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AUGUST 15 JRGL If it is in relation to an election offense, there must be

favorable recommendation by the Comelec.


Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service 2. It cannot be done in cases of impeachement and there are
no other constitutional limitations on the exercise of such
We’ve already mentioned Gonzales vs Office of the President power.
(2012). We will see what will happen in the impending dismissal
complaint overhaul that the Ombudsman because the newly In the case of Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec, the SC had the occasion to
appointed ombudsman has publicly declared that he will mention one doctrine, the doctrine of non diminution or non
implement the decision. This is contrary to the 2014 ruling of impairment of the presidents power of pardon by acts of
Gonzales vs. office of the President. Congress. Simply there can be no legislation which would limit the
power of the president to extend executive clemency because only
Gonzales III vs. Office of the President (2014) the constitution can provide for such limitation. In the said case,
this was the pardon extended to former president Estrada by Gloria
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting... disciplinary authority in Macapal Arroyo (GMA). It’s for the conviction for plunder and part
the President... over the Deputy Ombudsman violates... the of the discussion there wass whether the grant of pardon was
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus... conditional or absolute. Cited by petitioner was one of the
unconstitutional... we rule that subjecting the Deputy preambular clause, the third one saying that president Estrada
Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose affirmed that he will no longer stay in the public office. So the
own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are question was, in running for an elective position, did he violate the
subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but conditions of pardon. SC said that the preambular clause - the
seriously place at risk the... independence of the Office of the whereas clauses of the statute, the grant of pardon being one, is
Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express not considered to be part of the operative fact or act of the grant
constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them of pardon. The recitation of the grant of pardon stating that he is
tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. restored to all his political and civil rights is an indication that the
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the... constitutionally-granted grant was absolute and so, he was not disqualified to run.
independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly
did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec
independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of
the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
and... balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced
to revitalize. to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007,
necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and
trust in her subordinate officials who are not as... independent political rights.
as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and
controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position
true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like of President. None of the disqualification cases against him
the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major prospered but he only placed second in the results.
problem... for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2)
of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena,
Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void. and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local
elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
he statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a
very logical principle: the Executive power to remove and Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against
discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified
exercise any power over them, would result in an absurd to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder
situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is given the sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section
persons who can remove or suspend its members. 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section
12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding
The pardoning powers of the President is largely executive, that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been
discretionary, final and unappealable. If there is no constitutional effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former
provision or limitation violated, the private act of the President President Gloria M. Arroyo.
though official, which is the grant of pardon or clemency is
considered to be final and unappealable. Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections.
Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes,
The limitations as provided for in the Constitution are the intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same
following: ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be
proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
1. There must have to be conviction by final judgment
Issue: May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office
despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly
carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified
hold public office? use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part
Held: Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that
restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by
the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a
controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas
It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the
Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent
fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to
limit the scope of the pardon.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon
given to and accepted by former President Estrada does not Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is
actually specify which political right is restored, it could be merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot
inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a
intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither
and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was
the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be
text. conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public
office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo
legislative action. did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the
Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the extended to former President Estrada.
Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with
other acts of executive clemency, to wit: AMNESTY VS. PARDON

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise The case of Magdalo vs. Comelec discusses the distinction between
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, Amnesty and pardon. Amnesty is an act of the sovereign that’s why
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, the Constitution requires that section 19 requires prior
after conviction by final judgment. concurrence of congress, it’s not a private act of the president
alone unlike a pardon.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. Magdalo vs. Comelec
xxxx
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness
sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who
shall be granted by the President without the favorable have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty
recommendation of the Commission. looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the
offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty
the only instances in which the President may not extend stands before the law precisely as though he had committed
pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that no offense.
have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
which there was no favorable recommendation coming from private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof;
Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
pardoning power of the President. concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to
make the pardon conditional. Amnesty - any person can claim coverage or benefit under the
amnesty proclamation regardless of the stage whether he has not
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular yet been arrested, been arrested, tried, convicted or serving
clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada sentence provided one is covered by the amnesty proclamation,
has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position one can claim amnesty. In pardon, there must have to be a
or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate conviction by final judgment. You all remember that case of People
against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to vs. Salle Jr where the SC traced the history of the requirement of
suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. conviction by final judgment. In the original text of the ‘35
Constitution, this followed the American condition that there has parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those
or there is no requirement of conviction, only an act of commission. responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those
Once a crime has been committed, a person may be granted in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as
pardon already or executive clemency. In the ‘73 original draft, as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
approved, it required conviction by final judgment although even if
it is on appeal provided there has been a conviction by the trial WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y
court, pardon or clemency can be extended. When it was amended Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof
in ‘81, it returned to the American tradition that no conviction within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his
required. In the ‘87, it was restored and the phraseology was appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon
changed, it is now clear that there must have to be judgment of granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only
final conviction meaning there is no appeal pending, there is upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance
service of sentence or one must have applied for probation. In with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
instances where before under the imposed death penalty, a person must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody
may waive his right to appeal in writing except in instances of death the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the
penalty impositions, a convition is also considered final. When it is assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National
so, then executive clemency can be extended. Bureau of Investigation.

People vs. Salle, Jr. PARDON VS. PROBATION

Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows: You know what probation is, it covers a certain specie of offenses
where the penalty imposable does not exceed 6 years and there is
“Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in other requirements of first time offender. The question there is, is
this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, that granted by the president as part of his clemency powers?
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and Technically it is not, it is granted by the Court upon proper
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. recommendation of the parole and probation board. But it is also
granted by the executive department but again not granted directly
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with by the president but upon order of the court.
the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.” PARDON VS. PAROLE

Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation Who grants parole? Also the parole and probation board after
of conviction, it may be exercised at any time minimum service of minimum sentence under the ISL. Not directly
after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, granted by the president.
ofcourse, entirely different where the requirement is
" final conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of PARDON VS .AMNESTY (Humana man?)
Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or "conviction by
final judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article EFFECTS OF PARDON
VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be
extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final.  If the pardon is absolute, it restores the person to all his
civil and political rights.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is  If it is conditional, a condition must have to be complied
seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused commences to with or satisfied before a person is fully restored to all
serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly his rights civil and political.
waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed
by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for Sanctions for violations
probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. Where the
judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet There is a separate felony for failing to comply with conditional
therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, pardon or there can be administrative liability by requiring the
executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant. accused to serve the remainder if there is a violation of the pardon.

The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section Does pardoning power apply to administrative cases? The old case
19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of Llamas vs Executive Secretqary is still a good law. It can be
of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the extended to administrative cases but only if the power is with the
pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial president. In administrative cases relating to other branches of the
court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be government which the President does not have any power of
acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun discipline, the president cannot extend pardoning powers or
unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or clemency powers to those administrative held liable in their
instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require respective cases (?).
proof from the accused that he has not appealed from
his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof Llamas vs Executive Secretary Orbos
may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or
the appellate court, as the case may be. Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas
together with some other complainants filed an administrative
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for
accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed
office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned This refers to the military powers of the president. Section 181 as
with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume we all know is the longest provision in the present constitution
office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon singularly as a result of the effects of the declaration of Martial Law.
him. The framers of the 1987 Constitution has tried to perceive and
conceive all limitations to avoid repetition of the events of the past.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive The case of Lagman vs Exec Secretary is the longest decision now
clemency only in criminal cases. They say that the qualifying per report in the SCRA.
phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to
criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive There is a listing of the powers which the President can do under
clemency or pardon to anyone who has been “convicted in an Section 18. The first is referred to as the calling out power.
administrative case, allegedly because the word “conviction”
refers only to criminal cases. 1. Calling out power
To call out the armed forces to suppress any lawless
ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to violence invasion of.
grant executive clemency in administrative cases.
2. Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
HELD: Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may
be considered under criminal or administrative cases. , if the 3. Declaration of martial law
law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The
Constitution does not distinguish between which cases In Lagman, the SC said that the listing is not an enumeration of the
executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sequence of power that the President can exercise. It’s just a listing
sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if based on gravity or graveness of the offense. The SC cannot
executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it quantify nor direct which of these powers the president should or
would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of must exercise in a particular situation. It is not for the President to
impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 exercise calling out first then suspend then declare martial law. It
of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically depends on the calculation of the president based on the exercise
excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve of discretion on whether the conditions are met.
criminal offenses.
Lagman vs Executive Secretary
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the
President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative Graduation of powers: It refers to hierarchy based on scope
cases. It is the court’s considered view that if the President can and effect, and not to a sequence/order that the President
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines must adhere to. Also, the Court cannot calibrate the
and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can President's decision on which among the powers he will avail
she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are of in a given situation.
clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
The President as Commander-in-Chief has three extraordinary
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President powers: (a) Calling out the armed forces, (b) Suspending the
can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (c) Declaring martial
only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in law.
the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict Calling out the armed forces is the most benign and involves
an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the other ordinary police action. It is done only when it is necessary to
hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. The
required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision. only limitations are that the president must act within
constitutional boundaries and not in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF POWER
For both the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the declaration of martial law, the president is

1 The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
Art VII Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in of habeas corpus.
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or connected with, invasion.
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty- four hours following such thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of he shall be released.
a call.
allowed to resort to these only when there is actual invasion or declaration of martial law. In Fortun, the Court declared that it
rebellion AND public safety requires it. It is limited to 60 days, was only on "standby" in case Congress defaults, but the Court
subject to review and possible revocation by Congress, and also made it clear in the case at bar that the it can exercise its power
to review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court. of review simultaneously with the power of Congress to do the
Insurrection and IMMINENT danger are NOT grounds for the same.
suspension of the writ or declaration of Martial Law. As a
constitutionally granted power of the President, the Proclamation No. 216 is not vague and is, therefore,
recommendation of the Defense Secretary to declare martial constitutional.
law is not a prerequisite.
As held in this case, the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies
During the period of martial law, the president exercises police only to free speech cases. Proclamation No. 216 does not
power, which is normally a function of the legislature. The regulate speech or any other fundamental right that may be
president as commander-in-chief can also order arrests and facially challenged. It only seeks to penalize conduct, not
seizures without judicial warrants, ban public assemblies, speech.
takeover news media and agencies and censor the press, and
issue presidential decrees. Nonetheless, the president still does The inclusion of "other rebel groups" does not make the
not have unbridled discretion to infringe the rights of civilians proclamation vague, as it should be interpreted in relation to
because martial law does not suspend the operation of the the other words that accompany it. They refer to the other
Constitution, nor supplant the operation of civil courts or rebel groups as found in Proclamation No. 55 (calling out armed
legislative assemblies. forces), which was cited in Proclamation No. 216 by way of
reference in the Whereas clauses.
Petition for certiorari is not the appropriate proceeding. It is
also not correct to say that the power to review the factual The lack of operational parameters does not make the
basis of the declaration of Martial Law falls under Section 1 proclamation void. Operational guidelines are mere tools for
and Section 5, Article VIII. the implementation of the proclamation. Judicial review covers
only the sufficiency of the information or data at the time, or
Rule 65 is not the appropriate proceeding because this refers to prior to the declaration or suspension. The review by this Court
whether or not an official gravely abused his/her authority will be confined to the proclamation itself and the report
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The review of the submitted to Congress. Any act committed under the said
sufficiency of the FACTUAL basis of Martial Law cannot be done orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as
using the same standard of review. The jurisdiction of the criminal acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a
Supreme Court in reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis separate proceeding.
of the declaration of martial law is suis generis -- it is a special
ad specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court aside from those Sufficiency of factual basis test
enumerated in Section 1 (expanded jurisdiction of the Court)
and Section 5 (exclusive and original jurisdiction of the SC) of The president as Commander-in-Chief has the sole discretion to
Article VIII. If the Court applies the standard of review used in a declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ
petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its of habeas corpus. The determination of this Court as to whether
constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII. The framers of there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such must
the Constitution added an additional safeguard under the third ONLY be based on facts or information known by the President
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded at the time he made the declaration or suspension, which facts
jurisdiction of the Court. or information are already found in the proclamation as well as
the written Report submitted by him to Congress.
Lansang doctrine reiterated
The Court cannot look at the absolute correctness of the facts,
According to the case of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, decided after as this will unduly burden the president and impede the process
the declaration of martial law during the presidency of of decision-making. The Court should look into the full
Ferdnand Marcos, the declaration of martial law and the complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a or individually. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the
political question and not subject to judicial review. The Garcia President's decision is correct, rather it only has to satisfy itself
case overturned the Lansang doctrine, an earlier case that that the decision had sufficient factual bases. (Sufficiency >
declared that the factual basis of declaring martial law and the accuracy)
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are
subject to judicial inquiry. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court Standard of proof is only probable cause.
made it clear that the 1987 Constitution (Section 18, Article VII)
reverted to and constitutionalized the Lansang doctrine. The Supreme Court declared that the president only needs to
satisfy probable cause to make a declaration of martial law and
The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This is,
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of according to the majority decision, the most practical and most
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, expedient standard by which the President can ascertain the
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent of the existence or non-existence of rebellion. Based on the facts cited
actions taken by Congress. in the 2 proclamations and the report to Congress, the Court
found that the factual circumstances in Marawi warranted the
By this conclusion, the Court reversed the doctrine in Fortun vs. declaration of Martial Law. As to other parts of Mindanao, the
Macapagal-Arroyo insofar as it refers to the role of Congress Court took notice of the fact that the Maute group has
and the Supreme Court in the review of the factual basis of the
established extensive networks and linkages with foreign and that you are a citizen of majority age of no other particular
local armed groups. requirement. When the petition is filed, the SC said that it upheld
the old ruling in Lansang vs. Garcia that the declaration of martial
The counter-evidence provided by the petitioners were not law or suspension of the privilege of the writ is a justiciable not a
given credence. As found by the Court, the counter-evidence political question, however, unlike in Lansang vs. Garcia where the
came from unverified news reports. The ruling in Bedol vs. SC then said that it can be tested based on arbitrariness. This time
Commission on Elections on the admissiblity of independent around, the SC said the Lansang ruling requiring in arbitrariness is
relevant statements does not apply. Independent relevant no longer true because what is to be determined is sufficiency of
statements are reliable only when the statements are relevant factual basis. And the SC in determining whether the factual basis
and when the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. In the case are sufficient must have to consider the totality of the facts based
at bar, the truth or falsity of the contents of the news reports is on what has been reported to the president. It is based on
material. sufficiency not on accuracy. So even if the facts turn out later to be
inaccurate, but by the totality of the facts taken altogether when
Maute groups are terrorists. Although terrorism is not cited as the President made the declaration would make up a sufficient
a ground to declare martial law, terrorism and rebellion are basis for declaring martial law or suspending the writ that would be
not mutually exclusive. sufficient. SC is not allowed to take facts after into consideration in
determining whether the declaration or suspension was made
Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. Objective of a without sufficient factual basis. So the capof is up to the time of
terrorist is to sow and create a condition of widespread fear declaration or suspension. Unlike congress which is allowed to take
among the populace in order for the government to give in to matters even after. Now with respect to the requirement of
an unlawful demand. Rebellion is political. Nonetheless, determination of the existence of rebellion, SC said that the
nothing in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code nor RA 9372 President is still bound by Art 134 of the RPC and that kind of
makes them mutually exclusive. In fact, rebellion may be rebellion. However, the determination of its existence is based on
subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which is broader in probable cause. Such facts and circumstances which would
scope and covers a wide range of predicate crimes. Rebellion is engender a well-founded belief that rebellion is being committed.
only one of the various means by which terrorism can be It does not require preponderance, it does not require proof
committed. beyond reasonable doubt, only probable cause. Finally with respect
to the coverage of declaration of martial law or suspension of the
As to the powers of congress while the case of Fortun vs. Arroyo2 privilege, the SC made a discussion that it is not limited to where
on the Maguindanao Martial law declaration, said that the power actual public uprising is happening. Where public uprising is
to declare martial law is shared by both the President and required in rebellion, there are common crimes which are
Congress. That has been altered in the case of Lagman where the absorbed in rebellion under the doctrine of absorption and these
SC said there is no requirement of prior consent or approval from common crimes will be committed in areas where there is no actual
congress, the president can declare martial law. Absolutely, the public uprising. And so, despite the requirement of rebellion, it is
president has the power to declare without requiring any prior conceivable that the declaration may include areas where there
approval of any other office for that matter. What is the basis for may be no actual public uprising but there are common offenses
the president to declare martial law? This is based on the test of being committed in furtherance of rebellion. That’s why even if the
sufficiency of the factual basis - that there is invasion or rebellion actual public uprising is in Marawi, in the western side of
and that public safety requires it. Provided those are present, then Mindanao, Dinagat Island in the eastern side is covered by the
the president can declare martial law. When the President mixed declaration of the martial law because common crimes may be
that the court to congress in person or through his representatives committed in Dinagat Island in furtherance of rebellion in Marawi.
in writing as required by the constitution, congress can consider To follow the ruling of the SC, so the entire island had been placed
facts prior during and even after such declaration. It is a political (in martial law).
determination. Congress is not limited to a determination by the
court on the sufficiency of the factual basis. The SC’s authority Final item discussed in the case of Lagman is the matter of rebellion
come when there is an appropriate petition filed. What is that vs. terrorism. Justice Leonen was discussing in his dissent that what
nature of that petition in Lagman? The SC said: was committed was an act of terrorism and not rebellion. The SC
 If it were to be to question the calling out power, it must addressed that by saying that rebellion may be subsumed under
be based on rule 65 petition. Grave abuse of discretion. terrorism. Rebellion is one of the means to commit terrorism.
 But if it were to be to question the factual sufficiency of
the suspension of the privilege or declaration of martial Lansang vs. Garcia
law, then it is sui generis It is not a rule 65 petition (no longer true but just to compare the Lagman and this one..)
because it is not a test of grave abuse of discretion of
arbitrariness. It is a petition to test the sufficiency of the FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal
factual basis for such suspension or declaration. Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos
issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of
Again there is a difference between questioning the calling out habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the
power and with respect to the other two more grave declarations. growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were
It is sui generis because it does not follow the rule 65 rules, any invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and
citizen is supposed to be a proper party to question the sufficiency investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the
so when you talk about a legal standing, the only requirement is

2
The President has the sole and exclusive power to declare martial law or suspend independently of each other."50 Father Bernas points out, "Since the powers of
the writ. This power of the President is subject to review separately by Congress Congress and the Court are independent of each other, there is nothing to prevent
and the Supreme Court. Justice Mendoza stresses, "Thus, Congress and this Court Congress and the Court from simultaneously exercising their separate powers." 51
have separate spheres of competence. They do not act ‘jointly and sequentially’ but
suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not
meet the constitutional requisites. The declaration or suspension will lose its effect:
1. If the President lifts it himself like what happened in
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional. maguindanao declaration or
HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro 2. If congress nullifies it or
was subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC 3. If the SC, in a proper petition, revokes it and
declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis 4. By operation of law, if the period for efficacy has lapsed
of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and there has been no extension, then declaration or
by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground suspension will lose (its effectivety).
could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to
receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door Contracting and Guaranteeing Foreign Loans
sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged
by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected The 2005 case of Constantino vs. Cuisia discusses this section 20 of
lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that Art 7. Section 203 simply states that the President may contract or
there was actually a massive and systematic Communist- guarantee foreign loans subject to the prior approval or
oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as recommendation of the Monetary Board and subject to restriction
claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold t5he as may be provided for by law. So there is no question that the
suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. President can but there must have to be prior recommendation by
the monetary board. One of the questions raised here is that if the
Efficacy of the Declaration president pays the debt should there be authorization from the
monetary board and/or Congress to exterminate a debt. So he can
As to the efficacy of the declaration, the constitution says that the contract a loan but can he pay the loan without congressional
initial declaration cannot be longer than 60 days but any extension authorization? Because the constitution requires that all
can be longer. That’s why in Mindanao we are still under martial appropriations from the public treasury must have to be with
law up to 31st of December. And it is congress which will determine legislation and the SC said that there is a law. The law on debt
any request for extension whether it is needed. Can the SC review payment is not included in the general appropriations act. That is
the grant of extension by congress? The provision says any to ensure that we are or the country is compliant with its debt
extension thereof so it could also be. servicing obligation. On the manner of xxx, the SC said even then
even if there was no such law on debt servicing or debt termination
The declaration of martial law does not carry with it the or repayment of a debt of a loan, the fact that the constitution
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and vice grants to the president that power to contract a loan, it necessarily
versa. Both must have to be declared by the President. With includes the power to pay that loan because it defies common
respect to the suspension, we all know that what is actually sense and logic that if you are authorized to obtain one that you
suspended is not the writ itself but the privilege to be released from are not also authorized to pay up. So the president can pay up the
detention without official charge within the standard periods loan even without congressional authorization.
under article 125 of the RPC. The 12, 18 and 36 hrs. The suspension
of the privilege simply extends the period of extension without Constantino vs. Cuisia
charge to 72 hours because the constitution says that these
persons must be charged within 72 hours or 3 days otherwise, they During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a
would have to be released. A suspension of the privilege does not scheme to reduce the country’s external debt. The solution
therefore authorize or validate indefinite detention. It does not resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring
even validate invalid arrests, you can be arrested and detained programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts
without warrant but subsequently charged within that 3-day – they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion
window. Otherwise, that person must have to be released. It does programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor
not authorize indefinite detention without any official charge. children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC averred
that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous
Effects of Martial Law and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee”
contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And
As to the effects of martial law, what traditionally the effects of assuming that the President has such power unlike other
martial law in the so called political law concept, in the actual powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the
theatre of war, the executive can do anything. The martial law power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the
commander on the ground xxx, can exercise any of the powers of Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that the
government within that so called theatre of war. That is the reality. gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino
But our constitution, because it is a reaction to what has happened nation requires that the President alone must exercise this
before categorically states that power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence
1. The constitution is not suspended. of an entity specifically named by the Constitution–the
2. Civilian courts will continue to have jurisdiction over Monetary Board–reinforces the submission that not
civilians. Military courts are not conferred jurisdiction. respondents but the President “alone and personally” can
3. Legislative assemblies shall continue to function that validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to
includes all other governmental institutions. That stop acting pursuant to the scheme.
ideally should happen if there is no actual hostilities or
skirmishes ongoing like what we are having in ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her
mindanao. debt power to the respondents.

3
Art VII Section 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list
preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall of amounts paid to and expenses for each Member.
HELD: There is no question that the president has borrowing
powers and that the president may contract or guarantee
foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of
the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and Deportation against undesirable aliens
the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On
the other hand, the president can delegate this power to her This case of Rosas vs. Montor, is just a discussion to author to
direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the exclude and deport. Exclusion is the process by which a state can
Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to prevent the entry of a foreigner. The given is that, the entry and
execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact stay of a foreigner in the Philippines is a matter of privilege. His
that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for entry may be denied and if allowed entry already that person may
managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of be ordered deported and in deportation proceedings, there is no
the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to necessity that the foreigner must have to be convicted in a final
raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost judgment. Whatever determination that the executive may have
objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management over that person because his continued presence in the Philippines
goals. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect is inimical to public interest would be sufficient to cause his
of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause deportation. Now in Rosas, exclusion is again the act of the state
from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of thru Bureau of Immigration to deny the entry of a foreign national.
time-consuming detailed activities–the propriety of (2 days ago there was a foreign professor who was here on transit
incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the but he got sick and he was supposed to or there was a request for
many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting him to be taken out of the airport terminal for medical examination
countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, but because of his political views, his entry has been denied even
obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining on humanitarian grounds. He was allowed to however be examined
and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more by a physician in one of the lounges in the airport but never to get
often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign out of the terminal and go to a hospital for medical reason.
the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would Deportation on the other hand involves a proclamation where a
negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the foreigner has been allowed entry but again because of certain
respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded violations, again, not requiring conviction by final judgment, he
and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running may be ordered depowered or ordered to leave the country. What
the government. The act of the respondents are not comes to your mind is the case of sister fox, she has been in the
unconstitutional. Philippines for more than 30 years as a nun in a missionary ground
involved in urban poor and other poor communities but because
Exception she has been joining public assemblies which was or had been
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be critical to the Duterte administration, YOUR President ordered her
validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the deportation. So the Bureau of Immigration Commissioner
President. There are certain constitutional powers and cancelled her missionary visa and ordered her immediate
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be deportation. On appeal to the DOJ Sec, the order of the BI
exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or Commissioner was reversed because in deportation proceedings,
ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by as early as the case of hachigan, we all know that before a person
any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend is to be ordered arrested and deported there must have to be a
the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the determination that his stay is undesirable. He cannot be ordered
exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy). deported immediately without that determination. Upon orders of
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of YOUR president, his visa was cancelled without any proceedings.
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the On what ground? Apil apil kag rally madreha ka! So, the short of
suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the the long story was that the BI was ordered to conduct deportation
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by proceedings. She was able to prove her case or cause and the result
co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial was visa is still cancelled. She was ordered deported. But at least
law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the she still has options after the order issued by the BI unlike the first
exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial order it was a major reaction because nag rally rally, pahawaon!
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special Pak cancelled dayon!
class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of
the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means Rosas vs Montor
exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive
power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens
from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for
Power over foreign affairs its self-preservation or public interest. In the Philippines, aliens
may be expelled or deported from the Philippines on grounds
We have discussed the xxx. We have mentioned the xx office of the and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the PIA of
president on the stages of the negotiations of the treaty in relation 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant
to concurrence of senate requirements. That case of Liduyo vs thereto.[27]
Romulo that highlights the concept of political question, the matter
of bringing up a claim against a foreign sovereign cannot be forced Section 10[28] of the PIA of 1940 requires non-immigrants to
on our exec or the president because it affects foreign relations as present their unexpired passports and valid passport visas to
representative of the state in foreign relations it is still within the immigration officers. Pursuant to their powers as outlined in
political discretion of the president whether or not he would file Section 6[29] of the PIA of 1940, the examining immigration
such claim against a foreign sovereign. officer determines whether the non-immigrant is qualified to
enter the Philippines based on Section 29(a).[30] If the alien what has been approved in 2018. So if you’re taking about NOE
holds none of the disqualifications as stated in Section 29, he that’s okay because what is to be paid this year will necessarily be
may be admitted entry barring other circumstances that might paid next year in terms of salaries and expenses. But what about
affect his entry. If, however, the immigration officer determines projects? If in 2018 were taking about 300 km of roads in Luzon,
that an alien possesses any of the disqualifications under and it is re-enacted in 2019 where can they use that? Because the
Section 29, the immigration officer is authorized to issue an appropriation says in Luzon. How could they make use of that if the
exclusion order. budget is reenacted? It cannot be anyone be like PDAF it’s a lump
sum fund, there must have to be a specification on which project
Exclusion and deportation are formal removal procedures this particular amount should be spent on. So if that has been done
which ultimately results to an alien's removal from the territory and accomplished this year, what is the basis for using that next
provided for separately under Section 29 and 37 of the PIA, year for some other similar project?
respectively. The United States in Ex Parte Domingo
Corypus,[31] the Washington District Court in 1925
differentiated exclusion from deportation in the following
manner:

x x x Deporting a person who is already in the country, and


therefore enlarged, is depriving him of a privilege which he, at
least at the time, is enjoying in the United States; whereas a
person being denied the privilege to enter is not deprived of any
liberties which he had theretofore enjoyed. The gate is simply
closed and he may not enter.

Under Philippine immigration laws, exclusion is the authorized


removal of an alien by immigration officers, performing primary
inspection, or by the immigration boards of special inquiry, by
secondary inspection, of any foreigner arriving in the
Philippines who, upon inspection and prior to entry or
admission, is barred by immigration laws, rules and regulations
from entering or being admitted to the Philippines.[32] When an
alien is excluded he is immediately sent back to the country
where he came from on the same vessel which transported him,
unless in the opinion of the Commissioner of Immigration such
immediate return is not practicable or proper.[33] Under certain
circumstances, when an alien is excluded, Section 25[34] of the
PIA of 1940 authorizes the alien's detention until such time it is
determined that he is qualified for entry and/or admission.

Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are governed by


Sections 37[35] to 39 of the PIA. We have stated that the power
to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the
authority of the sovereign power.[36] It is a police measure
against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good and the
domestic tranquility of the people.

Power of legislation

We will discuss that. What probably is best to remember I don’t


know if you are familiar with the problem now of our budget. There
has been a deadlock as mentioned yesterday, the exec is changing
the rules on the budget proposal. They want a catch base
appropriation meaning that the appropriations must have to be
spend within a period of 1 or 2 years to complete a project. The
members of the lower house would want to continue with the
obligation based appropriation. According to the executive, it
increases the deficit (whatever that means, that means mapobre
tag samot). We all know that in the budgetary sense, when the exec
comes up with a budget proposal, not all of that amount is funded
it still has to be raised as the year progressed that’s why there are
corresponding revenue proposals in the budget proposal. That why
we are going to experience another TRAIN and it will affect your
school, hospital. Karon gas pa lang ug kuryente. Gamay pa lang. in
today’s news, the plan of the executive if they will take the dare of
the lower house is they are willing to take a re-enacted budget. So
they approved GAA 2018 will be used in 2019. My question is this