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RULE 57- PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT


|Abrillo, Gerli Therese|
Uy vs CA, GR No. 95550, 23 November 1992
Facts:
Enrique Anlap and Rosalinda Moreno-Anlap are the owners of a fishing vessel known as
"cub-cub" valued at P350,000.00. On September 20, 1985, they rented said vessel and
its accessories to petitioners for a period of sixty (60) days commencing September 20,
1985 until November 19, 1985, at the rental of P8,000.00 per 30-days or for a total sum
of P16,000.000, which petitioners fully paid. The agreement was that should petitioners
continue using the vessel after the expiration of the lease, the same shall be considered
renewed for another period of one hundred twenty (120) days, provided petitioners pay
the amount of P16,000.00 as advance payment for the first sixty (60) days and another
P16,000.00 after the expiration of the first sixty (60) days. However, despite the expiration
of the original 60-day period petitioners failed to return the fishing vessel and instead
continued using the vessel without paying rentals in spite of repeated demands.
Petitioners filed a notice of appeal from the aforesaid decision, while respondent filed an
ex-parte motion for writ of attachment dated December 18, 1989, which was granted, and
the same issued on December 19, 1989. Petitioners' ex-parte motion to discharge said
writ failed. Likewise, their attempt at securing a reversal with the Court of Appeals was a
failure with the dismissal of their petition for certiorari.
Petitioners specifically challenge the propriety of the order of preliminary attachment
issued by the trial court, which read as follows: It appearing that the appeal taken by the
defendants by filing a Notice of Appeal had not been perfected on account of the fact that
the last day for taking an appeal has not yet expired and finding the Ex-parte Motion for
writ of attachment to be meritorious, the same is hereby granted.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT preliminary attachment can be issued exparte after the perfection
of appeal?
Ruling:
Petitioners' impression that the trial court loses jurisdiction to issue a writ of attachment
upon perfection of the appeal is misplaced. The rules specifically state that a motion for
a writ of attachment may be filed at the commencement of an action or at anytime
thereafter. The trial court may even issue orders for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal. In the case of
Galang v. Endencia 10 this Court upheld the issuance of a writ of attachment even though
appeal had been perfected. Relying on Sec. 9, Rule 41 of the then Rules of Court, the
Court said that "[t]he levy in attachment of the properties of the defendant upon the
allegation that he is about to dispose of the same to defraud his creditors is one which is

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intended for the protection and preservation of the rights of the plaintiff and which in no
way involves any matter litigated by defendant's appeal." PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
24, 1990 is hereby REVERSED and the trial court's order of preliminary attachment
against the properties of the petitioners is hereby LIFTED and CANCELLED. It is further
ordered that properties attached be restituted to the petitioners or if this is not possible,
to allow petitioners to claim on the bond.
---oo0oo---
Davao light and Power co. vs CA, GR No. 93262, 29 November 1991
Facts:
On May 2, 1989 Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. (hereafter, simply Davao Light) filed a
verified complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages against Queensland
Hotel, etc. and Teodorico Adarna. The complaint contained an ex parte application for a
writ of preliminary attachment.
On May 12, 1989, the summons and a copy of the complaint, as well as the writ of
attachment and a copy of the attachment bond, were served on defendants Queensland
and Adarna; and pursuant to the writ, the sheriff seized properties belonging to the latter.
On September 6, 1989, defendants Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge
the attachment for lack of jurisdiction to issue the same because at the time the order of
attachment was promulgated (May 3, 1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11,
1989), the Trial Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cause and over the
persons of the defendants. On
September 14, 1989, Davao Light filed an opposition to the motion to discharge
attachment. On
September 19, 1989, the Trial Court issued an Order denying the motion to discharge.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a
defendant before acquisition of jurisdiction of the defendant’s person by summons or
voluntary submission to court?
Ruling:
Yes and consequently petition for review will have to be granted. The obtention by the
court of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is one thing; quite another is the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or over the subject-matter or
nature of the action, or the res or object hereof.
An action or proceeding is commenced by the filing of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading. By that act, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter or nature of the

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action or proceeding is invoked or called into activity; and it is thus that the court acquires
jurisdiction over said subject matter or nature of the action.
With regard to the provisional remedies of preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction,
receivership or replevin. They may be validly and properly applied for and granted even
before the defendant is summoned or is heard from.
A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the
provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other party may, at the commencement
of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into
the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered. It is a remedy which is purely statutory in respect of which the law requires a
strict construction of the provisions granting it. Withal no principle, statutory or
jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant.
The only pre-requisite is that the Court be satisfied, upon consideration of "the affidavit of
the applicant or of some other person who personally knows the facts, that a sufficient
cause of action exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1.
However valid and proper they might otherwise be, these do not and cannot bind and
affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by
the court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary
submission to the court's authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED, and the order and writ of attachment issued by Hon. Milagros C.
Nartatez, Presiding Judge of Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Civil Case
No. 19513-89 against Queensland Hotel or Motel or Queensland Tourist Inn and
Teodorico Adarna are hereby REINSTATED. Costs against private respondents.
---oo0oo---
Magdalena Estate vs Nieto, GR No. L-54242, 25 November 1983
Facts:
Defendants bought a parcel of land with an agreement with the plaintiff that even if the
defendant had not yet paid in full, the land title will be in their name. There was a remaining
balance of P12,000, the defendant were only able to pay P100 hence the plaintiff sent a
demand letter through their legal counsel wherein the defendant failed to comply.
The plaintiff filed an action in court and in the service of summons attached with the copy
of complains, the defendant concealed themselves to avoid service hence the court
allowed service of summons thru publication.

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The defendants-appellants contend that the lower court erred in allowing service of
summons by publication, and consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the defendants-appellants, and the decision is therefore void.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the court acquired jurisdiction over defendant by service by
publication?
Ruling:
No. personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of
jurisdiction divert the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to
the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot —consistently
with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights—confer upon the court jurisdiction over
said defendant."
The Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing defendant, absent a
personal service of summons within the forum... The proper recourse for a creditor in the
same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real or personal, of the resident
defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached under Rule 57,
Section 1 (f), in which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem
or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may then accordingly be deemed valid
and effective."
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated October 5, 1972 of the court a quo, is hereby SET
ASIDE and the case is remanded to the trial court for proper service of summons and
trial.
---oo0oo---
|Adizas, Alvino Leander|
MINDANAO SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC. (formerly Davao Savings &
Loan Association) & FRANCISCO VILLAMOR, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
POLY R. MERCADO, & JUAN P. MERCADO, G.R. No. 84481. April 18, 1989.

Facts:
On September 10, 1986, private respondents filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, a complaint against defendants D.S. Homes, Inc., and its directors, Laurentino G.
Cuevas, Saturnino R. Petalcorin, Engr. Uldarico D. Dumdum. Aurora P. De Leon, Ramon
D. Basa, Francisco D. Villamor, Richard F. Magallanes, Geronimo S. Palermo, Felicisimo
V. Ramos and Eugenio M. De los Santos (hereinafter referred to as D.S. Homes, et al.)
for "Rescission of Contract and Damages" with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment, docketed as Civil Case No. 18263.
On September 28, 1986, Judge Dinopol issued an order granting ex parte the application
for a writ of preliminary attachment.

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The private respondents amended their complaint and filed a second amended complaint
impleading as additional defendants herein petitioners Davao Savings & Loan
Association, Inc. and its president, Francisco Villamor, but dropping Eugenio M. De los
Santos.
Judge Dinopol issued ex parte an amended order of attachment against all the
defendants named in the second amended complaint, including the petitioners but
excluding Eugenio C. de los Santos. D. S. Homes. Inc., et al. and the Davao Savings &
Loan Association (later renamed Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. or "MSLA")
and Francisco Villamor filed separate motions to quash the writ of attachment. When their
motions were denied by the Court, D.S. Homes, Inc., et al. offered a counterbond in the
amount of P1,752,861.41 per certificate issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines, a
banking partner of petitioner MSLA. The lower court accepted the Land Bank Certificate
of Time Deposit for P1,752,861.41 as counterbond and lifted the writ of preliminary
attachment on June 5, 1987.
On July 29, 1987, MSLA and Villamor filed in the Court Appeals a petition for certiorari to
annul the order of attachment and the denial of their motion to quash the same. The
petitioners alleged that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the ex
parte orders of preliminary attachment and in denying their motion to quash the writ of
attachment, D.S. Homes, Inc., et al. did not join them.
On May 5, 1988, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari and remanded
the records of Civil Cases No. 18263 to the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
13, for expeditious proceedings. It held:
"Objections against the writ may no longer be invoked once a counterbond is
filed for its lifting or dissolution.
"The grounds invoked for the issuance of the writ form the core of the
complaint and it is right away obvious that a trial on the merit was necessary.
The merits of a main action are not triable in a motion to discharge an
attachment otherwise an applicant for dissolution could force a trial on the
merits on his motion).
Dissatisfied, the petitioners appealed to this Court.
Issues:
 Whether or not the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the ex
parte orders of preliminary attachment and in denying their motion to quash the
writ of attachment.
 Whether or not motion to quash the Writ of Attachment would still be allowed after
the defendant has obtained the discharge of the writ by filing a counterbond.

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 Whether or not the defendant, after procuring the dissolution of the attachment by
filing a counterbond, ask for the cancellation of the counterbond on the ground that
the order of attachment was improperly issued.

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court held that the only requisites for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment under Section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court are the
affidavit and bond of the applicant.
"SEC. 3. Affidavit and bond required. — An order of attachment shall
be granted only when it is made to appear by the affidavit of the
applicant, or of some other person who personally knows the facts,
that a sufficient cause of action exists, that the case is one of those
mentioned in section 1 hereof, that there is no other sufficient
security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that
the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the
possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum
for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims. The
affidavit, and the bond required by the next succeeding section must
be duly filed with the clerk or judge of the court before the order
issues."
No notice to the adverse party or hearing of the application required. As a matter
of fact a hearing would defeat the purpose of this provisional remedy. The time
which such hearing would take, could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment issues. While no
hearing is required by the Rules of Court for the issuance of an attachment (Belisle
Investment & Finance Co., Inc. vs. State Investment House, Inc., 72927, June 30,
1987; Filinvest Credit Corp. vs. Relova, 117 SCRA 420), a motion to quash the writ
may not be granted without "reasonable notice to the applicant" and only "after
hearing" (Secs. 12 and 13, Rule 57, Rules of Court).

2. After the defendant has obtained the discharge of the writ of attachment by filing a
counterbond under Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, he may not file
another motion under Section 13, Rule 57 to quash the writ for impropriety
or irregularity in issuing it. The reason is simple. The writ had already been
quashed by filing a counterbond, hence, another motion to quash it would be
pointless. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals correctly observed, when the ground
for the issuance of the writ is also the core of the complaint, the question of whether
the plaintiff was entitled to the writ can only be determined after, not before, a full-
blown trial on the merits of the case. This accords with our ruling in G .B., Inc. vs.
Sanchez, 98 Phil. 886 that: "The merits of a main action are not triable in a motion

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to discharge an attachment, otherwise an applicant for the dissolution could force


a trial on the merits of the case on this motion."
3. x x x x That question was answered by this Court when it ruled in Uy Kimpang vs.
Javier, 65 Phil. 170, that "the obligors in the bond are absolutely liable for the
amount of any judgment that the plaintiff may recover in the action without
reference to the question of whether the attachment was rightfully or wrongfully
issued." The liability of the surety on the counterbond subsists until the Court shall
have finally absolved the defendant from the plaintiff's claims. Only then may the
counterbond be released. The same rule applies to the plaintiff's attachment bond.
"The liability of the surety on the bond subsists because the final reckoning is when
the Court shall finally adjudge that the attaching creditor was not entitled to the
issuance of the attachment writ." (Calderon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155
SCRA 531.)
---oo0oo---

ELEAZAR V. ADLAWAN and ELENA S. ADLAWAN, petitioners, vs. Hon. Judge


RAMON AM. TORRES, as Presiding Judge of Branch 6, Regional Trial Court Cebu
City, ABOITIZ & COMPANY, INC. and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFFS OF CEBU,
DAVAO, RIZAL and METRO MANILA, Respectively, respondents, G.R. Nos. 65957-
58. July 5, 1994

Facts:
Respondent Aboitiz and Company sought to collect from petitioners a sum of money for
unpaid loan amortizations, technical and managerial services rendered and unpaid
installments of the equipment provided by Aboitiz. Acting on an ex parte application for
attachment, the Executive Judge issued an order directing the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment against the property of petitioners upon the filing by respondent
Aboitiz of an attachment bond.
Petitioners, however, moved for a bill of particulars and to set aside the ex parte writ of
attachment. Finding merit on the motion, the court ordered the lifting of the writ and
consequently the discharge of the levied property. Respondent Aboitiz filed a notice of
dismissal of its complaint, which was confirmed by the court, emphasizing that all orders
of the court issued prior to the filing of the notice of dismissal had been rendered functus
officio and all pending incidents moot and academic. Adlawan filed a motion for
implementation and enforcement of the order. However, this was denied by the court on
account of the filing by respondent Aboitiz before another court of an action for delivery
of personal property replevin & and the fling by Adlawan before the same court of an
action for damages in connection with the seizure of his property under the writ of
attachment. In the replevin suit, the court ordered the seizure and delivery of the property.
Alleging that while his office was in Cebu City, Adlawan was a resident of Minglanilla and
hence, Lapu Lapu City courts hould not entertain the action for replevin for lack of

