REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial
Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to
male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare
medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and
female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificateevidencing
that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which
certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
Hospital, who, in addition, explained that
“Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes
male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus
has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in
her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before
the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not
implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth
certificate be changed.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held
that, in deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered “the
compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence
presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks
of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor
that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of
male hormones (androgen), which is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being
male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the d
iversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature
has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a
male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court
added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the
consequences that will follow.
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs Republic of the Philippines
FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s a
biological male who feels trapped in a male body. Being that, he
sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure
was successful – he (she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in
2002, he filed a petition for the change of his first name (from
Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth
certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted
to make these changes, among others, so that he can marry his
American fiancé.
The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be
granted based on equity; that Silverio’s misfortune to be trapped
in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way
taken against him; that there was no opposition to his petition
(even the OSG did not make any basis for opposition at this point);
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of
Silverio and [her] fiancé and the realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the
birth certificate may be changed on the ground of gender re-
assignment.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds
no support in existing legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR
MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO
CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY
AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL
REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was passed. This
law provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has
jurisdiction in petitions for the change of first names and not the
regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio insofar as his first
name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the
petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still because the
ground upon which it is based(gender re-assignment) is not one of
those provided for by the law. Under the law, a change of name
may only be grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely
alleged gender re-assignment as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the
regular courts or a petition for the local civil registry. Not with the
courts because there is no law to support it. And not with the civil
registry because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was
born a male hence it was just but right that the entry written in his
birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To
grant the changes sought by Silverio will substantially reconfigure
and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will
allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women
such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
Silverio’s petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends to confer on a
person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to
change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has
to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing
the conferment of that privilege.”
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. VS. ALBIOS
FACTS:
Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before
the sala of Judge Calo in Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their
marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to
her, the marriage was a marriage in jest because she only wed the
American to acquire US citizenship and even arranged to pay him
$2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after
their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife
because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state and complying with their marital obligations. The
court even sent summons to the husband but he failed to file an
answer.
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the
marriage was void ab initio for lack of consent because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to
acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00..
However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the
case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case do not fall within the
concept of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally consented
to enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for
if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.
ISSUE:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio
on the ground of lack of consent?
RULING:
NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any vice of consent.
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to
do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention
to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must
be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer.
A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45
and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and
undue influence. None of these are present in the case.
Therefore, their marriage remains valid.
ARANES V. OCCIANO
Facts:
On Feb 17, 2000, Judge Salvador Occiano, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnized the
marriage of Mercedita Mata Arañes and Dominador B. Orobia
without the requisite marriage license at Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
When Orobia died, the petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast
properties” of Orobia was not recognized, because the marriage
was a null. She also cannot claim the pension of her husband who
is a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent
judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which
allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and
sufferings.
In his Comment, respondent judge averred that he was requested
by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the
marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. He was assured that
all the documents were complete, thus he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in his sala. However, on 17 February 2000, he acceded to
the request of Arroyo that he solemnize the marriage in Nabua
because Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the
rigors of travelling to Balatan. Before starting the ceremony he
discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage
license, thus he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested
its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of
the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for
the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of
human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it
might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered
from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity
for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their
failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and
Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license
to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to
comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter
only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license
would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. Respondent judge vigorously denies that
he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite
the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault
and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance
dated 28 August 2001 confessing that she filed the complaint out
of rage, and she realizes her own shortcomings. She attested that
respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage and
that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he
eventually solemnized the same.
From the records, petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January
2000 to be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner
nor Orobia claimed it. Also, the Civil
Registrar General and the Local Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur
has no records of the marriage. On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought
the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. The LCR
informed the judge that they cannot issue the same due to the
failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous
spouse.
Issue:
Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage
outside his jurisdiction and without the requisite marriage license.
Ruling:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the
authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior
courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. An appellate court
Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long
as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges
who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is
limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, may
not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage. Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing
a marriage without the requisite marriage license. Marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even
add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by
law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross
ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of
Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a
catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action
WHEREFORE,Judge Salvador M. Occiano, is fined P5,000.00 pesos
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
NINAL v. BAYADOG
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito
resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year
and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit
dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license.
After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license.
Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of
the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the
counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses
from securing a marriage license.
Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-
year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within
the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception
in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot
be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife
for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage
with respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other,
Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot
make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as
being one as “husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
MANZANO v. SANCHEZ
Facts:
Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the
lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him
on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22
March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage
with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When
respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to
know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
“separated.”
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that
when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he
did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was
that the two had been living together as husband and wife for
seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested
in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late
Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to
marry again; otherwise, Manzano could be charged with bigamy.
He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack
of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge
be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code.
Issue:
Is the reason of the respondent Judge in solemnizing the marriage
valid?
Ruling:
No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides “No license shall be
necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without
any legal impediment to marry each other. Respondent Judge
cannot take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting
as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two
individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is
merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not
serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.
REPUBLIC v. DAYOT
FACTS:
On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City
through the execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of
them had attained the age of maturity and that being unmarried,
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. Then Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual on August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an action
for bigamy against Jose. Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no
marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he
did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had
lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. The RTC
rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for the ground that
the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the
foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court of
Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that his marriage to Felisa
was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was
that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption
from a marriage license under Article 34 of the New Civil Code
were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab
initio?
RULING:
Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the
requirements of valid marriage in which the sworn affidavit that
Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper because they started
living together five months before the celebration of their
marriage. That according to the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 34 “No license shall be
necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediments to marry each other… “ it means
that a five years period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for
the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration
and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision
that the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson is
void ab initio.
REPUBLIC v. OBRECIDO
FACTS:
Orbecido and Villanueva were married ad had two children. Wife
went to US to work and later became a US citizen. Thereafter he
learned from his son that his wife obtained divorce and married
another man. Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry
under the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. RTC Zamboanga del
Sur granted his petition. The SolGen's motion for reconsideration
was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on
the Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).
RULING:
Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage.
The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of
celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time the
divorce decree is obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating
him/her to remarry.
However, Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did not
present competent evidence showing his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried.
BAYOT v. CA
FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American,
were married in Muntinlupa. They had a child name Alix, born in
November 27, 1982 in California.
In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in
Dominican Republic, which was docketed as Civil Decree No.
362/96 ordering the dissolution of the marriage. The same court
also issued Civil Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's conjugal
property in Muntinlupa in March 4, 1997.
She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the
ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity,
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of
the conjugal partnerships of gains with application for support
pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be
ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter
Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds
of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the
prior judgment of divorce.
RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case
No. 01-094 and set aside RTC's incidental orders. According the
the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss,
since the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when
the divorce decree was granted since Rebecca was an American
citizen when she applied for the decree.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in
Dominican Republic is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.
Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an
American citizen and remains to be one, being born to American
parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the
principle of jus soli granting American citizenship to those who are
born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of American
passport.
She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself
as an American citizen, as shown in her marriage certificate, in
Alix's birth certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican
Republic.
Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national
laws of the United States of America, a country which allows
divorce.
The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican Republic
court properly adjudicated the ex-couple's property relations.
The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized
here, the divorce decree must be proven as a fact and as valid
under the national law of the alien spouse.
The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she
secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in
any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of
foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court
issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican
Republic court are valid, and consequently, bind both Rebecca
and Vicente.
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a Filipino
citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by the DOJ
Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will
not, stand alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In
determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would
come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute
divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the
time a valid divorce is obtained.
CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS
Facts:
Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization. He was married to the
respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his
wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and
was granted. Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he
registered the divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was
informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage
as dissolved with the RTC where respondent failed to submit any
response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the
petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed before the
Court.
Issues:
WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction fro the recognition
of a foreign divorce decree.
Decision:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art
26 of the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes
is in favour of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can
invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian
citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the
authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to alien’s
national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered
the foreign decree of divorce on the petitioner and respondent’s
marriage certificate without judicial order recognizing the said
decree. The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is void.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is
reversed and Court ordered t6he remand of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings in light of the ruling.
FUJIKI v. MARINAY
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines
on January 23, 2004. Sadly, petitioner Fujiki could not bring
respondent Marinay back to Japan and they eventually lost
contact with one another. In 2008, Marinay met Shinichi Maekara
and they married without the earlier marriage being dissolved.
Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and
was able to reestablish contact with Fujiki and rekindle their
relationship. The couple was able to obtain a judgment in a
Japanese court that declared Marinay's marriage to Maekara void
on the ground of bigamy in 2010. Fujiki then filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)”. In this case, petitioner
prayed that:
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that
the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics
Office (NSO).
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not
meet standing and venue requirements as prescribed on the Rule
on Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC),
specifically, only the spouses (i.e. Marimay or Maekara) may file
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. Petitioner in a
Motion for Reconsideration claimed that the case should not be
dismissed as the above rule applied only to cases of annulment of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and not in a
petition for recognition of a foreign judgment. Notably, when the
Solicitor General was asked for comment, it agreed with the
Petitioner stating that the above rule should not apply to cases of
bigamy and that insofar as the Civil Registrar and the NSO are
concerned, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure
to be followed. Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that there is
no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule
108, citing De Castro v. De Castro and Niñal v. Bayadog which
declared that “[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy.
HELD:
YES. Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave
v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy.”
The Supreme Court further held that:
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific,
a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove
the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer
who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody
is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be
made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal
of office.
xxx
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the
case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign
laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the
foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
xxx
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a
fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While
the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance
with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law. Article 26 of the
Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”
Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the
proceedings.
DE CASTRO v. DE CASTRO
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991.
They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage
license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in
October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When
the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the
marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push
through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed
an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple
got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony,
petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes
and did not live together as husband and wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent
is valid.
HELD:
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas
a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence
presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage
license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together
for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during
cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be
considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous
and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage
license. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous
cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all.
The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so
they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
CHI MING TSOI v. CA
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the
celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of
defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between
them during their first night and same thing happened until their
fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private
place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them.
Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant
avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a
rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989
they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted
themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese
General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination
of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept
confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations
that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his
residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to
reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared
void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other
hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled
because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and
is physically and psychologically capable and since their
relationship is still young, they can still overcome their
differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical
examination and the result was there is not evidence of
impotency and he is capable of erection.
ISSUE:
Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with
his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot
the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness
of the marriage.
HALILI v. HALILI
FACTS:
Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to
respondent Chona Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking
that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together
as husband and wife. However, they started fighting constantly a
year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing
respondent and started dating other women. It was only upon
making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not
"fake."
ISSUE:
Whether or not his marriage to respondent ought to be declared
null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity.
RULINGS:
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines,
this Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on
psychological incapacity on a case-to-case basis - guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder
characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior.
Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle
their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others'
comments.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.
Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday
decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow
others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to
live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are
wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their
own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when
alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a
psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a
deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it has been shown
that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity
that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential
obligations of marriage and thus the Court declared the marriage
null and void.
ANTONIO v. REYES
FACTS:
In 1990, Leonilo Antonio married Marie Ivonne Reyes, who was ten
years older than Leonilo. In 1993, Leo filed a petition to annul their
marriage due to the alleged psychological incapacity of Reyes.
Leonilo claimed that Marie persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things. She would claim that she is
a psychologist but she is not. She’d claim she is a singer with the
company Blackgold and that she is the latter’s number 1 money
maker but she’s not. She’d also spend lavishly as opposed to her
monthly income. She fabricates things and people only to serve her
make-believe world.
Leonilo presented an expert who testified to Reyes’s psychological
incapacity. Reyes denied all of Leonilo’s allegations and she also
presented an expert to prove her case. The RTC ruled against
Reyes and declared their marriage void. Meanwhile, The
Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also annulled the marriage and
was even affirmed by the Vatican’s Roman Rata. However, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision hence the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marie Ivonne Reyes is psychologically
incapacitated.
HELD:
Yes, Reyes was proven to be psychologically incapacitated.
In this cases also, the Supreme Court emphasized what fraud or
misrepresentation means as contemplated in Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code vis-à-vis Article 46. But first, it must be stated: in
Psychological Incapacity, the misrepresentation done by
Reyes points to her inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity. In Article 45 (3),
marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article,
clarifies that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will
give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.” These
provisions of Article 45 (3) and Article 46 cannot be applied in the
case at bar because the misrepresentations done by Reyes is not
considered as fraud but rather such misrepresentations constitute
her aberrant 8ehavior which further constitutes Psychological
Incapacity. Her misrepresentations are not lies sought to vitiate
Leonilo’s consent to marry her. Her misrepresentations are
evidence that Marie cannot simply distinguish fiction/fantasy from
reality which is so grave and it falls under the fourth guideline laid
down in the Molina Case.
