieve the immediacy of current operations.
However, this may be challenging for a company commander without a staff.
4-23. FM 5-0 defines three planning horizonslong-, mid-, and short-range plans. These horizons
create a useful construct for operations executed by tactical units in a counterinsurgency. Additionally, the
familiar quarterly training guidance and brief processes in FM 7-0 fit the long-term nature
of counterinsurgency operations.
LONG-RANGE PLANNING
4-24. Long-range planning encompasses the range of time where the situation is too uncertain to plan
for specific operations. Commanders must visualize what conditions they desire to exist, resulting from the
cumulative effect of all their tactical objectives. Visualizing the time required to establish these conditions
places approximate bounds on the extent of future planning. In general, when units are in a rotation
and have a planned transfer of authority, the long-range plan should consider the conditions that the
commander desires to exist at three months after the transfer.
4-25. The long-range plan provides a construct for a commander to describe his vision of the
operational environment and their units role over time using lines of effort. In addition to describing the
units tactical objectives and the conditions they create, the plan provides a description of major events.
Providing a long lead time on major events can be critical to anticipating resources and identifying
milestones, or identifying and completing a series of interrelated tasks well in advance of the event.
Friendly forces as in a transfer of authority, the population as in elections, or the insurgency could drive the
event as it changes in phases, strategies, or organization.
4-26. Management of long-range plans allows the unit to synchronize its efforts with adjacent units
and the higher headquarters. When an objective requires the cumulative effect of hundreds of company,
platoon and squad missions to achieve the desired end state, long-range plans using lines of effort become
the tool to ensure unity of effort across the echelons. Assessment from current operations is analyzed
to determine if the desired effect is being achieved, then the long-range plan adjusts the activities of current
operations to ensure that the units efforts are directed towards the defined end state. Table 4-1 shows
COIN long-range planning cycles.
MID-RANGE PLANNING
4-27. Mid-range plans are derived from the long-range plan. The long-range plan narrows the scope to a
frame of time where objectives or milestones that support objectives can be clearly defined and operations
planned in detail along all lines of effort. The mid-range plans therefore refine and expand upon the
appropriate portion of the long-range plan. Mid-range planning should not exceed the units capability
to reasonably forecast events, assign resources and commit to a particular plan.
4-28. It is the mid-range plan that analyzes the mission in detail and produces the warning, fragmentary,
and operations orders that drive daily actions. These plans represent a commitment of resources and initiate
preparation by subordinate units. Table 4-2 shows various mid-range planning cycles.
SHORT-RANGE PLANNING
4-29. Short-range planning represents the scope of detailed planning associated with a specific mission
or one to four weeks of normal operations. With resources assigned through mid-range planning,
short-range planning, the unit refines and expands the plan to include the tactical arrangement of forces,
execution matrices, patrol schedules, ISR plans and convoys.
4-30. A framework order is a fragmentary order (FRAGO) that identifies and tasks units for missions
for one to four weeks. It has also been called a steady state order. An example is a battalion FRAGO that
identifies the company that will patrol the route each day during the upcoming week. Table 4-3 shows
possible short-range planning cycles for units.
CONSIDERATIONS
4-31. The long, mid and short-range planning horizons help units establish a routine to assess the
success of their plan and revise the plan based on a changing operational environment. COIN is an iterative
process. No unitcompany, battalion, or brigadeunderstands its AO well enough to craft a perfect
plan across all seven LOEs. Like a rheostat, each must be balanced against the others. Success in the
Establish Civil Security and Establish Civil Control lines of effort typically allows units to focus less on
security and more on support to governance and restoration of essential services LOEs. The most effective
C2 mechanisms often give one single, permanent, senior local government official overall responsibility
for the counterinsurgency in their AO. These local officials in turn establish a local board, composed
of representatives from the civil authority, the military, the police, the intelligence services, and the civil
population, who manage all civil or military assets inside their AO. Additionally, tactical design
in counterinsurgency must consider how to
Secure the populations and areas that remain loyal.
Reclaim the populations and areas that support the insurgency.
Eliminate the insurgency, politically, militarily and philosophically.
Develop Host Nation military and police forces that
Defend their own bases and other critical sites.
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE
4-38. Sometimes no HN government exists or the government is unable or unwilling to assume full
responsibility for governance. In those cases, this LOE may involve establishing and maintaining a military
government or a civil administration while creating an HN capability to govern. When well executed, these
actions may eliminate the root causes of the insurgency. Governance activities are among the most
important of all in establishing lasting stability for a region or nation. Stability operations establish
conditions that enable interagency and Host Nation actions to succeed. Military efforts help to build
progress toward achieving effective, legitimate governance by restoring public administration
and re-sorting public services while fostering long-term efforts to establish a functional, effective system
of political governance. Military actions help to shape the environment so interagency and HN actions can
succeed. Typical support to government tasks include
Support transitional administrations.
Support development of local governance.
Support anticorruption initiatives.
Support elections.
Themes
4-44. Tactical units most often implement their information engagement plans through the construct of
themes that address target audiences. Themes may include simple messages that can easily be repeated (the
bumper sticker) and are often referred to as talking points. Successful themes are those that
Keep objectives simple and achievable.
Manage expectations and perceptions of the HN populace. Keep counterinsurgent goals
attainable.
Use previous HN contacts and relationships.
Can be distributed using formal and informal methods by Soldiers at all levels. Formal methods
include posting public notices, briefings to community leaders, and talking to local media.
Informal methods include patrols talking to local citizenry, handing out leaflets, and using
loudspeakers.
Respond to events and insurgent propaganda rapidly, admit mistakes, and deals with the
populace honestly.
Target Audiences
4-45. In COIN, themes must be tailored to resonate with the target audience. The tailoring process
should take into account cultural understanding. In addition, audiences can be separated as far down as
neighborhoods, ethnicity, religion, class, and other factors. The audience may include the US civilian
population, international forums, US soldiers, HN population, and insurgents.
HN Population
4-46. Themes that target the HN populace should focus on rallying them against insurgent activities and
highlight successes of the HN government and HN security forces. Both themes will reinforce legitimacy.
These themes generally build cohesiveness among the population and counter insurgent divisive themes.
Cohesive themes highlight
Commonality of ultimate goals.
Commonality of labor, economic, and material problems.
Ability to separate facts from perceptions and solve important problems.
Ethnic similarities and common origins.
Religion and social similarities.
Traditional or historical evidence of unity.
Failure of traditional solutions accompanied by awareness of a need for new solutions.
Patriotism and nationalism.
Ability to provide information to the government without fear of reprisal.
Insurgent
4-47. Insurgents manage perceptions through propaganda and disinformation. Rarely do they have to
tell the truth. In technologically advanced insurgencies, filming an attack may be as important as the attack
itself. Therefore, themes aimed at insurgents must divide insurgent groups into smaller groups and
separate the insurgents from the population. Also, themes should counter insurgent propaganda. In many
successful information engagement plans, reconciliation and amnesty for certain insurgents have been key
components.
Divisive theme categories.
Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among elements of the insurgents.
Leadership rivalries within the insurgent movement.
Portrait of insurgents as criminals, inept, and counter to the goals of the HN populace.
Danger of betrayal from among the insurgents.
Harsh living conditions of insurgents.
Selfish motivation of opportunists supporting the insurgents.
Separate foreign fighters from domestic groups using patriotism and nationalism, when
appropriate.
Separate public from the perception that insurgents are noble.
Public outcry.
Reconciliation or amnesty.
Countering insurgent propaganda
Proactive and designed to neutralize the psychological impact of future attacks.
Acknowledge the possibility, even likelihood, of future attacks.
Criminal attacks against HN population.
Foreign ties and leadership.
Highlight Insurgent ineptitude.
Public Affairs
4-48. This is a commanders responsibility. Its purpose is to proactively inform and educate through
public information, command information, and direct community engagement. Public affairs have a
statutory responsibility to factually and accurately inform various publics without intent to propagandize
or manipulate public opinion. Public affairs facilitates a commanders obligation to support informed US
citizenry, US Government decision makers, and as tactical requirements may dictate non-US audiences.
Public affairs and other information engagement tasks must be synchronized to ensure consistency,
command credibility, and operations security as part of the planning process. (For more information, see
JP 3-61, AR 360-1, FM 46-1 and FM 3-61.1.)
Media
4-49. In a COIN environment, the most difficult portion of information engagementwhen necessary
involves dealing with the media. Media contacts normally should be handled by the appropriate public
affairs officer (PAO). However, this is not always possible, and silence is not always the best solution.
Refusal to speak with accredited members of the media may create strong negative impressions with
strategic implications.
Best Practices
Stress the human aspects of a story, including the impact of opposing operations on people,
with which readers, viewers, or listeners can identify.
Point out the needs of the unfortunate, and the fact that both Soldiers and HN counterparts are
working to address those needs.
If you do not know the answer, try to get it and then either inform the reporter, or refer the
reporter to another source. This may establish your team as a helpful source and develop a
relationship that can help ensure future balanced coverage.
Resist the temptation to attack other groups or organizations, and avoid committing information
fratricide.
If questioned about another agencys activities, refer to that agency for comment. Never speak
for other organizations.
Keep trusted reporters and editors who cover the AO about significant activities there.
Answer media inquiries promptly, accurately, and courteously.
Learn reporters deadlines and use them to the friendly forces advantage.
Encourage media to see what HN and US Soldiers are doing.
Avoid reacting emotionally to skepticism or hostility.
Discuss issues calmly.
Use facts to back up statements.
Stay focused on the mission.
Follow the policies of higher HQ and PAO for media interviews.
Remain friendly, yet professional.
Use reporters' names.
Use clear, understandable language.
Be prepared. Anticipate questions and think about various responses.
Get to know the interviewers.
Research the medias organizations and views.
Find out how the reporter previously conducted interviews.
Emphasize the interests of the local nationals or other beneficiaries of the mission.
Avoid speculation.
State only facts that can be verified.
Quote statistics with care, as data is easily repurposed.
Avoid repeating questions, especially those with incorrect or inflammatory language, as this
could easily be misquoted or taken out of context.
Refuse off-the-record discussionsthere is no such thing!
Avoid saying No comment. which can make you sound evasive.
Stay objective. Save personal opinions and beliefs for a more appropriate time and place.
Psychological Operations
4-50. These operations convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence
their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce
foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originators objectives (JP 1-02). Psychological operations
can be directed at the civilian populace as a whole, specific groups, or individuals outside the United States
and its territories. Psychological operations can influence and modify the behavior of foreign target
audiences in support of US objectives. In a COIN operation, PSYOP seeks to increase popular support for
the Host Nation government. Typically, PSYOP directs its messages at the populace. However,
psychological operations may focus on convincing enemy fighters to surrender rather than risk destruction.
Therefore, these capabilities may be integrated into counterinsurgency targeting. Psychological operations
units may also be task-organized with maneuver forces.
Population
4-51. The PSYOP message to the population in COIN has three key facets:
Obtain buy-in by COIN force for actions that affect the populace, such as
Control measures.
Census.
Win over passive or neutral people by showing HN legitimacy and commitment.
Encourage locals to provide information about the insurgency to US or HN security forces.
Insurgents
4-52. The PSYOP message to the insurgents has three key facets:
Divide insurgent leaders and guerrillas by emphasizing differences
In ideology within the insurgency.
In the degree of sacrifice required by different groups.
Divide insurgents and mass base by emphasizing
Failures of the insurgency.
Successes of the government.
Create a means for insurgents to abandon the movement and return to the society.
Leader and Soldier Engagement
4-53. The actions of leaders and Soldiers are the most powerful components of information
engagement. Visible actions coordinated with carefully chosen, truthful words influence audiences more
than either does alone. Local and regional audiences as well as adversaries compare the friendly forces
message with its actions. Face-to-face interaction by leaders and Soldiers strongly influences the
perceptions of the local populace. Meetings conducted by leaders with key communicators, civilian
leaders, or others whose perceptions, decisions, and actions will affect mission accomplishment can be
critical to mission success. These meetings provide the most convincing venue for conveying positive
information, assuaging fears, and refuting rumors, lies, and misinformation.
Techniques
4-54. At the tactical level, there are three primary means a unit can use to disseminate its message: word
of mouth, announcements, and town hall meetings.
Word of Mouth
4-55. This is the most basic form of sending and receiving information, and ultimately the form that
every other method will become. Word of mouth is the quickest, most common, most inaccurate and most
uncontrollable means of disseminating information; but it may be the best way to send a message. Rumors,
spins, casual conversations and dinner-table discussionswhatever form they take, word of mouth travels
like wild fire. It spreads out of control and the story grows and changes with each conversation. Everything
a unit does is observed and discussed by the locals and spun by the enemy. Units should be prepared
to counter false information. Patrols must interact with the populace. They must listen for rumors
and correct the ones they hear, but do not waste time arguing about them. Units must spread a positive
image and reinforce the good things the government is doing in the area to help the populace.
Announcements
4-56. Both written and verbal announcements are quick and controlled means of sending messages.
Flyers, loud speakers and public speaking are useful ways of informing the populace of progress, incentive
programs, civil projects and operations.
MOPs.
Supporting objectives.
Targets.
Frame the time and resources for near-term planning
Events
Ability to predict or analyze
Combat power
Operating tempo
Phasing or timing.
Pay attention to balanced development across all lines of effort.
Prioritize supporting objectives and targets to resources.
Develop order with tasks and ISR plan.
Make current operations plans.
Execute near-term missions.
Assess current operations, new intelligence or new missions.
Use this assessment to drive the process through another cycle.
4-59. Commanders modify the process as needed to fit the situation. While typical modification of the
MDMP is driven by the need to save time, the counterinsurgent unit has two key reasons to modify
the process:
The end product of long-range planning is not an operations order that is prepared
for execution in the traditional sense. The long-range plan provides a focus for short-range
planning and ensures that the operations currently being conducted are having the desired effect
on the end state.
Each planning session within a counterinsurgency is interrelated to the planning that preceded
it. Units will conduct a thorough MDMP initially and then build continuously on those products
and their situational understanding as they progress through successive planning cycles. Units
throughout their rotation continue to learn and adapt." Through assessment, the commander
will focus his staff on areas that require further detailed analysis and limit effort on areas where
sufficient analysis has already been conducted.
4-60. This analysis is captured in the staffs running estimate. A running estimate is a staff sections
continuous assessment of current and future operations to determine if the current operation is proceeding
according to the commanders intent and if future operations are supportable. This, along with the
commanders assessment and those of subordinate commanders, build a growing understanding of the
units operations area and allows the unit to modify the MDMP, not out of necessity of time but through
the ability to rapidly and accurately define problems and solutions.
4-61. Insurgencies are inherently complex and dynamic; they cannot be fully understood through a
single cycle of the MDMP. It is the cumulative effect of analysis and planning that builds and refines
knowledge of a units area of operations, captured in the running estimate over the course of many
successive planning cycles that allows the successful defeat of the insurgency.
4-62. By developing a comprehensive and iterative plan the counterinsurgent force follows the
conventional MDMP steps. However, fighting an insurgency, or more precisely conducting
counterinsurgency operations, is not a conventional military operation. As such, the operational
environment of counterinsurgency dictates some unique considerations to the conventional MDMP steps.
These considerations apply primarily to four MDMP stepsreceive the mission, mission analysis, COA
development and COA analysis. Figure 4-2 highlights considerations in a COIN MDMP.
Mission received from Step 1: Receipt of Commander's initial Mission developed internally
higher or developed mission guidance *
internally * WARNORD
WARNORD
Higher HQ's order/plan Step 2: Mission analysis Restated mission * Use PMESII-PT to analyze
Higher HQ's IPB Initial commander's intent the AO
Running estimates and planning guidance * Use the mission variables
Initial CCIR * and civil considerations to
develop better understanding
Updated running estimates
of the AO
Initial IPB products
Account for HN security
Initial ISR plan forces, multinational,
Preliminary movement paramilitary, and all US
forces and agencies
Account for multiple enemy,
multinational, and
paramilitary forces
WARNORD
Restated mission * Step 3: COA Updated running estimates Use components and
Initial commander's intent, Development and products manifestations of the
planning guidance, and COA statements and insurgency in IPB
CCIR * sketches Develop COAs for HN
Updated running Refined commander's intent security forces
estimates and planning guidance *
Initial PPB products
Refined commander's Step 4: COA Analysis War-game results War-game with four groups:
intent and planning (Wargame) Decision support templates Enemy/population
guidance Task organization Host Nation/US COIN forces
Enemy COAs
Mission to subordinate units Modeling may be an
COA statements and Recommended CCIR appropriate wargaming tool
sketches
WARNORD
Determine Constraints
4-70. The staff reviews the ROE.
Restate Mission
4-76. Although it is challenging to do for a COIN environment, the staff must use tactical mission
task(s) as the verb(s) in the mission statement.
Generate Options
4-85. The staff ensures that they cover all options, including additional LOEs and HN actions.
Assign Headquarters
4-88. The staff assigns headquarters, including HN security, joint and coalition forces.
wargaming, modeling is not a one-time event. Modeling sessions should be rerun as operations, events
and the operational environment changes.
4-94. Steps one through four remain unchanged in this technique. Step five, determining evaluation
criteria, can be complicated. This is where the planners develop the operations measures of effectiveness
and measures of performance. These measures are derived from the commanders end state and the
conditions leading to the end state. These measures show when the unit is successful and achieves the
commanders end state. Additionally, the measures should also tell commanders when they are gaining the
ability to influence the system.
4-95. The number of insurgent attacks can be a misleading indicator. Measures of effectiveness are
more accurate when there are multiple supporting measures that look at similar issues with the intent
of seeing the whole. In a counterinsurgency, the three major areas to measure are the strength of the
government, the support of the people, and the strength of the insurgency. By measuring these three areas
through a variety of quantifiable measurements, such as the ability to complete an essential service, the
number of tips reported to the police, and the volume and type of insurgent propaganda, the commander
should have a good feel for success and workable measures of effectiveness.
4-96. For step seven, select a method to record and display the results; the recording method must
capture the depth of the lessons that will be gained from the modeling and there must be a method to refine
certain critical products. There are four areas where the planners should focus on capturing new
information.
1. The planners must capture any greater depth of understanding for each of the variables.
2. They must record any new understanding of the variables and how they relate.
3. They must update the rules of behavior for each variable.
4. They must update the collection matrix.
4-97. An expanded synchronization matrix (Figure 4-4) captures the actions of US forces, HN forces
and the insurgents using the warfighting functions (WFFs). It also shows the population groups across the
political, economic, and social categories. Using a synch matrix to show these factors can reveal the
complexity of the operational environment over time. Based on their deeper understanding of the system,
new critical information requirements will arise that must be addressed in the collection matrix.
US COIN Forces
Movement and Maneuver
Fires
Intelligence
Sustainment
C2
Protection
HN COIN Forces
Movement and Maneuver
Fires
Intelligence
Sustainment
C2
Protection
Population
Political
Military
Economic
Social
Insurgent
Movement and Maneuver
Fires
Intelligence
Sustainment
C2
Protection
sites and key social infrastructure sites. The more detailed the board, the more accurate and meaningful the
modeling will be.
4-101. As operations unfold and more intelligence is gathered, the planners should update the rules
of behavior and capabilities for each group. As the knowledge of the individual groups and the system as a
whole is improved, the planners will be able to identify how to more effectively influence the system. This
planning tool does not stop when the operation order is issued. Modeling is an effective way
of understanding the counterinsurgency system and ongoing operations.
Step 5: COA Comparison
4-102. Staffs analyze and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA, as well as identifying
the one with the highest probability of success against the most likely enemy COA. Additional COIN
evaluation considerations may include
Effect on or role of the HN government.
Effect on or role of the HN security forces.
Effect on groups of the population.
Impact on information engagement.
Step 6: COA Approval
4-103. Either after participating in the COA comparison process or upon receipt of a COA recommended
decision, the commander makes a COA decision by approving a COA to execute.
Step 7: Orders Production
4-104. Units in COIN operations issue a warning order or WARNORD, and, after the commander selects
a COA, issue a written operation order. However, additional time for orders production may be needed if
the order must be translated into another language. To ensure nothing is lost in the translation, and ensure
success in multinational operations, the staff must keep orders and rehearsals simple.
TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES
4-105. Troop-leading procedures (TLPs) give small-unit leaders a dynamic framework for analyzing,
planning, and preparing for an operation.
4-106. TLPs in a COIN environment differ little from those described in FM 5-0. The next sections will
provide a brief description of the eight steps along with some additional considerations for COIN
operations. Figure 4-5 shows addition COIN considerations during TLPs.
Mission Analysis
4-112. Leaders use the METT-TC format to conduct mission analysis as they expand on the hasty
analysis they conducted in step one. After mission analysis is complete, an updated WARNORD,
WARNORD 2 is issued. In a COIN environment, special consideration must be given to
Mission
4-113. Units create their restated mission statement after analyzing higher headquarters mission
or analyzing their particular problem. It may take multiple times of conducting mission analysis to fully
grasp the problem.
Enemy
4-114. Units use the tools from Chapter 2 (elements of an insurgency, dynamics of an insurgency, the six
insurgent strategies, insurgent tactics and the strengths and vulnerabilities of insurgents) to help further
identify the group or groups of insurgents they may encounter. Then, define composition, disposition,
recent activities, most probable COA, and most dangerous COA.
Time
4-117. Use the acronym HOPE-P (higher, operational, planning, enemy, and populace) to identify the
various timelines.
Civil Considerations
4-118. Leaders must use the ASCOPE method to analyze areas controlled by various demographic
groups to obtain a better understanding of the AO.
COA Development
4-119. Leaders use COA development to determine one or more ways to accomplish the mission. In a
time-constrained environment, leaders may only be able to craft one COA. For long, mid, and short-range
plans, companies will need to develop tasks along all lines of effort. The six steps of COA development
in COIN are unchanged, but special consideration should be given to
Generate Options
4-121. Options should always consider employment of HN security forces and the HN government.
Array Forces
4-122. Array all enemy forces, such as different insurgent groups, as well as all friendly forces to include
Host Nation security forces. Small units may also have to develop plans to employ special teams such
as military working dog teams, tactical site exploitation teams, UASs or attack, reconnaissance, and assault
aviation.
Assign Responsibilities
4-124. Assign responsibilities for each task including those for HN security forces.
ROLE IN COIN
4-134. The expanded use of targeting in COIN gives the planner two key benefits: prioritization
and synchronization. Because the counterinsurgent often faces multiple objectives, many without clear
positional references, friendly courses of action may not be easily represented in terms of various forms
of maneuver. Each may instead portray a series of targets that the unit must influence over a specified time.
4-135. The targeting process focuses operations and the use of limited assets and time. Commanders
and staffs use the targeting process to achieve effects that support the objectives and missions during
counterinsurgency operations. It is important to understand that targeting is done for all operations, not just
attacks against insurgent. The targeting process can support PSYOP, civil-military operations, and even
meetings between commanders and Host Nation leaders, based on the commanders desires.
4-136. The synchronization of RSTA/ISR assets with available combat power is the greatest contribution
targeting brings to the counterinsurgent. The indirect nature of irregular warfare often creates limited
opportunities to strike or influence targets. Integrating the intelligence process and the operations process
through targeting can be used to ensure that maneuver units strike the right targets at the right time or are
prepared to strike targets of opportunity.
4-137. Effective targeting requires the creation of a targeting board or working group, although in many
cases, the targeting staff is similar to the planning staff. It is typically chaired by the XO or fire support
coordinator, and includes representatives from across the staff including S-2, S-3, S-5, S-7, S-9, air liaison
officer, and staff judge advocate. The goal is to prioritize targets and determine the means of engaging
them that best supports the commanders intent and operation plan. The focus of the targeting cell, in a
counterinsurgency environment, is to target people, both the insurgents and the population.
4-138. Effective targeting identifies the targeting options, both lethal and nonlethal, to achieve effects
that support the commanders objectives. Lethal assets are normally employed against targets with
operations to capture or kill. Nonlethal assets are normally employed against targets that are best engaged
with PSYOP, negotiation, political programs, economic programs, and social programs. Figure 4-6 shows
examples of potential targets.
DECIDE
4-142. This function focuses and sets priorities for intelligence collection and both lethal and nonlethal
plans. Intelligence and operations personnel, with the commander and other staff members, decide when a
target is developed well enough to engage. Continuous staff integration and regular meetings of the
intelligence cell and targeting board enable this function. Specifically, intelligence analysts need to identify
individuals and groups to engage as potential counterinsurgency supporters, targets to isolate from the
population, and targets to eliminate. During the decide activity, the targeting board produces a prioritized
list of targets and a recommended course of action associated with each. Executing targeting decisions may
require the operations section to issue fragmentary orders. Each of these orders is a task that should be
nested within the higher headquarters plan and the commanders intent. Targeting decisions may require
changing the intelligence synchronization plan. The targeting working group participates in COA analysis
and collaboratively develops the following decide function products:
Targeting FRAGO
4-148. The targeting FRAGO tasks units to execute the lethal and nonlethal plans.
DETECT
4-149. The detect function involves locating HPTs accurately enough to engage them. Targets are
detected through the maximum use of all available assets. The S-2 must focus the intelligence acquisition
efforts on the designated HPTs and PIR. Situation development information, through detection
and tracking, will be accumulated as collection systems satisfy PIR and information requirements.
Tracking is an essential element of the detect function of the targeting process. Tracking priorities are
based on the commanders concept of the operation and targeting priorities. Tracking is executed through
the collection plan, since many critical targets move frequently.
4-150. Detection at the tactical level is achieved through a variety of means such as a HUMINT source,
an anonymous tip, UAS, a combat patrol, SIGINT, DOMEX, rotary wing aircraft, USAF aircraft
or military working dog teams. The best means of detecting a target during an insurgency is HUMINT,
though. As such, the detect activity requires a detailed understanding of social networks, insurgent
networks, insurgent actions, and the communitys attitude toward the counterinsurgent forces.
4-151. For a target that must be engaged by nonlethal means, the detect function may require patrols
to conduct reconnaissance of a leaders home to determine if they are there, an assessment of a potential
project, or attendance at a greeting to meet with a leader.
DELIVER
4-156. The deliver function of targeting begins in earnest with execution. The targeting process provides
speed and efficiency in the delivery of lethal or nonlethal fires on targets in accordance with the Attack
Guidance Matrix or the targeting FRAGO. Within the deliver function, the system or combination
of systems selected during the decide phase is employed.
4-157. For a target that requires lethal means, units may eliminate the target using a joint direct attack
munition (JDAM) from a USAF aircraft, an Excalibur round, a Joint Tactical Attack Cruise Missile System
(JTACMS), or a sniper. However, many times it is more important to capture the target, so commanders
will choose to execute a raid or a cordon and search. For a target that requires nonlethal means, a
commander may choose to use an information engagement to convince a local leader, or to conduct a
project to garner the populations support through money or employment.
4-158. Target exploitation in the counterinsurgency environment is similar to that in law enforcement.
An exploitation plan not only facilitates gathering evidence for future court cases, but also may lead
to follow-on targets after successful exploitation. (See Chapter 6 for details on tactical site exploitation.)
ASSESS
4-159. At the tactical level, commanders use assessment to get a series of timely and accurate snapshots
of their effect on the insurgent and the population. It provides commanders with an estimate of the
insurgents combat effectiveness, capabilities, and intentions, as well as an accurate understanding of the
people. This helps commanders determine when, or if, their targeting efforts have been accomplished. The
assess phase relies heavily upon MOEs and MOPs.
4-160. Producing the assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility, but requires coordination
with operations, civil affairs, public affairs, information operations, and PSYOP to be effective. As part
of the targeting process, assessment helps to determine if another engagement of the target is necessary.
SUMMARY
Planning in COIN uses tactical design, either MDMP or TLP, and targeting to ensure units achieve their
end state over time. Throughout the COIN planning process, tactical units employ the seven COIN lines
of effort to ensure that they achieve unity of effort, prioritization in accomplishing tasks, control of the
population, and an increase in the Host Nation governments legitimacy.
Section IOVERVIEW
In COIN, the characteristics of the offense apply to all offensive operations. Tactical units conduct all four
types of offensive operations in the COIN environmentMovement to Contact, Attack, Exploitation,
and Pursuit. Within the four types of offensive operations, units conducting COIN focus on specific tactics
and techniques which include search and attacks, raids, cordon and searches, ambushes, sniper employment,
site exploitation (SE), and COIN patrols. Additionally, US forces should conduct combined offensive
operations with HN security forces at every opportunity in order to reinforce HN legitimacy, support HN
security forces, and support the HN rule of law.
PURPOSE IN COIN
5-1. Units conduct offensive operations to
Secure the populace continuously.
Isolate the insurgency from populace.
Prevent crime.
Destroy, disrupt, interdict, deny or neutralize elements of the insurgency.
Secure national and regional borders.
Integrate with and support HN security forces.
SURPRISE
5-3. Units achieve surprise by striking the enemy at a time, place, or manner in which he
is unprepared. Total surprise is rarely attainable or essential in conventional operations but is often
essential during COIN operations.
CONCENTRATION
5-4. This is the massing of combat power, particularly its effects, at the decisive point to achieve the
units purpose. During COIN, insurgents avoid situations in which US/HN security forces could potentially
mass combat power unless the potential collateral effects of use of that combat power will distance the
population from the US/HN government. This outweighs combat losses. US/HN security forces always
seek to mass nonlethal and lethal combat power, though not always visibly.
TEMPO
5-5. This is the rate of military action relative to the insurgency. Tempo is not the same as speed.
Successful COIN units control or alter tempo to maintain the initiative. Such action promotes surprise,
enters the enemys decision cycle, increases the protection of the attacking force, and decreases the
insurgents ability to defend or plan effectively.
AUDACITY
5-6. This is a simple plan of action, boldly executed. Audacity is critical to successful COIN offensive
operations and is completely reliant on a thorough understanding of the operational environment.
Creativity and mental agility are characteristics of an audacious counterinsurgent.
FLEXIBILITY
5-7. This is the ability of a military unit to adapt to unplanned or unexpected conditions of the
operational environment to achieve its tactical purpose and support the LOE.
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
5-9. This develops the situation and establishes or regains contact with the enemy (insurgent) forces
(FM 3-0). It also creates favorable conditions for subsequent tactical actions and stability operation. At a
tactical level, every movement can be treated as a movement to contact, because of the lack of information
concerning insurgent location, strength, capabilities, and intentions. Specific types of movements to contact
include search and attack and cordon and search operations.
ATTACK
5-10. This destroys or defeats enemy (insurgent) forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both (FM 3-0).
Attacks require mobility, countermobility, and survivability supported by direct and indirect fires. Attacks
may be hasty or deliberate, depending on the time available for planning and preparation. Commanders
execute hasty attacks when the situation calls for immediate action with available forces and minimal
preparation. They conduct deliberate attacks when they have more time to plan and prepare.
5-11. Tactical units normally conduct synchronized and special purpose attacks during COIN
operations. Special purpose attacks are ambushes, spoiling attacks, counterattacks, raids, feints,
and demonstrations. This chapter focuses on the tactics of raids, ambushes, and sniper employment.
EXPLOITATION
5-12. This rapidly follows a successful attack and disorganizes the enemy in depth (FM 3-0). Tactical
commanders exploit successful offensive operations. In COIN, failure to exploit may allow the insurgent
to egress, reposition, or disappear into the population. An example of a tactical unit conducting an
exploitation in COIN would be sending a unit on a raid based on information and intelligence gathered on
a cordon and search that occurred earlier in the day. Effective search procedures, tactical site exploitation,
tactical questioning, and use of ISR assets are key to units being able to effectively conduct an exploitation.
PURSUIT
5-13. This is conducted to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape with the aim
of destroying it (FM 3-0). Pursuit operations begin when an insurgent forces attempts to conduct retrograde
operations. Unlike conventional operations, where the enemys transition to retrograde operations leaves
him vulnerable to loss of internal cohesion and complete destruction, the insurgents transition
to retrograde operations may make it more difficult for tactical units to engage, capture, or kill him.
Successful pursuit of the insurgent relies on maintaining contact through surveillance assets, patrols,
and HN security forces.
5-14. Tactical leaders must recognize the potential of the insurgent to conduct a baited ambush during
retrograde operations. Critical to mitigating risk to friendly forces during a pursuit is maintaining one
of the eight forms of contact (direct, indirect, nonhostile/civilian, obstacle, CBRN, aerial, visual, and
electronic) and positioning of adjacent units such as aviation, HN security forces, surveillance assets, other
ground forces, and quick reaction forces (QRF).
MISSION
Offensive operations should be based on the best intelligence available, while inflicting the
minimal damage to the population, infrastructure, and local economy.
To further gather intelligence, units must be prepared to conduct SE.
Leaders should consider having a consequence management and a Perception Management
plan, in case the offensive actions go poorly.
ENEMY
Leaders must pay careful attention to insurgent escape routes, as most insurgents will seek
to flee from most. Other enemy considerations include
The insurgent resistance in the direction of attack into the target area.
