Austria vs.

Reyes ● They moved the lower court to refer the adoption papers to the Philippine Constabulary
for further study.
PARTIES: RUBEN AUSTRIA,CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA Mozo,
petitioners vs. PERFECTO CRUZ,BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ,ALBERTO ● On February 6, 1963, petitioners moved the lower court to set for hearing the matter of the
CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents. genuineness of the adoption of the respondents.

DOCTRINE: Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil ● Before the hearing, respondent Benita Cruz-Menez filed a motion asking the lower court to
Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must confine the petitioners’ intervention, should it be permitted, to properties not disposed of in
be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear the will of the decedent.
from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
● The lower court delimited the properties to those not disposed of in the will.
known the falsity of the Cause.
● MR by petitioners was denied. Hence, this petition by certiorari.
FACTS:
● LC assumed, by its orders in question, that the validity or invalidity of the adoption is not
● On July 7, 1956, Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate,
material nor decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if the adoption in
aatte mortem, of her last will and testament.
question were spurious, the respondents, will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs
● The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria but as testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia’s will.
rBenta and Lauro Austria Mozo (nephews and nieces of Basilia) but was dismisse. Hence,
Petitioners’ contention:
probate was allowed.
1. The entire estate should descend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the
the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent’s will.
respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Mefiez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-
Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted 2. The controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which reads: “The statement of a false
children. cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from
the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of
● On April 28, 1959, Basilia died.
such cause.”
● Respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor.
3. The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference that the
● On November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath onehalf of her
intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia. entire estate to the respondents. The basis of the institution being solely her belief that they
were compulsory heirs.
● That the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al,, had not in fact been adopted by the decedent
in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of heirs is valid
and without any right to succeed as heirs.
RULING: YES.
● the court allowed the intervention.
● Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code, the
● Both parties debated the authenticity or lack of it of the several adoption papers produced following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in
and presented by the respondents. the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face
of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity
● On motion of the petitioners, these documents were referred to the NBI for examination
of the cause.
and advice. NBI report seems to bear out the genuineness of the documents.
● Where the decedent’s will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for
● Dissatisfied, petitioners obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned
such institution of heirs, the will cannot be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code. Such
document examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of the said documents.
institutionmay be annulled only when it is clear, after an examination of the will that the
testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be heir”. This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary
false.
● The petitioners would have the court imply, from the use of the terms, “sapilitang
tagapagmana” (compulsory heirs) and “sapilitang mana” (legitime), that the impelling reason
or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix’s belief that under the law she
could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the
respondents, she did not make it known in her will.
● The “ tagapagmana” and “sapilitang mana” were borrowed from the language of the law
on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and the
abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would
have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound
by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre
disposition) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter’s children, and the
children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to
the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them.
Nuguid vs. Nuguid
Marquez
Doctrine:
Facts: Rosario Nuguid, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her
were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and
sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed
Nuguid. Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed the holographic will allegedly executed by
Rosario Nuguid. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the
deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground
therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir
of the deceased, oppositors—who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct
ascending line—were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
Trial Court declared the will null and void.
Issue: Whether the said will is void?
Ruling: Yes. The court held that where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line—her parents, and her
holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names
altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, shall annul the institution of
dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. Here, the deceased Rosario Nuguid left no
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending
line—her parents now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will
completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they
were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. Hence, the will in
question is a complete nullity because it provides for the institution of petitioner as
universal heir, and nothing more.
Note:
According to Manresa, preterition consists of omitting the heir in the will of not even
named, or even naming him as father, son, etc., is not instituted heir or expressly
disinherited, or assigned any part of the goods, resulting in a tacitly deprived of their right
to legitimate.
For there to be a preterition, according to Article 814, it is sufficient that in the will the
testator omits any one of those to whom, by his death, the forced inheritance corresponds.
It is necessary, then,
a) That the omission refers to a forced heir.
b)That the omission be complete; that the heir forcible nothing receives in the will
Preterition distinguished from disinheritance
Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.”
Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his
share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.”
Disinheritance is always “voluntary”; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be
“involuntary”.
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA
DIONGSON, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Constantino Acain filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio
Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, on the premise that
Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and
Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will
allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya with a 1982]).
translation in English submitted by petitioner without objection raised by private
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does
respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the
not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise,
appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament.
even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted
The will provided: from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil Code)

THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties, house, lands and money which
I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother
SEGUNDO ACAIN, Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C
Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain predeceases me, all the
money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute
my share shall be given by me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion,
Quirina, Laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus, it is the children of Segundo who are
claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner.
The oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of the
deceased and the latter’s widow Rosa Diongson Vda. De Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the
the following grounds: (1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
(2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
RTC- allowed the probate of the will
IAC- Dismissed the petition for the probate of the will
Issue: Whether or not private respondents have been preterited?
Held:
For the surviving spouse, there is no preterition.
For the adopted child, there is preterition.
However, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez,
whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Under Article 39
of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted
person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes
the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted
and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of
such institution of universal heirs·without any other testamentary disposition in the
will·amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear
terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v.
Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property
of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The
effect of annulling the institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy
(Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must, as already
stated above, be respected.