KALAW v. FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
In 1994, Valerio “Tyrone” Kalaw filed a petition to have his
marriage with Ma. Elena Fernandez be annulled on the ground that
Elena is psychologically incapacitated. The RTC, after hearing the
expert witnesses testify in court, eventually granted the petition,
but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision.
Tyrone appealed to the Supreme Court. In September 2011, the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA. Tyrone filed a
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the September 2011 decision (657 SCRA 822)
should be reversed.
HELD: Yes.
Trial court’s findings of facts should be given due weight
The SC ruled that it misappreciated the findings made by the RTC
when the SC reviewed the case in September 2011. The SC ruled
that the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court
deserved credence because it was in the better position to view
and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the
appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity
were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due
importance and respect. Therefore, it was not proper for the SC to
brush aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates, a
psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their
conclusions were solely based on the Tyrone’s version of the
events. The conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses
because they were largely drawn from the case records and
affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself
had accepted the veracity of the Tyrone’s factual premises.
Respondent could also establish the psychological incapacity of the
plaintiff spouse
The plaintiff in an annulment case under Article 36 carries the
burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, however, the
respondent, as the defendant spouse, could also establish the
psychological incapacity of the plaintiff spouse if the respondent
raised the matter in her/his answer. The courts are justified in
declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent
who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as
the imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed,
psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of
them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
Elena’s excessive mahjong sessions is indicative of her psychological
incapacity
In the September 2011 ruling, the SC noted that all the children of
Tyrone and Elena testified that although their parents have
differences, both took good care of them. However, upon closer
look at the testimonies of the children, it was shown that Elena was
too addicted to mahjong that she would even bring her children to
her mahjong sessions which were so frequent and would last from
early in the afternoon to past midnight. The fact that the
Elena brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did
not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested
her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully
exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion
of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her
own personal and escapist desires. This revealed her wanton
disregard for her children’s moral and mental development.
AZCUETA v. REPUBLIC
Facts:
Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of her marriage to Rodolfo Azcueta (Rodolfo)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Marietta averred that
Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Marietta complained that
despite her encouragement, Rodolfo never bothered to look for a
job and always depended on his mother for financial assistance
and for his decisions. It was Rodolfo’s mother who found them a
room near the Azcueta home and paid the monthly rental.
Rodolfo also pretended to have found work and gave Marietta
money which actually came from Rodolfo’s mother. When
Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and told her
his parents could support their needs. They had sex only once a
month which Marietta never enjoyed. When they discussed this,
Rodolfo told Marietta that sex was sacred and should not be
enjoyed or abused. Rodolfo also told her he was not ready for a
child. When Marietta asked Rodolfo if they could move to another
place, he did not agree and she was forced to leave and see if he
would follow her. He did not.
Rodolfo’s first cousin, who at one time lived with Rodolfo’s family,
corroborated Marietta’s testimony that Rodolfo was not gainfully
employed and relied on the allowance given by his mother who
also paid the rentals for the room the couple lived in. The
psychiatrist who examined Marietta testified that she found the
latter to be mature, independent, focused, responsible, had a
direction and ambition in life, and was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. Based on information gathered from Marietta, the
same psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from Dependent
Personality Disorder characterized by loss of self-confidence,
constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and
dependency on other people. The psychiatrist explained that the
root cause of the disorder was a cross-identification with
Rodolfo’s mother who was the dominant figure in the family
considering that Rodolfo’s father, a seaman, wasalways out of the
house. She added that the problem began during the early stages
of Rodolfo’s life but manifested only after his marriage. She stated
that the problem was severe, because he would not be able take
on the responsibilities of a spouse, and incurable, because it
began in early development and had been deeply ingrained in his
personality. She, thus,concluded that Rodolfo was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities.
Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service of
summons on him. The City Prosecutor found no collusion
between the parties. Based on the evidence presented by
Marietta, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage
void ab initio.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC’s decision, arguing that
the psychiatric report was based solely on the information given
by Marietta, and there was no showing that the alleged
psychological disorder was present at the start of the marriage or
that it was grave, permanent and incurable.The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC’s decision. Marietta, thus, brought the case to
the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to justify
a declaration that his marriage to Marrieta is void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Held:
Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
duties because of his Dependent Personality Disorder. His
marriage to Marietta was declared void ab initio.
Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her
husband’s psychological incapacity. As held in Marcos vs. Marcos
[397 Phil. 840 (2000)], there is no requirement that the
respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician
or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What
matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Marietta’s
testimony was corroborated in material points by Rodolfo’s close
relative, and supported by the psychiatrist’s testimony linking the
manifestations of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the
appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which
may indicate their candor or lack thereof. Since the trial court
itself accepted the veracity of Marietta’s factual premises, there is
no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity
drawn therefrom by her expert witness.
The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was alleged
in the petition, medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by testimony of an expert witness with more than 40
years experience in the field of psychology and psychological
incapacity, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. As
held in Te vs. Te (G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009), “(b)y the
very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”
Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was also established to have
clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of
marriage. Witnesses were united in testifying that from the start
of the marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his
mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident.
These manifestations of Rodolfo’s Dependent Personality
Disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being
rooted in his early development and a by-product of his
upbringing and family life.
Furthermore, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity had been shown
to be grave so as to render him unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The Court of Appeals’ opinion that
Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from his mother might
have been due to embarrassment for failing to contribute to the
family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was a
“responsible” realization since he was unemployed, were
dismissed by the High Court for being speculative and
unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court likewise disagreed
with the Court of Appeals’ finding that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility
and overdependence on his mother could be attributed to
immaturity, noting that at the time of his marriage, Rodolfo was
almost 29 years old. Also, the expert testimony identified a grave
clinical or medical cause
for Rodolfo’s abnormal behavior – Dependent Personality
Disorder.
A person afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder cannot
assume the essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, allows others to make most of his
importantdecisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with
people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing
things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in
order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned. (Te vs. Te, supra)
One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who
cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most
basic matters that spouses face every day; and one who cannot
contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of
his spouse, is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family
Code.
This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with
Dependent Personality Disorder is automatically deemed
psychologically incapacitated to perform his/her marital
obligations. The court must evaluate the facts, as guided by expert
opinion, and carefully examine the type of disorder and the
gravity thereof before declaring the nullity of a marriage under
Article 36.
Finally, it has been established that Rodolfo’s condition is
incurable, having been deeply
ingrained in his system since his early years.
CARLOS v. SANDOVAL
FACTS:
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers
who each have three parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later
Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad
Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two
parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo
II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action against
respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos
asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad
was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was
neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He
argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title,
including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.
HELD: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary
judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35
of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the
rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided.
Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment
rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment
of marriage.
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of
marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be
filed by any party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file
a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file
the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate
rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during
the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs
of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against
the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs
are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their
successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases
already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage
involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the
new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective
in its application.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against
respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends
upon when the marriage took place.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law
in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as
to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this
mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage?
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time
the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is
no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to
file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
VALDES v. RTC
Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They
begot 5 children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their
marriage null and void. It also directed the parties to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the
provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She
asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions
without marriage.
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties
during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other
properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and
partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code
shall apply."
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied.
Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code
does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102
and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family
dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio,
including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological
incapacity of the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147
applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read
consistently with Article 129.
Issues:
Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of
property in the case at bar.
Held:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation
is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of
the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains,
the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the
co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to
marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as
husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share
of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so
existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the
settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted
neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed
likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling
that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and
all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding
that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil
Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129,
12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for
valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is
annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spouses.
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its
explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void
marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of
nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. (Valdes
vs Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996).
CARINO v. CARINO
FACTS:
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao Cariño. He had
2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage,
this time with Susan Yee Cariño. In 1988, prior to his second
marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of
Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee.
Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4.
Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able
to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for
collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half
of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4
was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4
and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null
and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified
by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out
about the previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to
claim presumptive legitimes.
HELD:
The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the
absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and
SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized
without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage
between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for
purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto,
and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4
as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only
entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries
earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art.
148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as
a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two
were capacitated to marry each other for there were no
impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a
marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is
governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they
earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally
contributed by each party – this includes salaries and wages earned
by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have
contributed at all.