Insurgent resistance in the objective area.
Insurgent resistance at the target.
Insurgent resistance departing the objective.
TIME AVAILABLE
Leaders allocate sufficient time to conduct the operation; in COIN, this should include time
to conduct SE and tactical questioning.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
The level of inconvenience to the local populace should discourage insurgents and insurgent
sympathizers from remaining in the locale and encourage the local population to provide
information on the insurgents. The level of inconvenience should not be so great as to turn the
local population towards active or passive support of the insurgency.
Actions on the objective must include how to deal with nonhostile persons, bystanders, family
members, and detainees.
Mission
5-21. Leaders determine whether the search and attack is enemy or terrain-oriented. If enemy-oriented,
the search and attack should attack the enemy while inflicting minimal damage to the population,
infrastructure, and local economy. If terrain-oriented, the search and attack must be prepared to locate base
camps, caches, safe houses, or subterranean structures.
Time Available
5-22. The size of the area, especially the interior layout of urban buildings, impacts force size
and search time.
PHASES
5-23. A search and attack has three basic phases: organize, plan, and execute.
Organize
5-24. The commander task-organizes his unit into reconnaissance, fixing, and finishing forces, each
with a specific purpose and task. The size of the reconnaissance force is based on the available intelligence
about the size of insurgent forces in the AO. The less known about the situation, the larger the
reconnaissance force. The reconnaissance force typically consists of scout, infantry, aviation,
and electronic warfare assets. The fixing force must have enough combat power to isolate insurgents once
the reconnaissance force finds them. The finishing force must have enough combat power to defeat
insurgents. The commander can direct each subordinate unit to retain a finishing force, or he can retain the
finishing force at his echelon. The commander may rotate his subordinate elements through the
reconnaissance, fixing, and finishing roles. However, rotating roles may require a change in task
organization and additional time for training and rehearsal.
Reconnaissance Force
5-25. The reconnaissance force finds the enemy force using all means available. It can serve as an
element of the fixing force or follow and assume the role of the attack force if sufficiently resourced. If the
reconnaissance element makes contact without being detected by the insurgent, the commander has the
initiative. In COIN, HN security forces are often the best suited to conduct the reconnaissance, if they have
the training, equipment, and capability.
Fixing Force
5-26. Although sometimes included in the reconnaissance force in COIN, the fixing force develops the
situation, and then executes one of two options based on the commander's guidance and the mission
variables. The first option is to block identified routes that the insurgent can use to escape or use
for reinforcements. The second option is to conduct an attack to fix the insurgent in his current positions
until the finishing force arrives. The fixing force attacks if that action meets the commander's intent and it
can generate sufficient combat power against the insurgents. Depending on the insurgent's mobility and the
likelihood of the reconnaissance force being compromised, the commander may need to position his fixing
force before his reconnaissance force enters the AO.
Finishing Force
5-27. The finishing force must possess and maintain sufficient combat power to defeat the insurgent
templated. The finishing force may move behind the reconnaissance and fixing force or it may locate
where it is best prepared to rapidly maneuver on the insurgents location, by foot, vehicle, or air. The
finishing force must be responsive enough to engage the insurgent before he can break contact with the
reconnaissance force. The finishing force destroys or captures the insurgent by conducting hasty
or deliberate attacks, or employing indirect fire, attack reconnaissance aviation, or close air support
to destroy the insurgent. The commander may direct the finishing force to establish an area ambush and use
his reconnaissance and fixing forces to drive the insurgent into the ambushes.
Plan
5-28. The commander establishes control measures that allow for maximum decentralized actions
and small-unit initiative. Control measures facilitate the rapid consolidation and concentration of combat
power before an attack. The minimum control measures for a search and attack are an AO, objectives,
checkpoints, phase lines, limits of advance, and contact points. The use of target reference points (TRPs)
facilitates responsive fire support once a reconnaissance force makes contact with the enemy. The
commander uses objectives and checkpoints to guide the movement of subordinate elements. The
commander uses other control measures as needed such as phase lines, restrictive fire lines,
and marking systems.
Zones
5-29. The commander next determines how the area of operations will be broken down. Two
options are
Multiple
5-30. Assigning multiple small zones that keep subordinate elements concentrated and allow controlled,
phased movement throughout the overall area. This facilitates overall control and allows subordinates
to rapidly mass their combat power.
Single
5-31. Concentrate the main effort in one zone and use fire teams or squad patrols to reconnoiter the next
zone. Once the main effort has completed a thorough reconnaissance of the initial zone, it then moves into
the zone that the small units have reconnoitered, as they then move to their next zone. Small patrols
provide the initial reconnaissance information, which commanders evaluate and then focus additional
reconnaissance efforts.
Orientation
5-32. The commander determines how the search and attack will be conducted within the designated
zones. The zones may be searched selectively or systematically. The commander must visualize, describe,
and direct how subordinates will conduct the reconnaissance and how the attacking force will maneuver
against the enemy. Two methods include
Decentralized Attack
5-33. Each subordinate element is tasked to find, fix, finish, and exploit all enemy forces in their area
within their capabilities. If more combat power is required, then the BCT will employ additional assets, the
reserve, or adjacent units.
Centralized Attack
5-34. The commander retains control of the attack force while each subordinate element is tasked
to find and fix the enemy in their AO. This method works well when insurgents use base camps.
Execute
5-35. The four typical steps in search and attack operations are enter the AO, search the AO, locate the
enemy, and conduct the attack.
Enter the AO
5-36. Commanders determine how combined forces enter, conduct movement, and establish objective
rally points (ORPs) and bases (patrol bases, combat outposts), or (joint security stations) within the AO by
considering the eight forms of contact possible with the insurgent or the population. This technique allows
commanders and subordinate leaders to identify their units potential contact with the enemy
and population throughout all phases of the search and attack. Leaders synchronize the actions of adjacent
units and provide specific tasks to ensure subordinates understand actions on contact with both enemy
and civilians within the ROE. Units may enter the area or zone by infiltrating as an entire unit and splitting
or by infiltrating as smaller subordinate units via ground, air, or water (Figures 5-1 and 5-2).
Search the AO
5-37. Reconnaissance elements search areas to locate the enemy without detection. This allows more
time for leaders to plan and coordinate an attack. Generally, small units are used, since they move quickly
and with more stealth among the population regardless of the AO. Once an element of the insurgency
is discovered, the commanders concept, intent, and the situation on the ground dictates whether the
reconnaissance element follows the insurgent or fixes the insurgent until the attack force is in position.
Specific tasks may include route, area, and zone reconnaissance or other surveillance tasks.
Locate Enemy
5-38. Reconnaissance units must locate insurgent forces, tracks, or other indicators of direction
or location. In rural and some border operations, well-trained trackers can identify and follow insurgent
tracks that are hours or even days old. Units tracking the insurgent must be prepared to react to insurgent
contact and avoid likely ambush situations. Leaders must ensure support for the reconnaissance force if it
is compromised. In urban areas, tracking the insurgent is more difficult due to the nature of the terrain
and the insurgents use of the population. Leaders rely on HUMINT, a thorough knowledge of their AO,
UAS, attack reconnaissance aviation, and sound communication and coordination with adjacent units
to find the elusive insurgent.
React to Contact
5-42. If a unit makes contact, it takes immediate action to fix or destroy the insurgent. The speed
and violence of a hasty attack may compensate for the lack of a reconnaissance or combat power.
However, this is rarely true against a prepared insurgent defense or during periods of limited visibility.
Leaders should not assume the discovered insurgent force is alone; there may be mutually supporting
positions or units.
METHODS
5-46. The two basic methods of executing a cordon and search arecordon and knock and cordon
and enter. They differ in level of aggression. Based on the enemy SITEMP and identified operational risk,
actual cordon and search operations vary between these two levels.
5-47. Key factors to consider in selecting the method to use include the enemy threat, the local populace
support, the level of intelligence available, and the capabilities of the HN security forces. In both methods,
the cordon is still established with as much speed or surprise as possible to isolate the objective. Both
methods may require some integrated HN security forces or civil authorities to obtain the agreement by the
occupants of the targeted search area. Figure 5-3 compares the characteristics of permissive and
nonpermissive cordon and search operations.
5-49. A second version of the cordon and knock is cordon and ask, which means occupants or the local
Host Nation authorities are asked for permission to search a particular location. If permission is denied, no
entry occurs. However, the cordon and knock and the cordon and ask require some degree of integration
with HN security force or HN authorities to obtain the agreement by the occupants of the target to the
subsequent search. At a minimum, a sufficient number of translators, preferably one with each element,
is required.
CONSIDERATIONS
5-52. If intelligence indicates enemy presence, and the local populace is either neutral or supportive
of the insurgency, then the principles of speed and surprise are the keys to a successful cordon and search.
Specific considerations using elements of the mission variables are
Mission
5-53. Leaders determine the focus and method of the cordon and search based on the anticipated threat
and the level of violence in the area of operations.
Enemy
5-54. Cordon elements cannot effectively block pedestrian egress or ingress. Therefore, commanders
should consider how to best physically stop pedestrian traffic. Lethal fire is not a universal means
of enforcing the nature of a cordon.
police, with the military in support, best control a search involving smaller forces. Regardless of the
controlling agency, HN police are the best choice for performing the actual search. However, they must be
available in adequate numbers and be trained in search operations.
Time Available
5-56. As time available to plan and prepare for a cordon and search mission is generally limited, it
is often necessary to conduct planning while reconnaissance and intelligence collection are ongoing. The
size of the area, especially the interior layout of urban buildings, impacts force size and search time.
Leaders should plan on allowing time for follow-on missions based on exploitable information.
Civil Considerations
5-57. Cordon and search operations are a great opportunity for all Soldiers to conduct information
engagements with the population. Each Soldier should know and understand the information engagement
task and purpose.
PHASES
5-58. The phases of a cordon and search are the planning phase, reconnaissance phase, movement to the
objective phase, isolate the objective phase, search phase, and the withdrawal phase.
Plan
5-59. Establishing the cordon requires detailed planning, effective coordination, and meticulous
integration and synchronization of available assets to achieve the desired effects. This requires the
commander to consider both lethal and nonlethal effects. Each subordinate cordon position such as a traffic
control point or blocking position must have a designated leader and a clearly understood task and purpose.
5-60. A cordon and search operation can usually support the conduct engagement LOE. Commanders
must develop, integrate, and nest the information message in accordance with the purpose of the search.
Often the best message in COIN is ones actions or that of the entire unit.
5-61. Search of an urban area varies from a few, easily isolated buildings to a large well-developed
urban city. Leaders should divide the urban area to be searched into zones. Buildings should be numbered
and assigned specific search parties for coordination and clarity
Enablers
5-62. Assets employed during the cordon and search may include tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs), tactical
HUMINT teams (THTs), law enforcement professionals (LEPs), special advisors, attack, reconnaissance,
and assault aviation, CAS, SIGINT enablers, MASINT enablers, military working dog teams, (MWDs)
biometrics collection efforts, female searchers, and civil affairs teams (CATs, Chapter 3).
5-63. A TPT is an outstanding combat multiplier. Messages broadcast in the local language during
cordon and search/knock operations facilitates situational awareness and understanding for the local
inhabitants. These TPTs, using vehicle-mounted or man-pack loudspeaker systems, can help inform
and control the population. In addition, the TPT conducts face-to-face communication along with
disseminating handbills or leaflets explaining the purpose and scope of the cordon and search. This helps in
gaining compliance by the local population.
5-64. THT is also an outstanding combat multiplier. THTs collect valuable information from individuals
in the search area, provide a tactical questioning capability, and have additional language capabilities.
Organization
5-65. The typical cordon and search organization includes a command element, a cordon element, a
search element, and a reserve element each with a clear task and purpose. Figure 5-4 displays a typical
organization for search operations.
Command Element
5-66. An overall commander controls the unit conducting the cordon and search. He identifies the
subordinate element leaders.
Cordon Element
5-67. This force must have enough combat power to cordon off the area. An effective cordon that both
prevents the egress of individuals from the search area and prevents outside support to the search area,
is critical to the success of the search effort. Based on the mission variables (METT-TC), two cordons are
often established: an outer cordon to isolate the objective from outside reinforcements or disruptions,
and an inner cordon to prevent individuals from leaving or communicating with someone outside the
search area. Both cordon elements must maintain 360-degree security. UAS, scouts, attack reconnaissance
aviation, or sniper teams should be considered by tactical units for use in observing the objective area
for enemy both before and during the operation.
Search/Assault Element
5-68. The search element conducts the actual search operation. A search may orient on people, on
materiel, on buildings, or on terrain. Normally, it is organized into special teams. The most basic search
team is a two-person team consisting of one person who conducts the actual search while another person
provides immediate security to the searcher. Establish discipline and standardized search SOPs to ensure
searches are thorough, PIR-focused, and of minimal risk to Soldiers.
5-69. All search elements must be prepared to handle male and female personnel, key equipment,
hazardous materials (biohazards or other toxic elements), ordinance, and record key events. They must be
trained to understand and on order execute information engagements, tactical site exploitation, detainee
operations, and adjacent unit coordination. Search personnel must be trained to operate with HN security
forces and within the established ROE. First aid and other medical training is critical. Soldiers must be
proficient with signaling and marking devices as well as detection and recording equipment. Biometric
and video/audio recording device proficiency is crucial in COIN search operations. Basic language training
is essential to maintain effective searches and overall operational tempo.
5-70. Typical search teams are organized in two- to three-Soldier teams. Female Soldiers are a proven
combat multiplier during search operations, because few cultures tolerate males searching females. Search
teams clear each room or area in accordance with FM 3-21.8. Units should not confuse entry methods
and their levels of aggression with the requirement to respect the Host Nations people and homes.
Typically, once a room is cleared, one team member provides security while the other(s) searches. All
search element personnel are prepared to fight. Basic considerations for any search team include the
following:
Detailed instructions including prohibited items such as weapons, chemicals, medicines,
and machine tools.
Reconnaissance
5-72. Every target area should be reconnoitered prior to execution using many of the available
resources. If the target is part of a units AO, then a patrol around the target may not be out of order. ISR
assets, attack reconnaissance aviation, local nationals, and imagery are other methods for conducting
reconnaissance. The reconnaissance plan must not provide the enemy with indicators of an impending
cordon and search. Given the nature of COIN, the reconnaissance phase could last an extended period,
as units identify the relative size and location of buildings, entry points, cordon position and avenues
of approach. Further tools for objective analysis may be obtained from attack aviation photographs, maps,
and local emergency services departments.
Search
5-80. A search may be oriented toward people, materiel, buildings, or terrain. It usually involves both
HN police and military personnel. It must be a systematic action to ensure that personnel, documents,
electronic data, and other material are identified, evaluated, collected, and protected to develop intelligence
and facilitate follow-on actions.
5-81. The tempo at which a search operation is conducted should be slow enough to allow for an
effective search, while not so slow that it allows the insurgent force time to react to the search. Search
teams must consider a return to an area after an initial search. This can surprise and remove insurgents who
may not have been detected or may have returned. All searches should create pressure on insurgents
and sympathizers to not stay in the area, but not inconvenience the local residents to the degree that they
will collaborate with the insurgents.
5-82. Special laws regulate the search powers of military forces. Misuse of search authority can
adversely affect the outcome of operations and future legal proceedings; therefore, all searches must be
lawful and properly recorded to be of value. These laws must be disseminated to the population to ensure
understanding and compliance. Additional information on searches can be found in FM 3-06.20. Search
teams must have instructions for three basic categories:
Personnel
5-83. This includes both male and female and both persons of interest and other persons.
Physical Items
5-84. This includes weapons, equipment, documents, computers, and cameras.
Information Mediums
5-85. This includes data inside computers, cameras, and cell phones.
Withdrawal
5-86. During this phase, the unit may be the most vulnerable. To mitigate risk, a commander may
choose to
A relief in place.
Stay-behind elements to cover the withdrawal.
Different routes and timing.
Simultaneous or phased withdrawals.
SEARCH OPERATIONS
5-87. A search is the deliberate examination of a person, place, area or object using Soldiers, animal
or technological sensors to discover something or someone. Examples include searches of enemy
or detained personnel, military objective areas, personnel or vehicles at a checkpoint, and lines
of communication.
5-88. A search is conducted under a wide variety of situations and for a wide variety of purposes.
Typically, a person is searched in order to find something that is concealed. A place, area, or object, such
as a car or desk, is searched for something that may or may not be concealed. For more on vehicle
searches, see Chapter 7. Communication objects, such as letters, books, computers, cell phones, and other
media and signaling tools, are searched to discover information.
5-89. During a counterinsurgency, the rules of engagement and various agreements between the Host
Nation and US counterinsurgent forces often describe search situations, and may limit search methods.
5-90. During a search, it is important to keep the local population informed, as much as tactically
possible, that search contributes to their safety and security. This communication should begin during the
actual search, if possible, but is often accomplished after the search by follow-up patrols. Follow-up patrols
can not only aid in mitigating some of the negative aspects of the search but also see if missed individuals
have returned to the searched area. Follow up patrols which include civil affairs teams or tactical PSYOP
teams provide a great capability to conduct consequence management, assisting in the achievement
of information engagement, often through reinforcing themes, and collecting information for development
into intelligence.
TECHNIQUES
5-91. A search can orient on people, materiel, buildings, or terrain (FM 3-21.8) Key basic
considerations for conducting a search in various includes searching individuals, tactical site exploitation,
aerial searches, searching subterranean areas, searching individuals, detention of individuals, tactical
questioning and detainee processing.
Individuals
5-92. Any individual can be an insurgent, auxiliary, or member of the mass base. However, searchers
must avoid mistaking all suspects for the enemy. Because there may be little or no Host Nation personnel
identification procedures, identifying the correct person as an insurgent may be very difficult. It is during
the initial handling of individuals about to be searched that the greatest caution is required. During the
search, one member of a search team always covers the other member who makes the actual search. When
females have to be searched, every precaution is made to prevent violating local customs and mores. If
female searchers cannot be provided, consider using the medic to search female suspects.
Teams
5-93. Soldiers conduct individual searches in search teams that consist of the following:
Searcher
5-94. Actually conducts the search. This is the highest-risk position.
Security
5-95. Maintains eye contact with the person being searched.
Observer
5-96. Supervises search and warns of suspicious behavior or actions.
Methods
5-97. The most common search methods used to search an individual are frisk and wall searches.
A third, less common method, used in very select situations, is the strip search.
Frisk Search
5-98. Quick and adequate to detect weapons, evidence, or contraband. A frisk search is more dangerous
because the searcher has less control of the individual being searched.
Wall Search
5-99. Affords more safety for the searcher by leaning the suspect against any upright surface, such as a
wall, vehicle, tree, or fence. The search team places the subject in the kneeling or prone position if more
control is needed to search an uncooperative individual.
Strip Search
5-100. Considered only when the individual is suspected of carrying documents or other contraband on
his or her person. This extreme search method should be conducted in an enclosed area and by qualified
personnel when available.
Population Control
5-102. Three basic methods are used to control the population during a search of an urban area: assembly
of inhabitants in a central location, restriction of inhabitants to their homes, and control of the heads of the
households.
Houses or Buildings
5-106. The object of a house search is to look for contraband and to screen residents to determine if any
are guerrillas, auxiliaries, members of the underground or the mass base. A search party assigned to search
an occupied building should consist of at least one local police officer, a protective escort for local
security, and a female searcher. If inhabitants remain in the dwellings, the protective escort must isolate
and secure the inhabitants during the search. Forced entry may be necessary if a house is vacant or if an
occupant refuses to allow searchers to enter. If the force searches a house containing property while its
occupants are away, it should secure the house to prevent looting. Before US forces depart, the commander
should arrange for the community to protect such houses until the occupants return.
5-107. Try to leave the house in the same or better condition than when the search began. In addition
to information collection, the search team may use digital cameras or video recorders to establish the
condition of the house before and after the search. All sensitive material or equipment found in the house
should be documented before it is removed, to include date, time, location, the person from whom it was
confiscated, and the reason for the confiscation. The use of a digital camera can assist in this procedure.
For a detailed search, the walls and floors must be searched to discover hidden caches.
SITE EXPLOITATION
5-108. Tactical leaders plan, resource, direct, and supervise tactical site exploitation efforts during all
COIN offensive operations. Site exploitation (SE) is the systematic action executed with the appropriate
equipment, to ensure that personnel, documents, electronic data, and other material at a site are identified,
evaluated, collected, and protected in order to gather intelligence and facilitate follow-on actions. It is a
means by which tactical units exploit and analyze the insurgent after collecting biometric, physical, digital,
and spoken data. In COIN, insurgents who are captured many times are prosecuted within the HN rule
of law and SE is an excellent means of providing courts with evidence, especially when properly recorded.
SE contribute to the decide, detect, assess activities of D3A targeting cycle. Once collected, analyzed,
and assessed, it may lead to future operations. More information on SE can be found in CALL product
07-26. Figure 5-7 shows an example SE site sketch.
Conduct
5-109. Leaders ensure that Soldiers methodically and effectively identify, preserve, and collect evidence
while maintaining its integrity. They strive to prevent damage or corruption from foreign materials,
undocumented chains of custody, or loss. They consider how to mitigate risk by allowing minimal
personnel to operate in the area, by minimizing time on target, by concealing movement of evidence, by
avoiding patterns, and by maintaining an obvious respect for civilians and their belongings.
5-110. An important SE resource, biometric assets can measure humans by face, fingerprint, hand
geometry, handwriting, iris, retina, vein, voice, and DNA. Other SE resources include search, detention,
and marking tools; collection containers; marking materials; photographic, video, and voice recording
devices; linguists; and artificial sources of light. In addition, leaders
Initially evaluate the situation.
Decide whether the unit must perform an expedient or formal site exploitation.
Properly bag and tag evidence.
Record sworn statements, from Soldiers and locals, for entry into the legal system. (Using
evidence kits is the best and easiest way.)
Photograph captured contraband evidence with the suspect for judicial proceedings.
Ensure that photos of people, materiel, and other items of potential intelligence interest
and evidence collection are documented on and adjacent to the site.
Use document and material exploitation (DOMEX), which includes hasty analysis of pocket
contents, electronic mirror-imaging media, and evacuating data for further, more
detailed analysis.
Process detainees into detainee holding area (DHA), to include collection of biometric
and computer database information, by special BCT-level teams.
Ensure that pre- and post-bomb blast forensics and signatures collected from IED factories,
routinely collected by weapons intelligence teams (WITs), are entered into the system
for comparison and analysis with detainee records.
Techniques
5-111. Basic SE techniques include search methods, searches of individuals, detention of individuals,
tactical questioning, and debriefing.
Methods
5-112. Search methods must include providing security for search team, ensuring integrity of site,
conducting a methodical search, and coherently documenting effort for later review. The type of search
team used depends on many factors such as available forces, HN capabilities, and purpose of the search.
Most of these are covered in METT-TC. The following SE on-target checklist is not all inclusive:
Search all rooms or caves, to include roof, yard, any subterranean areas, and associated
vehicles for
ID cards.
Weapons.
Computers.
Documents.
Digital media.
Propaganda.
Cellular and satellite phones.
Large amounts of money.
Search other likely hiding places, which may include
Appliances (refrigeratorice cube trays, under and inside back housing).
Furniture hide spots (taped under furniture, hollow legs, inside cushions.
Floors (hollow flooring, removable wood boards, removable tiles, under rugs).
Gardens, false wall locations, chimney hide locations.
Search all vehicles for weapons and photograph the weapons.
Positively identify (PID) the target.
Photograph all individuals.
Complete packets on all individuals.
Rules
5-115. The six rules for processing detainees follow:
Search the detainee thoroughly and disarm him.
Silence the detainee.
Segregate the detainee from other detainees by sex and rank.
Safeguard the detainee from harm while preventing him from escaping.
Speed the detainee to the designated detainee collection point.
Tag the detainee with key information. Use approved format if possible. The tag includes the
date of capture, location of capture (grid coordinate), capturing unit, and special circumstances
of capture (how the person was captured).
Protected Status
5-116. Once the suspected insurgents are under friendly control, they assume the protected status
of detainees. This term includes any person captured or otherwise detained by armed force. Under the law
of war, leaders and Soldiers are personally responsible for detainees under their control. Mistreatment
of detainees is a criminal offense under the Geneva Convention and the 1996 War Crimes Act. One of the
most conspicuous violations of the Geneva Convention is the unauthorized photography of detainees.
Tactical Questioning
5-117. Units recognize value of timely information and intelligence during COIN operations and thus
may tactically question an insurgent on the objective. Units designate or construct a detainee holding area,
ensuring detainees are unable to communicate in any manner. Leaders then conduct tactical questioning
of priority detainees away from the group, as they carefully gather facts and details required to establish
consistencies or inconsistencies. Leaders then sort detainees into those to be taken off target, those without
further value, those no longer of interest, and those who require immediate battlefield interrogation by
qualified personnel. Leaders wanting the ability to interrogate personnel during a potential operations
should request and incorporate qualified interrogators into their mission task organization to facilitate
timelier information or intelligence.
present. Experiences from recent operations show that US forces using immediate tactical questioning
techniques with their Soldiers on target find important information that leads to actionable intelligence.
Tactical questioning must not violate the Law of War or any legal agreements (SOFAs and coalition
agreements). Typical questions should focus on discovering other nearby insurgents, their intentions, their
equipment, how they are financed, or their means of support.
Backtracking of Route
5-119. A successful technique to determine where the individuals were before they came to the point
of capture is to verbally backtrack their route. The detainee is questioned as to when he/she arrived, how
he/she traveled to the point of capture (foot or vehicle), and from what direction. With a general direction
and a means of travel, the route can be developed. Using a map, the Soldier asks leading questions
to determine the route. The detainee identifies significant terrain features seen at specific locations, such
as rivers, bridges, key buildings, or hills. Talking jogs the detainee's memory. Gradually, the detainee
reveals their route (where they originated). Considerations for successful tactical questioning follow:
Know your linguist; use more than one to double-check the integrity and accuracy
of information and reliability of linguist.
Have a basic knowledge of language(s) of detainee(s).
Learn to identify physical behavior and posture, resistance or defensive postures; use multiple
observers.
Study your target before he becomes a detainee on the objective.
Study behavior, values, and interests of others in the OE before conducting tactical questioning.
Consider placing uniformed linguist in the area of detainees and allow the detainees
to communicate so that the uniformed linguist can collect information (deception collection).
Conduct questioning of one individual in a separate room from other detainees so that if the
detainee answers he maintains plausible deniability with members of his community.
Commanders can prepare four to five questions related to information requirements. These can
be briefed as part of the patrol order and used by leaders during operations.
Prepare a tactical questioning plan for information that you believe the detainee may have.
Aerial Searches
5-120. Unmanned aerial systems (UAS), close air support (CAS), and rotary wing aircraft (attack
and reconnaissance aviation) can be used as observation platforms. CAS aircraft and attack reconnaissance
aviation can also provide commanders an aerial search capability with different search perspectives
and constraints. Rotary wing aircraft are an effective means of conducting mounted search patrols, specific
population control measures, and security operations.
5-121. Helicopter-mounted patrols may reconnoiter an assigned area or route in search of insurgent
elements. They may conduct snap checkpoints on roads to interdict insurgent mounted and dismounted
movement. When the element locates a known or suspected element, it can instruct attack aviation teams
to engage the insurgent element or it may also choose to land and attack the enemy with a dismounted
assault. This technique can be useful in open rural areas unless an air defense threat is present. Use
of aerial patrols should be used in operations when sufficient intelligence is available to justify their use
or friendly ground-based operations have become predictable to the insurgents. Such patrols are most
effective when used in conjunction with ground operations.
5-122. In aerial or air/ground search operations, helicopters insert troops in an area suspected
of containing insurgents. With the helicopters overwatching from the air, Soldiers search the area. Soldiers
remount and the process is repeated in other areas. Members of aerial patrols should be trained in tracking
procedures to follow insurgents to their base or safe houses using terrain, deception, and stand-off
capability of aviation optics in conjunction with ground and other technological assets. Leaders must plan
for the evacuation of prisoners, casualties, and materials, both by air and ground.
Security
5-127. Perimeter and flank security is imperative. A slow, methodical search is conducted in the area
of operations, with each search team systematically searching every square meter. The security element
moves toward the limits of advance of the search area. Deliberate search techniques emphasize where
to look for the insurgent locations that provide him with observation, cover, concealment, and an
egress route.
Signs of Tunnels
5-128. Several visual signs help in detecting the actual tunnels. Visual inspections often disclose the
general area of a tunnel, but not its precise location. The keys to finding a tunnel system are a thorough
terrain analysis (OAKOC) and an equally thorough physical ground search.
RAID
5-131. This is an operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an
adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability. It ends with a planned withdrawal
upon completion of the assigned mission (JP 3-0). A raid is conducted to destroy a position or installation,
destroy or capture insurgents or equipment, free friendly prisoners, or seize possible intelligence;
and is followed by a rapid withdrawal. By capturing insurgents, information can be developed into
intelligence and confiscating contraband can contribute to improved public order and safety. It is often
used as part of a strike operation. For additional information on raids, see FM 3-21.8 and FM 3-21.10.
5-132. A raid in a COIN environment can differ from a raid in conventional operations since the
requirement for minimizing collateral damage may be a significant factor. In addition, the time on the
objective prior to withdrawal may be greater, due to the requirement to conduct a detailed SE. As in all
raids, the success of the raid is based on accurate, timely, and detailed intelligence and planning.
CONSIDERATIONS
5-133. Raids in COIN could have lasting effects on the population and the insurgents. Specific
considerations using elements of the mission variables are
Mission
5-134. In a COIN, raids target insurgents, terrain, intelligence, or equipment. Missions are often executed
in conjunction with a form of cordon to prevent enemy escape into the population. Units should plan
and rehearse according to target intelligence, the commanders intent, and the purpose of the raid.
Enemy
5-135. The objective of the raid may be a valuable asset the insurgency is prepared to defend. Often, the
insurgent will have additional forces in the area positioned to alert, react, facilitate egress, or conduct
combat. Effective reconnaissance can increase awareness of these factors.
Time Available
5-136. Leaders should plan on allowing time for follow-on missions based on exploitable information.
Also, units should not stay on the objective too long.
TECHNIQUES
5-137. The minimum task organization for a raid is a headquarters section, an assault element, and a
security element. Depending on METT-TC variables, a support element may be formed separately
or integrated into the assault element. Additional specialty teams should consist of detainees or EPWs, SE,
or CASEVAC teams. Squads are typically too small to execute raids, especially in urban AOs. Figure 5-8
shows the concept of operations for a typical raid.
5-138. A typical raid during a counterinsurgency is executed in five phasesinsertion, seal off the
objective, assault the objective, secure the objective, and withdrawal. The following are some
considerations for each phase:
Insert
5-139. Insertion in COIN is less difficult than infiltration, especially in urban terrain, due to constant
civilian interaction. Units should use whichever method is most likely to achieve surprise. Deception, such
as disguising intent with other activities such as establishing a checkpoint, may be useful. Other
considerations include
Insertion by airborne or air assault can enhance surprise.
Launch the raid at an unexpected time or place by taking advantage of darkness and limited
visibility and moving over terrain that the enemy may consider impassable.
Infiltration of a sniper team before the raid.
Avoid detection in rural areas through proper movement techniques and skillful camouflage
and concealment to include taking advantage of natural cover of the terrain.
In urban areas, avoiding detection is difficult, therefore planning to delay detection
or awareness of the objective is better. This can be accomplished by rapid movement
or deception.
Withdraw
5-143. As planned, the unit withdraws from the objective area. A support force may provide suppressive
fires for withdrawal or provide escort away from the objective. Commanders consider use of stay behind
measures or devices to monitor backfill of insurgents or population support for the insurgency. A raid in a
COIN environment may modify phase five and withdraws at the discretion of the commander.
AMBUSH
5-144. An ambush is a form of attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a
moving or temporarily halted enemy (FM 3-90). Ambush patrols are combat patrols with missions
to establish and execute ambushes to harass or destroy insurgents or capture personnel and equipment. (For
further information on ambush, see FM 3-21.8 and FM 3-21.10.) By eliminating insurgents, an ambush
contributes to improving public order and safety, a key civil security subtask. It may be used
in clear-hold-build operations or strike operations.
TYPES
5-145. The two types of ambushes follow:
A point ambush involves elements deployed to support the attack of a single killing zone.
An area ambush involves elements deployed as multiple, related, point ambushes.
CATEGORIES
5-146. Based on the amount of preparation time, ambushes can be hasty or deliberate.
A hasty ambush is an immediate action drill of a friendly force with little or no information on
the insurgent force. The discovery of a nearby insurgent element, usually moving, provides a
limited opportunity for a friendly force to hastily occupy a position from which to ambush the
guerrilla.
A deliberate ambush is a planned operation against a specific insurgent force. Sufficient
detailed information of the enemy force, such as the size, nature, organization, armament,
equipment, route, direction or movement timeline is available to permit the detailed planning
of an ambush.