Article 854 of the Civil Code provides: NERI v. AKUTIN

“Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. 74 PHIL 185

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation.”
FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither of the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; was contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the
respondents over which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an
aggregate amount of money which the respondents were indebted to their father.
Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition with the Las
Pinas RTC for the partition of the decedent's estate and the appointment of a special
administrator on July 4, 2003. RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special
ISSUE: Whether or not the omission of the children of the first marriage annuls the institution
administrator.
of the children of the first marriage as sole heirs of the testator.
However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that
the decedent left a will dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate of the will and for
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy her appointment as special administratrix.
on the ground that testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second
The pertinent portions of the decedent's will reads:
marriage, without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the
erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in his property than those given Upon my death, IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ shall be the executor hereof and administrator
to the children by his second marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, of my estate until its distribution in accordance herewith, x x x
if contested, shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited
My entire estate shall be divided into six (6) parts to be distributed equally among and
person. This is but a case of preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.
between (1) IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ, my children (2) ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR.,
(3) ALEJANDRO OLONDRIZ, (4) ISABEL OLONDRIZ, (5) ANGELO OLONDRIZ, and their
mother (6) MARIA ORTEGAS OLONDRIZ, SR.3
The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the
heir; but the legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. decedent.

Then, Morales filed a manifestation and moved to suspend the intestate proceedings in order
to give way to the probate proceedings. The respondent heirs opposed Morales' motion for
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
suspension and her petition for allowance of the will. The respondent heirs moved to dismiss
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
the probate proceedings because Francisco was preterited from the will.
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In the instant case, while the children of the
first marriage were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any share in the hereditary ISSUE: Wheter or not the will is valid
property, without expressly being disinherited. It is, therefore, a clear case of preterition as
HELD: No. Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either
contended by appellants. The omission of the forced heirs or anyone of them, whether
because he is not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted
voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or
as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited - tacitly
is not at least manifest.
depriving the heir of his legitime.5 Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the
G.R. No. 198994, February 03, 2016 heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime.6

IRIS MORALES, Petitioners, v. ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ, ALFONSO JUAN In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the
OLONDRIZ, JR., ALEJANDRO MORENO OLONDRIZ, ISABEL ROSA OLONDRIZ testator's inheritance without the heir's express disinheritance.
AND FRANCISCO JAVIER MARIA OLONDRIZ,
Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of preterition.
FACTS: Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. died on June 9, 2003. He was survived by his widow,
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
Ana Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
Marino O. Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O. Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar
Maria Bautista Olondriz. His widow and children are collectively referred to as the
as they are not inofficious.
respondent heirs.
 Finally, there is no merit in the petitioner's argument that the previous order setting the case
for probate barred the RTC from ordering the case to proceed intestate. The disputed order is
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be
merely interlocutory and can never become final and executory in the same manner that a
effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation,
final judgment does.13 An interlocutory order does not result in res judicata.14 It remains
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the under the control of the court and can be modified or rescinded at any time before final
institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are judgment.
not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the
Solano vs. CA, G.R. No. L-41971 November 29, 1983
preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy.
Petitioner: Zonia Ana Solano
In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir,
legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the Respondents: Honorable Court of Appeals and Bienvenido & Emeteria Garcia
direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to
the conclusion of his preterition. Topic: Preterition (Article 854)

During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present evidence that Facts:
Francisco received donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime from the decedent.
 Dr Meliton Solano was a resident of Tabaco, Albay. He was married to Pilar Riosa,
However, Morales did not appear during the hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to
died. On a world tour, he met a French woman Lilly Gorand who became his 2 nd
present evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for reaching the reasonable conclusion
wife, after sometime Lilly left Solano.
that there was preterition.
 In 1930, he had an amorous relationship with Juana Gracia with whom he had 2
We will not entertain the petitioner's factual allegation that Francisco was not preterited
children namely, Bienvenido and Emeteria. In their birth certificate only the
because this Court is not a trier of facts. Furthermore, the CA concurred with the RTC's
mother’s name was written, no father’s name. Solano recognized the two children
conclusion. We see no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the lower courts.
by providing support and provision for their education.
The remaining question is whether it was proper for the RTC to (1) pass upon the intrinsic
 Solano started living with Trinidad Tuagnon whom he had 3 children, the only
validity of the will during probate proceedings and (2) order the case to proceed intestate
living child was Zonia. In her birth certificate it was written illegitimate child and
because of preterition.
PNC- Padre no Conocido (unkown father). However, Solano executed an agreement
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court's inquiry is limited to with Tuagnon acknowledging Zonia as his natural child. It was registered with the
questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only determine the will's civil registrar.
formal validity and due execution.8 However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute.9 It is
 Solano executed a will declaring Zonia as her universal heir, the will was probated.
not beyond the probate court's jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when
so warranted by exceptional circumstances.10 When practical considerations demand that the  In July 7, 1969, Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for recognition against
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court Solano, however he denied it. Solano died during the pendency of the case and was
should meet the issue. substituted as Zonia as the only surving heir of Solano in his will.