MORIGO v. PEOPLE
Facts:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the
house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four
years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost
contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to
receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former
replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada
to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed
to get married. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition
for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court.
Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at
Tagbilaran City. Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The
complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of Lucio’s
marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place. Appellant was charged with Bigamy in
information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage
with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His
motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy
case, Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his
defense of good faith.
Ruling:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary
before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters
into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo
and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio
might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally
construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure
that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case,
Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and
that it need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of
good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
academic.
TENEBRO v. CA
FACTS:
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in
1990. The two lived together continuously and without
interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed
Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling
which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit
with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his
marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no
record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with
Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological
incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD:
The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first
marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during
the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or
incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug
Justice Vitug pointed out that void ab initio marriages (except those
falling under the principle of psychological incapacity) should be
allowed to be used as a valid defense for bigamy. Void ab initio
marriages require no judicial decree to establish their nullity. It is
true that the Revised Penal Code does not require the first or
second marriage to be declared void to avoid a criminal case of
bigamy but this should only be applicable to voidable marriages –
because again, void ab initio marriages really do not need such
judicial decree.
JARILLO v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
On November 1979, the accused Victoria S. Jarillo,being previously
united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo in 1974, and
without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, contracted
a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage
was only discovered in 1999.
On the same year, Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) filed against
the appellant a civil case for annulment of marriage before the RTC.
Parenthetically, Jarillo filed for declaration of nullity of their
marriage against Alocillo in 2000.
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her marriage to Alocillo
was null and void because Aloci
llo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the
time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both
Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage
license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978. Notwithstanding her
defenses, the RTC found Jarillo guilty for the crime of bigamy in
2001 and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six years to ten
years of prision mayor.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed. It held
that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage
with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to
Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court.
This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo
was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also
struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s
contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage
as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC rendered a decision in 2003, declaring
petitioner’s 1974 marriage to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the
ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became
final and executory. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner
invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of
her conviction.
ISSUE:
W/N CA committed a reversible error in affirming the conviction of
Jarillo for the crime of bigamy despite the supervening proof that
her marriage to Alocillo had been declared void.
HELD:
No. Jarillo’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed.
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of
bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and
void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated. Under the
law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal
case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the
time the second marriage is contracted.
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is
presumed to be subsisting. Any decision in the civil action for nullity
would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into a second
marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision
in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
MEDINA v. KOIKE
Facts:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and
respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national,
were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.[4]
Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on
January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4,
2007.[5]
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of
Japan, filed for divorce[6] before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City,
Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as
appearing in the Divorce Certificate[7] and the same was duly
recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.[8]
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her
Certificate of Marriage[9] on file with the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition[10] for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity
to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code[11] before the RTC
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.[12] On
the other hand, Doreen presented several foreign documents,
namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of
Divorce"[13] and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"[14] both
issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by
the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She
also presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled
"Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of
Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the
Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification[15] issued by the City
Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said divorce
certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition,
photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding
English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil
Code of Japan 2000"[16] and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009"[17]
were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law
on divorce.[18]
In a Decision[19] dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's
petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of foreign divorce
decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign
divorce decree and" the national law of the alien recognizing his
or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven
The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by
Doreen were successfully proven to be public or official records of
Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of
her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The
RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The
Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated
by the Philippine Consul in Japan... adding too that the testimony
of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and
its effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she
was not presented as a qualified expert witness nor was shown to
have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan,
particularly those on family relations and divorce.
since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented and
considering further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign judgments and law.[23]
Doreen's motion for reconsideration[24] was denied in a
Resolution[25] dated November 28, 2014
Issues:
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC
erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce.
Ruling:
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign
marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner -
allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case
the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:... the law
confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing
trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.[26]
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself.
Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.[30] Since
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven like any other fact.[31]
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between
Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws
of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-
evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue
raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is
beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts,
whose findings on these matters are received with respect and
are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions.[32] In this regard,
it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders
rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be
brought to the Court of Appeals (CA)
It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure
proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they
are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. A
deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to
attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice
is the core reason for the existence of the courts.[35]
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial
justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in
accordance with this Decision.