CHARACTERIZATIONS
5-147. An ambush is characterized as either near or far. These are based upon the proximity of the
insurgent to friendly forces.
A near ambush is an ambush with the assault element within hand grenade distance of the kill
zone (less than 50 meters). Close terrain such as urban, jungle, and heavy woodlands may
require this positioning. It may also be appropriate in open or mountainous terrain in a rise
from the ground ambush.
A far ambush is an ambush with the assault element beyond reasonable assaulting distance
of the kill zone (beyond 50 meters).This location may be appropriate in open terrain offering
good fields of fire.
CONTROL MEASURES
5-148. The ambush commanders control of all elements at the ambush site is critical. This includes the
initial occupation, time in position, execution, and withdrawal. Commanders should develop control
measures for the
Occupation.
Execution.
Fire control measures.
Fratricide and collateral damage prevention, especially if assault element or a nonlinear
ambush.
Initiation of assault and actions on the objective.
Tactical site exploitation.
CONSIDERATIONS
5-149. Well-planned and well-executed ambushes are a useful offensive technique to employ against
insurgents. It is an effective technique to interdict and disrupt movement of insurgent forces within an area.
Specific considerations using elements of the mission variables are
Mission
5-150. Tactical units should attempt to ambush insurgents in manners they least expect and in ways that
minimize compromise by and risk to the HN populace. It is difficult for US forces to emplace an ambush
in populated areas due to size of units, appearance, and insurgent presence amongst the population.
Enemy
5-151. Commanders ensure ambush plans are flexible as to allow adjustment and initiative at the
ambush site.
TECHNIQUES
5-153. An ambush in COIN has five basic phases: planning, organizing, moving, occupying,
and executing.
Plan
5-154. Key steps in planning a deliberate ambush include
Determine the target and purpose of the ambush (kill or capture).
Determine the advantages and disadvantage for executing the ambush during limited visibility,
amongst the population, or vicinity of sensitive sites.
Determine if the ambush will be a point ambush or an area ambush.
Select the appropriate ambush formation.
Determine if the ambush will be a near ambush or a far ambush.
Determine communication requirements.
Determine weapons requirements and limitations.
Determine compromise contingency plans.
Determine what, if any, special equipment is required. This includes money for damage
compensation or the need to video or photograph the area for documentation.
Withdrawal.
Organization
5-155. An ambush patrol is organized in the same manner as other combat patrols to include a
headquarters, an assault element, a support element, and a security element. If an ambush site is to be
occupied for an extended period, double ambush forces may be organized to allow continuous coverage.
One ambush force occupies the site while the other conducts routine maintenance, rests, and eats at the
objective rallying point or alternate and supplementary concealed locations. They alternate on command,
usually after no more than eight hours.
Movement
5-156. Deliberate ambushes should include an objective rally point (ORP). Units should plan movement
to the ORP, from the ORP to the ambush site and back and withdrawal from the ambush site is back to the
ORP or to another final destination. In addition, leaders should plan movement that allows the unit to enter
the ambush site from the rear and avoid moving into the kill zone or across the suspected route of the
enemy force to be ambushed. In COIN, the presence of people near the ambush positions requires a
carefully planned movement. Units should use maps, imagery, video, HUMINT, and aerial photographs
to analyze the terrain and HN population. If possible, units conduct ground reconnaissance and avoid
selecting obvious ambush sites. Surprise is even more difficult to achieve in these areas. An ambush site
should provide
Clear fields of fire.
Concealed positions.
Canalization of the insurgents into the killing zone.
Little or no cover and concealment in the kill zone.
Covered routes of withdrawal (to enable the ambush force to break contact and avoid pursuit).
No egress route for the insurgent force.
A defensible position if compromised.
Occupation
5-157. In COIN, especially urban environments, it can be extremely difficult to occupy ambush sites
or positions uncompromised due to locals. As a rule, the ambush force occupies the ambush site at the
latest possible time permitted by the tactical situation and the amount of site preparation required. This not
only reduces the risk of discovery, but also reduces the time Soldiers must remain still and in position.
Techniques
5-158. Some techniques include using
Stay-behind elements.
Alternate infiltration methods such as HN security force vehicles.
Subterranean (urban) or subterranean structures (rural).
Feints.
Deception.
Firing Positions
5-159. The unit typically moves into the ambush site from the rear. Security elements are positioned first
to prevent surprise while the ambush is being established. Position automatic and precision fire weapons so
each can fire along the entire kill zone. If this is impossible, then ensure that automatic weapons have
overlapping sectors of fire. The point is to cover the entire kill zone and to achieve a large volume of near
simultaneous concentrated fires into the kill zone, fires that can inflict maximum damage on the insurgent.
The unit leader then selects a position where he can see when to initiate the ambush. Claymores,
explosives, and M203 grenade launchers are examples of what may be used to cover any dead space left by
the automatic and precision fire weapons. All weapons are assigned sectors of fire to provide mutual
support. Multiple positions also provide interlocking or overlapping support. The unit leader sets a time by
which positions are to be prepared.
Kill Zone
5-160. If Soldiers must enter the kill zone to place booby traps, special-purpose munitions, or expedient
devices, they must remove any tracks or signs that might alert the insurgents and compromise the ambush.
Under a strict ROE, units may choose to record the ambush using a video cameras.
Execution
5-161. A clear target engagement criteria is all that is needed to execute an ambush. Audible and visible
signals such as whistles and pyrotechnics must be changed often to avoid establishing patterns, or alerting
the insurgents to friendly actions or positions.
A signal by the security force to alert the patrol leader to the insurgents approach may be given
by hand-and-arm signals, radio, as a quiet voice message, transmission of a prearranged
number of taps, or by signaling with the push-to-talk switch or field telephone when there is no
danger that wire between positions will compromise the ambush.
A signal to initiate the ambush given by the patrol leader or a designated individual may be a
shot or the detonation of mines or other types of explosives. The ambush should be initiated
with a mass casualty-producing weapon (claymore, machine gun, or similar system).
A signal for lifting or shifting fires may be given by voice command, whistles, or pyrotechnics.
All fire stops immediately so the assault can be made before the insurgent can react.
A signal for withdrawal may also be by voice command, whistles, or pyrotechnics.
Surprise must be achieved or the attack is not an ambush. Surprise allows the ambush force
to seize and retain control of the situation. Units achieve surprise by careful planning,
preparation, and execution. Concealment and fire discipline are also critically important.
FORMATIONS
5-162. Whether independent or part of an area ambush, a point ambush is positioned along the expected
avenue of approach of the insurgent force. The selection of the type of ambush formation is important,
because it determines the volume of concentrated fire required to isolate, trap, and destroy the insurgents.
The formation to be used is determined by carefully considering possible formations and the advantages
and disadvantages of each in relation to terrain; conditions of visibility, forces, weapons, and equipment
ease or difficulty of control; force to be attacked; and overall combat situation. Types of ambush
formations include linear, L-shaped, Z-shaped, T-shaped, V-shaped, triangle, and box.
Linear
5-163. In a linear ambush, the attack element is deployed generally parallel to the insurgent forces route
of movement (road, trail, and stream). This positions the attack element parallel to the long axis of the kill
zone and subjects the insurgent force to heavy flanking fire (Figure 5-9). An advantage of the linear
formation is its relative ease of control under all conditions of visibility. The size of the force that can be
trapped in the kill zone is limited by the area the attack element can effectively cover with highly
concentrated fire. The force is trapped in the kill zone by natural obstacles, mines, booby traps,
or expedient devices, and direct and indirect fires.
L-Shaped
5-165. The L-shaped formation (Figure 5-10) is a variation of the linear formation. The long side of the
attack element is parallel to the kill zone and delivers flanking fire. The short side of the attack element
is at the end of, and at right angles to, the kill zone and delivers enfilading fire that interlocks with fire
from the other leg.
5-166. The L-shaped formation is flexible. It can be established on a curving stretch of a trail, near a
stream, or at a sharp bend in a trail or stream. When appropriate, fire from the short leg can be shifted
to parallel the long leg if the insurgent force attempts to assault or escape in the opposite direction.
In addition, the short leg prevents escape in that direction or reinforcement from that direction. Positive
means of controlling fires, such as aiming stakes, are needed to prevent the fire from one leg hitting
Soldiers positioned on the other leg.
Other
5-167. Other traditional ambush formations that are highly METT-TC dependent and usually better for
rural operations, include the following:
Z-Shaped Formation
5-168. The Z-shaped formation is a variation of the L-formation. The attack force is deployed as in the
L-formation, but with an additional side so that the formation resembles the letter Z. The additional side
may serve to engage a force attempting to relieve or reinforce the guerrillas, restrict a flank, prevent an
envelopment of the ambush force.
T-Shaped Formation
5-169. In the T-shaped formation, the attack element is deployed across, and at right angles to, the route
of movement of the hostile force so that the attack element and the target form the letter T. This formation
can be used day or night to establish a purely harassing ambush. It can be used at night to interdict
movement through open, hard-to-seal areas.
V-Shaped Formation
5-170. The V-shaped attack element is deployed along both sides of the insurgent route of movement so
it forms a V. Care is taken to ensure that neither group fires into the other. The V-formation is suited
for open terrain, but can also be used in the jungle.
Triangle Formation
5-171. The triangle is a variation of the V-formation that can be employed in three ways. The most
common technique is the closed triangle. The attack element is deployed in three groups, positioned so that
they form a triangle. An automatic weapon is placed at each point of the triangle and positioned so it can be
shifted quickly to interlock with either of the others. Elements are positioned so their fields of fire overlap.
Mortars may be positioned inside the triangle. When deployed in this manner, the triangle ambush becomes
a small unit strongpoint that is used to interdict night movement through open areas when insurgent
strategy is likely to be from any direction. Advantages include ease of control, all-round security,
and guerrillas approaching from any direction can be fired on by at least two automatic weapons.
Disadvantages include the requirement for an ambush force of platoon size or larger to reduce the danger
of being overrun by a large guerrilla force; one or more legs of the triangle may come under guerrilla
enfilade fire; and lack of dispersion, particularly at the points, increases danger from guerrilla mortar fire.
Box Formation
5-172. The box formation is similar in purpose to the triangle ambush. The unit is deployed in four
elements positioned so each element becomes a corner of a square or rectangle. Advantages
and disadvantages are much the same as the triangle formation.
VARIATIONS
5-173. Common ambush variations during counterinsurgency operations include
Baited Trap
5-174. A variation of the area ambush is the baited trap ambush. A central kill zone is established along
the insurgents avenue of approach. Point ambushes are established along the routes over which units
supporting or reinforcing the insurgent force will have to approach. The insurgents in the central kill zone
serve as bait to lure relieving or reinforcing insurgent units into the kill zones of the outlying ambushes.
Items such as infrastructure, sensitive equipment, caches, and security measures can be used as bait.
Spider Hole
5-175. This type of point ambush is designed for open areas that lack the cover and concealment
and other features normally desirable in a good ambush site. This technique is effective in less populated
rural areas or urban areas with subterranean. Concealed in a spider hole," a type of covered and concealed
foxhole, the attack element is deployed in the formation best suited to the overall situation. Soil is carefully
removed and positions expertly camouflaged. This ambush takes advantage of the tendency of patrols
and other units to relax in areas that do not appear to favor ambush. The chief disadvantage of this
technique is that the ambush elements vulnerability if compromised.
SNIPER OPERATIONS
5-176. Sniper operations are effective for both insurgent and counterinsurgent in the COIN environment.
Snipers, if employed correctly, are a COIN force multiplier and provide the commander an immediate
means to enter the insurgent decision cycle.
5-177. Small kill teams (SKTs), small observation teams (SOTs), and small capture teams (SCTs) differ
by task, manning, and equipment. SKT focuses on destroying of insurgent elements. SCTs focus on the
capture of those elements. SOTs are for reconnaissance. In COIN, more may be gained by capturing than
by killing the insurgent. However, SKTs can give commanders a deterrent to insurgent activity.
5-178. Sniper teams sometimes as part of SKTs, SOTs, or SCTs, are employed in populated urban areas
or large rural areas with adequate fields of fire. For mission success, all three teams employ specific point
and area weapons systems. All three also rely on redundant communications, marking materials, detailed
infiltration plans, exfiltration, mutual support, security, compromise contingencies, and engagement criteria
CONSIDERATIONS
5-179. Sniper employment in a COIN must be carefully considered. The infiltration or exfiltration
of snipers, SKTs, and SCTs must be meticulously planned with the understanding of the habits, behaviors,
and density of the local population. Besides the basic mission of precision fires and surgical elimination
of individuals, they are valuable for ISR collection, route and area security augmentation, countersniper
operations, and counter mortar or rocket operations. Compromise and contingency planning is critical
to sniper employment. Commanders base this detailed planning on a thorough analysis of the mission
variables with specific attention to terrain and civil considerations. Specific considerations using elements
of the mission variables are
Mission
Snipers must have clear engagement criteria and a thorough understanding of the ROE.
Engagement criteria must be refined so the individual sniper can make the correct engagement
decision while the target is engageable.
Once an engagement area and a sniper position are identified, then leaders should determine a
mutually supporting position for a security team to occupy.
Current and planned locations of sniper teams should be tracked by the headquarters
responsible for the area in which the snipers are operating. Often this means designating their
locations as a no fire area that can be tracked by all forces operating in the area to prevent
fratricide.
Enemy
Sniper positions need to be defendable in case of compromise by the enemy.
Terrain and Weather
Snipers, small kill teams, small observation teams, and small capture teams can aid
commanders in denying terrain and freedom of movement to insurgent elements while
providing security to sensitive or critical sites in both rural and urban areas.
Troops and Support Available
In addition to a robust communications capability, commanders resource these elements with
linguists, medical personnel, surveillance equipment, and sustainment resources. The QRF
is typically involved in the detailed planning of these operations and can be deployed forward
to minimize reaction time.
SKTs, SOTs or SCTs are task-organized with sniper-qualified personnel or squad designated
marksman, weapons squads, and specialty skills personnel. They may be comprised
of sniper-qualified individuals or squad designated marksman.
TECHNIQUES
5-180. All sniper operations in COIN should consider sniper positions, sniper security sniper insertion
and sniper extraction.
Positions
Tactical leaders must continually analyze the OE for potential sniper team overwatch positions.
Leaders reconnoiter to determine the suitability of potential positions. Leaders reconnoiter
to determine the suitability of potential positions. When employing sniper teams, leaders ensure
each position provides mutual support against a threat.
The insurgent often will engage from areas of passive support, and where he has a sense
of security. Detailed reconnaissance and accurate knowledge of the OE allows leaders
to recognize advantages and disadvantages of different positions and types of areas. There are
two basic areas for sniper positions in an urban environmentresidential areas and industrial
areas. Both areas include the use of elevated positions or ground level positions. Roofs are not
always the best place to operate since roofs are often not the highest location in the area and are
often wide open with little cover. Successful position selection techniques in COIN are
Rent Uninhabited Dwellings or Other Structures
Teams are careful not to establish a pattern or expose the property owner to the insurgency.
Owners may compromise the snipers.
Positions in Locally Occupied Homes
Teams, however, must consolidate the family in one part of the house with a security element.
When exfiltrating the residence, compensation should be provided to the owner.
Stay-Behind Opportunities
Teams may have the opportunity to achieve surprise if insurgents attempt to return to areas
after another counterinsurgent unit has conducted an operation.
Security
Sniper teams should move with a security element (squad or platoon) whenever possible. This
allows the teams to reach their area of operation faster and safer than if alone. The security
element also protects snipers during operations. When moving with a security element, snipers
follow these guidelines:
The leader of the security element leads the sniper team.
Snipers must appear to be an integral part of the security element. To do so, each sniper
carries his weapon system in line with and close to his body to hide the weapon's outline
and barrel length. Snipers also conceal from view all sniper-unique equipment (optics
and ghillie suits).
Sniper uniforms must be the same as that of security element members.
Snipers and element members maintain proper intervals and positions in the element
formation.
Infiltration
The key to sniper infiltration is undetected occupation of hide positions. An insertion may be
as simple as a drop off in close proximity and moving dismounted to the position. It can be
as complex as conducting a cordon and search/knock and leaving a stay-behind team. Planning
considerations for insertion include the mission variables and a detailed understanding of the
terrain and people. Planning considerations includestreetlights, barking dogs, nightlife
establishments, insertion vehicle noise (HMMWV engines, vehicle ramps hitting the ground),
and local nationals who may sleep on their roof or outdoors during hot summer months.
Exfiltration
Exfiltration is just as important; snipers do not want to compromise a position you may want
to use again in the future. The amount of time spent in a Sniper Position is dependent on the
situation. Sniper teams should have a preplanned emergency exfiltration route to a safe zone,
known by all supporting elements. The snipers can withdraw dismounted, during hours
of limited visibility, to a designated rally point, where the QRF can retrieve them
Some units use a quick reaction force (QRF) as a means of reinforcement or emergency
extraction, as well as maintaining or regaining contact with insurgents engaged by the snipers.
When properly employed, the US sniper teams can contribute significantly to the fight by
overwatching key areas, serving as an economy of force, eliminating insurgents, and causing
uncertainty within the insurgents. For further information on conventional sniper employment
techniques, see FM 3-21.11.
COIN PATROLS
5-181. A patrol is a detachment sent out by a larger unit to conduct a combat or reconnaissance
operation. A patrol may be a fire team, squad, platoon, or company. Conventional patrolling doctrine
applies to counterinsurgency operations, but some modifications must be made to account for the
insurgents activities and the operational environment. Aggressive patrolling in an area greatly reduces the
insurgents freedom of movement, disrupts operations, and weakens their influence on the local population.
Furthermore, Patrolling becomes more significant in counterinsurgency operations because of the difficulty
in locating and identifying insurgent forces. This section discusses the important role patrols play
in defeating the insurgent force. There are two types of patrolling in COIN operations: Reconnaissance
patrols and combat patrols. Patrols are an integral part of clear-hold-build operations, strike operations,
and PRC operations.
CONSIDERATIONS
5-182. Specific considerations using elements of the mission variables for COIN patrols are
Mission
5-183. Leaders must brief all patrol members as to the task and purpose of the operation. Every COIN
patrol has a task and purpose that is nested within one of the LOEs.
5-184. Leaders must plan patrol routes carefully and coordinate in detail with higher, lower, and adjacent
units, to include Host Nation security forces, aviation elements, fires, ISR elements, and reserve forces. All
patrols conduct rehearsals and a patrol brief at a minimum.
Enemy
5-185. Small-unit patrols are more effective than larger unit patrols against insurgent activities. This is
because they can cover more territory than a large unit, and are more difficult to track and predict. This
keeps the insurgent off balance.
Civil Considerations
5-189. Patrols are often the easiest way for tactical units to engage the HN population across
multiple LOEs.
Urban Patrols
5-194. The basics of patrolling remain the same in both urban and rural environments; however, the
differences between the urban and the rural environment require specific patrol considerations. Urban areas
have a high population density and patrols must be prepared for population related incidents. The
population may interact with the patrol in many ways, such as asking for medical attention
or demonstrating against the presence of the patrol itself. Basic urban patrolling consideration include
While contact with insurgents may happen, contact with elements of the population is certain.
If available, armored vehicles should be ready to rapidly reinforce urban patrols to provide
additional firepower.
At least one Soldier in each squad or team should be dedicated to scanning the rooftops
and upper level windows.
Actions at a halt must include 360-degree security. Soldiers should seek cover and face out.
Cover in an urban environment may be a light pole, a building corner or even a parked car.
Urban patrols should thoroughly scan the far side of all open areas, since insurgents will use
them to achieve stand-off.
If contact is likely, then the patrol should move by bounds. Moving by bounds, with one
element overwatching another element, is used in urban terrain just as in rural terrain.
React to contact in an urban environment often includes the basic elements of a cordon
and search. Once contact is made, return fire is initiated and simultaneously the area should be
cordoned to prevent the insurgents escape.
Combined Patrols
5-195. The combined patrol is a patrol conducted with Host Nation security forces and US units.
They are an important piece in increasing the legitimacy of the HN government and improving the skills
of the HN security forces.
Mutual Support
5-196. Commanders consider mutual support when task-organizing forces and assigning areas
of operations. Mutual support is support units render each other against an enemy, because of their
assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities (JP
1-02). Mutual support has two aspects: supporting range and supporting distance.
Supporting Range
5-197. Supporting range is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet
remain within the maximum range of the second units weapons systems (FM 3-0). It depends on available
weapons systems and is normally the maximum range of the supporting units indirect fire weapons. For
small units such as squads, sections, or platoons, it is the distance between two units that their direct fires
can cover effectively. If one unit cannot effectively or safely fire in support of the other unit, they may be
out of supporting range even though their weapons have the requisite range.
Supporting Distance
5-198. Supporting distance is the distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come
to the aid of the other. It is a function of terrain and mobility, distance, enemy capabilities, friendly
capabilities, and reaction time. During counterinsurgency operations, commanders should always consider
supporting distance. Units maintain mutual support when one unit can draw on another units capabilities
for support.
TYPES OF PATROLS
5-199. There are two types of patrols:
Reconnaissance Patrols
5-200. This type of patrol collects information and confirms or disproves the accuracy of information
previously received. They are used to locate insurgent units and base camps, to reconnoiter specific
locations, locate leaders, and gather intelligence. Reconnaissance patrols provide the commander with
timely, accurate information of insurgents, the population, and the terrain. This information is vital
in making tactical decisions. Leaders must ensure that no pattern is established that would allow an
insurgent force to ambush reconnaissance units. Reconnaissance patrols are further classified into two
types.
Security Patrols
5-209. The difference between a security patrol and a raid or ambush patrol is that combat activity is not
the primary mission of the security patrol. This is true even if combat is expected during the patrol.
Security patrols normally seek to control critical roads and trails, maintain contact between villages
and units, provide security for friendly forces, provide security in rural areas, and interdict insurgent routes
of supply and communication.
Saturation Patrols
5-210. This is when units use numerous combat patrols to saturate an area of suspected insurgent activity
by moving over planned and coordinated routes, which are changed frequently to avoid establishing
patterns. Saturation patrols are extremely effective against insurgents. Use of saturation patrols results in
the following:
Denial of an area to an insurgent force as it seeks to avoid contact with the saturation patrols.
Ability to harass insurgent forces.
Opportunity to discover insurgent forces.
Chance to gain an intimate knowledge of the area of operations.
Chance to reassure the local population that the government provides protection and security.
Satellite Patrols
5-211. This patrol technique adds depth to a patrol, deters ambushes, and provides patrols with a
maneuver element on enemy contact. Figure 5-11 shows a satellite patrol moving through a built-up area.
5-212. The satellite patrol uses a base unit to control smaller units, or satellites, that leave and return to
the base unit. The advantage of this technique is the unpredictability, to the enemy, of the route, size,
locations, and the patrols overall axis of advance. Satellite patrols are given either an area or an axis
of movement. As with all other patrols, they should have a specific task and purpose. Units have specific
requirements including
Organization
5-213. At a minimum, the patrol has one base and one satellite unit.
Size
5-214. The size of the base unit and satellites is METT-TC dependent. Normally, a satellite unit consists
of either a squad or a fire team. All units must be able to defend themselves until reinforcements arrive.
Movement
5-216. All units must know the overall route and if possible, left and right boundaries. Both the base unit
and the satellite units move in ways to confuse the enemy as to the patrols actual axis of advance.
Standard movement techniques are still used. Satellites move away from the base unit for limited periods
of time to inspect potential ambush sites, dead spaces, parallel roads, or other assigned missions. The time
that the satellite is separated from the base unit should be prescribed by the patrol leader prior to departure.
Training
5-217. Units may experience initial difficulty with this technique because of the dispersed, unpredictable,
and seemingly random movement of the satellite patrols. To properly execute the technique, units must
train and practice.
Actions on Contact
5-218. The unit in contact reacts normally. All other units move towards the unit in contact. The satellite
patrol leader coordinates, as needed, their routes, actions, and linkup.
Patrol Debrief
5-219. One of the best ways to turn information into intelligence is to conduct a patrol debrief following
every patrol. When the patrol is over, the unit has not completed its mission. The leader must ensure that
all the information collected during the patrol is turned over to the appropriate staff section for evaluation.
Additionally, all patrol members must be debriefed to collect any information not already identified. The
unit must also conduct an after-action review of the entire mission from start to finish. The unit must record
what operations were executed correctly and what could have been done better. This information must be
passed on so that others can learn from the operation. Finally, unit members must account for and clean
their equipment in order to be ready for the next operation. The debrief, at a minimum, should include
Specifics on the five Ws (who, what, when, where, why) and how.
Photos or sketches.
Answers to priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and other information requirements.
Actionable intelligence.
Recap of route.
Reports of enemy contact.
Engagements conducted:
Who engaged the guerrilla force?
What concerns have the HN population brought to the patrols attention?
What promises did the US make as a result of these concerns?
Tips or actionable information for intelligence.
Noteworthy observations (propaganda, graffiti, and so on).
Changes in the HN population, which leaders can use to improve understanding of community
dynamics. These changes may be detected in
Peoples attitudes toward coalition forces.
Local infrastructure.
Civil leadership.
Local organization.
Civil institutions.
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE
5-221. In COIN, tactical units must consider how offensive operations can be used to assist their efforts
to strengthen the local government. For instance, a unit might conduct a combined cordon and search based
on a tip provided by the local mayor, assist in securing polling sites during local or national elections,
or set the conditions for completion of a government project. Units must remember that all offensive
operations support one or another groups political agenda. Eliminating one insurgent group may lead
to another group filling the power vacuum.
emplacement of a sniper, or allow the covert positioning of a force for a later attack. Units must be careful
about too closely linking projects and offensive operations to ensure that they do not inadvertently decrease
the populations support.
SUMMARY
Offensive operations are a critical part of counterinsurgency and help Host Nations establish civil security
and civil control. Key operations include search and attacks, cordon and searches, searches, raids,
ambushes, and COIN patrols, especially in the clear phase of a clear-hold-build operation. Offensive
operations can support other LOEs such as support Host Nation security forces and restore essential
services. Commanders conduct offensive operations in COIN with constant considerations of the
population in support of the seven COIN LOEs.
Section IOVERVIEW
Tactical formations conduct three types of defensive operations in every environmentarea defense, mobile
defense, and retrograde. At the tactical level, counterinsurgency units focus mostly on executing an area
defense, although, there may be instances where mobile defense or retrograde are appropriate.
AREA DEFENSE
6-1. This type of defensive operation concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated
terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (FM 3-0). In counterinsurgencies, both
the insurgency and the counterinsurgent are vying for the support of the population as if it were terrain.
The focus of the area defense is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself
in mutually supporting, prepared positions. In counterinsurgencies, commanders choose an area defense
to secure the population by living among the population employing the seven COIN lines of effort.
Examples of an area defense in counterinsurgencies are a combat outpost next to a city market, a
permanent squad position at an electrical plant, and a checkpoint near a police station.
MOBILE DEFENSE
6-2. This type of defensive operation concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a
decisive attack by a striking force (FM 3-0). The mobile defense focuses on defeating or destroying the
enemy by allowing him to advance to a point where he is exposed to a decisive counterattack by the
striking force. Mobile defense operations are less common in counterinsurgencies, because insurgents
rarely mass. However, strike operations can be useful in destroying guerrilla bases. Another example of a
mobile defense at the tactical level is the use of quick reaction forces to exploit tactical intelligence.
RETROGRADE
6-3. This type of defensive operation involves organized movement away from the enemy (FM 3-0).
The enemy may force these operations, or a commander may execute them voluntarily.
In counterinsurgencies, retrograde operations are generally conducted intentionally after a unit
is transitioning responsibility of an area of operations to a Host Nation security force or a relief in place
with another US unit.
SITE SELECTION
6-6. Brigades, battalions, and companies routinely possess enormous AOs during counterinsurgencies,
some as large as US states. Within these large AOs, there can be hundreds or thousands of essential service
structure, governmental infrastructure, economic assets, population centers, and important leaders that may
be targets for the insurgency. There are many techniques to conduct security operations at the tactical level.
Tactical units need a framework to decide how best to secure the HN population, and HN infrastructure.
6-7. It is not possible to protect every asset and every point. Eventually, the insurgent will attack.
A primary goal is to protect those vital assets and points to such a degree that, if they are attacked, the
damage to them is minimal, while the insurgent's losses are heavy. The CARVER-P Vulnerability
Prioritization Matrix is a method for units to help the HN government in deciding what HN assets
to protect.
Step 1Identification
6-10. Identify and continually reevaluate the key structures, capabilities, organizations, and individuals
in the AO that the insurgents may target. Record each target's name and location on a separate Carver-P
Risk/Vulnerability Prioritization Matrix. Figure 6-2 showed an example matrix completed for a
power plant.
Step 2Evaluation
6-11. Evaluate this potential target using the Criteria Evaluation Tool shown in Figure 6-3. This tool
provides a simple means to determine risk either using the four generic risk statements of each criteria, or
by developing or modifying similar statements.
Step 3Analysis
6-12. In the Criteria Evaluation Tool (Figure 6-3), for each criteria, choose an appropriate risk
statement, which corresponds to a risk level. Then, explain why and how you assessed the risk level, assign
a numerical value for each of the criteria and, if needed, identify the control and mitigation for each
assessment. Transfer this information to the matrix and sum the values. This sum represents the assessed
desirability of the potential target from the insurgents perspective. The higher the number the more likely
the insurgent will attack the target.
Step 5Prioritization
6-14. Compare this target to others to determine priority.
CRITICALITY CRITERIA. Criticality refers to asset value. This is the primary consideration in targeting. A
target is critical when its destruction or damage has a significant impact on military, political, or economic
aspects of a community.
High effect on output, production, service, or mission ............................................................ High Risk
Moderate effect on output, production, service, or mission .................................................... Moderate Risk
Negligible effect on output, production, service, or mission.................................................... Low Risk
No significant effect on output, production, service, or mission .............................................. No Risk
Invulnerable to all but the most extreme targeting measures ................................................. No Risk
Moderately positive effects for insurgent; few significant negative effects ............................. Moderate Risk
No significant effects; neutral.................................................................................................. Low Risk
Overwhelmingly negative effects for insurgent; no significant positive effects ....................... No Risk
The target is easily recognizable at small arms range. Requires a small amount of
training for recognition ............................................................................................................ Moderate Risk
The target is hard to recognize at night or in bad weather, or might be confused with other
targets or target components. Requires some training for recognition ................................... Low Risk
The target cannot be recognized under any conditions, except by experts ............................ No Risk
PROTECTION
6-15. Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military
and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure, deployed or located
within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0). The elements of protection are the
same in concept between conventional operations and COIN. However, one important aspect is that,
counterinsurgents are responsible for protecting local citizens. By ensuring that the local population
is secure, counterinsurgents increase their effectiveness in all other tasks and gain allies who will provide
information and cooperation. This increases the security of tactical units.
Observation Post
6-18. Although an OP has too little combat power to secure the vital asset, it can immediately call
for support.
Vehicle Patrols
6-19. Vehicle patrols may be used to give periodic coverage to many low category vital assets. Timings
for patrols must be varied to prevent the likelihood of ambush and to retain the element of surprise. Patrols
should be strong enough to deal with anticipated threats and they must be supported by a local reserve.
Foot Patrols
6-20. Foot patrols also give periodic coverage to low category vital assets. Foot patrols will be
particularly valuable at vital assets where movement is congested, observation is difficult, and concealment
is easily afforded to enemy forces, such as those in busy city blocks.
Airmobile Patrols
6-21. Airmobile patrols may be used as a supplement to vehicle and foot patrols. They will be valuable
for checking vital assets over extended distances or where access is difficult.
Hardening
Hardening vehicles or static sitesIncreases protection.
Makes an insurgent attack more difficult.
Uses natural or man-made materials to protect personnel, equipment, or facilities.
Concrete or expedient barriers.
Sandbags, walls, shields, berms, or some other type of physical protection.
Protects resources from blast, direct and indirect fire, heat, radiation, or electronic warfare.
Concrete and expedient barriers.
Is intended to defeat or negate the effects of an attack.
Combat Identification
6-24. CID is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the OE sufficient
to support an engagement decision (JP 3-0). These objects, all of which are potential targets, must be
quickly discriminated as friendly, enemy, or neutral. This is necessary to ensure that enemy forces can be
destroyed, friendly entities can be identified and prevented from becoming fratricide victims, and neutral
entities can be identified to prevent collateral damage. Common combat identification techniques include
the use of
Glint tape.
Infrared lights and strobes.
Heat sources.
VS-17 panels.
Flares.
COUNTERINSURGENCY BASES
6-25. US counterinsurgency forces operate within a Host Nation and must have a base from which
to operate. Typically, bases try to secure the population and isolate the insurgency from its support. A base
is a locality where operations are projected or supported (JP 1-02). All bases must be securable
and defendable. Bases vary in accordance with the size of the unit occupying the base and the mission
of the units using the base. All types of bases require clear command relationships. In counterinsurgencies,
forward operating bases (FOBs), combat outposts, and patrol bases are three types of bases.
