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Facts: A case was filed by herein petitioner seeking that her name Ong Huan
Tin be changed to Teresita Tan. Said petition was, however, denied by the
court expressing the opinion that an alien cannot avail himself of the
provisions of our Rules of Court relating to change of name.
Issue: Whether or not an alien in this country may petition for a change of
name.
Ruling: The Court lay down the rule that aliens residing in the Philippines may
apply for change of name in the courts thereof. Accordingly, change of name
under our law, is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person
involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard
to, the rest of the community. The petition therefor is directed against all. It
is in rem. So it is, that under Section 3 of Rule 103, publication of the petition
is required. The broad general doctrine is that the status of an alien
individual is governed and controlled by the lex domicili. Implicit in this
precept is that an alien may be allowed to change his name here only if he
be domiciled in the Philippines. And "domicile" means permanent home, the
place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to
return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they
disclose intent."
Issue: Whether or not the correction in the birth certificate of the Petitioner
would tantamount to a substantial change in the entry of his birth and needs
a further adversarial proceeding.
Ruling: The Court reversed and set aside the appealed decision without
prejudice on the part of respondent to initiate the appropriate adversarial
proceedings such as may be minded. The Court citing Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court, in relation to Article 412 of the Civil Code, states the procedure by
which an entry in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected. The
proceeding there contemplated may generally be used only to correct
clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is
clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. On
the other hand, substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and
due process is properly observed.
The "corrections" sought to be made by respondent in the birth certificate of
Joven Lee could hardly qualify as just clerical errors and the intended
correction of the date of marriage of the parents of Joven Lee from 01
September 1989, appearing in his certificate of birth, to 25 January 1998,
would, in effect, change the status of the child. The changes in the entry in
the Certificate of Live Birth of Joven Lee S. Benemerito, which can possibly
affect successional and other rights of persons related to either or both
respondent and his wife, as well as that of Joven Lee himself, are simply too
substantial to be dealt with in summary, instead of the regular adversarial
proceedings, where all interested parties are impleaded, or at least notified,
and allowed to be heard before the proposed changes in the birth certificate
are effected.
Apparently, the proceedings conducted by the trial court in the instant case
fell much too short of the requirements. Nowhere in the records would it
appear that all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the
proceedings.
The obvious effect of Republic Act 9048 is merely to make possible the
administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first
name or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate
adversarial proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not the two minors should be allowed to discontinue using
their father's surname and should use only their mother's surname.
Ruling: No. We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition
for change of name. The 2 minors, who are presumably legitimate, are
supposed to bear principally the surname Divinagracia, their father's
surname (Art. 364.)
To allow them, at their mother's behest, to bear only their mother's
surname and to discard altogether their father's surname, thus
removing the prima facie evidence of their paternal provenance or
ancestry, is a serious matter in w/c, ordinarily, the minors and their
father should be consulted. The mother's desire should not be the sole
consideration.
The change of name is allowed only when there are proper and
reasonable causes for such change. Where, as in this case, the
petitioners are minors, the courts should take into account whether the
change of name would redound (to) their welfare or would prejudice
them. To allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the
minors' parentage and might create the impression that the minors are
illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only. That
would be inconsistent w/ their legitimate status as indicated in their
birth records.
Held/ruling: No. in general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine
whether or noe a particular person is legally held. The writ was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint of
liberty. Habeas corpus may also be resorted in cases where the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the persons entitled thereto, thus, it is the proper
remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter
be in the custody of a third person of her own free will.
The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all
depend on the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has
the right of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is
being withheld from the petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best
interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and not the
repsndent.
Not all of these requisites exist in this case. The dismissal of this petition is thus
warranted.
1. As to the question of identity. In habeas corpus proceedings, the question of
identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those
identity of person. In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstancial proof
establishes the individual and separate existence of the petitioner’s child from that
of the foster child herein.
2. Since the identity has not been established by evidence to be entitled to the
custody, private respondents cannot be said to be unlawfully withholding custody.
3. private respondents have the best interest of the child at heart.
Petitioner Atty. Rovira filed filed before the RTC of Iligan City a motion for attorney's
fees in a suit for recovery of ownership and possession of land, which was awarded.
Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal and it was transmitted to the Court of Appeals
before the petitioner could file a motion for reconsideration. As a result the RTC issued
another order requesting for the records to be returned. The CA set aside the recall
order for the notice of appeal because respondents’ appeal had already been perfected
and there was the ensuing elevation of its records. Petitioner contends that
respondents' appeal was not perfected for their failure to file a record on appeal to
elevate the incident to the CA.
Issue
Held
Yes. A trial court’s ruling on the matter of attorney’s fees initiated through a motion, in a
suit for recovery of ownership and possession of land, may be appealed by a mere
notice of appeal. Since the suit is not one where multiple appeals are taken, a record on
appeal is not necessary. Rule 41, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court provides that no record
on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require.
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Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before CA alleging that his
estranged wife Caroline Yu unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their minor child
Bianca. Subsequently, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
and dissolution of the absolute community of property. The petition included a prayer for
the award to her of the sole custody of Bianca and for the fixing of schedule of
petitioner’s visiting rights "subject only to the final and executory judgment of the CA.
ISSUE: Is WHC available to determine the custodial rights of parents over their
children?
HELD:
No. Articles 49 and 50 of the Family Code provides that the issue on the custody of the
spouse’s common children is deemed pleaded in the declaration of nullity case. Hence,
the writ of habeas corpus cannot be availed of by either spouse. Pursuant to the
aforementioned provisions, it is the court who shall determine the custody of the
common children in the case for declaration of nullity.
Issue: whether or no the failure to indicate in her petition fpr habeas corpus that
the parties exerted efforts to reach a compromise is a ground for the dismissal of
said petition.
Facts: this is a petition for correction of entries in birth certificate filed by Jennifer
Cagandahan. In her petition, she alleged that she was registered as a female in the
certificate of live birth but she later on developed seceondary male characteristics
and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplesia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess bith male and female
characteristics. The RTC granted respondent’s petition.
Issue: whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in
the birth certificate of the respondent on the ground of her medical condition.
Held: Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex
is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
To the person with CAH belongs the human right to pursuit of happiness and of
health, and to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to
take,
As for the respondent’s change of name, the court finds merit as it is due to CAH
where the same is the consequence of the recognition of his preferred gender.