People vs Buado, Jr.

688 SCRA 82, January 08, 2013

G.R. No. 170634 : January 8, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO BUADO, JR. y CIPRIANO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This case tells the revolting story of a lecherous father who made two of his very young daughters his
sex slaves for several years right in the family home. The trial court convicted him and prescribed the
death penalty for each of the two counts of rape. There would be no hesitation to affirm the penalty,
but the intervening passage of the law prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty now spares him
from the supreme penalty.

Under final review is the Decision promulgated on April 27, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed with modification the May 5, 2003 judgment rendered in Criminal Case No. 912-V-99 and
Criminal Case No. 974-V-99by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 171)in Valenzuela City (RTC),2 finding
Pedro BuadoyCipriano Jr. guilty of two counts of rape committed against his two minor daughters.

Antecedents

The amended informationsalleged as follows:cralawlibrary

Criminal Case No. 912-V-99

That sometime April 1999, in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, actuated by lust, force,threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have carnal knowledge of AAA,3 his daughter, a ten (10) year
old minor, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice in whatever amounts may be
awarded her under the provisions of the Civil Code.

Contrary to Law.

Criminal Case No. 974-V-99

That on or about November 10, 1999 in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously he and have sexual intercourse with one BBB, 8 years old, his daughter.

Contrary to Law.4?r?l1

The accused, assisted by counsel de officio, pled not guilty to each of the amended informations.
Evidence of the Prosecution

The Prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely: victims AAA and BBB; their mother CCC and older
sister DDD; Dr. Ida de Perio-Daniel; Dr.Mariella S. Castillo; PO2 Luisito M. Dela Cruz; and Rosalina E.
Chiong.

The accused and CCC were legally married, and used to live together in F. Bautista Street at Marulas,
Valenzuela City with their 13 children, eight of whom are girls. Among their children were AAA and BBB.
AAA was born on February 13, 1989,5 and BBB on October 11, 1990.6?r?l1

A.

The rape of AAA

On April 13, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., CCC and her children were attending a get-together party in the
adjacent house of DDD, then already married. The accused summoned AAA home from the party. Upon
AAA getting home, he ordered her to enter the bedroom, and once she was inside, he undressed her
and inserted his finger in her vagina.7He then went on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina,
giving vent to his lust.8 AAA could only cry while he was forcing himself on her.9?r?l1

Missing AAA at the party, CCC returned to the house and saw that her husband was there. He cursed her
many times, but she simply ignored him and went upstairs, where she found AAA crying. AAA told her
mother that her father had just molested her. AAA further told her mother that he had done the same
thing to her several times in the past,10 starting when she was still in Grade I. At the time, AAA was
already in Grade 4. AAA told her mother that he had also raped her several times in the past only when
CCC was not home, but that she had kept silent about the rapes because she had been too afraid of him
to complain. Besides, AAA also knew that he kepta gun at home and had a violent temper, having
frequently beaten his wife and children for no apparent reason. AAA explained in court that she finally
revealed her ordeals to her mother because her sufferings had become unbearable,11 saying:
Nahihirapan po ako.12?r?l1

It was not until June 9, 1999, however, that CCC and AAA mustered the courage to leave home and
denounce the fathers crimes. They hastened to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to finally
lodge a complaint against him. AAA was examined by Dr. Ida Perio-Daniel, who incorporated her
findings in Living Case No. MG-99-537,13 to wit:cralawlibrary

GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:cralawlibrary

Height: 123.0 cms. Weight: 44 lbs

Fairly nourished conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory subject. Breast infantile. Areola, light
brown, 1.4 cm, in diameter, Nipples light brown, flat 0.3 cm. In diameter.

No extragenital physical injury noted.

GENITAL EXAMINATION:cralawlibrary
Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, coaptated. Fourchette, tense.Vestibular mucosa,
pinkish. Hymen, short, thin, with old healed complete laceration at 6 o'clock position corresponding to
the face of a watch, edges rounded non-coaptable. Hymenalorifice, admits a tube 2.0 in diameter.
Vaginal walls, tight. Rugosities, prominent.

***

CONCLUSIONS:cralawlibrary

1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injury present on the body of the subject at
the time of the examination.

2. Old healed hymenal laceration present. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ

Afterwards, CCC and AAA, still in fear of the accused, did not want to return home. Hence, the NBI
referred them for temporary shelter to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
Haven in Alabang, Muntinlupa City. The rest of the unmarried children, including the then 9-year old
BBB, continued to live with their father.

B.

The rape of BBB

The rape of BBB was committed a few months later. At 6:00 a.m. of November 10, 1999, the accused
commanded BBB, who was then in the kitchen of their house, to undress and lie down on a piece of
plywood laid out on the ground.14 Already naked from the waist down, he pushed her down to the floor,
and lubricated his penis and BBBs vagina with cooking oil.15?r?l1

He next went on top of her, inserted his penis into her genitalia, and made pumping motions.16 He
ignored all her pleas for him to stop.17 She stated that he had also raped her many times previously but
that she had kept silent about the rapes out of fear of him.18 But she could not anymore bear her pain
that last time; hence, she went to her older sister DDDs house and finally reported the rape to
DDD.19 When BBB was narrating about her last rape, DDD could only embrace her young sister and cry.

Later on, DDD called up their mother who was then staying at the DSWD Haven in Alabang to tell her
about what the accused had just committed against BBB. CCC advised DDD to bring BBB to the DSWD
office in Valenzuela. The DSWD office endorsed BBB to the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH), where Dr. Mariella S. Castillo examined the child. The findings were initially
reflected in a provisional medical certificate on November 10, 1999,20 and ultimately in a final medical
certificate issued on the same date,21 to wit:cralawlibrary

GENITAL EXAMINATION:cralawlibrary

External Genitalia: normal

Hymen: crescentic, (+) absent hymenal tissue at 6 o'clock, (+) attenuation from 2 o'clock to 6 o'clock, no
hematoma, no laceration, no discharge
Anus: Normal

LABORATORY EXAMINATION:cralawlibrary

Vaginal swab smear: no spermatozoa seen.

IMPRESSION:cralawlibrary

Disclosure of physical and sexual abuse.

Multiple hematomas on chest and lower extremities.

Hematomas on chest and extremities are consistent with the patient's disclosure

Genital finding of absent posterior hymen and is indicative of prior penetration injury that has healed.

Armed with the provisional medical certificate issued by Dr. Castillo, DDD brought BBB to the Valenzuela
Police Station to charge the accused with rape. A police team was immediately dispatched to the house
of the accused to invite him for investigation. After the accused was brought in to the station, BBB and
her elder sister gave their respective written statements.22 On that occasion, BBB positively pointed to
her father as the rapist.23?r?l1

Version of the Defense

The accused was his own sole witness. He denied raping AAA and BBB.24 He justified the medico-legal
findings on BBB by shifting the blame on his drug addict son EEE, stating that in May 1999, BBB had told
him about EEE raping her;25 that BBB even showed him a plastic sachet containing small white granules
that EEE had supposedly dropped when he raped her;26 that he hit EEE upon learning about the rape;
that he wanted to charge EEE but his wife prevented him from doing so in order to avoid
embarrassment to the family; and that after CCC left home, he planned on reporting the rape to the
police authorities, but EEE became aware of his plan and quickly left home and stayed away.

The accused testified that he was a shoemaker earning an average of P15,000.00/month; that although
he thought that his income sufficed for him and his family, CCC felt differently, because she was envious
of their rich neighbors; that CCC suggested that he change his livelihood and deal in prohibited drugs;
that because he refused, CCC became angry and caused AAA and BBB to bring the false charges against
him;27 that CCC also wanted to reconcile with her former live-in partner with whom she had cohabited
prior to their marriage; that he could not understand why she wanted to do that, but there was nothing
he could do about it; that in May 1999, CCC left their conjugal home along with their two youngest
daughters; that he had no idea about where they had gone to until he learned that they were sheltered
in the DSWD Haven in Alabang; and that they returned home after six months only when he was already
in detention.28?r?l1

The accused said that he had disciplined his children either verbally or physically (i.e., by hitting them
with his bare hands or with a piece of wood).29 In that regard, he admitted having been charged with
child abuse in 1999 for spanking FFF, another son, but he insisted that the charge had been dismissed.
Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC convicted the accused, disposing as follows:cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, the Court finds accused PEDRO BUADO, JR. y CIPRIANO GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of two (2) counts of Rape penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing him to suffer in each
case the death penalty and to pay in each case the victims the following sums: Seventy Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty
Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.

Pursuant to the Constitution, let the entire records of these cases be forwarded to the Honorable
Supreme Court for automatic review.

SO ORDERED.30?r?l1

Ruling of the CA

Elevated to the Court on automatic appeal, the records were transferred to the CA for intermediate
review pursuant to People v. Mateo.31?r?l1

In due course, on April 27, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, but reduced the death penalty to
reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 912-V-99,32 as follows:cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of Branch 171, Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City,
dated May 5, 2003, is MODIFIED relative to Criminal Case No. 912-V-99 wherein the penalty imposed is
reduced to Reclusion Perpetua and the civil liability ex delito is reduced to P50,000.00. The award of
moral and exemplary damages is AFFIRMED.

Relative to Criminal Case No. 974-V-99, the penalty of death and the award of civil liability ex delito
of P75,000.00 and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 are AFFIRMED. The award of moral damages is
hereby INCREASED to P75,000.00

SO ORDERED.

Dacudao vs. Gonzales, 688 SCRA 109, January 08, 2013

SPOUSES AUGUSTO G.

DACUDAO AND OFELIA R.

DACUDAO,

Petitioners,
-versus-

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

ENBANC

G.R. No. 188056

Present:

SERENO, C.J,

CARPIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA,

REYES,

PERLAS-BERNABE, and

LEONEN,JJ:

RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE Promulgated: _ .... ~

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, t_rr- Respondent. JANUARY 08, 2013

X------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------X

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the

investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy

Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the

Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check payments
that were dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their

investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City

Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009. Three of the cases were

docketed as NPS Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-A-00356, Docket No. XI-02-

INV.-09-C-00752, and Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00753.1

On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of

Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State

Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all

cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the

DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action.

DO No. 182 reads:2

All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under Legacy

Group of Companies, may be filed with the docket section of the National

Prosecution Service, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila and shall

be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel for assignment and

distribution to panel members, per Department Order No. 84 dated

February 13, 2009.

However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr. et

al. of Legacy group of Companies in your respective offices with the

exemption of the cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City which is covered by

Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, should be forwarded to the Secretariat

of the Special Panel at Room 149, Department of Justice, Padre Faura,

Manila, for proper disposition.

For information and guidance.

Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded

by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the

Special Panel of the DOJ.3

Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to

the Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to

respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No.

182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the equal protection of
the laws, and their right to the speedy

disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of

justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive

effect.

Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ

Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 exempting from the coverage of DO No.

No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa already filed and pending in the

Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ

Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection

under the Constitution.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent

Secretary of Justice, maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ

Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and prays that the petition be dismissed

for its utter lack of merit.

Issues

The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:

1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus directly to the Court?

2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of

discretion in issuing DO No. 182?

3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2,

2009 violate petitioners’ constitutionally guaranteed rights?

Ruling

The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of

substance and merit, is dismissed.

Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by

coming directly to the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition

and mandamus without tendering therein any special, important or

compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition.

We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the

Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the

writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus

and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of

court forum.4

An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the

Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse. In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion,

we explained why, to wit:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy

of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without

serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the

Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the

competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal

with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution

has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary

writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely

necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an

exception to the policy. This was why the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v.

Suelto:

x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and

must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions

assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial

tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of

dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction

to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised

only where absolutely necessary or where serious and

important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction

should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings

before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other

tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or

another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the

issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the

competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial

Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for

the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and

should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that

courts and lawyers must strictly observe. (Emphasis

supplied)

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 460, 470. 5

G.R. No. 159508, August 29, 2012.

In People v. Cuaresma, the Court has also amplified the need for

strict adherence to the policy of hierarchy of courts. There, noting “a

growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their

applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even

their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by

the highest tribunal of the land,” the Court has cautioned lawyers and

litigants against taking a direct resort to the highest tribunal, viz:

x x x. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of

certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,

habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by

this Court with Regional Trial Courts x x x, which may issue the

writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also

shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the

Court of Appeals x x x, although prior to the effectivity of Batas

Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's

competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to

those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” This concurrence of

jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to

parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained

freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor

will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That

hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should

also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for

petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for

that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions

for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level

(“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial

Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of

Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original

jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when

there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and

specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy.

It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands

upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted

to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to

prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed,

the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of

Appeals in this regard, supra— resulting from the deletion of the

qualifying phrase, “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” — was

evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the

burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs

which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court

corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.

xxxx

The Court therefore closes this decision with the

declaration for the information and evidence of all

concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the policy,

but will require a more strict observance thereof. (Emphasis

supplied)

Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the

only judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the
Court is a court of last resort, not a court of the

first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the petitions for the

extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be

mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is

explicitly defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz:

Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed

not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or

resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,

whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be

counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to

the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,

officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction

over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also

be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid
of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of

its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-

judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the

petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a

regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the

Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.6

Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to

the Court was permissible, the petition must still be dismissed.

The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or

officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in

excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,

speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.7

“The sole office

of the writ of certiorari,” according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank

and Trust Company:

This rule has been amended, first by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC (Re: Amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) to specify that the 60-day period within which to file the petition
starts

to run from receipt of notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, if one is filed (effective

September 1, 2000); and by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, to add the last paragraph (effective December 27,

2007).

x x x is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the

commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the

issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which

means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in

an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal

hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a

positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to

act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or

board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a

capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of

jurisdiction.

For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the

following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a

tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b)

the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate

remedy in the ordinary course of law.9

The burden of proof lies on

petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in

excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction.

Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To

start with, they merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without

or in excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show that the

Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial

functions. Instead, the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising

any judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned issuances

were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates’ efficiency and economy

in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the
Legacy Group. The function involved was purely executive or

administrative.

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the

Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its

preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor

does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings

of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed,

in Bautista v. Court of Appeals,

10 the Supreme Court has held that a

preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating:

x x x [t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the

guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor

rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial,

and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be

reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his

complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has

no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been

committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused

is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be

said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass

judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.11

There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the

public prosecutor’s power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-

judicial in nature. Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the

public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive

department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.

But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-

judicial body quickly ends there. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ

of government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it

performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine

the rights of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect

as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect

whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause in order
to file a criminal information against a

person properly charged with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of

Justice reviews the public prosecutor’s orders or resolutions.

Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for prohibition.

However, we do not see how that can be. They have not shown in their

petition in what manner and at what point the Secretary of Justice, in

handing out the assailed issuances, acted without or in excess of his

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction. On the other hand, we already indicated why the issuances

were not infirmed by any defect of jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant omissions

of the petition transgressed Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any

tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,

quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby

may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with

certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the

respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter

specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and

justice may require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy

of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings

and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of

non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule

46. (2a)

Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a

remedy available only when “any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or

person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law

specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or

unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office

to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby

may file a verified petition in the proper court.”12 The main objective of mandamus is to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty on the part of

the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus does not issue to

control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of

conduct,13 which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have

the Secretary of Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not

indicated how and where the Secretary of Justice’s assailed issuances

excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which they

were unquestionably entitled.

Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong

presumption of its validity. In ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima,

14 the

Court has extended the presumption of validity to legislative issuances as

well as to rules and regulations issued by administrative agencies, saying:

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to

implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have

the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations

partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have

been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of
law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they

are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.15

DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the

Secretary of Justice had promulgated to govern the performance of the

mandate of the DOJ to “administer the criminal justice system in accordance

with the accepted processes thereof”16 as expressed in Republic Act No.

10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and Section 3, Chapter I, Title III

and Section 1, Chapter I, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order 292

(Administrative Code of 1987).

To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned

issuances, it became incumbent upon petitioners to prove their

unconstitutionality and invalidity, either by showing that the Administrative Code of 1987 did not
authorize the Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182,

or by demonstrating that DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the

Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws. They did not do so.

They must further show that the performance of the DOJ’s functions under

the Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws did not call for the

impositions laid down by the assailed issuances. That was not true here, for

DO No 182 did not deprive petitioners in any degree of their right to seek

redress for the alleged wrong done against them by the Legacy Group.

Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners and others like

them expedite the prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all those

responsible for the wrong through the creation of the special panel of state

prosecutors and prosecution attorneys in order to conduct a nationwide and

comprehensive preliminary investigation and prosecution of the cases.

Thereby, the Secretary of Justice did not act arbitrarily or oppressively

against petitioners.

Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the consolidation

decreed in DO No. 182 of the cases filed or pending in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City, claiming that the exemption traversed

the constitutional guaranty in their favor of the equal protection of law.17

The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated

March 2, 2009, to wit:

It has come to the attention of the undersigned that cases for

syndicated estafa were filed with your office against officers of the Legacy

Group of Companies. Considering the distance of the place of

complainants therein to Manila, your Office is hereby exempted from the

directive previously issued by the undersigned requiring prosecution

offices to forward the records of all cases involving Legacy Group of

Companies to the Task Force.

Anent the foregoing, you are hereby directed to conduct preliminary

investigation of all cases involving the Legacy Group of Companies filed

in your office with dispatch and to file the corresponding informations if

evidence warrants and to prosecute the same in court.

Petitioners’ attack deserves no consideration. The equal protection

clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application of the

laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply

equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.18

Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental

right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a

rational relationship to some legitimate government end.19

That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum

dated March 2, 2009, the Secretary of Justice took into account the relative

distance between Cagayan de Oro, where many complainants against the

Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where the preliminary investigations

would be conducted by the special panel. He also took into account that the

cases had already been filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de

Oro at the time he issued DO No. 182. Given the considerable number of
complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was

fully justified in excluding the cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro from

the ambit of DO No. 182. The classification taken into consideration by the

Secretary of Justice was really valid. Resultantly, petitioners could not

inquire into the wisdom behind the exemption upon the ground that the non-

application of the exemption to them would cause them some inconvenience.

Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right to the

speedy disposition of cases guaranteed by the Constitution. They posit that

there would be considerable delay in the resolution of their cases that would

definitely be “a flagrant transgression of petitioners’ constitutional rights to

speedy disposition of their cases.”20

We cannot favor their contention.

In The Ombudsman v. Jurado,

21 the Court has clarified that although

the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, such

speedy disposition is a flexible concept. To properly define that concept, the

facts and circumstances surrounding each case must be evaluated and taken

into account. There occurs a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of

a case only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and

oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are sought

and secured, or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of

time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.22 It is

cogent to mention that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved

is not determinant of the concept.23

The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was

ordered obviously to obtain expeditious justice for the parties with the least

cost and vexation to them. Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or

related questions to be dealt with during the preliminary investigation, the

Secretary of Justice rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the

most feasible means of promoting the efficient use of public resources and

of having a comprehensive investigation of the cases.

On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there would be

more cases reaching the DOJ in addition to those already brought by

petitioners and other parties. Yet, any delays in petitioners’ cases occasioned

by such other and subsequent cases should not warrant the invalidation of

DO No. 182. The Constitution prohibits only the delays that are

unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to render rights nugatory.24

In fine, we see neither undue delays, nor any violation of the right of

petitioners to the speedy disposition of their cases.

Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should cover only

future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being

investigated. They maintain that DO No. 182 was issued in violation of the

prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.

Petitioners’ assertion is baseless.

As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However,

exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in

nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies

or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights

but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already

existing rights.25 A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will

be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time

of its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that

extent. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person

who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally

attaches to or arises from procedural laws.

Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No.

182 constituted obstruction of justice. This ground of the petition, being

unsubstantiated, was unfounded.

Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the

Secretary of Justice to assume jurisdiction over matters involving the

investigation of crimes and the prosecution of offenders is fully sanctioned

by law. Towards that end, the Secretary of Justice exercises control and

supervision over all the regional, provincial, and city prosecutors of the

country; has broad discretion in the discharge of the DOJ’s functions; and administers the DOJ and its
adjunct offices and agencies by promulgating

rules and regulations to carry out their objectives, policies and functions.

Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts beyond

the bounds of his authority, or arbitrarily, or whimsically, or oppressively,

any person or entity who may feel to be thereby aggrieved or adversely

affected should have no right to call for the invalidation or nullification of

the rules and regulations issued by, as well as other actions taken by the

Secretary of Justice.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for

certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for lack of merit.

Petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Nazareth vs. Villar, 689 SCRA 385, January 29, 2013

G.R. No. 188635 January 29, 2013

BRENDA L. NAZARETH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,

REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR, HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., (COMMISSIONERS OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT), and DIR. KHEM M. INOK, Respondents.
 DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.1 A
violation of this constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the payment. However, the refund of
the disallowed payment of a benefit granted by law to a covered person, agency or office of the
Government may be barred by the good faith of the approving official and of the recipient.

Being assailed by petition for certiorari on the ground of its being issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is the decision rendered on June 4, 2009 by the Commission
on Audit (COA) in COA Case No. 2009-045 entitled Petition of Ms. Brenda L. Nazareth, Regional Director,
Department of Science and Technology, Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City, for review of Legal and
Adjudication Office (LAO)-National Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15, 2005 and LAO-National
Resolution No. 2006-308A dated May 12, 2006 on disallowances of subsistence, laundry, hazard and
other benefits in the total amount of P3,591,130.36,2 affirming the issuance of notices of disallowance
(NDs) by the Audit Team Leader of COA Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City against the payment of
benefits to covered officials and employees of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) for
calendar year (CY) 2001 out of the savings of the DOST.

The petitioner DOST Regional Director hereby seeks to declare the decision dated June 4, 2009 "null and
void," and prays for the lifting of the disallowance of the payment of the benefits for CY2001 for being
within the ambit of Republic Act No. 8439 (R.A. No. 8439), otherwise known as the Magna Carta for
Scientists, Engineers, Researchers, and other Science and Technology Personnel in the Government
(Magna Carta, for short), and on the strength of the Memorandum of Executive Secretary Ronaldo B.
Zamora dated April 12, 2000 authorizing the use of the savings for the purpose.

Antecedents

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the State to provide a
program for human resources development in science and technology in order to achieve and maintain
the necessary reservoir of talent and manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and
technology mastery.3 Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances and benefits
(Magna Carta benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the DOST, to wit:

(a) Honorarium. - S & T personnel who rendered services beyond the established irregular
workload of scientists, technologists, researchers and technicians whose broad and superior
knowledge, expertise or professional standing in a specific field contributes to productivity and
innovativeness shall be entitled to receive honorarium subject to rules to be set by the
Department;

(b) Share in royalties. - S & T scientists, engineers, researchers and other S & T personnel shall be
entitled to receive share in royalties subject to guidelines of the Department. The share in
royalties shall be on a sixty percent-forty percent (60%-40%) basis in favor of the Government
and the personnel involved in the technology/ activity which has been produced or undertaken
during the regular performance of their functions. For the purpose of this Act, share in royalties
shall be defined as a share in the proceeds of royalty payments arising from patents, copyrights
and other intellectual property rights;
If the researcher works with a private company and the program of activities to be undertaken
has been mutually agreed upon by the parties concerned, any royalty arising therefrom shall be
divided according to the equity share in the research project;

(c) Hazard allowance. - S & T personnel involved in hazardous undertakings or assigned in

hazardous workplaces, shall be paid hazard allowances ranging from ten (10%) to thirty (30%)
percent of their monthly basic salary depending on the nature and extent of the hazard
involved. The following shall be considered hazardous workplaces:

(1) Radiation-exposed laboratories and service workshops;

(2) Remote/depressed areas;

(3) Areas declared under a state of calamity or emergency;

(4) Strife-torn or embattled areas;

(5) Laboratories and other disease-infested areas.

(d) Subsistence allowance. - S & T personnel shall be entitled to full subsistence allowance
equivalent to three (3) meals a day, which may be computed and implemented in accordance
with the criteria to be provided in the implementing rules and regulations. Those assigned out of
their regular work stations shall be entitled to per diem in place of the allowance;

(e) Laundry allowance. - S & T personnel who are required to wear a prescribed uniform during
office hours shall be entitled to a laundry allowance of not less than One hundred fifty pesos
(P150.00) a month;

(f) Housing and quarter allowance. - S & T personnel who are on duty in laboratories, research
and development centers and other government facilities shall be entitled to free living quarters
within the government facility where they are stationed: Provided, That the personnel have
their residence outside of the fifty (50)-kilometer radius from such government facility;

(g) Longevity pay. - A monthly longevity pay equivalent to five percent (5%) of the monthly basic
salary shall be paid to S & T personnel for every five (5) years of continuous and meritorious
service as determined by the Secretary of the Department; and

(h) Medical examination. - During the tenure of their employment, S & T personnel shall be
given a compulsory free medical examination once a year and immunization as the case may
warrant. The medical examination shall include:

(1) Complete physical examination;

(2) Routine laboratory, Chest X-ray and ECG;

(3) Psychometric examination;

(4) Dental examination;

(5) Other indicated examination.

Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by
the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.4

The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta benefits to the covered
officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence of specific appropriation for the
purpose in the GAA. Subsequently, following the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E.
Vargas on April 23, 1999, October 28, 1999, June 20, 2000, February 27, 2001, June 27, 2001, October
10, 2001 and October 17, 2001, several NDs were issued disapproving the payment of the Magna Carta
benefits. The justifications for the disallowance were stated in the post-audit report, as follows:

a) ND Nos. 99-001-101 (98) to 99-105-101 (98) Payment of Subsistence and Laundry Allowances
and Hazard Pay for the months of February-November 1998 – The State Auditor claims that no
funds were appropriated in the 1998 General Appropriations Act for the said purpose
notwithstanding the effectivity of the Magna Carta, providing for payment of allowances and
benefits, among others, to Science and Technology Personnel in the Government;

b) ND Nos. 2000-101-101 (99) to 2000-010-101 (99) Payment of Subsistence and Laundry

Allowances and Hazard Pay for the months of January-June 1999 – The State Auditor claims that
no Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC)
guidelines were issued by the said Departments on the payment thereof;

c) ND Nos. 2001-001-101 (00) to 2001-013-101 (00) Payment of Subsistence and Laundry

Allowances, Hazard Pay and Health Care Program for the month of October 1999 and January-
September 2000 – The State Auditor claims that there was no basis for the payment of the said
allowances because the President vetoed provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA)
regarding the use of savings for the payment of benefits;

d) ND Nos. 2001-014-101(00) to 2001-025-101 (00) Payment of Subsistence and Laundry

Allowances, Hazard Pay and Medical Benefits for the months of January-October 2001 – The
provision for the use of savings in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) was vetoed by the

President; hence, there was no basis for the payment of the aforesaid allowances or benefits according
to the State Auditor.5

The disallowance by the COA prompted then DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the
Office of the President (OP) through his

Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 (Request for Authority to Use Savings for the Payment of Magna
Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439) for the authority to utilize the DOST’s savings to pay the
Magna Carta benefits.6 The salient portions of the Memorandum of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. explained the
request in the following manner:

x x x. However, the amount necessary for its full implementation had not been provided in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Since the Act’s effectivity, the Department had paid the 1998 MC benefits out
of its current year’s savings as provided for in the Budget Issuances of the Department of Budget and
Management while the 1999 MC benefits were likewise sourced from the year’s savings as authorized in
the 1999 GAA.
The 2000 GAA has no provision for the use of savings. The Department, therefore, cannot continue the
payment of the Magna Carta benefits from its 2000 savings. x x x. The DOST personnel are looking
forward to His Excellency’s favorable consideration for the payment of said MC benefits, being part of
the administration’s 10-point action program to quote "I will order immediate implementation of RA
8439 (the Magna Carta for Science and Technology Personnel in Government)" as published in the
Manila Bulletin dated May 20, 1998.

Through the Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by
authority of the President, approved the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr.,7viz:

With reference to your Memorandum dated April 03, 2000 requesting authority to use savings from the
appropriations of that Department and its agencies for the payment of Magna Carta Benefits as
provided for in R.A. 8439, please be informed that the said request is hereby approved.

On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST Regional Director in Region IX, lodged an
appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting of the disallowance of the
Magna Carta benefits for the period covering CY 1998 to CY 2001 amounting to P4,363,997.47. She
anchored her appeal on the April 12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora, and cited the
provision in the GAA of 1998,8 to wit:

Section 56. Priority in the Use of Savings.– In the use of savings, priority shall be given to the
augmentation of the amounts set aside for compensation, bonus, retirement gratuity, terminal leave,
old age pension of veterans and other personnel benefits authorized by law and those expenditure
items authorized in agency Special Provisions and in Sec. 16 and in other sections of the General
Provisions of this Act.9

In support of her appeal, the petitioner contended that the DOST Regional Office had "considered the
subsistence and laundry allowance as falling into the category ‘other personnel benefits authorized by
law,’ hence the payment of such allowances were charged to account 100-900 for Other Benefits
(Honoraria), which was declared to be the savings of our Office."10 She argued that the April 12, 2000
Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora not only ratified the payment of the Magna Carta benefits
out of the savings for CY 1998 and CY 1999 and allowed the use of the savings for CY 2000, but also
operated as a continuing endorsement of the use of savings to cover the Magna Carta benefits in
succeeding calendar years.