6-27. Some differences exist between brigade and battalion FOBs. Brigade FOBs are larger than
battalion FOBs, and they provide a rear location for elements of battalions such as forward support
companies. A battalion FOB is normally staffed with the minimum personnel needed to operate
and provide security. It should also maintain two methods for sustainment: road and either air or water.
COMBAT OUTPOSTS
6-28. This is a reinforced observation post that can conduct limited combat operations (FM 3-90).
In counterinsurgency operations, combat outposts are often company and platoon-sized bases inside
of insurgent-influenced territory. They represent a cornerstone of counterinsurgency operations, in that
they are a means to secure the population. Located in strategically important areas, a combat outpost
provides security in its immediate area and direct contact with the local populace. These benefits are
unavailable from remote bases. Although the strategy carries with it potential downsides in terms
of increased protection concerns and limiting flexibility, the bases provide a huge increase in overall
security in the area.
6-29. Properly placed combat outposts often increase overall security. Emplacing a company or platoon
combat outpost in sector is a deliberate operation requiring detailed planning and additional logistical
support. The unit must first decide the task and purpose of the outpost by analyzing their sector.
Purpose
6-30. Outposts may be employed
To secure key lines of communication or infrastructure.
To secure and co-opt the local populace.
To gather intelligence.
To assist the government in restoring essential services.
To force insurgents to operate elsewhere.
Priorities of Work
6-31. For the initial establishment of combat outposts, priorities of work need to be considered. Some
considerations include
Ensuring the position is free of noncombatants. Removing them from the area of operations
before occupying the position.
Selecting key weapons and crew-served weapon positions to cover likely mounted
and dismounted avenues of approach.
Clearing fields of fire. Prepare loopholes, aiming stakes, sector stakes, and target reference
point markings. Construct positions with overhead cover and camouflage.
Identifying and securing supra- and subsurface avenues of approach such as rooftops, sewers,
basements, and stairwells.
Constructing barriers and emplacing obstacles to deny the enemy any access to streets,
underground passages, and buildings, and to slow his movement in general.
Integrating barriers or obstacles with key weapons.
Improving and marking movement routes between positions, as well as to alternate
and supplementary positions.
Stockpiling ammunition, food, firefighting equipment, and drinking water.
PATROL BASES
6-32. When a patrol halts for an extended period, it takes active and passive measures to provide
maximum security by occupying a patrol base. A patrol base can be permanent or temporary.
Situations
6-33. Common situations that require establishing a patrol base include
A requirement to cease all movement to avoid detection.
A requirement to hide the unit during a lengthy, detailed reconnaissance of the objective area.
A need to prepare food, maintain weapons and equipment, and rest after extended movement.
A need to formulate a final plan and issue orders for actions at the objective.
A requirement for reorganization after a patrol has infiltrated the enemy area in small groups.
A need for a base where several consecutive or concurrent operations, such as ambush, raid,
reconnaissance, or surveillance patrols, can be conducted.
Purposes
6-34. In counterinsurgency operations, collocating patrol bases in population centers enables
combined forces
To deny the insurgent access to the local population.
To influence and assist the local government.
To provide security.
To help Host Nation security forces provide their own unaided security.
Methods of Establishment
6-35. Patrol bases, in the current fight, can be established using either of two methods. The same
priorities of work described for combat outposts apply also to patrol bases:
Move in with the indigenous population. The advantages of the first method are that Soldiers
will have more direct contact with the local government, the locals will identify combined
forces with the emerging Host Nation government, and the construction will be less intensive.
The disadvantages are that Soldiers may live in unsanitary conditions, the mass base
or auxiliary may inform insurgents about outgoing patrols with relative ease, attacks on the
base will have collateral damage considerations, and houses are often not suited for defense.
Build a new patrol base. Although more isolated from the population, new patrol bases are
usually on chosen ground and, therefore, easier to defend. Additionally, they are far more
resource and personnel intensive during construction. It is generally advisable to set aside
detailed planning time before sending a combined force to occupy the terrain.
TERRAIN
6-37. Proper evaluation and use of the terrain in the area is essential to hold down the number
of additional forces required for base defense. Key terrain factors to consider include the following:
Use of the terrain's natural defensive characteristics.
Use of artificial obstacles to enhance the terrain's natural defensive characteristics.
Control of all roads and waterways leading into the base.
Control of military lines of communications and civilian commerce routes.
Control of land areas surrounding the base to a range beyond that of enemy mortars
and rockets.
HOST NATION SECURITY FORCES
6-38. The base commander should consider the integration of Host Nation security forces in the overall
base defense effort. Particular emphasis is on integration of host country forces in patrol and populace
control activities. Both host and third country forces provide local security for their own units. However,
to ensure maximum benefit, all such local plans should be coordinated and integrated with the base master
defense plan.
COMMUNICATION
6-39. Control is the key to a successful base defense. To achieve the necessary control, a
communication capability must be established between the base defense operations center and sector
commanders, and between the sector commander and his bunkers, towers, and reserve. Bunkers or Towers
within each section can communicate laterally within the sector, and flank bunkers of one sector can
communicate with flank bunkers of adjacent sectors.
SUSTAINMENT
6-40. Depending on the mission and status of the battalion, the type of transport available, the weather,
and the terrain, resupply may be by air or ground. The availability of landing zones and drop zones
protected from the enemy's observation and fire is the main consideration if selecting organizing aerial
resupply.
PROTECTION
6-41. All units in the base area are responsible for preserving its fighting potential. Protective measures
reduce the probability (and the effects) of damage caused by hostile action. Responsibility for the conduct
of protective measures is assigned to fire fighting units, chemical units, medical units, and other units.
In addition, all units assigned to the base are tasked to conduct activities such as dispersion, camouflage,
blackout, field discipline, and use of shelters.
SECURITY
6-42. Early warning of pending actions ensures the base commander time to react to any insurgent
threat. Outposts, patrols, ground surveillance and countermortar radar, military working dogs teams,
and air reconnaissance and surveillance provide early warning. Information provided by civilians
and actions of indigenous personnel near the base are excellent indicators of pending enemy actions.
All-round security is essential.
DEFENSE IN DEPTH
6-43. Alternate and supplementary positions, observation posts, and mutually supporting strong points
in front of the base forward defense area extend the depth of the defense. The commander plans fires
throughout the defensive area up to the maximum range of available weapons. Portable obstacles may be
placed around critical targets during reduced visibility to disrupt the enemys plan and add depth to the
defense.
PATROLS
6-44. Base defense operations to counter small groups of enemy forces include aggressive, frequent
patrolling by squadand platoon-size forces to detect, capture, or destroy small groups of insurgents.
Dogs, if available, may be used to add security and additional detection ability to patrol operations.
Populated areas near the base are searched, and surprise checkpoints are established along known
or suspected routes of insurgent movement.
MUTUAL SUPPORT
6-46. Defending forces are positioned to ensure mutual employment of defensive resources that include
fires, observation, and maneuver elements. Mutual support between defensive elements requires careful
planning, positioning, and coordination because of the circular aspects of the base area. Surveillance,
obstacles, prearranged fires, and maneuvers are used to control gaps.
ALL-AROUND DEFENSE
6-47. In defensive planning, the base commander must be prepared to defend against enemy attack from
any direction. Plans are sufficiently flexible, and reserves are positioned to permit reaction to any threat.
Base defense forces are assigned primary and alternate positions and sectors of responsibility. All
personnel are assigned duty stations or shelters.
RESPONSIVENESS
6-48. Attacks against a base may range from long-range sniper, mortar, or rocket fire to attacks by
suicide bombers or major forces. The insurgent has the advantage of deciding when, where, and with what
force he will attack. The defender positions his forces and plans fires and movement so he can respond to
the widest possible range of enemy actions. The defender prepares plans, to include counterattack plans,
and rehearses, evaluates, and revises them as necessary.
PROTECTION
6-51. Protection involves enemy and security considerations.
Enemy
Coverage of dead spaces.
Creation of a safety zone to prevent rocket attacks.
Emplacement of IEDs along routes.
Observation.
Security
Position concrete block guard towers at each corner and reinforce with sandbags.
Use chain-link screens to protect positions from rocket-propelled grenades and hand grenades.
WORK AND SLEEP AREAS
Separate work areas from sleeping and eating areas for sanitation and health concerns.
Develop a basing strategy that
Projects where facilities will be located.
Identifies areas for expansion is required.
COMBAT OUTPOST EQUIPMENT
6-52. Standard equipment for the base includes
Kitchen sets.
Motor pool assets.
Gym sets.
Power generators.
Earth-moving equipment.
STORAGE
Create storage space by using military van containers (MILVANs).
Use MILVANs for bunkers, portable housing, and work units.
ELECTRICAL
6-53. When initially developing combat outposts
Envision the proper wiring and layout of zone power grids.
Consider using generators for backup.
Consider hiring contract electricians and construction workers, which can assist greatly in the
development of this system.
PLUMBING
Field sanitation is paramount to the health and safety of personnel on the combat outpost.
Bulk water from locally drilled wells is typically the main source of water.
FUEL
Fuel stands are required for storing and distributing bulk fuel assets.
COUNTERINFILTRATION AND EARLY WARNING
6-54. The key to an effective combat outpost defense lies in identifying the threats. Among the most
dangerous threats are infiltrators. The best defense against these threats is the population that surrounds the
combat outpost. As described in Chapter 1, internally displaced people, merchants, or shopkeepers are
potential sources of intelligence about insurgent attacks on bases. Soldiers from the combat outpost must
talk to their neighbors.
BASE DEFENSE
6-55. This includes both normal and emergency military measures taken to nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of enemy attacks or sabotage. The base commander is responsible for the local defense of the
base and provision of resources for other activities within the overall area of operations. The base defense
force commander executes base defense operations. Operations are conducted to ensure the continued
effectiveness of base facilities and units to fulfill their missions. The area commanders responsibilities
include protecting the resources of his area from interruptions caused by enemy activities. Figure 6-6
shows a possible organization of a base command.
BASE COMMANDER
6-56. The mission of the base commander is to exercise command, control, and administration of the
base and to exercise necessary control of resident and transient units not a part of the base command.
A base commander may also be the area commander. The base commanders responsibilities include
establishing the overall defense organization as well as planning, preparing, and executing all defense
measures.
In 1965, the Marine Corps created the Marine Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam. The plan
was to incorporate a Marine Squad with a Vietnamese Popular Defense Force platoon on the Fort Page
firebase.
On June 10, 1965, 12 Marines from C Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines were placed with a
Vietnamese Popular Defense Force platoon of about 30 men in a village. Binh Nghia had long been a
"hotbed" of Viet Cong activity. Aggressive patrols and intelligence gained by the Popular Defense Force
soldiers immediately disrupted Viet Cong Operations, and the sector grew quiet. The Viet Cong
requested support from the 409 North Vietnamese Army Battalion. They planned to attack Fort Page and
destroy the CAP. This would free the Viet Cong to resume regular operations.
On September 14, 1965, the CAP was conducting normal night patrols, leaving Fort Page with only 6
Marines and 12 Vietnamese soldiers. Forgetting that the CAP's presence was responsible for the lull in
Viet Cong activity, the squad leader lowered American security from 2 Marines to 1 Marine per guard
shift. This left Vietnamese Soldiers almost completely in charge of Fort Page security. Viet Cong Sappers
infiltrated that night and killed 6 Vietnamese Soldiers and 5 Marines. A reserve squad from a nearby
Marine company firebase arrived on scene after the NVA battalion withdrew. The Viet Cong thought they
had won.
The next morning, the Marine Division Commander asked remaining Marines if they wanted to stay. To a
soldier, they did. At night, the Marines and Vietnamese soldiers doubled their security, and Viet Cong
operations came to a complete stop.
In March 1967, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army planned another attack on Fort Page. The
CAP had reliable intelligence about the attack, and sent out two patrols to provide early warning. Fearing
a repeat of the 1965 attack, Marine commanders ordered the CAP to retire under threat of court martial.
The Marine squad leader asked his squad what they thought.
One said, Theyre not getting this fort. Theyre not getting this ville. Im not leaving here, no matter what.
The Marines stayed. When one of the CAP patrols killed the NVA battalion scout, the rest of the battalion
withdrew.
Fort Page was never again threatened. By the time the Marines withdrew from Binh Nghia, the
Vietnamese soldiers were patrolling in buddy teams on their own.
COUNTER AMBUSH
6-61. Ambushes are a basic tactic commonly used by guerrilla forces. As such, counterinsurgent forces
must continually operate under the understanding that they will encounter an ambush. Counterinsurgent
forces must therefore develop specific local procedures to both react to and to counter ambushes. Typical
complex insurgent ambushes involve IEDs, small arms fire, mortars, and sniper fire.
MOUNTED PROCEDURES
6-63. The following procedures may be used when reacting to an ambush while mounted:
Immediately return fire and assume a covered position if possible.
If you are in the kill zone, leave rapidly.
If you are not in the kill zone, use fire and maneuver to destroy the enemy if possible.
Scan your area and prepare for additional attacks, especially
An IED.
An enemy moving to flank.
An enemy moving to engage you with RPGs or antitank weapons.
Report contact to higher HQ.
Follow directions of the vehicle or convoy commander.
COUNTERING IEDS
6-64. An improvised explosive device (IED) is "a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner
incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy,
incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but it is normally made from nonmilitary
components" (JP 3-07.2). IEDs are key components of insurgent ambushes. (See also FM 3-90.119.)
TECHNIQUES
6-66. Wide usage, a destructive nature, and the resulting overall impact on military operations makes
the IED a significant factor for tactical units. For this reason, leaders at all levels must consider IEDs. At a
tactical level, a unit has three major techniques for defeating IEDs. They are
Attack the network.
Defeat the device.
Train the force.
Attack the Network
6-67. This method is used to defeat the complex network of IED makers, financiers, emplacers,
suppliers, and others before the IED is emplaced. It includes actions and activities against networks
designed to interrupt the enemys chain of IED activities by identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities
and enabling offensive operations. This effort is accomplished through intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, counter bomber targeting, device technical and forensic exploitation, disposal
of unexploded and captured ordnance, persistent surveillance directed toward defeat of the enemys
capabilities, and the execution of information tasks which includes command and control warfare, military
deception, and, especially, information engagements. Search operations and operations to kill or capture
network members provide the final, critical step in the process. It is better to find 100 detonators in a cache
than to deal with 100 IEDs on the battlefield.
6-68. Several analytical tools can be used by tactical units to detect members of an IED network
and synchronize all information gained through various sources. They are part of the targeting process,
which is discussed in Chapter 4. By correctly synchronizing intelligence at all levels, leaders can better
apply combat power to attacking the IED network. The three major tools are imagery and geospatial
intelligence analysis, pattern analysis, and link analysis.
Pattern Analysis
6-70. Units use pattern analysis to determine many of these patterns and predict potential hazards.
Pattern analysis is the ability to observe a selection of events or actions over a period of time in a defined
location or area. It is used to discover likely patterns or similarities that lead to a logical conclusion that the
action or event will occur again in the same location. The two most common forms are coordinates register
and pattern-analysis plot sheet.
Considerations
6-71. For IED analysis, commanders and staffs use pattern analysis to determine the
Types of IEDs.
Locations where IED incidents have occurred.
Characteristics of the IED sites.
Sizes of the IEDs.
Distance from road, mosque, other natural or man-made objects.
Type of terrain the threat prefers.
Other obstacles used in conjunction with IEDs.
Routes to and from the IED sites (worn paths, other).
Distance from the IED site to the possible cache.
Types of munitions and whether one or more types were used.
Whether the IEDs used explosively formed penetrators (EFPs).
Whether the IEDs used shape charges.
Other IED main components such as
Main charge (explosive)
Casing (materials around the explosives)
Initiators.
Methods of initiation, such as
Command wired.
Radio controlled.
Victim operated.
Timed.
Coordinates Register
6-72. A coordinates register shows cumulative events that have occurred within the AO and focuses on
the where of an event. Figure 6-9, which is an example of a coordinates register, is also known as an
incident map.
Note: List daily entry number on calendar. In journal, cross-reference each incident to the
incident overlay.
Link Analysis
6-74. Link analysis is used to show contacts, associations, and relationships between persons, events,
activities, organizations. The two most effective types of link analysis tools are the activities
and association matrixes and the link diagram.
Link Diagrams
6-76. Often, the link analysis is the most effective method to show the connections between people,
groups, or activities. An example of a link diagram is shown in Figure 6-13. The analyst can easily
determine from the diagram that A knows B, and that B knows C and D. B is suspected of knowing E,
and C knows D, B, and E. Although the same information could be shown on a matrix, it may be easier
to understand when shown on a link analysis diagram. As situations or investigations become more
complex, the ease in understanding a link analysis diagram becomes more apparent. In almost all cases, the
available information is first shown and analyzed on both types of matrixes, which are then used
to construct a link analysis diagram for further analysis.
Dismounted Patrols
6-78. Dismounted patrols are especially useful in countering IEDs. Use of dedicated counter IED
patrols, especially along main supply routes, is an important technique to reduce the threat of IEDs along
those routes. A great way to counter IEDs is to eliminate the popular support or acquiescence to the IED
cell through regular engagements. If that is not possible, then identify, and neutralize the kill zones.
Route Clearance
6-79. Route clearance teams (RCTs) are used to thwart ambushes, clear natural or man-made obstacles,
and detect IEDs. RCTs are comprised of engineers, EOD personnel, mechanical devices, and specialized
robotics to increase standoff from the IED threat. The purpose of route clearance is to eliminate
concealment for IEDs and munitions caches and to conduct the systemic detection and deterrence sweeps
along the cleared routes.
6-80. Route clearance missions consist of the following two phases: right-of-way clearance and route
maintenance and sweep operations. Right of way clearance is the removal of rubble, debris, berms, holes,
trenches, vegetation, and trash from the medians and shoulders of routes. Right-of-way clearance can be
conducted with special equipment such as an up-armored bulldozer. Cleaning the right of way in this
manner serves multiple purposes: IED-detection devices become more effective; it is more difficult for the
enemy to emplace IEDs; and all counterinsurgent forces can more easily identify IEDs should the enemy
attempt to emplace them again. Another technique is to use by local national labor, which employs the
population. Units should then conduct a deliberate route reconnaissance, identify and record the location
of man-made objects (buried pipes and cables), and investigate suspicious areas. Route maintenance
and sweep operations are when units conduct systemic, random detection sweeps of the cleared areas
and progress to detection and deterrence sweeps along the cleared route. A visual detection sweep should
focus on changed conditions.
Individual Techniques
6-82. Counter-IED operations at the soldier level revolve around several principles. (See
GTA 90-10-046 for information on combined arms improvised explosive device defeat operations.) Units
need to know, control, and identify when something is out of place in their area of operations. Insurgents
adapt their techniques based off of counterinsurgent unit actions. These principles are the following:
Maintain an offensive mindset.
Develop and maintain situational awareness.
Stay observant.
Avoid setting patterns.
Maintain 360-degree security.
Note: After these actions, there is a high probability that the suicide bomber will attempt to detonate
the explosive device. Use deadly force in accordance with the Theater ROE. Physically
restraining the suspect from detonating the device requires coordination with other Soldiers
and is inherently very dangerous.
Direct the suspect to show hands palms up. The suspect must show palms and fingers spread,
so it can be verified if the suspect is palming a detonator. Be advised that there may be a remote
detonator.
Tell the suspect to ground all carried items and step two paces away from them.
Direct the suspect to remove outer clothing and place garments on the ground.
Direct the suspect to raise or remove any undershirt, and to hold it up while turning a
complete circle.
Direct the suspect to lie face down, with arms outstretched palms up, and face turned away
from you. DO NOT approach, even if the suspect is injured. Maintain cover and wait for the
arrival of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel.
Report suicide bomber to higher HQ using the 10-line explosive hazard spot report.
If the suspect is noncompliant, deadly force will be used in accordance with the theater ROE.
Evacuate the area around the suspect (minimum 300 meters or METT-TC) to any hard cover
available.
Establish security and scan for secondary PBIEDs.
Maintain security in case of possible ambush.
Follow the directions of the vehicle/squad leader.
Active Countermeasures
6-93. Active countermeasures seek to detect and destroy the sniper before he can fire, or engage
and neutralize him after he fires.
Patrols
6-95. Constant reconnaissance and security patrols around a units position hinder a sniper from getting
into a firing position undetected. Small patrols are usually more effective than large ones. A moving sniper
who has been discovered by a patrol is at a great disadvantage since he lacks the firepower to fight a long
engagement. Small night reconnaissance patrols using night vision devices can be very effective
in disrupting and interdicting a sniper. Reconnaissance patrols should move by covered and concealed
routes to good observation points; should stop and observe; and then should move to another position. The
patrol routes and times must vary, and a reaction force or supporting weapons must be ready if the patrol
makes contact. A variation of the ambush patrol is the stay-behind ambush. A small ambush element
moves as part of a larger patrol and occupies its position without being observed. It then observes its kill
zone, which may be very large if the element has a sniper team with it, and engages enemy snipers as they
attempt to move into position. Currently, SKTs, SCTs, or small observation teams (SOTs) conduct
ambushes of likely sniper positions.
Obscurants
6-98. Projected smoke that builds quickly is a good response to protect a unit from further casualties
if engaged by an enemy sniper. It greatly limits his ability to acquire targets. The closer the smoke is placed
to the snipers location, the more effective it is. If the location of the sniper is unknown or cannot be
reached by projected smoke, a smoke cloud established near the unit can be effective in reducing the
snipers chances of hitting a target and allowing a unit to conduct first aid and CASEVAC.
Passive Countermeasures
6-99. Passive countermeasures prevent the sniper from acquiring a clear target and prevent his fires
from causing casualties. Passive countersniper measures are rarely successful by themselves. If passive
measure are the only measures enacted, they may also create a siege mentality and pass the initiative over
to the sniper. They include
TECHNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS
6-105. Countersniper actions have two parts: find and eliminate the sniper.
Eliminate Sniper
6-111. Once spotted, the enemy sniper must be killed or forced to surrender. To be successful in this
goal, the unit must rapidly locate, fix, and finish an active enemy sniper to ultimately kill or capture him.
Maneuver Rapidly
6-113. When contact is made, the on-scene commander needs to rapidly calculate the disposition of his
forces, the quick reaction force (QRF), and adjacent friendly forces and factor in time/space considerations
to determine how to neutralize the threat. Because of the fleeting nature of the sniper, it is often preferable
for the on-scene commander to begin to maneuver against the hostile sniper with an unengaged portion
of his own force rather than wait for a QRF.
CONSIDERATIONS
6-117. Establishing static checkpoints or closing roads near a high threat area often prevents further
drive-by attacks along a specific avenue of approach. However, the insurgents are not eliminated and they
will then look for new or different ways to attack. Timely and accurate reporting by subordinate units can
allow higher headquarters to integrate UAS and rotary wing aircraft to track vehicles after a drive-by
attack. This will open insurgents up to targeting counterinsurgent forces.
TECHNIQUES
6-118. One technique is to conduct mobile checkpoints. If effective, they can disrupt the ability
of insurgents to transport weapons in vehicles. Random snap checkpoints may encourage drive-by shooters
to look elsewhere for targets.
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE
6-120. This line of effort relates to the Host Nation governments' ability to gather and distribute resources
while providing direction and control for society. By disrupting the Host Nation governments ability
to conduct these functions, an insurgency can delegitimize the government. An example is the local
security of a key judge who has been instrumental in issuing verdicts against criminal activities
of insurgents in order to prevent his assassination. Defensive efforts may need to be applied so that a
government can conduct its basic functions which include
Controlling military and police activities.
Establishing and enforcing the rule of law.
Public administration.
Justice (a judiciary system, prosecutor/defense representation, and corrections).
Property records and control.
Civil information.
Historical, cultural, and recreational services.
An electoral process.
Disaster preparedness and response.
stagnant. Naturally, the Host Nation and combined forces will conduct stability operations to create
situations where businesses can thrive. An example is conducting route security, so that insurgents cannot
interfere with the transportation of products to a market. Economic infrastructure that might need defensive
considerations include
Natural resources.
Industries such as manufacturing and transportation.
Agriculture and livestockcrops, products, and storage facilities.
Local merchants and markets.
Credit associations.
SUMMARY
General Clutterbuck in the Malayan emergency said, (A Village police post)
was the only thing that
could provide security against the threat that really mattered in the villagesthe man with the knife, who
lived in the village and prowled the streets at night seeking out those people who had actively supported
the government or betrayed the guerrillas during the day. This chapter identified defensive operations
as they apply specifically to establishing civil security and civil control, and the other LOEs. Defensive
operations in COIN must secure the population, Host Nation security forces and government, and US
forces from the actions of insurgents.
Section IOVERVIEW
During an insurgency, stability operations are executed simultaneously with offensive and defensive operations.
They compliment and reinforce offensive and defensive operations. Because they begin to address the root
causes that lead to the insurgency, stability operations are often the most critical for defeating an insurgency.
There are five primary tasks within stability operationsestablish civil security, establish civil control, support
to governance, restore essential services, and support to economic and infrastructure development. Two
additional tasks support Host Nation security forces and conduct information engagement are added
to produce the seven COIN lines of effort. HN security forces are discussed in Chapter 8, while information
engagements are in Chapter 4. These seven COIN LOEs are a means for tactical units to manage a stability
operations numerous tasks, achieve unity of effort, and restore the legitimacy of a Host Nation government.
The stability tasks fall into three categories. This chapter will focus on the first two tasks:
Military forces retain primary responsibility.
Civilian agencies/organizations likely retain responsibility, but military forces prepared
to execute.
Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility.
CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD OPERATIONS
7-2. In a clear-hold-build operation, stability operations are conducted in the clear phase, hold
phase, and the build phase. In the build phase, which focuses on building HN capacity and capabilities,
stability operations are primary, although offensive operations and defensive operations occur
simultaneously. Stability operations address multiple COIN LOEs.
criminals and small, hostile groups. However, during an insurgency, the Army must now also address the
internal security threats by criminals and small, hostile groupsnotably the armed insurgents.
SUBORDINATE TASKS
7-4. Typical civil security subordinate tasks a counterinsurgent unit may perform are as follows
(combat-oriented techniques for establish civil security are covered in Chapter 6):
Enforce cessation of hostilities.
Enforce peace agreements and other arrangements.
Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
Support identification.
Protect key personnel and facilities.
Clear explosive and CBRN hazards.
SUBORDINATE TASKS
7-12. Typical civil control subordinate tasks a counterinsurgent unit may perform are
Establish public order and safety.
Establish interim criminal justice system.
Support law enforcement and police reform.
Support judicial reform.
Support property dispute resolution processes.
Support corrections reform.
Support public outreach and community rebuilding programs.
Establish Public Order and Safety
7-13. These tasks provide a broad range of activities to protect the civilian populace, provide interim
policing and crowd control, and secure critical infrastructure. These essential tasks represent actions that
must occur during and after an insurgency to ensure the long-term sustainability of any reform efforts. The
speed and effectiveness in performing these tasks directly correlates with the length of time to defeat the
insurgency. Executing these tasks as soon as practical after intervening reduces the time required
for related efforts and allows the mission to be accomplished far sooner. However, the militarys legal
authorities for all activities in the justice sector, particularly involving enforcement and adjudication of the
law, must be clear. Essential tasks may include
Secure the population.
Ensure humanitarian aid and security forces reach endangered populations and refugee camps.
Perform civilian police functions, including investigating crimes and making arrests.
Locate and safeguard key witnesses, documents, and other evidence related to key ongoing
or potential investigations and prosecutions.
Control crowds, prevent looting, and manage civil disturbances.
Secure facilities, records, storage equipment, and funds related to criminal justice and security
institutions.
Build Host Nation capacity to protect military infrastructure.
Build Host Nation capacity to protect infrastructure and public institutions.
Build Host Nation capacity for emergency response.
Fostering sustainability where military forces identify modernization needs and the means
to achieve them.
Establish Interim Criminal Justice System
7-14. Often in COIN, establishing or reestablishing an interim justice system is a prerequisite. This
restoration requires a wide range of skilled professionals working under a clearly defined legal authority:
judges, prosecutors, court administrators, defense lawyers, corrections personnel, law enforcement,
and investigators. These personneland the institutions they representprovide a temporary respite that
allows the Host Nation to restore its legal system. Essential tasks may include an initial response in which
military forces
Assess current laws and need for modifications or adoption of internationally accepted codes.
Assess Host Nation capacity to combat crime.
Deploy interim justice personnel to complement Host Nation criminal justice system.
Establish mechanisms to review the legality of detentions and minor cases to minimize pretrial
detention.
Enact interim legal codes and procedures permitted by international law.
Support Law Enforcement and Police Reform
7-15. US military forces provide support to law enforcement and policing operations, which is integral
to establishing civil control. HN police may provide this capability if the security environment permits.
Usually in insurgencies, the HN police may have become corrupt or failed altogether. In failed states,
especially during and immediately after conflict, military police forces are the only organizations able
to fill this void. At times, HN police augment military forces, rather than the other way around. The
preferred providers of civilian law enforcement services are HN police, augmented as required by military
and paramilitary police units with policing capabilities. Civilian agencies typically provide training
and capacity-building support for law enforcement services. However, US and HN military forces may be
required to perform these services in the interim, until the situation permits transition of this function
to civilian agencies or organizations. Essential tasks may include the following:
Identify, secure, and preserve evidence of
War crimes.
Crimes against humanity.
Corruption.
Transnational crime such as terrorism, organized crime, human trafficking, and narcotics.
Identify and detain perpetrators of these offenses.
Support vetting, checking credentials, and accounting for HN police forces.
Inventory and assess police facilities and systems.
Train and advise HN police forces.
Rehabilitate or construct necessary facilities.
Establish police academies.
TECHNIQUES
7-20. Most combat-oriented techniques for performing establish civil control-type tasks are covered
in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Checkpoint operations and vehicle searches help establish public order
and safety by limiting the insurgents freedom of movement.
Snap Checkpoint
7-25. This is a rapidly established, temporary checkpoint. If time allows, a designated, mobile unit
is trained and resourced for this mission. Then, with little warning, this unit can establish a snap checkpoint
almost anywhere.
Enduring Checkpoint
7-26. This is often established initially as a snap checkpoint. As the site is further developed, an
enduring checkpoint becomes semipermanent.
7-27. Insurgent forces often target traffic checkpoints with harassing sniper or indirect fire. A plan
to quickly locate and react to these threats often reaps great benefit. Additionally, checkpoints are often
targeted by insurgent snipers or by a scripted traffic incident. The insurgent's goal is to induce the
counterinsurgent to overact and then to exploit the overreaction in the media.
Locations
7-28. The precise location and degree of visibility of a checkpoint reflect its purpose. A highly visible
checkpoint is often located where traffic can avoid it. This works well for entry-control points and border
crossings. A concealed checkpoint is often located where traffic cannot avoid it by bypassing, turning
around or getting off the road without being observed and, if ordered, detained. Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3
show possible setups for snap and enduring checkpoints.
PLANS
7-30. Determine the specific purpose of the checkpoint. The purpose influences the location, degree
of individual checks, length of time, resources, and manpower required.
Define the parameters of searchesthis includes whether to search all pedestrians and all
vehicles. For vehicles, determine whether to search the vehicle, the occupants, or a
combination. Determine the search method and level of search detail. Distribute a Be on the
look out (BOLO) list, if available.
Establish the screening criteria for searches and the method of screening. This can reduce time
and manpower requirements.
Determine the in-effect time. Checkpoints lasting longer than 12 hours will require shifts.
Consider placing rest areas for shifts near the search area so they can be used as a reserve force.
Establish both near and far security. Near security protects the checkpoint force. Far security,
often concealed, prevents the escape of any vehicle or person attempting to turn back upon
sighting the checkpoint. Plans must include the actions taken when this happens.
Establish and brief the ROE and EOF procedures including warning signs.
Rehearse checkpoint operations, especially EOF procedures.
Design the checkpoint layout and gather the needed materials before arrival.
Determine the personnel requirements.
Emplace in positions where traffic cannot easily bypass the checkpoint.
After it can operate on its own, determine if the HN security force should man the checkpoint.
MATERIAL CONSIDERATIONS
7-31. Consider equipment, for example
Equipment, such as speed bumps or filled barrels, to slow and canalize vehicles.
Protection items, which may include both lethal and nonlethal munitions.
Concertina wire to control movement around the checkpoint.
Sandbags and wood for defensive positions or bunkers.
Binoculars, night vision devices, and flashlights.
Long-handled mirrors (for inspecting vehicle undercarriages).
Logs and checklists for inspectors, supervisors, and so on.
Caution flags and unit signs.
PERSONNEL CONSIDERATIONS
7-32. Consider each element:
Command element.
Security element.
Search element.
Linguists and Host Nation representation.
Military police.
Medical personnel.
Communications personnel.
Tactical PSYOP team.
HCTs.
