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STUDIES IN PROOF THEOR Y LECTURE NOT ES

STUDIES

IN

PROOF

THEOR Y

LECTURE

NOT ES

)

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© 1984 by « Bibliopolis, edizioni di

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u . I . CONTENTS Introductory remarks . Proposi tions and judgements " 3 Explanations of
u .
I
.
CONTENTS
Introductory
remarks
.
Proposi tions
and
judgements
"
3
Explanations
of
the
form s
of
judgement
'
7
I
Pr op
o sitions
11
Rule
s
o f
e q ua
l i ty
,
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
..
.
..
..
.
.
.
.
14
\
Hypothetical
judgements
and
s ubs
t i t u t i on
rul e s
16
Judgements
wi
t h
more
than
one
as sumption
and
contexts
1 9
Sets
and
c a teg o r i e
s
_
2 1
General
remarks
o n
the
rule s
2 4
Carte sian
product
of
a
family
of
s e t s
26
Definitional
equ ality
:
31
App Lf ca t Lcns
of
the
carte sian
produ
ct
;
'
, '
32
Disj oint
uni on
of
a
family
of
sets
... .
.
• ....
..
.
..
.
.
.
..
.
39
Appli cati
ons
o f
the
' disjoint
uni on
42
The
axiom
of' choice
...
...
• •
..
.....
•.•
..
...
.
50
The
notion
of
such
that
.......
..
53
1
Di
sjoint union
of " two
sets
..
.....
.
..
..
.
.
.
.
.
..
55
l
Pr-opo s L tional
equali ty
.• ..
...
...... . .
: . •
..
....
.
.
..
..
..
.
.
5
9
Finite
se ts
6
5
I
Consistency
..
'
,
,
..
69
"
~
Natural
numbers
•. •.•
.. ...
...
..
.
.
71
I
i
List s
; •.•
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
77
Wellorderings
••
.....
.
..
..
.
..
• •
.
...
.
.
..
.
79
t
I
Uni verses
....
•.
.
•' .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
8 7

I

I

These

Preface lectures were given in Padova at

tha Laboratorio per

Ricerche 'di Dinamica dei Sistemi e di Elettronica Biomedica o~ the

I

, Cons i g l i o

Nazionale

delle

Ricerche

during

the

month

of

June

1980.

I am indebted to Dr '. , Enrico Pagello of that laboratory for the op-

portunity of so doing . The audience

was

made

up

by

philosophers,

 

mathematicians and computer scientists. Accordingly,

I

tried

to

say

something which might be

of

interes~ to

each of

these

three

cat-

t

  • 1 egories. Essentially the same lectures, albeit in a somewhat im- proved and more advanced form, were given later in the same year
    I as part of the meeting on Konstruktive Mengenlehre und Typentheorie which was organized in Munich by Prof. Dr. Helmut Schwichtenberg,

,

I

~.

te whom I

am indebted

for

the

invitation,

during

the

week

29

Sep-

~emb~~ -

3 October

1980.

 

The

main

improvement

 

of the Munich

.l e c t u r es ,

as

compared wi t h

those given in Padova, was toe adoption of ·a systematic higher level

(Ger. Stufe)

notation which allows me to

write

simply

 

Fl (A,B),

 

L(A,B),

W(A,B) ,

),(b),

E(c,d), D(c,d,e),

R(c ,d,e),

T(c;d)

 

instead of (Tl x EO A)B(x),

(L x

e

A)B(x) ,

(Wx

e

iI)B(x) ,

(AX)b(x),

 

E(c,(x,y)d(x,y», D(c,(x)d(x),(y)e(y»; R(c,d,(x,y)e(x,y» ,

T(c,(x,y,z)d(x,y,z»,

respectively.

Moreover,

the

use , of higher

level variables arid

con-

stants makes it

possible

to

formulate

the

elimination and equality

rules

for

the

cartesian

product in

such

a

way

that

they

follOw

the

same

,pa t t e r n

as

the

elimination

and

equality

rules

 

for

all

the

other

type

forming

operations.

In

their new formulation,

these

rules

read

IT -elimination

 
 

(y Lx )

E.