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jurisdiction. Adlawan filed an omnibus motion praying for reconsideration and dissolution
of the writ of seizure, the retrieval of his seized property and dismissal of the complaint-
DENIED. MR also denied.
The 3rd Division of the SC ruled that since the attachment is an ancillary remedy, the
wthdrawal of the complaint left it with no leg to stand on. Respondent Aboitiz filed MR-
denied with finality. SC ruled that the properties to be returned are only those held by
Aboitiz by virtue of writ of attachment that has been declared nonexistent. Again, Aboitiz
filed against petitioners complaints for collection of sum of money with prayers for the
issuance of writs of attachment due to money and equipment loaned by Aboitiz to
petitioners. Complaint 1: Judge Torres ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment upon
filing of 5M bond. Complaint 2: Judge Jacinto ordered issuance of writ of attachment upon
filing of 2.5M bond. A writ was issued by sheriff for complaint 1, but not for complaint 4.
Issue:
Whether or not the writ of attachment issued by the respondent Judge in the consolidated
cases for collection of sums of money is legal.
Ruling:
YES! The affidavit submitted by respondent Aboitiz in support of its prayer for the writ of
attachment does not meet the requirements of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court
regarding the allegations on impending fraudulent removal, concealment and disposition
of defendant's property. As held in Carpio v. Macadaeg, 9 SCRA 552 (1963), to justify a
preliminary attachment, the removal or disposal must have been made with intent to
defraud defendant's creditors. Proof of defraud is mandated by paragraphs (d) and (e) of
Section 1, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court on the grounds upon which attachment
may issue. Thus, the factual basis on defendant's intent to defraud must be clearly alleged
in the affidavit in support of the prayer for the writ of attachment if not so specifically
alleged in the verified complaint.
It is evident from said affidavit that the prayer for attachment rests on the mortgage by
petitioners of 11 parcels of land in Cebu, which encumbrance respondent Aboitiz
considered as fraudulent concealment of property to its prejudice. We find, however, that
there is no factual allegation which may constitute as a valid basis for the contention that
the mortgage was in fraud of respondent Aboitiz. As this Court said in Jardine-Manila
finance, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 636 (1989), "The general rule is that the
affidavit is the foundation of the writ, and if none be filed or one be filed which wholly fails
to set out some facts required by law to be stated therein, there is no jurisdiction and the
proceedings are null and void." Bare allegation that an encumbrance of a property is in
fraud of the creditor does not suffice. Factual bases for such conclusion must be clearly
averred. The execution of a mortgage in favor of another creditor is not conceived by the
Rules as one of the means of fraudulently disposing of one's property. By mortgaging a
piece of property, a debtor merely subjects it to a lien but ownership thereof is not parted
with. Furthermore, the inability to pay one's creditors is not necessarily synonymous with
fraudulent intent not to honor an obligation. Consequently, when petitioners filed a motion

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for the reconsiderations of the order directing the issuance of the writ of attachment,
respondent Judge should have considered it as a motion for the discharge of the
attachment and should have conducted a hearing or required submission of counter
affidavits from the petitioners, if only to gather facts in support of the allegation of fraud.
This procedure should be followed because, as the Court has time and again said,
attachment is a harsh, extraordinary and summary remedy and the rules governing its
issuance must be construed strictly against the applicant. Verily, a writ of attachment can
only be granted on concrete and specific grounds and not on general averments quoting
perfunctorily the words of the Rules. The judge before whom the application is made
exercises full discretion in considering the supporting evidence proffered by the applicant.
One overriding consideration is that a writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution
except that it emanates at the beginning, instead of at the termination of the suit.
---ooo0oo---
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
BERNARDINO VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 115678. February 23, 2001
Facts:
The case commenced with the filing by petitioner of a Complaint against private
respondent Bernardino Villanueva, private respondent Filipinas Textile Mills and one
Sochi Villanueva before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. In the said Complaint,
petitioner sought the payment of P2,244,926.30 representing the proceeds or value of
various textile goods, the purchase of which was covered by irrevocable letters of credit
and trust receipts executed by petitioner with private respondent Filipinas Textile Mills as
obligor; which, in turn, were covered by surety agreements executed by private
respondent Bernardino Villanueva and Sochi Villanueva. In their Answer, private
respondents admitted the existence of the surety agreements and trust receipts but
countered that they had already made payments on the amount demanded and that the
interest and other charges imposed by petitioner were onerous.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Attachment, 4 contending that violation of the trust
receipts law constitutes estafa, thus providing ground for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment; specifically under paragraphs "b" and "d," Section 1, Rule 57 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner further claimed that attachment was necessary
since private respondents were disposing of their properties to its detriment as a creditor.
Finally, petitioner offered to post a bond for the issuance of such writ of attachment.
The Motion was duly opposed by private respondents and, after the filing of a Reply
thereto by petitioner, the lower court issued Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment, conditioned upon the filing of an attachment bond.
Following the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by private respondent Filipinas
Textile Mills, both private respondents filed separate petitions for certiorari before
respondent Court assailing the order granting the writ of preliminary attachment.

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Both petitions were granted, albeit on different grounds. In CA-G.R. SP No. 32762,
respondent Court of Appeals ruled that the lower court was guilty of grave abuse of
discretion in not conducting a hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary
attachment and not requiring petitioner to substantiate its allegations of fraud,
embezzlement or misappropriation. On the other hand, in CA-G.R. SP No. 32863,
respondent Court of Appeals found that the grounds cited by petitioner in its Motion do
not provide sufficient basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, they being
mere general averments. Respondent Court of Appeals held that neither embezzlement,
misappropriation nor incipient fraud may be presumed; they must be established in order
for a writ of preliminary attachment to issue.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions charging that respondent Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals is correct in denying the writ of
preliminary attachment they being a general averment.
Ruling:
The Motion for Attachment of petitioner states that —
1. The instant case is based on the failure of defendants as entrustee to
pay or remit the proceeds of the goods entrusted by plaintiff to defendant
as evidenced by the trust receipts (Annexes "B", "C" and "D" of the
complaint), nor to return the goods entrusted thereto, in violation of their
fiduciary duty as agent or entrustee;
2. Under Section 13 of P.D. 115, as amended, violation of the trust receipt
law constitute(s) estafa (fraud and/or deceit) punishable under Article 315
par. 1 [b] of the Revised Penal Code;
3. On account of the foregoing, there exist(s) valid ground for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment under Section 1 of Rule 57
of the Revised Rules of Court particularly under sub-paragraphs "b" and
"d", i.e. for embezzlement or fraudulent misapplication or conversion of
money (proceeds) or property (goods entrusted) by an agent (entrustee)
in violation of his fiduciary duty as such, and against a party who has
been guilty of fraud in contracting or incurring the debt or obligation;
4. The issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is likewise urgently
necessary as there exist(s) no sufficient security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be rendered against the defendants as the latter
appears to have disposed of their properties to the detriment of the
creditors like the herein plaintiff;

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5. Herein plaintiff is willing to post a bond in the amount fixed by this


Honorable Court as a condition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties of the defendants.
While the Motion refers to the transaction complained of as involving trust receipts,
the violation of the terms of which is qualified by law as constituting estafa, it does not
follow that a writ of attachment can and should automatically issue. Petitioner cannot
merely cite Section 1(b) and (d), Rule 57, of the Revised Rules of Court, as mere
reproduction of the rules, without more, cannot serve as good ground for issuing a writ of
attachment. An order of attachment cannot be issued on a general averment, such as
one ceremoniously quoting from a pertinent rule. As correctly held by respondent Court
of Appeals, such fraudulent intent not to honor the admitted obligation cannot be inferred
from the debtor's inability to pay or to comply with the obligations. On the other hand, as
stressed, above, fraud may be gleaned from a preconceived plan or intention not to pay.
As was frowned upon in D.P. Lub Oil Marketing Center, Inc., not only was
petitioner's application defective for having merely given general averments; what is
worse, there was no hearing to afford private respondents an opportunity to ventilate their
side, in accordance with due process, in order to determine the truthfulness of the
allegations of petitioner. As already mentioned, private respondents claimed that
substantial payments were made on the proceeds of the trust receipts sued upon. They
also refuted the allegations of fraud, embezzlement and misappropriation by averring that
private respondent Filipinas Textile Mills could not have done these as it had ceased its
operations starting in June of 1984 due to workers' strike. These are matters which should
have been addressed in a preliminary hearing to guide the lower court to a judicious
exercise of its discretion regarding the attachment prayed for. On this score, respondent
Court of Appeals was correct in setting aside the issued writ of preliminary attachment.
Time and again, we have held that the rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment
must be construed strictly against the applicants. This stringency is required because the
remedy of attachment is harsh, extraordinary and summary in nature. If all the
requisites for the granting of the writ are not present, then the court which issues it acts
in excess of its jurisdiction.
---oo0oo---
|Aguinalde, Kristopher Nico|
WEE vs. TANKIANSEE G.R. No. 171124, February 13, 2008
Facts: Petitioner Wee has money placements totaling to more than P210M with the
Wincorp, to which, respondent Tansiankee is a vice president and director.
Wincorp extended a loan equal to petitioner’s total money placement to a corporation,
Power Merge, with a subscribed capital of only P37.5M.

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This credit facility originated from another loan of about P1.5B extended by Wincorp to
another corporation Hottick Holdings. When the latter defaulted in its obligation, Wincorp
instituted a case against it and its surety. Settlement was, however, reached in which
Hottick’s president, Virata, assumed the obligation of the surety.
Under the scheme agreed upon by Wincorp and Hottick’s president, petitioner’s money
placements were transferred without his knowledge and consent to the loan account of
Power Merge through an agreement that virtually freed the latter of any liability. Allegedly,
through the false representations of Wincorp and its officers and directors, petitioner was
enticed to roll over his placements so that Wincorp could loan the same to Virata/Power
Merge.
Finding that Virata purportedly used Power Merge as a conduit and connived with
Wincorp’s officers and directors to fraudulently obtain for his benefit without any intention
of paying the said placements, petitioner instituted suit for damages with the RTC Manila.
Respondent was impleaded in the complaint as one of the defendants.
On the basis of the allegations in the complaint and the Affidavit of petitioner, RTC ordered
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties not exempt from
execution of all the defendants subject to petitioner’s filing of a P50M-bond. The writ was
consequently issued.
Arguing that the writ was improperly issued and that the bond furnished was grossly
insufficient, respondent moved for the discharge of the attachment.
The other defendants likewise filed similar motions. RTC denied all the motions. The
defendants, including respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration but the
trial court likewise denied the same.
Incidentally, while respondent opted not to question anymore the said orders, his co-
defendants, Virata and UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UEM-MARA), assailed the
same via certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. CA, however, denied it and the motion
for reconsideration thereon.
In a petition for review on certiorari before SC, the latter denied the petition and affirmed
the CA rulings for Virata’s and UEM-MARA’s failure to sufficiently show that the appellate
court committed any reversible error.
Respondent filed before the trial court another Motion to Discharge Attachment, re-
pleading the grounds he raised in his first motion but raising the following additional
grounds: (1) that he was not present in Wincorp’s board meetings approving the
questionable transactions; and (2) that he could not have connived with Wincorp and the
other defendants because he and Pearlbank Securities, Inc., in which he is a major
stockholder, filed cases against the company as they were also victimized by its
fraudulent schemes.

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Ruling that the grounds raised were already passed upon by it in the previous orders
affirmed by the CA and SC, and that the additional grounds were respondent’s affirmative
defenses that properly pertained to the merits of the case, RTC denied the motion.
With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent filed a certiorari petition
before the CA where the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing and
setting aside the aforementioned orders of the RTC and lifting the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment to the extent that it concerned respondent’s properties. Petitioner moved for
the reconsideration of the said ruling, but the CA denied the same. Hence, petitioner filed
a petiton for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the SC.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the CA was correct in lifting the writ of preliminary attachment
against respondent based on additional ground that allegedly pertains already to the
merits of the main action, i.e., lack of factual circumstances of fraud.
Ruling:
YES. Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court which pertinently reads:
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue.-At the commencement of the
action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have
the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be recovered in the following cases:

(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.
For a writ to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual
circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the
debtor’s mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The
applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the
creditor.
In the instant case, petitioner’s Affidavit is bereft of any factual statement that respondent
committed a fraud. The affidavit narrated only the alleged fraudulent transaction between
Wincorp and Virata and/or Power Merge, by which SC affirmed the writ of attachment
issued against the latter.
As to the participation of respondent in the said transaction, the affidavit merely states
that respondent, an officer and director of Wincorp, connived with the other defendants
to defraud petitioner of his money placements. No other factual averment or circumstance
detailing how respondent committed a fraud or how he connived with the other defendants
to commit a fraud in the transaction sued upon. In other words, petitioner has not shown
any specific act or deed to support the allegation that respondent is guilty of fraud.