Military working dog teams.
HN security force personnel.
ESTABLISHMENT
7-33. Position a combat vehicle off the road, but within sight, to deter resistance.
Keep this vehicle in a hull-down position and protected by local security. It must be able
to engage vehicles attempting to break through or bypass the checkpoint.
Place obstacles in the road to slow or canalize traffic into the search area.
Establish a reserve, if applicable.
Establish a bypass lane for approved convoy traffic.
Designate the vehicle search area.
Establish a parking area adjacent to the search area.
Designate male and female search areas near the vehicle search area. Normally, search women
using a metal detector, searched by a female Soldier or searched by a Host Nation female.
Consider a controlled bypass lane for HN civilians with medical emergencies, HN civilian
officials, or other HN population concerns
Consider the effect on the local population to include market times, sporting events, holidays,
and collateral damage
OPERATION
7-34. Screen all vehicles IAW with established, preferably written, criteria. Establish observation
for vehicles or occupants attempting to avoid the checkpoint. This includes
Exiting a vehicle and walking away or around the checkpoint.
Having a lead vehicle signal a following vehicle to avoid the area.
Creating a distraction to allow the vehicle or occupants to slip away.
SCREENING CONSIDERATIONS
7-35. In addition to having a basic published list of criteria
Note the number of occupants.
Note the type or color of the vehicle.
Devise a method of managing important changes or alerts.
Initial
7-37. This is a cursory search that is the same for all stopped vehicles. This relatively quick check
should take no more than two minutes. It may be combined with initial vehicle screening. Basic vehicle
initial search procedures include
Ensure at least two people conduct the search:
One guard (driver and occupants)
One searcher (vehicle)
Stop the vehicle at the search site.
Have all occupants exit the vehicle and move them to one location.
Instruct the driver to turn off the engine, and then open the hood, trunk, and all doors.
Continue the search once the above is complete.
Question or search of the driver and occupants is optional.
Begin and end the exterior search at the front of the vehicle, moving in a clockwise direction.
Visually search of the exterior and top of the vehicle.
Visually search of the underside of the vehicle.
Search the interior starting at the front compartment, then the right side, then the rear
compartment, then the left side, ending at the front.
Complete the search.
Instruct the driver and occupants to continue.
Primary
7-38. This is a full search of select vehicles. Vehicles may be selected randomly, IAW screening
guidelines or due to similarities to vehicles associated with previous events (a be-on-the-look-out,
or BOLO list.) This search usually entails checking the interior, exterior, engine and trunk compartments
and mirror checks of the vehicle underside. It should take two to five minutes. Primary search include
those of those of the initial search and may add the following
Question or search the driver and occupants.
Check the inside of the front hood.
Check the rear compartment.
Secondary
7-39. This is a detailed search of a suspect vehicle. A vehicle becomes suspect usually due to screening
or discovery of items during a primary search. This thorough search is manpower and time intensive. It
may include disassembling panels, checking interiors of wheels, and so on. At the basic level, to conduct a
secondary search of a vehicle
Ensure at least four people conduct the search:
Two for the driver and occupants.
Two more for the vehicle.
Assume that the driver and occupants or the vehicle itself is suspect.
If possible, have the vehicle stop in a safe and secure location.
Instruct the driver to turn off the engine, open the hood, open the trunk, and open all doors.
Obtain the keys from the driver.
Move the driver and occupants to a separate location.
Detain and search driver and occupants while searching the vehicle.
Begin the vehicle search at the front and end at the rear.
One searcher searches the right front, right side, and right rear.
The other searcher searches the left front, left side, and left rear.
Conduct a visual search of the exterior and top.
Conduct a visual search of the underside of the vehicle.
Without entering, conduct a visual search of the interior of the vehicle.
Ensure the engine is off, and then ensure the hood, trunk, and all doors are open.
Check the inside of the front hood.
Check the interior left and right sides.
Check the rear compartment.
Complete the search.
Return keys to driver.
Instruct driver and occupants to continue.
Vehicle Types
7-40. Vehicles are generally categorized into four types: automobiles (cars), motorcycles and bicycles,
buses, and heavy goods vehicles (trucks). Search considerations for the car are covered above as part
of basic vehicle considerations. Search considerations for the three additional vehicles follow:
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE
7-44. This helps build toward effective, legitimate governance. Specifically, it focuses on restoring
public administration and resuming public services, while fostering long-term efforts to establish a
functional, effective system of political governance. In every case, for the counterinsurgent to develop a
long-term solution, unit actions must strengthen the Host Nation government and reinforce its legitimacy
with the people (Figure 7-4). The formation of an effective local government is critical to the success
of any counterinsurgency operation because they provide the foundation for legitimate governance at the
national level. Additionally, effective local governments promote social stability when people have a say
in their own government. They also increase financial transparency, which helps fight corruption. At the
local level, the formation of local neighborhood councils serves as an excellent starting point
for supporting governance. Units may have to initiate these efforts without an external agency support.
Neighborhood and district councils are effective because they empower the population on many levels.
They help the populace devise local solutions to local problems and help citizens and community leaders
build skills in community decision making. All involved parties learn to resolve conflicts peacefully
and in a transparent fashion. Local councils also help leaders at the local level develop skills that can help
them serve at higher levels of government.
SUBORDINATE TASKS
7-45. Typical tasks include
Support transitional administrations.
Support development of local governance.
Support anticorruption initiatives.
Support elections.
Working with civilian contract consultants who had partnered with USAID, brigade officers
convinced the city council to establish a new structure that included five directorates: employment,
public safety, public works, budget office, and resettlement. The employment directorate would play
a direct role in enforcing the de-Baathification process and US officers hoped the resettlement
office could work with both Arabs and Kurds to defuse the tensions caused by land disputes. RTI
consultants and CA officers also helped the new Kirkuk budget office prepare the citys budget
for 2004 and established a citizens bureau to help handle complaints from the public.
Adapted from "On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM," May 2003January 2005
TECHNIQUES
7-50. Two critical governance techniques are negotiating and mediating, and leader and meeting
security. See FM 3-07 for additional technique considerations.
Negotiation
7-52. This is a discussion between at least two parties, with the intention to produce an agreement.
Mediation
7-53. This is an attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement or compromise between disputants through
the objective intervention of a neutral party.
Arbitration
7-54. This is the process by which disputants submit their differences to the judgment of an impartial
person or group appointed by mutual consent.
Usage in a Counterinsurgency
7-55. Unit leaders must be prepared to conduct negotiations or mediations with the leaders or members
of various groups. These groups may be political, ethnic, religious, tribal, military, or even family.
Understanding the composition of groups in the AO is vital for effective negotiations and mediations.
Analyzing civil considerations using ASCOPE of various groups can be extremely helpful in preparation
for these discussions. Furthermore, tensions or hostilities between groups may destabilize a society
and provide opportunities for insurgents. Negotiations and mediations may be broken down into two
categories: situational and preplanned.
Preplanned negotiations
7-57. These allow discussion and resolution of an upcoming, specific issue or problem. For example, a
company commander may conduct a work coordination meeting between leaders of the belligerents
to determine mine-clearing responsibilities. As with situational negotiations, preplanned negotiations
require leaders to know and understand the ROE and ROI. Leaders must also know as much as possible
about every aspect of the dispute or issue. The negotiators goal is to reach an agreement that is acceptable
to both sides, and that reduces antagonism and the threat of renewed hostilities.
Steps
7-60. Several steps are common to negotiations and mediations, especially preplanned negotiations:
Prepare
7-62. Thorough preparation is needed to ensure the success of the negotiation or mediation process.
Commanders must familiarize themselves with both the situation and the area in which their unit will
operate. They should consider selecting one person who understands conflict dynamics and cross-cultural
issues to observe a negotiation or mediation and give advice. This individual can watch for body language
and other indicators of how the process is working. In turn, this person may be able to coach more effective
techniques to the negotiators or mediators. Leaders should also develop an agenda for the meeting
and consider the conduct, customs, and actions expected at the meeting
Communicate
7-63. Participants must establish an effective means of communicating with all parties. They should not
assume that a certain leader or element is opposed to their efforts without careful investigation. Instead,
they must ensure that facts are correct before forming any opinions. The commander must earn the trust
and confidence of any opposing party. This includes establishing an atmosphere (and a physical setting)
that participants will judge to be both fair and safe.
Execute
7-64. Always strive to maintain control of the session; be firm, yet even-handed, in leading the
discussion. At the same time, be flexible, with a willingness to accept recommendations from the opposing
parties and from assistants and advisors. Settle the easy issues first. Be prepared to precede issue-by-issue
in a predetermined order. Actions can have different connotations to individuals of other cultures. Culture
shapes how people reason, what they accept as fact, and what principles they apply to decision making.
Also, nonverbal behavior, such as the symbolic rituals or protocols of the arrangement for a meeting,
is important. If participants cannot reach agreement, they must keep the dialogue going. At a minimum,
they must seek agreement on when the parties will meet again.
SUBORDINATE TASKS
7-72. Typical subordinate tasks to restore essential services follow:
Provide essential civil services.
Tasks related to civilian dislocation.
Support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.
Support public health programs.
Support education programs.
Provide Essential Civil Services
7-73. Although closely related to establishing and supporting effective local governance, efforts
to provide essential civil services to the HN population involve developing the capacity to operate,
maintain, and improve those services. This broader focus involves a societal component that encompasses
long-range education and training, employment programs, and economic investment and development. At
the tactical level, activities of military forces to provide essential civil services are often defined in terms
of the immediate humanitarian needs of the people: providing the food, water, shelter, and medical support
necessary to sustain the population until local civil services are restored. Once their immediate needs are
satisfied, efforts to restore basic services and transition control to civil authorities typically progress using
lines of effort based on the memory aid, SWEAT-MSO (sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash,
medical, safety, and other considerations). These lines of effort are vital to integrating efforts to reestablish
local HN services with similar, related actions to establish a safe, secure environment. Tactical units may
support the effort to provide essential civil services by conducting detailed infrastructure reconnaissance
or security for those types of reconstruction projects. Essential tasks may include
Provide for immediate humanitarian needs (food, water, shelter, and medical support).
Ensure proper sanitation, purification, and distribution of drinking water.
Provide interim sanitation, wastewater, and waste disposal services.
Tasks Related to Civilian Dislocation
7-74. In the fluid and uncertain nature of an insurgency, the population is often left homeless. The
presence and uncontrolled flow of dislocated civilians can threaten the success of any stability operation.
The treatment of displaced populations either fosters trust and confidencelaying the foundation
for stabilization and reconstruction among a traumatized populationor creates resentment and further
chaos. Local and international aid organizations are most often best equipped to deal with the needs of the
local populace but require a secure environment in which to operate. Through close cooperation, tactical
units can enable the success of these organizations by providing critical assistance to the populace. Nearly
80 percent of all dislocated civilians are women or children. Most suffer from some form of posttraumatic
stress disorder, and all require food, shelter, and medical care. Following a major disaster, humanitarian
crisis, or conflict, providing adequate support to dislocated civilians often presents a challenge beyond the
capability of available military forces. Therefore, military forces offer vital supportcoordinated with the
efforts of other agencies organizationsto provide humanitarian assistance to the general population. The
list of essential tasks includes
Assist dislocated civilians.
Support assistance to dislocated civilians.
Support security to dislocated civilian camps.
Support Famine Prevention and Emergency Food Relief Programs
7-75. Famine vulnerability may cause an insurgency. An insurgency could certainly lead to a food
scarcity. The combination of weak institutions, poor policies, and environmental change often results
in famine. Famine may result in food insecurity, increased poverty, morbidity, malnutrition, and mortality.
Government agencies, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), numerous
nongovernmental organizations, and the United Nations, are instrumental to response efforts
in famine-prone states. They oversee the major relief programs that provide emergency food aid
to suffering populations. Tactical unit of these efforts is vital to the overall success of the operation.
Essential tasks may include
Monitor and analyze food security and market prices.
Predict the effects of conflict on access to food.
Estimate total food needs.
Assess the adequacy of local physical transport, distribution, and storage of food.
Deliver emergency food aid to most vulnerable populations.
Support Public Health Programs
7-76. This enables the complementary efforts of local and international aid organizations. The initial
efforts of military forces aim to stabilize the public health situation within the operational area. These
efforts may include assessments of the civilian medical and public health system such as infrastructure,
medical staff, training and education, medical logistics, and public health programs. Achieving measurable
progress requires early coordination and constant dialog with other actors; ultimately, this also facilitates a
successful transition from military-led efforts to civilian organizations or the Host Nation. Essential tasks
may include
Assess public health hazards within their AO including malnutrition, water sources, and sewer
and other sanitation services.
Assess existing medical infrastructure including preventative and veterinary services, health
physical and psychologicalcare systems, and medical logistics.
Evaluate the need for additional medical capabilities.
Repair existing civilian clinics and hospitals.
Operate or augment the operations of existing civilian medical facilities.
Prevent epidemics through immediate vaccinations.
Support improvements to local waste and wastewater management capacity.
Promote and enhance the HN medical infrastructure.
Support Education Programs
7-77. Military activities to support education programs generally focus on repairing or building physical
infrastructure such as classrooms, schools, or universities. In some cases, trained personnel with
appropriate civilian backgrounds provide additional services such as administrative or educational
expertise.
SUBORDINATE TASKS
7-79. Typical subordinate tasks for support to economic and infrastructure development include
Support economic generation and enterprise creation.
Support public sector investment programs.
Support private sector development.
Protect natural resources and environment.
Support agricultural development programs.
Restore transportation infrastructure.
Restore telecommunications infrastructure.
Support general infrastructure reconstruction programs.
Use money as a weapon.
SUPPORT ECONOMIC GENERATION AND ENTERPRISE CREATION
7-80. Economic recovery begins with an actively engaged labor force. Insurgencies often gain recruits
by offering the unemployed a wage. When a tactical unit occupies its AO, the demand for local goods,
services, and labor creates employment opportunities for the local populace. Local projects, such
as restoring public services, rebuilding schools, or clearing roads, offer additional opportunities for the
local labor pool. Drawing on local goods, services, and labor presents the force with the first opportunity
to infuse cash into the local economy, which in turn stimulates market activity. However, this initial
economic infusion must be translated into consistent capital availability and sustainable jobs programs.
Thus, short-term actions are taken with an eye towards enabling financial self-reliance and the creation of a
durable enterprise and job market.
7-81. The local economy requires this stimulus to sustain economic generation and enterprise creation.
It includes efforts to execute contracting duties; identify, prioritize, and manage local projects;
and implement employment programs. Often, such programs reinforce efforts to establish security and civil
order by providing meaningful employment and compensation for the local populace. The assessment
of the economic sector must include developing knowledge and understanding of local pay scales; this
is essential to establishing jobs programs with appropriate wages. Inflated pay scales may divert critical
professionals from their chosen field in pursuit of short-term financial gains from new jobs created by the
force. Establishing appropriate pay scales is also significant when the environment includes illicit actors
willing to pay for actions or services in direct conflict with the aims of the force. Adversaries can easily
exploit relatively low pay scales and quickly undermine efforts to build positive perceptions among the
people.
7-82. HN enterprise creation is an essential activity whereby the local people organize themselves
to provide valuable goods and services. In doing so, they create jobs for themselves, their families,
and neighbors that are inherently sustainable after the departure of other actors. Host nation enterprises
may provide various goods and services, including essential services such as small-scale sewerage, water,
electricity, transportation, health care, and communications. The availability of financing through banking
or microfinance institutions is essential to enterprise creation. Essential tasks may include
Implement initiatives to provide immediate employment.
Create employment opportunities for all ages and genders.
Assess the labor force for critical skills requirements and shortfalls.
Assess market sector for manpower requirements and pay norms.
Implement public works projects.
Support establishment of a business registry to register lawful business activity at the local
or provincial level.
Provide start-up capital for small businesses through small-scale enterprise grants.
Encourage the creation of small lending institutions.
Enable the development of financial institutions.
Support Public Sector Investment Programs
7-83. Organizations such as the US Agency for International Development usually manage public sector
investment in a fragile state. However, the military force can also influence success in these programs.
Public sector investment ensures the long-term viability of public education, health care, and mass transit.
It also provides for development in industriessuch as mining, oil, and natural gasand hydroelectricity.
At the tactical level, units may spur investment through grant programs or direct public investment
projects. Essential tasks may include
Identify projects that require large amounts of labor.
Prioritize public investment needs.
Develop plans to allocate available resources.
Support Private Sector Development
7-84. Developing the private sector typically begins with employing large portions of the labor force.
In addition to acquiring goods and services from the local economy, the tasks that support private sector
development infuse much-needed cash into local markets and initiate additional public investment
and development. Essential tasks may include
Identify projects that require large amounts of labor.
Assess the depth of the private sector and enterprise creation.
Identify obstacles to private sector development.
Facilitate access to markets.
Strengthen the private sector through contracting and outsourcing.
Provide investors with protection and incentives.
to help prioritize programs and projects. Essential tasks may include an initial response in which military
forces
Assess overall condition of local energy infrastructure.
Determine and prioritize essential infrastructure programs and projects.
Assess condition of existing power generation and distribution facilities.
Assess condition of existing natural resources conversion and distribution facilities.
Assess condition of existing facilities needed to effectively execute essential tasks
in other sectors.
Assess conditions of existing municipal facilities that provide essential services.
Conduct expedient repairs or build new facilities to support the local populace.
Use Money as a Weapon System
7-89. Recent experiences have shown the effectiveness of using money to win popular support
and further the interests and goals of units conducting counterinsurgency operations. Money should be
used carefully. In most cases, higher authority will tightly control funds through strict accountability
measures that ensure the money is used properly. When used effectively, and with an end state in mind,
money can be an effective means to mobilize public support for the counterinsurgents cause and further
alienate the insurgents from the population. A counterinsurgency force can use money to
Fund civic cleanup and other sanitation projects, and the equipment to complete those projects.
Fund small scale infrastructure improvements.
Fund agricultural projects to improve farming practices and livestock health, or help implement
cooperative farming programs.
Repair civic and cultural sites and facilities.
Repair institutions and infrastructure critical to governance and rule of law such as prisons,
courthouses, and police stations.
Purchase education supplies or repair infrastructure critical for educating the local populace.
Pay rewards to citizens who provide information on enemy activities and locations
Support the creation, training, and operation of Host Nation security forces.
Fund events and activities that build relationships with Host Nation officials and citizens.
Repair damage resulting from combined and coalition operations.
Provide condolence payments to civilians for casualties from combined and coalition
operations.
TECHNIQUES
7-90. Two techniques include the USAID principles of reconstruction and development, which can be
used by tactical units for project selection and small-scale building projects. (See FM 3-07 for additional
considerations.)
Capacity Building
7-93. This principle involves the transfer of knowledge, techniques, and skills to the local people,
institutions, and government so that they develop the requisite abilities to deliver essential services to the
population. Ultimately, the local officials and institutions that gain capacity are better prepared to lead their
regions through political, economic, and security-related issues.
Sustainability
7-94. This principle says that commanders should design and select projects and services that will have
a lasting effect on the local population. In other words, the impact of the projects under consideration must
endure after the facility or service is handed off to local authorities and the unit (or contractor's) departure
from the site. Sustainability also implies that the local government has the necessary resources to staff
and maintain the project. There are examples where commanders have failed to conduct adequate analysis
and built new schools or medical clinics only to discover that too few teachers or doctors were available
to staff these facilities. Similarly, some commanders have purchased large generator systems to address
electricity shortfalls for neighborhoods within their AOs. However, without addressing the fuel,
maintenance, and service requirements of these systems, the machines eventually failed and were unable
to serve as a sustainable solution for the local electrical deficit.
Selectivity
7-95. The development community defines this principle as the allocation of resources based on need,
local commitment, and foreign policy interests. These strategic characteristics are equally important
tactically. Commanders seldom receive all of the financial resources they need when implementing their
essential service, economic, and governance lines of effort. Therefore, they must "mass" available
resources into select reconstruction projects that offer the following advantages:
The local government strongly supports them.
They will positively impact the most people
They will achieve the commander's desired effects.
Assessment
7-96. This principle advises the commander and his staff to carefully research nominations, adopt best
practices, and design for local conditions in their proposed projects. Commanders should request
or conduct an assessment of local conditions before investing financial resources into any potential relief
or reconstruction program. Money should not be invested in an intelligence vacuumall available
information about local conditions should be considered such as the population's requirements, animosities,
traditions, capabilities, economics, and so on. A detailed assessment of local conditions will best advise the
commander on the project's potential to deliver its desired effects.
Results
7-97. This principle relates directly to the principle of assessment and advises commanders to direct
resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and long-term focused objectives. This development
principle is analogous to the military principle of objectivedirect every military operation toward a
clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. It is equally critical that the commander and his staff
also assess potential unintended results from their use of money. Many second or third order effects from a
project may potentially outweigh the benefits from the original intent.
Partnership
7-98. This principle encourages close collaboration with local governments, communities, donors,
nonprofit organizations, the private sector, international organizations, and universities. Partnership plays a
central role in any relief, reconstruction, or development program as it supports each of the other principles
of reconstruction and development. In the context of money as a weapon system, effective partnership will
ensure the unit's financial resources are well invested and deconflicted with other programs from other
agencies.
Flexibility
7-99. This principle states that units must adapt to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities,
and maximize effectiveness as part of their reconstruction and development program. Just as the conditions
for offensive and defensive operations are often changing and uncertain, so are the relief
and reconstruction tasks associated with stability operations. These conditions will often require
commanders to change tactics to achieve desired objectives.
Accountability
7-100. Enforcing accountability, building transparency into systems, and emplacing effective checks
and balances to guard against corruption are important components to any relief, reconstruction,
or development program. Accountability in all actions, including the units use of money, reinforces the
legitimacy of the commander and his operations, as well as the legitimacy of the local government, in the
eyes of the population.
Concept Development
7-103. Identify needs and potential projects to fill those needs. Soldiers and leaders at every level
of responsibility should help in identifying potential projects that will further the units and the Host
Nations interests in an AO. Leaders identify potential projects through meetings with local officials
and through interaction with the local populace, along with their own observations of their area
of operations. Concurrently, possible locations are identified, surveyed, and discussed with the local
population and leaders to ensure suitability.
Project Planning
7-104. Once the site has been selected and the project is ready to move forward, a plan for security
is developed and implemented. Whenever possible, Host Nation police forces should be used. The
counterinsurgent unit should also continually assess the security situation and adjust the security plan
accordingly based on the changing threat. Consideration should also be given to sustaining the security
forces for the duration of the project.
Create the design and obtain approval of design.
Determine resource requirements.
Material.
Equipment.
PersonnelLabor (professional, skilled, and unskilled).
SUMMARY
The seven counterinsurgency lines of effort (LOEs), establish civil security, establish civil control, support
Host Nation security forces, support to governance, restore essential services, and support to economic
and infrastructure development are critical to the success of any stability consideration during a
counterinsurgency operation. Ultimate success in any counterinsurgency operation requires a
combination of military and nonmilitary efforts. As President Bush stated in 2007 in reference
to operations in Iraq:
A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that
military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities.
Stability operations during a counterinsurgency seek to bring about those community improvements
and create a safe, secure, and productive environment for the populace.
BENEFITS
8-1. A Host Nation is a nation which permits, either by written agreement or official invitation,
government representatives, agencies, forces or supplies of another nation to operate in or to transit
through its territory under specified conditions (JP 1-02). A Host Nation naturally needs security forces.
Therefore, a primary goal of partnering is to get the best that both sides have to offer. Figure 8-1 shows a
typical flow of these benefits.
US ARMY ASSETS
8-2. These bring numerous assets to the counterinsurgency fight. They bring a professional military
with its training, leadership, targeting, technology, assets, resources, and expertise.
HN ASSETS
8-3. These also bring many assets to the fight. If properly measured, organized, rebuilt, trained,
equipped, advised, and mentored, an HN security force unit is uniquely able to protect the HN population,
because they understand the operational environment far better than US Forces. Their cultural
and situational awareness is a significant force multiplier during any counterinsurgency operation,
especially in HUMINT, information engagement, negotiations, and targeting. In terms of specific COIN
operations, HN security forces can aid or even take the lead on clear-hold-build operations. They should be
completely integrated in the planning process, instrumental in the decision of what areas need to be
cleared, included in the site selection process for the hold phase, and leveraged in the decisions on what
stability operations need to be conducted during the build phase. Thus, a Host Nation unit potentially
brings to a counterinsurgency fight the abilities shown in Figure 8-2.
Understand the Operational The AO is their home and their culture; they know the language, the
Environment different groups, the political situation, educational levels, economic
considerations, historical bad actors, and unofficial community leaders.
Provide Human Intelligence The HN security force is better able to gather information that leads
to HUMINT for a host of reasons, to include speaking the same
language, understanding the important players in the area, and so on.
Put the Pieces Together They can often better integrate the different fragments of intelligence
into the context of the operational environment.
Determine Credibility of They possess a vastly superior sense of cultural and situational
Intelligence Assets (Sources, awareness vital to managing and assigning credibility to sources.
Walk-Ins, Call-Ins)
Validate and Check They can confirm not only the interpreters' ability, but also the
Interpreters interpreters' loyalty.
Identify and Root Out They can pick out minute differences between normal and abnormal
Infiltrators behavior.
Gain Information Superiority They can write messages that resonate with the local populace.
CHALLENGES
8-4. Most nations have at least some cultural obstacles to developing a professional military that
is responsive and accountable to the HN population. Part of the challenge is to design a professional
military that minimizes these culture obstacles. Most challenges arise from the differing perspectives of the
US and the Host Nation.
EXAMPLES
8-5. Common cultural challenges include the following:
Nepotism, such as, rank or positions based on who you know.
Denial of negative results or errors in the interest of saving face.
Corruption, such as unofficial or under the table entitlements.
Influence from competing loyalties (ethnic, religious, tribal and political allegiances).
CATEGORIES
8-6. These challenges fall under one of four broad categories of resources, leadership, abusing power
organizational structures.
Resources
8-7. Governments must properly balance national resources to meet the peoples expectations. Funding
for services, education, and health care can limit resources available for security forces. HN spending
priorities may result in a security force capable of protecting only the capital and key government facilities,
leaving the rest of the country unsecured. HN security forces will typically not have the same resources,
equipment, money, or salaries as US units. US units may not have the means to partially sustain the HN
security forces to maximize their effectiveness. Conducting effective COIN operations requires allocating
resources to ensure integration of efforts to develop all aspects of the security force.
Leadership
8-8. Counterinsurgents may need to influence the existing HN approach to leadership. HN leaders may
be appointed and promoted based on family ties or membership in a party or faction, rather than on
demonstrated competence or performance. Leaders may not seek to develop their subordinates or feel the
need to ensure the welfare of subordinates. In some cases, leaders enforce the subordinates obedience by
fear and use their leadership position to exploit them. Positions of power can lead to corruption, which can
also be affected by local culture. Ethical climate and decision making in the HN security force leadership
is often reflected in the HN security force organizations treatment of detainees. This is a proven barometer
of the commanders ability to guide his unit and provide lasting security for the HN population.
8-9. US Forces tasked to develop HN security forces should take special interest in how the Host
Nation appoints, promotes, and develops leaders. The best way US advisors and partner units can influence
leaders is to provide positive leadership examples.
Abuse of Power
8-10. The behavior of HN security force personnel is often a primary cause of public dissatisfaction.
Corrupting influences of power must be guarded against. Cultural and ethnic differences within a
population may lead to significant discrimination within the security forces and by security forces against
minority groups. In more ideological struggles, discrimination may be against members of other political
parties, whether in a minority cultural group or not. Security forces that abuse civilians do not win the
populaces trust and confidence; they may even be a contributing factor of the insurgency. US partners
and advisors must identify and address biases, as well as improper or corrupt practices.
8-11. Abuse of power, such as hoarding property, extortion, or reprisal attacks on a specific group,
could be a root cause that lead to the insurgency or could worsen the insurgency. Units need to understand
issues in the OE and define the problem before attempting to fix problems. A current example is how various
groups may have a long cyclical history of conflict with other population groups. Ethnic, historical, political,
racial, religious, social, and territorial turmoil may contribute to cycles of violence in the Host Nation so
intractable that it will take establishing discipline, a code of honor, patriotic nationalism, and a merit based
promotion system inherent in a professional military to break this societal norm. Even then, these efforts may
not be sufficient to stop the abuse of power.
Organizational Structures
8-12. Perhaps the biggest hurdle for US forces is accepting that the Host Nation can ensure security
using organizational and operational structures that differ from US practices. The goal is not to make the HN
unit a US unit, nor even to make it operate like a US unit. HN security force commanders must be given leeway
in resolving their own security problems. Mirror imaging HN security force structure is often impractical
and does not approach the problem from the perspective root causes that lead to the insurgency. The
population, and subsequently their military, will have cultural aspects that will differ with US norms.
8-13. Commanders must recognize that the American way is best bias is counterproductive with
respect to most Host Nation security forces. While relationships among US police, customs, and military
organizations and individual unit structure work for the United States, those relationships may not exist in other
nations that have developed differently. Units and advisors should develop innovative ways to maximize the
effectiveness of the Host Nations organization, units, and bureaucracy.
GOALS
8-14. Training HN security forces is a slow and painstaking process. It does not lend itself to a quick
fix. To ensure long-term success, commanders clarify their desired end state for training programs early. These
goals consist of a set of military characteristics common to all militaries. Those characteristics have nuances
in different countries. Figure 8-3 shows how well-trained HN security forces should be characterized.
Developing HN security forces is a complex and challenging mission. The United States and multinational
partners can only succeed if they approach the mission with the same deliberate planning and preparation,
energetic execution, and appropriate resourcing as the combat aspects of the COIN operation. Accordingly,
COIN force commanders and staffs need to consider the task of developing HN security forces during their
initial mission analysis. They must make that task an integral part of all assessments, planning, coordination,
and preparation. This section discusses developing a plan and developing Host Nation security forces.
DEVELOPING A PLAN
8-15. To defeat the insurgency and be able to sustain success, the Host Nation should develop a plan,
with US assistance when necessary, to improve the units organization, training, material, leadership, personnel,
and facilities. However, these elements are tightly linked, simultaneously pursued, and difficult to prioritize.
Commanders monitor progress in all domains. The HN security force plan must be appropriate to HN
capabilities and requirements. At the tactical level, the US advisors or partner units will outline goals, allocate
resources, and schedule events as part of the plan under the COIN line of effortsupport Host Nation security
forces.
CONSIDERATIONS
8-16. Competently trained and led Host Nation security forces are vital to winning a counterinsurgency
and to sustaining a stable, secure, and just state. If local communities do not perceive US and HN forces
as legitimate, or that they cannot provide for security, then the population will not risk providing the timely
intelligence necessary to defeat the insurgency. In addition, if the populace does not see at least a gradual
transition to Host Nation responsibility, they may begin to view the HN security forces as an instrument
or puppet of US forces. Finally, these failures will result in HN security forces that are ill equipped to persevere
in a protracted struggle after US/coalition forces withdraw.
PROFICIENT
Security forces can work well in close coordination to suppress lawlessness and insurgency.
Military units are
Tactically and technically proficient
Able to perform their national security responsibilities
Able to integrate their operations with those of multinational partners.
WELL LED
Leaders at all levels
Have sound professional standards and appropriate military values.
Are selected and promoted based on competence and merit.
PROFESSIONAL
Security forces
Are honest, impartial, and committed to protecting and serving the entire population, operating under
the rule of law, and respecting human rights.
Are loyal to the central government and serving national interests, recognizing their role as the
peoples servants and not their masters.
Operate within a code of conduct and ethical behavior.
Recognize the merits of a trained and capable NCO and junior officer corps.
FLEXIBLE
Security forces can accomplish the broad missions required by the Host Nationnot only to defeat
insurgents or defend against outside aggression, but also to increase security in all areas. This requires an
effective command organizational structure that makes sense for the Host Nation.
SELF-SUSTAINED
Security forces must be able to manage their own equipment throughout its life cycle. They must also
be able to provide their own administrative and sustainment support, especially fuel, water, food, and
ammunition.
8-17. US leaders must gain trust and form bonds with HN security force units and personnel as part
of the partnership mission. Working towards cultural understanding improves the US forces relationship
with the partner units. Commanders must treat the individuals in partner units as they treat their Soldiers by
living, eating, sleeping, socializing, planning, and fighting side by side. The Host National security force
must know that US forces care for them both individually and professionally. It is this bond, not the
materials or support that commanders provide, that inspires that level of commitment and loyalty. To
successfully train and support HN security forces, the US partner unit or advisor must
Ensure security forces understand that they support the HN government and the people.
Maintain relevancy of security forces for their culture, their population, and their laws.
Understand and define the security problem.
Ensure credibility and legitimacy to all counterinsurgency operations.
Provide a model for society by using military units of mixed ethnicity, religion, political
affiliation, for example, who can work together to secure and protect all the people.
Conduct multinational operations with each newly trained security force.
Promote mutual respect between US and HN forces and between the military, police,
and paramilitary.
