POWER TO PARDON AND GRANT AMNESTY 
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact
ATTY.  ALICIA  RISOS-  VIDAL  VS.  COMELEC  AND  JOSEPH  EJERCITO 
ESTRADA
FACTS:  
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President
Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during
the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October
25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada,
explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a
Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the
Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada
before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public
office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification.
Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in
relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that
President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored
by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
ISSUE:
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having
been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty
of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?
HELD/RATIO:
Yes. Estrada was granted an ​absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil
and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective
office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE VS. SALLE
FACTS:
On November 1991, Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were
convicted of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson before
the RTC of Quezon City. Salle and Mengote filed their Notice of Appeal
which was accepted by the Supreme Court on March 24, 1993.
In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The Court
required Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance
Group (FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the motion.
Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of
counsel on his misimpression that the motion was necessary for his early
release from the New Bilibid Prison following the grant of a conditional
pardon by the President on December 9, 1993.
After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution
which provides that the President may, except in cases of impeachment or
as otherwise provided in the Constitution, grant pardon ​after conviction by
final judgment,​ the Court required (1) the Solicitor General and the counsel
for accused-appellants to submit their memoranda on the issue of the
enforceability of the conditional pardon and (2) the Presidential Committee
for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court why it
recommended to the President the grant of the conditional pardon despite
the pendency of the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his
appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable.
HELD/RATIO:
No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has
no effect until the person withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his
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 conviction to be final and Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his
appeal.
“
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntadois
hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to secure
from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court.
The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take
effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance
with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert
every possible effort to take back into his custody the said appellant,
LLAMAS VS. ORBOS
FACTS:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with
some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III
for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption.
Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days
hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office.
In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO
showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without
completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
ISSUE:
​Whether or not pardon is applicable to administrative cases.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes. ​The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The
SC does not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the
President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases,
which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses
DRILON VS. CA
FACTS:
In 1973, the respondents were charged with double murder before Military
Commission No. 34 [Murder of Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez during
early martial law]. The military promulgated a decision acquitting Raul
Paredes but sentencing Rodolfo Ganzon to life imprisonment with hard
labor. Paredes was released while Ganzon served sentence until being
placed under house arrest under guard. With the change of admin,
Secretary of Justice directed State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe to conduct
a preliminary investigation against private respondents. Respondents
moved for dismissal of Ganzon’s case on the ground that President
Ferdinand Marcos has given an absolute pardon and he can no longer be
tried anew, and Paredes’s case being previously acquitted. State
Prosecutor denied their petition. CA however granted the dismissal of
cases as they find that the pardon by Marcos to Ganzon was valid as
presented by evidences and testimonials.
ISSUE:
Whether or not President Marcos extended absolute pardon to Ganzon
HELD/RATIO:
Key indicators reveal that President Marcos has indeed pardoned Ganzon.
Pardoning power includes grant reprieves, commutation of sentences,
remit fines and forfeitures which are all final and unappealable.
Commutation of sentence extinguishes criminal liability partially which in
effect changes the penalty to a lesser one. Ganzon, being voluntarily
released in 1978 with no terms or conditions except that he should remain
under house arrest is a proof of the commutation of his sentence by the
President. The Court cannot consider Ganzon’s house arrest as a
continuation of his sentence because in no way is arrest a penalty but
rather it merely takes a person into custody in order that he may be
forthcoming to answer for the commission of an offense and that the
records own lacking condition as the exact terms of his house arrest which
parenthetically no longer exists. Ganzon has served his sentence and can
no longer be re-investigated for the same offense, much more undergo
further imprisonment to complete his service. The court therefore need not
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 consider whether Ganzon was pardoned and whatever pardon the former
President may have extended to him as Ganzon was a freeman as early
as 1978.
MOSANTO VS. FACTORAN
FACTS:
Sandiganbayan convicted Salvacion A. Monsanto, treasurer of Calbayog
City, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents
and sentenced them to imprisonment. Petitioner appealed her conviction
which was affirmed. While her motion for reconsideration was pending,
President Marcos extended to her absolute pardon of which she accepted
on December 1984. By reason of pardon, petitioner is requesting that she
be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since it is still
vacant. Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated without
necessity of a new appointment provided that the amount due to
Sandiganbayan and litigation costs be paid. Petitioner wrote the ministry
stressing that the full pardon wiped out the crime which implies that her
service has never been interrupted and therefore her date of reinstatement
should correspond to the date of her suspension and that she is entitled to
backpay for the duration of her suspension and that her share to
Sandiganbayan be removed as well. Deputy Executive replied that
acquittal and not absolute pardon of a former public officer is the only
ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment
of salaries, benefits and emoluments during period of suspension
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsanto may reapply for the position vacated
HELD/RATIO:
Petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by
reason of her conviction. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for
a new appointment which would include the evaluation of whether she can
once again be entrusted with public funds.
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties
and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Pardon does
not restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or
forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly
restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
The petitioner although pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay
for lost earnings and benefits.
BARROQUINTO VS. FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
Petitioners were charged with crime of murder, Barrioquinto not yet been
arrested while Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment. Before
perfecting an appeal, Jimenez and Barrioquinto (although already
apprehended) submitted his case to the Guerilla Amnesty Commission
presided by the respondents herein which grants amnesty in favor of all
persons who may be charged with an act penalized under RPC in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the
war efforts of the enemy and committed during the period from Dec 8,
1941. After preliminary hearing, the cases was returned to the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga with no decision whether they are entitled of
the amnesty on the ground that neither admitted to the crime committed.
ISSUE:
W/N the admission of guilt is required to be granted amnesty
HELD/RATIO:
In order to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty, it is not necessary that
he should admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which
he is charged. It is sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or
the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of
said Amnesty Proclamation.
Pardon is granted after conviction while amnesty is granted to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes
after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of
an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives
the punishment but does not restore the rights to hold public office or right
of suffrage unless expressly restored by the terms of the pardon while
amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
itself
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In Amnesty, it should be determined whether or not the offense committed
is of political character
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (SECTION 21)  
BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO
FACTS: ​Petitioner Bayan Muna is a registered party-list group.
Respondent Blas Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo
was impleaded in his capacity as then Exec. Sec.
Having a key determinative bearing in this case is the Rome Statute, which
was signed in Dec. 2000 through Charge dÁffaires Enrique Manalo. This
Statute established the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for most serious crimes of
international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal
jurisdictions. Serious crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity and crimes of aggression are covered. As of the filing of the
instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have
completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The
Philippines is not among the 92.
The RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement (Agreement) accepted by then
DFA Sec. Ople via Exchange of Notes dated May 13, 2003. The
Agreement was sent by Amb. Francis Ricciardone to the DFA proposing
the terms of the bilateral agreement between RP and US. In summary, the
Agreement aims to protect “persons” of the RP and US from harassment
suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals, unless
such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council. The term
“persons” in the Agreement is defined as current or former government
officials, employees, or military personnel or nationals of one Party.
In response to the OSG’s query on the status of the Agreement, Amb.
Ricciardone replied in his letter dated Oct. 2003 that the exchange of
diplomatic notes are legally binding agreement under international law;
and that under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and
consent of the US Senate.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the Agreement was contracted validly, which also
questions whether or not respondents gravely abused their discretion in
concluding it; and
2) W.O.N the Agreement, which has not been submitted to the Senate for
concurrence, contravenes the Rome Statute and other treaties.
HELD/RATIO:
The Agreement is valid. the doctrine of incorporation. As expressed in
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law and international
jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls
into the category of inter-governmental agreements which is an
internationally accepted form of international agreement. In thus agreeing
to conclude the Agreement, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
represented by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, acted within the scope of
the authority and discretion vested in her by the Constitution. At the end of
the day, the President — by ratifying, thru her deputies, the non-surrender
agreement — did nothing more than discharge a constitutional duty and
exercise a prerogative that pertains to her office.
2) Senate concurrence is not required. Under Article 2 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as "an international
agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or
more related instruments and whatever its particular designation."
International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require
legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive
agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require
legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a
narrower range of subject matters than treaties. The Supreme Court in
Eastern Sea Trading, as reiterated in Bayan, has given recognition to the
obligatory effect of executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Senate: “The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements
without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been
confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have
entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and
consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and
copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the
settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously
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 questioned by our courts.”
Furthermore, ​the Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does
it differ from, the Rome Statute.One complements the other. As a matter of
fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC.
According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to “be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states].”
The Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states,
like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders,
the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the
signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.
Also, it bears stressing that the RP is only a signatory to the Rome Statute
and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by Senate. Under international
law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a
signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty; whereas a State-Party, on the other hand,
is legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith. Thus,
the RP is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to
follow any provision in the treaty would be premature.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
 
AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO
FACTS: In their capacities as Members of the Congress, citizens and
taxpayers, petitioners via a petition for mandamus and prohibition demand
that a copy of the full text, together with its pertinent annexes and
attachments, of the Japan-Philippine Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA) be furnished upon them by the then Usec Aquino who is the
Chairman of the Philippine Coordinating COmmittee to Study the
Feasibility of the Japan-PH Economic Partnership Agreement. By virtue of
the fact that the said agreement is still under negotiation, the requested
copy of the document with the offers has not been produced to which the
petitioners strongly protested saying that the refusal to produce said
document is tantamount to the violation of their constitutionally-vested right
to transparency and information on matters of public concern and that
they will be remiss of their duty as lawmakers as the non-disclosure will
hamper their effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social,
political and economic decision-making as well as it will effectively make
the Senate a mere rubber stamp of the Executive, which is a violation of
the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners argue that the President
cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since whatever
power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade
agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article
VI, Section 28 (2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of
Presidential Decree No. 1464.
ISSUE: W/N the Executive erred in its decision not to furnish the
Congress with the pertinent documents it has requested for.
HELD/RATIO: ​JPEPA, being an international trade agreement is by
nature, of public concern, no question on that. However, although JPEPA
is of public concern, the talks that happened during the negotiation are
within the ambit of diplomatic negotiations which are matters covered by
the doctrine of executive privilege thus constituting an exception to the
right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.It has been
stressed by the Court in previous jurisprudence (​PMPF v Manglapus​) that
"secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the
constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the
freedom of access to information."
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that
while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential—
since there should be "ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is
approved" — the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is
reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their
offers with the understanding that "historic confidentiality" would govern
the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to
deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations.
In their claim as to the Congress' right to participate in the JPEPA
negotiations, the Court said that time and time again, it has been
jurisprudentially established that the treaty-making power is exclusive to
the President, being the sole organ of the nation in its external relations,
the Constitution vests the said power in the President, subject only to the
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 concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. It
follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast
legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations.
While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such
pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the
conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even
Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as a
means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the
Senate. Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as
private citizens, petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail
to present a "sufficient showing of need" that the information sought is
critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do
not include treaty-negotiation.
With all these reasons and more, the petition was dismissed.
BAYAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: ​On Mar. 1947, the PH and US entered into a Military Bases
Agreement which formalized the use of installations in the PH territory by
US military personnel. The PH and US also entered into a Mutual Defense
Treaty in Aug. 1930 to respond to any external armed attack and further
strengthen defense and security relationship. The Military Bases
Agreement expired in 1991 after the rejection of the Senate of its
extension.
In 1997, negotiations by the PH and US on the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) led to a consolidated draft which resulted to a final series of
conferences and negotiations. In Feb. 1998, Pres. Ramos approved the  
VFA, which was respectively signed by US Amb. Hubbard. In Oct. 1998,
Pres. Estrada, through respondent Sec. of Foreign Affairs, ratified the
VFA. Thereafter, the President, acting through Exec. Sec. Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate the VFA for concurrence pursuant to
Sec. 21, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution. In May 1999, it was approved by
⅔ vote of all the members of the Senate. In June 1999, the VFA officially
entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between Sec. Siazon and
US Amb. Hubbard.
ISSUE: ​Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Sec. 21 Art. VII or of
Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution? Were the requirements of the
applicable provision complied with?
HELD/RATIO: ​Undoubtedly, Sec. 25, Art. XVIII, which specifically deals
with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should
apply in the instant case. However, whether under Sec. 21, Art. VII or Sec.
25, Art. XVIII, the Constitution is clear that the concurrence of the Senate
is mandatory to comply with the constitutional requirements. The issue
shall then be resolved by checking if the requirements of Sec. 25, Art.
XVIII were complied with when Senate gave its concurrence to the VFA.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met,
viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in
by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of
the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized
as a treaty by the other contracting state. The first and second requisites
are present w/o dispute. The phrase “recognized as a treaty”means that
the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a
treaty. To require the other contracting state, the US, to submit the VFA to
the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord
strict meaning to the phrase. It is inconsequential whether the US treats
the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law,
an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. The records reveal that
the US Government, through Amb. Hubbard, has stated that the United
States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA.
For as long as the US accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and
binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is
indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. JUDGE LANTION
FACTS: ​On Jan 13, 1977, Pres Marcos issued PD No. 1069 ​“Prescribing
the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes
in a Foreign Country.” Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon signed in Manila
the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (RP-US
Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Reso No. 11, expressed its
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concurrence in the ratification of said treaty.
On Jun 18, 1999, the DOJ received from the DOF a US Note Verbale
requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez (private respondent) to US.
Attached were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by
US District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting
documents for said extradiction. He appears to be charged in US with
violation of conspiracy to defraud the US, attempt to evade tax, fraud, false
statement of entries and election contributions in name of another.
On the same day, Sec of Justice (petitioner) issued an order designating
and authorising a panel of attys. to take charge of and o handle the case
pursuant to Sec 5(1) of PD No. 1069. The panel found matters to be
addressed. Jimenez wrote a letter requesting copies of the official
extradition request from US govt and all documents and papers submitted,
and be given time to comment on the request after he receive the copies.
In response, the petitioner denied the requests on the grounds that it is
premature to furnish the copies [DOJ is in the process of evaluating
whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD
1069—Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty)
have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by
the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal
cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in
criminal prosecution inapplicable].
On Aug 6, 1999, Jimenez filed with RTC of NCR for mandamus, certiorari
and prohibition, with an application for the issuance to TRO and a writ of
preliminary injunction. On Aug 10, 1999, Hon Ralph Lantion (respondent)
issued an order in favour of Jimenez. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1) W/N Jimenez is entitled of the due process of rights of notice and
hearing?
2) W/N there’s conflict between the basic due process rights and
provisions of RP-US Extradition Treaty?
HELD/RATIO:
1) YES. The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil
& administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these rights will
invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any
pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to
appear therein & present their side.
The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a
criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation
of liberty of the prospective extradite. A favorable action in an extradition
request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus
exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is
like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same
result – the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent.
2) The rule of pacta sunt servanda requires the parties to a treaty to keep
their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's
legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments. The principle lex
posterior derogat priori clarifies that a treaty may repeal a statute and a
statute may repeal a treaty.
There’s no conflict between into law and municipal or national law. Instead,
we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due
process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of
extradition proceedings.
The Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to le his comment with supporting
evidence.
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