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The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must contain such particulars as to how the
fraud imputed to respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue
the writ. Absent any statement of other factual circumstances to show that respondent, at
the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, or
without any showing of how respondent committed the alleged fraud, the general
averment in the affidavit that respondent is an officer and director of Wincorp who
allegedly connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient to support
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
In the application for the writ under the said ground, compelling is the need to give a hint
about what constituted the fraud and how it was perpetrated because established is the
rule that fraud is never presumed.
Verily, the mere fact that respondent is an officer and director of the company does not
necessarily give rise to the inference that he committed a fraud or that he connived with
the other defendants to commit a fraud. While under certain circumstances, courts may
treat a corporation as a mere agroupment of persons, to whom liability will directly attach,
this is only done when the wrongdoing has been clearly and convincingly established.
Considering that petitioner has not fully satisfied the legal obligation to show the specific
acts constitutive of the alleged fraud committed by respondent, the trial court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction when it issued the writ of preliminary attachment against the
properties of respondent
The merits of the main action are not triable in a motion to discharge an attachment
otherwise an applicant for the dissolution could force a trial of the merits of the case on
his motion.
However, the principle finds no application here because petitioner has not yet fulfilled
the requirements set by the Rules of Court for the issuance of the writ against the
properties of respondent. The evil sought to be prevented by the said ruling will not arise,
because the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the writ in this case can be
determined by simply reading the complaint and the affidavit in support of the application.
---oo0oo---
FOUNDATION SPECIALISTS, INC., vs. BETONVAL READY CONCRETE INC. and
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO., INC., G.R. No. 170674 August 24, 2009
Facts:
On separate dates, petitioner FSI and respondent Betonval executed three contracts for
the delivery of ready mixed concrete by Betonval to FSI. Betonval delivered the ready
mixed concrete pursuant to the contracts but FSI failed to pay its outstanding balance. As
an accommodation to FSI, Betonval extended the seven day credit period to 45 days.
Betonval demanded from FSI its balance. Betonval informed FSI that further defaults
would leave it no other choice but to impose the stipulated interest for late payments and

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take appropriate legal action to protect its interest. While maintaining that it was still
verifying the correctness of Betonval’s claims, FSI sent Betonval a proposed schedule of
payments devised with a liability for late payments fixed at 24% p.a.
Thereafter, FSI paid Betonval according to the terms of its proposed schedule of
payments. It was able to reduce its debt, inclusive of the annual interest. Nevertheless, it
failed to fully settle its obligation.
Betonval thereafter filed an action for sum of money and damages in the RTC. It also
applied for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment alleging that FSI employed
fraud when it contracted with Betonval and that it was disposing of its assets in fraud of
its creditors.
FSI denied Betonval’s allegations and moved for the dismissal of the complaint. FSI also
filed a counterclaim and prayed for AD, MD, ED and AF.
The RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment and approved the P500,000 bond of
Stronghold.
The RTC ruled for Betonval. However, it awarded compensatory damages to FSI on the
ground that the attachment of its properties was improper.
FSI and Stronghold separately filed MRs while Betonval filed a motion for clarification and
reconsideration. The RTC denied both MRs.. All parties appealed to the CA. However,
only the respective appeals of Betonval and Stronghold were given due course because
FSI’s appeal was dismissed for nonpayment of the appellate docket fees.
the CA upheld the RTC order with modification. FSI’s MR was denied, hence this petition
for review on certiorari
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT There was improper attachment of FSI’ properties
WHETHER OR NOT Petitioner is entitled to the amount of actual damages prayed for
Ruling:
YES; Betonval’s application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment was
based on Section 1(d) and (e), Rule 57 of the ROC. However, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
factual findings that there was improper attachment of FSI’s properties.. However, these
are factual matters that have been duly passed upon by the RTC and the CA and which
are inappropriate in a petition for review.
Moreover, we agree with the RTC and the CA that FSI’s properties were improperly
attached. Betonval was not able to sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the
alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from FSI’s mere nonpayment
of the debt or failure to comply with its obligation. In Ng Wee v. Tankiansee, we held that
the applicant must be able to demonstrate that the debtor intended to defraud the creditor.
Furthermore:

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The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason
which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise
given. To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the ROC, fraud
should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently
contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention
not to pay, as it is in this case. Fraud is a state of mind and need not be proved by direct
evidence but may be inferred from the circumstances attendant in each case.
In other words, mere failure to pay its debt is, of and by itself, not enough to justify an
attachment of the debtor’s properties. A fraudulent intention not to pay (or not to comply
with the obligation) must be present.
NO; In its bid for a bigger award for actual damages it allegedly suffered from the wrongful
attachment of its properties, FSI enumerates the standby costs of equipment and
manpower standby costs it allegedly lost. We cannot grant FSI’s prayer. FSI did not
pursue its appeal to the CA as shown by its failure to pay the appellate docket fees. It is
well-settled that a party who does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any
affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he has obtained from the lower
court whose decision is brought up on appeal.
---oo0oo---
LEELIN MARKETING CORPORATION v. C & S AGRO DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
GR No. L-38971, Apr 28, 1983
Facts:
This was an action originally for a sum of money filed by plaintiff Leelin Marketing Corp.
(LEELIN, for short) against defendants Mario Santos and Aurelio Cartaño doing business
under the name and style of C & S Agro Development Company before the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur. LEELIN procured a writ of preliminary attachment upon its
filing of a bond of P12,962.17, the amount of its claim, by virtue of which the merchandise
in the stores of defendants in Tabaco and Legazpi, Albay, one panel car and one sedan
car were attached. However, upon presentation by defendants of a counterbond executed
by Belfast Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., (the Surety, for brevity) in the amount of
P20,000.00, and approved by the Trial Court, the attachment was dissolved.
Defendants having failed to appear for trial, a commissioner appointed by the Court
received the evidence. In due course, decision was rendered ordering defendants:
". . . to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff, Leelin Marketing Corporation, the amounts
of P14,020.26 in full payment of their account together with their corresponding interests
as of January 15, 1969 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the amount of
P12,962.17 until fully paid; P3,505.07 as attorney's fees, and P1,312.25 to indemnify
plaintiff of the expenses incurred by it in connection with this case and the writ of
preliminary attachment secured therein. Without pronouncement as to costs."

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The decision having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued but the
same was returned unsatisfied. LEELIN moved to charge the Surety on its counterbond,
setting the motion for hearing. The Surety filed an opposition denying all liability for
payment of the monetary judgment.
Resolving the motion, the Trial Court "reluctantly" held that the Surety cannot be held
liable for the judgment under the terms and conditions set forth in the bond. Said the
Court:
"In the spirit prevailing in Section 20, Rule 57, Revised Rules of Court, we believe, the
plaintiff should have notified the surety (Belfast Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.) when it
presented its evidence during the trial, in the spirit of fairness and to comply with the strict
requirements of due process. A day in Court must be given the Surety before it should be
adjudged or held liable under the counterbond. This should have been done by the
plaintiff either before trial or before entry of the final judgment, i.e., not later than the date
when the judgment becomes final and executory. This is the rule and has been reiterated
by our Supreme Court in numerous cases. Plaintiff failed to observe or follow this
procedure; accordingly, we cannot hold the surety liable even if the terms and conditions
of the bond were differently words as quoted. . . ."

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the counterbond put up by a surety company for the discharge of
an attachment liable for the money judgment in favor of the judgment creditor

HELD:
It is thus clear that the cases cited by the Surety requiring notice of hearing before the
finality of the judgment in regards the claim of damages have no applicability in the case
at bar. The application by the Trial Court of Section 20, Rule 57, is likewise misplaced.
Under Section 17 of Rule 57, in order that the judgment creditor may recover from the
Surety on the counterbond, it is necessary (1) that execution be first issued against the
principal debtor and that such execution was returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; (2)
that the creditor made a demand upon the surety for the satisfaction of the judgment; and
(3) the surety be given notice and a summary hearing in the same action as to his liability
for the judgment under his counterbond.
In the case at bar, we find that LEELIN had substantially complied with the foregoing
requisites. A writ of execution had been issued and had been returned unsatisfied. It had
filed a motion to charge the Surety on its counterbond. A notice for the hearing of the
motion had been served on the Surety and summary hearing was held.

It must be conceded that there is nothing in the language or terms of the bond executed
by the Surety under which it could be held liable for the amount of the judgment.
Admittedly, too, LEELIN did not contest the words of the bond but remained silent with
respect thereto at the time it was presented. As good faith is presumed, we assume that
the parties had committed a mutual mistake believing that its terms correctly reflected the
purpose for which it had been filed, that is, to secure the discharge of the writ of

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attachment. Mutual mistake and good faith having attended the execution of the bond,
the reformation of the instrument is in order.
The Surety should be held estopped from denying that the purpose and intent of the bond
was for the lifting of the attachment for that would be allowing it to enrich itself by its own
bad faith. By the very wording of its bond, the same was issued "in consideration of the
lifting of (the) attachment".
A modification of the bond is declared and the provision of section 12 of Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court considered read into and embodied in the bond in question. It is not the
terms of the bond that control but the provisions of the law requiring the filing of such
bond. In statutory or judicial bonds, the rule is "that the statute under which the bond is
given shall be read into and considered as a part thereof, and that whatever conditions
contrary to law that may be embodied therein will be ruled out and treated as surplusage,
the theory being that when a contract of suretyship is entered into pursuant to a statute,
the parties are deemed to have had the law in contemplation when the contract was
executed."
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is reversed, and the Court of origin is hereby
ordered to proceed with the execution against Belfast Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., to
the extent of the amount of the counterbond, with costs against said surety company.
SO ORDERED.
---oo0oo---
TOWERS ASSURANCE CORPORATION vs ORORAMA SUPERMART, ITS OWNER-
PROPRIETOR, SEE HONG and JUDGE BENJAMIN K. GOROSPE, Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Branch I, G.R. No. L-45848 November
9,1977
Facts:
On February 17, 1976 See Hong, the proprietor of Ororama Supermart in Cagayan de
Oro City, sued the spouses Ernesto Ong and Conching Ong in the Court of First Instance
of Misamis Oriental for the collection of the sum of P 58,400 plus litigation expenses and
attorney's fees (Civil Case No. 4930).

See Hong asked for a writ of preliminary attachment. On March 5, 1976, the lower court
issued an order of attachment. The deputy sheriff attached the properties of the Ong
spouses in Valencia, Bukidnon and in Cagayan de Oro City.

To lift the attachment, the Ong spouses filed on March 11, 1976 a counterbond in 'the
amount of P 58,400 with Towers Assurance Corporation as surety. In that undertaking,
the Ong spouses and Towers Assurance Corporation bound themselves to pay solidarity
to See Hong the sum of P 58,400.

On March 24, 1976 the Ong spouses filed an answer with a counterclaim. For non-
appearance at the pre- trial, the Ong spouses were declared in default.

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On October 25, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision, ordering not only the Ong
spouses but also their surety, Towers Assurance Corporation, to pay solidarily to See
Hong the sum of P 58,400. The court also ordered the Ong spouses to pay P 10,000 as
litigation expenses and attorney's fees.

Ernesto Ong manifested that he did not want to appeal. On March 8, 1977, Ororama
Supermart filed a motion for execution. The lower court granted that motion. The writ of
execution was issued on March 14 against the judgment debtors and their surety. On
March 29, 1977, Towers Assurance Corporation filed the instant petition for certiorari
where it assails the decision and writ of execution.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the surety is liable without first giving it an opportunity to be heard

Ruling:
Under section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might recover from the surety on the
counterbond, it is necessary (1) that execution be first issued against the principal debtor
and that such execution was returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; (2) that the creditor
made a demand upon the surety for the satisfaction of the judgment, and (3) that the
surety be given notice and a summary hearing in the same action as to his liability for the
judgment under his counterbond.

The first requisite mentioned above is not applicable to this case because Towers
Assurance Corporation assumed a solidary liability for the satisfaction of the judgment. A
surety is not entitled to the exhaustion of the properties of the principal debtor (Art. 2959,
Civil Code; Luzon Steel Corporation vs. Sia, L-26449, May 15, 1969, 28 SCRA 58, 63).

But certainly, the surety is entitled to be heard before an execution can be issued against
him since he is not a party in the case involving his principal. Notice and hearing constitute
the essence of procedural due process. (Martinez vs. Villacete 116 Phil. 326; Insurance
& Surety Co., Inc. vs. Hon. Piccio, 105 Phil. 1192, 1200, Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. Beson,
L-26865-66, January 30. 1970. 31 SCRA 313).

WHEREFORE, the order and writ of execution, insofar as they concern Towers
Corporation, are set aside. The lower court is directed to conduct a summary hearing on
the surety's liability on its counterbond. No costs.

---oo0oo---

|Antido, Zyra Mae|

Sps. Olib and Roberta R. Olib, vs Hon. Edelwina C. Pastoral, Judge of the RTC of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch III and Corazon M. Navia, G.R. No.
81120August 20, 1990

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Facts:
On 13 November 1981, Corazon M. Navia sued the spouses Oscar and Roberta Olib for
dissolution of their partnership and other reliefs, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
a preliminary attachment. On 10 November 1983, the writ was granted resulting in the
attachment of six parcels of land belonging to the petitioners.

After 2 years, the petitioners filed a motion to discharge the preliminary attachment on the
ground that the attachment bond executed for one year from November 1983 had already
lapsed.

On 25 February 1986, Judge Miguel Rallos rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners.
On 16 April 1986, Navia perfected her appeal. However, the annotation of the preliminary
attachment on the certificates/titles of the attached land was not canceled since such was
not mentioned in the dispositive portion of the court’s decision.

On 20 July 1987, the petitioners moved for the discharge of the writ of preliminary
attachment on the basis of the judgment in their favor which was opposed by Navia by
contending that she had already perfected her appeal to the Court of Appeals, divesting
the trial court any jurisdiction over the case.

On 24 August 1987, Judge Edelwina C. Pastoral, who succeeded Judge Rallos, denied
the motion on the ground invoked in the opposition. A motion for reconsideration was filed
by the petitioners but was denied by the court a quo.

Issues:
1. Whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment is automatically discharged where
judgment is for the party against whom attachment is issued as provided for in
Section 19 of Rule 57; and
2. Whether or not the attachment bond had already lapsed for non-payment of the
premiums.

Ruling:

The petition is without merit.

1. Attachment is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence


apart from the main suit or claim instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant.
Consequently, where the main action is appealed, the attachment, being an
incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so also removed from the
jurisdiction of the court a quo.
In the interpretation of Rule 57, Section 19 the court hold that the order of
attachment is considered discharged only where the judgment has already
become final and executory and not when it is still on appeal because except in a
few specified cases, execution pending appeal is no t allowed.

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2. The non-payment of premiums on the attachment bond does not necessarily


extinguish or terminate the effectivity of the counter-bond in the absence of an
express stipulation in the contract making such non-payment of premiums a cause
for the termination of the undertaking.

---oo0oo---

Bro. Bernard Oca, FSC, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, et al., petitioners, vs Laurita
Custodio, respondent, G.R. No. 174996, 3 December 2014

Facts:
On 8 September 1988, St. Francis School of General Trias Cavite, Inc. (School) executed
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with De La Salle Greenhills (DLSG) to formalize
their relationship as the organization and establishment of the school was accomplished
through the assistance of the La Salle Brothers. The agreement permitted DLSG to
exercise supervisory powers over the Schools’s academic affairs.

Pursuant to the terms of the MOA, DLSG appointed the petitioners herein to sit in the
meetings of the BOARD of Trustees, who later on were also elected as officers of the
school. Custodio challenges the validity of the membership of the DLSG Brothers and
their purported electionas officers of the School.