Train the trainers first, and then train the HN cadre.
Support the HN cadre in training the whole force.
Separate HN military and police forces, especially during their training.
Place the HN cadre in charge as soon as possible.
Recognize achievement, especially excellence.
Train all security forces not to tolerate abuses or illegal activity outside of culturally
acceptable levels.
Develop methods to report violations.
Enable HN to assume the lead in counterinsurgency operations to alleviate effects of a large US
presence.
Create, as needed, special elements in each force such as SWAT, waterway, border, or SOF.
Establish and use mobile training teams.
Ensure infrastructure and pay is appropriate and managed by the Host Nation government.
Promote professionalism that does not tolerate internal incompetence. Develop methods
to redress.
ORGANIZING US FORCES
8-18. As planning unfolds, mission requirements should drive the initial organization for the unit
charged with developing security forces. To achieve unity of effort, a single organization should receive
this responsibility. Typically, these duties are undertaken by some form of an advisor team. Due
to manpower constraints, some functions are best undertaken by partner units.
Partner Units
8-19. This is a unit that shares all or a portion of an area of operation with an HN security force unit. US
forces operating as partner units to HN security forces need to be prepared to make some organizational
changes. US forces should consider establishing combined staff cells for intelligence, operations, planning
and logistics. These staff cells support transparent operations and unity of effort, enhance the relationship
between the BCT and the HN force by demonstrating a degree of trust, and develop HN capacity in key
staff areas by having HN personnel get intimately familiar with various staff procedures by performing
them alongside their CF partners.
8-20. Additionally, before deploying, US forces should train in partnering with HN security forces. This
will ease the transition to multinational operations. At a minimum, this should include cultural awareness
training, basic language training, and basic soldier skills training such as marksmanship and first aid.
Advisor Units
8-21. An advisor is a military member who conducts operations that train Host Nation military
individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime skills;
provide advice and assistance to military leaders, and provide training on tactics, techniques,
and procedures required to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, and develop
indigenous individual, leader, organizational skills. Advisor units can be internally or externally resourced.
Internally resourced advisor teams are created from the partner unit when they are required to establish
them on their own. Externally resourced teams are usually DA resourced for the duration of the advisor
team mission. One way of organizing for this role is to have an eleven person team with clearly divided
responsibilities. Each person's duties should reflect his responsibilities to the internal team, and to advising
their HN security force counterpart. In certain situations, the partner unit commander might need to provide
a security element to support an advisor team. This security element might need to be large enough
to guard a compound on an HN security force base and to crew several vehicles. A ten-person security
element has proved be useful in Iraq and Afghanistan. Figure 8-4 shows possible duties on the advisor
team.
Team Chief This Soldier is the principal advisor to the HN battalion commander and is
the Advisor team commander.
Team Sergeant This is the advisor team NCOIC, who also serves as principal advisor to the
HN command sergeant major or equivalent.
Executive Officer This Soldier is the principal advisor to the HN security forces executive
officer in addition to performing the same functions that any unit executive
officer would do in a traditional unit.
Intelligence Officer This Soldier is the principal advisor to the HN Intelligence Staff and provides
intelligence to the Advisor Team Chief.
Operations Officer This Soldier is the principal advisor to HN Staff for Operations and Training
(S3) and plans the advisor team operations.
Operations NCOIC This Soldier is the training NCOIC for the Advisor Team and is the principal
advisor to the Operations Staff NCO in the HN security force.
Operations NCO This Soldier is the advisor team armorer and principal instructor for basic
rifle marksmanship (small arms), short-range marksmanship
(SRM)/close-quarters battle (CQB), urban operations, patrolling,
checkpoints, and any other individual training deemed necessary based on
the OE.
Operations NCO This Soldier is the advisor team S1. He is also the principal instructor
for fires and effects considerations (CAS and artillery support).
Medical NCO This Soldier is the advisor team medical NCOIC and primary instructor
to HN security forces concerning medical issues.
Communications NCO This Soldier is the advisor team communications NCOIC and principal
communications instructor.
Logistics Officer This Soldier is the principal advisor to the HN staff for logistics and is the
logistics Chief for the advisor team.
connection, but are not sufficiently equipped to do everything required to build a well trained, well led,
sustainable and professional force. A nation's armed force that behaves unprofessionally can quickly lose
legitimacy, which is needed to conduct counterinsurgency operations and draw quality recruits. When the
US military mission fails to prepare HN security forces to take the leada key political objectiveunity
of effort suffers at many levels. The results are often corruption, nepotism, and bureaucracy, which
generate obstacles to units who must rapidly adapt to the insurgent strategies and tactics. Due to these
factors, the HN will eventually lose the ability to persevere against a steadfast insurgent fighting a
protracted war.
8-25. US forces often choose to use a readiness assessment of an HN security force unit. Figure 8-6
shows an example format for a readiness assessment.
Assessment Periods
8-26. Assessing Host Nation security forces should be done for three distinct periods of timeshort,
mid, and long. Considerations for each include
Short
8-27. The advisor and partner unit are involved in the training of the Host Nation security force unit.
An example of a short term goal for an advisor unit would be ensuring that the HN operations officer
is tracking all of his units conducting missions. An example for a partner unit would be training the HN
Soldiers on marksmanship and room clearing.
Mid
8-28. The HN unit is more self-sufficient, but still not fully capable, and the advisor acts in a
supervisory role. An example of a mid-range goal for an advisor unit would be ensuring that the HN staff
plans for logistical support during missions. An example of a mid range goal for a partner unit would be
training platoon size units to move tactically during patrols.
Long
8-29. The HN unit can conduct training, planning, sustainment, and operations with little guidance
and the advisor provides oversight and mentorship. An example of advisor unit long-range goal would be
to ensure that the HN intelligence officer gathers, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence and is fully
integrated into the planning process. An example of a partner long-range goal would be to migrate
to providing only the additional forces and quick-reaction force (QRF) capabilities to the Host Nation
security force unit.
ORGANIZE
8-31. Organizing HN forces depends on the Host Nations social and economic conditions, cultural
and historical factors, and security threat. The development programs aim is to create an efficient
organization with a command, intelligence, logistic, and operations structure that makes sense for the Host
Nation. Conventional forces with limited special-purpose teams, such as explosive ordnance disposal
and special weapons and tactics (SWAT), are preferred. Elite units tend to divert a large share of the best
leadership and remove critical talent from the regular forces. Doctrine should be standard across the force,
as should unit structures. The organization must facilitate the collection, processing, and dissemination
of intelligence across and throughout all security forces.
8-32. In many situations, simple personnel accountability is one of the greatest impediments to effective
organizations. The advisor team should mentor and advise the Host Nation security forces on keeping
better accountability. Formations, timelines, and uniform standards can be slow to be accepted, which can
stem from lack of supplies. Also, it is important that the unit can manage its leave and pass system. Once
achieved, this will further the capabilities of the Host Nation unit and allow them to focus on operations
and training, not troops to task.
Organizational Structure
8-33. As much as possible, the Host Nation should determine the security force organizations structure.
The Host Nation may be open to proposals from US forces, but should approve all organizational designs.
As the HN government strengthens, US leaders and trainers should expect increasingly independent
organizational decisions. These may include changing the numbers of forces, types of units, and internal
organizational designs. Culture and conditions might result in security forces being given what may be
considered nontraditional roles and missions. HN police may be more paramilitary than their US
counterparts, and the military may have a role in internal security. Eventually, police and military roles
should clearly differ. Police should counter crime, while the military should address external threats.
However, the exact nature of these missions depends on the HN situation. In any event, police and military
roles should be clearly delineated.
Organizational Types
8-34. The day-to-day troops-to-task requirements and priorities of effort requires a wide assortment of
Host Nation security forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Although the police force should be
the frontline of COIN security forces, other units are required to assist the police on a temporary basis until
the police can conduct operations on their own. Police forces are not equipped or trained in operating
in high intensity situations.
Military
8-35. Military forces might have to perform police duties at the start of an insurgency; however, it
is best to establish police forces to assume these duties as soon as possible. Few military units can match a
good police unit in developing an accurate human intelligence picture of their AO. Because of their
frequent contact with populace, police often are the best force for countering small insurgent bands
supported by the local populace.
8-36. Although the long term objectives in training Host Nation militaries need to focus on foreign
defense, realities of counterinsurgencies often dictate that the military establish civil security and civil
control. Commanders must ensure that military units coordinate with local police with respect
to intelligence gathering, interacting with civilians, and civil affairs.
8-37. A Host Nation security force unit will be task-organized into elements that can accomplish one
of three functionsconducting offensive operations, conducting defensive operations, and implementing
civil control. These organizations sizes vary based on the operational environment; the components, the
elements and dynamics of the insurgency; and the phase of the counterinsurgency. A Host Nation security
force must also have C2, a reserve, and some form of sustainment support.
Offensive Force
8-38. A HN unit needs the capability to conduct offensive operations as well as specific
counterinsurgency operations, such as search and attacks, raids, cordon and searches, ambushes, and site
exploitation (SE). Due to the elusive nature of the insurgent, this force may be the smallest organization in
the unit.
Defensive Force
8-39. A HN unit needs to have the ability to conduct defensive operations. Typically, HN
counterinsurgency units focus on executing area defense at the tactical level that includes securing
important events, critical infrastructure, and bases. Depending on the phase of the counterinsurgency
and insurgent capabilities, this force may be quite large.
Police
8-41. The primary frontline COIN force is often the policenot the military. However, the police are
only a part of the rule of law. Common roles of the police forces are to investigate crimes, provide traffic
control, preserve the peace by resolving simple disputes and civil disturbance control. Police require
support from a code of law, judicial courts, and a penal system. Such support provides a coherent
and transparent system that imparts justice. Upholding the rule of law also requires other civil institutions
and an HN ability to support the legal system. If parts of the rule of law do not work, then commanders
must be prepared to meet detention requirements.
8-42. Countering an insurgency requires a police force that is visible day and night. The Host Nation
will not gain legitimacy if the populace believes that insurgents and criminals control the streets. Well-sited
and protected police stations can establish a presence in communities, which secures communities
and builds support for the HN government. Daily contact with locals gives police a chance to collect
information for counterinsurgents.
8-43. Police might be organized on a national or local basis. Whatever police organization
is established, Soldiers must understand it and help the Host Nation effectively organize and use it. This
often means dealing with several police organizations and developing plans for training and advising each
one. A formal link or liaison channel must exist between the HN police, HN military forces, and US forces.
This channel for coordination, deconfliction, and information sharing enables successful COIN operations.
Police often consist of several independent but mutually supporting forces. These may include
Criminal and traffic police.
Border police.
Transport police for security of rail lines and public transport.
Specialized police forces.
Internal Affairs.
Paramilitary
8-44. Success in a counterinsurgency depends on isolating the insurgent from the population. Insurgents
intimidate the population into passive support and prevent the population from providing information
to counterinsurgent units. A technique to combat this is to establish a paramilitary organization.
Paramilitary forces are designed to support the rule of law and stabilize the operating environment,
particularly for when the HN police forces and military forces are standing-up organizing. Temporary
in nature, the paramilitary units mandate should be two-fold.
It needs to provide the population with a means of securing themselves.
It should have the means to gather and report intelligence about the insurgency.
It can sometimes be used covertly to target insurgents within higher headquarters guidance.
Organization
8-45. Once citizen leaders are identified, units can work with locals in organizing the paramilitary units.
The units need to have recognizable uniforms, standard light weapons, and a salary. The salaries will take
away from the insurgent recruitment base.
Limitations
8-46. Paramilitary organizations should be prevented from conducting offensive operations. They
should also be monitored closely for insurgent infiltration or abuse of power.
Demobilization
8-47. Eventually, the best way to demobilize a paramilitary force might be to integrate part of it into the
HN military or police force.
Corrections
8-48. If counterinsurgents seek to delegitimize an insurgency by criminalizing it, then the Host Nation
must establish a robust corrections system. A counterinsurgency with this goal, should be provided with a
more robust armament than in stable governments.
The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan are not the first time US forces have
created Host Nation security forces from scratch and allowed them to win
in a counterinsurgency. The Philippine-American War began in 1898
and ended officially in 1902, but hostilities remained until 1913. The war was
not a popular one in the United States, but resulted in a stable and free
Philippine Republic.
The Philippine Constabulary (PC) was established on August 8, 1901,
to assist the United States military in combating the remaining Filipino
revolutionaries. The PC was entrusted into the hands of Captain Henry T.
Allen, named as the chief of the force and later dubbed as "the Father of the
Philippine Constabulary." With the help of four other army officers, Captain
Allen organized the force, trained, equipped, and armed the men as best
as could be done under difficult conditions.
General Henry Adler said it best when he said, For some time to come, the
number of troops to be kept here should be a direct function of the number
of guns put into the hands of the natives
It is unwise to ignore the great
moral effect of a strong armed force above suspicion.
The Constabulary was instrumental in defeating the insurgency. Originally
officered by Americans, the Filipinos slowly over took all operations of the
unit. At a tactical level, they were initially used to augment US forces
and moved into having their own area of operations. In July of 1901, the US
Army garrisoned 491 positions and by December it only garrisoned 372
positions. Although poorly armed with shotguns and revolvers, the
constabulary soon maintained ownership of entire provinces.
TRAIN
8-53. US and multinational training assistance should address shortfalls at every level with the purpose
of establishing self-sustaining training systems.
US Trainers
8-54. Soldiers assigned to training missions should receive training on the specific requirements
of developing HN forces. The course should emphasize the Host Nations cultural background, introduce
its language, and provide cultural tips for developing a good rapport with HN personnel. The course should
also include protection training for troops working with HN forces. US trainees must become familiar with
the HN organization and equipment, especially weapons not in the US inventory. This training must
emphasize the following:
Sustaining training and reinforcing individual and team skills.
Using the smallest possible student-to-instructor ratio.
Developing HN trainers.
Training to standardsnot to time.
Providing immediate feedback and using after-action reviews.
Respecting the HN culture, but learning to distinguish between cultural practices and excuses.
Learning the HN language.
Working with interpreters.
Establish Standards
8-55. The Host Nation unit and trainers must establish clear measures for evaluating the training
of individuals, leaders, and units. Insurgent strategies and their corresponding responses from targeted
governments vary widely. COIN operations require many of the same individual and collective skills
performed in conventional military operations, but also include additional requirements for COIN. Small
units execute most COIN operations; therefore, effective COIN forces require strong junior leaders.
Soldiers and Marines know how to evaluate military training. Metrics for evaluating units should include
subjective measures, such as loyalty to the HN government, as well as competence in military tasks.
However, the acceptance of values, such as ethnic equality or the rejection of corruption, is far more
difficult than evaluating task performance.
Partner Units
8-58. Partner units play an important role in advising. Advisors cannot go out with every Host Nation
operation, but, as almost all operations in COIN are combined, a partner unit can effectively advise a Host
Nation unit. Partner units can be most effective at advising Host Nation units in the planning process,
especially MDMP. The MDMP model may need to be modified to suit the HN security force. Staff
sections should work closely with their HN peers as part of the planning process.
8-59. Partner units might have to provide limited support or supplies to their Host Nation unit. For
example, a unit might provide its HN unit JP-8 or Class VIII, or it might help recover a disabled tank.
It should never create a reliance on partner unit support. The commander allocates partner support,
considering the realities of the situation.
8-60. HN security force staffs, when fully capable, should be able to achieve the following:
Operations
8-61. Plans are synchronized with consideration given to all Warfighting Functions. They are
disseminated to appropriate personnel in a timely manner and operate within a short-, mid-, and long-term
framework.
Intelligence
8-62. Intelligence is shared with other units and agencies. It is fully integrated into the planning process,
is bottom fed, and uses multiple sensors.
Sustainment
8-63. Units have synchronized methods for requesting supplies and sustainment assets. Planners
account for logistical capabilities during the planning process.
Soldiers
8-65. Training can be divided into individual, unit, and staff training.
Individual
8-66. Individual skills training covers marksmanship, first aid, land navigation, and individual
movement techniques. Host nation security forces do not always have the institutional military instruction
that US forces have, so much of the individual skills training occurs at the unit. Marksmanship will be
of particular concern, due to the need for precise fires in COIN.
Unit
8-67. Unit training is focused on getting Host Nation battalions, companies, platoons, and squads ready
to conduct operations. This typically means training focused on three key tasks: checkpoint operations,
combat patrols (mounted and dismounted), and cordon and search operations.
Staff
8-68. Staff training involves training staffs to use and implement systems focused on planning, logistical
support, intelligence integration, and command and control.
Police
8-69. Police training is best conducted as an interagency and multinational operation. Ideally, leaders
for police training are civilian police officers from the Departments of Justice and State, along with senior
police officers from multinational partners. Civilian police forces have personnel with extensive experience
in large city operations and in operating against organized crime groups. Experience countering organized
crime is especially relevant to COIN; many insurgent groups are more similar to organized crime in their
organizational structure and relations with the populace than they are to military units. US military police
units serve best when operating as a support force for the professional civilian police trainers. However,
military police units may be assigned the primary responsibility for police training, and they must be
prepared to assume that role if required.
8-70. Higher level police skills, such as civilian criminal investigation procedures, anti-organized crime
operations, and police intelligence operationsare best taught by civilian experts.
8-71. Effective policing also requires an effective justice system that can process arrests, detentions,
warrants, and other judicial records. Such a system includes trained judges, prosecutors, defense counsels,
prison officials, and court personnel. These people are important to establishing the rule of law.
8-72. Military police or corrections personnel can also provide training for detention and corrections
operations. HN personnel should be trained to handle and interrogate detainees and prisoners according
to internationally recognized human rights norms by the appropriate US personnel. Prisoner and detainee
management procedures should provide for the security and the fair and efficient processing of those
detained.
8-73. Police forces, just like military forces, need quality support personnel to be effective. This
requires training teams to ensure that training in support functions is established. Specially trained
personnel required by police forces include the following:
Armorers.
Supply specialists.
Communications personnel.
Administrative personnel.
Vehicle mechanics.
Leaders
8-74. The effectiveness of the HN security forces directly relates to the quality of their leadership.
Building effective leaders requires a comprehensive program of officer, staff, and specialized training. The
ultimate success of any US involvement in a COIN effort depends on creating viable HN leaders able
to carry on the fight at all levels and build their nation on their own. One of the major challenges that
partner units and advisor teams may face is the perceived low quality of leader, especially the junior
leader ranks.
8-75. The leader training methodology must reinforce the different levels of authority within the HN
security force. The roles and responsibilities of each commissioned officer and NCO rank must be firmly
established so recruits understand what is expected of them. Their subordinate relationship to civilian
authorities must also be reinforced to ensure civilian control. In addition, training should establish team
dynamics. In some cultures, security forces may need training to understand the vital role of members not
in primary leadership positions.
Commissioned Officers
8-76. Officer candidate standards should be high. Candidates should be in good health and pass an
academic test with higher standards than the test for enlisted troops.
Officer Candidates
8-77. These should be carefully vetted to ensure that they do not have close ties to any radical
or insurgent organizations.
Additional Training
8-79. In addition to tactical skills, commissioned officers should be trained in accountability,
decision-making, delegation authority, values, and ethics. Special COIN training should address
Intelligence collection and legal considerations.
Day and night patrolling.
Site security.
Cordon and search operations.
Operations with
Other US Forces.
Other HN governmental agencies.
Intergovernmental organizations.
Nongovernmental organizations.
Treatment of detainees and prisoners.
Psychological operations.
Civil military operations.
Negotiations.
Ethnic and religious sensitivity.
Noncommissioned Officers
8-80. Professional and effective security forces all have a professional NCO Corps. NCOs need training
in tactical skills, accountability, values, and ethics. Relations and responsibilities between the Officer
and NCO Corps should be clearly defined, and should empower the NCO Corps. Units often create special
NCO academies to train NCOs from partner Host National units.
Civilian Leaders
8-81. Additionally, Host Nation civilian leaders may need specific training to improve their skills
and performance. These key representatives might include
City mayor.
Officials from public works, utilities, transportation, and communication.
Local police chief.
Fire-fighting officials.
Superintendent of schools.
Religious leaders.
Health and medical officials and leaders.
Judicial representatives.
Editors of local news media.
Business and commercial leaders.
Augmenting
8-82. This is an arrangement where the Host Nation provides either individuals or elements to US units
or vice versa. Augmentation can occur at a number of levels and in many different forms. For example, a
US squad can be augmented with HN individuals, a US company can be augmented with an HN platoon,
and a US battalion can be augmented with an HN company. The benefit of this type of training strategy
is that Host Nation security forces can emulate US forces in actual combat operations. In addition, US
forces can gain valuable cultural, language, and intelligence-gathering skills. Typically a chain of
command will be agreed upon prior to execution, however, command may be executed as a partnership.
Figure 8-7 shows an example of how augmenting a unit can be implemented.
EQUIP
8-83. The requirement to provide equipment may be as simple as assisting with maintenance of existing
formations or as extensive as providing everything from shoes and clothing to vehicles, communications,
and investigation kits. If insurgents use heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, HN security
forces need comparable or better equipment. This especially applies to police forces, which are often
lightly armed and vulnerable to well-armed insurgents.
8-84. Primary considerations should include maintainability, ease of operation, and long-term
sustainment costs. Few developing nations can support highly complex equipment. In COIN operations,
having many versatile vehicles that require simple maintenance is often better than having a few highly
capable armored vehicles or combat systems that require extensive maintenance. Developing an effective
HN maintenance system may begins with major maintenance performed by contractors. The program then
progresses to partnership arrangements with US forces as HN personnel are trained to perform the support
mission.
ADVISE
8-85. Advisors are the most prominent group of US personnel that serve with HN units. Advisors live,
work, and fight with their HN units. Segregation is kept to an absolute minimum. The relationship between
advisors and HN forces is vital. US partner unit commanders must remember that advisors are not liaison
officers, nor do they command HN units. Additionally, partner units regularly advise their HN security
force counterparts.
8-86. Effective advisors are an enormous force enhancer. The importance of the job means that the most
capable individuals should fill these positions. Advisors should be Soldiers known to take the initiative
and set the standards for others.
8-87. Professional knowledge and competence win the respect of HN troops. Effective advisors develop
a healthy rapport with HN personnel but avoid the temptation to adopt HN positions contrary to US
or multinational values or policy.
8-88. Advisors who understand the HN military culture understand that local politics have national
effects. Effective advisors recognize and use cultural factors that support HN commitment and teamwork.
A good advisor uses the cultures positive aspects to get the best performance from each security force
member and leader.
Guidelines
8-89. Important guidelines for advisors include
Remain patient. Be subtle. In guiding Host Nation counterparts, explain the benefits of an
action and convince them to accept the idea as their own. Respect the rank and positions of
Host Nation counterparts.
Exercise diplomacy in correcting Host Nation security forces. Praise each success and work
to instill pride in the unit.
Work to continually train and improve the unit, even in the combat zone. Help the commander
develop unit SOPs.
Know light infantry tactics and unit security procedures.
Use confidence missions to validate training.
Understand that an advisor is not the unit commander but an enabler. The Host Nation
commander makes decisions and commands the unit. Advisors help with this task.
Train Host Nation units to standard and fight alongside them. Consider Host Nation limitations
and adjust.
Flexibility is key. It is impossible to plan completely for everything in this type of operation.
Constantly look forward to the next issue and be ready to develop solutions to problems that
cannot be answered with a doctrinal solution.
Remember that most actions have long-term strategic implications.
Try to learn enough of the language for simple conversation, at a minimum, greetings.
Keep Host Nation counterparts informed; try not to hide agendas.
Remain prepared to act as a liaison to multinational assets, especially air support and logistics.
Maintain liaison with civil affairs and humanitarian teams in the area of operations.
Remain ready to advise on the maintenance of equipment and supplies.
Stay integrated with the unit. Eat their food. Do not become isolated from them.
Remain aware of the operations in the immediate area to prevent fratricide.
Insist on Host Nation adherence to the recognized human rights standards concerning treatment
of civilians, detainees, and captured insurgents. Report any violation to the chain of command.
Remain objective in reports on Host Nation unit and leader proficiency. Report gross
corruption or incompetence.
Maintain a proper military bearing and professional manner.
Advisor Teams
8-90. Advisor teams link Host Nation units and US partner units to fill the gaps of the HN's supply
system. They have the ability to bring attention to shortfalls in equipment both to their higher US chain
of command and, through their chain of command, the Host Nation higher headquarters. The advisor
should ensure that the Host Nation logistical system is being used properly first. In addition, the advisor
team may assist by hand walking his HN counterpart through the HN system.
8-91. Advisor teams often have authority to provide tactical equipment such as radios through their
appropriated funds. The advisor team must use this money since it is one of the few forms of leverage they
posses.
8-92. It is important to note that advisors should not use bribery or coercion, since results achieved from
these actions are only temporary. As soon as the payment is made, or the force is removed, the Host
Nation counterpart has no reason to comply. In practice, these techniques are not efficient and will not
achieve the long-term goal of developing proficiency, competence, and initiative in the counterpart.
8-99. Just as in counterinsurgency operations, advising is an iterative process. The advisor team and the
HN unit will not get it right the first time. However, both the HN unit and the advisor team must learn
and adapt faster than insurgents.
Adjusting to native cuisine can pose a problem for the advisor. Refusal to accept food and
beverages when offered might be considered an insult.
The advisor does not become discouraged. Not all advice will be accepted. Some will be
implemented later.
The advisor cannot forget that a careless word or action can cost the United States dearly
in good will and cooperation that may have been established with great effort and at
considerable cost.
The advisor does not criticize HN policy in front of HN personnel. It is the advisors obligation
to support the incumbent government just as he does his own. This obligation is US
national policy.
The advisor studies his counterpart to determine his personality and background. He makes
every effort to establish and maintain friendly relationships. He learns something about his
counterparts personal life and demonstrates an interest in his likes and dislikes.
The advisor recognizes and observes military courtesy and local customs and courtesies. He
recognizes that in many cultures, observance of formal courtesies must take place before other
business can be conducted. When in doubt, he leans toward the polite.
The advisor does not get caught up in personality clashes between HN officers/personnel.
The advisor keeps in mind that HN partners may consider person-to-person relationships more
important than organizational frameworks.
The advisor may have to deal with the HN norms regarding time and timeliness.
Advising Principles
8-101. Advising principles can best be described as shown in Figure 8-8.
By, With, Not counting immediate action battle drill responses, the mark of an effective
and Through advisory effort is the amount of stake the Host Nation security forces take in their
own operations.
Empathy Leads to Truly understanding other human beings and where they come from allows
Cultural Competence honest relationships to develop. These relationships are critical factors
of success.
Success is Built This relationship is likely to be tested on numerous occasions and challenges;
on Personal only one built on a solid relationship of mutual trust can survive and ensure
Relationships mission success.
Advisors Increasing the advisors level of frustration is the rapid realization that, when the
are not Them dealing with partner units, advisors are not one of them. The advisors are often
alone navigating between two military systems and two cultures, never quite
fitting in with either of them.
You Will Never The advisor attaining a tactical objective does not achieve success; success
Win
Nor Should is achieved by the Host Nation forces achieving the objective.
You
Advisors are not Advisors are not intended to lead Host Nation security forces in combat; they are
Commanders ultimately responsible for command and control only of their own small TEAM
of US combat advisors.
Advisors Advisors are advocates for the Host Nation security forces with partner units.
are Honest Brokers
Living Advisors will likely find themselves isolated with great autonomy, often with no
with Shades of Gray supervision and will encounter moral and ethical dilemmas on a daily basis.
Talent is Everything, The paradox lies in that in some Host Nation forces, recognized talent can take a
but back seat to rank. Advisors must understand that rank on the uniform
Understand Rank is important to many armies, but it is skin deep; the ways around rank are the
relationship and talent.
Make Do Advisors will never have everything that they feel they need to succeed.
Scrounging, bartering, and horse-trading are daily activities of the combat
advisor. An enormous amount of energy must be devoted to these activities.
These efforts will not only help the advisor achieve mission success but also
endear him to his counterpart.
Respect
8-104. In order to get respect, mentors need to give it.
Relationship
8-105. Mentors need to have a good working relationship with Host Nation forces.
Trust
8-106. The best way to gain trust is through shared danger and hardship. Nothing builds trust faster than
facing the enemy together.
Team
8-107. The end state should be a unity of effort for the advisor team, the HN unit, and the partner unit. If
a recommendation is made to the Host Nation unit, mentors should move on. If every recommendation
becomes a point of contention, the mutual respect and relationship that has been carefully cultivated will be
damaged. Figure 8-9 shows the process that is needed to build a relationship that ultimately develops into
an effective team. Giving respect sets the conditions for trust and, finally, a good team, where mentoring
can occur.
Commander's One-on-One
8-111. Remember some AAR points are best kept between the advisor and the Host Nation commander.
8-114. Newly trained units should enter their first combat operation in support of more experienced HN,
US, or multinational forces. Partner units and advisor teams need to closely monitor the situation
and support each other and the Host Nation. It is paramount that the Host Nation security force not be
defeated in the initial stage of their operations. Host nation units can be broken down into smaller elements
and paired with US forces in order to put a Host National face on the operation and provide the Host
Nation with support and training experience.
SUMMARY
A successful COIN effort establishes HN institutions that can sustain government legitimacy. Developing
effective HN security forcesincluding military, police, and paramilitary forcesis one of the highest
priority COIN tasks. Soldiers and Marines can make vital contributions to this mission by training
and advising the HN security forces. Effective tactical commanders must understand the importance
of this mission and select the right personnel as trainers and advisors. Using the MORTEAM framework
may enable tactical leaders to successfully train, mentor and conduct operations with Host Nation security
force.
OVERVIEW
A-1. IPB is the systematic process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic
areathe area of operations (AO) and its associated area of interest (Figure A-1). It provides the basis
for intelligence support to current and future operations, drives the military decision-making process,
and supports targeting and battle damage assessment. The procedure (as well as each of its four steps)
is performed continuously throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of a COIN operation.
INCREASED COMPLEXITY
A-2. Uncovering intricate relationships takes time, careful analysis, and constant refinement
to determine actual effects on friendly and threat courses of action (COAs). These relationships
exist among
Population groups.
The infrastructure.
The historical, cultural, political, or economic significance of the area in relation to surrounding
urban and rural areas or the nation as a whole.
The physical effects of the natural and man-made terrain.
A-3. A primary goal of any IPB is to accurately predict the threats likely COA (step fourwhich may
include political, social, religious, informational, economic, and military actions). Commanders can then
develop their own COAs that maximize and apply combat power at decisive points. Understanding the
decisive points in counterinsurgency operations allows commanders to select objectives that are clearly
defined, decisive, and attainable.
A-8. Figures A-2 and A-3 are not all-encompassing lists of COIN characteristics. Instead, they provide
a starting point or outline useful for conducting a COIN-focused IPB and analysis that can be modified
to fit the specific operational environment and meet the commanders requirements. Commanders
and staffs can compare the categories presented with those in the civil affairs area study and assessment
format found in FM 3-05.40 and the IPB considerations for stability operations found in ST 2-91.1.
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS
A-9. Since the COIN environment comprises an interconnected system of systems, considerations
among the key elements of the environment will overlap during a COIN intelligence analysis. For example,
boundaries, regions, or areas relate to a physical location on the ground. Hence, they have terrain
implications. These boundaries, regions, or areas often stem from some historical, religious, political,
administrative, or social aspect that could also be considered a characteristic of the society. Overlaps can
also occur in a specific category, such as infrastructure. For instance, dams are a consideration for their
potential effects on transportation and distribution (mobility), administration and human services (water
supply), and energy (hydroelectric).
A-10. This overlap recognition is a critical concern for commanders and their staffs. In taking apart
the COIN environment and analyzing the pieces, commanders and staffs cannot lose perspective of how
each piece interacts with any other and as part of the whole. Otherwise, their vision will be shortsighted,
and they will fail to recognize the second-and third-order effects of their proposed COAs; the actual end
state differing dramatically from the one envisioned by the commander. The increased density
of combatants and noncombatants, infrastructure, and complex terrain means that a given action will likely
have unintended consequencespositive or negative. Those consequences will be more widely felt
and their impact will spread in less time than in other environments. These unintended results may have
important strategic and operational consequences. The multiple ways these dynamic COIN elements
and characteristics combine make it necessary to approach each COIN environment as a unique challenge
for intelligence analysis.
Terrain
A-12. In every COIN operation, terrain and its effects on both threat and friendly forces must be
assessed and understood. Then commanders can quickly choose and exploit the terrain (and weather
conditions) that best supports their missions. Effective terrain analysis thoroughly assesses structures
as well as the ground on which they stand (Figure A-2). An analysis of terrain first considers broader
characteristics and effects and then progresses to a more detailed examination.
Natural Terrain
A-13. Natural terrain features significantly influence unit operations. They dictate where buildings can
be constructed, the slopes and patterns of streets, and even the broad patterns that develop over longer
periods, all of which influence a units scheme of maneuver. The military aspects of terrainobservation
and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC)
remain critical to the analysis of natural terrain in, under, and around areas where COIN operations will be
conducted. Fortunately, commanders and their staffs are normally accustomed to this type of analysis.