The appeal was referred to the Regional Legal and Adjudication Director (RLAD), COA Regional Office IX
in Zamboanga City, which denied the appeal and affirmed the grounds stated in the NDs.

Not satisfied with the result, the petitioner elevated the matter to the COA Legal and Adjudication Office
in Quezon City

On September 15, 2005, respondent Director Khem N. Inok of the COA Legal and Adjudication Office
rendered a decision in LAO-N-2005-308,11 denying the petitioner’s appeal with the modification that
only the NDs covering the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2000 were to be set aside in view of the
authorization under the Memorandum of April 12, 2000 issued by Executive Secretary Zamora as the
alter ego of the President. The decision explained itself as follows:

In resolving the case, the following issues should first be resolved:

 1. Whether or not the "approval" made by the Executive Secretary on April 12, 2000 on the
request for authority to use savings of the agency to pay the benefits, was valid; and

2. Whether or not the payments of the benefits made by the agency using its savings for the
years 1998 and 1999 based on Section 56 of RA 8522 (General Appropriations Act of 1998
[GAA]) were legal and valid.

Anent the first issue, the law in point is Article VI, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution, which aptly
provides that:

"(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the PRESIDENT, x x x
may by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."

Simply put, it means that only the President has the power to augment savings from one item to
another in the budget of administrative agencies under his control and supervision. This is the very
reason why the President vetoed the Special Provisions in the 1998 GAA that would authorize the
department heads to use savings to augment other items of appropriations within the Executive Branch.
Such power could well be extended to his Cabinet Secretaries as alter egos under the "doctrine of
qualified political agency" enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Binamira v. Garrucho, 188
SCRA 154, where it was pronounced that the official acts of a Department Secretary are deemed acts of
the President unless disapproved or reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the authority
granted to the DOST by the Executive Secretary, being one of the alter egos of the President, was legal
and valid but in so far as the use of agency’s savings for the year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was
reenacted in 2001, the authority granted on the use of savings did not necessarily extend to the
succeeding year.

On the second issue, the payments of benefits made by the agency in 1998 and 1999 were admittedly
premised on the provisions of the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) for CY 1998 and 1999 regarding
the use of savings which states that:

"In the use of savings, priority shall be given to the augmentation of the amount set aside for
compensation, bonus, retirement gratuity, terminal leave, old age pensions of veterans and other
personal benefits x x x." (Underscoring ours.)

It can be noted, however, that augmentation was likewise a requisite to make payments for such
benefits which means that Presidential approval was necessary in accordance with the above-cited
provision of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, the acts of the agency in using its savings to pay the said
benefits without the said presidential approval were illegal considering that during those years there
was no appropriations provided in the GAA to pay such benefits.

Further, COA Decision Nos. 2003-060 dated March 18, 2003 and 2002-022 dated January 11, 2002,
where this Commission lifted the DOST disallowance on the payments of similar benefits in 1992 to
1995, can not be applied in the instant case. The disallowances therein dealt more on the classification
of the agency as health related or not while the instant case deals mainly on the availability of
appropriated funds for the benefits under RA 8439 and the guidelines for their payments.
Likewise, the certification of the DOST Secretary declaring work areas of S and T personnel as hazardous
for purposes of entitlement to hazard allowance is not valid and may be considered as self-serving.
Under RA 7305 and its Implementing Rules and Regulation[s] (Magna Carta of Public Health Workers),
the determination which agencies are considered health-related establishments is within the
competence of the Secretary of Health which was used by this Commission in COA Decision No. 2003-
060, supra, to wit:

xxxx

"It bears emphasis to state herein that it is within the competence of the Secretary of Health as
mandated by RA 7305 and its IRR to determine which agencies are health-related establishments.
Corollary thereto, the certifications dated October 10, 1994 issued by then DOH Secretary Juan M.
Flavier that certain DOST personnel identified by DOST Secretary Padolina in his letter dated September
29, 1994 to be engaged in health and health-related work and that of Secretary Hilarion J. Ramiro dated
December 12, 1996 confirming the staff and personnel of the DOST and its attached agencies to be
engaged in health-related work and further certified to be a health-related establishment were
sufficient basis for reconsideration of the disallowance on subsistence and laundry allowances paid for
1992, 1993 and 1995."

xxxx

Assuming that the situation in the DOST and its attached agencies did not change as to consider it
health-related establishment for its entitlement to magna carta benefits, still the payments of the
benefits cannot be sustained in audit not only for lack of said certification from the Secretary of
Department of Health for the years 1998 and 1999 but more importantly, for lack of funding.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein Appeal is DENIED with modification. NDs Nos. 2001-001-
101 (00) to 2001-013-101 (00) issued for the payments of benefits for CY 2000 are hereby SET ASIDE
while NDs pertaining to benefits paid for CY 1998, 1999 and 2001 shall STAY.

On December 1, 2005, the petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration in the COA Legal and
Adjudication Office-National in Quezon City.

By resolution dated May 12, 2006,12 the COA Legal and Adjudication Office-National denied the motion
for reconsideration.

Thence, the petitioner filed a petition for review in the COA Head Office, insisting that the payment of
Magna Carta benefits to qualified DOST Regional Office No. IX officials and employees had been allowed
under R.A. No. 8349.

On June 4, 2009, the COA rendered the assailed decision, further modifying the decision of respondent
Director Inok by also lifting and setting aside the NDs covering the Magna Carta benefits for CY 1998 and
CY 1999 for the same reason applicable to the lifting of the NDs for CY 2000, but maintaining the
disallowance of the benefits for CY 2001 on the ground that they were not covered by the authorization
granted by the Memorandum of April 12, 2000 of Executive Secretary Zamora.

The pertinent portions of the decision are quoted below, to wit:

Hence, the appellant filed the instant petition for review with the main argument that the payment of
Magna Carta benefits to qualified DOST Regional Office No. IX employees is allowed pursuant to RA No.
8439.

ISSUE

The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the payment of Magna Carta benefits for CYs 1998, 1999
and 2001 is valid and legal.

DISCUSSION

It is clear that the funds utilized for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits came from the savings of
the agency. The approval by the Executive Secretary of the request for authority to use the said savings
for payments of the benefits was an affirmation that the payments were authorized. The Memorandum
dated April 3, 2000 of the DOST Secretary requested for the approval of the payment out of savings of
the CY 2000 benefits. Likewise, the same Memorandum mentioned the 1998 Magna Carta benefits
which were paid out of its current year’s savings as provided for in the budget issuances of the DBM and
the 1999 Magna Carta benefits which were sourced from the year’s savings as authorized in the 1999
GAA. When such memorandum request was approved by the Executive Secretary in a Memorandum
dated April 12, 2000, it was clear that the approval covered the periods stated in the request, which
were the 1998, 1999 and 2000 Magna Carta benefits.

Thus, this Commission hereby affirms LAO-National Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15, 2005
which lifted ND Nos. 2001-001-101 (00) to 2001-013-101 (00) for the payments of Magna Carta benefits
for CY 2000 and which sustained the NDs for payments in 2001. However, for the disallowances covering
payments in 1998 and 1999, this Commission is inclined to lift the same. This is in view of the approval
made by the Executive Secretary for the agency to use its savings to pay the benefits for the years
covered. Thus, when the Executive Secretary granted the request of the DOST Secretary for the payment
of the Magna Carta benefits to its qualified personnel, the said payments became lawful for the periods
covered in the request, that is, CYs 1998, 1999 and 2000. Since the Magna Carta benefits paid in 2001
were not covered by the approval, the same were correctly disallowed in audit.

In a previous COA Decision-No. 2006-015 dated January 31, 2006, the payment of hazard, subsistence
and laundry allowances given to personnel of the DOST, Regional Office No. VI, Iloilo City, was granted.
The same decision also stated that in (sic) no doubt the DOST personnel, who are qualified, are entitled
to receive the Magna Carta benefits. The 1999 GAA did not prohibit the grant of these benefits but
merely emphasized the discretion of the agency head, upon authority of the President, to use savings
from the Department’s appropriation, to implement the payment of benefits pursuant to the DOST
Charter.

RULING

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal on the payment of Magna Carta benefits for CYs
1998 and 1999 which were disallowed in ND Nos. 99-001-101 (98) to 99-015-101 (98) and 2000-001-101
(99) to 2000-010-101 (99), is hereby GRANTED. Likewise, the lifting of ND Nos. 2001-001-101 (00) to
2001-013-101 (00) as embodied in LAO-National Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15, 2005 is
hereby CONFIRMED. While the disallowances on the payment of said benefits for 2001 as covered by ND
Nos. 2001-014-101 (01) to 2001-032-101 (01) are hereby AFFIRMED.
 Issues

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari, with the petitioner insisting that the COA gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the disallowance of the Magna Carta
benefits for CY 2001 despite the provisions of R.A. No. 8439, and in ruling that the Memorandum of April
12, 2000 did not cover the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001.

Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing ND No. 2001-014-101(01) to ND No. 2001-032-
101(01)?

Ruling

The petition for certiorari lacks merit.

R. A. No. 8439 was enacted as a manifestation of the State’s recognition of science and technology as an
essential component for the attainment of national development and progress. The law offers a
program of human resources development in science and technology to help realize and maintain a
sufficient pool of talent and manpower that will sustain the initiative for total science and technology
mastery. In furtherance of this objective, the law not only ensures scholarship programs and improved
science and engineering education, but also affords incentives for those pursuing careers in science and
technology. Moreover, the salary scale of science and technology personnel is differentiated by R. A. No.
8439 from the salary scales of government employees under the existing law.

As earlier mentioned, Section 7 of R. A. No. 8439 confers the Magna Carta benefits consisting of
additional allowances and benefits to DOST officers and employees, such as honorarium, share in
royalties, hazard, subsistence, laundry, and housing and quarter allowances, longevity pay, and medical
examination. But the Magna Carta benefits will remain merely paper benefits without the corresponding
allocation of funds in the GAA.

The petitioner urges the Court to treat the authority granted in the April 12, 2000 Memorandum of
Executive Secretary Zamora as a continuing authorization to use the DOST’s savings to pay the Magna
Carta benefits.

We cannot agree with the petitioner.

The April 12, 2000 Memorandum was not a blanket authority from the OP to pay the benefits out of the
DOST’s savings. Although the Memorandum was silent as to the period covered by the request for
authority to use the DOST’s savings, it was clear just the same that the Memorandum encompassed only
CY 1998, CY 1999 and CY 2000. The limitation of its applicability to those calendar years was based on
the tenor of the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. to the effect that the DOST had previously used its
savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits in CY 1998 and CY 1999; that the 2000 GAA did not provide for
the use of savings; and that the DOST personnel were looking forward to the President’s favorable
consideration. The Memorandum could only be read as an authority covering the limited period until
and inclusive of CY 2000. The text of the Memorandum was also bereft of any indication that the
authorization was to be indefinitely extended to any calendar year beyond CY 2000.

As we see it, the COA correctly ruled on the matter at hand. Article VI Section 29 (1) of the 1987
Constitution firmly declares that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." This constitutional edict requires that the GAA be purposeful, deliberate,
and precise in its provisions and stipulations. As such, the requirement under Section 2013 of R.A. No.
8439 that the amounts needed to fund the Magna Carta benefits were to be appropriated by the GAA
only meant that such funding must be purposefully, deliberately, and precisely included in the GAA. The
funding for the Magna Carta benefits would not materialize as a matter of course simply by fiat of R.A.
No. 8439, but must initially be proposed by the officials of the DOST as the concerned agency for
submission to and consideration by Congress. That process is what complies with the constitutional
edict. R.A. No. 8439 alone could not fund the payment of the benefits because the GAA did not mirror
every provision of law that referred to it as the source of funding. It is worthy to note that the DOST
itself acknowledged the absolute need for the appropriation in the GAA. Otherwise, Secretary Uriarte,
Jr. would not have needed to request the OP for the express authority to use the savings to pay the
Magna Carta benefits.

In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the
budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient
for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception is found in Section 25
(5),14 Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for their
respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The plain language
of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioner’s posture, which we should now
dispose of as untenable.

It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI of
the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer savings only to augment another item in the GAA is
strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive. As the Court has expounded in Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections:15

When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions
are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where
the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail
the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express
exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to
inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.

The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the
general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words.
Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply
to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will
be resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction
of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of
the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.

The claim of the petitioner that the payment of the 2001 Magna Carta benefits was upon the
authorization extended by the OP through the 12 April 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary
Zamora was outrightly bereft of legal basis. In so saying, she inexplicably, but self-servingly, ignored the
important provisions in the 2000 GAA on the use of savings, to wit:
Sec. 54. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional
Commissions under Article IX of the Constitution, the Ombudsman and the Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

Sec. 55. Meaning of Savings and Augmentation. Savings refer to portions or balances of any
programmed appropriation in this Act free of any obligation or encumbrance still available after the
completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorized, or arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant
positions and leaves of absence without pay.

Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of an item, project, activity or purpose with an
appropriation which upon implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed resources is determined
to be deficient. In no case, therefore, shall a non-existent item, project, activity, purpose or object of
expenditure be funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations authorized
otherwise in this Act. (Bold emphases added)

Under these provisions, the authority granted to the President was subject to two essential requisites in
order that a transfer of appropriation from the agency’s savings would be validly effected. The first
required that there must be savings from the authorized appropriation of the agency. The second
demanded that there must be an existing item, project, activity, purpose or object of expenditure with
an appropriation to which the savings would be transferred for augmentation purposes only.

At any rate, the proposition of the petitioner that savings could and should be presumed from the mere
transfer of funds is plainly incompatible with the doctrine laid down in Demetria v. Alba,16 in which the
petition challenged the constitutionality of paragraph 1 of Section 4417 of Presidential Decree No. 1177
(Budget Reform Decree of 1977) in view of the express prohibition contained in Section 16(5)18 of Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution against the transfer of appropriations except to augment out of
savings,19 with the Court declaring the questioned provision of Presidential Decree No. 1177 "null and
void for being unconstitutional" upon the following reasoning, to wit:

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under
the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and
those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources,
the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of
augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for
which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e., transfer may be allowed for the purpose of
augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section
16(5). It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office
or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project, or activity of any department, bureau
or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as
to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are
to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said
transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law,
thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

Clearly and indubitably, the prohibition against the transfer of appropriations is the general rule.
Consequently, the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 without a specific item or provision
in the GAA and without due authority from the President to utilize the DOST’s savings in other items for
the purpose was repugnant to R.A. No. 8439, the Constitution, and the re-enacted GAA for 2001.

The COA is endowed with sufficient latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has the
power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purposes for which they had been
intended by law. The "Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad
powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public
funds and property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, to
establish the techniques and methods for such review, and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations".20

Thus, the COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and
responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are
perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law. Verily, the Court has sustained the decisions of
administrative authorities like the COA as a matter of general policy, not only on the basis of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also upon the recognition that such administrative authorities held
the expertise as to the laws they are entrusted to enforce.21The Court has accorded not only respect but
also finality to their findings especially when their decisions are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.22

Only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and grant a petition for certiorari
brought to assail its actions.23Section 1 of Rule 65,24 Rules of Court, demands that the petitioner must
show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding. Inasmuch as the sole office of the writ
of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner should establish that the COA gravely abused
its discretion. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-
judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.25 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ.26

The petitioner dismally failed to discharge her burden.1âwphi1 We conclude and declare, therefore,
that the COA’s assailed decision was issued in steadfast compliance of its duty under the Constitution
and in the judicious exercise of its general audit power conferred to it by the Constitution.
Nonetheless, the Court opines that the DOST officials who caused the payment of the Magna Carta
benefits to the covered officials and employees acted in good faith in the honest belief that there was a
firm legal basis for the payment of the benefits. Evincing their good faith even after receiving the NDs
from the COA was their taking the initiative of earnestly requesting the OP for the authorization to use
the DOST’s savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits. On their part, the DOST covered officials and
employees received the benefits because they considered themselves rightfully deserving of the
benefits under the long-awaited law.

The Court declares and holds that the disallowed benefits received in good faith need not be reimbursed
to the Government. This accords with consistent pronouncements of the Court, like that issued in De
Jesus v. Commission on Audit,27 to wit:

Nevertheless, our pronouncement in Blaquera v. Alcala28supports petitioners’ position on the refund of

the benefits they received. In Blaquera, the officials and employees of several government departments
and agencies were paid incentive benefits which the COA disallowed on the ground that Administrative
Order No. 29 dated 19 January 1993 prohibited payment of these benefits. While the Court sustained
the COA on the disallowance, it nevertheless declared that:

Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund
of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received.
Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The
officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the
amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident
that they richly deserve such benefits.

This ruling in Blaquera applies to the instant case. Petitioners here received the additional allowances
and bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such
payment. At the time pet1t10ners received the additional allowances and bonuses, the Court had not
yet decided Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit.29 Petitioners had no knowledge that such
payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the allowances
and bonuses they received but disallowed by the COA.

Also, in Veloso v. Commission on Audit30 the Court, relying on a slew of jurisprudence31 ruled that the
recipients of the disallowed retirement and gratuity pay remuneration need not refund whatever they
had received:

x x x because all the parties acted in good faith. In this case, the questioned disbursement was made
pursuant to an ordinance enacted as early as December 7, 2000 although deemed approved only on
August 22, 2002. The city officials disbursed the retirement and gratuity pay remuneration in the honest
belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with
gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such reward.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari for lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision
issued on June 4, 2009 by the Commission Proper of the Commission on Audit in COA Case No. 2009-
045; and DECLARES that the covered officials and employees of the Department of Science and
Technology who received the Magna Carta benefits for calendar year 2001 are not required to refund
the disallowed benefits received.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Funa vs. Agra, 691 SCRA 196, February 19, 2013

G.R. No. 204964 October 15, 2014

REMIGIO D. ESPIRITU AND NOEL AGUSTIN, Petitioners,

vs.
LUTGARDA TORRES DEL ROSARIO represented by SYLVIA R. ASPERILLA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Lands classified as non-agricultural in zoning ordinances approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board or its predecessors prior to June 15, 1998 are outside the coverage of the compulsory
acquisition program of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. However, there has to be substantial
evidence to prove that lands sought to be exempted fall within the non-agricultural classification.

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set aside the decision2 dated September 28, 2012
and resolution3 dated November 29, 2012 of the Court of Appeals. These orders reinstated the
order4 dated February 19, 2004 of then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Roberto M. Pagdanganan
approving petitioner’s application for exemption.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

In 1978, the City Council of Angeles City, Pampanga, enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978,
classifying areas in Barangay Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City, as agricultural land.5

Pursuant to this ordinance, Lutgarda Torres del Rosario (del Rosario) allegedly requested the City Zoning
Administrator to exempt from the zoning classification Lot Nos. 854 and 855 located in Barangay Margot
and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City.6 The land is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-11809
withan area of 164.7605 hectares.7 The request was allegedly approved on March 7, 1980 by Engineer
Roque L. Dungca, Angeles City Development Coordinator/Zoning Administrator, and the lots were
allegedly reclassified as non-agricultural or industrial lots.8

On June 10, 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act No. 6657) was enacted.

On October 10, 2000, del Rosario, through her representative Sylvia R. Asperilla (Asperilla), filed an
application for exemption with the Department of Agrarian Reform, seeking to exempt Lot Nos. 854 and
855 from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage.9
On February 19, 2004, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Roberto M. Pagdanganan (Secretary
Pagdanganan) issued an order granting the application for exemption. Citing Department of Justice
Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, Secretary Pagdanganan stated that lands classified as non agricultural
before the enactment of CARP are beyond its coverage.10

On March 26, 2004, farmers in del Rosario’s landholdings, led by Remigio Espiritu (Espiritu), filed a
motion for reconsideration11 of the order. They argued that under Zoning Ordinance No. 13, Series of
1978, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Resolution No. 705, Series of 2001, and Angeles City
Council Resolution No. 3300, Series of 2001, the land holdings were classified as agricultural, not
industrial.12They argued that as per certifications by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board dated
June 1, 2001, May 28, 2001, and November 24, 2003, the landholdings were within the agricultural zone,
and there was no zoning ordinance passed that reclassified the area into other land uses.13

The motion was given due course by the Department of Agrarian Reform, this time headed by Secretary
Nasser C. Pangandaman (Secretary Pangandaman). Hence, on June 15, 2006, then Secretary
Pangandaman issued an order14 granting the motion for reconsideration and revoking the earlier order
of then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Pagdanganan.

Del Rosario contended that this order was sent to her through Clarita Montgomery in Barangay Margot,
Sapang Bato, Angeles City, and not at Asperilla’s address in Cubao, Quezon City, which was her address
on record. Del Rosario alleged that she only came to know of the order on January 26, 2007, when the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Pampanga handed her a copy of the order.15 She then filed her
motion for reconsideration of the order dated June 15, 2006. The motion was dated February 9, 2007.16

Acting on del Rosario’s motion for reconsideration, Secretary Pangandaman found that the certifications
issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board classified the landholdings as agricultural before
June 15, 1988.17 Based on the ocular inspections conducted by the Center for Land Use Policy, Planning
and Implementation (CLUPPI), the land remained agricultural and was planted with sugar cane and
corn.18 Accordingly, Secretary Pangandaman denied del Rosario’s motion in the order19 dated March 3,
2008.

Del Rosario filed a notice of appeal20 before the Office of the President on March 27, 2008.

On May 7, 2009, the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
Manuel B. Gaite (Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite), rendered the decision21dismissing the appeal for
lack of merit.

Del Rosario filed a motion for extension of 10 days to file her motion for reconsideration.22 Citing
Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987, and Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,23 the Office of the
President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Natividad G. Dizon, denied the motion in the
order24 dated July 14, 2009.

Aggrieved, del Rosario filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals arguing (1) that she was
denied due process when the order of Secretary Pangandaman was "erroneously sent to another
address"25 and (2) that the decision of then Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was void since he had
been appointed to the Securities and Exchange Commission two months prior to the rendering of the
decision.26
On September 28, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition. The Court of
Appeals stated that del Rosario was indeed prevented from participating inthe proceedings that led to
the issuance of Secretary Pangandaman’s order when the notices were sent to her other address on
record.27 It also found that the decision issued by then Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was void since
it violated Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution.28 The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PETITION is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 07 May 2009,
and the Order dated 15 June 2006 are hereby SET ASIDE. Perforce, with the nullity of the said Decision
and Order, the Pagdanganan Order granting exemption to petitioner’s land is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.29

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,30petitioners, namely Remigio Espiritu and Noel
Agustin, now come before this court via a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to set aside the ruling
of the Court of Appeals.

In particular, petitioners argue that respondent was not denied due process as she was able to actively
participate in the proceedings before the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Office of the
President.31 They also argue that respondent was not able to present proof that Deputy Executive
Secretary Gaite was not authorized tosign the decision and, hence, his action is presumed to have been
donein the regular performance of duty.32

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in
itsdecision. She argues that she was deprived of due process when Secretary Pangandaman’s order was
sent to the wrong address. She also argues that the Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite’s decision was
void since he had already been appointed to the Securities and Exchange Commission two months
prior.33

The issue, therefore, before this court is whether the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the order of
Secretary Pangandaman and the decision of Deputy Secretary Gaite and reinstated the order of
Secretary Pagdanganan.

This petition should be granted.

Respondent was not deprived of due process

The Court of Appeals, in finding for respondent, stated that:

Since she was not notified, [del Rosario] was not able to participate in the proceedings leading to the
issuance of the Pangandaman Order. The absence of notice that resulted in the inability of [del Rosario]
to be heard indubitably confirms her claim of lackof due process. [Del Rosario] indeed was denied her
day in the administrative proceedings below. And considering that [del Rosario] was not accorded due
process, the Pangandaman Order is void for lack ofjurisdiction. Hence, contrary to respondents’
submission, it could not attain finality.34

The Court of Appeals, however, did not take into consideration that respondent was still able to file a
motion for reconsideration of Secretary Pangandaman’s order, albeit beyond the allowable period to
file. In Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 06,35 Series of 2000:
 RULE III
Commencement, Investigation and Resolution of Cases

....

SECTION 21. Motion for Reconsideration. — In case any of the parties disagrees with the decision or
resolution, the affected party may file a written motion for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the order, furnishing a copy thereof tothe adverse party. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period to appeal.

Any party shall be allowed only one(1) motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the RD or approving
authority shall rule on the said motion within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. In the event that
the motion is denied, the adverse party has the right to perfect his appeal within the remainder of the
period to appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on
reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of
reversal within which to perfect his appeal.(Emphasis supplied) Despite being filed late, Secretary
Pangandaman still gave due course to the motion and resolved it on its merits. This is clear from his
order dated March 3, 2008, which reads:

During the 50th Special CLUPPI Committee-B Meeting, held on 18 December 2007, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Sylvia Espirilla [sic] was deliberated upon and the Committee recommended
the DENIAL of the Motion for Reconsideration based on the following grounds:

● The certifications issued by the HLURB shows that the subject properties were classified as
agricultural before 15 June 1986 [sic]; and

● Based on the ocular inspection conducted by the CLUPPI Inspection Team, it was found out
that the area remained agricultural. In fact, it [is] still dominantly planted with sugar cane and
corn.36 (Emphasis supplied)

While it may be true that respondent was prevented from filing a timelymotion for reconsideration of
Secretary Pangandaman’s order, it would be erroneous to conclude that she had been completely
denied her opportunity to be heard. In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Samson:37

. . . . In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to
meet the requirements of due process.In Casimiro v. Tandog, the Court held:

The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due
process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s sideor the opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one
may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized toinclude the following: (1)
the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel,
to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made
known to the parties affected.38 (Emphasis supplied)

When respondent filed her motion for reconsideration assailing Secretary Pangandaman’s order, she
was able to completely and exhaustively present her arguments. The denial of her motion was on the
basis of the merits of her arguments and any other evidence she was able to present. She was given a
fair and reasonable opportunity to present her side; hence, there was no deprivation of due process.

It was also erroneous to conclude that respondent was "denied her day in the administrative
proceedings below."39Respondent was able to actively participate not only in the proceedings before the
Department of Agrarian Reform, but also on appeal to the Office of the President and the Court of
Appeals.

Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite’s decision is presumed valid, effective, and binding

Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution states:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies orassistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict ofinterest in the conduct of their office.

. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

It is alleged that Gaite was appointed Commissioner to the Securities and Exchange Commission on
March 16, 2009.40 It is also alleged that he has already lost his authority as Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs when he rendered the decision dated May 7, 2009 since he is constitutionally prohibited
from holding two offices during his tenure. This, however, is not conclusive since no evidence was
presented as to when he accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, or assumed the position.

Assuming that Gaite’s appointment became effective on March 16, 2009, he can be considered a de
factoofficer at the time he rendered the decision dated May 7, 2009.

In Funa v. Agra,41 a petition was filed against Alberto Agra for holding concurrent positions as the acting
Secretary of Justice and as Solicitor General. This court, while ruling that the appointment of Alberto
Agra as acting Secretary of Justice violated Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution, held that he was a
de facto officer during his tenure in the Department of Justice:

A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if
the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is
in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant
authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a
mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those
of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting
Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective
as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary in
order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority
emanates from the State. Agra’s official actions covered by this clarification extend to but are not
limited to the promulgation of resolutions on petitions for review filed in the Department of Justice, and
the issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars relative to the prosecution of criminal
cases.42 (Emphasis supplied)

Assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of the President after his appointment to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, any decision he renders during this time is presumed to be valid,
binding, and effective.

With Gaite being a public officer, his acts also enjoy the presumption of regularity, thus:

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption in [sic] rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be madein support of the presumption and in case of
doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.43 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent has not presented evidence showing that the decision was rendered ultra vires, other than
her allegation that Gaite had already been appointed to another office. Unless there is clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, the decision dated May 7, 2009 is conclusively presumed to have
been rendered in the regular course of business.

Respondent’s landholdings were agricultural, not industrial

Prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, lands were classified into agricultural, residential, or
industrial by law or by zoning ordinances enacted by local government units. In Heirs of Luna v. Afable:44

It is undeniable that local governments have the power to reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural
lands. Section 3 of RA No. 2264 (The Local Autonomy Act of 1959) specifically empowers municipal
and/or city councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the
National Planning Commission. By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange,
prescribe, define, and apportion the land within itspolitical jurisdiction into specific uses based not only
on the present, butalso on the future projection of needs. It may, therefore, be reasonably presumed
that when city and municipal boards and councils approved an ordinance delineating an area or district
in their cities or municipalities as residential, commercial, or industrial zone pursuant to the power
granted tothem under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, they were, at the same time,
reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for non-agricultural use; hence, ensuring the
implementation of and compliance with their zoning ordinances.45 (Emphasis supplied) Republic Act No.
6657 became effective on June 15, 1988, and it covered all public and private lands, including lands of
the public domain suited for agriculture.46 Upon its enactment, questions arose as to the authority of
the Department of Agrarian Reform to approve or disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural
land to non-agricultural. Then Agrarian Reform Secretary Florencio B.Abad (Secretary Abad) was of the
opinion that laws prior to Republic Act No. 6657 authorized the Department of Agrarian Reform,
together with the Department of Local Government and Community Development and the Human
Settlements Commission, to allow or disallow conversions. In response to Secretary Abad’s query, the
Department of Justice issued Opinion No. 44 on March 16, 1990, written by then Secretary of Justice
Franklin M.Drilon. The opinion, reproduced in full, states:

Sir:

This refers to your letter of the 13th instant stating your "position that prior to the
passage of R.A. 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform had the authority to classify
and declare which agricultural lands are suitable for non-agricultural purposes, and to
approve or disapprove applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural
uses."