On 8 July 2002, the Board of aTrustees of St. Francis School resolved to remove
respondent Laurita Custodio as a member of the board and as a member of the
corporation. In reaction to her removal, on 3 October 2002, respondent filed with the trial
court a complaint with prayer for the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction against
petitioners and still assailing the legality of the membership of the board.

The trial court rendered decisions in favor of herein respondent and issued a status quo
order allowing the respondent to continue to discharge her functions as school director
and curriculum administrator. Consequently, the petitioners filed before the CA a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to nullify the trial court’s orders. The petition
was dismissed.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the issuance of a Status Quo Order is proper in an intra-corporate
suit involving the reinstitution of an employee to its former position.

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Ruling:
The issuance of a status quo order is not proper.

First, the directive to reinstate the respondent in the case to her former position is a
command directing the undoing of an act already consummated which is the exclusive
province of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief and not a status quo order which is
limited only to maintaining the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things
which immediately preceded the controversy. Second, the trial court’s omission of not
requiring respondent to file a bond before the issuance of the Status Quo Order is in
contravention with the express instruction of Section 1 Rule 10 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies.

Lastly, an application for a status quo order which in fact seeks injunctive relief must be
verified aside from the posting of the requisite bond. In the present case, the application
was merely signed by the respondent’s counsel and was unverified. Therefore, the said
status quo order must be set aside.

---oo0oo---

Rule 58- Preliminary Injunction


November 13, 2000
SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 11-2000
TO : Judges of Lower Courts
RE : Ban on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders or Writs of
Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunctions in Cases Involving
Government Infrastructure Projects
Your attention is invited to Republic Act No. 8975, entitled AN ACT TO ENSURE
THE EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLETION OF GOVERNMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY PROHIBITING LOWER COURTS FROM ISSUING
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS OR
PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTIONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, which was approved by the
President on 7 November 2000 and published in the 11 November 2000 issues of The
Manila Bulletin and The Malaya, newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The
law takes effect fifteen (15) days following such publication.
Pertinent provisions of the Act read as follows:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. — Article XII, Section 6 of the Constitution
states that the use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall
contribute to the common good. Towards this end, the State shall ensure the expeditious

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and efficient implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects to


avoid unnecessary increase in construction, maintenance and/or repair costs and to
immediately enjoy the social and economic benefits therefrom.
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. —
(a) "National government projects" shall refer to all current and future
national government infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including
projects undertaken by government-owned and -controlled corporations, all projects
covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise
known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related and necessary activities
such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment and materials,
implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair
and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding.
(b) "Service contracts" shall refer to infrastructure contracts entered into by any
department, office or agency of the national government with private entities and non-
government organizations for services related or incidental to the functions and
operations of the department, office or agency concerned.
SECTION 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders,
Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. — No court, except
the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions,
officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the government's
direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or
location of any national government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as
defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any
such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for
such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted
by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those
claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This
prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued,
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an

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amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the
court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void,
the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified
and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that
the guilty party may incur under existing laws.
SECTION 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. — Any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of
Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect.
SECTION 5. Designation of Regional Trial Courts. — The Supreme Court may
designate regional trial courts to act as commissioners with the sole function of
receiving facts of the case involving acquisition clearance and development of
right-of-way for government infrastructure projects. The designated regional trial
court shall within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the referral, forward its findings
of facts to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.
SECTION 6. Penal Sanction. — In addition to any civil and criminal liabilities he
or she may incur under existing laws, any judge who shall issue a temporary restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in violation of Section 3
hereof, shall suffer the penalty of suspension of at least sixty (60) days without pay.
Please be guided accordingly.
The Court Administrator shall immediately disseminate copies of this
Administrative Circular to all lower court Judges and see to it that they strictly comply with
the law.
Issued this 13th day of November, 2000.

(SGD.) HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.


Chief Justice
---oo0oo---
|Arevalo, Maria Lourdes Isabel|

 A.M. 07-7-12-SC, Amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the Rules of Court,
December 12, 2007

With respect to Rule 58 – Preliminary Injunction:

Before the amendment, the language used with respect to the effectivity of a Temporary
Restraining Order issued by lower courts is 20 days (or 60 days when issued by the Court

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of Appeals) “from notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined.” The amendment
uses “service” instead of “notice”, hence the rule now states “from service on the party
or person sought to be enjoined.”

The following provision has also been added to Section 5 of Rule 58: “The trial court, the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Tax Appeals that issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against a lower court, board, officer, or quasi-judicial agency shall
decide the main case or petition within 6 months from the issuance of the writ.”

---oo0oo---

Paras v. Roura, A.C. No. 3180, June 29, 1988

Facts:
This is an administrative case against respondent Judge Roura who rendered a decision
against the driver of the Philippine Rabbit Bus who was guilty of damage to property with
multiple serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The decision became final
and executory and a Writ of Execution was issued but it was returned unsatisfied which
resulted to the issuance of a Subsidiary Writ of Execution. The Philippine Rabbit filed a
petition for certiorari and prayed for Preliminary Injunction which was granted by the CA.
After the 20-day effectivity of the injunction, the sheriff proceeded with the public auction
sale.

Issue/Ruling:
The issue in this case is the period of effectivity of a Temporary Restraining Order. The
complainant argues that the phrase “until further order from the court” has the effect of
restraining the implementation of a Writ of Execution. However, the SC ruled that Section
8 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines which reproduced Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court, set the duration of effectivity of restraining orders issued by all inferior courts
and states that a restraining order is to be “effective only for a period of 20 days from the
date of its issuance.” Therefore, the life span of a TRO automatically expires on the 20th
day by the sheer force of law and no judicial declaration to that effect is necessary.
---oo0oo---

Federation of Land Reform Farmers of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
88384, July 14, 1995

Facts:
The DENR ordered in a formal demand private respondent Torres to vacate a parcel of
land in Antipolo, Rizal but the latter refused to do so. Instead, he filed for the issuance of
Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the DENR from ejecting him, alleging that he has a
pending application for registration of title to property. The trial court, taking into account
the length of time to resolve the application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to
prevent the same from being moot and academic, issued an order for the maintenance
of the status quo and restrained the DENR from ejecting the private respondent. FLRFP,
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who filed a motion for intervention, filed a motion to declare without force and effect the
restraining order earlier issued by the trial court because under Section 5 of Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court, a Temporary Restraining Order has a lifespan of only 20 days and by
its failure to decide whether to grant the Writ of Preliminary Injunction within said period,
the trial court could no longer grant the said writ.

Issue/Held:
The issue here is whether the trial court could extend the TRO beyond the 20-day period.
The SC ruled that, ordinarily, the effectivity of a TRO is non-extendible and the courts
have no discretion to extend the same considering the mandatory tenor of the rule.
However, there is no reason to prevent a court from extending the 20-day period when
the parties themselves ask for such extension or for the maintenance of the status quo.
By issuing an order for the maintenance of the status quo, the trial court should be
deemed as merely exercising its inherent power under Section 5 of Rule 135 of the Rules
of Court “to enforce order in proceedings before it” in the absence of any showing that it
has gravely abused its discretion in so doing.
---oo0oo---
|Briton, Denese Caren Ann|

GABRIEL DE LA PAZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, respondent.


A.M. No. RTJ-04-1857. July 29, 2005

Facts:
On October 22, 2004, Judge Santos B. Adiong, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Marawi City, was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law in A.M. No. RTJ-
04-1863 for issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in violation of Section 21(1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 and Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and for citing FAPE employees in contempt of court in disregard of Section 3, Rule 71 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly,he was meted a penalty of six months
suspension without salary and benefits.

On November 23, 2004. Judge Adiong was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
abuse of authority with a penalty of six months suspension without pay in the instant
administrative case.
Before the Court, Judge Adiong filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification inquiring on
whether the abovementioned two decisions each imposing six months suspension should
be served simultaneously or successively. In the alternative, Judge Adiong prays that
should said two penalties be served successively, the six months suspension in the
present case be reconsidered and modified to a Fine reasoning that: a) he admits his
procedural lapses; b) has served the judiciary for 38 years; c) his continued suspension
will cause the clogging of the court docket considering that the acting judge therein, Hon.
Amer Ibrahim is at the same time the Executive Judge and is likewise busy attending to
his own cases which includes electoral protest cases needing preferential attention; d) in
one case, Admin. Case No. 532-MJ, the Court reconsidered the six months suspension
of the respondent therein to a Fine; e) he is the family breadwinner with 6 children ages
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5, 7, 8 and 9 and the other two still in college; f) he is suffering from prostate cancer and
severe gout/arthritis but has to stop medication because of financial restraint; g) in 1990,
they were attacked by a losing litigant as a result of which, his wife died from gunshot
wounds and he survived because of timely medical attention; and, h) he intends to file an
application for optional retirement. Judge Adiong also informs the Court that he has
already served the penalty of six months in A.M. No. No. RTJ-04-1863.
Anent Judge Adiongs prayer that the six months suspension be converted to a Fine.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent judge erred for issuing a writ of preliminary injunction?
2. Whether or not the penalty of suspension for six months will be served
simultaneously or successively?
Ruling:

1. Respondent judge’s failure to comply with procedural due process is aggravated


by his total inattention to the parameters of his jurisdiction. As the presiding judge
of RTC, Marawi City, he should have known that Makati City was way beyond the
boundaries of his territorial jurisdiction insofar as enforcing a writ of preliminary
injunction is concerned. Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides that
the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions. The rationale, as explained in
Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals is "that the trial court has no jurisdiction
to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin acts being performed or about to
be performed outside its territorial jurisdiction."

In the case at bar, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is not a mere deficiency
in prudence, or lapse of judgment on the part of respondent judge but a blatant disregard
of basic rules constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. The responsibility of judges to
keep abreast of the law and changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the
Supreme Court, is a pressing need. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory
acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone
is bound to know, excuses no one – not even judges.

Respondent judge is likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law for summarily punishing
FAPE’s president and employees without any written charge for indirect contempt or
giving them any opportunity to explain their refusal to obey the court’s order, as mandated
by Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. What makes the act more
reprehensible was the four FAPE employees cited for contempt, two of whom were
arrested and detained with the exception of Dr.Borromeo, were not even impleaded in
Special Civil Action No. 690-10. Worse, the arrest of the said employees was made
despite the issuance by the Court of Appeals of a TRO enjoining the respondent from
enforcing the Order of February 26, 2001.

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The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and
necessity, inasmuch as respect for the courts, which are ordained to administer the laws
necessary to the good order of society, is as necessary as respect for the laws
themselves. As in all other powers of the court, the contempt power, however plenary it
may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow
himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his
duties. The failure of a judge to afford the alleged contemner the opportunity to be heard
as a matter of due process of law deserves administrative sanction.

The seeming eagerness and haste with which respondent judge demonstrated in issuing
the assailed orders, warrants and writ betray a design to railroad judicial processes to
favor a preferred litigant. The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a
manner which displays obvious partiality is deplorable and violative of Rule 2.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which requires a judge to behave at all times to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. A judge is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of judicial authority for having precipitately
adjudged guilty of indirect contempt in disregard of the elementary rules of procedure.

The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that,
if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases
within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the procedure is so
simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err
thereon amounts to ignorance of the law.

1. The penalty of suspension for six months shall be served successively. These two
cases arose from two different causes of action and, therefore, the penalties
should both be served. Moreover, in the en banc Resolution dated February 25,
1992, the Court categorically stated that in case of two or more suspensions, the
same shall be served successively by the erring lawyer.
Adm. Case No. 532- MJ is not applicable in the present case because facts obtained in
the aforesaid case are different. In the said case, the respondent judge was found guilty
of ignorance of the law with a penalty of six months suspension without pay. He continued
to perform his judicial duties while the resolution of his Motion for Reconsideration is still
pending. However, the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Court, in contemplation of
the said decision, withheld payment of the salary of the respondent judge for six months.
When the motion for reconsideration was denied, six months have elapsed. Upon a
Clarificatory Manifestation on whether he will still be suspended for six months but with
pay since the monetary portion of the judgment had already been satisfied when his salary
for the period had been withheld from him, the Court amended the penalty to the effect
that the respondent judge is sentenced to pay a Fine equivalent to his salary for six
months.
ACCORDINGLY, Judge Santos B. Adiong shall serve the penalty imposed on him in A.M.
No. RTJ-04-1863 and in this case, SUCCESSIVELY. The prayer for a modification of the
penalty to a Fine is DENIED for lack of merit.

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---oo0oo---

GOLDEN GATE REALTY, CORPORATION, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE


COURT, HON. ANTONIO DESCALLAR, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Iloilo Branch XXIV; Spouses EMILIO YOUNG and ALBERTA YOUNG, G.R.
No. 74289, July 31, 1987

Facts:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
order of the Regional Trial Court declaring as void all proceedings conducted before the City Court
of Iloilo on the ground that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the ejectment case filed by the
petitioner, the latter having failed to allege that a demand to vacate was made to the private
respondents.

On November 26, 1980, petitioner filed three (3) separate complaints for ejectment
against private-respondent Emilio Young and two other defendants before the City Court
of Iloilo, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 13436, 13439, and 13462. These cases were jointly
tried. Civil Case No. 13439 refers to the ejectment case filed against respondent Young.

A motion to dismiss was filed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction considering that the
complaint failed to allege prior demand to vacate the premises. An opposition thereto was
filed by the petitioner claiming that only a demand to pay rentals due is a prerequisite to
an action for unlawful detainer citing as its authority Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court.