Forms and Functions Construction and Placement Military Aspects of Terrain: OAKOC
Cores.
Construction. Observation and fields of fire.
Industrial areas. Mass or framed Smoke (fire), dust (explosions), and
Toxic industrial material production flying debris
Light or heavy clad
and storage facilities
Rubble
Material (dirt, wood, stone, brick,
Standard signs and markings for
cinder block, concrete, steel, and Engagement ranges
toxic chemicals
glass) (including minimum safe distances
Outlying high-rise areas. and backblast factors) and
Density and thickness (roofs,
obliquity/angles (ricochets)
Residential areas and shantytowns. floors, and interior and exterior
walls) Elevation and depression
Commercial ribbon areas. considerations
Load-bearing walls and columns
Forts and military bases. Lasers and reflective concerns
Height (floors)
Doors, windows, fire escapes, Avenues of approach
Broad Urban Patterns
and other openings (mobility corridors).
Types. Interior floor plan (including crawl Airspace
Satellite spaces, elevators, and stairs) Surface
Network Supersurface
Placement. Subsurface
Linear
Segment Random
Close, orderly block Key terrain
Dominant or central hub (if any). Dispersed Landmarks
Man-Made Terrain
A-14. Building composition, frontages, placement, forms and functions, size, floor plans, and window
and door locations affect maneuver, force positioning, and weapons deployment considerations. Angles,
displacement, surface reflection, and antenna locations influence command and control. Structures also
influence ISR operations. The increased density and volume created by man-made structures increases how
much information commanders and their staffs collect and assess as well as the number of forces required.
Building materials and construction will also influence force structures to include weapons and equipment
required. Heavily constructed buildings combined with hot and cold extremes may affect target
identification for thermal sights. Thick walls, for example, may make combat vehicle identification
difficult by distorting hotspots. Additionally, the increased use of heaters and warming fires may clutter
thermal sights with numerous hotspots. The ability to maneuver through the urban dimensionsairspace,
supersurface, surface, and subsurfaceand shoot through walls, ceilings, and floors also creates increased
psychological stress. The physical characteristics of man-made terrain can also be analyzed using OAKOC.
Weather
A-15. Weather and its effects are often considered when examining the military aspects of terrain.
Military aspects of weather include temperature (heat and cold), light conditions, precipitation (cloud
cover, rain, snow, fog, and smog), and wind. Their military effects during COIN are similar to any
operational environment (see FM 34-81 and FM 34-81-1). Extremes of heat and cold affect weapon
systems and the Soldiers that operate them. Precipitation affects mobility and visibility.
A-16. Commanders also analyze weather for its potential effect on civilians and civilian infrastructure
as well as Soldiers and military equipment. Rain might create sewage overflow problems in areas with
collapsed sewage infrastructure, increasing disease and even creating panic. Rain and flooding may also
make some subsurface areas impassable or extremely hazardous to civilian and military forces alike. Other
weather effects on COIN can include
Heavy snowfall may paralyze area transportation and distribution infrastructure, hindering the
governments ability to provide vital human services (police, fire fighting, medical,
and rescue). Heavy rains and flooding may have similar effects especially on poorly designed
and constructed roads or roads that have been damaged by tracked vehicles.
Extreme hot and cold weather climates, which increase the dependence (and military
significance) of many elements of the infrastructure. For example, the energy infrastructure
may be critical. Without it, civilians may be inadequately cooled or heated, or they may be
unable to cook their food.
In tropical areas, rain can occur at the same time each day during the wet season. Threat forces
may attack during these periods knowing aircraft will have difficulty responding. Bad weather
also reduces the effectiveness of surveillance, direct and indirect fire, and logistic support.
Inclement weather may preclude demonstrations or rallies by threats. Good weather may mean
a maximum turnout of civilians for events such as festivals, sporting events, and other social,
cultural, or religious activities.
Severe weather may affect psychological, civil-military and humanitarian assistance operations.
Heavy rains and severe dust storms may disrupt leaflet drops, construction projects, food
and water distribution, and medical and veterinary assistance programs.
SOCIETY
A-17. This manual shows that societal considerations take on added importance in COIN. Critical
to operational success is knowing and understanding which groups live in an area, what relationships exist
among them, and how each population group will respond to friendly and threat activities. Often
determining any of this is very difficult. Cultural acuity is also essential in helping commanders and their
staffs to view the area as the residents view it. The demographics presented show what conditions exist,
while the other categories help to explain the root causes or why conditions exist (Figure A-3). Other
categories besides basic demographics that are important to gain this understanding include health, history,
leadership, ethnicity and culture, religion, and government and politics.
ARTICLES
Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Military Review, May-Jun 2005, Kalev I. Sepp.
COIN Cliff Notes: Techniques for the Conventional Rifle Platoon in Laymans Terms. Infantry
Magazine, July-August 2008, Craig Coppock.
Counterinsurgency Redux, Survival, Winter 2006-2007, David Kilcullen.
The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commanders Perspective on Conduct Information
Tasks. Military Review, May-Jun 2006, Ralph O. Baker.
Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq. Military Review, Jan-Feb 2006,
David Petraeus.
Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency. Military Review, May-Jun
2006, David Kilcullen.
The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence.," Military Review, May-June 2006, Professional Forum
BOOKS
Galula, David. Counterinsurgency WarfareTheory and Practice. London: Praeger, 1964.
Hammes, T.X. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 2004
Kitson, Frank. Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping. London: Faber
and Faber, 1971.
Trinquier, Roger. Modern WarfareA French View of Counterinsurgency. New York: Praeger, 1964.
Zedong, Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare. London: Cassell, 1965.
Twenty-Eight Articles:
Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency
LTC David Kilcullen, PhD, originally submitted his essay, 28 Articles, to Military
Review for the CAC CG's Special Topics Writing Competition: Countering
Insurgency. However, he was asked to publish it immediately to help Soldiers in the
field. Even though doing so cost him the opportunity to competeand possibly
winthe competition, the Australian Army officer graciously agreed, and pulled the
essay from the contest. The article is reprinted in this appendix, with permission,
from the May-June 2006 issue of Military Review, and formatted to fit this
publication.
INTRODUCTION
C-1. Your company has just been warned about possible deployment for counterinsurgency operations
in Iraq or Afghanistan. You have read David Galula, T.E. Lawrence, and Robert Thompson. You have
studied FM 324, and now understand the history, philosophy, and theory of counterinsurgency. You
have also watched Black Hawk Down and The Battle of Algiers, and you know this will be the most
difficult challenge of your life.
C-2. But what does all that theory mean at the company level? How do the principles translate into
action at night, with the GPS down, the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a language you
dont understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people by ones and twos? How does
counterinsurgency actually happen?
C-3. There are no universal answers, and insurgents are among the most adaptive opponents you will
ever face. Countering them will demand every ounce of your intellect. But be comforted: You are not the
first to feel this way. There are tactical fundamentals you can apply to link the theory with the techniques
and procedures you already know.
WHAT IS COUNTERINSURGENCY?
C-4. If you have not studied counterinsurgency theory, here it is in a nutshell: Counterinsurgency is a
competition with the insurgent for the right to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population.
You are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat anything with less strength than
you. But you have more combat power than you can or should use in most situations. Injudicious use
of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless people, and societal disruption that fuel and perpetuate the
insurgency. The most beneficial actions are often local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors. For
your side to win, the people dont have to like you but they must respect you, accept that your actions
benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly regarding their
security. In this battlefield, popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than the facts and more
powerful than a hundred tanks.
C-5. Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience, the distilled
essence of what those who went before you learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but
are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.
PREPARATION
C-6. Time is short during predeployment, but you will never have more time to think than you have
now. This is your chance to prepare yourself and your command.
1. Know your turf. Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion, and culture.
Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance. Your
task is to become the world expert on your district. If you dont know precisely where you
will be operating, study the general area. Read the map like a book: Study it every night
before sleep and redraw it from memory every morning until you understand its patterns
intuitively. Develop a mental model of your area, a framework in which to fit every new
piece of knowledge you acquire. Study handover notes from predecessors; better still, get
in touch with the unit in theater and pick their leaders brains. In an ideal world, intelligence
officers and area experts would brief you; however, this rarely happens, and even if it does,
there is no substitute for personal mastery. Understand the broader area of influence, which
can be a wide area, particularly when insurgents draw on global grievances. Share out aspects
of the operational area among platoon leaders and noncommissioned officers; have each
individual develop a personal specialization and brief the others. Neglect this knowledge,
and it will kill you.
2. Diagnose the problem. Once you know your area and its people, you can begin to diagnose
the problem. Who are the insurgents? What drives them? What makes local leaders tick?
Counterinsurgency is fundamentally a competition between each side to mobilize the
population in support of its agenda. So you must understand what motivates the people
and how to mobilize them. You need to know why and how the insurgents are getting
followers. This means you need to know your real enemy, not a cardboard cut-out. The
enemy is adaptive, resourceful, and probably grew up in the region where you will be
operating. The locals have known him since he was a boy; how long have they known you?
Your worst opponent is not the psychopathic terrorist of Hollywood; it is the charismatic
follow-me warrior who would make your best platoon leader. His followers are not misled
or naïve; much of his success may be due to bad government policies or security forces that
alienate the population. Work this problem collectively with your platoon and squad leaders.
Discuss ideas, explore the problem, understand what you are facing, and seek a consensus. If
this sounds unmilitary, get over it. Once you are in theater, situations will arise too quickly
for orders or even commanders intent. Corporals and privates will have to make snap
judgments with strategic impact. The only way to help them is to give them a shared
understanding, then trust them to think for themselves on the day.
3. Organize for intelligence. In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him
is often nearly impossible. Intelligence and operations are complementary. Your operations
will be intelligence-driven, but intelligence will come mostly from your own operations, not
as a product prepared and served up by higher headquarters. So you must organize
for intelligence. You will need a company S2 and an intelligence section (including analysts).
You might need platoon S2s and S3s, and you will need a reconnaissance and surveillance
(R&S) element. You will not have enough linguistsyou never dobut carefully consider
where best to use them. Linguists are a battle-winning asset, but like any other scarce
resource, you must have a prioritized bump plan in case you lose them. Often during
predeployment the best use of linguists is to train your command in basic language. You will
probably not get augmentation for all this, but you must still do it. Put the smartest soldiers in
the S2 section and the R&S squad. You will have one less rifle squad, but the intelligence
section will pay for itself in lives and effort saved.
4. Organize for interagency operations. Almost everything in counterinsurgency
is interagency. And everything important, from policing to intelligence to civil-military
operations to trash collection, will involve your company working with civilian actors
and local indigenous partners you cannot control, but whose success is essential for yours.
Train the company in interagency operations: Get a briefing from the US Department
of State, aid agencies, and the local police or fire brigade. Train point-men in each squad
to deal with the interagency people. Realize that civilians find rifles, helmets, and body armor
intimidating. Learn how not to scare them. Ask others who come from that country or culture
about your ideas. See it through the eyes of a civilian who knows nothing about the military.
How would you react if foreigners came to your neighborhood and conducted the operations
you planned? What if somebody came to your mothers house and did that? Most
importantly, know that your operations will create a temporary breathing space, but long-term
development and stabilization by civilian agencies will ultimately win the war.
5. Travel light and harden your combat service support (CSS). You will be weighed down
with body armor, rations, extra ammunition, communications gear, and a thousand other
things. The enemy will carry a rifle or rocket-propelled grenade launcher, a shemagh (head
scarf), and a water bottle if he is lucky. Unless you ruthlessly lighten your load and enforce a
culture of speed and mobility, the insurgents will consistently out-run and out-maneuver you.
But in lightening your load, make sure you can always reach back to call for firepower
or heavy support if needed. Also, remember to harden your CSS. The enemy will attack your
weakest points. Most attacks on Coalition forces in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, outside preplanned
combat actions like the two battles of Fallujah or Operation Iron Horse, were against CSS
installations and convoys. You do the math. Ensure your CSS assets are hardened, have
communications, and are trained in combat operations. They may do more fighting than your
rifle squads.
6. Find a political/cultural adviser. In a force optimized for counterinsurgency, you might
receive a political-cultural adviser at company level, a diplomat or military foreign area
officer able to speak the language and navigate the intricacies of local politics. Back on planet
Earth, the corps and division commander will get a political advisor; you will not, so you
must improvise. Find a POLAD (political-cultural adviser) from among your people
perhaps an officer, perhaps not (see article 8). Someone with people skills and a feel for the
environment will do better than a political-science graduate. Dont try to be your own cultural
adviser: You must be fully aware of the political and cultural dimension, but this is a different
task. Also, dont give one of your intelligence people this role. They can help, but their task
is to understand the environment. The POLADs job is to help shape it.
7. Train the squad leadersthen trust them. Counterinsurgency is a squad and platoon
leaders war, and often a private soldiers war. Battles are won or lost in moments: Whoever
can bring combat power to bear in seconds, on a street corner, will win. The commander on
the spot controls the fight. You must train the squad leaders to act intelligently
and independently without orders. If your squad leaders are competent, you can get away
with average company or platoon staffs. The reverse is not the case. Training should focus on
basic skills: marksmanship, patrolling, security on the move and at the halt, and basic drills.
When in doubt, spend less time on company and platoon training, and more time on squads.
Ruthlessly replace leaders who do not make the grade. But once people are trained and you
have a shared operational diagnosis, you must trust them. We talk about this, but few
company or platoon leaders really trust their people. In counterinsurgency, you have no
choice.
8. Rank is nothing; talent is everything. Not everyone is good at counterinsurgency. Many
people dont understand the concept, and some cant execute it. It is difficult, and in a
conventional force only a few people will master it. Anyone can learn the basics, but a few
naturals do exist. Learn how to spot these people, and put them into positions where they can
make a difference. Rank matters far less than talenta few good men led by a smart junior
noncommissioned officer can succeed in counterinsurgency, where hundreds of well-armed
soldiers under a mediocre senior officer will fail.
9. Have a game plan. The final preparation task is to develop a game plan, a mental picture
of how you see the operation developing. You will be tempted to try and do this too early.
But wait, as your knowledge improves, you will get a better idea of what needs to be done
and a fuller understanding of your own limitations. Like any plan, this plan will change once
you hit the ground, and it may need to be scrapped if there is a major shift in the environment.
But you still need a plan, and the process of planning will give you a simple, robust idea
of what to achieve, even if the methods change. This is sometimes called operational
design. One approach is to identify basic stages in your operation, for example establish
dominance, build local networks, marginalize the enemy. Make sure you can easily
transition between phases, forward and backward, in case of setbacks. Just as the insurgent
can adapt his activity to yours, so you must have a simple enough plan to survive setbacks
without collapsing. This plan is the solution that matches the shared diagnosis you developed
earlier. It must be simple, and known to everyone
GOLDEN HOUR
C-7. You have deployed, completed reception and staging, and (if you are lucky) attended the
in-country counterinsurgency school. Now it is time to enter your sector and start your tour. This is the
golden hour. Mistakes made now will haunt you for the rest of your tour, while early successes will set the
tone for victory. You will look back on your early actions and cringe at your clumsiness. So be it. But you
must act.
10. Be there. The most fundamental rule of counterinsurgency is to be there. You can almost
never outrun the enemy. If you are not present when an incident happens, there is usually
little you can do about it. So your first order of business is to establish presence. If you cant
do this throughout your sector, then do it wherever you can. This demands a residential
approach: living in your sector, in close proximity to the population rather than raiding into
the area from remote, secure bases. Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night
patrollingall these seem more dangerous than they are. They establish links with the locals,
who see you as real people they can trust and do business with, not as aliens who descend
from an armored box. Driving around in an armored convoy, day-tripping like a tourist
in hell, degrades situational awareness, makes you a target, and is ultimately more dangerous.
11. Avoid knee-jerk responses to first impressions. Dont act rashly; get the facts first. The
violence you see may be part of the insurgent strategy; it may be various interest groups
fighting it out with each other or settling personal vendettas. Normality in Kandahar is not the
same as in Seattleyou need time to learn what normality looks like. The insurgent
commander wants to goad you into lashing out at the population or making a mistake. Unless
you happen to be on the spot when an incident occurs, you will have only second-hand
reports and may misunderstand the local context or interpretation. This fragmentation
and disaggregation of the battlefield, particularly in urban areas, means that first
impressions are often highly misleading. Of course, you cant avoid making judgments. But
if possible, check them with an older or a trusted local. If you can, keep one or two officers
from your predecessor unit for the first part of the tour. Try to avoid a rush to judgment.
12. Prepare for handover from day one. Believe it or not, you will not resolve the insurgency
on your watch. Your tour will end, and your successors will need your corporate knowledge.
Start handover folders, in every platoon and specialist squad, from day one. Ideally, you
would have inherited these from your predecessors, but if not you must start them. The
folders should include lessons learned, details about the population, village and patrol reports,
updated maps, and photographsanything that will help newcomers master the environment.
Computerized databases are fine, but keep good back-ups and ensure you have hard copy
of key artifacts and documents. This is and tedious, but essential. Over time, you will create a
corporate memory that keeps your people alive.
13. Build trusted networks. Once you have settled into your sector, your key task is to build
trusted networks. This is the true meaning of the phrase hearts and minds, which comprises
two separate components. Hearts means persuading people their best interests are served by
your success; minds means convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you
is pointless. Note that neither concept has anything to do with whether people like you.
Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, if you successfully build
networks of trust, these will grow like roots into the population, displacing the enemys
networks, bringing him out into the open to fight you, and letting you seize the initiative.
These networks include local allies, community leaders, local security forces,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other friendly or neutral nonstate actors in your
area, and the media. Conduct village and neighborhood surveys to identify needs in the
community, and then follow through to meet them. Build common interests and mobilize
popular support. This is your true main effort; everything else is secondary. Actions that help
build trusted networks serve your cause. Actionseven killing high-profile targets that
undermine trust or disrupt your networkshelp the enemy.
14. Start easy. If you were trained in maneuver warfare you know about surfaces and gaps. This
applies to counterinsurgency as much as any other form of maneuver. Dont try to crack the
hardest nut firstdont go straight for the main insurgent stronghold, try to provoke a
decisive showdown, or focus efforts on villages that support the insurgents. Instead, start
from secure areas and work gradually outwards. Do this by extending your influence through
the locals own networks. Go with, not against, the grain of local society. First win the
confidence of a few villages and see who they trade, intermarry, or do business with. Now
win these people over. Soon enough the showdown with the insurgents will come. But now
you have local allies, a mobilized population, and a trusted network at your back. Do it the
other way around and no one will mourn your failure.
15. Seek early victories. In this early phase, your aim is to stamp your dominance in your sector.
Do this by seeking an early victory. This will probably not translate into a combat victory
over the enemy. Looking for such a victory can be overly aggressive and create collateral
damageespecially since you really do not yet understand your sector. Also, such a combat
victory depends on the enemy being stupid enough to present you with a clear-cut target,
which is a rare windfall in counterinsurgency. Instead, you may achieve a victory by
resolving long-standing issues your predecessors have failed to address, or by co-opting a key
local leader who has resisted cooperation with our forces. Like any other form of armed
propaganda, achieving even a small victory early in the tour sets the tone for what comes later
and helps seize the initiative, which you have probably lost due to the inevitable hiatus
entailed by the handover-takeover with your predecessor.
16. Practice deterrent patrolling. Establish patrolling methods that deter the enemy from
attacking you. Often our patrolling approach seems designed to provoke, then defeat, enemy
attacks. This is counterproductive; it leads to a raiding, day-tripping mindset or, worse, a
bunker mentality. Instead, practice deterrent patrolling. There are many methods for this,
including multiple patrolling in which you flood an area with numerous small patrols working
together. Each is too small to be a worthwhile target, and the insurgents never know where all
the patrols aremaking an attack on any one patrol extremely risky. Other methods include
so-called blue-green patrolling, where you mount daylight, overt humanitarian patrols, which
go covert at night and hunt specific targets. Again, the aim is to keep the enemy off balance,
and the population reassured through constant and unpredictable activity, which, over time,
deters attacks and creates a more permissive environment. A reasonable rule of thumb is that
oneto two-thirds of your force should be on patrol at any time, day or night.
17. Be prepared for setbacks. Setbacks are normal in counterinsurgency, as in every other form
of war. You will make mistakes, lose people, or occasionally kill or detain the wrong person.
You may fail in building or expanding networks. If this happens, dont lose heart, simply
drop back to the previous phase of your game plan and recover your balance. It is normal
in company counterinsurgency operations for some platoons to be doing well while others do
badly. This is not necessarily evidence of failure. Give local commanders the freedom
to adjust their posture to local conditions. This creates elasticity that helps you survive
setbacks.
18. Remember the global audience. One of the biggest differences between the
counterinsurgencies our fathers fought and those we face today is the omnipresence
of globalized media. Most houses in Iraq have one or more satellite dishes. Web bloggers;
print, radio, and television reporters; and others are monitoring and reporting your every
move. When the insurgents ambush your patrols or set off a car bomb, they do so not
to destroy one more track, but because they want graphic images of a burning vehicle
and dead bodies for the evening news. Beware of the scripted enemy who plays to a global
audience and seeks to defeat you in the court of global public opinion. You counter this by
training people to always bear in mind the global audience, to assume that everything they
say or do will be publicized, and to befriend the media. Get the press on-sidehelp them get
their story, and trade information with them. Good relationships with nonembedded media,
especially indigenous media, dramatically increase your situational awareness and help get
your message across to the global and local audience.
19. Engage the women, beware of the children. Most insurgent fighters are men. But
in traditional societies, women are hugely influential in forming the social networks that
insurgents use for support. Co-opting neutral or friendly women, through targeted social
and economic programs, builds networks of enlightened self-interest that eventually
undermine the insurgents. You need your own female counterinsurgents, including
interagency people, to do this effectively. Win the women, and you own the family unit. Own
the family, and you take a big step forward in mobilizing the population. Conversely, though,
stop your people from fraternizing with the local children. Your troops are homesick; they
want to drop their guard with the kids, but children are sharp-eyed, lacking in empathy,
and willing to commit atrocities their elders would shrink from. The insurgents are watching:
They will notice a growing friendship between one of your people and a local child,
and either harm the child as punishment, or use them against you. Similarly, stop people from
throwing candies or presents to children. It attracts them to our vehicles, creates crowds the
enemy can exploit, and leads to children being run over. Harden your heart and keep the
children at arms length.
20. Take stock regularly. You probably already know that a body count tells you little, because
you usually cant know how many insurgents there were to start with, how many moved into
the area, how many transferred from supporter to combatant status, or how many new fighters
the conflict has created. But you still need to develop metrics early in the tour and refine them
as the operation progresses. They should cover a range of social, informational, military,
and economic issues. Use metrics intelligently to form an overall impression of progressnot
in a mechanistic traffic-light fashion. Typical metrics include percentage of engagements
initiated by our forces versus those initiated by insurgents; longevity of friendly local leaders
in positions of authority; number and quality of tip-offs on insurgent activity that originate
spontaneously from the population; and economic activity at markets and shops. These mean
virtually nothing as a snapshot; it is trends over time that help you track progress
in your sector.
GROUNDHOG DAY
C-8. Now you are in steady state. You are established in your sector, and people are settling into that
groundhog day mentality that hits every unit at some stage during every tour. It will probably take you at
least the first third of your tour to become effective in your new environment, if not longer. Then in the last
period you will struggle against the short-timer mentality. So this middle part of the tour is the most
productivebut keeping the flame alive, and bringing the local population along with you, takes immense
leadership.
21. Exploit a single narrative. Since counterinsurgency is a competition to mobilize popular
support, it pays to know how people are mobilized. In most societies there are opinion
makerslocal leaders, pillars of the community, religious figures, media personalities,
and others who set trends and influence public perceptions. This influence, including the
pernicious influence of the insurgents, often takes the form of a single narrative: a simple,
is small), but small-scale projects rarely proceed smoothly into large programs. Keep
programs small; this makes them cheap, sustainable, low-key, and (importantly) recoverable
if they fail. You can add new programsalso small, cheap and tailored to local conditions
as the situation allows.
25. Fight the enemys strategy, not his forces. At this stage, if things are proceeding well, the
insurgents will go over to the offensive. Yes, the offensive, because you have created a
situation so dangerous to the insurgents (by threatening to displace them from the
environment) that they have to attack you and the population to get back into the game. Thus
it is normal, even in the most successful operations, to have spikes of offensive insurgent
activity late in the operation. This does not necessarily mean you have done something wrong
(though it may, it depends on whether you have successfully mobilized the population). At
this point the tendency is to go for the jugular and seek to destroy the enemys forces in open
battle. This is rarely the best choice at company level, because provoking major combat
usually plays into the enemys hands by undermining the populations confidence. Instead,
attack the enemys strategy. If he is seeking to recapture the allegiance of a segment of the
local population, then co-opt them against him. If he is trying to provoke a sectarian conflict,
go over to peace-enforcement mode. The permutations are endless, but the principle is the
same: Fight the enemys strategy, not his forces.
26. Build your own solutiononly attack the enemy when he gets in the way. Try not to be
distracted or forced into a series of reactive moves by a desire to kill or capture the
insurgents. Your aim should be to implement your own solution, the game plan you
developed early in the operation and then refined through interaction with local partners.
Your approach must be environment-centric (based on dominating the whole district
and implementing a solution to its systemic problems) rather than enemy-centric. This means
that particularly late in the operation you may need to learn to negotiate with the enemy.
Members of the population that supports you also know the enemys leaders. They may have
grown up together in the small district that is now your company sector, and valid negotiating
partners sometimes emerge as the operation progresses. Again, you need close interagency
relationships to exploit opportunities to co-opt segments of the enemy. This helps you wind
down the insurgency without alienating potential local allies who have relatives or friends in
the insurgent movement. At this stage, a defection is better than a surrender, a surrender
is better than a capture, and a capture is better than a kill.
GETTING SHORT
C-9. Time is short, and the tour is drawing to a close. The key problem now is keeping your people
focused, maintaining the rage on all the multifarious programs, projects, and operations that you have
started, and preventing your people from dropping their guard. In this final phase, the previous articles still
stand, but there is an important new one.
27. Keep your extraction plan secret. The temptation to talk about home becomes almost
unbearable toward the end of a tour. The locals know you are leaving, and probably have a
better idea than you of the generic extraction plan. Remember, they have seen units come
and go. But you must protect the specific details of the extraction plan, or the enemy will use
this as an opportunity to score a high-profile hit, recapture the populations allegiance by
scare tactics that convince them they will not be protected once you leave, or persuade them
that your successor unit will be oppressive or incompetent. Keep the details secret within a
tightly controlled compartment in your headquarters.
al-Hassani tribes and Shia communities. But that work was not wasted. In mastering your first
area, you learned techniques you can apply: how to case an operational area and how
to decide what matters in the local societal structure. Do the same again, and this time the
process is easier and faster, since you have an existing mental structure and can focus on what
is different. The same applies if you get moved frequently within a battalion or brigade area.
What if higher headquarters doesnt get counterinsurgency? Higher headquarters is telling
you the mission is to kill terrorists, or pushing for high-speed armored patrols and a
base-camp mentality. They just dont seem to understand counterinsurgency. This is not
uncommon, since company-grade officers today often have more combat experience than
senior officers. In this case, just do what you can. Try not to create expectations that higher
headquarters will not let you meet. Apply the adage first do no harm. Over time, you will
find ways to do what you have to do. But never lie to higher headquarters about your locations
or activitiesthey own the indirect fires.
What if you have no resources? You have no linguists, the aid agencies have no money
for projects in your area, and you have a low priority for civil affairs. You can still get things
done, but you need to focus on self-reliance: Keep things small and sustainable and ruthlessly
prioritize effort. The local population are your allies in this: They know what matters to them
more than you do. Be honest with them; discuss possible projects and options with community
leaders; get them to choose what their priorities are. Often they will find the translators,
building supplies, or expertise that you need, and will only expect your support and protection
in making their projects work. And the process of negotiation and consultation will help
mobilize their support and strengthen their social cohesion. If you set your sights on what
is achievable, the situation can still work.
What if the theater situation shifts under your feet? It is your worst nightmareEverything has
gone well in your sector, but the whole theater situation has changed and invalidates your
efforts. Think of the first battle of Fallujah, the Askariya shrine bombing, or the Sadr uprising.
What do you do? Here is where having a flexible, adaptive game plan comes in. Just as the
insurgents drop down to a lower posture when things go wrong, now is the time for you to drop
back a stage, consolidate, regain your balance, and prepare to expand again when the situation
allows. But see article 28: If you cede the initiative, you must regain it as soon as the situation
allows, or you will eventually lose.
C-11. This, then, is the tribal wisdom, the folklore that those who went before you have learned. Like
any folklore it needs interpretation and contains seemingly contradictory advice. Over time, as you apply
unremitting intellectual effort to study your sector, you will learn to apply these ideas in your own way
and will add to this store of wisdom from your own observations and experience. So only one article
remains, and if you remember nothing else, remember this:
28. Whatever else you do, keep the initiative. In counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything.
If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment. Provided you mobilize the
population, you will win. If you are reacting to the enemy, even if you are killing or capturing
him in large numbers, then he is controlling the environment and you will eventually lose.
In counterinsurgency, the enemy initiates most attacks, targets you unexpectedly,
and withdraws too fast for you to react. Do not be drawn into purely reactive operations:
Focus on the population, build your own solution, further your game plan, and fight the
enemy only when he gets in the way. This gains and keeps the initiative.
7. Treat the sub-chiefs of your force quite easily and lightly. In this way you hold yourself above
their level. Treat the leader, if a Sharif, with respect. He will return your manner and you and he
will then be alike, and above the rest. Precedence is a serious matter among the Arabs, and you
must attain it.
8. Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not be too intimate, too
prominent, or too earnest. Avoid being identified too long or too often with any tribal sheikh, even
if C.O. of the expedition. To do your work you must be above jealousies, and you lose prestige
if you are associated with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable feuds. Sharifs are above all
blood-feuds and local rivalries, and form the only principle of unity among the Arabs. Let your
name therefore be coupled always with a Sharif's, and share his attitude towards the tribes. When
the moment comes for action put yourself publicly under his orders. The Bedu will then follow
suit.
9. Magnify and develop the growing conception of the Sharifs as the natural aristocracy of the
Arabs. Intertribal jealousies make it impossible for any sheikh to attain a commanding position,
and the only hope of union in nomad Arabs is that the Ashraf be universally acknowledged as the
ruling class. Sharifs are half-townsmen, half-nomad, in manner and life, and have the instinct
of command. Mere merit and money would be insufficient to obtain such recognition; but the
Arab reverence for pedigree and the Prophet gives hope for the ultimate success of the Ashraf.
10. Call your Sharif 'Sidi' in public and in private. Call other people by their ordinary names, without
title. In intimate conversation call a Sheikh 'Abu Annad', 'Akhu Alia' or some similar by-name.
11. The foreigner and Christian is not a popular person in Arabia. However friendly and informal the
treatment of yourself may be, remember always that your foundations are very sandy ones. Wave
a Sharif in front of you like a banner and hide your own mind and person. If you succeed, you will
have hundreds of miles of country and thousands of men under your orders, and for this it is worth
bartering the outward show.
12. Cling tight to your sense of humor. You will need it every day. A dry irony is the most useful
type, and repartee of a personal and not too broad character will double your influence with the
chiefs. Reproof, if wrapped up in some smiling form, will carry further and last longer than the
most violent speech. The power of mimicry or parody is valuable, but use it sparingly, for wit
is more dignified than humor. Do not cause a laugh at a Sharif except among Sharifs.
13. Never lay hands on an Arab; you degrade yourself. You may think the resultant obvious increase
of outward respect a gain to you, but what you have really done is to build a wall between you
and their inner selves. It is difficult to keep quiet when everything is being done wrong, but the
less you lose your temper the greater your advantage. Also then you will not go mad yourself.
14. While very difficult to drive, the Bedu are easy to lead, if have the patience to bear with them.
The less apparent your interferences the more your influence. They are willing to follow your
advice and do what you wish, but they do not mean you or anyone else to be aware of that. It
is only after the end of all annoyances that you find at bottom their real fund of goodwill.
15. Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do
it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under
the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think
it is.
16. If you can, without being too lavish, forestall presents to yourself. A well-placed gift is often most
effective in winning over a suspicious sheikh. Never receive a present without giving a liberal
return, but you may delay this return (while letting its ultimate certainty be known) if you require
a particular service from the giver. Do not let them ask you for things, since their greed will then
make them look upon you only as a cow to milk.
17. Wear an Arab head cloth when with a tribe. Bedu have a malignant prejudice against the hat,
and believe that our persistence in wearing it (due probably to British obstinacy of dictation)
is founded on some immoral or irreligious principle. A thick head cloth forms a good protection
against the sun, and if you wear a hat your best Arab friends will be ashamed of you in public.
