Journal ol Consulting and Clinical Psychology

1975, Vol. 43, No. 4, 522-527

Public and Private Self-Consciousness:

Assessment and Theory
Allan Fenigstein, Michael F. Scheier, and Arnold H. Buss
University of Texas at Austin
A scale was constructed to assess individual differences in self-consciousness.
Norms and test-retest reliability are presented. Factor analysis of the scale
revealed that self-consciousness has three components: public, private, and
social anxiety. The relationships among these three factors are examined. The
scale was found useful in research on social behavior, and its implications for
research and therapy are discussed.

Self Jawareness is a central concept in sev-
eral divergent approaches to behavior and life.
In psychoanalysis, increased awareness of the
self is both a tool and a goal. Self-examination
enables the person to recognize his uncon-
scious thoughts, motives, and defenses; one
result of the therapy is increased insight, i.e.,
greater self-awareness. Rogerian therapy,
existential analysis, and a variety of other
insight therapies have also emphasized the
importance of attending to and understanding
one's inner thoughts and feelings. Relatively
newer traditions, such as transactional analy-
sis, encounter groups, and sensitivity training,
have stressed the value of "getting in touch
with oneself" and recognizing how one's be-
havior affects others. The quest for self-insight
may also be seen in the widespread interest
in the practice of meditation.
Previous interest in self-awareness has de-
rived from either a therapeutic orientation or
a philosophical approach to life. Recently,
self-awareness has been approached from an
entirely different perspective—that of social
psychology. Argyle (1969) has speculated
about the impact of self ^awareness on social
interaction, and Duval and Wicklund (1972)
have elaborated an entire theory of self-
awareness. Laboratory research generated by
Duval and Wicklund's theory has examined
both the effects of stimuli that direct atten-
tion toward the self (mirrors and cameras)
Allan Fenigstein is now at Kenyon College, Gam-
bier, Ohio, and Michael F. Scheier is now at Car-
negie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Arnold
H. Buss, Department of Psychology, University of
Texas, Austin, Texas 78712.
522
and the effects of motor activity and external
distractions that move attention away' from
the self (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). These
manipulations have affected such diverse be-
haviors as aggression (Scheier, Fenigstein, &
Buss, 1974), attribution (Duval & Wicklund,
1973), and self-esteem (Ickes, Wicklund, &
Ferris, 1973).
The unifying thread in the aforementioned
therapies, philosophies, and laboratory stud-
ies is the process of self-focused attention:
when the person is focusing on his thoughts,
feelings, behaviors or appearance; when he is
reflecting, fantasizing, or daydreaming about
himself; or when he is making decisions or
plans that involve himself. However, none of
the previous approaches considers individual
differences. Some persons constantly think
about themselves, scrutinize their behavior,
and mull over their thoughts—to the point of
obsessiveness. At the other extreme are per-
sons whose absence of self-consciousness is so
complete that they have no understanding of
either their own motives or of how they ap-
pear to others.
The consistent tendency of persons to di-
rect attention inward or outward is the trait
of self-consciousness. Self-awareness refers to
a state: the existence of self-directed atten-
tion, as a result of either transient situational
variables, chronic dispositions, or both. Indi-
vidual differences in self-consciousness may
have implications for many of the previously
mentioned phenomena. Meditation may be
more easily accomplished by high self-con-
scious persons who have had previous experi-
ence in turning inward. Persons high in self-
 PUBLIC AND PBIVATE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
consciousness may readily fit into insight
therapy, whereas others may be refractory,
Also, there may be differences between high
and low self-conscious persons in their sus-
ceptibility to the effects of a mirror, a cam-
era, or an audience. Given this background,
individual differences in self-consciousness
should be assessed. To that end, we devised a
scale.
METHOD
Pilot Work
The first step in constructing the scale was to
identify behaviors that constitute the domain of
self-consciousness. The following classification was
constructed: (a) preoccupation with past, present,
and future behavior; (b) sensitivity to inner feel-
ings; (c) recognition of one's positive and nega-
tive attributes; (d) introspective behavior; (e) a
tendency to picture or imagine oneself; (f) aware-
ness of one's physical appearance and presentation;
and (g) concern over the appraisal of others.
Thirty-eight items were devised to sample this
domain, and the scale was administered to 130
undergraduate women and 82 undergraduate men.
A principal-components factor analysis using vari-
max rotation was performed on the data (Nie,
Bent, & Hull, 1970). A large proportion of the
variance (43%) was accounted for by the first
three factors that emerged. The remaining factors
contained only a few items each and were unin-
terpretable. The first two factors suggested that
self-consciousness has two major components—one
private and one public. The private self-conscious-
ness factor was concerned with attending to one's
inner thoughts and feelings, e.g., "I reflect about
myself a lot." The public self-consciousness factor
was defined by a general awareness of the self as a
social object that has an effect on others, e.g.,
"I'm very concerned about the way I present my-
self." The third factor, social anxiety, was defined
by a discomfort in the presence of others, e.g., "I
feel anxious when I speak in front of a group."
Public and private self-consciousness refer to a
process of self-focused attention; social anxiety re-
fers to a reaction to this process. When attention is
turned inward, a person may find something to be
anxious about. It seems reasonable, then, for an
anxiety factor to emerge as a by-product of self-
consciousness. Clearly, the three factors have theo-
retical implications for the nature of self-con-
sciousness and were pursued in subsequent con-
structions of the scale.
Further revisions of the scale were needed for
several reasons. A few of the original items loaded
highly on more than one factor; other items were
endorsed either too frequently or too infrequently;
a few items were reported by some subjects as
being ambiguous; and, above all, there was a clear
need for replication to make sure that the three
factors were stable. Accordingly, some items were
523
discarded, new items were added, and the inven-
tory went through several revisions. Prior to two
final administrations, the revised scales were given
to nine different samples, with a total N of 1,821.
The same three factors consistently emerged.
RESULTS
Self-Consciousness Scale
The final version of the scale consisted of
23 items. Each item was rated on a scale of 0
(extremely uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely
characteristic). The scale was first adminis-
tered to a sample of 179 male and 253 fe-
male college students. Analyses were initially
performed separately for men and women,
and the factor loadings and the norms were
highly similar for both genders. Therefore the
male and female data were combined.
Factor analysis. The results of a principal-
components analysis using varimax rotation
are presented in Table 1. Three factors were
retained for final rotation. The loadings of
the items lined up closely with a priori ex-
pectations. (In addition to the orthogonal ro-
tation, an oblique rotation was performed on
the data, yielding highly similar results.)
Those items retained from previous versions
of the scale loaded in essentially the same
way as they did earlier, and all items loaded
above .40 with their appropriate factor. Item
analyses indicated that none of the items was
endorsed in one direction by more than 85%
of the sample.
Norms. Subscale means and standard devi-
ations are presented separately for men and
women so that they may be used in subse-
quent research (see Table 2). The distribu-
tion of scores on each subscale for both
genders approximated normality, with the
only exception being women's scores on pub-
lic self-consciousness; they were negatively
skewed. In general, the data show an absence
of gender differences. These college norms are
the only ones available, and norms for other
age, class, and clinical populations are obvi-
ously needed.
Replication. Since a few new items were
included in this final version, it seemed neces-
sary to check the stability of the factors and
the reliability of the norms. Consequently, the
scale was administered to another sample of
152 college undergraduates. Factor loadings
 524 A. FENIGSTEIN, M. F. SCHEIER, AND A. H. Buss