The motion to dismiss was denied on December 1, 1981; the pertinent portion of the order
reads: Going over the complaints filed by the plaintiff in these three cases, the Court
agrees, with the findings of the defendant that there is no word or phrase in paragraph 7
of the complaint categorically saying that the defendants "vacate the premises". But the
Court feels that there is no necessity that such a word "vacate" must have to be stated
categorically in the complaint. It could be gleaned from the complaint that the plaintiff,
through its counsel, "gave notice to the defendant to pay the sum of P18,000.00 within
five (5) days from receipt of his letter and failing to do so a case of ejectment would be
filed against him. Such allegation substantially connotes that warning is given to the
defendant that in case he fails to pay the amount demanded for him as rentals in arrears,
then he has to vacate the premises. There is no necessity of so categorically stating the
word "vacate" or the phrase containing the word "vacate" the premises in the allegation
in the complaint. The Court believes that there has been substantial compliance in the
wordings of the allegation in the complaint that confers jurisdiction upon it. "Motion to
Dismiss" is hereby denied for lack of merit.

A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied by the same court. On January
1982, respondent Young filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a petition for
certiorari and prohibition seeking the nullification of the order of the City Court denying
his motion to dismiss, docketed as Civil Case No. 14191. Meanwhile, the City Court of
Iloilo rendered a decision in the ejectment case in favor of petitioner and against private-

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respondents and the two other defendants. On March 1982, a decision was rendered
dismissing the petition for certiorari (Civil Case No. 14191) for having become moot and
academic. A petition for review on certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court relative to
Civil Case No. 14191 and docketed as G.R. No. 60402. The petition was dismissed for
having been filed out of time per minute resolution of the Supreme Court dated July 28,
1982. The motion for reconsideration filed was denied on October 4, 1982.

A writ of execution was issued in Civil Case No. 13439 where the City Sheriff ejected the
respondent spouses Emilio and Alberta Young and scheduled for auction sale the
properties levied upon. On May 4, 1984, respondent Young filed Civil Case No. 15712
which seeks to nullify 13439. On even date, respondent-Court (Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo) issued ex-parte a temporary restraining order, enjoining the petitioner herein and
the City Sheriff of Iloilo from conducting the sale at public auction and set the hearing for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to May 11, 1984 which was reset to May
21, 1984.On May 21, 1984, petitioner filed its answer and opposition to the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. Thereafter, a hearing was conducted. On May 24, 1984, for
lack of material time within which to decide the prayer for preliminary injunction,
respondent-Court issued an order extending to ten (10) days the effectivity of the
restraining order, or up to June, 1984.On June 4, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City issued the questioned order nullifying the decision in Civil Case No. 13439 of the City
Court of Iloilo for having been rendered without jurisdiction. According to the respondent
trial court, for the said city court to have acquired jurisdiction over the ejectment case
which was filed by the petitioner, the demand to vacate by the latter should have been
couched in definite and not conditional words. Thus, the principle of res judicata cannot
be applied to the ejectment case.

The court, further, permanently restrained the petitioners from enforcing and executing
the annulled decision and directed the Sheriff to desist from carrying out the public auction
sale and to return the properties levied upon by him to the private respondents.

The petitioner appealed contending, among others, that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing a temporary restraining order and in extending the effectivity
thereof; in issuing a final injunction based on the evidence presented during the hearing
of an application for a preliminary injunction; and in enjoining the enforcement of a
judgment that has become final and executor. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Trial Court erred in extending the period of the TRO for another
ten (10) days?
2. Whether or not the Trial Court pre-empted itself from conducting any further trial
on the merits of the case when it permanently enjoined the Sheriff from conducting
an auction sale and annulled proceedings?

Ruling:

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1. In its decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial court acted correctly in
issuing a temporary restraining order and in extending the same because the
prescribed 20-day period for the efficacy of such an order is not a hard and fast
rule. Accordingly, where the party against whom a temporary restraining order
is directed adopts a posture which would unreasonably prevent the court from
deciding the propriety of issuing a writ of preliminary injunction within the
prescriptive period as in this case where the petitioner filed its answer three
days before the expiration of the restraining order, the Court may, as an
exception and on a case to case basis as justice dictates, extend the period of
effectivity of such order provided that such extension is definite and does not
go beyond another twenty days.
2. The said court should not have permanently enjoined the sheriff from
conducting the auction sale and more importantly, it should have not annulled
the proceedings in Civil Case No.13439 altogether because by doing so, the
said court pre-empted itself from conducting any further trial of the case. It went
beyond the extent of the relief that the called-for hearing may grant, and that
is, the issuance of preliminary injuction.

There is nothing strange or unusual for evidence in a hearing for injunction to


be considered in the final determination of the merits of the case. Also, where
the allegation in the complaint merely refers to a demand for payment of the
rentals agreed upon, without any statement to the effect that a demand has
been made to vacate the premises, such allegation is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court in an unlawful detainer case. Consequently, there
can be no valid and final judgment which may serve as a basis for the
application of the principle of res judicata.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED and the


decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1986 and the order of the
respondent Regional Trial Court dated June 4, 1984 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The decision of the City Court of Iloilo in Civil Case No. 13439 is REINSTATED, and is
immediately executory.

---oo0oo---

MIRANDA vs. SUPREME COURT et al. (Joel G. Miranda vs. Supreme Court, En
Banc, The Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and
Local Government.) G.R. No. 140130.October 26, 1999

Facts: Petitioner has impleaded as respondents in the instant petition the Supreme Court
En Banc, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretary of Interior and Local Government.
He seeks injunction against the implementation of the final and executory decision dated
July 28, 1998 and the resolution of September 28, 1999 denying reconsideration in G.R.
No. 136351 entitled "Joel G. Miranda vs. Antonio Abaya and the Commission and the
Commission of Elections."

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Issue:
Can the Supreme Court be sued before itself, in the guise of seeking to declare its
judgments, resolutions, or orders unconstitutional?

Ruling:
No.

Initially, it is to be noted that the petition lacks the required explanation why service was
effected by mail. This lapse alone is sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the
petition.

But over and above this technical flaw are the following considerations which warrant
dismissal of the petition.

1. The remedy sought by petitioner is not sanctioned by the Rules.

All incidents relating to a case submitted before the Court must be threshed out in the
same case, and not in an independent original action. Filing a separate action is
tantamount to forum shopping. In fact, petitioner may even be held liable for his false
certification of non-forum shopping (pages 9-10 of the petition) and the petition upon
premise, may be forthwith dismissed.

2. Then too, other than the annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions (of
courts below the Court of Appeals only) under Rule 47 of the rules of Court, a final and
executory judgment can, generally, not be questioned at anytime and before any forum
after attaining such finality. Final judgments must be enforced, they are no longer open
to question. "Finality of decision of courts is not dependent upon their correctness, but
upon the expiration of the period fixed by the rules therefore" (Feria vs. Suva, 92 Phil. 963
[1953]). "The very purpose for which the courts are organized is to put an end to
controversy, to decide the questions submitted by the litigants, and to determine the
respective rights of the parties. With full knowledge that courts are not infallible, the
litigants submit their respective claims for judgment, and they have a right at some time
or the other to have final judgment on which they can rely as a final disposition of the
issues submitted, and know that there is an end to the litigation." (Miranda vs. Court of
Appeals, 71 SCRA 295 [1976]). An original action such as the present petition is nowhere
to be found among the remedies available to petitioner as a losing party in G.R. No.
136351.

3. The instant original petition questioning this Court's final and executory decision G.R.
No. 136351 is an attempt to circumvent the proscription against a second motion for
reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 56 makes Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court
applicable to cases filed before the Supreme Court. Thus,

Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration.- No second motion for reconsideration of a


judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.

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The prohibition against the filing of a second motion for reconsideration is justified by
public policy which demands that at the, risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
must become final at some definitive date fixed by law (Government Service Insurance
System vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 187 [1997]).

4. Injunction cannot be issued by this Court against itself. It would be the height of
absurdity to expect this Court, or any court for that matter, to issue a provisional or
preliminary remedy against itself. The Court is asked to stand as the judge and the
respondent at one and the same instance. Surely, no one can be a judge in its own acts
without being charged with incompetence, bias, and partiality. Insisting on this would
result in the violation of the very fundamental principles of judicial due process of law.
Petitions such as this must never be allowed to prosper.

In point of fact, the only complaint or grumble of petitioner is that his motion for
reconsideration in G.R. No. 136351 was denied in a minute resolution. If only to write finis
to this matter, it must be said that this Court has time and again upheld the constitutionality
of resolutions denying motions for reconsideration on the ground that basic issues have
already been passed upon by the Court and that no substantial arguments were
presented to warrant a reversal of the decision. Petitioner himself in Paragraph 22 of his
petition says that he is aware of such principle. Clearly, the instant petition is nothing but
an attempt to delay execution of our judgment in G.R. No. 136351.

The petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.

---oo0oo---

|Cañas, Melanie Mei|


Sps. Lago vs Judge Abad AM No. RTJ 10-2205 January 17,2011
Facts:
Complainants were the defendants in a civil action for Preliminary Injunction, Easement
of Road Right of Way, and Attorney’s Fees, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO), filed on July 2, 2009 by Christina M. Obico before the RTC, Gingoog City, Misamis
Oriental. Complainants assert that the civil complaint was never raffled, and that no notice
of raffle was ever served upon them, yet the case went directly to Branch 43, where
respondent judge is the acting presiding judge. On July 7, 2009, respondent judge issued
an Order directing the issuance of a TRO "effective seventy two hours from date of
issue," without requiring Obico to put up a bond. Complainants allege that at that time,
they were not yet in receipt of the summons and copy of the complaint, as well as Obico’s
affidavit and bond. On July 14, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order extending the
72-hour TRO, which had already expired, "for another period provided that the total period
should not exceed twenty days." Again, respondent judge failed to require Obico to put
up a bond even as complainants assert that it is already of judicial notice that a TRO
under the amended new rules has been elevated to the level of an injunction.
Complainants claim that this is violative of Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
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In his Resolution dated August 11, 2009, respondent judge ordered, among others, the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction conditioned upon the application of a bond
by Obico in the amount of ₱100,000.00. Complainants argue, however, that said directive
was violative of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court since they were not required "to
show cause, at a specific time and place, why the injunction should not be granted."
Due to these acts of respondent judge, complainants filed a motion for inhibition from
further hearing the case, since they perceive that respondent judge was bereft of the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. The motion was denied by respondent judge in his
Resolution Complainants then filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance Further Proceedings on
the ground of the pendency of their appeal before the Supreme Court of the Order denying
the motion for inhibition. However, at the December 15, 2009 setting for pre-trial of the
civil case, respondent judge issued an Order denying the motion to hold in abeyance
further proceedings. Respondent judge also allowed Obico to present evidence ex parte
on January 26, 2010 for failure of complainants to appear during the pre-trial.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge violated Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
Yes, OCA found respondent judge to have been grossly and deliberately ignorant of the
law and procedure for violation of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, specifically by means of
the following acts: (1) when the civil complaint with prayer for the issuance of a TRO was
filed on July 2, 2009, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction thereon and, without the
mandated raffle and notification and service of summons to the adverse party, issued a
72-hour TRO on July 7, 2009; (2) when respondent judge set the case for summary
hearing on July 14, 2009, purportedly to determine whether the TRO could be extended
for another period, when the hearing should be set within 72 hours from the issuance of
the TRO; (3) when he eventually granted an extension of an already expired TRO to a full
20-day period; and (4) when he issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Obico
without prior notice to herein complainants and without the required hearing.
Rule 58, as amended, mandates a full and comprehensive hearing for the determination
of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, separate from the
summary hearing for the extension of the 72-hour TRO. The preliminary injunction prayed
for by the applicant can only be heard after the trial court has ordered the issuance of the
usual 20-day TRO. Within that period of 20 days, the court shall order the party sought to
be enjoined to show cause at a specified time and place why the injunction should not be
granted. During that same period, the court shall also determine the propriety of granting
the preliminary injunction and then issue the corresponding order to that effect. In the
case of respondent judge, he gravely failed to comply with what the rule requires, i.e., to
give complainants the opportunity to comment or object, through a full-blown hearing, to
the writ of injunction prayed for. Instead, respondent judge railroaded the entire process
by treating the summary hearing for the extension of the TRO as the very same hearing
required for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