18. Disguise is not advisable. Except in special areas, let it be clearly known that you are a British
officer and a Christian. At the same time, if you can wear Arab kit when with the tribes, you will
acquire their trust and intimacy to a degree impossible in uniform. It is, however, dangerous
and difficult. They make no special allowances for you when you dress like them. Breaches
of etiquette not charged against a foreigner are not condoned to you in Arab clothes. You will be
like an actor in a foreign theatre, playing a part day and night for months, without rest, and for an
anxious stake. Complete success, which is when the Arabs forget your strangeness and speak
naturally before you, counting you as one of themselves, is perhaps only attainable in character:
while half-success (all that most of us will strive for; the other costs too much) is easier to win
in British things, and you yourself will last longer, physically and mentally, in the comfort that
they mean. Also then the Turks will not hang you, when you are caught.
19. If you wear Arab things, wear the best. Clothes are significant among the tribes, and you must
wear the appropriate, and appear at ease in them. Dress like a Sharif, if they agree to it.
20. If you wear Arab things at all, go the whole way. Leave your English friends and customs on the
coast, and fall back on Arab habits entirely. It is possible, starting thus level with them, for the
European to beat the Arabs at their own game, for we have stronger motives for our action,
and put more heart into it than they. If you can surpass them, you have taken an immense stride
toward complete success, but the strain of living and thinking in a foreign and half-understood
language, the savage food, strange clothes, and stranger ways, with the complete loss of privacy
and quiet, and the impossibility of ever relaxing your watchful imitation of the others for months
on end, provide such an added stress to the ordinary difficulties of dealing with the Bedu, the
climate, and the Turks, that this road should not be chosen without serious thought.
21. Religious discussions will be frequent. Say what you like about your own side, and avoid criticism
of theirs, unless you know that the point is external, when you may score heavily by proving it so.
With the Bedu, Islam is so all-pervading an element that there is little religiosity, little fervor,
and no regard for externals. Do not think from their conduct that they are careless. Their
conviction of the truth of their faith, and its share in every act and thought and principle of their
daily life is so intimate and intense as to be unconscious, unless roused by opposition. Their
religion is as much a part of nature to them as is sleep or food.
22. Do not try to trade on what you know of fighting. The Hejaz confounds ordinary tactics. Learn the
Bedu principles of war as thoroughly and as quickly as you can, for till you know them your
advice will be no good to the Sharif. Unnumbered generations of tribal raids have taught them
more about some parts of the business than we will ever know. In familiar conditions they fight
well, but strange events cause panic. Keep your unit small. Their raiding parties are usually from
one hundred to two hundred men, and if you take a crowd they only get confused. Also their
sheikhs, while admirable company commanders, are too 'set' to learn to handle the equivalents
of battalions or regiments. Don't attempt unusual things, unless they appeal to the sporting instinct
Bedu have so strongly, unless success is obvious. If the objective is a good one (booty) they will
attack like fiends, they are splendid scouts, their mobility gives you the advantage that will win
this local war, they make proper use of their knowledge of the country (don't take tribesmen
to places they do not know), and the gazelle-hunters, who form a proportion of the better men, are
great shots at visible targets. A sheikh from one tribe cannot give orders to men from another; a
Sharif is necessary to command a mixed tribal force. If there is plunder in prospect, and the odds
are at all equal, you will win. Do not waste Bedu attacking trenches (they will not stand
casualties) or in trying to defend a position, for they cannot sit still without slacking. The more
unorthodox and Arab your proceedings, the more likely you are to have the Turks cold, for they
lack initiative and expect you to. Don't play for safety.
23. The open reason that Bedu give you for action or inaction may be true, but always there will be
better reasons left for you to divine. You must find these inner reasons (they will be denied, but
are none the less in operation) before shaping your arguments for one course or other. Allusion
is more effective than logical exposition: they dislike concise expression. Their minds work just
as ours do, but on different premises. There is nothing unreasonable, incomprehensible,
or inscrutable in the Arab. Experience of them and knowledge of their prejudices will enable you
to foresee their attitude and possible course of action in nearly every case.
24. Do not mix Bedu and Syrians, or trained men and tribesmen. You will get work out of neither,
for they hate each other. I have never seen a successful combined operation, but many failures.
In particular, ex-officers of the Turkish army, however Arab in feelings and blood and language,
are hopeless with Bedu. They are narrow minded in tactics, unable to adjust themselves
to irregular warfare, clumsy in Arab etiquette, swollen-headed to the extent of being incapable
of politeness to a tribesman for more than a few minutes, impatient, and, usually, helpless without
their troops on the road and in action. Your orders (if you were unwise enough to give any) would
be more readily obeyed by Bedouins than those of any Mohammedan Syrian officer. Arab
townsmen and Arab tribesmen regard each other mutually as poor relations, and poor relations are
much more objectionable than poor strangers.
25. In spite of ordinary Arab example, avoid too free talk about women. It is as difficult a subject
as religion, and their standards are so unlike our own that a remark, harmless in English, may
appear as unrestrained to them, as some of their statements would look to us, if translated literally.
26. Be as careful of your servants as of yourself. If you want a sophisticated one you will probably
have to take an Egyptian, or a Sudani, and unless you are very lucky he will undo on trek much
of the good you so laboriously effect. Arabs will cook rice and make coffee for you, and leave you
if required to do unmanly work like cleaning boots or washing. They are only really possible
if you are in Arab kit. A slave brought up in the Hejaz is the best servant, but there are rules
against British subjects owning them, so they have to be lent to you. In any case, take with you an
Ageyli or two when you go up country. They are the most efficient couriers in Arabia,
and understand camels.
27. The beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of them. Keep
always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing: watch yourself and your companions all
the time: hear all that passes, search out what is going on beneath the surface, read their
characters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses and keep everything you find out
to yourself. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and no ideas except the work in hand,
so that your brain is saturated with one thing only, and you realize your part deeply enough
to avoid the little slips that would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will be
proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it."
m meter(s)
H
MASINT measurement and signature
HCT HUMINT collection team intelligence
HMMWV high-mobility, multipurpose MDMP military decision-making process
wheeled vehicle METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and
HN host nation weather, troops and support
available, time available, and
HOPE-P higher, operational, planning,
civilian considerations
enemy, and populace
MILVAN military van (container)
HPT high-payoff target
MOE measure of effectiveness
HQ headquarters
MOP measure of performance
HUMINT human intelligence
MORTEAM Measure (assess)
I Organize
Rebuild/build facilities
IAW in accordance with Train
ID identification Equip
Advise
IDAD internal defense and development
Mentor
IDP internally displaced person
MWD military working dog
IE information engagement
IED improvised explosive device N
IGO intergovernmental organization NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
IPB intelligence preparation of the NCO noncommissioned officer
battlefield
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
IPI indigenous population and
NGA National Geospatial-Intelli-
institutions
gence Agency
IRA Irish Republican Army
NGO nongovernmental organization
ISR intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance O
Section IITERMS
advisor
A military member who conducts operations that train Host Nation military individuals
and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime
skills; provide advice and assisstance to military leaders, and provide training on tactics,
techniques, and procedures required to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness,
and insurgency, and develop indigenous individual, leader, organizational skills.
ambush
A form of attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving
or temporarily halted enemy (FM 3-0).
area defense
A type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated
terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (FM 3-0).
area of interest
(Joint) That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent
thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations.
This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the
accomplishment of the mission (JP 1-02).
area of operations
An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas
of operations do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force
commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their
missions and protect their forces (JP 1-02).
area security
A form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces, installation routes,
and actions within a specific area (FM 3-90).
assessment
(Army) The continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an
operation (FMI 5-0.1).
*asymmetric warfare
Conflict in which a weaker opponent uses unorthodox or surprise tactics to attack weak
points of a stronger opponent, especially if the tactics include terrorism, guerrilla warfare,
criminal activity, subversion, or propaganda.
auxiliary
In unconventional warfare, that element of the resistance force established to provide the
organized civilian support of the resistance movement. (AR 310-25).
avenue of approach
An air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key
terrain in its path (JP 1-02).
capacity building
The process of creating an environment that fosters Host Nation institutional development,
community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial
systems (FM 3-07).
center of gravity
(Joint) The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action,
or will to act (JP 3-0).
civil considerations
How the manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the
civilian leaders, populations, organizations within an area of operations influence the conduct
of military operations (FM 6-0). See also METT-TC.
civil-military operations
(FM 3-07) The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit
relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations
and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area
in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives.
Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities
and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These
activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also
occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may
be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil
affairs and other forces (JP 3-57).
civil war
A war between opposing groups of citizens of the same country.
clear
(Army) A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces
and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area (FM 3-90).
close air support
(CAS) Air action by fixedand rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close
proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with
the fire and movement of those forces (DOD).
close combat
Combat carried out with direct-fire weapons, supported by indirect fires, air-delivered fires,
and nonlethal engagement means. Close combat defeats or destroys enemy forces or seizes
and retains ground (FM 3-0).
coalition
(Joint) An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 5-0)
collateral damage
Unintended and undesirable civilian personnel injuries or material damage adjacent to a target
produced by the effects of demolition weapons.
combat patrol
(NATO): For ground forces, a tactical unit sent out from the main body to engage
in independent fighting; detachment assigned to protect the front, flank, or rear of the main
body by fighting if necessary.
combat power
(Army) The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a
military unit/formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by
converting potential into effective action (FM 3-0).
combined arms
The synchronized and simultaneous application of the elements of combat powerto achieve
an effect greater than if each element of combat power was used separately or sequentially
(FM 3-0).
command
(Joint) 1. The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over
subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority
and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment
of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment
of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline
of assigned personnel.
2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the
purpose of bringing about a particular action.
3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual (JP 1).
command and control
(Joint) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command and control
functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications,
facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating,
and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1).
(Army) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders perform
command and control functions through a command and control system (FM 6-0).
commanders critical information requirement
(Joint) An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical
to facilitating timely decisionmaking. The two key elements are friendly force information
requirements and priority intelligence requirements (JP 3-0).
commanders intent
(Joint) A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state. It may
also include the commanders assessment of the adversary commanders intent and an
assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation (JP 3-0).
(Army) A clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force
must establish with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the
desired end state (FM 3-0).
commanders visualization
The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state,
and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will achieve that end state
(FM 3-0).
comprehensive approach
An approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the
United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations,
multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared
goal (FM 3-07)
concept of operations
(Joint) A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force
commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The
concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. (JP 5-0, Army) A statement
that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission
and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state. It
is normally expressed in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations (FM 3-0).
condition
(DOD) Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system,
or individual is expected to operate and may affect performance.
control
(Joint) 1. Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part
of the activities of subordinate or other organizations.
2. In mapping, charting, and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks
or objects on the Earth or on a map or a photograph, whose positions or elevations (or both)
have been or will be determined.
3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group
will respond as directed. 4. An indicator governing the distribution and use of documents,
information, or material. Such indicators are the subject of intelligence community agreement
and are specifically defined in appropriate regulations (JP 1-02).
(Army) 1. In the context of command and control, the regulation of forces and warfighting
functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commanders intent (FM 3-0).
2. A tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a
specified area to prevent its use by an enemy (FM 3-90).
3. An action taken to eliminate a hazard or reduce its risk (FM 5-19).
4. In the context of stability mechanisms, to impose civil order (FM 3-0).
conventional forces
Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons (JP 1-02).
counterinsurgency
(Joint) Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions
taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02).
counterterrorism
(Joint) operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt,
and respond to terrorism (JP 1-02).
course of action
1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or a unit may follow.
2. A possible plan open to an individual or a commander that would accomplish or is related
to the accomplishment of a mission.
3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission.
4. A line of conduct in an engagement.
5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development
phase (JP 1-02).
deception
Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification
of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests (JP 1-02).
decision point
(Army) An event, area, or point in the battle where and when the friendly commander will
make a critical decision (FM 3-0).
decisive operation
The operation that directly accomplishes the mission. It determines the outcome of a major
operation, battle, or engagement. The decisive operation is the focal point around which
commanders design the entire operation (FM 3-0).
decisive point
(Joint) A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted
upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute
materially to achieving success. (JP 3-0) [Note: In this context, adversary also refers
to enemies.]
defeat
A tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost
the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated forces commander is unwilling
or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly
commanders will, and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions
of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use (FM 3-90).
displaced person
(Army) A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country
or as an internally displaced person is a civilian involuntarily outside his area or region within
his country (FM 2-0).
disrupt
A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain,
and obstacles to upset an enemys formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his
forces to commit prematurely or attack in piecemeal fashion (FM 3-90).
doctrine
Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions
in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application
(JP 1-02).
defensive operations
Combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces,
and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (FM 3-0).
demobilization
(Joint) The process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment
and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national
security and economic vitality (JP 4-05).
destroy
In the context of defeat mechaisms, to apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so
that it can no longer perform any function and cannot be restored to a usable condition
without being entirely rebuilt (FM 3-0).
2. A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it
is reconstituted (FM 3-90).
effect
(Army) A result, outcome, or consequence of an action (FMI 5-0.1).
engagement
A tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelon maneuver forces (JP 1-02).
end state
(Joint) The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commanders objectives
(JP 3-0).
enemy
A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (FM 3-0).
enemy combatant
A person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an
armed conflict. This term includes both enemy combatants and unlawful enemy
combatants (DODD 2310.01E. September 5, 2006).
execution
Putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using
situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions
(FM 3-0).
exfiltration
The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception,
surprise, or clandestine means (JP 1-02).
exploitation
1. Taking full advantage of success in military operations, following up initial gains,
and making permanent the temporary effects already achieved.
2. An offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed
to disorganize the enemy in depth (JP 1-02).
explosive ordnance disposal
The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal
of unexploded ordnance. It may also include explosive ordnance which has become
hazardous by damage or deterioration (JP 1-02).
fires
The effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons (JP 1-02).
fix
(Army) 1. A tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy from moving any
part of its force from a specific location for a specific period of time. 2. An engineer obstacle
effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attackers movement within a
specified area, normally an engagement area (FM 3-90).
foreign internal defense
(Joint) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action
programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its
society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (JP 1-02).
forward operating base
An area used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities (FM 0).
full-spectrum operations
The Armys operational concept: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability
or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve
decisive results. They employ synchronized actionlethal and nonlethalproportional to the
mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational
environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the
situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces (FM 3-0).
goals (governmental planning)
Goals are more specific statements than objectives, they represent the actions or things to be
accomplished in order to achieve the established objectives. A goal is an observable
and measurable end result.
guerrilla
(DOD definition): A combat participant in guerrilla warfare. Dictionary definition: A member
of an irregular, usually indigenous military or paramilitary unit that operates in small units
and uses guerrilla warfare. Source: The Spanish diminutive form of guerra (war) that means
small or little war." The word developed in reference to the tactics that the Spanish
resistance used against Napoleon's forces in Spain.
guerrilla force
(DOD) A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military
lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied
territory.
guerrilla warfare
(GW, DOD, NATO) Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile
territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.
host nation
(Joint) A nation which permits, either by written agreement or official invitation, government
representatives and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions,
within its borders. (JP 1-02).
host nation support
Civil or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during
peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between
nations (JP 1-02).
human intelligence
(Army) The collection of information by a trained human intelligence collector from people
and their associated documents and media sources to identify elements, intentions,
composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities
(FM 2-22.3). [Note: trained HUMINT collectors are Soldiers holding military occupational
specialties 97E, 351Y {formerly 351C}, 351M {formerly 351E}, 35E, and 35F, and Marines
holding the specialty 0251.]
imagery intelligence
Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared
sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein
images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film,electronic display
devices, or other media (JP 1-02).
indigenous
Existing, born, or produced in a lor region. Synonym: Native.
infiltration
(Army) A form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement
through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the
enemy rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires (FM 3-90).
information engagement
The integrated employment of public affairs to inform US and friendly audiences;
psychological operations, combat camera, US Government strategic communication
and defense support to public diplomacy, and other means necessary to influence foreign
audiences; and, leader and Soldier engagements to support both efforts (FM 3-0).
information warfare
Information Operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote
specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries (JP 1-02).
insurgency
(Joint) An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through
the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02).
insurgent
(DOD) Member of a political party who rebels against established leadership.
intelligence
1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation,
and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.
2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation,
investigation, analysis, or understanding (JP 1-02).
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
The systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific
geographic area. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is designed to support the
running estimate and military decision-making processes. Most intelligence requirements are
generated as a result of the IPB process and its interrelation with the decision-making process
(FM 34-130).
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(Army) An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors,
assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current
and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. For Army
forces, this activity is a combined arms operation that focuses on priority intelligence
requirements while answering the commanders critical information requirements (FM 3-0).
interagency
(Joint) United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department
of Defense (JP 3-08).
interagency coordination
(Joint) Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that
occurs between elements of Department of Defense and engaged US Government agencies
for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 1-02).
interdict
A tactical mission task where the commander prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemys use
of an area or route (FM 3-90).
intergovernmental organization
(Joint) An organization created by a formal agreement, such as a treaty, between two or more
governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging
or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by
member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
and the African Union (JP 3-08).
internal defense and development
(IDAD, DOD) The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth
and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building
viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs
of society.
irregular forces
(DOD) Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces,
police, or other internal security forces (FM 3-07).
irregular warfare
A broad form of conflicts in which insurgency, counterinsurgency, and unconventional
warfare are the principle activities (FM 3-0).
isolate
In the context of defeat mechanisms, to deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that
enable the exercise of coercion, influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action
(FM 3-0).
joint
Connotes activities, operations, organizations, and so on, in which elements of two or more
Military Departments participate (JP 1-02).
joint force
A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached,
of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander
(JP 1-02).
joint operations
A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces
in relationships, such as support or coordinating authority which, of themselves,do not create
joint forces (JP 1-02).
key terrain
Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either
combatant (JP 1-02).
leadership
The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while
operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization (FM 6-22).
line of effort
A line that links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purposecause and effectto
focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions (FM 3-0).
line of communications
(Joint) A route, either land, water, or air, that connects an operating military force with a base
of operations and along which supplies and military forces move (JP 1-02).
major operation
A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces
of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational and,
sometimes, strategic objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted
simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a
single commander (JP 1-02).
maneuver
(Joint) Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with
fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the
mission (JP 3-0).
measure of effectiveness
(Joint) A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational
environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an
objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0).
measure of performance
(Joint) A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task
accomplishment (JP 3-0).
METT-TC
A memory aid used in two contexts:
1. Information Management the major subject categories into which relevant information
is grouped for military operations: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, civil considerations (FM 6-0). 2. In the context of tactics, major
variables considered during mission analysis (mission variables, FM 3-90).
milestone
A significant event in a project.
military decision-making process
A process that integrates the activities of the commander, staff and subordinate commanders
in developing and operation plan or order. It establishes procedures for analyzing a mission;
developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action; selecting the best course of action;
and producing an operation plan or order (FMI 5-0.1).
mission
(Joint) 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken
and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military
units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more
aircraft to accomplish one particular task (JP 1-02).
mission command
The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission
orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results from
subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commanders
intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding
(FM 6-0).
movement to contact
A form of the offensive designed to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact
(JP 1-02).
multinational operations
(Joint) A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more
nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16).
neutral
(Army) A party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy forces
(FM 3-0).
nongovernmental organization
(Joint) A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human
suffering; or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental
protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; or encouraging the establishment
of democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08).
nonlethal fires
Any fires that do not directly seek the physical destruction of the intended target and are
designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces, functions,
and facilities. Psychological operations, electronic warfare (jamming), and other command
and control countermeasures are all nonlethal fire options (FM 6-20).
objective
(Army) A location on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate
changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort (FM 3-90).
objective area
(DOD, NATO) A defined geographical area within which is located an objective to be
captured or reached by the military forces. This area is defined by competent authority
for purposes of command and control.
offensive operations
Combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources,
and population centers. They impose the commanders will on the enemy (FM 3-0).
operation
1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training,
or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including
movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle
or campaign (JP 1-02).
operation order
(OPORD, DOD) A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the
purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called the five paragraph
field order.
operation plan
(DOD) Any plan for the conduct of military operations. Operation plans are prepared in either
a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN).
operating tempo
The annual operating miles or hours for the major equipment system in a battalion-level
or equivalent organization. Commanders use operating tempo to forecast and allocate funds
for fuel and repair parts for training events and programs (FM 7-0).
operations process
The major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing,
executing, and continuously assessing the operation. The commander drives the operations
process (FM 3-0).
operations security
A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions
attendant to military operations and other activities to a. identify those actions that can be
observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators hostile intelligence
systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical
information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that
eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary
exploitation (JP 1-02).
order
A communication that is written, oral, or by signal, which conveys instructions from a
superior to a subordinate. In a broad sense, the terms order and command are
synonymous. However, an order implies discretion as to the details of execution, whereas a
command does not (JP 1-02). Combat orders pertain to operations and their service support.
paramilitary forces
Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them
in organization, equipment, training, or mission (JP 1-02).
partner unit
A unit that shares all or a portion of an area of operation with an HN security force unit. US
forces operating as partner units to HN security forces need to be prepared to make some
organizational changes.
patrol
A detachment of ground, sea, or air forces sent out for the purpose of gathering information
or carrying out a destructive, harassing, mopping-up, or security mission (JP 1-02).
phase
A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. A change
in phase usually involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement.
Phasing helps in planning and controlling and may be indicated by time, distance, terrain,
or an event (FM 3-0).
plan
A design for a future or anticipated operation (FM 5-0).
planning
The process by which commanders (and the staff, if available) translate the commanders
visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the
expected results (FM 3-0).
PMESII-PT
A memory aid for the varibles used to describe the operational environment (operational
variables, FM 3-0):
Political
Military
Economic
Social
Information
Infrastructure
Physical (environment)
Time
populace controls
Controls that provide security for the populace, mobilize human resources, deny personnel to
the guerrilla, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of guerrilla agents.
preparation
Activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an operation. Preparation
includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance; coordination; inspections; and movement (FM 3-0).
procedures
Standard and detailed courses of action that describe how to perform a task.
program (governmental planning)
A program supports the plan and is a more detailed determination of specific objectives
established in the plan.
projects (governmental planning)
Projects comprise the components of programs and are the specific actions and tasks to be
accomplished.
propaganda
Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the
opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either
directly or indirectly (JP 1-02).
psychological operations
(PSYOP) Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the
behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose
of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable
to the originators objectives (JP 1-02).
public affairs
(PA) Those public information, command information, and community relations activities
directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department
of Defense (JP 1-02).
pursuit
An offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with
the aim of destroying it (JP 1-02).
quick reaction force
(QRF) A designated organization for any immediate response requirement that occurs in a
designated area of operation (FM 3-90.6).
raid
(Joint) An operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an
adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability. It ends with a planned
withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission (JP 3-0) [Note: In this context,
adversary also refers to enemies].
rebellion
Open, armed, and usually unsuccessful defiance of or resistance to an established
government.
regular forces
Members of a nations armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.
reintegration
The process through which former combatants, belligerents, and dislocated civilians receive
amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing
members of the local populace (FM 3-07).
relief in place
(Army) An tactical enabling operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part
of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit (FM 3-90).
reserve
Portion of a body of troops which is kept to the rear or withheld from action at the beginning
of an engagement, in order to be available for a decisive movement (JP 1-02).
resistance movement
An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally
established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability
(JP 1-02).
resource controls
Controls that regulate the movement or consumption of materiel resources, mobilize materiel
resources, and deny materiel to the guerrilla.
revolution
The overthrow or renunciation of one government or ruler and the substitution of another by
the governed.
risk
(DOD) Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards (JP 1-02).
risk management
The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors,
and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 1-02).
rule of law
A principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including
the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced,
and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights
principles (FM 3-07).
rules of engagement
(Joint) Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances
and limitations under which United States forces will initiate or continue combat engagement
with other forces encountered (JP 1-02).
running estimate
A staff sections continuous assessment of current and future operations to determine if the
current operation is proceeding according to the commanders intent and if future operations
are supportable (FMI 5-0.1).
search and attack
A technique of conducting a movement to contact that shares many of the characteristics
of an area security mission (FM 3-0).
sabotage
(DOD) An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a
country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national
defense or war materiel, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources.
security
(Joint) 1. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against
all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from
the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability
from hostile acts or influences (JP 1-02).
security force assistance
The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, Host Nation, or regional security
forces in support of a legitimate authority (FM 3-07).
security operations
Those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning
of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space
within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander
to effectively use the protected force.
security sector reform
The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve
the way it provides safety, security, and justice (FM 3-07).
shaping operation
An operation at any echelon that creates and preserves conditions for the success of the
decisive operation (FM 3-0).
situational awareness
Knowledge of the immediate present environment, including knowledge of the factors
of METT-TC (FMI 5-0.1).
situational understanding
(Army) The product of applying analysis and judgment to the common operational picture
to determine the relationship among the factors of METT-TC (FM 3-0).
special operations
Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve
military, political, economic, or informational objectives employing military capabilities
for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require
covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the
rnage of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with
operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations
through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from
conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode
of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational
intelligence and indigenous assets (JP 1-02).
stability operations
(Joint) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities
conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power
to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental
services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0).
strike
(Joint) An attack to damage or destroy an objective or capability (JP 1-02).
support
(Joint) The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force
in accordance with a directive requiring such action.
2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects,
or supplies other forces in combat (JP 1, Army) In the context of stability mechanisms,
to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the other instruments of national
power to function effectively (FM 3-0).
supporting range
The distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within
the maximum range of the second units weapons systems (FM 3-0).
subversion
(DOD) Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, political
strength, or morale of a regime.
synchronization
1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum
relative combat power at a decisive place and time (FM 3-0).
2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with
the operation plan (JP 1-02).
tactical questioning
(DOD) Direct questioning by any DOD personnel of a captured or detained person to obtain
time-sensitive tactical intelligence, at or near the point of capture or detention and consistent
with applicable law.
tactical mission task
The specific activity a unit performs while conducting a form of tactical operation or form
of maneuver. It may be expressed in terms of either actions by a friendly force or effects on
an enemy force (FM 7-15).
tactics
(Joint) The employment ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. (CJCSI
5120.02A)
target
(DOD) 1. An entity or object considered for possible engagement or other action.
2. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which
intelligence operations are directed. 3. An area designated and numbered for future firing.
task-organizing
(Army) The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistic package of specific
size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when
task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to training, experience, equipage,
sustainability, operating environment, enemy threat, and mobility. For Army forces, it
includes allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their
command and support relationships (FM 3-0).
techniques
(Army/Marine Corps) The general and detailed methods used by troops or commanders
to perform assigned missions and functions, specifically, the methods of using equipment
and personnel (FM 3-90).
tempo
(Army) The rate of military action (FM 3-0).
(Marine Corps) The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to
the enemy (MCRP 5-12A).
terrorism
(Joint) The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate
fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that
are generally political, religious, or ideological (JP 3-07.2).
terrorist
(DOD) An individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result.
troop-leading procedures
A dynamic process used by small unit leaders to analyze amission, develop a plan,
and prepare for an operation (FM 5-0).
unconventional warfare
A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration,
predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are
organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external
source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence
activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (JP 1-02).
underground
A covert unconventional warfare organization established to operate in areas denied to the
guerrilla forces or conduct operations not suitable for guerrilla forces FM 1-02.
unexploded ordnance
Explosive ordnance which has been primed, fuzed, armed, or otherwise prepared for action,
and which has then been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner
as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material, and remains
unexploded either by malfunction or design, or for any other cause (JP 1-02).
unified action
(Joint) The synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental
and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1).
unity of effort
(Joint) The coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants
are not necessarily part of the same commor organizationthe product of successful unified
action (JP 1).
vulnerable state
A nation either unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services
to significant portions of the population (FM 3-07)
warfighting function
A group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a
common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives
(FM 3-0).
weapons of mass destruction
Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction or of being used in such a manner
as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives
or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons, but exclude the means
of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part
of the weapon (JP 1-02).
ARMY REGULATION
AR 350-30, Code of Conduct/Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) Training.
10 December 1985.
FIELD MANUALS
FM 2-0, Intelligence. 17 May 2004.
SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
CALL HANDBOOKS
For Center for Army Lessions Learned (CALL) Handbooks go to
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/archives.asp
07-06, Southern Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Operations. November 2006.
07-08, CF/SOF Integration and Interoperability. January 2007.
FIELD MANUALS
FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics. 21 September 2004.
FM 3-0, Operations. 27 February 2008.
FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations. 29 September 2006.
FM 3-05.120 (S/NF), Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence. 15 July 2007 (U).
FM 3-05.202, Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations. 2 February 2007.
FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 30 August 2007.
FM 3-05.302, Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 28 October 2005.
FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. 28 February 2002.
FM 3-06.20, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations.
25 April 2006.
FM 3-07, Stability Operations. 6 October 2008.
FM 3-21.10, The Infantry Rifle Company. 27 July 2006.
FM 3-21.11, The SBCT Infantry Rifle Company. 23 January 2003.
FM 3-21.20, The Infantry Battalion. 13 December 2006.
FM 3-21.21, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalion. 8 April 2003.
FM 3-21.75, The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills. 28 January 2008.
FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. 15 December 2006.
FM 3-90, Tactics. 4 July 2001.
FM 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion. 7 April 2008.
FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team. 4 August 2006.
FM 3-90.15, Sensitive Site Operations. 25 April 2007.
FM 3-90.119, Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations. 21 September 2007.
FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. 20 January 2005.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 14 May 2007.
JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID). 30 April 2004.
JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. 14 April 2006.
JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations. 17 October 2007.
JP 3-13, Information Operations. 13 February 2006.
JP 3-53, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations. 5 September 2003.
TRAINING CIRCULARS
TC 7-98-1, Stability and Support Operations Training Support Package. 5 June 1997.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
NAVMC 2890 (FMFRP 12-15), Small Wars Manual (Reprint of1940 USMC). 1 April 1987.
http://www.au.af/mil/au/awc/awcgate/swm/full.pdf.
Counterinsurgency Operations Southern & Western Afghanistan. Task Force 31, January 2007.
Counterinsurgency Handbook. Multi-National ForceIraq. 1st ed. Camp Taji, Iraq: Counterinsurgency
Center for Excellence, May, 2006.
Commanders Handbook for Security Force Assistance. Joint Center for International Security Force
Assistance, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 14 July 2008.
Developing Iraqs Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authoritys Experience. RAND National
Defense Institute. 2005.
CIVILIAN PUBLICATIONS
These books can be located in libraries or purchased at bookstores or online. The Combined Arms
Research Library at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/biblio/mildep.asp has some of these
publications.
Barber, Noel. The War of the Running Dogs: Malaya, 1948-1960. New York: Weybright and Tulley, 1971.
Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New York:
Basic Books, 2002.
Callwell, Charles E. Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska.
Ellis, John. From the Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerrilla, Revolutionary, and Counterinsurgency
Warfare from the Romans to the Present. London: Greenhill, 1995.
Galula, David. Counterinsurgency WarfareTheory and Practice. London: Praeger, 1964.
Hammes, T. X. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 2004.
Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace. New York: Viking, 1977.
Krepinevich, Andrew Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
Larteguy, Jean. The Centurions. New York: Dutton, 1962.
Linn, Brian McAllister. The Philippine War, 18991902. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas,
2002.
Mao Zedong. On Guerrilla Warfare. London: Cassell, 1965.
McCuen, John J. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War. St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005.
Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
ONeill, Bard E. Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Dulles, VA: Potomac
Press, 1996.
Taber, Robert. War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare. Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books, 2002.
Trinquier, Roger. Modern WarfareA French View of Counterinsurgency. New York: Praeger, 1964.
United States Marine Corps. Small Wars Manual. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987.
West, Bing. The Village. New York: Pocket Books, 1972.
MILITARY PUBLICATIONS
Military Review articles are located at
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/repository/MREditions2006-English.xml
Baker, Ralph O. The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commanders Perspective on the
Conduct of Information Operations. Military Review 86, 3 (May-Jun 2006), 1332.
Chiarelli, Peter W. and Patrick R. Michaelis. Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum
Operations, Military Review 85, 4 (Jul-Aug 2005), 417.
Kilcullen, David. Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency. Military
Review 86, 3 (May-Jun 2006), 103108.
Petraeus, David. Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq. Military Review 86,
1 (Jan-Feb 2006), 212.
Lawrence, T. E. The 27 Articles of T. E. Lawrence. The Arab Bulletin (20 Aug 1917).
http://www.gwpda.org/1917/27arts.html
Sepp, Kalev I. Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Military Review 85, 3 (May-Jun 2005), 812.
Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0909005
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the
initial distribution number 114766, requirements for FM 3-24.2.
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