B(x)

(x

oS

 

C

E.

n

(A ,B)

d(yl ' 6

cO.(y»

 

,

 
F ( c " d) 6 C ( c )
 

F ( c " d)

6

C ( c )

 
 

.

(x

E

A)

(y(x) E.

B(x)

(x

E.

 
 

b Cx )

6

B(x)

dey)

6

C(A(y»

 
 

F(A,(b) ,d)

F(A,(b) ,d)
 

r-e spe ct.t vely. Here y is

a

bound

function

variable,

 

F

is

a

new non-

cano~ical (eliminatory) operator by means of which the

binary ap-

plication operation can be defined, putting

 

Ap(c,a)

== F(c, (y)y(a»,

 

and

y(x)

E.

B(x)

(x

E.

A)

is

an

assumption,

itself hypothetical, which

has

been

put within

parentheses

to

indicate

that

it

is

being dis-

charged.

A program

of

the

new form

F(c,d)

has value~ provided c has

value A (b)

and

deb)

has

value

e.

This

rule

for

evaluating

F(c,d)

reduces

to

the

lazy evaluation

rule

for

Ap(c,a)

when

the

above

defi-

nition is

being made.

Choosing

C(z)

to

be

B(a),

thus

independent of

z,

and

d(y)

to

be

y(a),

the

new eiimination

rule

reduces

tp

the

old

one and the new equality rule

to

the

first

of the

two

old

equality

'.

,.

l

!

·1

r~les. Moreover,

the

second of

these,

that

is,

the

rule

 
 

C

E

n (A,B)

 
 

c

(Ax)Ap(c,x) E

n(A,BJ

 

can

be

derived

by means

of

the

~-rules in

the

same

way

as

the

rule

 

cEI:(A,B)

 
 

c

= (p(c) ,q(c») E

E (A,B)

 

is.derived byway

of example on

p .

62

of the

main

text

.

Conversely ,

the new elimination and equality rules can be derived

from

the

old

ones

by

making

the

definition

 
 

F(c ,d)

-=

d( (x)Ap(c ,x».

 

So, actually, they are equivalent.

 
 

It

only

remains

for

me

to

thank

Giovanni Sambin for

having

undertaken, at his own suggestion, the considerable work of writing
I and typing these notes, therebf making the lectures accessible to a wider aUdience.

stockholm,

January

1984,

Pel' Martin-Lof

1

j

I

1

- 1 -

-

1

-

 

Introductory

remarks

 

, Ma t hema t i ca l

logic

and

th~ relation

between

logic

and

mathematics

have

been

interpreted

in

at

l~ast three

different ways:

(1)

mathematical

logic , as

symbolic

logic,

or

logic using mathe -

matical .ymbolism;

 

(2)

mathematical

logic 'as

foundations

tor philosophy)

of mathe-

matics;

 

(3)

mathematical

logic

as

logic

studied by mathematical methods,

as

a

branch

of mathematics. '

We

shall

here

mainly

be

interested

in mathematical logic

in

the

second

sense.

What

 

shall

do

is

also mathematical

logic

in

the

first sense,

but

certainly

not

in

the

third .

 

' The

principal

problem

that

remained

afterP 'rincipia Mathematica

was

completed

was,

according

to

its

authors,

that of

justifying the

axiom

of

reducibility

(or,

as

we would

now say,

the

impredicative

com -

prehension

axiom) '.

The, ramified

theory

of

types

was

predicative,

but

it was not sufficient for deriving even elementary parts of analysis . So th~ axiom of reducibility was ~dded on the pragmatic ground that it

was

needed,

although

no .atisfactory

justification

(explanation) of it

could

be

provided.

The

whole

point

of

the

ramification wa s , then lost ,

so that it might just as well be abolished. What then remained was

the

simple

theory

of

types. Its official justification ( Wittgenstein

,

R~~sey) rests

on

the

interpretation

of propositions

as

truth

values

and propositional functions

(of

one

or several

variables;

as

truth

functions. The laws of the classical propositional logic are then

clearly valid,

and

tion

is

restricted

so

to

are

the

quantifier

laws ,

finite

domains.

However,

as

it

long

does

as quantifica - not

seem

poss-

ible

to make

sense

of quantification

over

infinite

domains ,

like

the

-

2

-

domain of natural numbers, on this interpretation of the notions of

proposition and propositional f~nction. For this reason, afuong others,

what we develop here is an intuitionistic theory of types ; which is

also predicative (or 'ramified). It is free from the deficiency of

Russell's ramified theory of types, as regards the possibility of de-

veloping elementary parts

of

mathematics,

like

the

theory

of

' r e a l

num-

bers, because of the presence of the operation which allows us to

form

the

cartesian

product

of ,a ny given

family

of

sets,

in

particular,

the

set of all functions from one set to another.

 
 

In

two

areas,

at

leasti our

language

~eems to

have advantages -

 

over traditional foundational languages. First, Zermelo-Fraenkel set

theory cannot adequately deal with the foundational problems of cat·

egory theory, where the category of all sets, the category of all

groups, the , category

of

functors

from

one

such

category

to

another

etc. are considered. These problems a~e coped with by means of the

distinction between sets and categories (in the logical or philosophi-

cal

sense,

not

in

the

sense

of

category

theory)

which

is

made

in

intu-

itionistic type theory. Second, present logical symbolisms are inad-

equate as programming languages, which explains why computer scien-

tists have developed their own languages (FORTRAN, ALGOL, LISP,

PASCAL,

...

) and systems of proof rules (Hoare 1 , Dijkstra 2, • . ). We

have shown elsewhere 3 how the additional richness of ' t y pe theory, as

compared with first order predicate logic, makes it usable as a pro-

gramming language.

l

'

C.

A.

Hoare,

An axiomatic

basis

munications

of

the

ACM,

Vol.

12,196 '9,

of

pp.

computer

576-580

programming,

and

583.

Com-

2

E.

Englewood

W.

Dijkstra,

Cliffs,

N.J .,

A discipline

1976.

of

Programming,

Prentice Hall,

ming,

L.

J.

3

P.

"

Martin-Lof,

Constructive mathematics

and

computer

program-

Logic,

Cohen,

Methodology

and

Philosophy

of Science

VI;

Edited ,by

J.

Los,

H.

Pfeiffer

and

K.-P.

Podewski,

North-Holland,

Amsterdam,

1982,

pp.

153-175.

'

- 2 - domain of natural numbers, on this interpretation of the notions of proposition and
 

-

3

-

 

Propositions

and

Judgements

 
 

Here

the , dis~i~ctionbetween proposition

(Ger.

Satz)

 

and

asser-

tion

or

judgement ' ( Ge r .

Urteil)

is

essential.

What

we

combine

by

means

of'

the

logical

operations

,

(.l::>

,

,

&

v

,

V

"

3 ')

and

hold

to

be

true

are

propositions.

When

we

hold

a

proposition

to

be

true ,

we

make

a j~dge-

ment: '

 
 

proposition ~JUdgement,

 

In

particular, ' t he

premisses

and

conclusion

of

a

logical

inference

are

judgements.

 
 

The

distinction

between

propositions

and

jUdgements

was

clear

 

from

Frege

to

Principia.

These

 

notions

have

later be

en

rep

1

aced

by

the

formalistic

notions

of

formula

and

theorem

(in

a

formal

system) ,

re-

spectively. Contrary to formUlas,

propositions

are

not

def'ined

induc-

tively . So

to

speak,

they

f'orm

 

an

open

concept,

In

standard

textbook

presentations

of

first

order

logic,

 

we

d'

   

can

~stinguish three

quite

 

separ-a te

steps:

 

(1) inductive definition of terms and formulas ,

(2) specif'ication of aXioms and rules of inference ,

 

(3)

semantical

interpretation.

 

Formulas

and

ddt e uc ~ons ' are

given

meaning

only

through

semantics

which

is

usually

done

follOWing

Tarski

and

assuming

'

set

theory .

,

 

What

we

do

here

is

t

t

,

mean

0

be

closer

to

ordinary mathematical

pract~ce. We

will avoid keeping form and meaning (content) apart

In-

stead

we

will

at

the

same

time

 

display

certain

forms

of jUdgemen~ and

inference

that

are

used

in

mathematical

 

d

explain ' , them

 

,

"

proofs

an

seman-

tically.

Thus

we

make

explicit

 

h

w

t

a

is

usually

implicitly

taken

f'or

 

4

-

granted. When o ne tre at s

as

arty

ot he r

 

b r anc h

of

math ematics,

as

· i n

the metamathematical

lo g i c traditi on

originated

by

Hilbert ,

such

ju dge -

 

ments

and

inf erences ·are o nl y p artially

and

 

f ormal l y

re pr e se nted

in

the

s o- called

o bj

ec t

language,

 

while

they are

implicitly used;

as

in

any

other

b r anch of mathematics,

in

the

s o- cal led

metal anguage.

Our

main

aim

is

to

build

up

a

system

o f

f

orma l

rules

representing

in

the

bes

t

p ossible

way

informal

(mathe matical)

rea soning.

In

the

 

u sual natu ral deduction style ,

the

rules

given are

not quite . f ormal .

For

i ns t ance ,

the

rule .

 

A

 

A v

B

takes

f or

that

A and

B

are

f ormulas,

and

then d oes

it

say

granted i nf e r

that · we can

A v

B

to

be

true when

A is

true

o nl y If

we

are

t o

give

a

f ormai

rule,

we have

to make

this

expllcit,

writing

 
 

A prop.

 

B

prop .

 

A

tr-ue

o r

A

v

B

tr ue

 
 

A,

B

prop .

 

.1-

A

 

l-AyB

 

where

we use,

like Frege,

the

symb ol

l-

to

the

of

A to

signify

 

that A

is

true .

In our system

of rules

, . t h i s

left wi l l

always

be

explicit .

 

A

r ule

o f

inference

is · j ustified

by

explaining the

conclusion

o n

the assumpti on

that

the

pre misses

are

kno wn .

H.ence,

before

a

rule

of

infere nce

can

be

just

ified,

it

must

be

explained wh a t

it

is

that we

must know

"in

o r de r

to have

the

right to

make

a

judgement o f

any one

of the

various

f orms

that

the

premisses

and

cOnclusion can have.

 
 

-

5

-

 

. We

us e

f our · f orms

of

(1)

A

is

a

set

(a bbr .

A s~t ) ,

 

(

2 )

A

and

 

B .~e

equ al

~ets (A

 

~ B),

 

(

3)

a

is .an element

o f

the

set

A

(a

 

A) ,

 

(4)

a

and

 

b

are

equal elements of the set

A

(a

=

b

E

A) .

 

(If we

read

£

lit.rally

a s

~a~~ , then we ~ight

~rite A E

 

A

=

BESet ,

a

e

El

(!) ,

a

=

b

E

El(A ) ,

re spectively .)

Of

Set , cou rse ,

any

synta ctic

ements

and

varia ble s

l

co u ld

be

letters

f

us ed ·,

or

ae't s

the use

i s

o nl y

0

e t t e r s conve n ience .

sma

t

f

11

l

f

or

el -

Not e

t hat

o r di na r

y

c api t a set

·t

he o r y ,

a

E

b

and

 

a

= b

are

pr opos it i ons ,

whi l e

they

in a r e

j udgem

ents

 

here.

A

jUdgement

o f

the

f orm

 

A

=

B

h as

n o

mean ing

 

less ·we already kn

ow

A

and

B

t o

b~ sets

.

Like wise ,

a

jUdgeme

nt

o f

t he

f orm

b

a

E A pre supp oses

th at

A is

a

set ,

and

a

judgement o f

f orm

a ·= b

E A pr esupp o se

.s,

first,

 

that

 

A is

a se

t

an

d

 

sec ond,

t he t ha t

a

and

are

elem ent s

o f

A.