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WHEREFORE, Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. is found liable for Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Procedure, and is hereby meted a fine of ₱25,000.00, with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same, or any similar infraction in the future, shall be dealt with more
severely.
---oo0oo---
Nerwin vs Philippine National Oil Company G.R. No. 167057, April 11, 2012
Facts:
In 1999, National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-qualify
and to bid for a contract known as IPB No. 80 for the supply and delivery of about 60,000
pieces of wood poles and 20,000 of cross-arms. Nerwin was one of the bidders, the
contract was awarded to him being the lowest bidder. However, NEA’s board of directors
passed a resolution reducing by 50% the material requirements for IPB 80 to which
Nerwin protested. A losing bidder, Tri State and Pacific Synergy filed a complaint alleging
the documents Nerwin submitted during the pre-qualification bid were falsified. Finding a
way to nullify the bid, NEA sought the opinion of Gov’t Corporate Counsel who upheld the
eligibility of Nerwin. NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders for IPB 80
contract. As a result, Nerwin filed a complaint with prayer of injunction which was grabted
by RTC Manila. PNOC – Energy Development Corporation issued an invitation to pre-
qualify and bid for O-ILAW project. Nerwin filed a civil action in RTC alleging that it was
an attempt to subject portions of IPB 80 to another bidding. He prayed for TRO to enjoin
respondents to the proposed bidding. Respondents averred that this is in violation of a
rule that government infrastructure are not subject to TROs. RTC granted TRO
nevertheless. CA ruled in favor of respondents. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the case pursuant to RA 8975 which prohibits
issuance of TRO except SC to government projects.
Ruling:
Decision of CA affirmed. Sec 3 of RA 8975 clearly prohibits issuance of TRO, preliminary
injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions against government.
The CA explained why it annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC issued
on July 20, 2003 and December 29, 2003,and why it altogether dismissed Civil Case No.
03106921, as follows:
a. It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respond Judge.s
issuance of a preliminary injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.
b. Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application
for/preliminary injunction, and worse, in issuing a preliminary injunction through the
assailed order enjoining petitioners sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The same is a
palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved on November 7, 2000, thus, already
existing at the time respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders
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. The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 whicun
derscored the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National Resources Development projects
of, and public utilities operated by, the government.
---oo0o---
RALPH P. TUA vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG G.R. No. 170701, January 22,
2014
Facts:
On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition for herself and in behalf of her minor children
for the issuance of a protection order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, against her husband, petitioner
Ralph Tua. Respondent claimed that she and her children had suffered from petitioner’s
abusive conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her and the children physical
harm for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; that she was actually deprived
of custody and access to her minor children; and, that she was threatened to be deprived
of her and her children’s financial support. Respondent and petitioner were married on
January 10, 1998 in Makati City. They have three children, namely, Joshua Raphael born
on February 9, 1999, Jesse Ruth Lois, born on June 27, 2000, and Jezreel Abigail, born
on December 25, 2001. In her Affidavit attached to the petition, respondent claimed,
among others, that: there was a time when petitioner went to her room and cocked his
gun and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he wanted to convince her not to
proceed with the legal separation case she filed; she hid her fears although she was
scared; there was also an instance when petitioner fed her children with the fried chicken
that her youngest daughter had chewed and spat out; in order to stop his child from crying,
petitioner would threaten him with a belt; when she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and
insecure with the latter's presence and asked him to stop coming to the house as often
as he wanted or she would apply for a protection order, petitioner got furious and
threatened her of withholding his financial support and even held her by the nape and
pushed her to lie flat on the bed; and, on May 4, 2005, while she was at work, petitioner
with companions went to her new home and forcibly took the children and refused to give
them back to her.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in holding and finding in a manner contrary to
established rules and jurisprudence that public respondent committed no grave abuse of
discretion when the latter issued the Temporary Protective Order (TPO) dated 23
May 2005 without observing due process of law and considerations of justice and
basic human rights.
2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals in refusing to rule on
the constitutionality of the provisions of RA 9262 has decided the case in a manner not in
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accord with established laws and jurisprudence considering that contrary to its findings
the constitutionality of the said law is the lis mota of the case.
Ruling:
Petition is denied. The decision o# the CA affirming the RTC issuance of the Temporary
Protection Order, was affirmed. The Supreme Court was order to resolve with dispatch
the petition for a permanent protection order.
---oo0oo---
|Cello, Caleb|
ANA THERESIA “RISA” HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL VS. TOLL REGULATORY
BOARD, G.R. No. 181293 February 23, 2015

Facts:
The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created in order to supervise and regulate, on
behalf of the government, the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities by
the private sector. On the same date, P.D. 1113 was issued granting to the Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines the right, privilege, and authority to
construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll
Expressways.

TRB and PNCC later entered into a Toll Operation Agreement, which prescribed the
operating conditions of the right granted to PNCC under P.D. 1113. Afterwards, PNCC
entered into an agreement with PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada (CITRA), a limited liability
company organized and established under the laws of the Republic of Indonesia, whereby
the latter committed to provide PNCC with a pre-feasibility study on the proposed MME
project. As a result of the feasibility and related studies, PNCC and CITRA submitted,
through the TRB, a Joint Investment Proposal (JIP) to the Republic of the Philippines. The
JIP embodied the implementation schedule for the financing, design and construction of
the MMS in three stages: the South Metro Manila Skyway, the North Metro Manila
Skyway, and the Central Metro Manila Skyway.

PNCC and CITRA entered into a Business and Joint Venture Agreement and created the
Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CMMTC). CMMTC was a joint venture
corporation organized under Philippine laws to serve as a channel through which CITRA
shall participate in the construction and development of the project. CMMTC completed
the design and construction of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway, which was
operated and maintained by PSC.

On 18 July 2007, the Republic of the Philippines, through the TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC
executed the assailed Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement
(ASTOA) and on 21 December 2007, PNCC, PSC, and CMMTC entered into the assailed

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Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)16providing for the successful and seamless


assumption by SOMCO of the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro
Manila Skyway. Meanwhile, petitioner PNCC Traffic Management and Security
Department Workers Organization (PTMSDWO) filed a Notice of Strike against PSC on
the ground of unfair labor practice, specifically union busting. On 3 January 2008,
petitioners PTMSDWO and PNCC Skyway Corporation Employees Union (PSCEU) filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258 (RTC), a complaint against
respondents TRB, PNCC, PSC, CMMTC, and SOMCO. The complaint was for injunction
and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a temporary
restraining order, and sought to prohibit the implementation of the ASTOA and the MOA,
as well as the assumption of the toll operations by SOMCO.

The RTC issued an Order24 denying the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. According to the RTC, petitioners were seeking
to enjoin a national government infrastructure project. In view of its denial of the ancillary
prayer, the RTC required defendants to file their respective Answers to the Amended
Complaint.

Petitioners argue that the franchise for toll operations was exclusively vested by P.D.
1113 in PNCC, which exercised the powers under its franchise through PSC in
accordance with the STOA. By agreeing to the arrangement whereby SOMCO would
replace PSC in the toll operations and management, PNCC seriously breached the terms
and conditions of its undertaking under the franchise and effectively abdicated its rights
and privileges in favor of SOMCO.

On the merits of the arguments in the petition, respondents argue that nothing in the
ASTOA, the approval thereof by the DOTC Secretary, the MOA, or the TOC was violative
of the Constitution. It is argued that the authority to operate a public utility can be granted
by administrative agencies when authorized by law.

Issues:

I. Whether the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility
II. Whether the TOC issued to SOMCO was valid
III. Whether the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary was valid
IV. Whether the assumption of toll operations by SOMCO is disadvantageous
to the government.
RULING:

I. TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility. It is abundantly
clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of P.D.
1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a qualified person

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or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility and
to issue the corresponding toll operating permit or TOC.
II. The TOC issued to SOMCO was not irregular. The TOC, as a grant of
authority from the government, is subject to the latter's control insofar as
the grant affects or concerns the public.Like all other franchises or licenses
issued by the government, the TOC is issued subject to terms, conditions,
and limitations under existing laws and agreements. This rule especially
holds true in this instance since the TRB has the power to issue "the
necessary 'Toll Operation Certificate' subject to such conditions as shall be
imposed by the Board including inter alia" those specified under Section
3(e) of P.D. 1112. Thus, impliedly written into every TOC are the conditions
prescribed therein.
III. Approval of the AS TOA by the DOTC Secretary was approval by the
President.
IV. The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on
which the Constitution or the circumstances require the President to act
personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised through
executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are
presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved by the latter
V. Petitioners have not shown that the transfer of toll operations to SOM CO
was grossly disadvantageous to the government. When one uses the term
"grossly disadvantageous to the government," the allegations in support
thereof must reflect the meaning accorded to the phrase. "Gross" means
glaring, reprehensible, culpable, flagrant, and shocking. It requires that the
mere allegation shows that the disadvantage on the part of the government
is unmistakable, obvious, and certain. The aim in the establishment of toll
facilities is to draw from private resources the financing of government
infrastructure projects. Naturally, these private investors would want to
receive reasonable return on their investments. Thus, the collection of toll
fees for the use of public improvements has been authorized, subject to
supervision and regulation by the national government.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The prayer for the issuance of


a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order is
DENIED.

---oo0oo---
Rule 59- Receivership

PILAR NORMANDY VS. CALIXTO DUQUE,G.R. No. L-25407 August 29, 1969

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Facts:
Appellant Saura served as a receiver of the WARVETS (appellees). During his term, by
authority of the court, appellant went to Japan for purpose of checking on the reported
undervaluation of goods. The expenses incurred by him during the trip amounted to P
9,341.48 which was granted reimbursement by a court order. Except from this reimburse
amount, appellant received no other fee or compensation from the WARVETS. In fact, for
a continuous period of three years, he performed his duties as receiver without receiving
any compensation as such. Hence, he prayed before the court to be reimbursed for the
amount of P 10,000.00 as compensation which was granted by the court upon his
discharge as a receiver. Afterwards, appellant filed another motion for reimbursement for
the amount he allegedly paid as compensation of a clerk whom he employed when he
was still a receiver amounting to P 5,236.00. However, the same was denied by the court.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the lower court erred in holding that appellant is not entitled to
reimbursement of the salaries paid by him to his clerk as receiver of the WARVETS

RULING:
No. A receiver is a representative of the court appointed for the purpose of preserving
and conserving the property in litigation and prevent its possible destruction or dissipation
if it were left in the possession of any of the parties. The receiver is not the representative
of any of the parties but of all of them to the end that their interests may be equally
protected with the least possible inconvenience and expense. It is inherent in the office
of a receiver not only that he should act at all times with the diligence and prudence of a
good father of a family but should also not incur any obligation or expenditure without
leave of the court and it is the responsibility of the court to supervise the receiver and see
to it that he adheres to the above standard of his trust and limits the expenses of the
receivership to the minimum. For these reasons, it is generally the receivership court that
is in a better position to determine whether a particular expenditure is reasonable and
satisfied or not and its ruling thereon may not be disturbed by this Court.

It is true that in the case at bar, the motion in question of the receiver was not opposed
by any of the parties. It is to be observed, however, that the records show that the court a
quo had previously allowed or approved reimbursements to the receiver of expenditures
made by him in connection with the performance of his duties, more particularly, for a trip
made to Japan and for the fees of a lawyer who had allegedly assisted him,
notwithstanding he is a lawyer himself. Besides, the court a quo fixed the total
compensation to the appellant receiver at P10,000.00 for his services as such and said
amount, from all appearances, is agreeable to everyone, including appellant.

The receivership court's reasons for withholding approval of the reimbursement in


question are precisely because "whatever amount he (the receiver) now seeks in addition
thereto (P10, 000.00) would be improper. Moreover, he is now estopped from claiming
any further amount as compensation for alleged clerical services employed by him as

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such receiver without prior approval or authority of this Court." We find these reasons to
be cogent enough in the premises, especially because appellant's alleged employment
of a clerk was made without prior leave of court. In these circumstances, it cannot be said
that the court a quo abused its discretion, much less gravely.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

---oo0oo---

JULIO VIVARES and MILA IGNALING VS. JOSE REYES, G.R. No. 155408 February
13, 2008

Facts:
Severino Reyes was the father of respondent Jose Reyes and Torcuato Reyes. Upon the
death of Severino, respondent and Torcuato came upon their inheritance consisting of
several properties. They had an oral partition of the properties and separately
appropriated to themselves said properties. However, Torcuato died with a last will and
testament, and Vivares was designated as the executor of said will and testament while
Ignaling was declared a lawful heir of Torcuato.

Believing that Torcuato did not receive his full share in the estate of Severino, petitioners
instituted an action for Partition and Recovery of Real Estate before the Camiguin RTC
against Engr. Jose Reyes. After which, petitioner filed a Motion to Place Properties in
Litigation under Receivership4 before the trial court alleging that to their prejudice
respondent had, without prior court approval and without petitioners’ knowledge, sold to
third parties and transferred in his own name several common properties. They further
claimed that respondent was and is in possession of the common properties in the estate
of Severino, and exclusively enjoying the fruits and income of said properties and without
rendering an accounting on them and turning over the share pertaining to Torcuato.

Respondent filed his Opposition to Place the Estate of Severino Reyes under receivership
while petitioners filed their Offer of Exhibits in support of their motion for receivership. The
trial court issued an order granting the petitioners’ motion and appointed Salantin as
receiver conditioned on the filing of a P 50,000.00 bond. However, respondent being
unable to attend the hearing, filed a Motion to Discharge Receiver upon the filing of a
counterbond and to cancel the notice of lis pendens.

Consequently, the trial court issued an Order denying respondents motion, thus
respondent file a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. After careful examination, the CA
reversed the trial court’s ruling and racionated that the court a quo failed to observe the
well-settled rule that allows the grant of the harsh judicial remedy of receivership only in
extreme cases when there is an imperative necessity for it.

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Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petitioner for certiorari in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE ANNOTATION OF A NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS


PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER WHEN THERE IS A
NEED TO SAFEGUARD THE PROPERTIES IN LITIGATION.
II. WHETHER OR NOT A DULY APPOINTED RECEIVER OF PROPERTIES
IN LITIGATION SHOULD BE DISCHARGED SIMPLY BECAUSE THE
ADVERSE PARTY OFFERS TO POST A COUNTERBOND.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE CANCELLATION OF A NOTICE OF LIS
PENDENS ANNOTATED ON TAX DECLARATION NO. 112 IS
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Ruling:
Petition is denied. The trial court acted arbitrarily in granting the petition for appointment
of a receiver as "there was no sufficient cause or reason to justify placing the disputed
properties under receivership."

First, petitioners miserably failed to adduce clear, convincing, and hard evidence to show
the alleged fraud in the transfers and the antedating of said transfers. The fact that the
transfers were dated prior to the demise of Torcuato on May 12, 1992 does not
necessarily mean the transfers were attended by fraud. He who alleges fraud has the
burden to prove it.

Moreover, respondent has adduced documentary proof that Torcuato himself similarly
conveyed several lots in the estate of Severino based on the oral partition between the
siblings. To lend credence to the transfers executed by Torcuato but distrust to those
made by respondent would be highly inequitable as correctly opined by the court a quo.
Indeed, receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted only in extreme situations.

Second, petitioner is willing to post a counterbond in the amount to be fixed by the court
based on Sec. 3, Rule 59 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Anchored on this rule, the
trial court should have dispensed with the services of the receiver, more so considering
that the alleged fraud put forward to justify the receivership was not at all established.
Thus, the trial court failed to consider the posting of the counterbond in addition to other
reasons presented by the offeror why the receivership has to be set aside.

Third, since a notice of lis pendens has been annotated on the titles of the disputed
properties, the rights of petitioners are amply safeguarded and preserved since "there
can be no risk of losing the property or any part of it as a result of any conveyance of the
land or any encumbrance that may be made thereon posterior to the filing of the notice
of lis pendens." Once the annotation is made, any subsequent conveyance of the lot by

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the respondent would be subject to the outcome of the litigation since the fact that the
properties are under custodia legis is made known to all and sundry by operation of law.
Hence, there is no need for a receiver to look after the disputed properties.

Fourth, it is undisputed that respondent has actual possession over some of the disputed
properties which are entitled to protection. Between the possessor of a subject property
and the party asserting contrary rights to the properties, the former is accorded better
rights. In litigation, except for exceptional and extreme cases, the possessor ought not to
be deprived of possession over subject property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The June 18, 2002 CA Decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 67492 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as it ordered the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in TD No. 112.

---oo0oo---

|Corot, Rossnel|

CIRILO D. DOLAR v. CARLOS L. SUNDIAM, GR No. L-27631, 30 April 1971

Facts:
On June 25, 1948, one Generoso Tupas, Jr. filed a petition with the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo (docketed as Special Proceeding 472) for the allowance of his father's will and
the appointment of an administrator for the deceased's estate. The deceased was
survived by his spouse, his son Generoso Tupas, Jr., and his other children by a first
marriage.

After the probate of the will and the appointment of the deceased's widow (later replaced
by Luis Tupas) as judicial administrator of the testate estate, Generoso Tupas, Jr., on
December 5, 1953, sold to the herein respondent Lumampao, for the price of P40,000,
two (2) parcels of land bequeathed to him by his father. On August 9, 1955, Lumampao,
by virtue of this purchase, asked the surrogate court to be allowed to intervene in the
proceedings. The court granted his motion.

On July 9, 1956, a project of partition of the testate estate, comprising at least two hundred
twenty-three (223) hectares, was submitted to the probate court for approval, by the
herein petitioner Luis Tupas, as judicial administrator thereof. The two parcels of land of
the testate estate previously sold to Lumampao, with an area of ninety-two (92) hectares,
more or less, were thereunder expressly assigned to Generoso Tupas, Jr. This project
of partition was approved by the probate court on July 16, 1956.

On February 18, 1957, however, a complaint for the recovery of the said two parcels of
land was filed by Lumampao against GenerosoTupas, Jr. and Luis Tupas with the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo (docketed as civil case 4276), on the ground that the defendants
therein, by use of force, threats, stealth, strategy and intimidation, deprived him of the
possession of the said properties and gathered all the products therefrom. The validity

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of the sale to him of these properties, which was brought in issue in the said case, was
upheld by the court a quo on May 15, 1959.

This decision, in turn, was affirmed on appeal, by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 26507-
R onApril 2, 1964.

Issue:

Whether a receiver may be appointed over property in custodia legis.

Ruling:
Ordinarily, a receiver cannot be put on property with is already in custody of the law.

In the case, a piece of property which is originally a part of the estate of a deceased
person is sold by an heir of the deceased having a valid claims and said piece of property
is by mistake, subsequently inventoried or considered part of the deceased`s estate
subject to settlement. Then it was sold once more to another person with approval and
authority of the probate court.

A receiver of the property so sold may be appointed by the court (during the pendency of
a motion to set aside the 2nd sale) when in the sound judgment of the court the grant of
temporary relief(receivership) is reasonably necessary to secure and protect the rights of
its real owner against any danger of loss or material injury to him

Accordingly, the order of the court a quo dated December 1, 1966 is hereby affirmed.
The said court is, however, enjoined to act in consonance with the tenor and intendment
of this decision. No costs.

---oo0oo---

CENTRAL SAWMILL VS ALTO SURETY AND INSURANCE CO., GR No. L-24508, 25


April 1969.

Facts:
This appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated October 4, 1960
in its Civil Case No. 27374, entitled Central Sawmills, Inc. vs. Alto Surety & Insurance
Co., et al., ordering the appointment of a receiver of the properties of defendant-appellant
Alto Surety & Insurance Company as well as from the order of October 25, 1960 denying
the motion for reconsideration thereof was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals
in a resolution.

That on May 16, 1960, the Insurance Commissioner addressed another letter marked
exhibit G-Receivership.

In granting the petition for receivership, the court a qou said:

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Firstly, plaintiff has offered the provisions of Section 1, Rule 61 of the Rules of Court,
more particularly paragraph (d) thereof. In support of its claim, plaintiff has cited the case
of Philippine Trust Co. vs. Francisco Santamaria 53 Phil. 463, wherein the Supreme Court
ordered the appointment of a receiver of all the properties and assets of a judgment debtor
in aid of execution of judgment rendered against it. The action against the judgement
debtor in the said case was for the recovery of a sum of money.

Secondly plaintiff has cited the provisions of Section 2, Rule 61 of the Rule of court.

In relation to this provision of law, Exhibits E-Receivership and G-Receivership tend to


show that defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., is in imminent danger of
insolvency. As a matter of fact, no less than the Insurance Commissioner of the
Philippines has manifested in his letter dated May 16, 1960 and marked as Exhibit G-
Receivership that the defendant corporation and is in a precarious financial condition.

Thirdly, plaintiff has cited the provision of Section Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

It must be remembered that plaintiff filed the present petition for receivership in view of
the return of the Sheriff of Manila (Exhibit C-Receivership) to the effect that the writ of
execution marked Exhibit B-Receivership could not be satisfied for the reasons stated
therein.

It is not disputed by the appellant company that though in the years 1955 and 1956 it was
in a position to pay installments, or September 1, 1958 and thereafter, it was no longer in
a position to mark any payments whatsoever.

In view of all the above, the issue raised in this appeal is purely a question of law; this
appeal is therefore beyond the competence of this Court.

ACCORDINGLY, let this case be certified, as it is hereby certified, under the provisions
of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, to the Honorable Supreme Court for proper
disposition.

Issue:
Whether or not, in an action for the collection of a debt, where there is already a final and
executory judgment, the authority to appoint a receiver of the properties of the judgment
debtor which are not involved in the action in aid of execution of said judgment.

Ruling:
With regard to receivership as an aid to execution under Sec. 41 of Rule 39, it has been
held that the provision of Rule 59 are applicable, for instance the procedure, requirements
for a bond, and functions of a receiver.

As quoted: With this precedent, it is obvious that the order of receivership appealed from
should be affirmed.

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Only one point of procedure need be clarified now. In its petition for the appointment of a
receiver, plaintiff-appellee relied expressly only on the provisions of Section 1(d) of Rule
61 (Rules of 1940)

This specific citation naturally gave defendant-appellant cause to oppose the petition on
the ground that underline provision thus cited, the receivership contemplated is only that
"of the property, real or personal, which is the subject of the action." It was only in its
memorandum, which is not included in the record on appeal but mentioned only in the
opposition to the motion for reconsideration of the order granting the receivership (p. 50,
Record on Appeal), that plaintiff-appellant must have referred the court a quo to other
provisions of the Rules, particularly, Section 2 of Rule 61 and Section 39 of Rule 39. Thus,
as may be seen from the above-quoted portions of its order of receivership, the said court,
made reference to all the three provisions which it said were "offered" or cited by the
plaintiff-appellee, namely: Section 1 (d), Rule 61, Section 2, Rule 61 and Section 39, Rule
39. Seemingly, the court a quo was uncertain as to which particular one of these
provisions was the proper basis of authority because it simply ruled that "after considering
the evidence and the argument adduced by the parties in relation to plaintiff's petition for
receivership and further considering the outstanding obligations of defendant corporation,
the Court is of the opinion that plaintiff's motion for receivership is well-taken and made
no commitment as to which rule or provision it was relying upon for its action.

WHEREFORE, with the above clarification that Section 39 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
1940, now Section 43 of Rule 39 of the current Rules, is the provision applicable to the
receivership herein in question, the same being in aid for money, the disputed orders of
the court a quo dated October 4, 1960 and October 15, 1960 are hereby affirmed, with
costs against defendant-appellant, Alto Surety & Insurance Company, Inc.

---oo0oo---

ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO F.


BORROMEO, GR No. 1106473, 31 January 1964.

Facts:
On August 9, 1991, respondent Camilo Borromeo, a realtor, filed against petitioner a civil
complaint for the recovery of three (3) parcels of land and the house built thereon in the
possession of the petitioner and registered in her name under Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Mandaue. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-1148 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28,
Mandaue City.

In his complaint, Borromeo alleged that he purchased the property on July 11, 1991 from
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian national and former lover of the petitioner for many years
until he deserted her in 1991 for the favors of another woman. Based on the deed of sale
which the Austrian made in his favor, Borromeo filed an action to recover the ownership
and possession of the house and lots from Descallar and asked for the issuance of new
transfer certificates of title in his name.

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In her answer to the complaint, Descallar alleged that the property belongs to her as the
registered owner thereof; that Borromeo's vendor, Wilhelm Jambrich, is an Austrian,
hence, not qualified to acquire or own real property in the Philippines. He has no title,
right or interest whatsoever in the property which he may transfer to Borromeo.

On March 5, 1992, Borromeo asked the trial court to appoint a receiver for the property
during the pendency of the case. Despite the petitioner's opposition, Judge Mercedes
Golo-Dadole granted the application for receivership and appointed her clerk of court as
receiver with a bond of P250,000.00.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order, but it was denied.

Petitioner sought relief in the Court of Appeals by a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No.
27977 "Antonietta O. Descallar vs. Hon. Mercedes G. Dadole, as Judge, RTC of Mandaue
City, Branch 28, and Camilo F. Borromeo").

On July 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari. In due time,
she appealed the Appellate Court's decision to this Court by a petition for certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in appointing a receiver for real
property registered in the name of the petitioner in order to transfer its possession from
the petitioner to the court-appointed receiver

Ruling:
Yes. The order of receivership tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The appointment of
a receiver is not proper where the rights of the parties (one of whom is in possession of
the property), are still to be determined by the trial court.

In this case, there is no showing that grave or irremediable damage may result to
respondent Borromeo unless a receiver is appointed. The property in question is real
property, hence, it is neither perishable nor consumable. Even though it is mortgaged to
a third person, there is no evidence that payment of the mortgage obligation is being
neglected. In any event, the private respondent's rights and interests, may be adequately
protected during the pendency of the case by causing his adverse claim to be annotated
on the petitioner's certificates of title.

Another flaw in the order of receivership is that the person whom the trial judge appointed
as receiver is her own clerk of court. This practice has been frowned upon by this Court

WHEREFORE, finding grave abuse of discretion in the order of receiver which the
respondent Court of Appeals affirmed in its decision of July 29, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No.
27977, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the appellate
court, as well as the order dated March 17, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue

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City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-1148, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Costs against the private respondent.

---oo0oo---

|Dado, Ardill Geos|

Ventosa vs Fernan, GR No. L-14941, 31 January 1964

Facts:
The La Paz Ice Plant and Cold Storage Co., Inc.; were leased to petitioner Natalio
Ventosa. The formal document of lease was executed on January 31, 1958 and duly
ratified before Notary Public Pedrito A. Gianzon, and approved in a resolution, by the
Board of Directors of the said company. The contract of lease was further approved by
the Public Service Commission. On February 4, 1958, Ventosa allegedly took possession
of the leased premises, including the factory and equipment and operated the same, of
such lessee.

Respondent C. N. Hodges and Ricardo Gurrea filed an action in the CFI of Iloilo against
Lezama spouses and praying for the appointment ex-parte of a receiver for the properties
of the corporation. Respondent Jose Dineros was appointed receiver and took
possession of the plant.

Petitioner then filed a motion to intervene and a complaint in intervention likewise the
defendants Lezama spouses filed their answer, with counterclaims. The complaint in
intervention was admitted and petitioner filed a motion for an order from the respondent
Judge, directing the receiver not to interfere with the management of the corporation.

Respondents Hodges and Gurrea filed with this Court an ex-parte motion to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the lease had area expired or in the alternative that the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction be lifted. Petitioner, however explained that upon motion
of Atty. Roman Cruz, said Commission on February 18, 1959, reconsidered its order of
January 6, 1959, approving the renewal of the lease. Respondents ex parte motions were,
therefore, denied. The respondent Judge was directed to cite respondents Jose Dineros
and Ernesto Gianzon for contempt result of which proceeding has not been reported by
the respondent Judge, until the present.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he denied
petitioner’s motion

Ruling:
“After the appointment of a receiver, claimants of the property or any interest therein may
enforce their claims only by permission of the court appointing the receiver. Such a
claimant may be made party to the suit in order to establish his claim; or he may petition
to have it heard before a master; or he may, by express permission of the court, bring a

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suit for the possession, care being taken to protect the receiver. But a receiver will not be
ordered to deliver the property to a claimant until his right is established in one of these
modes.”

It is also held that property under receivership is property in 49ustodial egis which should
remain under the administration and control of the receivership court, through its creation,
the receiver, for the purpose of preservation and for the benefit of the party who may be
adjudged entitled to it; that the effect of the appointment of a receiver is to remove the
parties to the suit from the possession of the property.

These principles of law being true, there must be hearing of some form or a regular trial
of the issues in the said civil case No. 4994, as between respondents Gurrea and Hodges,
on one hand, and the petitioner herein, on the other, as intervenor therein, so as to
determine the party who is legally entitled to the possession and control of the ice plant
in question; and until such party is adjudged that right, the property must remain under
the control and supervision of the court, through its receiver.

---oo0oo---

Pacific Merchandising Corporation vs Consolacion Insurance and Surety Co., Inc.,


G.R. No. L-14941, January 31, 1964

Facts:
That on the 19th day of October, 1962, a Writ of Execution as issticaIy the Court of First
Instance of Manila under Civil Case No. 49691, entitled Pacific Merchandising
Corporation vs. Leo Enterprises, Inc., a copy of the said Writ of Execution to the
complaint;

That by virtue of the aforesaid Writ of Execution, the Sheriff of Manila levied and attached
the following: Second Hand AUTOMATICKET Machine No. MG-31833 and Cinema
Projectors Complete, trademark SIMPLEX PEERLESS MAGNARC NOS. 52625 and
62387. Atty. Greg V. Pajarillo was appointed on as Receiver of all the assets, properties
and equipment of Paris Theatre. The sale at public auction of the above described
properties was postponed and was later cancelled due to the representation of Atty.
Pajarillo as Receiver of Paris Theatre operated by Leo Enterprises, Inc. in which case a
judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff against Leo Enterprises, Inc. Third-party
defendant Pajarillo approached the third-party plaintiff and applied for a surety bond in
the amount of P5,000.00 to be rated in favor of thd plaintiff in order to guarantee to said
plaintiff the payment of obligations in favor by the Leo Enterprises, Inc.;

The bond applied for was in fact executed in favor of the plaintiff with third-party defendant
Pajarillo as principal and third-party plaintiff as surety likewise to protect third party plaintiff
against damage and injury, the third party defendant Pajarillo executed in favor of the
former an INDEMNITY AGREEMENT.