ANDO v. DFA
FACTS:
In 2001, Edelina Tungul married a Japanese citizen named Yuichiro
Kobayashi. In 2004, Kobayashi obtained a divorce decree against
Edelina in Japan. Kobayashi later married someone else.
In 2005, Edelina again married another Japanese citizen
named Masatomi Ando.
Thereafter, Edelina tried to renew her passport but this time she
wanted to use her married name – she wanted to use Ando’s name.
However, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) told her
that same cannot be issued to her until she can prove by
competent court decision that her marriage with her said husband
Masatomi Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
In 2010, Edelina filed a petition for declaratory relief as she insists
that she should be issued a passport bearing her married name
even without a judicial declaration that her marriage with Ando is
valid because, according to the law, void and voidable marriages
enjoy the presumption of validity until proven otherwise. And also
on that juncture, she prayed that the court recognize her second
marriage as valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief should prosper.
HELD:
No. In the first place, the petition is misplaced. Edelina failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies. When her request for renewal
of passport under her married name was denied, she should have
appealed the denial to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs – pursuant
to the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239 (Philippine
Passport Act).
Second, her prayer to have her second marriage be “honored” is
not proper. The proper remedy is for her to file a petition for the
judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree
is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal
law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven like any other fact.
CASTILLO v. CASTILLO
Facts:
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married
Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent
married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea
be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista.
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended that her
marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured
any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.
RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous
marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said that
the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she
married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato
bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court
dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial
decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial
declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly,
RTC also said that even if respondent eventually had her first
marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first
and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage
was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity
for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second
marriage with Renato.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and
upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC,
the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972
and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3
August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law
in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the
Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does
not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage.
Issue:
W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage.

Ruling:
NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.
The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is
valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no
judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio
before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is
not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first
marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her
subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
Ratio:
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined
in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both
marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also
born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and
1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions
under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80,
81, 82, and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable marriages
are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.
SANTIAGO v. PEOPLE
Facts:
4 months after solemnization of marriage, Leonila (petitioner) and
Nicanor Santiago were served an information for Bigamy for the
prosecution adduced that Nicaonor was still married to Estela
when he entered into the 2ndmarriage; he was able to escape
while petitioner pleaded ‘not guilty’ relying on the fact that when
she married him, she thought he was single. She soon averred
that their marriage was void due to lack of marriage license,
wherein she should not then be charged with bigamy. 11 years
after inception if criminal case, Estela Galang, the first wife,
testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met
petitioner and introduced herself as the legal wife. Petitioner
denied allegation and stated that she met Estela only after she
had already married Nicanor.
Issue:
W/N petitioner is co-accused in the instant case of Bigamy
W/N marriage between Leonila and Nicanor is valid
Held:
Lower courts consistently found that petitioner indeed knew of
the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following
circumstances: (1) when Nicanor was courting and visiting
petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their
disapproval of him (2) it was incredible for a learned person like
petitioner to not know of his true civil status (3) Estela, who was
the more credible witness, compared to petitioner who had
various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that
she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former
was the legal wife of Nicanor. InPeople v. Archilla, knowledge of
the second wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage,
constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of
Bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice. She is not
co-accused. She is guilty of Bigamy as an accomplice thereby
sentenced to 6m arresto mayor to 4y prision correccional.
VITANGCOL v. PEOPLE
Facts:
On December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice).
Born into their union were three (3) children. After some time,
Alice eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married
to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced
by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics
Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy
against Norberto.
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this
case. He presents as evidence a Certification from the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has
no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and
his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an
essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the
prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. In
addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first
marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy.
Issue:
Whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar
that it has no record of the marriage license issued to petitioner
Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of
petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy
charge.
Ruling:
No. Petition for Certiorari is DENIED.
The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has
no record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming that it is
true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage
license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere
certifications by the civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years
before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his
alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this
case was pending, he did not present any decision from any trial
court nullifying his first marriage.
Ratio:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are
present in this case. Petitioner was still legally married to Gina
when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted
him of the crime charged.
ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES
Facts:
Lupo Almodiel Atienza filed an administrative case against
Judge Brillantes for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
Impropriety. Complainant alleges that he has two children with
Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at a subdivision in
Makati, which he purchased in 1987. One day, he caught the
respondent asleep in his bedroom. He asked the houseboy about
him and the latter said that the judge had been cohabiting with De
Castro. Atienza did not bother to wake up the respondent
instead asked the houseboy to take care of his two children.