   

,

,

   
 

Each

 

f orm

 

o f

judgem ent

 

admits

 

o f

severa 1 differe nt

read ings ,

 

as

i n

the

ta.ble:

 

A set

a

E

A

 

A is

a

set

a

is

an

'e

Lemen t

o f

the

set . A

   

A

is

A

is

a

pr op ositi on

a

is

a

pr

o of

 

( con structi on)

of

A is

n onempt y true

 

the

pr op ositi

on

A

 

A

is

an

i ntenti on

 

a

is

a meth od o f f~lfliling

   

A

is

f u lfi l l a bl e

(expectati on)

 

(real izing)

 

the

intention

. ( realizable)

 
 

( exp ectati on )

 

A

 

A is

a

problem

 

a

i s

a

method

of solving

the

   

A i s

solvable

(task)

 

p rob

l em ( doing

the

task)

A

   

I

ric '

 

-

6

-

\

 

-

7

The

se cond,

logical

interpretation

is discu ssed

toghether

with

rules

   

Explanations of the

forms

o f

judgement

 

below .

The

 

third

was

suggested

by

Heytin g 4 a nd

t he

"a

is

fourth

by

Kol mo-

 

gOrov 5 .

The

last

i s

very

close

to

programming.

a

method

.

.

.

"

can

'

 

For

each one

of

the . four

forms

of

judgement,

we. now explain

wha t

be

read

as

"a

is

a

program

".

Since

programming

languages

have

 

a

a

judgement of

that

form means .

 

We

can

explain what a

judgement ,

s a

y

formal

notation

for

the

program

but

not

for

A,

we c omplete the

sen-

 

of

the

first

form,

means

by

answering

one

of the

follo wing three

ques -

tence

with

 

" ...

which

meets

the

a, s pe c i f

i ca ti on

A".

In .Kolmogorov 's

in-

tions:

· t e r

pr

e t a t i on ,

d

the word

problem

refers

to something to

be

done and

the

 

wor

p rogram

to

how to

do

it .

The

analogy bet ween t he

first

and

 

the

   

Wha t

is

a

set?

 

second

interpretation

is . implicit

in

the Brouwer-Heyting interpret-

What

is

it

that

we must

 

know in

order

to have

the

right

to

judge

ation

of ,~he logical constant~. It was

made

more

explicit

bY ,Curry ,and

 

something

to

be

a

set?

Feys6 , but only for the impl icational fragment , and i t wa s exten ded t o

           
 

,

.

7

 

What

does

a

judgement of

the

form

 

" A is

a

set·" mean?

intuitionistic

first

order arithmetic by

Howard

_

It

is

the

only

 

known

   

way of int.rpretin~

i~tuitionistic logic

so

that

th~ axiom

o f

6h oic e

 

The

first ,is

the ontolog ical

(anc

ient Greek) ,

 

t he

second

the

epis-

 

becomes , valid .

 

temol~gical (Descartes,

Kant,

••

.

)

and

the

third

the

seman t ica l

(mod-

 

To

distin gui sh between proofs. of

judgements

(usually

in

tree-like

 

ern)

way

of

posing essentially

the

same

question .

At

first

sight ,

we

 

form)

and

proofs

(here

identified with

element s ,

 

thus

could assume

that

a

set

is

defined

by

prescribing ho w i t s

elements

to

use

the

left

of

of propo sit ions the

E . )

we

reser ve

it when confusion might occur.

word

con str uction

for

the

latter and

are formed.

N is

defined

This we

do

by giving

when

the

we say

rules :

that

the

set

of na tura l

numbers

   

a

N

 

o E

N

 

a'E

N

 

4

A.

Hey ting,

Die

intuitionistische

Grundlegung

der

Ma t hema t ik ,

   

by

which

its

elements are

constr ucted.

 

However"

the

we akn

e s s

o f

thi s

 

Erkenntnis,

Vol.

2,

1931 ,

pp.

106 -115 .

.

 

definition is

clear:

10 10 ,

for

instance,

though

not

   

5

A.

N.

Kolmogorov ,

Zur · Deutung der

M~thematische Zeitschrift ,

Vol.

35 .

1932,

intuitionistis chen pp .

Logik,

6

H.

B.

Curry and

R.

Feys,

Combinatory

Logic,

Vol.

1,

North-

 

thegi ven

can

bring

~uish the

rules,

is

clearly an

it

to

the

form

a'

for

elements which have a

element

some a

form

by

of

N,

e ' N.

which

sinc,e we

We

thus

we

obta inable wi th '

kno w

t h at

we

can

h a ve . to di rect ly

d isti n - see

-Holland ;

Amsterdam ,

1958