In support of the foregoing view, you contend that under R.A. No. 3844, as amended, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) is empowered to "determine and declare anagricultural land to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial orsome other urban purpose" and to "convert agricultural land from
agricultural to non-agricultural purposes"; that P.D. No. 583, as amended by P.D. No. 815 "affirms that
the conversion of agricultural lands shall be allowed only upon previous authorization of the [DAR]; with
respectto tenanted rice and corn lands"; that a Memorandum of Agreement dated May 13, 1977
between the DAR, the Department of Local Government and Community Development and the then
Human Settlements Commission "further affirms the authority of the [DAR] to allow or disallow
conversion of agricultural lands"; that E.O. No. 129-A expressly invests the DAR with exclusive authority
to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial and
other land uses'; and that while inthe final version of House Bill 400, Section 9 thereof provided that
lands devoted to "residential, housing, commercial and industrial sites classified as such by the
municipal and city development councils as already approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, in their respective zoning development plans" be exempted from the coverage of the Agrarian
Reform program, this clause was deleted from Section 10 of the final version of the consolidated bill
stating the exemptions from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. We take it
that your query has been prompted by the study previously made by this Department for Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig Jr. and Secretary Vicente Jayme (Memorandum dated February 14, 1990)
which upheld the authority of the DAR to authorize conversions of agricultural lands to non-agricultural
uses as of June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No.
6657). [I]t is your position that the authority of DAR to authorize such conversion existed even prior to
June 15, 1988 or as early as 1963 under the Agricultural Land Reform Code(R.A. No. 3844; as amended).

It should be made clear at the outset that the aforementioned study of this Department was based on
facts and issues arising from the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). While there is no specific and express authority given to DAR in the CARP law to approve or
disapprove conversion of agricultural lands to nonagricultural uses, because Section 65 only refers to
conversions effected after five years from date of the award, we opined that the authority of the DAR to
approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands to nonagricultural uses applies only to
conversions made on or after June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of R.A.No. 6657, solely on the basis
of our interpretation of DAR's mandate and the comprehensive coverage of the land reform program.
Thus, we said:
"Being vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, it is believed to be the agrarian reform law's intention that any conversion ofa private
agricultural land to non-agricultural uses should be cleared beforehand by the DAR. True, the DAR's
express power over land use conversion is limited to cases in which agricultural lands already awarded
have, after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the
locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes. But to suggest that these are the only instances when the DAR can
require conversion clearances would open a loophole in the R.A. No. 6657, which every landowner may
use to evade compliance with the agrarian reform program. Hence, it should logically follow from the
said department's express duty and function to execute and enforce the said statute that any
reclassification of a private land as a residential, commercial or industrial property should first be
cleared by the DAR."

It is conceded that under the laws in force prior to the enactment and effective date of R.A. No. 6657,
the DAR had likewise the authority, to authorize conversions of agricultural lands to other uses, but
always in coordination with other concerned agencies. Under R.A. No. 3344, as amended by R.A. No.
6389, an agricultural lessee may, by order of the court, be dispossessed of his landholding if after due
hearing, it is shown that the "landholding is declared by the [DAR] upon the recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes."

Likewise, under various Presidential Decrees (P.D. Nos. 583, 815 and 946) which were issued to give
teeth to the implementation of the agrarian reform program decreed inP.D. No. 27, the DAR was
empowered to authorize conversions of tenanted agricultural lands, specifically those planted to rice
and/or corn, to other agricultural or tonon-agricultural uses, "subject to studies on zoning of the Human
Settlements Commissions" (HSC). This non-exclusive authority of the DAR under the aforesaid laws was,
as you have correctly pointed out, recognized and reaffirmed by other concerned agencies, such as the
Department of Local Government and Community Development (DLGCD) and the then Human
Settlements Commission (HSC) in a Memorandum of Agreement executed by the DAR and these two
agencies on May 13, 1977, which is an admission that with respect to land use planning and conversions,
the authority is not exclusive to any particular agency but is a coordinated effort of all concerned
agencies.

It is significant to mention thatin 1978, the then Ministry of Human Settlements was granted authority
to review and ratify land use plans and zoning ordinance of local governments and to approve
development proposals which include land use conversions (see LOI No. 729 [1978]). This was followed
by P.D.No. 648 (1981) which conferred upon the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (the
predecessors of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB][)] the authority to promulgate
zoning and other land use control standards and guidelines which shall govern land use plans and zoning
ordinances of local governments, subdivision or estate development projects of both the public and
private sector and urban renewal plans, programs and projects; as well as to review, evaluate and
approve or disapprove comprehensive land use development plans and zoning components of civil
works and infrastructure projects, of national, regional and local governments, subdivisions,
condominiums or estate development projects including industrial estates.
P.D. No. 583, as amended by P.D. No. 815, and the 1977 Memorandum of Agreement, abovementioned,
cannot therefore, be construed as sources of authority of the DAR; these issuances merely affirmed
whatever power DAR had at the time oftheir adoption.

With respect to your observation that E.O. No. 129-A also empowered the DAR to approve or
disapprove conversions of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses as of July 22, 1987, it is our view
that E.O. No. 129-A likewise did not provide a new source of power of DAR with respect to conversion
but it merely recognized and reaffirmed the existence of such power as granted under existing laws. This
is clearly inferrable from the following provision of E.O. No. 129-A to wit:

"Sec. 5. Powers and Functions. Pursuant to the mandate of the Department, and in order to ensure the
successful implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, the Department is hereby
authorized to:

1) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential,
commercial, industrial and other land uses as may be provided by law"

Anent the observation regarding the alleged deletion of residential, housing, commercial and industrial
sites classifiedby the HLURB in the final version of the CARP bill, we fail to see how this [sic]
circumstances could substantiate your position that DAR's authority to reclassify or approve conversions
of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses already existed prior to June 15, 1988. Surely, it is clear that
the alleged deletion was necessary to avoid a redundancy inthe CARP law whose coverage is expressly
limited to "all public and private agricultural lands" and "other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture" (Sec. 4, R.A. No. 6657). Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines "agricultural land" as that
"devoted to agricultural activity as defined in the Act and not classified as mineral forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land."

Based on the foregoing premises, wereiterate the view that with respect to conversions ofagricultural
lands covered by R.A. No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such
conversions may be exercised from the date of the law's effectivity on June 15, 1988. This conclusion is
based on a liberal interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 in the light of DAR's mandate and the extensive
coverage of the agrarian reform program.47 (Emphasis supplied) Department of Justice Opinion No. 44
became the basis of subsequent issuances by the Department of Agrarian Reform, stating in clear terms
that parties need not seek prior conversion clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform for lands
that were classified as non-agricultural prior to Republic Act No. 6657. The subsequent rulings are
outlined in Junio v. Secretary Garilao:48

Following the opinion of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the DAR issued Administrative Order (AO)No.
6, Series of 1994, stating that conversion clearances were no longer needed for lands already classified
as non-agricultural before the enactment of Republic Act 6657. Designed to "streamline the issuance of
exemption clearances, based on DOJ Opinion No. 44," the AO provided guidelines and procedures for
the issuance of exemption clearances.

Thereafter, DAR issued AO 12, Series of 1994, entitled "Consolidated and Revised Rules and Procedures
Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses." It provided that the guidelines on
how to secure an exemption clearance under DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994, shall apply to agricultural
lands classified or zoned for non-agricultural uses by local government units (LGUs); and approved by
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before June 15, 1988. Under this AO, the DAR
secretary had the ultimate authority to issue orders granting or denying applications for exemption filed
by landowners whose lands were covered by DOJ Opinion No. 44.49 (Citations omitted)

Accordingly, lands are consideredexempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 if the following
requisites are present:

1. Lands were zoned for non-agricultural use by the local government unit; and

2. The zoning ordinance was approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board before
June 15, 1998.

In revoking the prior order of exemption, Secretary Pangandaman took note of the following
considerations:

● The Certification dated 18 November 2003, of Mr. David D. David, Planning Officer IV and
Zoning Administrator of the City of Angeles states that the City Planning and Development
Office, Zoning Administration Unit (CPDO-ZAU) certifies that subject property covered by TCT
No. 11804 is classified as agricultural based on the certified photocopy of Zoning Ordinance,
Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978, issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board,
Regional Office No. 3 (HLURB-Region III) on 03 September 2001;

● Also, upon verification with HLURB-Region III, we were informed that as per copy of the
approved Zoning Plan of 1978, the subject properties were classified as agricultural. The said
Zoning Plan of 1978 was approved under NCC Plan dated 24 September 1980; and

● Based on the ocular inspection conducted by the CLUPPI Inspection Team, it was found that
the area remained agricultural. In fact, it is still dominantly planted withsugar cane and corn.50

(Emphasis supplied)

Upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration, Secretary Pangandaman also took into consideration the
recommendations of the Center for Land Use Policy, Planning, and Implementation Committee, thus:

During the 50th Special CLUPPI Committee-B Meeting, held on 18 December 2007, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Sylvia Espirilla [sic] was deliberated upon and the Committee recommended
the DENIAL of the Motion for Reconsideration based on the following grounds:

● The certifications issued by the HLURB shows that the subject properties were classified as
agricultural before 15 June 1986 [sic]; and

● Based on the ocular inspection conducted by the CLUPPI Inspection Team, it was found out
that the area remained agricultural.1âwphi1 In fact, it [is] still dominantly planted with sugar
cane and corn.51 (Emphasis supplied)

Secretary Pangandaman also found that:

The certifications submitted by the [respondents] which is the Certification dated 18 November 2003, of
Mr. David D. David, Planning Officer IV and Zoning Administrator of the City of Angeles states that the
City Planning Development Office, Zoning Administration Unit (CPDOZAU) certifies that the subject
properties covered by TCT No. T-11804 is classified as agricultural based on the certified photocopy of
Zoning Ordinance, Ordinance No. 13[,] Series of 1978 issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, Regional Office No. 3 (HLURB-Region III) on 03 September 2001.

Such certification was corroborated bya certification issued by the HLURB Regional Director, Region III,
Ms. Edithat [sic] Barrameda in its certification dated 28 May 2001 and 24 November 2003. It was stated
in the said certification that the subject landholding is within the agricultural zone based on
Comprehensive LandUse Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the City Council of Angeles City approved
through HLURB Resolution No. 705 dated 17 October 2001. Also a certification was issued by Director
Barrameda on 01 June 2001, stating therein that, "Duplicate copies of the Certification issued by this
Board toMs. Lutgarda Torres on 18 December 1991 and 8 July 1998, respectively are not among the files
for safekeeping when she assumed as Regional Officer on 03 July 2000.["]52(Emphasis supplied)

These findings were sustained on appeal by the Office of the President, stating that:

[Respondents'] argument that the land has ceased to be agricultural by virtue of reclassification under
Ordinance No. 13, series of 1978 cannot be sustained since the records of the case or the evidence
presented thereto are bereft of any indication showing the same. In fact, nowhere was it shown that a
certified true copy of the said Ordinance was presented before this Office or the office a quo.53

The factual findings of administrative agencies are generally given great respect and finality by the
courts as it is presumed that these agencies have the knowledge and expertise over matters under their
jurisdiction.54 Both the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Office of the President found
respondent's lands to be agricultural. We see no reason to disturb these findings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated September 28, 2012 and resolution dated
November 29, 2012 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The order dated June 15, 2006 of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the decision dated May 7, 2009 of the Office of the President are
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Manalang-Demingillo vs. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippine (TIDCORP),
692 SCRA 369, March 05, 2013

G.R. No. 168613 : March 5, 2013

ATTY. MA. ROSARIO MANALANG-DEMIGILLO, Petitioner, v. TRADE

AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES (TIDCORP), and its BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Respondents

G.R. No. 185571

 TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Petitioner, v. MA. ROSARIO S. MANALANG-
DEMIGILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A reorganization undertaken pursuant to a specific statutory authority by the

Board of Directors of a government-owned and government-controlled
corporation is valid.

Antecedents

On February 12, 1998, the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
was renamed Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines (TIDCORP) pursuant to Republic Act No. 8494 entitled An Act
Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 1080, As Amended, by
Reorganizing And Renaming the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation, Expanding Its Primary Purpose, and for Other
Purposes.

Republic Act No. 8494 reorganized the structure of TIDCORP. The issuance
of appointments in accordance with the reorganization ensued. Petitioner
Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo) was appointed as Senior Vice
President (PG 15) with permanent status, and was assigned to the Legal and
Corporate Services Department (LCSD) of TIDCORP.

In 2002, TIDCORP President Joel C. Valdes sought an opinion from the Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) relative to TIDCORPs
authority to undertake a reorganization under the law, whose Section 7 and
Section 8 provide as follows:
c ralawl ibra ry

Section 7. The Board of Directors shall provide for an organizational

structure and staffing pattern for officers and employees of the Trade and
Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) and upon
recommendation of its President, appoint and fix their remuneration,
emoluments and fringe benefits: Provided, That the Board shall have
exclusive and final authority to appoint, promote, transfer, assign and re-
assign personnel of the TIDCORP, any provision of existing law to the
contrary notwithstanding. x x x

Section 8. All incumbent personnel of the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation shall continue to exercise their duties and functions
as personnel of the TIDCORP until reorganization is fully implemented but
not to exceed one (1) year from the approval of this Act. The Board of
Directors is authorized to provide for separation benefits for those who
cannot be accommodated in the new structure. All those who shall retire or
are separated from the service on account of the reorganization under the
preceding Section shall be entitled to such incentives, as are authorized by
the Corporation, which shall be in addition to all gratuities and benefits to
which they may be entitled under existing laws.

In Opinion No. 221 dated September 13, 2002,1 then Government Corporate
Counsel Amado D. Valdez opined as follows: cra lawlib rary

There is no question on the power of the PhilEXIM (also known as TIDCORP)

Board of Directors to undertake a reorganization of the corporations present
organizational set-up. In fact, the authority to provide for the corporations
organizational structure is among the express powers granted to PhilEXIM
through its Board.

As to the one-year period to implement a reorganization mentioned in

Section 8 of RA 8494, it is our considered opinion that the same provision
refers to the initial reorganization to effect transition from the Philippine
Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (Philguarantee) to what is
now known as the Trade and Investment Corporation of the Philippines
(TIDCORP). The one-year period does not, however, operate as a limitation
that any subsequent changes in the organizational set-up pursuant to the
authority of the Board to determine the corporations organizational structure
under Section 7 of RA 8494, which is designed to make the corporation more
attuned to the needs of the people or, in this case, the sector of the
Philippine economy that it serves, can only be made during the same one-
year period.

On the basis of OGCC Opinion No. 221, the Board of Directors passed
Resolution No. 1365, Series of 2002, on October 22, 2002 to approve a so-
called Organizational Refinement/Restructuring Plan to implement a new
organizational structure and staffing pattern, a position classification system,
and a new set of qualification standards.

During the implementation of the Organizational Refinement/Restructuring

Plan, the LCSD was abolished. According to the List of Appointed Employees
under the New Organizational Structure of TIDCORP as of November 1,
2002, Demigillo, albeit retaining her position as a Senior Vice President, was
assigned to head the Remedial and Credit Management Support Sector
(RCMSS). On the same date, President Valdes issued her appointment as
head of RCMSS, such appointment being in nature a reappointment under
the reorganization plan.
On December 13, 2002, President Valdes issued a memorandum informing
all officers and employees of TIDCORP that the Board of Directors had
approved on December 11, 2002 the appointments issued pursuant to the
newly approved positions under the Organizational Refinement/Restructuring
Plan.

In her letter dated December 23, 2002 that she sent to TIDCORP Chairman
Jose Isidro Camacho, however, Demigillo challenged before the Board of
Directors the validity of Resolution No. 1365 and of her assignment to the
RCMSS. She averred that she had been thereby illegally removed from her
position of Senior Vice President in the LCSD to which she had been
previously assigned during the reorganization of July 1998. She insisted that
contrary to OGCC Opinion No. 221 dated September 13, 2002 the Board of
Directors had not been authorized to undertake the reorganization and
corporate restructuring.

On January 31, 2003, pending determination of her challenge by the Board

of Directors, Demigillo appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
raising the same issues.

TIDCORP assailed the propriety of Demigillos appeal to the CSC, alleging

that her elevation of the case to the CSC without the Board of Directors
having yet decided her challenge had been improper and a clear case of
forum-shopping.

Later on, however, TIDCORP furnished to the CSC a copy of Board Decision
No. 03-002 dismissing Demigillos appeal for its lack of merit, thereby
rendering the question about the propriety of Demigillos appeal moot and
academic. Board Decision No. 03-002 pertinently reads as follows: c ralawlib ra ry

Atty. Demigillo failed to show to the Board that she was prejudiced in the
implementation of the TIDCORP organizational refinements/restructuring.
She was reappointed to the same position she was holding before the
reorganization. She was not demoted in terms of salary, rank and status.
There was a (sic) substantial compliance with the requirements of RA 6656,
particularly on transparency. More importantly, the said organizational
refinements done and adoption of a new compensation structure were made
in accordance with what is mandated under the Charter of the Corporation.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Board decided as it hereby

decides to DISMISS the appeal of Atty. Ma Rosario Demigillo for lack of
merit.2
?r?l1
In the meanwhile, by letter dated April 14, 2003, President Valdes informed
Demigillo of her poor performance rating for the period from January 1,
2002 to December 31, 2002, to wit: c ralawl ibra ry

After a thorough evaluation/assessment of your job performance for the

rating period January 1 to December 21, 2002, it appears that your over-all
performance is Poor.

Records show that you consistently behaved as an obstructionist in the

implementation of the Corporate Business Plan. You failed to demonstrate
cooperation, respect and concern towards authority and other members of
the company. You also failed to abide by Civil Service and company policies,
rules and regulation. You miserably failed to adapt and respond to changes.
You were very resentful to new approaches as shown by your vehement
objection to new improved policies and programs. Instead of helping raise
the morale of subordinate at high levels (sic) and promote career and
professional growth of subordinates, you tried to block such efforts towards
this end.

In view of the foregoing and your failure to prove that you have effectively
and efficiently performed the duties, functions and responsibility (sic) of your
position, I am constrained to give you a rating of "Poor" for your 2002
performance.3 ?r?l1

On April 28, 2003, Demigillo formally communicated to Atty. Florencio P.

Gabriel Jr., Executive Vice President of the Operations Group, appealing the
"poor rating" given her by President Valdes.

In a memorandum dated May 6, 2003, Atty. Gabriel informed Demigillo that

he could not act on her appeal because of her "failure to state facts and
arguments constituting the grounds for the appeal and submit any evidence
to support the same."4 ?r?l1

On May 6, 2003, President Valdes issued a memorandum to Demigillo

stating that he found no justification to change the poor rating given to her
for the year 2002.

On August 12, 2003, Demigillo received a memorandum from President

Valdes stating that her performance rating for the period from January 1,
2003 to June 2003 "needs improvement," attaching the pertinent
Performance Evaluation Report Form that she was instructed to return
"within 24 hours from receipt."5?r?l1
Not in conformity with the performance rating, Demigillo scribbled on the
right corner of the memorandum the following comments: "I do not agree
and accept. I am questioning the same. This is pure harassment." ???ñr?bl ?š ??r† ??l l?? l ?br?rÿ

She then appealed the poor performance rating on August 14, 2003, calling
the rating a part of Valdes "unremitting harassment and oppression on
her."6?r?l1

On August 19, 2003, Demigillo reported for work upon the expiration of the
90-day preventive suspension imposed by the Board of Directors in a
separate administrative case for grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, insubordination and gross discourtesy. In her
memorandum of that date, she informed Atty. Gabriel Jr. of her readiness to
resume her duties and responsibilities, but requested to be allowed to
reproduce documents in connection with the appeal of her performance
rating. She further requested that the relevant grievance process should
commence.

It appears that the Board of Directors rendered Decision No. 03-003 dated
August 15, 2003 unanimously dropping Demigillo from the rolls.7 Demigillo
received the copy of Decision No. 03-003 on August 25, 2003.

Decision of the CSC

On October 14, 2004, the CSC ruled through Resolution No. 0410928 that
the 2002 Organizational Refinements or Restructuring Plan of TIDCORP had
been valid for being authorized by Republic Act. No. 6656; that Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 8498 granted a continuing power to TIDCORPs Board of
Directors to prescribe the agencys organizational structure, staffing pattern
and compensation packages; and that such grant continued until declared
invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction or revoked by Congress.

The CSC held, however, that TIDCORPs implementation of its reorganization

did not comply with Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6656;9 that although there
was no diminution in Demigillos rank, salary and status, there was
nonetheless a demotion in her functions and authority, considering that the
2002 reorganization reduced her authority and functions from being the
highest ranking legal officer in charge of all the legal and corporate affairs of
TIDCORP to being the head of the RCMSS reporting to the Executive Vice
President and having only two departments under her supervision; and that
the functions of Demigillos office were in fact transferred to the Operations
Group.
The CSC further held that the dropping from the rolls of Demigillo did not
comply with the mandatory requirement under Section 2, particularly 2.2
Rule XII of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Actions Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998.

Subsequently, TIDCORP reinstated Demigillo to the position of Senior Vice

President in RCMSS, a position she accepted without prejudice to her right to
appeal the decision of the CSC.

Ruling of the CA

Both Demigillo and TIDCORP appealed the decision of the CSC to the Court
of Appeals (CA). Demigillos appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87285.
On the other hand, TIDCORPs appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
87295.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 87285, Demigillo partially assailed the CSCs decision,

claiming that the CSC erred: (1) in holding that Section 7 of Republic Act No.
8494 granted the Board of Directors of TIDCORP a continuing power to
reorganize; (2) in holding that the 2002 TIDCORP reorganization had been
authorized by law; and (3) in not holding that the 2002 TIDCORP
reorganization was void ab initio because it was not authorized by law and
because the reorganization did not comply with Republic Act No. 6656.10 ?r?l1

In CA-G.R. SP No. 87295, TIDCORP contended that the CSC erred: (1) in
ruling that Demigillo had been demoted as a result of the 2002 TIDCORP
reorganization; and (2) in ruling that TIDCORP had failed to observe the
provisions of Section 2, particularly 2.2 Rule XII of the Revised Omnibus
Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (Memorandum Circular
No. 40, Series of 1998) on dropping from the rolls, to the prejudice of
Demigillos right to due process.11
?r?l1

On June 27, 2005, the CAs Fourth Division promulgated its decision in
CAG.R. SP No. 87285,12 which, albeit affirming the ruling of the CSC,
rendered a legal basis different from that given by the CSC, to wit:
c ralawl ibra ry

In numerous cases citing Section 20 and Section 31, Book III of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, the
Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative that the President of the Philippines
has the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President.
Hence, being the alter ego of the President of the Philippines, the Board of
Directors of the private respondent-appellee is authorized by law to have a
continuous power to reorganize its agency.13 ?r?l 1

Anent Demigillos contention that the 2002 reorganization effected was

invalid, the CA ruled: c ralawli bra ry

x x x. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been regarded as valid

provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out in
good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient.

In the case at bench, it is our considered opinion that except for her
allegations, the petitioner-appellant (Demigillo) failed to present sufficient
evidence that the reorganization effected in 2002 did not bear the earmarks
of economy and efficiency. Good faith is always presumed.14 ?r?l 1

The CA held that Demigillo could not be reinstated to her previous position
of Senior Vice President of the LCSD in view of the legality of the 2002
reorganization being upheld.15 ?r?l1

With respect to CA-G.R. SP No. 87295, the CAs Special Former Thirteenth
Division promulgated a decision on November 28, 2008,16 denying
TIDCORPs appeal, and holding that Demigillo had been demoted and
invalidly dropped from the rolls by TIDCORP, explaining: c ralawlib ra ry

We do not need to stretch Our imagination that respondent Demigillo, one of the highest
ranking officers of the corporation, was indeed demoted when she was designated to be the
head of merely one sector. She may have retained her title as SVP, but she was deprived of
the authority she previously enjoyed and stripped of the duties and responsibilities assigned
to her under the Legal and Corporate Services. In utter disregard of respondent Demigillos
right to security of tenure, petitioner TIDCORP demoted her in the guise of
"reorganization."?r?l ??

xxx

Next, petitioner TIDCORP asserts that respondent Demigillo was legally dropped from the
rolls. This is a delirious supposition which does not deserve merit at all. ?r?l ??

xxx

Petitioner TIDCORP did not bother to adduce proof that it complied with the rudiments of
due process before dropping Demigillo from the rolls. She was not given the chance to
present evidence refuting the contentious ratings as her employer refused to discuss how it
arrived at such assessment. Her unceremonious dismissal was made even more apparent
as she was never advised of the possibility that she may be separated from service if her
rating would not improve for the next evaluation period.17 ?r?l1

Issues
Demigillo filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing
the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 87285 (G.R. No. 168613), asserting that
the CA gravely erred: (1) in holding that the Board of Directors of TIDCORP
was an alter ego of the President who had the continuing authority to
reorganize TIDCORP; and (2) in holding that the reorganization of TIDCORP
effected in 2002 was valid considering her alleged failure to present
evidence sufficiently showing that the reorganization did not bear the
earmarks of economy and efficiency.18 Corollarily, she sought her
reinstatement to a position comparable to her former position as Senior Vice
President in the LCSD.19 ?r?l1

Likewise, TIDCORP appealed through a petition for review on certiorari,

praying for the reversal of the decision promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No.
87295 (G.R. No. 185571), contending that the CA erred: (1) in ruling that
Demigillo had been demoted as a result of the TIDCORP 2002
reorganization; and (2) in ruling that Demigillo had not been legally dropped
from the rolls.20
?r?l1

On March 8, 2011, the Court En Banc consolidated G.R. No. 168613 and
G.R. No. 185571.21 ?r?l1

Ruling of the Court

We deny the petition for review of Demigillo (G.R. No. 168613) for its lack of
merit, but grant the petition for review of TIDCORP (G.R. No. 185571).

G.R. No. 168613

In its comment in G.R. No. 168613,22 TIDCORP argues for the application of
the doctrine of qualified political agency, contending that the acts of the
Board of Directors of TIDCORP, an attached agency of the Department of
Finance whose head, the Secretary of Finance, was an alter ego of the
President, were also the acts of the President.

TIDCORPs argument is unfounded.

The doctrine of qualified political agency, also known as the alter ego
doctrine, was introduced in the landmark case of Villena v. The Secretary of
Interior.23 In said case, the Department of Justice, upon the request of the
Secretary of Interior, investigated Makati Mayor Jose D. Villena and found
him guilty of bribery, extortion, and abuse of authority. The Secretary of
Interior then recommended to the President the suspension from office of
Mayor Villena. Upon approval by the President of the recommendation, the
Secretary of Interior suspended Mayor Villena. Unyielding, Mayor Villena
challenged his suspension, asserting that the Secretary of Interior had no
authority to suspend him from office because there was no specific law
granting such power to the Secretary of Interior; and that it was the
President alone who was empowered to suspend local government officials.
The Court disagreed with Mayor Villena and upheld his suspension, holding
that the doctrine of qualified political agency warranted the suspension by
the Secretary of Interior. Justice Laurel, writing for the Court, opined: c ralawlib ra ry

After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in this
case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of
government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization
established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our
Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of
the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive. (Runkle v. United States [1887], 122 U. S., 543; 30 Law. ed.,
1167; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1141; see also U. S. v. Eliason [1839], 16 Pet., 291; 10 Law. ed.,
968; Jones v. U. S. [1890], 137 U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691; 11 Sup. Ct., Rep., 80;
Wolsey v. Chapman [1880], 101 U. S., 755; 25 Law. ed., 915; Wilcox v. Jackson [1836],
13 Pet., 498; 10 Law. ed., 264.)

Fear is expressed by more than one member of this court that the acceptance of the
principle of qualified political agency in this and similar cases would result in the assumption
of responsibility by the President of the Philippines for acts of any member of his cabinet,
however illegal, irregular or improper may be these acts. The implications, it is said, are
serious. Fear, however, is no valid argument against the system once adopted, established
and operated. Familiarity with the essential background of the type of Government
established under our Constitution, in the light of certain well-known principles and
practices that go with the system, should offer the necessary explanation. With reference to
the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear
and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the
establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the
Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the
principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This
means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions
and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should
be of the Presidents bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and in the language of
Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of
the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments,
their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise,
and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United
States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the
matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority."
(Myers v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U.S. 52 at 133; 71 Law. Ed., 160).
x x x.???ñ r?b l?š ??r†??l l ?? l ?b r?rÿ

The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the

heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of the
President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance of
their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the President
himself should disapprove such acts. This doctrine is in recognition of the
fact that in our presidential form of government, all executive organizations
are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that the heads of the Executive
Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the
multiple executive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are
performed through the Executive Departments. The doctrine has been
adopted here out of practical necessity, considering that the President
cannot be expected to personally perform the multifarious functions of the
executive office.

But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the
acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members
being themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet. Under
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1080, as further amended by Section 6
of Republic Act No. 8494,24 the five ex officio members were the Secretary
of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Governor of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Director-General of the National Economic and
Development Authority, and the Chairman of the Philippine Overseas
Construction Board, while the four other members of the Board were the
three from the private sector (at least one of whom should come from the
export community), who were elected by the ex officio members of the
Board for a term of not more than two consecutive years, and the President
of TIDCORP who was concurrently the Vice-Chairman of the Board. Such
Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by
reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to
the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that
sat them in the Board.

Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board of Directors

effected the assailed 2002 reorganization, they were acting as the
responsible members of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP constituted
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080, as amended by Republic Act No.
8494, not as the alter egos of the President. We cannot stretch the
application of a doctrine that already delegates an enormous amount of
power. Also, it is settled that the delegation of power is not to be lightly
inferred.25 ?r?l1

Nonetheless, we uphold the 2002 reorganization and declare it valid for

being done in accordance with the exclusive and final authority expressly
granted under Republic Act No. 8494, further amending Presidential Decree
No. 1080, the law creating TIDCORP itself, to wit: c ralawl ibra ry

Section 7. The Board of Directors shall provide for an organizational structure and staffing
pattern for officers and employees of the Trade and Investment Development Corporation
of the Philippines (TIDCORP) and upon recommendation of its President, appoint and fix
 their remuneration, emoluments and fringe benefits: Provided, That the Board shall have
exclusive and final authority to appoint, promote, transfer, assign and re-assign personnel
of the TIDCORP, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding. ???ñ r?b l?š ??r† ??l l?? l ?br?rÿ

In this connection, too, we reiterate that we cannot disturb but must respect
the ruling of the CSC that deals with specific cases coming within its area of
technical knowledge and expertise,26 absent a clear showing of grave abuse
of discretion on its part. That clear showing was not made herein. Such
deference proceeds from our recognition of the important role of the CSC as
the central personnel agency of the Government having the familiarity with
and expertise on the matters relating to the career service.

Worthy to stress, lastly, is that the reorganization was not arbitrary and
whimsical. It had been formulated following lengthy consultations and close
coordination with the affected offices within TIDCORP in order for them to
come up with various functional statements relating to the new
organizational setup. In fact, the Board of Directors decided on the need to
reorganize in 2002 to achieve several worthy objectives, as follows: c ralawl ibra ry

(1) To make the organization more viable in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness
and make it more responsive to the needs of its clientèles by eliminating or minimizing any
overlaps and duplication of powers and functions;

(2) To come up with an organizational structure which is geared towards the strengthening
of the Corporation's overall financial and business operations through resource allocation
shift; and

(3) To rationalize corporate operations to maximize resources and achieve optimum

sustainable corporate performance vis-a-vis revised corporate policies, objectives and
directions by focusing the Corporation's efforts and resources to its vital and core
functions.27
?r?l1 ???ñr?bl ?š ??r† ??l l?? l?br?rÿ

The result of the lengthy consultations and close coordination was the
comprehensive reorganization plan that included a new organizational
structure, position classification and staffing pattern, qualification standards,
rules and regulations to implement the reorganization, separation incentive
packages and timetable of implementation. Undoubtedly, TIDCORP effected
the reorganization within legal bounds and in response to the perceived need
to make the agency more attuned to the changing times.

Having found the 2002 reorganization to be valid and made pursuant to

Republic Act No. 8494, we declare that there are no legal and practical bases
for reinstating Demigillo to her former position as Senior Vice President in
the LCSD. To be sure, the reorganization plan abolished the LCSD, and put
in place a set-up completely different from the previous one, including a new
staffing pattern in which Demigillo would be heading the RCMSS, still as a
Senior Vice President of TIDCORP. With that abolition, reinstating her as
Senior Vice President in the LCSD became legally and physically impossible.
Demigillos contention that she was specifically appointed to the position of
Senior Vice President in the LCSD was bereft of factual basis. The records
indicate that her permanent appointment pertained only to the position of
Senior Vice President.28 Her appointment did not indicate at all that she was
to hold that specific post in the LCSD. Hence, her re-assignment to the
RCMSS was by no means a diminution in rank and status considering that
she maintained the same rank of Senior Vice President with an
accompanying increase in pay grade.

The assignment to the RCMSS did not also violate Demigillos security of
tenure as protected by Republic Act No. 6656. We have already upheld
reassignments In the Civil Service resulting from valid reorganizations.29 Nor
could she claim that her reassignment was invalid because it caused the
reduction in her rank, status or salary. On the contrary, she was reappointed
as Senior Vice President, a position that was even upgraded like all the other
similar positions to Pay Grade 16, Step 4, Level II.30 In every sense, the
position to which she was reappointed under the 2002 reorganization was
comparable with, if not similar to her previous position.

That the RCMSS was a unit smaller than the LCSD did not necessarily result
in or cause a demotion for Demigillo. Her new position was but the
consequence of the valid reorganization, the authority to implement which
was vested in the Board of Directors by Republic Act No. 8494. Indeed, we
do not consider to be a violation of the civil servants right to security of
tenure the exercise by the agency where she works of the essential
prerogative to change the work assignment or to transfer the civil servant to
an assignment where she would be most useful and effective. More
succinctly put, that prerogative inheres with the employer,31 whether public
or private.

G.R. No. 185571

As earlier stated, TIDCORPs petition for review in G.R. No. 185571 is

meritorious.

Anent the first issue in G.R. No. 185571, we have already explained that
Demigillo was not demoted because she did not suffer any diminution in her
rank, status and salary under the reorganization. Her reassignment to the
RCMSS, a smaller unit compared to the LCSD, maintained for her the same
rank of Senior Vice-President with a corresponding increase in pay grade.
The reassignment resulted from the valid reorganization.

With respect to the second issue, Demigillo was validly dropped from the
rolls by TIDCORP as the consequence of the application of the rules
governing her employment. Section 2 (2.2), Rule XII of the Revised
Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (Memorandum
Circular No. 40, Series of 1998) provides: cra lawlib rary

xxx

2.2 Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance

a. An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive unsatisfactory

ratings may be dropped from the rolls after due notice. Notice shall mean
that the officer or employee concerned is informed in writing of his
unsatisfactory performance for a semester and is sufficiently warned that a
succeeding unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation from
the service. Such notice shall be given not later than 30 days from the end
of the semester and shall contain sufficient information which shall enable
the employee to prepare an explanation.

b. An official or employee, who for one evaluation period is rated poor in

performance, may be dropped from the rolls after due notice. Notice shall
mean that the officer or employee is informed in writing of the status of his
performance not later than the 4th month of that rating period with
sufficient warning that failure to improve his performance within the
remaining period of the semester shall warrant his separation from the
service. Such notice shall also contain sufficient information which shall
enable the employee to prepare an explanation.

Under Section (b), supra, an official or employee may be dropped from the
rolls provided the following requisites are present, namely: (1) the official or
employee was rated poor in performance for one evaluation period; (2) the
official or employee was notified in writing of the status of her performance
not later than the 4th month of the rating period with sufficient warning that
failure to improve her performance within the remaining period of the
semester shall warrant her separation from the service; and (3) such notice
contained adequate information that would enable her to prepare an
explanation.

All of the requisites were duly established herein.

As to the first requisite, there is no dispute that President Valdes gave

Demigillo a poor performance rating for the annual rating period from
January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002.

The second requisite speaks of a sixth-month or per semester rating period.

Although Demigillos poor rating was made on an annual basis, that was
allowed by the implementing rules of Executive Order No. 292.32 Regarding
the need to give her the written notice of her performance status not later
than the 4th month of the rating period, or at the half of the semester, the
requirement did not apply here because her rating was made on an annual
basis. By analogy, however, the written notice for an annual rating period
could be sent on the 6th month or in the middle of the year. Nevertheless,
this was not expressly provided for in the Civil Service rules. In any case, it
is emphasized that the purpose of the written notice being sent to the
affected officer or employee not later than the 4th month of the rating
period has been to give her the sufficient time to improve her performance
and thereby avert her separation from the service. That purpose is the very
essence of due process.

In Demigillos case, therefore, what was crucial was whether she had been
allowed to enhance her performance within a sufficient time from her receipt
of the written notice of the poor performance rating up to her receipt of the
written notice of her dropping from the rolls. The records show that she was,
indeed, given enough time for her to show improvement. She received on
April 21, 2003 a letter from President Valdes that indicated her poor
performance rating for the period of January 1, 2002 to December 31,
2002.33 The Board of Directors issued on August 15, 2003 the decision
dropping her from rolls.34 She received a copy of the decision on August 25,
2003.35 Thereby, she was given almost four months to improve her
performance before she was finally dropped from the rolls.

The second requisite further mentions that the written notice must contain
sufficient warning that failure to improve her performance within the
remaining period of the semester shall warrant separation from the service.
Although the letter informing Demigillo of her poor performance rating did
not expressly state such a warning to her, it stated her gross failures in the
performance of her duties.36 The Performance Evaluation Report Form
corresponding to her, which was attached to the memorandum given to her,
reflected her poor performance.36 She was notified in writing of the denial of
her appeal of the poor rating.37 It cannot be denied that the letter of poor
rating, the Performance Evaluation Repmi Form, and the denial of her appeal
all signified to her that she could be removed from the service unless she
would improve her performance. Thereby, she was given ample warning to
improve, or else be separated from the service. In that regard, she was
certainly not a witless person who could have missed the significance of such
events. She was not only a lawyer. 38 She was also a mid-level ranking
government official who had been in the government corporate sector for
almost 20 years.39 Her familiarity with the dire consequences of a failure to
improve a poor rating under Civil Service rules was justifiably assumed.

Anent the third requisite, the letter of President Valdes plainly stated the
reasons for her poor rating. Her Performance Evaluation Repmi Form, which
was attached to the letter, enumerated several criteria used in measuring
her management skills and the corresponding rating per criterion. The letter
even suggested that in order for her to enhance her performance she should
undergo extensive training on business management, a comprehensive
lecture program on Civil Service rules and regulations, and a training on
effective public relations. The letter indicated that the contents of the
Performance Evaluation Report had been discussed with her. Moreover,
Demigillo formally appealed the poor performance rating, except that
TIDCORP denied her appeal.40All these circumstances show that she was
given more than enough information about the bases for her poor
performance rating, enabling her to appeal properly.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.

168613; AFFIRM the decision promulgated on June 27, 2005 by the Court of
Appeals in its CA-G.R. No. 87285; GRANT the petition for review on
certiorari in G.R. No. 185571; SET ASIDE the decision promulgated on
November 28, 2008 by the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. No. 87295; and
ORDER Atty. MA. ROSARIO MANALANG-DEMIGILLO to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Maliksi vs. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 292, March 05, 2013

G.R. No. 203302 April 11, 2013

MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HOMER T. SAQUILAVAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Court hereby resolves the Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration tiled by petitioner
Emmanuel L. Maliksi against the Court's decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, dismissing his
petition for certiorari assailing the resolution dated September 14, 2012 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Bane that sustained the declaration of respondent Homer T. Saquilayan
as the duly elected Mayor of Imus, Cavite.

For clarity, we briefly restate the factual antecedents.

During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for
the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite
alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts.
Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision,
declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist
from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the
meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then
installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to
recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it
issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to
defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another
order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.

On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s decision and
declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.1
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process
because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the
printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because
there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.
On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion for
reconsideration.2
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him, and to the use of the
printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division. 1âwphi1

In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Court, by a vote of 8-7, dismissed Maliksi’s
petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied due process because:
(a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the
First Division — referring to the orders of the First Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment
the cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to
raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then pronounced
that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the
paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot images were not secondary images, but
considered original documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule
on Electronic Evidence; and that the First Division’s finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had
been tampered had been fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading
discovered during the revision.
In his Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Maliksi raises the following arguments, to wit:

I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN BANC
GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION DESPITE A CLEAR
VIOLATION OF PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF
LAW CONSIDERING THAT DECRYPTION, PRINTING AND EXAMINATION OF
THE DIGITAL IMAGES OF THE BALLOTS, WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR THE
ASSAILED 14 SEPTEMBER 2012 RESOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT,
WHICH IN TURN AFFIRMED THE 15 AUGUST 2012 RESOLUTION OF THE
COMELEC FIRST DIVISION, WERE DONE INCONSPICUOUSLY UPON A MOTU
PROPRIO DIRECTIVE OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION SANS ANY NOTICE
TO THE PETITIONER, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
 II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN BANC
GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION’S RULING
TO DISPENSE WITH THE PHYSICAL BALLOTS AND RESORT TO THEIR
DIGITAL IMAGES NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE BALLOTS ARE
THE BEST AND MOST CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF THE VOTERS’ WILL, AND
THAT BALLOT IMAGES CAN BE RESORTED TO ONLY IF THE OFFICIAL
BALLOTS ARE LOST OR THEIR INTEGRITY WAS COMPROMISED AS
DETERMINED BY THE RECOUNT/REVISION COMMITTEE, CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH ARE WANTING IN THIS CASE, AND IN FACT THE INTEGRITY OF THE
BALLOT BOXES AND ITS CONTENTS WAS PRESERVED AND THE ISSUE OF
TAMPERING WAS ONLY BELATEDLY RAISED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
AFTER THE REVISION RESULTS SHOWED THAT HE LOST.
III.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, IT IS THE HUMBLE SUBMISSION OF THE
PETITIONER-MOVANT THAT THE 12 MARCH 2013 RESOLUTION ISSUED BY
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN BANC IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO
AND THEREFORE OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT, FOR HAVING BEEN
PROMULGATED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ AT THE TIME OF THE DELIBERATION AND
VOTING ON THE 12 MARCH 2013 RESOLUTION IN THE INSTANT CASE.3
Maliksi insists: (a) that he had the right to be notified of every incident of the proceedings and to be
present at every stage thereof; (b) that he was deprived of such rights when he was not informed of
the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division; (c) that the March
28, 2012 and April 17, 2012 orders of the First Division did not sufficiently give him notice inasmuch
as the orders did not state the date, time, and venue of the decryption and printing of the ballot
images; and (d) that he was thus completely deprived of the opportunity to participate in the
decryption proceedings.

Maliksi contends that the First Division’s motu proprio directive for the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images was highly irregular. In this regard, he asserts: (a) that the
decryption, printing, and examination should have taken place during the revision before the trial
court and after the revision committee had determined that the integrity of the official ballots had not
been preserved; (b) that the trial court did not make such determination; (c) that, in fact, Saquilayan
did not allege or present any proof in the RTC to show that the ballots or the ballot boxes had been
tampered, and had, in fact, actively participated in the revision proceedings; (d) that the First Division
should not have entertained the allegation of ballot tampering belatedly raised on appeal; (e) that the
First Division should have limited itself to reviewing the evidence on record; and (f) that the First
Division did not even explain how it had arrived at the conclusion that the integrity of the ballots had
not been preserved.

Maliksi submits that the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 is null and void for having been
promulgated despite the absence from the deliberations and lack of signature of Justice Jose
Portugal Perez.
Ruling
The Court grants Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and reverses the decision
promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division of the COMELEC denied to him
the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption and printing of the ballot
images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division
with the use of the printouts of the ballot images.
It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed recount
proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of
procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized
under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by
the COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election
protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials.4

As we see it, the First Division arbitrarily arrogated unto itself the conduct of the recount
proceedings, contrary to the regular procedure of remanding the protest to the RTC and directing the
reconstitution of the Revision Committee for the decryption and printing of the picture images and
the revision of the ballots on the basis thereof. Quite unexpectedly, the COMELEC En Banc upheld
the First Division’s unwarranted deviation from the standard procedures by invoking the COMELEC’s
power to "take such measures as the Presiding Commissioner may deem proper," and even citing
the Court’s minute resolution in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party-List v. Commission on
Elections5 to the effect that the "COMELEC has the power to adopt procedures that will ensure the
speedy resolution of its cases. The Court will not interfere with its exercise of this prerogative so long
as the parties are amply heard on their opposing claims."
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections,
the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases
should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their
opposing claims. The parties’ right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be
waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice
to be thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not
have upheld the First Division’s deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily
resolving the election protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties with notice of its proceedings
and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due process.
I.
Due process requirements

The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of
the original official ballots themselves.6 In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal,7 the Court held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the
PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the
voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional
equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of
revision of votes in an electoral protest."
That the two documents—the official ballot and its picture image—are considered "original
documents" simply means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when either
is presented as evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral
Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the
ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to the parties. Despite the equal
probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the
rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the
official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the voters’ will. In that regard, the picture
images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost
or their integrity has been compromised.
For instance, the aforesaid Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 (In Re: Comelec
Rules of Procedure on Disputes In An Automated Election System in Connection with the May 10,
2010 Elections), as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9164, itself requires that "the Recount
Committee determines that the integrity of the ballots has been violated or has not been preserved,
or are wet and otherwise in such a condition that (the ballots) cannot be recounted" before the
printing of the image of the ballots should be made, to wit:
xxxx

(g) Only when the Recount Committee, through its chairman, determines that the integrity of the
ballots has been preserved or that no signs of tampering of the ballots are present, will the recount
proceed. In case there are signs that the ballots contained therein are tampered, compromised, wet
or are otherwise in such a condition that it could not be recounted, the Recount Committee shall
follow paragraph (l) of this rule.
xxxx
(l) In the event the Recount Committee determines that the integrity of the ballots has been violated
or has not been preserved, or are wet and otherwise in such a condition that it cannot be recounted,
the Chairman of the Committee shall request from the Election Records and Statistics Department
(ERSD), the printing of the image of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the CF card used in
the May 10, 2010 elections in the presence of the parties. Printing of the ballot images shall proceed
only upon prior authentication and certification by a duly authorized personnel of the Election
Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) that the data or the images to be printed are genuine
and not substitutes. (Emphases supplied.)

xxxx
Section 6, Rule 10 (Conduct of Revision) of the 2010 Rules of Procedure for Municipal Election
Contests, which governs the proceedings in the Regional Trial Courts exercising original jurisdiction
over election protests, provides:
xxxx

(m) In the event that the revision committee determines that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot
box have not been preserved, as when proof of tampering or substitution exists, it shall proceed to
instruct the printing of the picture image of the ballots stored in the data storage device for the
precinct. The court shall provide a non-partisan technical person who shall conduct the necessary
authentication process to ensure that the data or image stored is genuine and not a substitute. Only
after this determination can the printed picture image be used for the recount. (Emphases supplied.)
xxxx
A similar procedure is found in the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, to wit:
Rule 43. Conduct of the revision. – The revision of votes shall be done through the use of
appropriate PCOS machines or manually and visually, as the Tribunal may determine, and
according to the following procedures:
xxxx
(q) In the event that the RC determines that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot box was not
preserved, as when there is proof of tampering or substitution, it shall proceed to instruct the printing
of the picture image of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the data storage device for the
same precinct. The Tribunal may avail itself of the assistance of the COMELEC for the service of a
non-partisan technical person who shall conduct the necessary authentication process to ensure that
the data or images stored are genuine and not merely substitutes. It is only upon such determination
that the printed picture image can be used for the revision of votes. (Emphases supplied.)
xxxx

Also, the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal’s Guidelines on the Revision of Ballots requires
a preliminary hearing to be held for the purpose of determining whether the integrity of the ballots
and ballot boxes used in the May 10, 2010 elections was not preserved, as when there is proof of
tampering or substitutions, to wit:

Section 10. Revision of Ballots

xxxx
(d) When it has been shown, in a preliminary hearing set by the parties or by the Tribunal, that the
integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes used in the May 10, 2010 elections was not preserved, as
when there is proof of tampering or substitutions, the Tribunal shall direct the printing of the picture
images of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the data storage device for the same precinct.
The Tribunal shall provide a non-partisan technical person who shall conduct the necessary
authentication process to ensure that the data or image stored is genuine and not a substitute. It is
only upon such determination that the printed picture image can be used for the revision. (As
amended per Resolution of February 10, 2011; Emphases supplied.)
xxxx

All the foregoing rules on revision of ballots stipulate that the printing of the picture images of the
ballots may be resorted to only after the proper Revision/Recount Committee has first determined
that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes was not preserved.
The foregoing rules further require that the decryption of the images stored in the CF cards and the
printing of the decrypted images take place during the revision or recount proceedings. There is a
good reason for thus fixing where and by whom the decryption and the printing should be conducted.
It is during the revision or recount conducted by the Revision/Recount Committee when the parties
are allowed to be represented, with their representatives witnessing the proceedings and timely
raising their objections in the course of the proceedings. Moreover, whenever the Revision/Recount
Committee makes any determination that the ballots have been tampered and have become
unreliable, the parties are immediately made aware of such determination.
When, as in the present case, it was not the Revision/Recount Committee or the RTC exercising
original jurisdiction over the protest that made the finding that the ballots had been tampered, but the
First Division in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the parties should have been given a formal
notice thereof.
Maliksi was not immediately made aware of that crucial finding because the First Division did not
even issue any written resolution stating its reasons for ordering the printing of the picture images.
The parties were formally notified that the First Division had found that the ballots had been
tampered only when they received the resolution of August 15, 2012, whereby the First Division
nullified the decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. Even so, the
resolution of the First Division to that effect was unusually mute about the factual bases for the
finding of ballot box tampering, and did not also particularize how and why the First Division was
concluding that the integrity of the ballots had been compromised. All that the First Division declared
as justification was a simple generalization of the same being apparent from the allegations of ballot
and ballot box tampering and upon inspection of the ballot boxes, viz:
xxxx

The Commission (First Division) took into consideration the allegations of ballot and ballot box
tampering and upon inspecting the ballot boxes, it is apparent that the integrity of the ballots had
been compromised so, to be able to best determine the true will of the electorate, we decided to go
over the digital image of the appealed ballots.8 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
It was the COMELEC En Banc’s assailed resolution of September 14, 2012 that later on provided
the explanation to justify the First Division’s resort to the picture images of the ballots, by observing
that the "unprecedented number of double-votes" exclusively affecting the position of Mayor and the
votes for Saquilayan had led to the belief that the ballots had been tampered. However, that
explanation by the COMELEC En Banc did not cure the First Division’s lapse and did not erase the
irregularity that had already invalidated the First Division’s proceedings.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonio T. Carpio advances the view that the COMELEC’s finding
of ballot tampering was a mere surplusage because there was actually no need for such finding
before the ballots’ digital counterparts could be used. He cites Section 3, Rule 16 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804, as amended by Resolution No. 9164, which states:
Section 3. Printing of Ballot Images. - In case the parties deem it necessary, they may file a motion
to be approved by the Division of the Commission requesting for the printing of ballot images in
addition to those mentioned in the second paragraph of item (e). Parties concerned shall provide the
necessary materials in the printing of images such as but not limited to copying papers, toners and
printers. Parties may also secure, upon prior approval by the Division of the Commission, a soft copy
of the ballot images contained in a secured/hashed disc on the condition that the ballot images be
first printed, at the expense of the requesting party, and that the printed copies be signed by the
parties’ respective revisors or representatives and by an ERSD IT-capable representative and
deposited with the Commission.
The Over-all chairman shall coordinate with the Director IV, Election Records and Statistics
Department (ERSD), for the printing of images. Said director shall in turn designate a personnel who
will be responsible in the printing of ballot images.
Justice Carpio posits that when a party files a motion for the printing of the ballots that he or she
deems necessary, there is actually no need for a finding of tampering of the ballots or the ballot
boxes before the COMELEC Division may grant the motion. He states that a determination by the
parties that the printing is necessary under Section 3 is a ground separate from Section 6(e), which
in turn pertinently states that:
Section 6. Conduct of the Recount –
 xxxx
(e) Before the opening of the ballot box, the Recount Committee shall note its condition as well as
that of the locks or locking mechanism and record the condition in the recount report. From its
observation, the Recount Committee must also make a determination as to whether the integrity of
the ballot box has been preserved.
In the event that there are signs of tampering or if the ballot box appears to have been
compromised, the Recount Committee shall still proceed to open the ballot box and make a physical
inventory of the contents thereof. The committee shall, however, record its general observation of
the ballots and other documents found in the ballot box.
The application of Section 3 to this case is inappropriate, considering that the First Division did not in
any way suggest in its decision dated August 15, 2010 that it was resolving Saquilayan’s motion to
print the ballot images. Instead, the First Division made therein a finding of tampering, thus:

The COMELEC (First Division) took into consideration the allegations of ballot and ballot box
tampering and upon inspecting the ballot boxes, it is apparent that the integrity of the ballots had
been compromised so, to be able to best determine the true will of the electorate, we decided to go
over the digital images of the appealed ballots.

Even the COMELEC En Banc did not indicate in its decision dated September 14, 2012 that the First
Division merely resolved Saquilayan’s motion for the printing of the ballot images; instead, it
reinforced the First Division’s finding that there was tampering of the ballots. The non-mention of
Saquilayan’s motion was a clear indication of the COMELEC’s intention to act motu proprio; and also
revealed its interpretation of its very own rules, that there must be justifiable reason, i.e. tampering,
before the ballot images could be resorted to.
The application of Section 3 would only highlight the First Division’s denial of Maliksi’s right to due
process. For, if the First Division was really only acting on a motion to allow the printing of the ballot
images, there was a greater reason for the First Division to have given the parties notice of its ruling
thereon. But, as herein noted, the First Division did not issue such ruling.
To interpret Section 3 as granting to any one of the parties the right to move for the printing of the
ballot images should such party deem it necessary, and the COMELEC may grant such motion, is
contrary to its clear wording. Section 3 explicitly states: "in case the parties deem it necessary, they
may file a motion." The provision really envisions a situation in which both parties have agreed that
the ballot images should be printed. Should only one of the parties move for the printing of the ballot
images, it is not Section 3 that applies but Section 6(e), which then requires a finding that the
integrity of the ballots has been compromised.

The disregard of Maliksi’s right to be informed of the decision to print the picture images of the
ballots and to conduct the recount proceedings during the appellate stage cannot be brushed aside
by the invocation of the fact that Maliksi was able to file, after all, a motion for reconsideration. To be
exact, the motion for reconsideration was actually directed against the entire resolution of the First
Division, while Maliksi’s claim of due process violation is directed only against the First Division’s
recount proceedings that resulted in the prejudicial result rendered against him. Notably, the First
Division did not issue any order directing the recount. Without the written order, Maliksi was deprived
of the chance to seek any reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held recount through a
seasonable petition for certiorari in this Court. In that context, he had no real opportunity to assail the
conduct of the recount proceedings.
The service of the First Division orders requiring Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits
for the printing of the picture images did not sufficiently give Maliksi notice of the First Division’s
decision to print the picture images. The said orders did not meet the requirements of due process
because they did not specifically inform Maliksi that the ballots had been found to be tampered. Nor
did the orders offer the factual bases for the finding of tampering. Hence, to leave for Maliksi to
surmise on the factual bases for finding the need to print the picture images still violated the
principles of fair play, because the responsibility and the obligation to lay down the factual bases and
to inform Maliksi as the party to be potentially prejudiced thereby firmly rested on the shoulders of
the First Division.
Moreover, due process of law does not only require notice of the decryption, printing, and recount
proceedings to the parties, but also demands an opportunity to be present at such proceedings or to
be represented therein. Maliksi correctly contends that the orders of the First Division simply
required Saquilayan to post and augment his cash deposit. The orders did not state the time, date,
and venue of the decryption and recount proceedings. Clearly, the First Division had no intention of
giving the parties the opportunity to witness its proceedings.
Mendoza v. Commission on Elections9 instructs that notice to the parties and their participation are
required during the adversarial aspects of the proceedings. In that case, after the revision of the
ballots and after the election protest case was submitted for decision, the ballots and ballot boxes
were transferred to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) in connection with a protest case pending in
the SET. Mendoza later learned that the COMELEC, with the permission of the SET, had meanwhile
conducted proceedings within the SET’s premises. Mendoza then claimed that his right to due
process was violated because he had not been given notice by the COMELEC that it would be
conducting further proceedings within the SET premises. The Court did not sustain his claim,
however, and pointed out:
After consideration of the respondents’ Comments and the petitioner’s petition and Reply, we hold
that the contested proceedings at the SET ("contested proceedings") are no longer part of the
adversarial aspects of the election contest that would require notice of hearing and the participation
of the parties. As the COMELEC stated in its Comment and without any contrary or disputing claim
in the petitioner’s Reply:

"However, contrary to the claim of petitioner, public respondent in the appreciation of the contested
ballots in EPC No. 2007-44 simultaneously with the SET in SET Case No. 001-07 is not conducting
"further proceedings" requiring notice to the parties. There is no revision or correction of the ballots
because EPC No. 2007-04 was already submitted for resolution. Public respondent, in coordinating
with the SET, is simply resolving the submitted protest case before it. The parties necessarily take
no part in said deliberation, which require utmost secrecy. Needless to state, the actual decision-
making process is supposed to be conducted only by the designated members of the Second
Division of the public respondent in strict confidentiality."
In other words, what took place at the SET were the internal deliberations of the COMELEC, as a
quasi-judicial body, in the course of appreciating the evidence presented and deciding the provincial
election contest on the merits. These deliberations are no different from judicial deliberations which
are considered confidential and privileged. We find it significant that the private respondent’s
Comment fully supported the COMELEC’s position and disavowed any participation in the contested
proceeding the petitioner complained about. The petitioner, on the other hand, has not shown that
the private respondent was ever present in any proceeding at the SET relating to the provincial
election contest.1âwphi1
To conclude, the rights to notice and to be heard are not material considerations in the COMELEC’s
handling of the Bulacan provincial election contest after the transfer of the ballot boxes to the SET;
no proceedings at the instance of one party or of COMELEC has been conducted at the SET that
would require notice and hearing because of the possibility of prejudice to the other party. The
COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party of the steps it is taking in the course of
deliberating on the merits of the provincial election contest. In the context of our standard of review
for the petition, we see no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
committed by the COMELEC in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the appreciation
of ballots this deliberation entailed.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the First Division denominated the proceedings it had conducted as an "appreciation of
ballots" like in Mendoza. But unlike in Mendoza, the proceedings conducted by the First Division
were adversarial, in that the proceedings included the decryption and printing of the picture images
of the ballots and the recount of the votes were to be based on the printouts of the picture images.
The First Division did not simply review the findings of the RTC and the Revision Committee, but
actually conducted its own recount proceedings using the printouts of the picture image of the
ballots. As such, the First Division was bound to notify the parties to enable them to participate in the
proceedings.
Significantly, Section 6(l), Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No, 8804, as amended by COMELEC
Resolution No. 9164, requires the parties’ presence during the printing of the images of the ballots,
thus:

xxxx
(l) In the event the Recount Committee determines that the integrity of the ballots has been violated
or has not been preserved, or are wet and otherwise in such a condition that it cannot be recounted,
the Chairman of the Committee shall request from the Election Records and Statistics Department
(ERSD), the printing of the image of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the CF card used in
the May 10, 2010 elections in the presence of the parties. Printing of the ballot images shall proceed
only upon prior authentication and certification by a duly authorized personnel of the Election
Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) that the data or the images to be printed are genuine
and not substitutes.
xxxx
We should not ignore that the parties’ participation during the revision and recount proceedings
would not benefit only the parties, but was as vital and significant for the COMELEC as well, for only
by their participation would the COMELEC’s proceedings attain credibility as to the result. The
parties’ presence would have ensured that the requisite procedures have been followed, including
the required authentication and certification that the images to be printed are genuine. In this regard,
the COMELEC was less than candid, and was even cavalier in its conduct of the decryption and
printing of the picture images of the ballots and the recount proceedings. The COMELEC was
merely content with listing the guidelines that the First Division had followed in the appreciation of
the ballots and the results of the recount. In short, there was vagueness as to what rule had been
followed in the decryption and printing proceeding.
II.
Remand to the COMELEC
We are mindful of the urgent need to speedily resolve the election protest because the term of the
position involved is about to end. Thus, we overlook pro hac vice the lack of factual basis for the
COMELEC’s decision to use the digital images of the ballots and sustain its decision thereon.
Although a remand of the election protest to the RTC would have been the appropriate procedure,
we direct the COMELEC En Banc instead to conduct the decryption and printing of the digital
images of the ballots and to hold recount proceedings, with due notice to all the parties and
opportunity for them to be present and to participate during such proceedings. Nothing less serves
the ideal objective safeguarded by the Constitution.
In the absence of particular rules to govern its proceedings in accordance with this disposition, the
COMELEC is urged to follow and observe Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended
by COMELEC Resolution No. 9164.

The Court, by this resolution, does not intend to validate the victory of any of the parties in the 2010
Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as yet. The Court simply does not want to
countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, a cornerstone of our legal
system.11 After all, it is the Court’s primary duty to protect the basic rights of the people vis-à-vis
government actions, thus:
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared
towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this
ethical principle: "The end does not justify the means." No matter how noble and worthy of
admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply
irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. The Court cannot just
turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined
principles.12
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioner Emmanuel Maliksi; REVERSES the Court's decision promulgated on March 12, 2013; and
DIRECTS the Commission on Elections En Bane to conduct proceedings for the decryption of the
picture images of the ballots involved in the protest after due authentication, and for the recount of
ballots by using the printouts of the ballot images, with notice to and in the presence of the parties or
their representatives in accordance with the procedure laid down by Rule 15 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804, as amended by Resolution No. 9164.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Re: Letter Complaint of Merlita B. Fabiana Against Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., et al., 700 SCRA
348, July 02, 2013

A.M. No. CA-13-51-J July 2, 2013

RE: LETTER COMPLAINT OF MERLITA B. FABIANA AGAINST PRESIDING JUSTICE ANDRES
B. REYES, JR., ASSOCIATE JUSTICES ISAIAS P. DICDICAN AND STEPHEN C. CRUZ; CARAG
JAMORA SOMERA AND VILLAREAL LAW OFFICES AND ITS LAWYERS ATTYS. ELPIDIO C.
JAMORA, JR. AND BEATRIZ O. GERONILLA-VILLEGAS, LAWYERS FOR MAGSAYSAY
MARITIME CORPORATION AND VISAYAN SURETY AND INSURANCE CORPORATION.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative matter stems from the claim for death benefits by the heirs of the late Marlon
Fabiana (heirs of Fabiana) against manning agent Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and its principal
Air Sea Holiday GMBH-Stable Organizations Italia.

Complainant Merlita B. Fabiana, Marlon’s surviving spouse, hereby accuses Court of Appeals (CA)
Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and Associate Justice
Stephen C. Cruz, as the former Members of the CA’s First Division, of having openly defied the
resolution promulgated by the Court on January 13, 2010 in G.R. No. 189726 entitled Heirs of the
Late Marlon A. Fabiana, [herein represented by Merlita B. Fabiana] v. Magsaysay Maritime Corp., et
al., whereby the Court had allegedly "fixed with finality complainant’s claims for death benefits and
other monetary claims, including damages and attorney’s fees, against the Maritime Company
arising from the death of her husband."1
The relevant antecedents follow.
On December 19, 2007, the Labor Arbiter granted the following claims to the heirs of Fabiana, to wit:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing premises, respondents are liable to pay the following to
the complainants:
US $82,500.00 death benefits to complainant Merlita B. Fabiana;

US $16,500.00 to complainant Jomari Paul B. Fabiana;

Salary differentials from July 17, 2006 to April 23, 2007 computed at US $1,038 deducting the US
$424.00 monthly salaries already paid by the respondents;
The difference of 1,500.00 Euro contributed by fellow Filipino seafarer and US $1,000 remitted by
respondents computed at the rate of exchange at the time of payment;

Sick benefits from April 23, 2007 to May 11, 2007 computed at US $1,038.00 monthly salary rate;
US $331.00 guaranteed overtime pay;
P7,574.00 actual damages;
P100,000.00 for moral damages;

P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages;

Ten percent (10%) attorney’s fees computed on the total awards.2
On December 10, 2008, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) rendered its
decision,3 disposing:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal is MODIFIED in the sense that the award
of moral and exemplary damages are reduced to P50,000.00 each while the other awards are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The parties then separately brought their respective petitions for certiorari to the CA, specifically:
(a)
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 109382 entitled Heirs of the late Marlon A. Fabiana, herein represented by Merlita
B. Fabiana v. National Labor Relations Commission, Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and Air Sea
Holiday GMBH-Stab[i]le Organizations Italia (Hotel), assailing the jurisdiction of the NLRC in
entertaining the appeal of Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and its principal, and seeking the
reinstatement of the moral and exemplary damages as awarded by the Labor Arbiter (first
petition);4 and

(b)
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 109699 entitled Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, Eduardo Manese, Prudential
Guarantee (Surety), and Air Sea Holiday GMBH-Stable Organizations, Italia v. Heirs of the late
Marlon Fabiana, and National Labor Relations Commission challenging the propriety of the
monetary awards granted to the heirs of Fabiana (second petition).5
In the second petition, the petitioners averred that the late Marlon Fabiana had died from a non-work
related disease after his employment contract had terminated.
On August 20, 2009, when the heirs of Fabiana filed their comment vis-à-vis the second petition,
they sought the consolidation of the two petitions. Their request for consolidation was not acted
upon, however, but was soon mooted a month later by the First Division of the CA promulgating its
decision on the first petition (C.A.-G.R. No. 109382) on September 29, 2009,6 to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the challenged
Decision is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED insofar as interest at the rate of six percent per annum (6%
p.a.) is imposed on all the monetary awards, reckoned from the Labor Arbiter’s judgment on 19
December 2007, except moral and exemplary damages to which the same rate of interest is
imposed, but reckoned from the time the aforementioned decision was promulgated on 10
December 2008 by the NLRC Sixth Division. An additional interest of twelve percent per annum
(12% p.a.) is applied on the total amount ultimately awarded upon finality of the decision until fully
paid.
The petitioners’ motion for preliminary mandatory injunction is deemed resolved by this decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Magsaysay Maritime Corporation filed on October 25, 2009 a motion for clarification in C.A.-G.R. No.
109382 instead of a motion for reconsideration.7 In response, the CA issued its clarification on
November 26, 2009 by stating that the "affirmance with modification" was but the "consequence of
the certiorari petition being merely ‘partially granted.’"8

On their part, the heirs of Fabiana filed a motion for reconsideration in C.A.-G.R. No. 109382, which
the CA denied. Hence, on November 23, 2009, they appealed to the Court by petition for review on
certiorari (G.R. No. 189726). However, the Court, through the Third Division,9 denied the petition for
review on certiorari through the resolution of January 13, 2010,10 quoted as follows:

Acting on the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated 29 September 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109382, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for failure to
sufficiently show that the appellate court committed any reversible error in the challenged decision
as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
A careful consideration of the petition indicates a failure of the petitioners to show any cogent reason
why the actions of the Labor Arbiter, the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of
Appeals which have passed upon the same issue should be reversed. Petitioners failed to show that
their factual findings are not based on substantial evidence or that their decisions are contrary to
applicable law and jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.
In the meanwhile, on October 16, 2009, the heirs of Fabiana moved to dismiss the second petition
(C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 109699) on the ground that the intervening promulgation on September 29, 2009
by the First Division of the decision on the first petition (C.A.-G.R. No. 109382) had rendered the
second petition moot and academic.11
On June 4, 2010, however, the First Division of the CA, then comprised by Presiding Justice Reyes,
Jr., Associate Justice Dicdican (ponente) and Associate Justice Cruz, denied the motion to dismiss
filed in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 109699,12 holding thusly:
This has reference to the motion filed by the private respondents, through their counsel, to dismiss
the petition in the case at bench on the ground that it has been rendered moot and academic by the
decision promulgated on September 29, 2009 by this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 109382.

After a judicious scrutiny of the whole matter, we find the said motion to dismiss to be wanting in
merit. It is not true that the petition in this case has been rendered moot and academic by the
decision promulgated by this Court on September 29, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 109382. The said
decision rendered by this Court passed upon two limited issues only, namely, the NLRC’s jurisdiction
to allow the petitioners’ appeal thereto despite flaws in their verification and non-forum shopping
papers and the propriety of the reduction by the NLRC of the amount of damages awarded to the
private respondents. A reading of the said decision will unmistakably bear this out. However, in the
case at bench, the petitioners have assailed omnibously the NLRC’s awards in favor of the private
respondents for death benefits, sickness allowance, salary differentials and other monetary claims.
We have to pass upon the propriety of all these monetary awards.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, we hereby DENY the aforementioned motion to
dismiss filed in this case.
We hereby give the parties a fresh period of fifteen (15) days from notice hereof within which to file
memoranda in support of their respective sides of the case.
SO ORDERED.
The second petition (C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 109699) was ultimately resolved on September 16, 2011 by
the Sixth Division of the CA, composed of Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, Associate Justice
Normandie B. Pizarro (ponente) and Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, dismissing the petition
upon not finding the NLRC to have gravely abused its discretion.
As earlier adverted to, the complainant accuses Presiding Justice Reyes, Jr., Associate Justice
Dicdican and Associate Justice Cruz with thereby willfully disobeying the resolution of January 13,
2010 promulgated by the Court.
The complaint lacks merit.

In administrative proceedings, the burden of substantiating the charges falls on the complainant who
must prove her allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence.13 Here, the allegation of willful
disobedience against respondent CA Justices was unsubstantiated and baseless. The issues raised
in the first petition (C.A.-G.R. No. 109382) were limited to the NLRC’s jurisdiction over the appeal by
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and its principal, and to the reduction of the amounts awarded as
moral and exemplary damages. In contrast, the second petition (C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 109699)
concerned only the propriety of awarding monetary benefits. Under the circumstances, the
promulgation by the Court of the resolution of January 13, 2010 in G.R. No. 189726 did not divest
the respondents as members of the First Division of the CA of the jurisdiction to entertain and pass
upon the second petition (C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 109699), something that they sought to explain through
their resolution promulgated on June 4, 2010. The explanation, whether correct or not, was issued in
the exercise of judicial discretion. It is not for us to say now in a resolution of this administrative
complaint whether the explanation was appropriate or not, nor for the complainant to herself hold
them in error. The recourse open to the heirs of Fabiana, including the complainant, was to move for
the correction of the resolution, if they disagreed with it, and, should their motion be denied, to assail
the denial in this Court through the remedy warranted under the law.
The complainant’s initiation of her complaint would take respondent Justices to task for their regular
performance of their office. Yet, as the surviving spouse of the late-lamented Marlon, she was
understandably desirous of the most favorable and quickest outcome for the claim for death benefits
because his intervening demise had rendered her and her family bereft of his support. Regardless of
how commendable were her motives for initiating this administrative complaint, however, she could
not substitute a proper judicial remedy not taken with an improper administrative denunciation of the
Justices she has hereby charged. That is impermissible. If she felt aggrieved at all, she should have
resorted to the available proper judicial remedy, and exhausted it, instead of resorting to the
unworthy disciplinary charge.
Truly, disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against any Judge or Justice in relation
to the performance of official functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate
judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies.14 The Court has fittingly explained why in In
Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo,15 to wit:
Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court
and the lower courts established by law, the question submits to only one answer: the administrative
or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is
available, and must wait on the result thereof.
Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that any contrary
postulation can have only intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who feels aggrieved by a
judicial order or decision not yet final and executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal
prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an
indispensable first step, confer the prosecutor (Ombudsman) with an incongruous function
pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the determination of whether the questioned disposition is
erroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that
impediment, whatever determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of administrative or
criminal litigation, a possibility hereafter more fully explored.
Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already pointed out, within the
power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly or vicariously, to review
judgments or final orders or resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review—by appeal or
special civil action—is not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised in
accordance with a well-defined and long established hierarchy, and long standing processes and
procedures. No other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and vexatiously
repetitive.
Moreover, in Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-
Gymn Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon.
Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals,16 the Court
ruminates:
In this regard, we reiterate that a judge’s failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate
the evidence presented does not necessarily incur administrative liability, for to hold him
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has
erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make his position doubly unbearable. His judicial
office will then be rendered untenable, because no one called upon to try the facts or to interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. Administrative sanction
and criminal liability should be visited on him only when the error is so gross, deliberate and
malicious, or is committed with evident bad faith, or only in clear cases of violations by him of the
standards and norms of propriety and good behavior prescribed by law and the rules of procedure,
or fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence. 1âwphi1

To be clear, although we do not shirk from the responsibility of imposing discipline on the erring
Judges or Justices and employees of the Judiciary, we shall not hesitate to shield them from
baseless charges that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice.17
Even as we dismiss the administrative charge, we deem it necessary to observe further, in the
exercise of our administrative supervision over the CA, that the matter addressed here was really
simple and avoidable if only the CA had promptly implemented its current procedure for the
consolidation of petitions or proceedings relating to or arising from the same controversies. Section
3(a), Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals has forthrightly mandated the
consolidation of related cases assigned to different Justices, viz:

Section 3. Consolidation of Cases. – When related cases are assigned to different justices, they
shall be consolidated and assigned to one Justice.
(a) Upon motion of a party with notice to the other party/ies, or at the instance of the Justice to whom
any or the related cases is assigned, upon notice to the parties, consolidation shall ensue when the
cases involve the same parties and/or related questions of fact and/or law. (Emphases supplied)
xxxx
A perusal of the two petitions showed that they involved the same parties and the same facts. Even
their issues of law, albeit not entirely identical, were closely related to one another. It could not also
be denied that they assailed the same decision of the NLRC. For these reasons alone, the request
for consolidation by the heirs of Fabiana should have been granted, and the two petitions
consolidated in the same Division of the CA.

The consolidation of two or more actions is authorized where the cases arise from the same act,
event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the
same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction and that consolidation will not give one party
an undue advantage or that consolidation will not prejudice the substantial rights of any of the
parties.18 As to parties, their substantial identity will suffice. Substantial identity of parties exists when
there is a community of interest or privity of interest between a party in the first case and a party in
the second, even if the latter has not been impleaded in the first case.19 As to issues, what is
required is mere identity of issues where the parties, although not identical, present conflicting
claims.20 The justification for consolidation is to prevent a judge from deciding identical issues
presented in the case assigned to him in a manner that will prejudice another judge from deciding a
similar case before him.
We are perplexed why the CA did not act on and grant the request for consolidation filed on August
20, 2009 by the heirs of Fabiana. In fact, the consolidation should have been required as a matter of
course even without any of the parties seeking the consolidation of the petitions, considering that the
two cases rested on the same set of facts, and involved claims arising from the death of the late
Marlon Fabiana.
It is true that under the Rules of Court,21 the consolidation of cases for trial is permissive and a
matter of judicial discretion.22 This is because trials held in the first instance require the attendance of
the parties, their respective counsel and their witnesses, a task that surely entails an expense that
can multiply if there are several proceedings upon the same issues involving the same parties. At
the trial stage, the avoidance of unnecessary expenses and undue vexation to the parties is the
primary objective of consolidation of cases.23 But the permissiveness of consolidation does not carry
over to the appellate stage where the primary objective is less the avoidance of unnecessary
expenses and undue vexation than it is the ideal realization of the dual function of all appellate
adjudications. The dual function is expounded thuswise:
An appellate court serves a dual function. The first is the review for correctness function, whereby
the case is reviewed on appeal to assure that substantial justice has been done. The second is the
institutional function, which refers to the progressive development of the law for general application
in the judicial system.
Differently stated, the review for correctness function is concerned with the justice of the particular
case while the institutional function is concerned with the articulation and application of constitutional
principles, the authoritative interpretation of statutes, and the formulation of policy within the proper
sphere of the judicial function.
The duality also relates to the dual function of all adjudication in the common law system. The first
pertains to the doctrine of res judicata, which decides the case and settles the controversy; the
second is the doctrine of stare decisis, which pertains to the precedential value of the case which
assists in deciding future similar cases by the application of the rule or principle derived from the
earlier case.
With each level of the appellate structure, the review for correctness function diminishes and the
institutional function, which concerns itself with uniformity of judicial administration and the
progressive development of the law, increases.24
In the appellate stage, therefore, the rigid policy is to make the consolidation of all cases and
proceedings resting on the same set of facts, or involving identical claims or interests or parties
mandatory. Such consolidation should be made regardless of whether or not the parties or any of
them requests it. A mandatory policy eliminates conflicting results concerning similar or like issues
between the same parties or interests even as it enhances the administration of justice.
In this connection, the Court reminds all attorneys appearing as counsel for the initiating parties of
their direct responsibility to give prompt notice of any related cases pending in the courts, and to
move for the consolidation of such related cases in the proper courts. This responsibility proceeds
from their express undertakings in the certifications against forum-shopping that accompany their
initiatory pleadings pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 7 and related rules in the Rules of Court, to the
effect that they have not theretofore commenced any actions or filed any claims involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of their knowledge, no such
other actions or claims are pending therein; that if there were such other pending actions or claims,
to render complete statements of the present status thereof; and if they should thereafter learn that
the same or similar actions or claims have been filed or are pending, they shall report that fact within
five days therefrom to the courts wherein the said complaints or initiatory pleadings have been filed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the administrative complaint against Presiding Justice Andres
B. Reyes, Jr., Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz of the
Court of Appeals for its lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to forthwith adopt measures that will ensure the strict
observance of Section 3, Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, including the
revision of the rule itself to make the consolidation of cases and proceedings concerning similar or
like issues or involving the same parties or interests mandatory and not dependent on the initiative of
the parties or of any of them.
All attorneys of the parties in cases brought to the third level courts either on appeal or interlocutory
review (like certiorari) are REQUIRED to promptly notify the reviewing courts of the pendency of any
other cases and proceedings involving the same parties and issues pending in the same or other
courts.
Let this decision be FURNISHED to the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals
and the Office of the Court Administrator for their guidance; and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for dissemination to all its chapters.
SO ORDERED.

Re: Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases for Submitted for Decision and to
Resolve Pending Motions in the Regional Trial Court, Br. 27, San Fernando, La Union, 700 SCRA 806, July
09, 2013

A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC July 9, 2013

RE: FAILURE OF FORMER JUDGE ANTONIO A. CARBONELL TO DECIDE CASES

SUBMITTED FOR DECISION AND TO RESOLVE PENDING MOTIONS IN THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 27, SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case originates from the judicial audit conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) on March 3 and 4, 2008 in the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union,
Branch 27, in view of the disability retirement of Presiding Judge Antonio A. Carbonell on December
31, 2007.

According to the Audit Team’s Report, Branch 27 had a total caseload of 231 cases, consisting of
147 criminal cases and 84 civil cases, and Judge Carbonell failed to decide 41 criminal cases (one
inherited) and 22 civil cases (four inherited), namely: Criminal Case Nos. 1183, 4559, 5117, 3532,
3672, 5165, 5007, 5946, 6934, 5763, 7014, 5991, 4724, 6311, 6076, 4789, 6297, 5424, 4928, 6403,
6816, 5635, 5666, 5134, 5865, 6284, 6454, 5394, 6770, 5375, 5356, 7557, 5940, 6311, 6333, 7729,
7111, 6325, 6068, 6517, and 7766; and Civil Case Nos. 3009, 4564, 4563, 4714, 3647, 4362, 6041,
4798, 4561, 6989, 2882, 6185, 7153, 7163, LRC 2332, SCA 7198, 7310, 3487, 7327, 7331, 7298,
and 7323.1

Judge Carbonell was also reported to have failed to resolve pending motions or incidents in four
criminal cases and 12 civil cases, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 7559, 6409, 7787, and 7788; and Civil
Case Nos. 4793, LRC 1308, 7064, 4973, SP 2901, SP 2952, AC 1797, 7100, 7152, 7060, SP 2986,
and SP 2987.2

In a Memorandum dated May 15, 2008, the OCA recommended to the Court that a fine
of P50,000.00 be imposed upon Judge Carbonell for gross inefficiency for failing to promptly decide
the cases and to resolve pending motions and incidents.3

On June 17, 2008, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to furnish Judge Carbonell with a copy of
the Audit Team’s Report, and ordered him to submit his comment on the report within ten days from
notice.4

Not having received the comment from Judge Carbonell despite the lapse of the time given, the
Court resolved on September 21, 2010 to require him to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt.5

Judge Carbonell replied,6 stating that he had incorporated his comment/compliance to the June 17,
2008 resolution in the letter dated July 17, 2008 (Re: Very Urgent Request for Release of Disability
Retirement Benefits and Money Value of Accrued Leave Credits) he had sent to Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno.7 He remarked that the Court had actually granted his request for the payment of
his disability retirement benefits subject to the retention of P200,000.00 pending resolution of the
pending administrative cases against him.8

In his July 17, 2008 letter to Chief Justice Puno, Judge Carbonell surmised that the Audit Team
might have overlooked the fact that he had inherited some of the undecided cases from the
predecessor judge; that said cases had no transcripts of stenographic notes, because of which he
was impelled to require the parties to submit their respective memoranda; that the cases would only
be considered submitted for decision after the parties would have filed their respective memoranda;
and that he had undergone a quadruple heart bypass operation in 2005 that had adversely affected
his pace in deciding the cases.

On November 23, 2010, the Court referred Judge Carbonell’s letter to the OCA for evaluation,
report, and recommendation.9

In its Memorandum dated February 2, 2011,10 the OCA reiterated its recommendation to impose a
fine of P50,000.00 on Judge Carbonell, noting that he had failed to render any valid reason for his
delay in deciding the cases submitted for decision and in resolving the pending motions or incidents
in other cases. The OCA noted that only five cases submitted for decision had been inherited; and
that the case records did not bear any requests for extension of time or any directive for the
transcription of stenographic notes. It stressed that heavy caseload would not justify the failure to
promptly decide and resolve cases because he could have simply asked the Court for an extension
of time.

The recommendation of the OCA is well-taken, subject to the modification of the penalty to be
imposed.

As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should at all times act with efficiency and probity.
He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain professional competence. The
pursuit of excellence ought always to be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that he
can do to sustain the trust and confidence that the public have reposed in him and the institution he
represents.11

The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases.12 Delay in the
disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judicial
system, as judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay.13 Thus, judges
have been constantly reminded to strictly adhere to the rule on the speedy disposition of cases and
observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for deciding cases, which is three months from
the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum for lower courts.14 To further impress upon
judges such mandate, the Court has issued guidelines (Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated
January 15, 1999) that would insure the speedy disposition of cases and has therein reminded
judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution.

Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges and understanding of
circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses. Hence, the Court
has allowed extensions of time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to
do is to request and justify an extension of time to decide the cases, and the Court has almost
invariably granted such request.

Judge Carbonell failed to decide a total of 63 cases and to resolve 16 pending motions or incidents
within the 90-day reglementary period. He intimated that his poor health affected his pace in
deciding the cases. Had such been the case, then he should have explained his predicament to the
Court and asked for an extension of time to decide the cases. Unfortunately, he failed to do so.

Judge Carbonell claims that some of the inherited cases had no transcripts of stenographic notes,
thereby preventing him from resolving the cases on time. He posits that a case would not be
considered submitted for decision if the parties did not yet file their respective memoranda. 1âwphi 1

The Audit Team’s Report shows that, in an apparent attempt to suspend the running of the 90-day
period to decide the cases, Judge Carbonell liberally gave the parties in most of the overdue cases
several extensions of time to file their respective memoranda. Some extensions were even for
indefinite periods, with the parties being simply given "ample time to file their memo," as the relevant
court orders stated.

In view of the foregoing, Judge Carbonell’s excuses are futile in the light of the following provisions
of Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3, 1989, viz:

(3)

A case is considered submitted for decision upon the admission of the evidence of
the parties at the termination of the trial. The ninety (90) days period for deciding the
case shall commence to run from submission of the case for decision without
 memoranda; in case the Court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be
considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or the
expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack of transcript of
stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the period for
deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by another judge not the
deciding judge in which case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days
from the completion of the transcripts within which to decide the same.

(4)

The court may grant extension of time to file memoranda, but the ninety (90) day
period for deciding shall not be interrupted thereby.

Without a doubt, Judge Carbonell’s failure to decide several cases within the reglementary period,
without justifiable and credible reasons, constituted gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of
administrative sanctions,15 like fines. The fines imposed have varied in each case, depending chiefly
on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, including the
presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances like the damage suffered by the parties from
the delay, the health condition and age of the judge, etc.16 Thus, in one case, the Court mitigated the
liability of a Judge who had been suffering from illnesses and who had later retired due to disability,
and imposed upon him a fine of P20,000.00 for failure to decide 31 cases.17

Considering that Judge Carbonell similarly retired due to disability, the Court believes that his poor
health condition greatly contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his duties as a trial judge.
That mitigated his administrative liability, for which reason the Court reduces the recommended
penalty of fine from P50,000.00 to P20,000.00.

WHEREFORE, Retired Judge Antonio A. Carbonell is ORDERED to pay a fine of P20,000.00 to be

deducted from the P200,000.00 that was withheld from his retirement benefits, and the balance to be
immediately released to him.

SO ORDERED.

Samson vs. Era, 701 SCRA 241, July 16, 2013

A.C. No. 6664 July 16, 2013

FERDINAND A. SAMSON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An attorney who wittingly represents and serves conflicting interests may be suspended from the
practice of law, or even disbarred when circumstances so warrant.
Antecedents
Ferdinand A. Samson has brought this complaint for disbarment charging respondent Atty. Edgardo
O. Era with violation of his trust and confidence of a client by representing the interest of Emilia C.
Sison, his present client, in a manner that blatantly conflicted with his interest.
Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding scam
perpetrated by ICS Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level Marketing Business (ICS
Corporation), a corporation whose corporate officers were led by Sison. The other officers were
Ireneo C. Sison, William C. Sison, Mimosa H. Zamudio, Mirasol H. Aguilar and Jhun Sison.
Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the criminal prosecution
of Sison and her group. Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the demand letter dated
July 19, 2002 demanding the return or refund of the money subject of their complaints. He also
prepared the complaint-affidavit that Samson signed and swore to on July 26, 2002. Subsequently,
the complaint-affidavit charging Sison and the other corporate officials of ICS Corporation with
several counts of estafa1was presented to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
(OCPQC). After the preliminary investigation, the OCPQC formally charged Sison and the others
with several counts of estafa in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96 (RTC), in Quezon City.2
In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss the possibility of
an amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson and the others that undergoing
a trial of the cases would just be a waste of time, money and effort for them, and that they could
settle the cases with Sison and her group, with him guaranteeing the turnover to them of a certain
property located in Antipolo City belonging to ICS Corporation in exchange for their desistance. They
acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in turn they received a deed of
assignment covering land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-4475 executed by
Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation.3
Samson and his relatives later demanded from Atty. Era that they be given instead a deed of
absolute sale to enable them to liquidate the property among themselves. It took some period of
negotiations between them and Atty. Era before the latter delivered to them on November 27, 2003
five copies of a deed of absolute sale involving the property. However, Atty. Era told them that
whether or not the title of the property had been encumbered or free from lien or defect would no
longer be his responsibility. He further told them that as far as he was concerned he had already
accomplished his professional responsibility towards them upon the amicable settlement of the
cases between them and ICS Corporation.4
When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title of the property at the Registry of Deeds and
the Assessor’s Office of Antipolo City, they were dismayed to learn that they could not liquidate the
property because it was no longer registered under the name of ICS Corporation but was already
under the name of Bank Wise Inc.5 Upon their urging, Atty. Era negotiated as their counsel with ICS
Corporation.
Due to the silence of Atty. Era for sometime thereafter, Samson and his group wrote to him on
September 8, 2004 to remind him about his guarantee and the promise to settle the issues with
Sison and her cohorts. But they did not hear from Atty. Era at all.6
During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his group. This
forced them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to find out later on, however, that Atty.
Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other criminal cases in
the other branches of the RTC in Quezon City involving the same pyramiding scam that she and her
ICS Corporation had perpetrated.7 In this regard, they established Atty. Era’s legal representation of
Sison by submitting several certified copies of the minutes of the proceedings in the criminal cases
involving Sison and her group issued by Branch 102 and Branch 220 of the RTC in Quezon City
showing that Atty. Era had appeared as the counsel of Sison in the cases for estafa pending and
being tried in said courts.8 They also submitted a certification issued on November 3, 2004 indicating
that Atty. Era had visited Sison, an inmate in the Female Dormitory in Camp Karingal, Sikatuna
Village, Quezon City as borne out by the blotter logbook of that unit.9
On January 20, 2005, Samson executed an affidavit alleging the foregoing antecedents, and praying
for Atty. Era’s disbarment on the ground of his violation of the trust, confidence and respect reposed
in him as their counsel.10
Upon being required by the Court to comment on the complaint against him within 10 days from
notice, Atty. Era several times sought the extension of his period to file the comment to supposedly
enable him to collate documents relevant to his comment.11 The Court granted his request and
allowed him an extension totaling 40 days. But despite the lapse of the extended period, he did not
file his comment.
On September 27, 2005, Samson reiterated his complaint for disbarment against Atty. Era.12
By its resolution dated March 1, 2006,13 the Court required Atty. Era to show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure to submit his comment.
In the comment that he subsequently filed on April 11, 2006 in the Office of the Bar Confidant,14 Atty.
Era alleged that the conclusion on April 23, 2002 of the compromise settlement between Samson
and his group, on one hand, and Sison and her ICS Corporation, on the other, had terminated the
lawyer-client relationship between him and Samson and his group; and that on September 1, 2003,
he had been appointed as counsel de officio for Sison by Branch 102 of the RTC in Quezon City
only for purposes of her arraignment.
On July 17, 2006, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.15
In his report and recommendation dated October 1, 2007,16the Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests, for failing to serve his clients with competence and diligence, and for failing to
champion his clients’ cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
The Investigating Commissioner observed that the evidence did not sustain Atty. Era’s claim that his
legal services as counsel for Samson and his group had terminated on April 23, 2003 upon the
execution of the compromise settlement of the criminal cases; that he even admitted during the
mandatory conference that there was no formal termination of his legal services;17 that his
professional obligation towards Samson and his group as his clients did not end upon execution of
the settlement agreement, because he remained duty-bound to see to it that the settlement was duly
implemented; that he also had the obligation to appear in the criminal cases until their termination;
and that his acceptance of the engagement to appear in behalf of Sison invited suspicion of his
double-dealing and unfaithfulness.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Era be suspended from the practice of law
for six months, viz:
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests, failing to serve his client, complainant herein, with competence and diligence and
champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. It is respectfully
recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act would merit a more severe
penalty.18
In Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195 passed on October 19, 2007,19 the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP-CBD, with the modification that Atty. Era be suspended from the practice of law for two years.

On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-180,20 denying Atty.
Era’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195.
The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court.21
On October 17, 2012, Atty. Era filed a Manifestation and Motion (With Leave of Court).22 However,
on November 26, 2012, the Court merely noted the manifestation, and denied the motion for its lack
of merit.23

Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP.
In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged Atty. Era with violating Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests by accepting the responsibility of
representing Sison in the cases similar to those in which he had undertaken to represent Samson
and his group, notwithstanding that Sison was the very same person whom Samson and his group
had accused with Atty. Era’s legal assistance. He had drafted the demand letters and the complaint-
affidavit that became the bases for the filing of the estafa charges against Sison and the others in
the RTC in Quezon City.
Atty. Era’s contention that the lawyer-client relationship ended when Samson and his group entered
into the compromise settlement with Sison on April 23, 2002 was unwarranted. The lawyer-client
relationship did not terminate as of then, for the fact remained that he still needed to oversee the
implementation of the settlement as well as to proceed with the criminal cases until they were
dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court. It is also relevant to indicate that the execution
of a compromise settlement in the criminal cases did not ipso facto cause the termination of the
cases not only because the approval of the compromise by the trial court was still required, but also
because the compromise would have applied only to the civil aspect, and excluded the criminal
aspect pursuant to Article 2034 of the Civil Code.24
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts." Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his group entire devotion to their genuine interest,
and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights.25 He was expected to exert his best
efforts and ability to preserve the clients’ cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his clients
likewise served the ends of justice.26
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,27 the Court discussed the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue
or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.28
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on five rationales, rendered as follows:

x x x. First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with undivided
loyalty. A client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust. Instilling such
confidence is an objective important in itself. x x x.
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the effectiveness of legal
representation. To the extent that a conflict of interest undermines the independence of the lawyer’s
professional judgment or inhibits a lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the client’s behalf,
the client’s expectation of effective representation x x x could be compromised.
Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard the client’s confidential information
xxx. Preventing use of confidential client information against the interests of the client, either to
1âwphi 1

benefit the lawyer’s personal interest, in aid of some other client, or to foster an assumed public
purpose is facilitated through conflicts rules that reduce the opportunity for such abuse.
Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by inducing a client to
make a gift to the lawyer xxx.
Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in obtaining adequate
presentations to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for example, a lawyer might appear on both
sides of the litigation, complicating the process of taking proof and compromise adversary
argumentation x x x.29
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would
be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In
the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a
substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client
consents to it after consultation.30 The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of
loyalty.31 Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and
information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with
care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
1âwphi 1

appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice.32 The nature of that
relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.33

Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the
termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client’s
confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional
employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will
injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client.
Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s confidences acquired in the previous
relation.34 In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly declares
that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him."
The lawyer’s highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs
even to himself.35 The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client’s ceasing to employ the attorney and
retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the
client.36

In the absence of the express consent from Samson and his group after full disclosure to them of the
conflict of interest, therefore, the most ethical thing for Atty. Era to have done was either to outrightly
decline representing and entering his appearance as counsel for Sison, or to advice Sison to engage
another lawyer for herself. Unfortunately, he did neither, and should now suffer the proper sanction.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating
Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS
him from the practice of law for two years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning
that his commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO 0. ERA and
entered m his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court
Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Concern Citizen vs. Catena, 701 SCRA 255, July 16, 2013

A.M. No. 2008-23-SC September 30, 2014

ALLEGED LOSS OF VARIOUS BOXES OF COPY PAPER DURING THEIR TRANSFER FROM
THE PROPERTY DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES (OAS), TO THE
VARIOUS ROOMS OF THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret.
RELEASE OF COMPULSORY RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER R.A. No. 8291 OF MR. ISIDRO
P. AUSTRIA, FORMER SUPPLY OFFICER II, PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY, SUPREME
COURT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Before us is the administrative matter inquiring into the loss of 140 reams of long copy paper,and 40
reams of short copy paper, valued at P27,000.00, delivered to the Philippine Judicial Academy
(PHILJA). The loss was criminal theft by all means.
Also for our consideration now is the application for the release of his retirement benefits due to his
intervening compulsory retirement from the service on his 65th birthday on August 17, 2012 of one
of the employees under investigation.

Antecedents
On October 23, 2008, Boc’s Trading Co., Inc. delivered 1,300 reams of short copy paper and 1,100
reams of long copy paper to the Supreme Court intended for the Philippine Judicial Academy
(PHILJA). As instructed by Administrative Officer Ma. Christina M. Recio, the delivery was initially
accepted by Ryan Orcullo, the Property Custodian of the PHILJA, because Supply Officer II Isidro
Austria and Store Keeper IV Lenin Mario Ordoñez, both of the Property and Supply Section, PHILJA
Administrative Office, were then not around. The first batch of copy paper, consisting of 300 reams
long copy paper and 800 reams of short copy paper, were unloaded under the supervision of Orcullo
and broughtdirectly to the stock rooms and available spaces at the premises of the PHILJA. When
Orcullo left for his lunch break, Ordoñez took over. The rest of the delivery were unloaded from the
delivery truck at the Centennial Building of the Court upon the instruction of Ordoñez.
With the help of Judicial Staff Employee II Elizalde S. Carmona, Ordoñez then initiated the transfer
of the copy paper to the stockroom and the Reproduction Room (Repro Room) of the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) in the Supreme Court Multipurpose Building located in the SC New
Building. In the afternoon of October 23, 2008, Orcullo informed Administrative Officer Recio that
400 reams of short copy paper and 40 reams of long copy paper were missing.
In his letter dated October 27,2008, Atty. Rodel O. Hernandez formally reported the missing boxes of
copy paper belonging to the PHILJA to PHILJA Vice Chancellor Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr.,
disclosing that the preliminary investigation conducted by Administrative Officer Recio and HR
Officer III Ma. Lourdes Pelaus revealed that: (a) Austria had admitted having used the SC’s Lite Ace
van with Plate No. SEF 868 to unload 50 reams of short bond paper contained in five boxes in
Intramuros to pay his outstanding personal debt of P5,000.00; but had denied any involvement in the
loss of the other boxes of copy paper; (b) Ordoñez had claimed that he supervised and made the
transfer of 300 reams in 30 boxes of long bond paper to the OCA stock room, but the verification had
shown only 270 reams in 27 boxes; he had admitted riding the PHILJA van with Plate No. SFV 785
to deliver the reams of copy paper to the Repro Room without the proper trip ticket, leaving the
boxes ofcopy paper there without padlocking the stockrooms; (c) driver Eusebio M. Glor of the
Administrative Division had admitted driving the Lite Ace van with Plate No. SEF 868 to Intramuros
with Austria on board, and had acknowledged facilitating the unlawful transfer of 50 reams of copy
paper in 50 boxes; but had denied knowledge of the remaining missing boxes of copy paper; and (d)
Carmona had driven the PHILJA van with Plate No. SFV 785 upon the request of Ordoñez without
the corresponding trip ticket, and had assisted Ordoñez only in the transfer of the boxes from the
OCA stockroom to the Repro Room.1
The Office of Administrative Services (OAS) directed Austria, Ordoñez, Glor and Carmona to submit
their respective comments, and to show cause why they should not be held administratively liable for
grave misconduct, and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. They were further
summoned to appear before the OAS for investigation.
In his comment,2 Ordoñez reiterated his denial of any knowledge of the loss of the 30 boxes of long
copy paper from the OCA stockroom, but admitted that he had initiated the transfer upon the
instructions of Administrative Officer Recio. He claimed that he had merely endorsed the copy paper
to Orcullo as the PHILJA Property Custodian tasked with overseeing the supplies in the stockroom;
that it was already the practice in the PHILJA to bring to or take supplies from the Repro Room with
the help of any available PHILJA drivers even without any corresponding trip tickets although the
drivers might have other driving assignments; and that even the guards were aware of the practice.

On his part, Austria conceded that he had used the 50 reams of papers to pay for the copy paper he
had borrowed from one "Mr. Roy" of the Jimmy Roy Trading, a supplier of toners, inks, and
sometimes copy paper. He denied that the copy paper was payment for his personal loan,
maintaining that he had only borrowed the copy paper in order to avoid delays for an upcoming
PHILJA training. Recalled by the OAS, however, Austria retracted, and pointed to Glor as having
taken the copy paper. According to him, Glor even planned their purported escape.
Glor declared that Austria had instructed him to load five boxes of short copy paper in the van, and
directed him to proceed to a place in Intramuros, where someone else unloaded the copy paper.
Recalled by the OAS, Glor likewise recanted, averring instead that the paper had been unloaded by
Austria on Orosa St. near the Philam Insurance Company; and that he had been coached by Austria
on what their version would be.3
After conducting the investigation,the OAS concluded that Ordoñez had failed to exercise the
required diligence in the performance of his task in overseeing the delivery of the copy paper by not
seeing to the safe storage of the copy paper, and by not properly endorsing the copy paper to his
office or to the security guard assigned in the areawhere he had left the reams of copy paper. The
OAS pointed out that the loss of the copy paper from the OCA stockroom had been Ordoñez’s fault,
because he was the person in charge of the stockroom; that Ordoñez’s negligence had facilitated
the theft of the 50 reams by Austria and Glor; and that the theft had resulted in the loss of
approximately P27,000.00 by the Court.4
The OAS found that Austria and Glor had committed perjury by giving false statements, as borne
outby the incongruence of their initial narration of facts and their subsequent statements blaming
each other as the perpetrator of the theft of the copy paper; that it was clear that their act of taking
the copy paper without authorityconstituted theft; that they were liable for serious dishonesty
considering that their acts were attended by certain circumstances that rendered their offense
serious, namely: (a) damage and prejudice to the Government; (b) moral depravity; and (c)
employment of fraud or falsification ofofficial documents in committing the dishonest acts.5

As to Carmona, the OAS observed that he was still responsible for securing the trip ticket as a driver
even if he had been requested to help Ordoñez,6
The OAS ultimately recommended as follows:

A. x x x
I. For having been found guilty of Gross Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Mesrs. Isidro T.
 Austria and Eusebio M. Glor, be meted with the penalty of DISMISSAL from
the service with forfeiture of benefits except accrued leave credits;
II. For having been found guilty ofGross Neglect of Duty, Mr. Lenin Mario M.
Ordoñez, be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with forfeiture
of benefits except accrued leave credits;
III. Mesrs. Austria, Glor and Ordoñez, be directed to restitute to the Court the
copy papers stolen; and
IV. For driving without a trip ticket to the PHILJA Reproduction Room, Mr.
Elizalde S. Carmona, be WARNED that a repetition of similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
B. The Security Division be reminded to strictly implement the Resolution of the
Court dated July 11, 1989, Re: Security Guidelines for the Supreme Court; and
directed toenforce the use of trip tickets with corresponding Gate Pass, Requisition
and Issue Slip (RIS), or transfer slip, whichever is appropriate for the property/ies or
supplies to be brought outside the Court’s premises.
C. This Office submits for the Court’s information, the Memorandum with supporting
documents dated February 20, 2009 of Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Vice Chancellor,
PHILJA, providing (a) their stock position as of December 2008; (b) documents
showing distribution of supplies and materials to the various PHILJA offices/divisions;
(c) information that the PHILJA has implemented stricter rules in order to resolve any
form or (sic) waste or pilferage at PHILJA.
For the Court’s consideration.7
Meanwhile, on May 4, 2009, Ordoñez resigned from the PHILJA, citing the approval of his family’s
visa application for immigrant status in Canada as the reason for his resignation.8On June 23, 2009,
the Court En Banc approved his resignation, subject tothe usual clearance requirements and without
prejudice to the outcome of this administrative case.9Subsequently, the parties manifested that they
were submitting the case for resolution upon the pleadings filed.10
On August 20, 2014, the Third Division directed the consolidation of A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. with
A.M. No. 2008-23-SC.11 The Banc accepted the consolidation on September 9, 2014.
Ruling
After reviewing the records, we are satisfied with and adopt the findings of the OAS.
There is grave misconduct when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule are present.12 Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straight forwardness.13 Both gross misconduct and dishonesty are
grave offenses that are punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.14 Conduct prejudicial to the
best interestof the service is also classified as a grave offense under Section 22(t) of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service laws, with
the penalty for the first offense being suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year,
and for the second offense being dismissal.15The Civil Service laws and rules contain no description
of what specific acts constitute the grave offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. However, jurisprudence has been instructive, with the Court having considered the following
acts or omissions as constitutive of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, namely: (a)
misappropriation of public funds; (b) abandonment of office; (c) failure to report back to work without
prior notice; (d) failure to keep public records and property safe; (e) making false entries in public
documents; and (f) falsification of court orders.16
In Court Administrator v. Sevillo,17 the act of stealing mail matter by the respondent, a process server
in the Municipal Circuit Court of Jordan Buenavista-Nueva Valencia, Guimaras, was held to
constitute "grave dishonesty and grave misconduct or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service," with the Court opining:
It can never be said often enough that the conduct of judges and court personnel must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum at all times but must also be above suspicion. In this regard,
respondent Sevillo has been grossly deficient. By stealing mail matters he has blatantly degraded
the judiciary and diminished the respect and regard of the people for the court and its personnel.
Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.
Lamentably, respondent has become no better than a common thief; consequently, he does not
deserve to stay a minute longer in the judicial service.
In Re: Pilferage of Supplies in the Stockroom of the Property Division, OCA Committed by Teodoro
L. Saquin, Clerk II,18 the respondent admitted stealing office supplies from the OCA, and selling the
supplies to sidewalk vendors in front of the Isetann Department Store along Recto Avenue corner
Quezon Boulevard, Manila. The Court meted the penalty of dismissal from the service, with forfeiture
of all leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-entry to any Government entity
or any Government-owned or Government-controlled corporation; and further directed the referral of
the records of the case to the Department of Justice for investigation with a view to the filing, if
warranted, of the appropriate criminal proceedings.
For making false statements, committing perjury and stealing the copy paper, Austria and Glor are
guilty of grave misconduct,19 gross dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Their dismissal from the service is the proper penalty, with forfeiture of retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the Government.
In addition, the records of the case should be referred to the Department of Justice for investigation
with a view to the filing, if warranted, of the appropriate criminal proceedings.

On August 17, 2012 and during the pendency of A.M. No. 2008-23-SC, Austria turned 65 years old
and was deemed compulsorily retired from the service. He applied for retirement benefits under
Republic Act No. 8291 (The Government Service Insurance Act of 1997), and his application was
docketed as A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. The OAS recommended on July 30, 2104 that the benefits of
Austria under Republic Act No. 8291 could be paid to him by the Government Service Insurance
System "subject to the usual clearance requirements." As stated, the Third Division of the Court
directed the consolidation of A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. with A.M. No. 2008-23-SC, and the Banc
accepted the consolidation on September 9, 2014.
The fact that Austria meanwhile reached the compulsory retirement age did not render A.M. No.
2008-23-SC moot, let alone release him from whatever liability he had incurred while in the active
service. The jurisdiction acquired by the Court continues despite his compulsory retirement. Indeed,
the Court retains its jurisdiction to declare a respondent either innocent or guilty of the charge even
in the extreme case of the respondent’s supervening death. If innocent, the respondent receives the
vindication of his name and integrity by declaring his service in the Government to be well and
faithful; if guilty in anyway, he deserves the sanction just and appropriatefor his administrative sin.20
Where a respondent is found guilty ofa grave offense but the penalty of dismissal is no longer
possible because of his compulsory retirement, the Court has nevertheless imposed the just and
appropriate disciplinary measures and sanctions by decreeing the forfeiture of all benefits to which
he may be entitled, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, including Government-owned and Government-controlled
corporations,21 and by imposing a fine to be deducted from the retirement benefits. In Orfila v.
Arellano, respondent Human Rights Resource Management Officer II, being guilty of misconduct,
was meted a fine equivalent toher salary for six (6) months to be deducted from whateverleave and
retirement benefits or privileges she was entitled to.22

Austria is now being held guilty of the grave offenses of gross dishonesty and grave misconduct,
(either of which is punishable by dismissal for the first offense), as well as of conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, but since the penalty of dismissal could no longer be imposed on
him, the Court forfeits all benefits to which hecould be entitled, except accrued leave credits, with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the Government, including
Government-owned and Government-controlled corporations, and fines him in the amount
equivalent to his salary for his last six (6) months in the service to be deducted from whatever
accrued leave benefits remained for him.Hence, his request in A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. for the
release of his compulsory retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291 is denied.

Ordoñez is guilty of gross neglect of duty. Even if he did not have a direct hand in the theft of the
copy paper,his negligence facilitated the theft. As correctly found by the OAS, he failed to safely
store and to endorse the copy paper to the assigned security personnel; and that he did not also
conduct an actual count and make a record of all the reams of copy paper delivered to his
safekeeping. Had hebeen diligent in performing his tasks and responsibilities as a Storekeeper
IV,23Austria and Glor would not have managed to take out the reams of copy paper out ofthe
stockroom, of which he was then in charge. Indeed, he soadmitted this during the investigation.24
Neglect of duty is the failure to giveone’s attention to a task expected of him. Gross neglect is such
neglect that, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its
character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare. The term does not necessarily include willful
neglect or intentional official wrongdoing.25 Those responsible for such act or omission cannot
escape the disciplinary power of this Court.26 The imposable penalty for gross neglect of duty is
dismissal from the service.

Ordoñez resigned effective May 4, 2009, purportedly to migrate to Canada.27 His resignation would
not extricate him from the consequences of his gross neglect of duty, because the Court has not
allowed resignation to be an escape or an easy way out to evade administrative liability or
administrative sanction.28 Ordoñez remains administratively liable, but his resignation prevents his
dismissal from the service. A fine can be imposed, instead, and its amount is subject to the sound
discretion of the Court. Section 56 (e) of Rule IV of the RevisedUniform Rules provides that fine as a
penalty shall be in an amount not exceeding the salary for six months had the respondent not
resigned, the rate for which is that obtaining at the time of his resignation.29 The fine shall be
deducted from any accrued leave credits, with the respondent being personally liable for any
deficiency that should be directly payable to this Court. He is further declared disqualified from any
future government service.

The recommended sanction for Cardona is warning. Such sanction is sufficient considering that
Ordoñez merely solicited the help of Cardona in transferring the reams of copy paper from the OCA
stockroom to the Repro Room in the SC New Building. Although Carmona admittedly used a trip
ticket not authorized for the transfer, we cannot appreciate that fact against him because the rule on
securing trip tickets was notyet strictly implemented at that time. At any rate, it nowhere appeared
that Carmona directly participated in the theft.1âw phi 1
We emphasize that all court employees, being public servants in the Judiciary, must always act with
a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum, but must also be inaccordance with the law and court regulations. To
maintain the people’s respect and faith in the Judiciary, they should be upright, fair and honest.
Theyshould avoid any act or conduct that tends to diminish public trust and confidence in the
courts.30
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDSand DECLARES:
1. EUSEBIO M. GLORandISIDRO T. AUSTRIAguilty of gross dishonesty, grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and, accordingly;
(a) EUSEBIO M. GLORis DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE
OF ALL BENEFITS EXCEPT ACCRUED LEAVE CREDITS; and
(b) ISIDRO T. AUSTRIA FORFEITS all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, WITH PREJUDICE TO REEMPLOYMENT IN ANY BRANCH OR
INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-
OWNED AND GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, and is
ORDERED TO PAY A FINE equivalent to his salary for six months computed at the
salary rate of his former position at the time of his resignation, to be deducted from
whatever accrued leave benefits remained for him;
2. LENIN MARIO M. ORDOÑEZ guilty of gross neglect of duty, and, accordingly, he is
ORDERED TO PAY A FINE equivalent to his salary for six months computed at the salary
rate of his former position at the time of his resignation; and he is declared DISQUALIFIED
FROM RE-EMPLOYMENT IN ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE
GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS.
The Court DENIES the application of ISIDRO T. AUSTRIA in A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. for the release
of his compulsory retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 8291.
The Court ORDERS EUSEBIO M. GLOR, ISIDRO T. AUSTRIA and LENIN MARIO M. ORDONEZ to
restitute to the Court the amount of P27,000.00 as cost of the copy paper stolen. ELIZALDE S.
CARMONA is WARNED that a repetition of a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator is instructed to refer the records of this administrative case to
the Department of Justice for investigation and filing, if warranted, of the appropriate criminal
proceedings against ISIDRO T. AUSTRIA, EUSEBIO M. GLOR and LENIN MARIO M. ORDONEZ.
SO ORDERED.
Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, 704 SCRA 561, September 03, 2013
G.R. No. 179987, September 03, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (REPRESENTED BY SALLY A.

MALABANAN),Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the
decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying
the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang,
Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in
accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang
Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On
February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed
an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City,
Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title.1
cra law virtualaw li bra ry

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented
during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed
for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as
shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per
Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-
1656 on March 15, 1982.2 cralaw virtualaw l ibra ry

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land
registration, disposing thusly: chan robles v irt ua1aw 1ib ra ry

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places
under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this
case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of
legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration
shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had
failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and
that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’ s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not
be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of possession.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of
February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains
the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled
that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted
in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that
the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also
date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration
proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of
initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that
the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more
than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been “converted” into
private property through prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property
sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by
sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his
predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as
alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State.
Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to
acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the
land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period
prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998,
he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the
land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.

The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the
application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the
interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates
its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had been
declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
 Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of
land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs
to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such
character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of
the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and
municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the
West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong
to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16 All lands not appearing to be clearly under private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the
public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17 cralaw virtualaw l ibra ry

Classifications of public lands according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of
public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were
classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that
the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935
Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands
may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of
lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive
Department.22 cralaw virtualaw li bra ry

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be
alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State,
or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and
(b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation
that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A
positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative
to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If,
however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or
when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth,
thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion
must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department
exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the
State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the
Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
chan robles v irt ua1aw 1i bra ry

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June
12, 1945, or earlier, viz: chan roble s virtua1aw 1 ibra ry

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words “lands of the public domain” or “alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain” to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest
or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of
the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase “alienable
and disposable” further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public
domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under
the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to
come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit: chan roble s virtua1aw 1i bra ry

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in

possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and

notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
 4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or
earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public
domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the
public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been already
classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof
that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies,
and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the
land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date
of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social
policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and
occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the
wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other
legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the
Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no
requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June
12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession
and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the
application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for
land registration, not the ownership or title over it. Alienable public land held by a possessor, either
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the
period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as
long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying
the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property
subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption
that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription
may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a
grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public
possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not
necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31cralaw virtualaw l ibra ry

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to
unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof
for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that
such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted
legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the
adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area
limitations.34
c ralaw vi rtualaw l ibra ry

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development
of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial
or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public
domain, namely: chanrob les vi rtua1aw 1 ibra ry

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly
under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section
11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s
possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and
the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of
the public domain and has become private property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer

intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are
removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted
into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated
or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under
the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary
or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private
ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a
condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
 that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession – possession and occupation that is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted
to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription
never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land
registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the
President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent’s Partial
Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

SO ORDERED.

Embido vs. Pe, Jr., 708 SCRA 1, October 22, 2013

A.C. No. 6732 October 22, 2013

ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
WESTERN VISA YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO
CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE,
ANTIQUE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the
gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty.
Salvador N Pe, Jr. respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an in existent
decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by
Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
 Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written
communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter
requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in
Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.1
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for a
copy of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case
No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then
discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was
the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings
No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose
petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,3 Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated
October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special Proceedings No.
084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that had been
presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK.4
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October 12,
2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the
situation.5
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the situation
in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification.6

In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4,

2005,7 wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified
decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the respondent were
substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit dated
March 20, 2005.8
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his constitutional right to remain
silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter appeared
and gave his sworn statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the
records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for
falsification of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and for
violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).10 The NBI
likewise recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be
commenced against the respondent.11 Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a
Member of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to the Office of the Bar Confidant.12
Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit,13 whereby he
denied any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on
Shirley’s petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent laws
involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had
gone back to him to present a copy of what appeared to be a court decision;14 that Dy Quioyo had
then admitted to him that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he had advised Dy
Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an overseas
Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in Manila to solve his
documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr.
that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn
statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the
effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified document
at the instance of Dy Quioyo.15
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondent’s counter-affidavit as his
comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of the
Attorney’s Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility , and recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged the purported
decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084 concerned a
petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner,
when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the petition for declaration of presumptive death
of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the petitioner;18 and that the respondent had
received P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She rationalized her conclusions
thusly:

Respondent’s denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel Jalipa
(deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn statement of
the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first place, if the
decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic
decision on file in Judge Penuela’s branch except for the names and dates? Respondent failed to
explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and merely invoked his right
to remain silent. If his side of the story were true, he should have made this known in the
investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a mere afterthought. Finally, there is no
plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate him in this
incident.19
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 200,20the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved, with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
by suspending the respondent from the practice of law for six years.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
70921 denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-
063. The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in accordance with Section
12(b), Rule 139-B22 of the Rules of Court.

On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondent’s comment/opposition as his
appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the complainant’s reply as his comment on the petition
for review; (3) to require the respondent to file a reply to the complainant’s comment within 10 days
from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case within 15 days from
notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of grave
misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of money.
The respondent’s main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that he had
had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of Dy
Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto Avenue in Manila
to resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a history of
employing unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.
However, the respondent’s denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of the
falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyo’s categorical declaration on the respondent’s
personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive evidence, was not
overcome by the respondent’s blanket denial, which by nature was negative evidence.23
Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did not
command credence. It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit only after
1âwphi 1

the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him to comment.24 The
belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more than an after thought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared that
her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the forged decision. But such
reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was rendered unreliable due to
its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of
authorship of the falsification by the husband is immediately exposed and betrayed by the falsified
decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela
in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having
authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and
integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a
lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not
to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can
justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.25Specifically, the deliberate
falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral
turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country,
given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status
of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.