After that, the respondent prevented him from visiting his child and
has alienated the affection of his children. The Complainant also
claims that the respondent is married to Zenaida Ongkiko.
The judge denies having been married to Ongkiko because their
marriage was celebrated twice without marriage license,
therefore, his marriage to De Castro in civil rites in Los
Angeles, California was because he believed in good faith and for
all legal purposes, that his first marriage was solemnized without
marriage license.
He further argues that Article 40 of the Family Code is not
applicable in his case because his first marriage in 1965 was
 governed by the Civil Code and the 2nd relationship was 1991
under the Family Code. No retroactive Effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of marriage license of his previous
marriage justifi3es his act to cohabit with De Castro
Held:
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was
admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went
through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was
already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any
law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before
one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to
correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were
married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license
on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the
date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40,
which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested
right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
REPUBLIC v. OLAYBAR
Facts:
Respondent requested CENOMAR finding that she is married to a
certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean national. Thus she filed a petition for
Cancellation of Entries in Marriage Contract.
The court granted the petition in favor of the respondent
The petition for the reconsideration of the assailed marriage
contract on the grounds that:
 There was no clerical spelling, typographical and innocuous errors
in the marriage contract for it fall within the provision of Rule 108
of the Rules of Court
 Granting the cancellation of all entries in the wife portion of the
marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio
Issue
Whether of not the cancellation of entries in marriage contract
which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule
108 proceeding
Held
Yes. Aside for the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was
presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent
showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered
into and that she was not even aware of such existence.
MONTANEZ v. CIPRIANO
FACTS:
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores. On January
24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent
married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed with the
RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage
with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code. On July
18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of
respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became
final and executory on October 13, 2003. On May 14, 2004,
petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from
the first marriage, filed with the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a
Complaint for Bigamy against respondent. Lourdes Cipriano
alleged that her first marriage was already declared void ab initio
in 2003. Thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to
her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983. The prosecution
argued that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated
when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity. RTC
ruled in favor of respondent on the ground that both wedding
were governed by the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, hence,
no judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent
to contracting a subsequent marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage
in 2003 justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed
against her.
HELD:
NO. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative
of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. In the case at bar, the
respondent’s clear intent was to obtain judicial declaration of
nullity to escape from the bigamy charges against her.
SSC v. AZOTE
FACTS:
On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of
the SSS, were married in civil rites. On April 27, 1994, Edgardo
submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their three older
children as designated beneficiaries. Thereafter, Edgardo
submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his three
younger children as additional beneficiaries. On January 13, 2005,
Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim for
death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It
appeared, however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier
submitted another Form E-4 with a different set of beneficiaries,
namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer
Azote (Elmer),as dependent. Consequently, Edna’s claim was
denied. Her children were adjudged as beneficiaries and she was
considered as the legal guardian of her minor children. Edna filed
a petition with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump sum and
monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that she was the
legitimate wife of Edgardo. In its answer, the SSS averred that
there was a conflicting information in the forms submitted by the
deceased. Summons was published in a newspaper of general
circulation directing Rosemarie to file her answer. Despite the
publication, no answer was filed and Rosemarie was subsequently
declared in default. SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for lack of
merit. The SSC further wrote that the National Statistics Office
(NSO) records revealed that the marriage of Edgardo to one
Rosemarie Teodora Sino was registered on July 28, 1982.
Consequently, it opined that Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not
valid as there was no showing that his first marriage had been
annulled or dissolved.
ISSUE:
W/N Edna should be adjudged as the widow of the deceased,
thus, entitled to the benefits
RULING:
No. The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282.
Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only
the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the
beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In this case, there is a
concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with
another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract.
Edgardo even acknowledged his married status when he filled out
the 1982 Form E-4 designating Rosemarie as his spouse.
It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna
was celebrated at the time when the Family Code was already in
force. For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code,

Edna, without doubt, failed to establish that there was no
impediment or that the impediment was already removed at the
time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the
rule that "whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by
law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial
evidence." Edna could not adduce evidence to prove that the
earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or
whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive
death before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that
Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that Edna was
not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-
member, she would not qualify under the law to be the
beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo.