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IN

PROOF

THEOR Y

LECTURE

NOT ES

)

ISBN 88-7088-105-9

© 1984 by « Bibliopolis, edizioni di

Napoli, via Arangio Ruiz 83

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I
.
CONTENTS
Introductory
remarks
.
Proposi tions
and
judgements
"
3
Explanations
of
the
form s
of
judgement
'
7
I
Pr op
o sitions
11
Rule
s
o f
e q ua
l i ty
,
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
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.
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.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
..
.
..
..
.
.
.
.
14
\
Hypothetical
judgements
and
s ubs
t i t u t i on
rul e s
16
Judgements
wi
t h
more
than
one
as sumption
and
contexts
1 9
Sets
and
c a teg o r i e
s
_
2 1
General
remarks
o n
the
rule s
2 4
Carte sian
product
of
a
family
of
s e t s
26
Definitional
equ ality
:
31
App Lf ca t Lcns
of
the
carte sian
produ
ct
;
'
, '
32
Disj oint
uni on
of
a
family
of
sets
... .
.
• ....
..
.
..
.
.
.
..
.
39
Appli cati
ons
o f
the
' disjoint
uni on
42
The
axiom
of' choice
...
...
• •
..
.....
•.•
..
...
.
50
The
notion
of
such
that
.......
..
53
1
Di
sjoint union
of " two
sets
..
.....
.
..
..
.
.
.
.
.
..
55
l
Pr-opo s L tional
equali ty
.• ..
...
...... . .
: . •
..
....
.
.
..
..
..
.
.
5
9
Finite
se ts
6
5
I
Consistency
..
'
,
,
..
69
"
~
Natural
numbers
•. •.•
.. ...
...
..
.
.
71
I
i
List s
; •.•
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.
.
77
Wellorderings
••
.....
.
..
..
.
..
• •
.
...
.
.
..
.
79
t
I
Uni verses
....
•.
.
•' .
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8 7

# I

These

Preface lectures were given in Padova at

tha Laboratorio per

Ricerche 'di Dinamica dei Sistemi e di Elettronica Biomedica o~ the

I

 , Cons i g l i o Nazionale delle Ricerche during the month of June 1980. I am indebted to Dr '. , Enrico Pagello of that laboratory for the op- portunity of so doing . The audience was made up by philosophers, mathematicians and computer scientists. Accordingly, I tried to say something which might be of interes~ to each of these three cat-

t

• 1 egories. Essentially the same lectures, albeit in a somewhat im- proved and more advanced form, were given later in the same year
I as part of the meeting on Konstruktive Mengenlehre und Typentheorie which was organized in Munich by Prof. Dr. Helmut Schwichtenberg,

,

I

### •

~.

 te whom I am indebted for the invitation, during the week 29 Sep- ~emb~~ - 3 October 1980. The main improvement of the Munich .l e c t u r es , as compared wi t h those given in Padova, was toe adoption of ·a systematic higher level (Ger. Stufe) notation which allows me to write simply Fl (A,B), L(A,B), W(A,B) , ),(b), E(c,d), D(c,d,e), R(c ,d,e), T(c;d) instead of (Tl x EO A)B(x), (L x e A)B(x) , (Wx e iI)B(x) , (AX)b(x),

E(c,(x,y)d(x,y», D(c,(x)d(x),(y)e(y»; R(c,d,(x,y)e(x,y» ,

T(c,(x,y,z)d(x,y,z»,

 respectively. Moreover, the use , of higher level variables arid con- stants makes it possible to formulate the elimination and equality rules for the cartesian product in such a way that they follOw the

same

,pa t t e r n

as

the

elimination

and

equality

rules

for

all

the

other

type

forming

operations.

In

their new formulation,

these

rules

IT -elimination

(y Lx )

E.

B(x)

(x

oS

C

E.

### n

(A ,B)

d(yl ' 6

cO.(y»

, F ( c " d)

6

C ( c )

.

(x

E

A)

(y(x) E.

B(x)

(x

E.

b Cx )

6

B(x)

dey)

6

C(A(y»

F(A,(b) ,d) r-e spe ct.t vely. Here y is

a

bound

function

variable,

F

is

a

new non-

cano~ical (eliminatory) operator by means of which the

binary ap-

plication operation can be defined, putting

 Ap(c,a) == F(c, (y)y(a», and y(x) E. B(x) (x E. A) is an assumption, itself hypothetical, which has been put within parentheses to indicate that it is being dis- charged. A program of the new form F(c,d) has value~ provided c has value A (b) and deb) has value e. This rule for evaluating F(c,d) reduces to the lazy evaluation rule for Ap(c,a) when the above defi- nition is being made. Choosing C(z) to be B(a), thus independent of z, and d(y) to be y(a), the new eiimination rule reduces tp the old one and the new equality rule to the first of the two old equality

'.

# l

## ·1

 r~les. Moreover, the second of these, that is, the rule C E n (A,B) c (Ax)Ap(c,x) E n(A,BJ can be derived by means of the ~-rules in the same way as the rule cEI:(A,B) c = (p(c) ,q(c») E E (A,B) is.derived byway of example on p . 62 of the main text . Conversely , the new elimination and equality rules can be derived from the old ones by making the definition F(c ,d) -= d( (x)Ap(c ,x». So, actually, they are equivalent. It only remains for me to thank Giovanni Sambin for having

undertaken, at his own suggestion, the considerable work of writing
I and typing these notes, therebf making the lectures accessible to a wider aUdience.

stockholm,

January

1984,

Pel' Martin-Lof

j

I

### 1 - 1 - Introductory remarks , Ma t hema t i ca l logic and th~ relation between logic and mathematics have been interpreted in at l~ast three different ways: (1) mathematical logic , as symbolic logic, or logic using mathe - matical .ymbolism; (2) mathematical logic 'as foundations tor philosophy) of mathe- matics; (3) mathematical logic as logic studied by mathematical methods, as a branch of mathematics. ' We shall here mainly be interested in mathematical logic in the second sense. What shall do is also mathematical logic in the first sense, but certainly not in the third . ' The principal problem that remained afterP 'rincipia Mathematica was completed was, according to its authors, that of justifying the axiom of reducibility (or, as we would now say, the impredicative com - prehension axiom) '. The, ramified theory of types was predicative, but

it was not sufficient for deriving even elementary parts of analysis . So th~ axiom of reducibility was ~dded on the pragmatic ground that it

 was needed, although no .atisfactory justification (explanation) of it could be provided. The whole point of the ramification wa s , then lost , so that it might just as well be abolished. What then remained was the simple theory of types. Its official justification ( Wittgenstein , R~~sey) rests on the interpretation of propositions as truth values and propositional functions (of one or several variables; as truth functions. The laws of the classical propositional logic are then clearly valid, and tion is restricted so to are the quantifier laws , finite domains. However, as it long does as quantifica - not seem poss- ible to make sense of quantification over infinite domains , like the

-

2

-

domain of natural numbers, on this interpretation of the notions of

proposition and propositional f~nction. For this reason, afuong others,

what we develop here is an intuitionistic theory of types ; which is

also predicative (or 'ramified). It is free from the deficiency of

Russell's ramified theory of types, as regards the possibility of de-

 veloping elementary parts of mathematics, like the theory of ' r e a l num- bers, because of the presence of the operation which allows us to form the cartesian product of ,a ny given family of sets, in particular, the set of all functions from one set to another. In two areas, at leasti our language ~eems to have advantages -

over traditional foundational languages. First, Zermelo-Fraenkel set

theory cannot adequately deal with the foundational problems of cat·

egory theory, where the category of all sets, the category of all

groups, the , category

of

functors

from

one

such

category

to

another

etc. are considered. These problems a~e coped with by means of the

distinction between sets and categories (in the logical or philosophi-

cal

sense,

not

in

the

sense

of

category

theory)

which

is

in

intu-

itionistic type theory. Second, present logical symbolisms are inad-

equate as programming languages, which explains why computer scien-

tists have developed their own languages (FORTRAN, ALGOL, LISP,

PASCAL,

...

) and systems of proof rules (Hoare 1 , Dijkstra 2, • . ). We

have shown elsewhere 3 how the additional richness of ' t y pe theory, as

compared with first order predicate logic, makes it usable as a pro-

gramming language.

l

'

C.

A.

Hoare,

An axiomatic

basis

munications

of

the

ACM,

Vol.

12,196 '9,

of

pp.

computer

576-580

programming,

and

583.

Com-

2

E.

Englewood

W.

Dijkstra,

Cliffs,

N.J .,

A discipline

1976.

of

Programming,

Prentice Hall,

ming,

L.

J.

3

P.

"

Martin-Lof,

Constructive mathematics

and

computer

program-

Logic,

Cohen,

Methodology

and

Philosophy

of Science

VI;

Edited ,by

J.

Los,

H.

Pfeiffer

and

K.-P.

Podewski,

North-Holland,

Amsterdam,

1982,

pp.

153-175.

' - 3 - Propositions and Judgements Here the , dis~i~ctionbetween proposition (Ger. Satz) and asser- tion or judgement ' ( Ge r . Urteil) is essential. What we combine by means of' the logical operations , (.l::> , , & v , V " 3 ') and hold to be true are propositions. When we hold a proposition to be true , we make a j~dge- ment: ' proposition ~JUdgement, In particular, ' t he premisses and conclusion of a logical inference are judgements. The distinction between propositions and jUdgements was clear from Frege to Principia. These notions have later be en rep 1 aced by the formalistic notions of formula and theorem (in a formal system) , re- spectively. Contrary to formUlas, propositions are not def'ined induc- tively . So to speak, they f'orm an open concept, In standard textbook presentations of first order logic, we d' can ~stinguish three quite separ-a te steps:

(1) inductive definition of terms and formulas ,

(2) specif'ication of aXioms and rules of inference ,

 (3) semantical interpretation. Formulas and ddt e uc ~ons ' are given meaning only through semantics which is usually done follOWing Tarski and assuming ' set theory . , What we do here is t t , mean 0 be closer to ordinary mathematical pract~ce. We will avoid keeping form and meaning (content) apart In- stead we will at the same time display certain forms of jUdgemen~ and inference that are used in mathematical d explain ' , them , " proofs an seman- tically. Thus we make explicit h w t a is usually implicitly taken f'or
 4 - granted. When o ne tre at s as arty ot he r b r anc h of math ematics, as · i n the metamathematical lo g i c traditi on originated by Hilbert , such ju dge - ments and inf erences ·are o nl y p artially and f ormal l y re pr e se nted in the s o- called o bj ec t language, while they are implicitly used; as in any other b r anch of mathematics, in the s o- cal led metal anguage. Our main aim is to build up a system o f f orma l rules representing in the bes t p ossible way informal (mathe matical) rea soning. In the u sual natu ral deduction style , the rules given are not quite . f ormal . For i ns t ance , the rule . A A v B takes f or that A and B are f ormulas, and then d oes it say granted i nf e r that · we can A v B to be true when A is true o nl y If we are t o give a f ormai rule, we have to make this expllcit, writing A prop. B prop . A tr-ue o r A v B tr ue A, B prop . .1- A l-AyB where we use, like Frege, the symb ol l- to the of A to signify that A is true . In our system of rules , . t h i s left wi l l always be explicit . A r ule o f inference is · j ustified by explaining the conclusion o n the assumpti on that the pre misses are kno wn . H.ence, before a rule of infere nce can be just ified, it must be explained wh a t it is that we must know "in o r de r to have the right to make a judgement o f any one of the various f orms that the premisses and cOnclusion can have.
 - 5 - . We us e f our · f orms of (1) A is a set (a bbr . A s~t ) , ( 2 ) A and B .~e equ al ~ets (A ~ B), ( 3) a is .an element o f the set A (a A) , (4) a and b are equal elements of the set A (a = b E A) . (If we read £ lit.rally a s ~a~~ , then we ~ight ~rite A E A = BESet , a e El (!) , a = b E El(A ) , re spectively .) Of Set , cou rse , any synta ctic ements and varia ble s l co u ld be letters f us ed ·, or ae't s the use i s o nl y 0 e t t e r s conve n ience . sma t o» f 11 l f or el - Not e t hat o r di na r y c api t a set ·t he o r y , a E b and a = b are pr opos it i ons , whi l e they in a r e j udgem ents here. A jUdgement o f the f orm A = B h as n o mean ing less ·we already kn ow A and B t o b~ sets . Like wise , a jUdgeme nt o f t he f orm b a E A pre supp oses th at A is a set , and a judgement o f f orm a ·= b E A pr esupp o se .s, first, that A is a se t an d sec ond, t he t ha t a and are elem ent s o f A• . , , Each f orm o f judgem ent admits o f severa 1 differe nt read ings , as i n the ta.ble: A set a E A A is a set a is an 'e Lemen t o f the set . A A is A is a pr op ositi on a is a pr o of ( con structi on) of A is n onempt y true the pr op ositi on A A is an i ntenti on a is a meth od o f f~lfliling A is f u lfi l l a bl e (expectati on) (real izing) the intention . ( realizable) ( exp ectati on ) A A is a problem a i s a method of solving the A i s solvable (task) p rob l em ( doing the task) A

# I

ric '

 - 6 - \ - 7 The se cond, logical interpretation is discu ssed toghether with rules Explanations of the forms o f judgement below . The third was suggested by Heytin g 4 a nd t he "a is fourth by Kol mo- gOrov 5 . The last i s very close to programming. a method . . . " can ' For each one of the . four forms of judgement, we. now explain wha t be read as "a is a program ". Since programming languages have a a judgement of that form means . We can explain what a judgement , s a y formal notation for the program but not for A, we c omplete the sen- of the first form, means by answering one of the follo wing three ques - tence with " ... which meets the a, s pe c i f i ca ti on A". In .Kolmogorov 's in- tions: · t e r pr e t a t i on , d the word problem refers to something to be done and the wor p rogram to how to do it . The analogy bet ween t he first and the Wha t is a set? second interpretation is . implicit in the Brouwer-Heyting interpret- What is it that we must know in order to have the right to judge ation of ,~he logical constant~. It was made more explicit bY ,Curry ,and something to be a set? Feys6 , but only for the impl icational fragment , and i t wa s exten ded t o , . 7 What does a judgement of the form " A is a set·" mean? intuitionistic first order arithmetic by Howard _ It is the only known way of int.rpretin~ i~tuitionistic logic so that th~ axiom o f 6h oic e The first ,is the ontolog ical (anc ient Greek) , t he second the epis- becomes , valid . temol~gical (Descartes, Kant, •• . ) and the third the seman t ica l (mod- To distin gui sh between proofs. of judgements (usually in tree-like ern) way of posing essentially the same question . At first sight , we form) and proofs (here identified with element s , thus could assume that a set is defined by prescribing ho w i t s elements to use the left of of propo sit ions the E . ) we reser ve it when confusion might occur. word con str uction for the latter and are formed. N is defined This we do by giving when the we say rules : that the set of na tura l numbers a N o E N a'E N 4 A. Hey ting, Die intuitionistische Grundlegung der Ma t hema t ik , by which its elements are constr ucted. However" the we akn e s s o f thi s Erkenntnis, Vol. 2, 1931 , pp. 106 -115 . . definition is clear: 10 10 , for instance, though not 5 A. N. Kolmogorov , Zur · Deutung der M~thematische Zeitschrift , Vol. 35 . 1932, intuitionistis chen pp . Logik, 6 H. B. Curry and R. Feys, Combinatory Logic, Vol. 1, North- thegi ven can bring ~uish the rules, is clearly an it to the form a' for elements which have a element some a form by of N, e ' N. which sinc,e we We thus we obta inable wi th ' kno w t h at we can h a ve . to di rect ly d isti n - see -Holland ; Amsterdam , 1958