It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing that
may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and
integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among them who
wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorney’s Oath for them to:
x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; x
x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct themselves as lawyers according to the
best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients x x
x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a
privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the
privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer’s Oath and the canons of ethical
conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional
dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that reveal
his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to practice law
confers upon him.27 Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose
duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a
professional or private capacity.28 The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.29WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND
PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this decision.
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.
This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated against
ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

De Leon vs. Pedreña, 708 SCRA 13, October 22, 2013

A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013

JOCELYN DE LEON, Complainant, v. ATTY. TYRONE PEDRENA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who commits overt acts of sexual harassment against a female client is guilty of reprehensible
conduct that is unbecoming of a member of the Bar, and may be condignly punished with suspension from
the practice of law.

Antecedents

Jocelyn de Leon filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone Pedreña, a Public Attorney. She averred in her
complaint affidavit that Atty. Pedreña had sexually harassed her as follows: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

1. On January 30, 2006, at about 10:00 in the morning, I went to the Public Attorney’s
Office in Parañaque City, in order to inquire from ATTY. TYRONE PEDRENA about the status
of my case for support for my two minor children against my husband, which case is being
handled by Atty. Pedreña;

2. At that time, said Atty. Pedreña was at a court hearing, so I waited at his office until he
arrived at about II :45 a.m. Atty. Pedreña told me to go ahead to Tita Babes Restaurant so
we could take our lunch together and to talk about my said case;

3. While we were eating at the said restaurant, he asked me many personal matters rather
than to discuss my said case. But still, I answered him with respect, for he was my lawyer;

4. After we took our lunch, he told me to just go back on February I, 2006 at 10:00 a.m.
because according to him, my said case was quite difficult, that he needed more time to
study;

5. Since Atty. Pedreña was also already going home then, he told me then to ride with him
and he would just drop me by the jeepney station;

6. Although I refused to ride with him, he persistently convinced me to get in the car, and
so I acceded to his request so as not to offend him;

7. Right after we left the parking lot and not yet too far from the City Hall, Atty. Pedreña
immediately held my left hand with his right hand, insisted me to get closer with him and
laid me on his shoulder;

8. I immediately responded by saying "AYOKO HO!" But he persisted in trying to get hold of
my hand and he also tried very hard to inserting (sic) his finger into my firmly closed hand.
Thus, I became very afraid and at the same time offended for his lack of respect for me at
that moment;

9. Despite my resistance, he continued rubbing my left leg. I was then attempting to

remove his hand on my leg, but he grabbed my hand and forced it to put (sic) on his penis;

10. Because I was already really afraid at that moment, I continued to wrestle and
struggle, and as I saw that we were already approaching the 7-Eleven Store, the place
where I was supposed to get off, Atty. Pedreña made another move of pressing his finger
against my private part;

11. I thereafter tried at all cost to unlock the car’s door and told him categorically that I
was getting off the car. But because the traffic light was on green, he accelerated a bit
more instead, but sensing my insistence to get off, he stopped the car, and allowed me to
get off. He then reminded me to see him on February 1, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. for the
continuation of hearing of my case;

12. That on February 1, 2006, I had to come for my case, but this time, I brought with me
my five-year-old child to avoid another incident. I was not able to see Atty. Pedreña then,
so I just signed some documents; 1
In his answer, Atty. Pedreña averred that De Leon’s allegations were unsubstantiated; that entertaining
such a complaint would open the gates to those who had evil desires to destroy the names of good lawyers;
that the complaint was premature and should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping because De
Leon had already charged him with acts of lasciviousness in the Parañaque City Prosecutor’s Office; and that
he had also filed a complaint for theft against De Leon.2

Attached to Atty. Pedreña’s answer were his counter-affidavit in the criminal case for acts of lasciviousness
and his complaint-affidavit for theft. In his counter affidavit, Atty. Pedreña admitted giving a ride to De
Leon, but he vehemently denied making sexual advances on her, insisting that she had sat very close to him
during the ride that even made it hard for him to shift gears, and that the ride had lasted for only two to
three minutes.3 He claimed that De Leon was allowing herself to be used by his detractors in the Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO) after he had opposed the practice of certain PAO staff members of charging indigent
clients for every document that they prepared. In his complaint affidavit for theft, he stated that he had
another passenger in his car at the time he gave a ride to De Leon, who did not notice the presence of the
other passenger because the ride lasted for only two to three minutes; and that the other passenger was
Emma Crespo, who executed her own affidavit attesting that she had witnessed De Leon’s act of taking his
(Pedreña) cellphone from the handbrake box of the car.4

Only De Leon appeared during the hearing.5 Hence, Atty. Pedreña was deemed to have waived his right to
participate in the proceedings.6

Thereafter, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Pedreña and the
striking off of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.7 Holding that a disbarment case was sui generis and
could proceed independently of the criminal case that was based on the same facts; and that the
proceedings herein need not wait until the criminal case for acts of lasciviousness brought against Atty.
Pedreña was finally resolved, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Pedreña. had made
sexual advances on De Leon in violation of Rule 1.018 and Rule 7.039 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-83 dated September 19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, and
imposed upon Atty. Pedreña suspension from the practice of law for three months. 10

Atty. Pedreña filed a motion for reconsideration with the IBP,11 which adopted and approved Resolution No.
XX-2012-43 dated January 15, 2012, denying the motion and affirming with modification its Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-83 by increasing the period of suspension to six months.12

On February 28, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors transmitted to the Court Resolution No. XX-2012-43 and
the records of the case for final approval.13

In the Resolution dated April 24, 2012, the Court noted the IBP Board of Governors’ notice ofResolution No.
XX-2012-43.14 chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

Ruling

The report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner stated thusly: chanRoble svirtual Lawl ibra ry

There is no doubt that Complainant was able to prove her case against the Respondent.
During the clarificatory hearing, she was straightforward and spontaneous in answering the
questions propounded on her. Her account of the incident that happened on 30 January
2006 was consistent with the matters she stated in her Complaint and Verified Position
Paper.

On.the other hand, Respondent’s defenses are not credible enough to rebut the claims of
Complainant. His defenses are replete with inconsistencies and his actuations in the entire
proceedings show lack of integrity in his dealings with both the Complainant and this
Commission.
 xxxx

We find no merit at all in the defenses put forth by Respondent. The Theft case filed by
Respondent is a mere afterthought on his part. We note that such criminal complaint
hinged on a claim that there was another person during that incident who allegedly saw
Complainant stealing Respondent’s mobile phone. Yet, in Respondent’s Position Paper and
in his Counter-Affidavit to the Acts of Lasciviousness case, which was executed after the
institution of the criminal complaint for Theft, Respondent never mentioned anything about
a third person being present during the incident. If the presence of this third person was
crucial to prove his case against herein Complainant, there is no reason why this allegation
would be omitted in his Position Paper and Counter-Affidavit to at least support his defense.

Furthermore, Respondent’s contention that Complainant is being used by his detractors is

self-serving. His memo regarding the amount of RATA he receives is a relatively harmless
query to a higher authority, which could not possibly motivate his colleagues to prod other
people to file cases against Respondent.15

We adopt the findings and conclusions of the Investigating Commissioner, as sustained by the IBP Board of
Governors, for being substantiated by the evidence on record.

The records show that Atty. Pedreña rubbed the complainant’s right leg with his hand; tried to insert his
finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed
his finger against her private part. Given the circumstances in which he committed them, his acts were not
merely offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They constituted
misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In this regard, it bears stressing that immoral conduct is gross when
it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or
when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of
decency.16

The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the Legal Profession. Members of the Bar are
clearly duty bound to observe the highest degree of morality and integrity in order to safeguard the
reputation of the Bar. Any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer that tends to expose a deficiency in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, is sufficient to
warrant the lawyer’s suspension or disbarment.17 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, provides that a
member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended for grossly immoral conduct, or violation of his oath as a
lawyer. Towards that end, we have not been remiss in reminding members of the Bar to live up to the
standards and norms of the Legal Profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Pedreña’s misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he was then a Public Attorney mandated to
provide free legal service to indigent litigants, and by the fact that De Leon was then such a client. He also
disregarded his oath as a public officer to serve others and to be accountable at all times, because he
thereby took advantage of her vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of his legal assistance.

Yet, even as we agree with the findings of the IBP, we consider the recommended penalty of suspension for
six months not commensurate with the gravity of the offensive acts committed.

Verily, the determination of the penalty to impose on an erring lawyer is within the Court’s discretion. The
exercise of the discretion should neither be arbitrary nor despotic, nor motivated by any animosity or
prejudice towards the lawyer, but should instead be ever controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously
guard the purity and independence of the Bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties
to the Court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession, and to the general public.18

In determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed on Atty. Pedreña, therefore, we take into
consideration judicial precedents on gross immoral conduct bearing on sexual matters. Although most of the
judicial precedents dealt with lawyers who engaged in extramarital affairs, or cohabited with women other
than their wives,19 they are nonetheless helpful in gauging the degree of immorality committed by the
respondent.

In Advincula v. Macabata,20 the Court held that the errant lawyer’s acts of turning his client’s head towards
him and then kissing her on the lips were distasteful, but still ruled that such acts, albeit offensive and
undesirable, were not grossly immoral. Hence, the respondent lawyer was merely reprimanded but
reminded to be more prudent and cautious in his dealings with clients.

In Barrientos v. Daarol,21 the respondent lawyer was disbarred, but the severest penalty was imposed not
only because of his engaging in illicit sexual relations, but also because of his deceit. He had been already
married and was about 41 years old when he proposed marriage to a 20-year-old girl. He succeeded in his
seduction of her, and made her pregnant. He not only suggested that she abort the pregnancy, but he also
breached his promise to marry her, and, in the end, even deserted her and their child.

In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,22 the Court adjudged the respondent lawyer, a married man with children, highly
immoral for having taken advantage of his position as the chairman of the College of Medicine of his school
in enticing the complainant, then a student in the college, to have carnal knowledge with him under the
threat that she would flunk in all her subjects should she refuse. The respondent was disbarred for grossly
immoral conduct.

Without diminishing the gravity of the complainant’s sad experience, however, we consider the acts
committed by Atty. Pedreña to be not of the same degree as the acts punished under the cited judicial
precedents. Neither did his acts approximate the act committed by the respondent lawyer in Calub v.
Suller,23 whereby we disbarred the respondent lawyer for raping his neighbor’s wife notwithstanding that his
guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt in his criminal prosecution for the crime. We further note
that, unlike in Barrientos where there was deceit and in Delos Reyes where there were threats and taking
advantage of the respondent lawyer’s position, Atty. Pedreña did not employ any scheme to satiate his lust,
but, instead, he desisted upon the first signs of the complainant’s firm refusal to give in to his advances.

In view of these considerations, the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years is fitting
and just.

WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS ATTY. TYRONE PEDRENA from the practice of law for two years effective
upon receipt of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

SO ORDERED.

Ganzon vs. Arlos, 708 SCRA 115, October 22, 2013

G.R. No. 174321 October 22, 2013

ROLANDO GANZON, Petitioner,

vs.
FERNANDO ARLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

A government employee who is found guilty of grave misconduct may be dismissed from the service
even upon the first offense.
The Case

Petitioner Rolando Ganzon, an employee of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG), seeks the reversal of his dismissal from the service and the accessory penalties on the
ground of grave misconduct.
Antecedents
The DILG Regional Office in Port San Pedro, Iloilo City held its Christmas party on December 17,
1999 at the office parking lot. When the Christmas party was about to end at 7:30 in the evening,
respondent Fernando Arlos (Arlos), then the OIC Provincial Director of DILG, left to get some
documents from the Office of the Operations Division located at the second floor of the building.
While Arlos was making his way to the stairs, Ganzon suddenly approached and pulled out a short
firearm of unknown caliber from his waist and with no provocation pointed the firearm at Arlos,
angrily shouting in Ilongo: Nanding, hulat anay. Diin ang boss mo? Nga-a nga wala man nya ako
guin-patawag?1 Arlos responded: Ato ti sir Orendez sa may program. May kuhaon lang ako sa
ibabaw.2Arlos parried Ganzon’s firearm-wielding hand and tried to proceed towards the stairs, but
Ganzon blocked his path, pushed him back, and again pointed the firearm at Arlos’ chest. Sensing
that Ganzon would shoot him then, Arlos quickly warded off Ganzon’s firearm-wielding hand. At that
instant, the firearm exploded and the bullet hit the floor. Ganzon again aimed the firearm at Arlos,
prompting the latter to run away as fast as he could. Ganzon followed Arlos, and when they got to
the gate of the building, Ganzon once more pushed him back and pointed the firearm at him, saying:
Patay ka!3 Ganzon held the firearm close to his waistline to conceal it from the view of the other
people present at the time.
At around 9:45 in the morning of December 21, 1999, Arlos went to the DILG office to see the
Regional Director upon the latter’s instruction. Ganzon, who was then standing near the entrance to
the building, shouted upon seeing Arlos enter the gate: O, ti ano?,4 obviously still referring to the
incident of December 17, 1999. Arlos answered: Ang kadto ko diri indi away, kundi makigkita ako sa
kay Director.5
The incidents of December 17, 1999 and December 21, 1999 impelled Arlos to administratively
charge Ganzon with grave misconduct.

On his part, Ganzon denied the charge and elected to undergo a formal investigation. During the
formal investigation conducted by Regional Office No. 6 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC
Regional Office), the parties agreed that in order to dispense with the presentation of witnesses and
other evidence, they would just adopt the evidence presented in the pending criminal prosecution for
attempted homicide (Criminal Case No. 648-2000 entitled People v. Ganzon ) in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (Branch 1) in Iloilo City arising from the same incident.6 Accordingly, Arlos was
directed to submit the complete transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 648-2000.
The witnesses for the Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 648-2000 were Arlos, DILG employee
Nestor Sayno, DILG Provincial Director Eliseo Orendez, and Fernando Totesora, Jr., the security
guard then assigned at the DILG Regional Office. They attested to what had transpired in the
evening of December 17, 1999, specifically, that Ganzon had threatened and aimed a firearm at
Arlos.7
In his turn, Ganzon presented himself and two others, namely, Bobby Pepino, also an employee of
the DILG Regional Office, and Voltaire Guides.8 They described a different version of the incident, to
wit:
ROLANDO GANZON testified that he is presently assigned with the Planning Unit of DILG. He has
been connected with the DILG for twenty-five (25) years. From 1994 to 1999 he was assigned as
DILG Officer of the Municipality of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo. In September 1999, he transferred to the
Regional Office. On December 17, 1999, about 7:30 in the evening, he was with Bobby Pepino and
Voltaire Guides waiting for the drinks to be served to guests in their Christmas Party. Fernando Arlos
arrived and asked them what they were doing at the lobby. He answered that they were waiting for
the drinks to be served.
Fernando said that they should be getting better performance ratings. He immediately responded
that sometimes performance ratings are disregarded or even changed. Fernando got angry, and in
order to avoid further discussion, Rolando stood up. At that time, guests were starting to arrive.
Fernando pushed his body against Rolando at the same time raising his right hand. Rolando held his
hand; Fernando raised his left but again Rolando held it. They then pushed and shoved each other
to the gate.
At the gate, Fernando immediately left. Rolando went back to the administrative office to take his
dinner. After eating, he went to the quadrangle to watch the program. At the quadrangle, he saw
Provincial Director Orendez, Regional Director Reyes, and Presidential Consultant Jonathan Sanico.
He stayed there up to 2 o’clock in the morning. During that time no policeman came to arrest him.
He further testified that before the incident he had no grudge or ill feeling against Fernando Arlos. He
also testified about the hole located at the lobby of the Regional Office. He said that no shell or slug
was recovered in connection with the subject incident. He testified about the change made on his
performance rating and that he would often meet Fernando Arlos and no altercation or heated
argument transpired between them.9
Ruling of CSC Regional Office
On February 7, 2002, the CSC Regional Office rendered its decision finding Ganzon guilty of grave
misconduct, ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, Rolando Ganzon is hereby found guilty of Grave Misconduct and meted out the
penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished Fernando Arlos, Rolando Ganzon, Atty. Virgilio Teruel, Atty.
Rey Padilla, Director Rexdito Reyes of DILG Regional Office No. 6, Iloilo City, the GSIS Branch
Manager in Iloilo City and Director Purita H. Escobia of CSC Iloilo Provincial Office at their known
addresses.10
Ruling of CSC Main
Ganzon appealed to the Civil Service Commission Main Office (CSC), which affirmed the contested
ruling of the CSC Regional Office on January 27, 2004, to wit:
WHEREFORE , the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED . The decision of the Civil Service
Regional Office No. VI finding Rolando Ganzon guilty of grave misconduct and penalizing him with
dismissal from the service, is affirmed in all aspects. It should be understood that the penalty of
dismissal as imposed in this case carries with it such accessory penalties as forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and disqualification from public employment.11
Ganzon moved for a reconsideration, but his motion to that effect was denied through the resolution
dated November 9, 2004.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Ganzon appealed by petition for review in the Court of Appeals (CA), submitting the following issues,
namely:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONER WAS
ESSENTIALLY CONNECTED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFENSE CHARGED CAN BE CONSIDERED AS SERVICE
CONNECTED DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT ESSENTIALLY CONNECTED WITH
THE OFFICE OF THE PETITIONER AND WAS NOT PERPETRATED WHILE IN
PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL FUNCTION.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CAN HOLD LIABLE THE
PETITIONER FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT DESPITE HIS ACQUITTAL IN THE CRIMINAL
CASE FILED AGAINST HIM.

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL IS UNJUST AND EXCESSIVE.12

On February 15, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed decision affirming the ruling of the
CSC,13 thus:

WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the present petition, the same is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed judgments AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

On August 3, 2006, the CA denied Ganzon’s motion for reconsideration.14

Issues
Hence, Ganzon has appealed to the Court upon the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT ATTENDING A CHRISTMAS PARTY AS REQUIRED BY THE
OFFICE IS AN OFFICIAL FUNCTION AND THAT ANY UNTOWARD INCIDENT
COMMITTED DURING SUCH CHRISTMAS PARTY IS AUTOMATICALLY CONSIDERED
SERVICE RELATED AND THAT THE OFFENDER COULD BE LIABLE FOR GRAVE
MISCONDUCT?
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED ACT COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONER WAS
INTIMATELY RELATED TO HIS OFFICE IN ORDER TO CONSIDER IT AS GRAVE
MISCONDUCT IN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE LAW.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL IS UNJUST AND EXCESSIVE.15
 Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior.
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.16
In accordance with Section 46 of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), misconduct is among the grounds for disciplinary action, but no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law
and after due process. It is cogent to mention that the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service , which governs the conduct of disciplinary and non-disciplinary
proceedings in administrative cases, classifies grave misconduct as a grave administrative offense.17
Did Ganzon’s act of aiming his loaded firearm at Arlos and menacing him with it constitute grave
misconduct in the context of the foregoing provisions?
Undoubtedly it did. Drawing and pointing the loaded firearm at Arlos evinced the intent on the part of
Ganzon to cause some harm upon Arlos on whom he vented his resentment of the poor
performance rating he received. Considering that Ganzon pointed his loaded firearm at Arlos not
only once, but four times, Ganzon’s menacing acts engendered in the mind of Arlos the well-founded
belief that Arlos’ life could be in imminent danger. That the firearm exploded when Arlos parried
Ganzon’s firearm-wielding hand did not help dissipate the belief.
Nonetheless, Ganzon projects that his acts did not constitute grave misconduct in the contemplation
of the law because they were not committed in relation to his performance of duty; and that the
Christmas party was not an official function as to render any untoward incident committed on the
occasion thereof a misconduct. He posits that his offense could exist without the office; and that the
holding of the office was not a constituent element of his offense.
We disagree.
The Court stressed in Largo v. Court of Appeals18 the criteria that an act, to constitute a misconduct,
must not be committed in his private capacity and should bear a direct relation to and be connected
with the performance of his official duties.
Ganzon’s acts met the criteria in Largo v. Court of Appeals . To begin with, he was not acting in a
private capacity when he acted menacingly towards Arlos, it being clear that his resentment of his
poor performance rating, surely a matter that concerned his performance of duty, motivated his
confronting the latter. Moreover, it did not matter that his acts were committed outside of office
hours, because they were intimately connected to the office of the offender. An act is intimately
connected to the office of the offender if it is committed as the consequence of the performance of
the office by him, or if it cannot exist without the office even if public office is not an element of the
crime in the abstract. This was the thrust in Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 with the Court citing ample
jurisprudence.20
In Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan , one of the two main issues was whether the crime of grave threats
charged against the accused had been committed in relation to his office. The resolution of the issue
would determine whether or not it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction to try him. The
accused contended that it was not established that the crime charged had been committed by him
while in the discharge of or as the consequence of his official functions as municipal mayor. He
pointed out that public office was not an essential ingredient of grave threats, the crime charged,
which could be committed with the same facility by a public officer and a private individual alike. The
Court resolved that the crime charged was properly within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
because the amended information contained allegations showing that Alarilla had taken advantage
of his official functions as municipal mayor when he committed the crime of grave threats against the
complainant, a municipal councilor, by aiming a gun at and threatening to kill the latter on the
occasion of a public hearing during which the latter delivered a privilege speech critical of Alarilla’s
administration. The Court explained that the crime charged was "intimately connected with the
discharge of Alarilla’s official functions" because the crime charged was Alarilla’s response to the
complainant’s attack against his performance as a mayor; and that if Alarilla was not the mayor, "he
would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during
said privilege speech."21
Considering that Ganzon resented the poor performance rating he had received, and his resentment
caused his aggressive confrontation of Arlos, it definitely appears that Ganzon’s offense could not be
separated from his performance of duty. Indeed, under Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan and its progenitor
rulings, an act that is the consequence of the discharge of the employee’s official functions or the
performance of his duties, or that is relevant to his office or to the discharge of his official functions is
justly considered as service-related.
The fact that the acts of Ganzon were committed within the premises of the DILG Regional Office
No. 6 strengthens our view that such acts could not but be connected to Ganzon’s public
employment. Verily, the Court has regarded the commission of offensive overt acts by public officials
and employees within the premises of their public offices to be deserving of administrative
reprobation.
For instance, in Quiroz v. Orfila,22 the court employees’ conduct of shouting at each other and
quarreling within the court premises and during working hours were considered as exhibiting
discourtesy and disrespect to their co-workers and to the court itself. Their behavior was held to be
contrary to the ethical standard demanded by Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees).

Another illustrative instance is Baloloy v. Flores,23 where the respondent Sherwin M. Baloloy was
charged with misconduct because:
x x x complainant alleged that as he was going back to his office after delivering court documents,
he noticed respondent sitting on a bench, staring menacingly at him. Without any warning,
respondent stood up and boxed him several times in the face. To avoid further harm, complainant
ran towards room 315 and once he was inside, the secretary therein locked the door. Respondent
pursued him and started kicking and banging at the door, all the while shouting invectives at him.
Respondent left after apparently sensing the alarm he was causing.

A few minutes after respondents left, complainant left room 315 accompanied by a friend named
Demet. They went to respondent’s office to report the incident to respondent’s superior. When they
got there, however, they saw respondent holding a screwdriver, provoking them to fight. The branch
clerk of court intervened and requested Demet to take complainant to the hospital. x x x.

Finding both the complainant as legal researcher and the respondent as process server guilty of
misconduct, the Court ruled that:
We have time and again emphasized that the conduct and behavior or everyone connected with an
office charged with the administration of justice must at all times be characterized by propriety and
decorum. This Court will not tolerate misconduct committed by court personnel, particularly during
office hours and within court premises. Such misconduct shows a total lack of respect for the court,
and erodes the good image of the judiciary in the eyes of the public.
Both complainant and respondent have fallen short of the standard of conduct required of court
employees. Fighting with each other during working hours shows disrespect not only of coworkers
but also of the court.24 (Emphasis supplied)
Although court employees were involved in the foregoing situations, while the conduct of an
employee of the DILG is the focus herein, the same considerations taken into account in the former
are applicable herein.
Even if the affair occurred outside of the regular work hours, Ganzon’s menacing attitude towards
Arlos still had no excuse, particularly as Arlos was his superior in the office hierarchy. Section 4(c) of
RA 6713 (Code of Conduct Standards for Public Officials and Employees) fittingly provides:
(c) Justness and sincerity. – Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all
times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone,
especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and
shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
public safety and public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
It is almost superfluous to remind all public employees like Ganzon that the law of good manners
and proper decorum was law during as well as outside office hours.
Another ground for Ganzon’s appeal was that the administrative case should not have been resolved
independently of the criminal case; and that his eventual acquittal in the criminal case precluded his
administrative liability.

Again, the Court disagrees.

We uphold the CA’s following rumination on the matter, viz:
x x x. The mere fact that he was acquitted in the criminal case (said criminal case was based on the
same facts or incidents which gave rise to the instant administrative case) does not
ipso facto absolve him from administrative liability. Time and again, the Supreme Court has laid
down the doctrine that an administrative case is not dependent on the conviction or acquittal of the
criminal case because the evidence required in the proceedings therein is only substantial and not
proof beyond reasonable doubt.25
An administrative case is, as a rule, independent from criminal proceedings. The dismissal of a
1âwphi1

criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or the acquittal of an accused who is also a
respondent in an administrative case does not necessarily preclude the administrative proceeding
nor carry with it relief from administrative liability. This is because the quantum of proof required in
administrative proceedings is substantial evidence, unlike in criminal cases which require proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Substantial evidence, according to Section 5 of Rule 133, Rules of Court,
is "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion." In contrast, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.26
Finally, Ganzon’s insistence that the penalty of dismissal from the service imposed on him was
unjustified and excessive is unwarranted.
After being duly found guilty of grave misconduct, Ganzon was rightly meted the penalty of dismissal
from the service for his first offense conformably with the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service,27 to wit:
RULE IV
Penalties
Section 52. Classification of Offenses. – Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are
classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the
government service.
A The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:

1. Dishonesty;
xxxx
3. Grave Misconduct;
1st offense – Dismissal (Emphasis supplied)
In this regard, Section 56 and Section 58 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service respectively state that the penalty of dismissal shall result in the permanent
separation of the respondent from the service, with or without prejudice to criminal or civil liability,
and shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and the perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the
decision.
The Court deems it worthwhile to emphasize as a final word that the imposition of the correct
disciplinary measures upon erring public officials and employees has the primary objective of the
improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public s faith and confidence in the
Government. The punishment of the erring public officials and employees is secondary, but is
nonetheless in accord with the Constitution, which stresses in Section 1 of its Article XI that a public
office is a public trust, and commands that public officers must at all times be accountable to the
people, whom they must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.
WHEREFORE the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals and ORDERS
petitioner Rolando Ganzon to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Vivo vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 709 SCRA 276, November 12, 2013
G.R. No. 187854 November 12, 2013

RAY PETER O. VIVO, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAME CORPORATION (PAGCOR), Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

By petition for review on certiorari the petitioner seeks the review and reversal of the decision
promulgated on February 27, 2009,1 whereby the Court of Appeals CA) reversed and set aside the
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission CSC) dated April 20072 and August 1, 2007.3
Also under review is the denial by the CA of the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration through the
resolution promulgated May 11, 2009.4
Antecedents
The petitioner was employed by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) on September 9, 1986, and was PAGCOR’s Managing Head of its Gaming Department
at the time of his dismissal from office.5On February 21, 2002, he received a letter from Teresita S.
Ela, the Senior Managing Head of PAGCOR’s Human Resources Department, advising that he was
being administratively charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to the
interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence;6 that he should submit a written
explanation of the charges; and that he was at the same time being placed under preventive
suspension.7
On February 26, 2002, the petitioner’s counsel, replying to Ela’s letter, assailed the propriety of the
show-cause memorandum as well as the basis for placing the petitioner under preventive
suspension.
On March 14, 2002, the petitioner received the summons for him to attend an administrative inquiry,
instructing him to appear before PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) on March 15,
2002.8 At the petitioner’s request, however, the inquiry was conducted at his residence on said date.
His statement was taken in a question-and-answer format. He was also furnished the memorandum
of charges that recited the accusations against him and indicated the acts and omissions constituting
his alleged offenses. The memorandum of charges was based on the statements of PAGCOR
personnel who had personal knowledge of the accusations against him. However, when his counsel
requested to be furnished copies of the statements, PAGCOR rejected the request on the ground
that he had already been afforded the sufficient opportunity to confront, hear, and answer the
charges against him during the administrative inquiry. The petitioner was then allowed to submit his
answer on March 26, 2002.
Thereafter, the CIU tendered its investigation report to PAGCOR’s Adjudication Committee.9
The Adjudication Committee summoned the petitioner to appear before it on May 8, 2002 in order to
address questions regarding his case. His counsel moved for the re-scheduling of the meeting
because he would not be available on said date, but the Adjudication Committee denied the request
upon the reason that the presence of counsel was not necessary in the proceedings. His counsel
moved for the reconsideration of the denial of the request.10
The petitioner received the letter dated May 15, 2002 from Ela informing him of the resolution of the
PAGCOR Board of Directors in its May 14, 2002 meeting to the effect that he was being dismissed
from the service.11
After the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the resolution of the PAGCOR Board of
Directors dismissing him from the service was denied, he appealed his dismissal to the CSC.
In its resolution dated April 11, 2007, the CSC ruled that PAGCOR had violated the petitioner’s right
to due process, and accordingly set aside his dismissal from the service, viz:
In fine, the Commission finds that the right of Vivo to due process was violated when he was ousted
from his office without the corresponding Board Resolution that should have set out the collegial
decision of the PAGCOR Board of Directors.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal of Ray Peter O. Vivo is hereby
GRANTED. The letters dated May 15, 2002 and June 5, 2002 issued by Teresita S. Ela, Senior
Managing Head, Human Resource Department, Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR), are SET ASIDE.12
xxxx
The CSC remanded the case to PAGCOR with the instruction for PAGCOR to complete its
reinvestigation within three months from receipt of the resolution.

After the CSC denied its motion for reconsideration, PAGCOR elevated the case to the CA.
On February 27, 2009, the CA promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of
the CSC upon its finding that the petitioner had been accorded procedural due process. The CA
remanded the case to the CSC for the determination of the appeal of the petitioner on the merits,
specifically the issue of whether the dismissal had been for cause.13
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
The petitioner raises the following issues, namely:

1. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Petitioner’s right for (sic) due process was not
violated transgressed (sic) the fundamental rules in administrative due process.
2. The Court of Appeals decision in setting aside CSC Resolutions Nos. 070732, dated 01
April 2007, and 071485, dated 01 August 2007, is contrary to the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and settled jurisprudence.14
The petitioner would have the Court hold that PAGCOR’s failure to furnish him a copy of the Board
Resolutions authorizing his dismissal and denying his motion for reconsideration was a fatal and
irreparable defect in the administrative proceedings that ultimately resulted in the illegality of his
dismissal from the service. He further argues that he was denied due process by PAGCOR’s refusal
to re-schedule the Adjudication Committee meeting in order to enable his counsel to attend the
meeting with him, because the refusal constituted a violation of his right to be represented by
counsel.

Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due
process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings,
this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.15 Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is
not always necessary,16 and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals17 elaborates on the well-established meaning of due process in administrative proceedings
in this wise:
x x x Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-
type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges
and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.18
The petitioner actively participated in the entire course of the investigation and hearings conducted
by PAGCOR. He received the letter from Ela apprising him of his being administratively charged for
several offenses, and directing him to submit an explanation in writing. He was later on properly
summoned to appear before the CIU, which conducted its proceedings in his own residence upon
his request. During the administrative inquiry, the CIU served him a copy of the memorandum of
charges, which detailed the accusations against him and specified the acts and omissions
constituting his alleged offenses. He was also given the opportunity to appear before the
Adjudication Committee to answer clarificatory questions. Lastly, he was informed through a
memorandum of the decision of the Board of Directors dismissing him from the service.
In contrast, the petitioner could not dispute the observance of his right to due process by PAGCOR
as set forth herein. He made no credible showing of the supposed violation of his right to due
process. He was heard through the written statement he submitted in response to the memorandum
of the charges against him. He actively participated in the administrative inquiry conducted by the
CIU at his own residence. He was afforded the opportunity to clarify his position in the proceedings
before the Adjudication Committee. He was also able to appeal the adverse decision to dismiss him
from the service to the CSC. There is also no question that PAGCOR complied with the twin-notice
requirement prior to the termination of his employment, the first notice being made through Ela’s
letter dated February 21, 2002 informing him on his being administratively charged for the offenses
mentioned, and the second being through the letter dated May 15, 2002 advising him that
PAGCOR’s Board of Directors had resolved to dismiss him from the service. It is settled that there is
no denial of procedural due process where the opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments
or through pleadings is accorded.19
The petitioner takes the CA to task for not considering: (1) PAGCOR’s failure to furnish him copies of
the Board Resolutions referred to by Ela in the memorandum served on him, and (2) the refusal of
PAGCOR to have him be represented by counsel.

The petitioner cannot be sustained.

As the CA found, and correctly so, the petitioner’s pleadings explicitly admitted that his dismissal had
been effected through board resolutions. That he was not furnished copies of the board resolutions
did not negate the existence of the resolutions, and did not invalidate the contents of the board
resolutions. It is beyond question that he was duly informed of the subject-matter of the board
resolutions. Consequently, the CSC’s conclusion that his dismissal had been unauthorized was
unfounded. In any case, even assuming for the sake of argument that there was no board resolution
approving his dismissal, the lapse did not render his dismissal illegal but unauthorized. However, as
the CA succinctly put it, an unauthorized act could be the subject of ratification.20
As regards the supposed denial of the petitioner’s right to counsel, it is underscored that PAGCOR
denied his request to re-schedule the conference before the Adjudication Committee because his
counsel would not be available on the day fixed for that purpose. In its letter denying the request, the
Adjudication Committee asserted that the presence of counsel was not indispensable in the conduct
of its proceedings. We find nothing objectionable in the denial of the request. In an administrative
proceeding like that conducted against the petitioner, a respondent has the option of engaging the
services of counsel. As such, the right to counsel is not imperative because administrative
investigations are themselves inquiries conducted only to determine whether there are facts that
merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service.21
It is noteworthy, however, that the petitioner was actually assisted by his counsel from the outset of
the administrative case against him. That counsel, Atty. Cesar B. Jimenea Jr. of the Jimenea and
Associates, ensured that the petitioner’s every concern reached PAGCOR, and that he was clarified
of any matter affecting his rights all throughout the investigation and hearings. As the records
indicate, his counsel sent to Ela a letter calling attention to supposedly palpable violations of his
client’s right to due process, and objecting to Ela’s right to place his client under preventive
suspension. The same counsel filed in behalf of the petitioner the letter-requests to be furnished
certain documents and records of the investigation,22 his answer to the memorandum of charges,23the
letter-request for the re-setting of the conference before the Adjudication Committee,24 the
reconsideration of the letter denying the request,25 and the motion to reconsider the decision of the
Board of Directors to dismiss him from the service.26
In any event, any procedural defect in the proceedings taken against the petitioner was cured by his
filing of the motion for reconsideration and by his appealing the adverse result to the CSC. The
1âw phi 1

Court held in Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission27 that any defect in the observance of due
process is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration, and that denial of due process cannot
be successfully invoked by a party who was afforded the opportunity to be heard. In Autencio v.
Mañara,28 the Court observed that defects in procedural due process may be cured when the party
has been afforded the opportunity to appeal or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
The petitioner was not denied due process of law, for he was afforded the fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain his side. That, to us, was sufficient to meet the requirements of due
process.29 In Casimiro v. Tandog,30 the Court pronounced:

The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due
process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively
a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties affected.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in holding that P AGCOR had properly observed the
requirements of due process in its administrative proceedings against the petitioner. WHEREFORE,
the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
February 27, 2009 by the Court of Appeals; REQUIRES the Civil Service Commission to determine
the petitioner's appeal on the merits, particularly the issue of whether the dismissal was for cause;
and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Re: Letters of Lucena B. Rallos for Alleged Acts/Incidents/Occurrences Relative to the Resolution(s)
Issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 by Court of Appeals Executive Judge Pampio Abarintos and associate
Justice Ramon Paul Hernando and Victoria Isabel Paredes, 711 SCRA 673, December 10, 2013

PDF FILE

G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, Petitioner, v. CITY OF CEBU, T.C. (TITO)

SAYSON AND RICARDO HAPITAN, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 159692]

BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, SR., AND BIENVENIDO DOUGLAS LUKE

BRADBURY JABAN, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF CEBU,
CITY MAYOR ALVIN GARCIA, SANGGUNIANG PANLUNSOD OF CITY
OF CEBU, HON. RENATO V. OSMEÑA, AS PRESIDING OFFICER OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNSOD, AND CITOM CHAIRMAN ALAN
GAVIOLA, AS CITOM CHIEF, CITOM TRAFFIC ENFORCER E. A.
ROMERO, AND LITO GILBUENA, Respondents.

DECISION
 BERSAMIN, J.:

The goal of the decentralization of powers to the local government units (LGUs) is to ensure the enjoyment
by each of the territorial and political subdivisions of the State of a genuine and meaningful local autonomy.
To attain the goal, the National Legislature has devolved the three great inherent powers of the State to the
LGUs. Each political subdivision is thereby vested with such powers subject to constitutional and statutory
limitations.

In particular, the Local Government Code (LGC) has expressly empowered the LGUs to enact and adopt
ordinances to regulate vehicular traffic and to prohibit illegal parking within their jurisdictions. Now
challenged before the Court are the constitutionality and validity of one such ordinance on the ground that
the ordinance constituted a contravention of the guaranty of due process under the Constitution by
authorizing the immobilization of offending vehicles through the clamping of tires. The challenge originated
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at the instance of the petitioners – vehicle owners who had borne the brunt
of the implementation of the ordinance – with the RTC declaring the ordinance unconstitutional, but it has
now reached the Court as a consolidated appeal taken in due course by the petitioners after the Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment of the RTC.

Antecedents

On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to
authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions
and prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City).1 The pertinent provisions of
Ordinance No. 1664 read: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawl ibra ry

Section 1. POLICY – It is the policy of the government of the City of Cebu to immobilize any
motor vehicle violating any provision of any City Ordinance on Parking Prohibitions or
Restrictions, more particularly Ordinance No. 801, otherwise known as the Traffic Code of
Cebu City, as amended, in order to have a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets
in the City of Cebu at all times.

Section 2. IMMOBILIZATION OF VEHICLES – Any vehicle found violating any provision of

any existing ordinance of the City of Cebu which prohibits, regulates or restricts the parking
of vehicles shall be immobilized by clamping any tire of the said violating vehicle with the
use of a denver boot vehicle immobilizer or any other special gadget designed to immobilize
motor vehicles. For this particular purpose, any traffic enforcer of the City (regular PNP
Personnel or Cebu City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel) is hereby authorized to
immobilize any violating vehicle as hereinabove provided.

Section 3. PENALTIES – Any motor vehicle, owner or driver violating any ordinance on
parking prohibitions, regulations and/or restrictions, as may be provided under Ordinance
No. 801, as amended, or any other existing ordinance, shall be penalized in accordance
with the penalties imposed in the ordinance so violated, provided that the vehicle
immobilizer may not be removed or released without its owner or driver paying first to the
City Treasurer of Cebu City through the Traffic Violations Bureau (TVB) all the accumulated
penalties for all prior traffic law violations that remain unpaid or unsettled, plus the
administrative penalty of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for the immobilization of the said
vehicle, and receipts of such payments presented to the concerned personnel of the bureau
responsible for the release of the immobilized vehicle, unless otherwise ordered released by
any of the following officers: c hanRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

a) Chairman, CITOM
b) Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology
c) Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belciña

3.1 Any person who tampers or tries to release an immobilized or clamped motor vehicle by
destroying the denver boot vehicle immobilizer or other such special gadgets, shall be liable
for its loss or destruction and shall be prosecuted for such loss or destruction under pain or
 penalty under the Revised Penal Code and any other existing ordinance of the City of Cebu
for the criminal act, in addition to his/her civil liabilities under the Civil Code of the
Philippines; Provided that any such act may not be compromised nor settled amicably
extrajudicially.

3.2 Any immobilized vehicle which is unattended and constitute an obstruction to the free
flow of traffic or a hazard thereof shall be towed to the city government impounding area
for safekeeping and may be released only after the provision of Section 3 hereof shall have
been fully complied with.

3.3 Any person who violates any provision of this ordinance shall, upon conviction, be
penalized with imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months
or of a fine of not less than Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) nor more than Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00), or both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court.2 ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban, Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury
Jaban (Jaban, Jr.) brought suit in the RTC in Cebu City against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon.
Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato
V. Osmeña, and the chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM),
seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and
for being contrary to law, and damages.3 Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had
properly parked his car in a paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and
documents from his office;4 that upon his return after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being
immobilized by a steel clamp, and a notice being posted on the car to the effect that it would be a criminal
offense to break the clamp;5 that he had been infuriated by the immobilization of his car because he had
been thereby rendered unable to meet an important client on that day; that his car was impounded for three
days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City
Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car;6 that the fine was imposed without any court hearing and
without due process of law, for he was not even told why his car had been immobilized; that he had
undergone a similar incident of clamping of his car on the early morning of November 20, 1997 while his car
was parked properly in a parking lot in front of the San Nicolas Pasil Market in Cebu City without violating
any traffic regulation or causing any obstruction; that he was compelled to pay P1,500.00 (itemized as
P500.00 for the clamping and P1,000.00 for the violation) without any court hearing and final judgment;
that on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where there was no sign prohibiting
parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative Lito Gilbuena; and that he was compelled to pay
the total sum of P1,400.00 for the release of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment rendered
by a court of justice.7
cralawred

On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, T.C. Sayson,
Ricardo Hapitan and John Does to demand the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of
the Traffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.8 He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left
his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the
vehicle of the anay exterminator who had asked to be allowed to unload his materials and equipment from
the front of the residence inasmuch as his daughter’s car had been parked in the carport, with the assurance
that the unloading would not take too long;9that while waiting for the anay exterminator to finish unloading,
the phone in his office inside the house had rung, impelling him to go into the house to answer the call; that
after a short while, his son–in–law informed him that unknown persons had clamped the front wheel of his
car;10 that he rushed outside and found a traffic citation stating that his car had been clamped by CITOM
representatives with a warning that the unauthorized removal of the clamp would subject the remover to
criminal charges;11and that in the late afternoon a group headed by Ricardo Hapitan towed the car even if it
was not obstructing the flow of traffic.12

In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its co–defendants,13 the City Attorney of Cebu presented
similar defenses, essentially stating that the traffic enforcers had only upheld the law by clamping the
vehicles of the plaintiffs;14 and that Ordinance No. 1664 enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality and
validity.15
The cases were consolidated before Branch 58 of the RTC, which, after trial, rendered on January 22, 1999
its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void upon the following ratiocination:chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

In clear and simple phrase, the essence of due process was expressed by Daniel Webster as
a “law which hears before it condemns”. In another case[s], “procedural due process is that
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial.” It contemplate(s) notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered affecting ones (sic) person or property.” In both procedural and substantive due
process, a hearing is always a pre–requisite, hence, the taking or deprivation of one’s life,
liberty or property must be done upon and with observance of the “due process” clause of
the Constitution and the non–observance or violation thereof is, perforce, unconstitutional.

Under Ordinance No. 1664, when a vehicle is parked in a prohibited, restrycted (sic) or
regulated area in the street or along the street, the vehicle is immobilized by clamping any
tire of said vehicle with the use of a denver boot vehicle immobilizer or any other special
gadget which immobilized the motor vehicle. The violating vehicle is immobilized, thus,
depriving its owner of the use thereof at the sole determination of any traffic enforcer or
regular PNP personnel or Cebu City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel. The vehicle
immobilizer cannot be removed or released without the owner or driver paying first to the
City Treasurer of Cebu through the Traffic Violations Bureau all the accumulated penalties
of all unpaid or unsettled traffic law violations, plus the administrative penalty of P500.00
and, further, the immobilized vehicle shall be released only upon presentation of the receipt
of said payments and upon release order by the Chairman, CITOM, or Chairman,
Committee on Police, Fire and Penology, or Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belcina. It should be
stressed that the owner of the immobilized vehicle shall have to undergo all these ordeals
at the mercy of the Traffic Law Enforcer who, as the Ordinance in question mandates, is the
arresting officer, prosecutor, Judge and collector. Otherwise stated, the owner of the
immobilized motor vehicle is deprived of his right to the use of his/her vehicle and
penalized without a hearing by a person who is not legally or duly vested with such rights,
power or authority. The Ordinance in question is penal in nature, and it has been held;

xxx

WHEREFORE, premised (sic) considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance

No. 1664 unconstitutional and directing the defendant City of Cebu to pay the plaintiff
Valentino Legaspi the sum of P110,000.00 representing the value of his car, and to all the
plaintiffs, Valentino L. Legaspi, Bienvenido P. Jaban and Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury
Jaban, the sum of P100,000.00 each or P300,000.00 all as nominal damages and another
P100,000.00 each or P300,000.00 all as temperate or moderate damages. With costs
against defendant City of Cebu.

SO ORDERED.16 (citations omitted) cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

The City of Cebu and its co–defendants appealed to the CA, assigning the following errors to the RTC,
namely: (a) the RTC erred in declaring that Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional; (b)
granting, arguendo, that Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional, the RTC gravely erred in holding that
any violation prior to its declaration as being unconstitutional was irrelevant; (c) granting, arguendo, that
Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional, the RTC gravely erred in awarding damages to the plaintiffs; (d)
granting, arguendo, that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages, the damages awarded were excessive and
contrary to law; and (e) the decision of the RTC was void, because the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
had not been notified of the proceedings.

On June 16, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,17 overturning the RTC and declaring Ordinance
No. 1664 valid, to wit:
chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

The principal thrust of this appeal is the constitutionality of Ordinance 1664. Defendants–
appellants contend that the passage of Ordinance 1664 is in accordance with the police
powers exercised by the City of Cebu through the Sangguniang Panlungsod and granted by
RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. A thematic analysis of the law
on municipal corporations confirms this view. As in previous legislation, the Local
Government Code delegates police powers to the local governments in two ways. Firstly, it
enumerates the subjects on which the Sangguniang Panlungsod may exercise these
powers. Thus, with respect to the use of public streets, Section 458 of the Code states: chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

Section 458 (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative branch of

the city, x x x shall x x x

(5) (v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges,
park and other public places and approve the construction, improvement,
repair and maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops and
terminals or regulate the use of the same by privately owned vehicles
which serve the public; regulate garages and the operation of conveyances
for hire; designate stands to be occupied by public vehicles when not in
use; regulate the putting up of signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts
on the streets; and provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of
streets and public places;

(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or

obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare,
authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public
places.

It then makes a general grant of the police power. The scope of the legislative authority of
the local government is set out in Section 16, to wit: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Section 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of
the general welfare.

This provision contains what is traditionally known as the general welfare clause. As
expounded in United States vs. Salaveria, 39 Phil 102, the general welfare clause has two
branches. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates
to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge
the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second branch of
the clause is much more independent of the specific functions of the council, and authorizes
such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for health, safety,
prosperity and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants.

In a vital and critical way, the general welfare clause complements the more specific
powers granted a local government. It serves as a catch–all provision that ensures that the
local government will be equipped to meet any local contingency that bears upon the
welfare of its constituents but has not been actually anticipated. So varied and protean are
the activities that affect the legitimate interests of the local inhabitants that it is well–nigh
impossible to say beforehand what may or may not be done specifically through law. To
ensure that a local government can react positively to the people’s needs and expectations,
the general welfare clause has been devised and interpreted to allow the local legislative
council to enact such measures as the occasion requires.

Founded on clear authority and tradition, Ordinance 1664 may be deemed a legitimate
exercise of the police powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu. This local
law authorizes traffic enforcers to immobilize and tow for safekeeping vehicles on the
streets that are illegally parked and to release them upon payment of the announced
penalties. As explained in the preamble, it has become necessary to resort to these
measures because of the traffic congestion caused by illegal parking and the inability of
existing penalties to curb it. The ordinance is designed to improve traffic conditions in the
City of Cebu and thus shows a real and substantial relation to the welfare, comfort and
 convenience of the people of Cebu. The only restrictions to an ordinance passed under the
general welfare clause, as declared in Salaveria, is that the regulation must be reasonable,
consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, consistent with
national laws and policies, and not unreasonable or discriminatory. The measure in question
undoubtedly comes within these parameters.

Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration on August 4, 2003, the Jabans and Legaspi
came to the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.

Issues

Based on the submissions of the parties, the following issues are decisive of the challenge, to wit: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit of the legislative
powers of the City of Cebu; and

2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the requirements for validity and
constitutionality, particularly the limitations set by the Constitution and the
relevant statutes.

Ruling

The petitions for review have no merit.

A.

Tests for a valid ordinance

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,18 the Court restates the tests of a valid ordinance thusly: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.19 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted
within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance
with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and
reason, and its consistency with public policy).

B.

Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the formal requirements

Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within the corporate powers of the LGU of the City of Cebu?

The answer is in the affirmative. Indeed, with no issues being hereby raised against the formalities
attendant to the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664, we presume its full compliance with the test in that
regard. Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the
State’s great powers, namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation.
The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU
in the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully functioning subdivision
of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations.
In particular, police power is regarded as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’”20 It is unquestionably “the power vested in the
legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subject of the same.”21According to
Cooley: “[The police power] embraces the whole system of internal regulation by which the state seeks not
only to preserve the public order and to prevent offences against itself, but also to establish for the
intercourse of citizens with citizens, those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are
calculated to prevent the conflict of rights and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so
far as it is reasonably consistent with the right enjoyment of rights by others.”22

In point is the exercise by the LGU of the City of Cebu of delegated police power. In Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Bel–Air Village Association, Inc.,23 the Court cogently observed: cha nRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot
be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The
National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations
or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking
body. (emphasis supplied) cha nrob lesvi rtualawlib ra ry

The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact
traffic rules and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by
virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.24

Section 458 of the LGC relevantly states: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Composition. – (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

xxx

(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of
the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and
in addition to said services and facilities, shall:

xxx

(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges,

parks and other public places and approve the construction,
improvement repair and maintenance of the same; establish bus
and vehicle stops and terminals or regulate the use of the same by
privately–owned vehicles which serve the public; regulate garages
and operation of conveyances for hire; designate stands to be
occupied by public vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting
up of signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets;
and provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of streets and
public places;

(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit

encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the
interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments
and illegal constructions in public places; (emphasis supplied) chan roblesv irtualawl ibra ry
The foregoing delegation reflected the desire of Congress to leave to the cities themselves the task of
confronting the problem of traffic congestions associated with development and progress because they were
directly familiar with the situations in their respective jurisdictions. Indeed, the LGUs would be in the best
position to craft their traffic codes because of their familiarity with the conditions peculiar to their
communities. With the broad latitude in this regard allowed to the LGUs of the cities, their traffic regulations
must be held valid and effective unless they infringed the constitutional limitations and statutory safeguards.

C.

Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664with the substantive requirements

The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the adherence to the constitutional guaranty of due
process of law. The guaranty is embedded in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which ordains: chanRoblesvi rtua lLaw lib rary

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of the
Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a protection
essential to every inhabitant of the country, for, as a commentator on Constitutional Law has vividly
written:25

x x x. If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty, or property, he is
denied the protection of due process. If the enjoyment of his rights is conditioned on an
unreasonable requirement, due process is likewise violated. Whatsoever be the source of
such rights, be it the Constitution itself or merely a statute, its unjustified withholding
would also be a violation of due process. Any government act that militates against the
ordinary norms of justice or fair play is considered an infraction of the great guaranty of
due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation merely of the procedure
prescribed by the law or affects the very validity of the law itself.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,26 the Court expounded on the aspects of the guaranty of due process of law
as a limitation on the acts of government, viz: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually
called “procedural due process” and “substantive due process.”

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic
procedural due process issues are concerned with that kind of notice and what form of
hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action.

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an
adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property. In other words,
substantive due process looks to whether there is sufficient justification for the
government’s action. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is
such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. For example, if a law
is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so
long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area
where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the
government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary
to achieve a compelling government purpose.

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such
power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject
to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the
prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights.
Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
 fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person
to his life, liberty and property.27 ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

The Jabans contend that Ordinance No. 1664, by leaving the confiscation and immobilization of the motor
vehicles to the traffic enforcers or the regular personnel of the Philippine National Police (PNP) instead of to
officials exercising judicial authority, was violative of the constitutional guaranty of due process; that such
confiscation and immobilization should only be after a hearing on the merits by courts of law; and that the
immobilization and the clamping of the cars and motor vehicles by the police or traffic enforcers could be
subject to abuse.

On his part, Legaspi likewise contends that Ordinance No. 1664 violated the constitutional guaranty of due
process for being arbitrary and oppressive; and that its provisions conferring upon the traffic enforcers the
absolute discretion to be the enforcers, prosecutors, judges and collectors all at the same time were vague
and ambiguous.28 He reminds that the grant of police powers for the general welfare under the LGC was not
unlimited but subject to constitutional limitations;29 and that these consolidated cases should not be
resolved differently from the resolution of a third case assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 1664 (Astillero
case), in which the decision of the same RTC declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as unconstitutional had attained
finality following the denial of due course to the appeal of the City of Cebu and its co–defendants.

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of the
petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive
tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the
statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.

To us, the terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were broad enough to
include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else obstructed the streets, alleys and sidewalks, which were
precisely the subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in avowedly aiming to ensure “a smooth flow of vehicular traffic
in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times” (Section 1). This aim was borne out by its Whereas
Clauses, viz:chanRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

WHEREAS, the City of Cebu enacted the Traffic Code (Ordinance No. 801) as amended,
provided for Parking Restrictions and Parking Prohibitions in the streets of Cebu City;

WHEREAS, despite the restrictions and prohibitions of parking on certain streets

of Cebu City, violations continued unabated due, among others, to the very low
penalties imposed under the Traffic Code of Cebu City;

WHEREAS, City Ordinance 1642 was enacted in order to address the traffic
congestions caused by illegal parkings in the streets of Cebu City;

WHEREAS, there is a need to amend City Ordinance No.1642 in order to fully

address and solve the problem of illegal parking and other violations of the Traffic
Code of Cebu City;30 (emphasis supplied) c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth and progress in the population and
economic centers of the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest
and advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in order to fulfill the
compelling government purpose of immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic congestions caused by
illegally parked vehicles obstructing the streets of the City of Cebu.

Legaspi’s attack against the provisions of Ordinance No. 1664 for being vague and ambiguous cannot stand
scrutiny. As can be readily seen, its text was forthright and unambiguous in all respects. There could be no
confusion on the meaning and coverage of the ordinance. But should there be any vagueness and ambiguity
in the provisions, which the OSG does not concede,31 there was nothing that a proper application of the
basic rules of statutory construction could not justly rectify.

The petitioners further assert that drivers or vehicle owners affected by Ordinance No. 1664 like themselves
were not accorded the opportunity to protest the clamping, towing, and impounding of the vehicles, or even
to be heard and to explain their side prior to the immobilization of their vehicles; and that the ordinance was
oppressive and arbitrary for that reason.

The adverse assertions against Ordinance No. 1664 are unwarranted.

Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and arbitrary. Any driver or vehicle owner whose
vehicle was immobilized by clamping could protest such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP personnel
enforcing the ordinance. Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1664, supra, textually afforded an administrative
escape in the form of permitting the release of the immobilized vehicle upon a protest directly made to the
Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman of the Committee on Police, Fire and Penology of the City of Cebu;
or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belciña – officials named in the ordinance itself. The release could be
ordered by any of such officials even without the payment of the stipulated fine. That none of the
petitioners, albeit lawyers all, resorted to such recourse did not diminish the fairness and reasonableness of
the escape clause written in the ordinance. Secondly, the immobilization of a vehicle by clamping pursuant
to the ordinance was not necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of the
apprehension for illegal parking or obstruction. In that situation, the enforcer would simply either require the
driver to move the vehicle or issue a traffic citation should the latter persist in his violation. The clamping
would happen only to prevent the transgressor from using the vehicle itself to escape the due sanctions.
And, lastly, the towing away of the immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a summary impounding, but
designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from obstructing traffic in the vicinity of the apprehension and
thereby ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The owner of the towed vehicle would not be deprived of his
property.

In fine, the circumstances set forth herein indicate that Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the elements of
fairness and reasonableness.

Did Ordinance No. 1664 meet the requirements of procedural due process?

Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there are many instances
under our laws in which the absence of one or both of such requirements is not necessarily a denial or
deprivation of due process. Among the instances are the cancellation of the passport of a person being
sought for the commission of a crime, the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative
charges, the distraint of properties to answer for tax delinquencies, the padlocking of restaurants found to
be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies, and the abatement of nuisance per se.32 Add to them
the arrest of a person in flagrante delicto.33

The clamping of the petitioners’ vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No. 1664 (and of the vehicles of others
similarly situated) was of the same character as the aforecited established exceptions dispensing with notice
and hearing. As already said, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was
necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such
circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous. Nor should the lack of a trial–type hearing prior to
the clamping constitute a breach of procedural due process, for giving the transgressors the chance to
reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest could equally satisfy the need for a hearing. In other
words, the prior intervention of a court of law was not indispensable to ensure a compliance with the
guaranty of due process.

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce the
ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving
away.

Finally, Legaspi’s position, that the final decision of the RTC rendered in the Astillero case declaring
Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional bound the City of Cebu, thereby precluding these consolidated appeals
from being decided differently, is utterly untenable. For one, Legaspi undeservedly extends too much
importance to an irrelevant decision of the RTC – irrelevant, because the connection between that case to
these cases was not at all shown. For another, he ignores that it should be the RTC that had improperly
acted for so deciding the Astillero case despite the appeals in these cases being already pending in the CA.
Being the same court in the three cases, the RTC should have anticipated that in the regular course of
proceedings, the outcome of the appeal in these cases then pending before the CA would ultimately be
elevated to and determined by no less than the Court itself. Such anticipation should have made it refrain
from declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional, for a lower court like itself, appreciating its position in
the “interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation,” should have exercised a
“becoming modesty” on the issue of the constitutionality of the same ordinance that the Constitution
required the majority vote of the Members of the Court sitting en banc to determine.34 Such “becoming
modesty” also forewarned that any declaration of unconstitutionality by an inferior court was binding only on
the parties, but that a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court would be a precedent binding on all.35

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on June 16, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the
costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.