The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco's preterition  The Garcias impugned the recognition of Zonia as an acknowledged natural child,
annulled the institution of heirs. The annulment effectively caused the total abrogation of the they stated that that Zonia be declared as well, as an adulterous child.
will, resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance.12 The decedent's will, no matter how valid
 The trial court declared Garcias and Zonia as Adulterous children, the declaration
it may appear extrinsically, is null and void. The conduct of separate proceedings to
of Zonia as a sole heir is null and void, lastly, the 3 children share equally having 1/3
determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary provisions would be superfluous. Thus,
each of the estate of Solano without prejudce to the legacy given to Trinidad. The
we cannot attribute error - much less grave abuse of discretion - on the RTC for ordering the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
case to proceed intestate.
Issue: Whether the institution of Zonia as a sole heir in the will is null and void Under Article
854 of the Civil Code.
Ruling: Yes. Under Article 854 which states that the preterition or omission of one, some, or
all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. In this case, the GARCIAS and
ZONIA were in the same category as illegitimate children; that Zonia's acknowledgment as a
"natural child" in a notarial document executed by Solano and Trinidad Tuagnon on
December 22, 1943 was erroneous because at the time of her birth in 1941, Solano was still
married to Lilly Gorand, his divorce having been obtained only in 1943, and, therefore, did
not have the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of Zonia's conception, that being
compulsory heirs, the Garcias were, in fact, pretended from Solano's Last Will and Testament;
and that as a result of said preterition, the institution of Zonia as sole heir by Solano is null
and void pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code. The disposition in the will giving the
usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon over the five parcels of land in Bantayan, Tabaco,
Albay, is a legacy and should be respected in so far as it is not inofficious.
Other Issues:
 Hereditary shares of the GARCIAS and ZONIA. However, contrary to the
conclusions of the Courts below, holding that the entire Will is void and intestacy
ensues, the pretention of the GARCIAS should annul the institution of ZONIA as
heir only insofar as the legitime of the omitted heirs is impaired. The Will, therefore,
is valid subject to that limitation. It is a plain that the intention of the testator was
to favor ZONIA with certain portions of his property, which, under the law, he had
a right to dispose of by Will, so that the disposition in her favor should be upheld
as to the one-half (1/2) portion of the property that the testator could freely dispose
The will of Edward Christensen contains the following:
of. Since the legitime of illegitimate children consists of one half (1/2) of the
hereditary estate, the GARCIAS and ZONIA each have a right to participation
therein in the proportion of one-third (1/3) each. ZONIA's hereditary share will,
therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of the estate, while the GARCIAS will
respectively be entitled to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 of the value of the estate.
 Difference sa case of Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al.,reiterating the ruling in Neri, et al. vs.
Akutin, et al., which held that where the institution of a universal heir is null and
void due to pretention, the will is a complete nullity and intestate succession ensues,
is not applicable herein because in the Nuguid case, only a one-sentence will was
involved with no other provision except the institution of the sole and universal
heir; there was no specification of individual property; there were no specific
legacies or bequests. It was upon that factual setting that this Court declared:The
disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question 'a complete nullity. Article
854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies 'the institution of heir'. Considering,
however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as
universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null."
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified in that the hereditary share in
the estate of the decedent of petitioner Zonia Ana T. Solano is hereby declared to be (1/2 + (1/3
of 1/2) or 4/6 of said estate, while that of private respondents, Bienvenido S. Garcia and
Emeteria S. Garcia, shall each be (1/3 of 1/2) or (1/6) of the estate. The usufruct in favor of
Trinidad Tuagnon shall be respected. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. No costs.
AZNAR v. DUNCAN (Substitution of heirs – not an issue raised in the merits of the case)
FACTS: Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died
leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951. The will was admitted to probate by the Court of
First Instance of Davao in its decision of February 28, 1954. In that same decision the court
declared that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia (hereinafter referred to as Helen Garcia) was a
natural child of the deceased.
the Court of First Instance of Davao issued an order approving the project of partition
submitted by the executor, dated June 30, 1964, wherein the properties of the estate were
divided equally between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan (named in the will as Maria Lucy
Christensen Daney, and hereinafter referred to as merely Lucy Duncan), whom the testator
had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter (natural) and Helen Garcia, who had
been judicially declared as such after his death. The said order was based on the proposition
that since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir
was annulled, and hence the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died
intestate, saving only the legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have
been duly approved by the lower court and distributed to the legatees.
… and provided, further, that should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY die without living issue, then, and in that event, I give, devise and bequeath
all the rest, remainder and residue of my property one-half (1/2) to my well-beloved
sister, Mrs. CARRIE LOUISE C. BORTON, now residing at No. 2124, Twentieth
Street, Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and one-half (1/2) to the children of my
deceased brother, JOSEPH C. CHRISTENSEN, namely: Mrs. Carol F. Ruggaver, of
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and Joseph Raymond Christensen, of Manhattan
Beach, California, U.S.A., share and share alike, the share of any of the three above
named who may predecease me, to go in equal parts to the descendants of the
deceased; and, provided further, that should my sister Mrs. Carol Louise C. Borton
die before my own decease, then, and in that event, the share of my estate devised
to her herein I give, devise and bequeath to her children, Elizabeth Borton de
Treviño, of Mexico City Mexico; Barbara Borton Philips, of Bakersfield, California,
 U.S.A., and Richard Borton, of Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., or to the heirs of any - On October 29, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Davao issued an order approving the
of them who may die before my own decease, share and share alike. project of partition submitted by the executor, dated June 30, 1964, wherein the properties
of the estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan (named in
ISSUE: Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should pertain to Lucy Duncan and
the will as Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, and hereinafter referred to as merely Lucy
to Helen Garcia in equal shares, or whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir
Duncan), whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter (natural)
should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia,
and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death.
equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate.
- The said order was based on the proposition that since Helen Garcia had been preterited
HELD: One point deserves to be here mentioned: It is the institution of substitute heirs to the
in the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled, and hence the properties
estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event she should die without living issue. This
passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate, saving only the legacies left
substitution results in effect from the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is entitled
in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have been duly approved by the lower
only to the income from said estate, unless prior to her decease she should have living issue,
court and distributed to the legatees.
in which event she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property will go to the
other relatives of the testator named in the will. Without deciding this, point, since it is not ISSUE:
one of the issues raised before us, we might call attention to the limitations imposed by law
- Whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should be merely reduced to
upon this kind of substitution, particularly that which says that it can never burden the
the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire
legitime (Art. 864 Civil Code), which means that the legitime must descend to the heir
estate.
concerned in fee simple.
The will of Edward E. Christensen contains, among others, the following clauses which are
G.R. No. L-24365 June 30, 1966
pertinent to the issue in this case:
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (Now Mrs.
deceased.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, who is now
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, executor and appellee,
residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
vs.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, oppositor and appellant. xxx xxx xxx
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, oppositor and appellee.
7. I give, devise, and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
FACTS: Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted
- Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died
by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines,
leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951. The will was admitted to probate by the Court
the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00)…
of First Instance of Davao in its decision of February 28, 1954. In that same decision the
court declared that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia (hereinafter referred to as Helen CFI: The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there has been preterition of
Garcia) was a natural child of the deceased. The declaration was appealed to this Court, Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the
and was affirmed in its decision of February 14, 1958 (G.R. No. L-11484). institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, which provides:

- In another incident relative to the partition of the deceased's estate, the trial court ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of the line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
will, which said court found to be valid under the law of California. testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar
as they are not inofficious.
- Helen Garcia appealed from the order of approval, and this Court, on January 31, 1963,
reversed the same on the ground that the validity of the provisions of the will should be IAC: This is not a case of preterition, but is governed by Article 906 of the Civil Code, which
governed by Philippine law, and returned the case to the lower court with instructions says: "Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime
that the partition be made as provided by said law (G.R. No. L-16749). belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied." Appellant also suggests that
considering the provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly denied his relationship to Lucy Duncan in the event she should die without living issue. This substitution results
with Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless although less than the amount of her in effect from the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is entitled only to the income
legitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited within the meaning of Article 918, which from said estate, unless prior to her decease she should have living issue, in which event she
reads: would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property will go to the other relatives of the
testator named in the will. Without deciding this, point, since it is not one of the issues
ART. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which,
raised before us, we might call attention to the limitations imposed by law upon this kind
if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul
of substitution, particularly that which says that it can never burden the legitime (Art. 864
the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devices and
Civil Code), which means that the legitime must descend to the heir concerned in fee
legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair
simple.
the legitimate.
CFI DECISION SET ASIDE. REMAND FOR PARTITION - oppositor-appellee Maria Helen
Thus, according to appellant, under both Article 906 and 918, Helen Garcia is entitled only to her
Christensen Garcia no more than the portion corresponding to her as legitime, equivalent to
legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the succession were intestate.
one-fourth (1/4) of the hereditary estate… in accordance with Article 908 of the Civil Code.
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him
R E S O L U T I O N (July 30, 1967) MAKALINTAL, J.:
at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without
disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. Oppositor-appellant has filed an ex-parte petition dated July 11, 1966, making reference to an
alleged oversight (SUBSTITUTION ISSUE) and asking for the corresponding correction, in
- The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the expressed wishes of the
the last paragraph before the dispositive part of our decision, which reads as follows:
testator in the present case as may be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his
will. He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her Oppositor-appellant points out that the matter of substitution of heirs was taken up and
share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to discussed in her brief particularly in pages 28 and 32 thereof. This is indeed quite true, but
possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during the reference to and discussion of the rights of the substitute heirs (called American heirs in
his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any change and the brief) appears to be merely for the purpose of refuting the theory advanced by appellees
that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was and not for the purpose of having the rights of said heirs defined in so far as, under the terms
expressly recognized by him. of the will, they may affect the legitime of oppositor-appellant.

HELD: This point of course was not and could hardly have been squarely raised as an issue inasmuch
as the substitute heirs are not parties in this case. We have nevertheless called attention "to
In the case at bar the testator did not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but
the limitations imposed by law upon this kind of substitution," because in the brief for
left her a legacy of P3,600.00.
oppositor-appellant, at page 45, she makes the conclusion "that the Last Will and Testament
The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death consisted of 399 shares of stocks in the of Edward E. Christensen are valid under Philippine Law and must be given full force and effect;"
Christensen Plantation Company and a certain amount in cash. One-fourth (1/4) of said estate and to give them full force and effect would precisely affect the legitime of oppositor-
descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she became the owner of her share as of the appellant.
moment of the death of the decedent (Arts. 774, 777, Civil Code), she is entitled to a
Wherefore, the last paragraph before the dispositive part of our decision quoted above is
corresponding portion of all the fruits or increments thereof subsequently accruing. These
amended by eliminating the following phrase in the first sentence: "although no reference to
include the stock dividends on the corporate holdings. The contention of Lucy Duncan that
it has been made in the brief for
all such dividends pertain to her according to the terms of the will cannot be sustained, for
it would in effect impair the right of ownership of Helen Garcia with respect to her Reyes v. Barretto-Datu
legitime.
FACTS:
SUBSTITUTION ISSUE:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto died he left his share
One point deserves to be here mentioned, although no reference to it has been made in the in a will to Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his
brief for oppositor-appellant. It is the institution of substitute heirs to the estate bequeathed two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of
a fishpond was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. Maria Gerardo, as administratrix Dy Yieng SEANGIO, Barbara D. SEANGIO and Virginia D. SEANGIO, petitioners,
prepared a project of partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed and the shares vs. Hon. Amor A. REYES, Alfredo SEANGIO, et al., respondents.
delivered. G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006

Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she executed two wills,
in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in
the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto
alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by
Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the LC held that Salud was not the
daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was
appealed to the SC, which affirmed the same.
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of
Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano
Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the
recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only
of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud
Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano
Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the
decision of the court based thereon as well.
ISSUE:
W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and Salud did not na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako
acquire valid title to it.
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio-
Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of Dy Yieng Seangio. However,
petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia opposed the petition contending that: 1) Dy Yieng
is still very healthy; 2) Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia
giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the
Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of
the estate; and 4) Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting one of the private respondents,
Alfredo, for a cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the
event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will. The
document referred to as the holographic will of Segundo was entitled Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng
mana. The following are some of the dispositions:
“Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila
at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko
ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging
lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya
nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.

HELD: Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang
na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na
NO. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto’s last will
millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking
and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them
kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being
one, and was not null and void. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng
or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her
being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong
assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½) assigned to inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak
Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a at hindi siya makoha mana.
testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father’s will a share smaller than her saksi.”
legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total
A petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was filed by the petitioner and
ommission of a forced heir
reiterating that the probate proceedings should take precedence over the petition filed by the
private respondents because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over the
intestate proceedings.
Private respondents’ argument:
A. moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings on the ground that the document
purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition
of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under
Article 783 of the Civil Code.
B. There is preterition which would result to intestacy because the will only shows an
alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing
else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee
or legatee.
RTC: issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings.
ISSUE/S:
compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute
an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the
name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute
her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the
altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1âwphi1
*NOTE THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT:
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law
favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838
of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated,
the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will
to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.

1. WON the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will _________________________________________________________________________________
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin
2. WON there is preterition.
GR Nos. L-27860 & L-27896. March 29, 1974.
HELD:
Doctrine: Substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will so that he may
1. YES. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted.
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject
to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be Facts: Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from Texas, USA.
witnessed. During their marriage, they had acquired and accumulated considerable assets and
properties in the Philippines and in Oklahoma and Texas in the USA. All said properties
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance constituted their conjugal estate. They both lived, worked and were domiciled in Iloilo City
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, for around 50 years. Before her death, Linnie Jane executed her last will and testament in the
dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be City of Iloilo, leaving her estate, less her debts and funeral expenses, to her husband Charles.
clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative The will provided that should Charles die, the remainder of her estate go to her brothers and
disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of sisters, share and share alike. Should any of the brothers and sisters die before the husband,
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the Linnie willed that the heirs of the said siblings be substituted in the deceased’s sibling’s place.
property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of
Alfredo.10 When Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate court, and was appointed Executor, then
later, Special Administrator. He moved to be allowed to continue administering the family
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in business, as per Linnie Jane’s wishes, and to engage in sales, conveyances, leases, mortgages
the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in and other necessary transactions. He also filed the necessary and appurtenant administration
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. and accounting records, and income tax returns for the estate. Charles named seven brothers
It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it and sisters of Linnie Jane as her heirs (Esta, Emma, Leonard, Aline, David, Sadie, Era and
cannot be given effect.11 Nimroy), but the order admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs,
Nimroy Higdon, so Charles filed a verified motion to have Nimroy’s name included.
2. NO. The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was,
in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering under
American law. He did file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of such
return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was contemplating "renouncing
the will". On the question as to what property interests passed to him as the surviving spouse,
he answered:
“None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal
charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the remaining
property and interests of the deceased in their Community estate to the devisees and legatees
named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally
determined and paid.”
Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having liquidated Linnie’s estate, which
includes her share in the conjugal partnership. A longtime employee of the Hodges, Avelina
Magno, was appointed Administratrix for Linnie’s estate, and a Special Administratrix for
Charles. Magno was appointed, but later Harold Davies, representative of Charles’ heirs in
the US, was designated Co-Special Administrator, who was then replaced by one Joe Hodges,
Charles’ nephew. One Atty. Mirasol was also appointed as co-administrator, and an order of
probate and letters of administration were issued to Hodges and Mirasol.
At this point, the SC was already very much confused about the gaps in the facts, convinced
that the parties representing both estates had cooked up modus operandi to settle money
matters, a settlement with records the Court never saw, —which, however, went awry, with
more and more heirs from the US flocking to the Iloilo shores, and lawyers filing their
respective claims for retainer fees.
Years later, PCIB became the administrator of Charles’ estate, asserting a claim to all of his
estate, including those properties and assets that passed to him upon Linnie Jane’s death.
Avelina Magno opposed this, as Linnie Jane’s other heirs would be prejudiced, so she
continued acting in her capacity as administratix entering into sales and other such
conveyances. For these acts, the PCIB dismissed her as an employee of Charles’ estate, to
Issue: Whether Linnie’s disposition in favor of her siblings is void? – NO
which she responded by locking up the premises being used by PCIB as offices, which were
among the estate’s properties. Ruling:
PCIB’s Contention
It is PCIB’s contention that, viewed as a substitution, the testamentary disposition in favor of
Mrs. Hodges’ brothers and sisters may not be given effect. In his capacity as sole heir and
successor to Linnie’s estate, Charles appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He
operated all the assets, engaged in business and performed all acts in connection with the
entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as he had been operating, engaging
and doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December 25,
1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession and control, and registered
in his name alone, not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all said assets. As the sole and
exclusive heir, Charles did not need to liquidate the estate. Neither was there any asset left to
Linnie’s estate at the time of Charles’ death, though Linnie’s estate may have referred to “all
of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate” which would go to her siblings in the event
of Charles death. The provision is thus void and invalid at least as to Philippine assets. There
are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized by our Civil Code
(Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or common substitution, sometimes referred to
as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All
other substitutions are merely variations of these. The substitution provided for by paragraph
four of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary substitution, because there is
clearly no obligation on the part of C. N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the
properties for the substitute heirs. At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in
order that a vulgar or simple substitution can be valid, three alternative conditions must be
present, namely, that the first designated heir (1) should die before the testator; or (2) should
not wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do so. None of these
conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution provided for by the above-
quoted provision of the Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is void. Manresa
even said, “when another heir is designated to inherit upon the death of a first heir, the second
designation can have effect only in case the first instituted heir dies before the testator,
whether or not that was the true intention of said testator.”
Avelina Magno’s Claims
Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate, and gave a
vested remainder-estate or the naked title over the same estate, to her relatives. After Linnie’s
death, Charles, as administrator and executor of the will, unequivocably and clearly through
oral and written declarations and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and
repudiated his life-estate and usufruct. Since there was no separation or segregation of the
interests of Linnie and Charles in the combined conjugal estate, as there has been no such
separation or segregation, and because of Charles’ repudiation, both interests have
continually earned exactly the same amount of rents, emoluments and income.
To a certain extent, PCIB’s contention that Linnie’s testamentary substitution, when viewed
as a substitution, may not be given effect, is correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Linnie’s will
provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor
for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution
because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir
or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859;
and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is imposed
thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these
premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary
dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition exclusively FACTS:
in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that subject, when it is
obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may
enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857) and, in the
present case, no such possible default is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs.
Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what
Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his
inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges,
subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned
and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law.
It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned
and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during
his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any
portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa,
and all his rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the
occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the
inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically
become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence
of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to Avelina Magno’s view, however, it was not the usufruct alone of Linnie’s estate, respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived
as contemplated in Article 869, that she bequeathed to Charles during his lifetime, but the full the testator;
ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there
was no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion
thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court saw no legal impediment to this kind of
institution, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Charles as the surviving spouse,
consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Linnie had no surviving ascendants nor
descendants.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,
Administratrix vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees
 Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain in 1964, with only his widow
MARCELLE DEMORON DE RAMIREZ (a French who lives in Paris) as compulsory
heir.
 His will was admitted to probate by the CFI of Manila, Branch X, in 1965. Maria
Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate; to which she submitted
an inventory of the estate (in Spanish).
 In 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property
of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en
pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall
go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (decedent’s grandnephews) "en nuda propriedad."
Furthermore, 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the
remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of WANDA DE WROBLESKI (an Austrian
who lives in Spain and decedent’s companion).
 Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds:
(a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to
the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with
(b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first
heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in
Article 863 of the Civil Code;
(c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda
Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and
that
(d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building
between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give
this property to them

G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982  Lower Court approved the project of partition in its order; which Jorge and Roberto
have appealed to this Court.
Doctrine:
Jorge and Roberto’s arguments:
A vulgar substitution of heirs is valid even if the heir designated survives the testator
inasmuch us vulgar substitution can take place also by refusal or incapacity to inherit of the As to the widow's legitime.
first heir.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full
A fideicommissary substitution is void if first heir is not related in the 1st degree to the second ownership; It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question
heir. and justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle
because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or
her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have
transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction. From this
any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter
point of view, there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not
to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and
be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word
tended to favor Wanda.
"degree" as generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this interpretation. by
As to the substitutions. providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally
instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one
"Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance
generation from the first heir.
in default of the heir originally instituted." "Although the Code enumerates four classes, there
are really only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first
others are merely variations of these two." heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary.

The simple or vulgar substitution is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads: There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as
required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs
contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the
instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be
properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and
incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
the naked owners."
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the
Other Minor Issues:
three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.
As to the usufruct of Wanda: W/N usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir lands by aliens. – NO. ITS VALID.
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution
does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred
the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at time of the death of the testator. or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
MAIN ISSUES:
Court upholds the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the
1. W/N the vulgar substitutions are valid? YES
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession.
2. W/N the fideicommissary substitution is valid? NO. VOID We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private
lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
HELD: naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying
money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
1. Dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes
refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code. Hence, The usufruct in favor of Wanda is upheld because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest
the vulgar substitution is valid. title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which
is proscribed by the Constitution.
2. The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda,
the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered
substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir distributed as follows:
originally instituted."
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no
ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez. attitude towards her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed his
estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him.
AZNAR VS DUNCAN (PRETERITION)
Wherefore, the order of the trial court dated October 29, 1964, approving the project of
FACTS: partition as submitted by the executor-appellee, is hereby set aside; and the case is remanded
with instructions to partition the hereditary estate anew as indicated in this decision, that is,
- Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died
by giving to oppositor-appellee Maria Helen Christensen Garcia no more than the portion
leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951.
corresponding to her as legitime, equivalent to one-fourth (1/4) of the hereditary estate, after
- CFI DAVAO issued an order approving the project of partition submitted by the deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will of the
executor, dated June 30, 1964, wherein the properties of the estate were divided decedent, in accordance with Article 908 of the Civil Code. Costs against appellees in this
equally between Maria Duncan and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared instance.
as such after his death. The said order was based on the proposition that since
Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as RABADILLA v. CA
heir was annulled… GR 113725

- The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there has been preterition FACTS: A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a
of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the annulment devisee to a 511, 855 hectare land. A condition was however imposed to the effect that:
of the institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, which provides:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the lifetime
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
of said Maria Belleza;
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar
as they are not inofficious. 3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants, shall
continue delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;
ISSUE: WON THERE WAS PRETERITION
4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of Belleza.
HELD: NO. THE TESTATOR DID NOT COMPLETELY OMIT HELEN BUT LEFT HER 3600
LEGACY In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny Rabadilla.

Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny to reconvey the said
him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir land to the estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to comply with the
without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the land was
mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain dated January 16,
1895, May 25, 1917, and April 23, 1932, respectively. In each one of those cases the testator left In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to
to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the near descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since
the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons. It Aleja had no near descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the
was held that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirs be obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.
annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.
ISSUE: WON Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to comply with the terms of the Will left by
The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the expressed wishes of the testator Aleja Belleza.
in the present case as may be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will. He refused
HELD: NO. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The “near descendants”
to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of
being referred to in the will are the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised
property was already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died. Hence, when Dr. ISSUE: How should clause 8 be interpreted?
Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the same property was transmitted to Johnny
HELD: The authorities differ on the interpretation of article 751. Some hold that under said
Rabadilla by virtue of succession.
article the nephews and nieces inherit by representation together with the brothers and sisters
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and of the testator, as in legal succession; while others, Manresa among them, hold that said article
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. excludes nephews and nieces when brothers and sisters survive.
Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
The Court thinks the testator, a lawyer, by referring to "all who are entitled thereto," instead
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
of referring to his "relatives," precisely meant to avoid the uncertainty of the interpretation of
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
article 751 and to indicate his wish that the residue of his estate be distributed in equal parts
were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear therefore, that
to all who would have been entitled to inherit from him had he died intestate.
Johnny should have continued complying with the terms of the Will. His failure to do so shall
give rise to an obligation for him to reconvey the property to the estate of Aleja.

G.R. No. L-48627 February 19, 1943

TESTATE ESTATE OF VICENTE SINGSON PABLO, deceased. ROSALIA ROSARIO

VDA. DE SINGSON,petitioner-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFINA F. VDA. DE LIM, oppositor-appellee,
EMILIA FLORENTINO, ET AL., oppositors-appellees,
EVARISTO SINGSON, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.

FACTS: Don Vicente Singson Pablo, a lawyer of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, died on April 15, 1938,
without any descendant or ascendant, his nearest surviving relatives being his widow, four
brothers, and four nieces, the children of a deceased sister.

He left a will which was duly probated, clause 8 of which reads: "all of my properties not
disposed of otherwise in this testament shall be distributed in equal parts to all who are
entitled thereto."

The widow, as administratrix, presented a project of partition in which the properties not
disposed of in the will were adjudicated to the four brothers and the four nieces of the
deceased "in the proportion provided in paragraph 8 of the will."

The brothers, appellants herein, objected to the project of partition insofar as it includes the
nieces of the deceased, on the ground that under clause 8 of the will, in relation to article 751
of the Civil Code, they were not entitled to any share.

The nieces also objected to the project of partition, alleging that certain other specified
properties had been omitted therefrom, which formed part of the properties not disposed of
and which under clause 8 of the will "should be distributed in equal parts to all who are
entitled thereto."

In this connection appellants invoke article 751 of the Civil Code, which provides that "a
disposition made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as
made in favor of those nearest in degree."