TABLE 1
ITEMS AND FACTOR LOADINGS or THE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS SCALE

Factor loading*
Private self- Public self- Social
A priori scale assignment consciousness consciousness anxiety

Private self-consciousness

' I'm always trying to figure myself out. (1) .65

^Generally, I'm not very aware of myself. (3)b .48
'. reflect about myself a lot. (5) .73
~) I'm often the subject of my own fantasies. (7) .45
(jf I never scrutinize myself. (9)b .51
!_gjim generally attentive to my inner feelings. (13) .66
; ,x I'm constantly examining my motives. (IS) .62
| •jpl sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere
watching myself. (18) .43
-2_g>I'm alert to changes in my mood. (20) .55
m aware of the way my mind works when I work
through a problem. (22) .46

Public self-consciousness

^ 'm concerned about my style of doing things. (2) .47

y I'm concerned about the way I present myself. (6) .65
1 I'm self-conscious about the way I look. (11) .61
l usually worry about making a good impression. (14) .72
the last things I do before I leave my house
is look in the mirror. (17) .51
m concerned about what other people think of me. (19) .73
m usually aware of my appearance. (21) .60

Social anxiety

It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new

situations. (4) .76
I have trouble working when someone is watching me. (8) .26 .45
get embarrassed very easily. (10) .70
don't find it hard to talk to strangers. (12)b -.66
'/f I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group. (16) .21 .46
groups make me nervous. (23) .69

Note. The numbers in parentheses indicate the sequence of items on the scale.
•b Only factor loadings greater than .20 are listed.
Item was reversed for scoring.

and norms were essentially the same for this
sample as • for the major sample.
Subscale correlations. In order to determine
the relationship among the three factors, cor-
relations were computed using the raw sub-
scale scores. The subscale correlations for the
final two samples are presented in Table 3.
Public self-consciousness correlated moder-
ately with both private self-consciousness and
social anxiety; these correlations were stable
across both samples. The correlation of private
self-consciousness with social anxiety fluctu-
ated around zero.
Reliability. One remaining issue was the
stability of individual scores over time. A
new sample of 84 subjects completed the scale
twice, with a 2-week interval between admin-
istrations. Testjretest correlations for the
subscales were: public self-consciousness, .84;
private self-consciousness, .79; social anxiety,
 PUBLIC AND PSIVATE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
TABLE 2
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS TOR
COLLEGE MEN AND WOMEN
Men8 Women"
Variable M SD M SD
Private self-consciousness 25.9 5.0 26.6 5.1
Public self-consciousness 18.9 4.0 19.3 4.0
Social anxiety 12.S 4.1 12.8 4.5
Total self-consciousness 57.3 9.2 58.7 8.9
• n • 179.
\>n = 253.
.73; and total score, .80. These correlations
establish that the scale and the subscales are
reasonably reliable.
DISCUSSION
Self-Consciousness
There appear to be two separate aspects of
self-consciousness: One deals with a cogni-
tive, private mulling over the self, and the
other emphasizes an awareness and concern
over the self as a social stimulus. The private
dimension of self-consciousness is similar to
the Jungian conception of introversion (Jung,
1933). The introvert is generally oriented
toward the internal world of ideas and con-
cepts, whereas the thrust of private self-
consciousness is more specific: Its focus is on
thoughts and reflections that deal solely with
the self.
Public self-consciousness is related to the
conceptions of Mead (1934). Mead argued
that consciousness of self comes about when
the person becomes aware of another's per-
spective; then he can view himself as a social
object. The emphasis here is clearly on the
reactions of others to the self. Similarly, the
essence of public self-consciousness is the self
as a social object.
The relationship of social anxiety to public
self-consciousness may be of some theoretical
importance. Although the items comprising
these two factors appear to be similar, social
anxiety and public self-consciousness repeat-
edly emerge as separate factors. Moreover,
the correlation between them is consistently
low; but there is a correlation. Why? In our
view, the sequence is as follows: First a per-
son becomes aware of himself as a social
525
object. Given this public self-consciousness,
he may then evaluate himself and become
apprehensive; that is, public self-conscious-
ness may be a necessary antecedent of social
anxiety. However, self-awareness does not
automatically imply social anxiety; a person
may focus attention on himself without ex-
periencing discomfort.
The absence of gender differences was un-
expected. Everyday stereotypes suggest that
women are more self-conscious than men,
particularly with respect to their public self-
consciousness. However, the data indicate no
gender difference on any of the three dimen-
sions. Perhaps the stereotypes are outdated.
Research Implications
Both the Public and Private Self-Conscious-
ness subscales have already 'been shown to be
useful in laboratory situations involving so-
cial behavior. One study found that women
who were high in public self ^consciousness, as
measured by a pretest using the Self-Con-
sciousness Scale, were more sensitive to rejec-
tion by a peer group: Following exclusion
from the group, they were less attracted to
the group and less willing to affiliate with
them than low public self-conscious women
(Fenigstein, 1974). Private self-consciousness
was unrelated to reaction to rejection.
In other, ongoing research, subjects were
pretested on the Private Self-Consciousness
subscale and then divided into high and low
groups. Subjects high in private self-con-
sciousness appear to be more responsive to
their transient affective. state: Following
provocation by an anger instigator, they were
more aggressive than low private self-con-
TABLE 3
SUBSCALE CORRELATIONS
Public Private
Public with with
with social social
Sample private anxiety anxiety
1" .23* .21* .11
2b .26* .20* -.06
• » = 452.
t>K = 152.
*p <.01.
526 A. FENIGSTEIN, M. F. SCHEIEE, AND A. H. Buss
scious control subjects. Public self-conscious-
ness was unrelated to angry aggression.
There is also a considerable body of re-
search on self-awareness as a manipulated
variable (see Duval & Wicklund, 1972). We
assume that dispositional self-consciousness
has essentially the same impact on behavior
as situational self-awareness. For example, in
the ongoing research just mentioned, angered
subjects who were made self-aware through
exposure to their own image in a mirror
aggressed more than a no-mirror control
group. Another example involves attribution
of causality. Wicklund and Duval (1973)
have argued that causality for an event is
attributed to the stimulus that is the focus
of attention. Subjects confronted by a mirror
were more likely to perceive themselves as
causal agents than control subjects. Such self-
attribution has also been found in self-con-
scious persons. When high public self-con-
scious subjects were rejected by a peer group,
they were more likely to accept responsibility
for the rejection than low public self-con-
scious subjects (Fenigstein, 1974). In this
interpersonal context, a person's degree of
public self-consciousness is likely to determine
his focus of attention. Presumably, in imper-
sonal contexts, for example, failure on an
exam, it is the -private dimension of self-con-
sciousness that would affect a person's at-
tributions.
The Duval and Wicklund (1972) theory
has stimulated other research. Of particular
interest are studies relating to the accuracy
of self-reports. Persons rated their own so-
ciability, and several days later they were
observed in a social context. The correlation
between self-report and social behavior was
very low. When this procedure was repeated
with a mirror present during the self-report,
the correlation was very high (Pryor, Gib-
bons, & Wicklund, cited in Wicklund, in
press). In another study, the behavior of
subjects who were allowed to aggress in the
presence of a mirror conformed more closely
to their prior self-ratings of aggressiveness
than a no-mirror control group (Carver,
1974). Presumably, the mirror increases
awareness of one's internal state, thus result-
ing in more veridical self-reports. By ex-
trapolation, moving from situational self-
awareness to dispositional self-consciousness,
the trait may act as a moderator variable be-
tween self-report and behavior. Self-conscious
persons closely examine their beliefs and feel-
ings, and so their reported dispositions may
have greater predictive validity than the re-
ports of non-self-conscious persons. This
possibility has far-reaching implications for
personality assessment.
Implications for Therapy
Self-consciousness also has implications for
therapy. Consider stage fright in someone who
must appear in public—a teacher or an actor.
This fear might be specific to the given work
context and therefore especially amenable to
a focused therapy such as systematic desensi-
tization. Or the fear might be an outcome of
a strong public self-consciousness—a gen-
eralized preoccupation with self-presentation.
If so, insight therapy might be preferable to
problem-centered therapy.
Regardless of the nature of the presenting
problem, private self-consciousness might be
an important determiner of the outcome of
therapy. Other things equal, a person low in
private self-consciousness would seem to be a
poor candidate for insight therapy. For such
therapy to succeed, the person would first
have to be made more privately self-conscious,
but this might be like rolling a stone uphill.
Given the tendency to avoid thinking about
himself, he would be hard pressed to reveal
inner thoughts, feelings, and impulses. Re-
sistance to the therapist would derive not
from an unwillingness to reveal personal in-
sights but from an inability to do so. Faced
with this potential difficulty, a therapist might
do well to assess his client's initial level of
self-consciousness.
A person extremely high in private self-con-
sciousness might also present a problem for
insight therapy. Such therapy may merely
encourage the person to continue to use his
ideational self-concern as a substitute for
action. For this person, therapy would best be
directed toward getting him out of himself and
into the world around him. We suggest that
the client needs not to think about himself.
What happens to self-consciousness in the
course of different types of therapies? Ro-
gerian, Gestalt, and other insight therapies, by
 PUBLIC AND PEIVAXE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
consistently directing the person's attention
toward himself, might raise private self-con-
sciousness. Other types of therapy, particu-
larly those involving role playing and psycho-
drama, might affect public self-consciousness
by heightening the person's awareness of his
impact on others. In brief, a person's endur-
ing disposition to be self-conscious (public or
private) would seem to be an important issue
in both the choice and the goal of therapy.
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self-awareness and attitudes toward punishment.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of
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Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. A. theory of objective
self-awareness. New York: Academic Press, 1972.
Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. S. Effects of objective
self-awareness on attribution of causality. Jour-
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nal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1973, 9,
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Fenigstein, A. Self-consciousness, self-awareness and
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(Received December 13, 1974)