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A decision was rendered tne court of First Instance of Manila defendant Leo Enterprises,
Inc. appealed to the court of Appeals. The defendant failed to pay and was duly notified
of the demand made on the principal upon reminder by third-party plaintiff regarding his
obligations in favor of the plaintiff, the third-party defendant, Greg V. Pajarillo replied that
he no longer was bound to pay because he had ceased to be the receiver of Paris Theatre
operated by Leo Enterprises, Inc. by virtue of the previous decision of the Court and thus
the refusal to pay

Issue:
Whether or not third party defendant-appellant Gregorio V. Pajarillo is, under the facts
and circumstances obtaining, liable to plaintiff for the unpaid amount claimed.

Ruling:
A receiver is not an agent or representative of any party to the action. He is an officer of
the court exercising his functions in the interest of neither plaintiff nor defendant, but for
the common benefit of all the parties in interest.

Thus, "a receiver, strictly speaking, has no right or power to make any contract binding
the property or fund in his custody or to pay out funds in his hands without the authority
or approval of the court.

Unauthorized contracts of a receiver do not bind the court in charge of receivership. They
are the receiver's own contracts and are not recognized by the courts as contracts of the
receivership.

The aforesaid agreement and undertaking entered into by appellant Pajarillo not having
been approved or authorized by the receivership court should, therefore, be considered
as his personal undertaking or obligation. Certainly, if such agreements were known by
the receivership court, it would not have terminated the receivership without due notice
to the judgment creditor as required by Section 8 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.

where one has rendered services to another, and these services are accepted by the
latter, in the absence of proof that the service ",as rendered gratuitously, it is but just that
he should pay a reasonable remuneration therefore because "it is a well-known principle
of law, that no one should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another."

---oo0oo---

Rule 60- Replevin

Bachrach Motor Co. vs Summers, G.R. No. L-17393, July 21, 1921

Facts:
On March 9, 1920, Elias Aboitiz executed a chattel mortgage upon a Nash automobile,
bearing the Factory No. 143643, in favor of the Bachrach Motor Company, Inc., to secure
a debt for P3,675, payable in twelve installments. In the month of November of the same

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year, the mortgagor defaulted in the payment of the installment for that month; and as a
consequence the Motor Company determined to have the car sold for the purpose of
foreclosing the mortgage, in the manner prescribed in section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage
Law (Act No. 1508). It accordingly requested Ricardo Summers, as sheriff of the city of
Manila, to take the car from the debtor and to expose it to public sale, as provided in said
section. Acting in pursuance of this authority the sheriff applied to the mortgagor for the
automobile; but the mortgagor refused to surrender possession; and the Motor Company
instituted an action of replevin to recover the car. However, its effort to get possession
were again destined to be temporarily baffled, as Aboitiz gave bond for the retention of
the automobile pendente lite. The Motor Company thereupon filed the present petition in
this court for the writ of mandamus to compel the sheriff to seize the car from the
mortgagor and sell it. To this petition the sheriff demurred, and the cause is now before
us for the determination of the issues thus presented.

Issue:
Whether, after default by the mortgagor in the performance of the conditions of a chattel
mortgage, the sheriff is unconditionally bound to seize the mortgaged property, at the
instance of the creditor, and sell it to satisfy the debt.

Ruling:
In commercial usage the property which is the subject of a chattel mortgage is, as well
known, almost invariably left in the possession of the mortgagor, and this possession is
not disturbed until the mortgagor defaults in the payment of the secured debt or otherwise
fails to comply with the condition of the mortgage.

Where, however, the debtor refuses to yield up the property, the creditor must institute an
action, either to effect a judicial foreclosure directly, or to secure possession as a
preliminary to the sale contemplated in the provision above quoted. He cannot lawfully
take the property by force against the will of the debtor.

The right of the mortgagee to have possession after condition broken must therefore be
taken to be unquestionable; and to this effect is the great weight of American authority.

And whatever conclusion may be drawn in the premises with respect to the true nature of
a chattel mortgage, the result must in this case be the same; for whether the mortgagee
becomes the real owner of the mortgaged property — as some suppose — or acquires
only certain rights therein, it is none the less clear that he has after default the right of
possession; though it cannot be admitted that he may take the law into his own hands
and wrest the property violently from the possession of the mortgagor. Neither can he do
through the medium of a public officer that which he cannot directly do himself. The
consequence is that in such case the creditor must either resort to a civil action to recover
possession as a preliminary to a sale, or preferably he may bring an action to obtain a
judicial foreclosure in conformity, so far as practicable, with the provisions of the Chattel
Mortgage Law.

---oo0oo---

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|De Luna, Glenn|

ROMEO S. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DENNIS CANOY
AND ALEX DE LEON, respondents. G.R. No. 79021 May 17, 1993

Facts:
Judge Lauro V. Francisco of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII issued a
search warrant directing the immediate search of the premises of R.R. Construction and
the seizure of an Isuzu dump truck. Canoy seized the vehicle and took custody. Chua
filed a civil action for replevin for the recovery of possession of the vehicle against Canoy
and in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII, presided by Judge Leonardo B.
Cañares. He alleged that he had a lawful ownership and possession of the vehicle; that
he had not sold the vehicle to anyone; that he had not stolen nor carnapped it, and that
he had never been charged of the crime of carnapping or any other crime for that matter.
The writ of replevin was issued and the vehicle was seized. Meanwhile, a case for
carnapping against Chua pending preliminary investigation before the Office of the City
Fiscal of Cebu City was provisionally dismissed with the following reservation: "without
prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved". The Court of Appeals
reversed the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII and ordered the dismissal of
the Replevin action, and directed that possession of the subject vehicle be restored to
Canoy.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred when it ordered the transfer of possession
seized to Chua when the latter filed an action for replevin.
Ruling:
Yes. Where a personal property is seized under a search warrant and there is reason to
believe that the seizure will not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal and there
are conflicting claims over the seized property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action
for replevin. However, where there is still a probability that the seizure will be followed by
the filing of a criminal action, as in the case at bar where the case for carnapping was
"dismissed provisionally, without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership
is resolved in favor of complainant", or the criminal information has actually been
commenced, or filed, and actually prosecuted, and there are conflicting claims over the
property seized, the proper remedy is to question the validity of the search warrant in the
same court which issued it and not in any other branch of the said court. Thus, the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII erred when it ordered the transfer of possession
of the property seized to Chua when the latter filed the action for replevin. It should have
dismissed the case since by virtue of the "provisional dismissal", of the carnapping case
there is still a probability that a criminal case would be filed, hence a conflict in jurisdiction
could still arise. The basic principle that a judge who presides in one court cannot annul

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or modify the orders issued by another branch of the same court because they are co-
equal and independent bodies acting coordinately, must always be adhered to.
---oo0oo---

SERVICEWIDE SPECIALISTS INCORPORATED vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and


ARMANDO CUSTODIO, JR. G.R. No. 103301 December 8, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner of Servicewide Specialists Inc., seeks a review on certiorari of the 30th August
1991 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 20289 setting aside the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, which disposed of then Civil
Case No. 83-18536, a suit for replevin and damages.

On July 27, 1979, Eleuterio Bondoc executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage
of the balance of the account in favor of Cesar Dollente which, upon approval by Filinvest
Corporation, Cesar Dollente executed and delivered to Filinvest Corporation a promissory
note in the amount of P37,528.83, payable in installments. On October 26, 1979, Cesar
Dollente, as vendor, executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage over the
aforementioned vehicle for the balance of his account in favor of Ernesto Dollente. On
September 28, 1979, Ernesto Dollente executed and delivered to Filinvest Corporation a
promissory note for the sum of P37,528.83, payable in monthly installments. This
obligation was secured by a chattel mortgage executed between Cesar Dollente and
Ernesto Dollente, which was annotated and registered. Subsequently, Filinvest
Corporation assigned all its rights and interests on the promissory note and chattel
mortgage to plaintiff, with notice to Ernesto Dollente. The original defendant Ernesto
Dollente, having defaulted in the payment of the monthly installments which fell due on
June 15, 1979 up to September 15, 1981, plaintiff demanded from said defendant the
payment of the entire balance, which includes interest thereon and to return the motor
vehicle in question. By reason of the refusal of the original defendant to pay the entire
balance and to surrender possession of the subject motor vehicle, this case was filed and,
upon its filing, upon motion, a writ of seizure was issued and the same was implemented
by the sheriff. A counter-replevin bond having been filed, defendant Armando Custodio,
Jr. had obtained possession of the mortgaged vehicle.
Issue:
Whether or not a case for replevin may be pursued without Ernesto Dollente, an
indispensable party to the suit.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, stating that, Rule
60 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of possession of
personal property, to apply for a writ of replevin if it can be shown that he is "the owner of

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the property claimed or is entitled to the possession thereof." The plaintiff need not be the
owner so long as he is able to specify his right to the possession of the property and his
legal basis therefor. The question then, insofar as the matter finds relation to the instant
case, is whether or not the plaintiff (herein petitioner) who has predicated his right on
being the mortgagee of a chattel mortgage should implead the mortgagor in his complaint
that seeks to recover possession of the encumbered property in order to effect its
foreclosure.
In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be established. A foreclosure under
a chattel mortgage may properly be commenced only once there is default on the part of
the mortgagor of his obligation secured by the mortgage. The replevin in the instant case
has been sought to pave the way for the foreclosure of the object covered by the chattel
mortgage. The conditions essential for that foreclosure would be to show, firstly, the
existence of the chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor. These
requirements must be established since the validity of the plaintiff’s exercise of the right
of foreclosure are inevitably dependent thereon. It would thus seem, considering
particularly an adverse and independent claim of ownership by private respondent, that
the lower court acted improvidently when it granted the dismissal of the complaint against
Dollente.
---oo0oo---
OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ and NENITA P. FERNANDEZ vs. INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE BANK, now UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES; and PREMIERE
INSURANCE & SURETY CORP. G.R. No. 131283 October 7, 1999

Facts:
On or about October 26, 1993, petitioners, purchased a Nissan Sentra Sedan through a
financing scheme of the private respondent, the International Corporate Bank, now Union
Bank of the Philippines, and the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of the financing
institution on November 10, 1993.

When the respondent bank filed its complaint with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of
Replevin on November 28, 1997, the monthly installments were almost fully paid; they
would have been fully paid on November 26, 1997. They could not have been considered
in default at the time the complaint was filed, considering that: (a) they attempted many
times to pay the bank their installments for the months of August, September, October,
1996, and up to the time of the filing of the case, they had not received any statement of
delinquency as mandated by R.A. No. 3165, otherwise known as the Truth in Lending
Act.

Their petition for the outright dismissal of the complaint, as well as the lifting of the Writ
of Replevin was denied even if the amount of P553,344.00 representing the value of the
chattel was beyond the jurisdiction of the court. For consideration before this court is the
Urgent Motion to Re-deliver the Chattel and the Motion to Dismiss by way of Special and
Affirmative Defenses the following: that this Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to try the

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case and to issue the Writ of Replevin, for the reason that the plaintiffs office is in Makati
and defendants residence is in Quezon City.

Issue:
Whether or not a writ of replevin issued by Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay could be
enforced in Quezon City.

Ruling:
Yes. The court stated the rules governing writs and processes:

(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.

(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan
trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in
the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the
regional trial court.

Thus, the Writ of Replevin issued by the MTC of Pasay, which obviously does not
fall under item (a) of the above-cited Rule, may be validly enforced anywhere in the
Philippines. We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further explained.

The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a regional
trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly
provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same,
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. No legal provision, statutory or
reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit [to] its area
of enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim Rules
expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the
processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made
regarding the processes contemplated in paragraph (b).
---oo0oo---

|Enage, Nikkos|
Stronghold Insurance V. Court of Appelas G.R No. 89020, May 5, 1992

Facts:
Leisure Company Inc. filed a civil case against Northern Motors for replevin and damages.
It sought to recover office furniture and equipments.
The lower court ordered the delivery of the properties subject to posting of a bond under
sec 2. Rule 60. The bon was posted by Stronghold Insurance Company.
Northern Motors filed a counter-bond for the recovery of possession of the properties.
However, despite of earnest effort, Leisure Company never showed again.

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Leisure Company was declared non-suited for not appearing during the pre-trial. Northern
Motors filed a motion for a writ of execution.
Stronghold contend that a motion for a writ of execution is not a proper remedy but an
application against the bond instead is the proper remedy.
The lower court ruled in favor of Northern Motors. The court ruled that even a motion for
a writ of execution was filed by the defendant, it is clear that the defendant sought to
recover damages from the bond posted by stronghold company as they invoke sec 10 of
rule 60 in relation to sec 20 of rule 57.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the bond posted by the surety would answer for the damages
obtained by the defendant.
Ruling:
The court explained the nature of the proceedings to recover damages against a surety.
Upon application of the prevailing party, the court shall order the surety why the bond
should not respond for the judgment damages. If the surety should contest the reality or
the unreasonableness of the damages claimed by the prevailing party, the court shall set
a hearing. The hearing will be summary in nature and limited only to such new defenses.
As held by the CA, stronghold insurance has no ground to asail the awards against it in
the disputed order. Unless it has a new defense, it cannot simplistically dissociate itself
from leisure club and disclaim liability. Sec 2 of rule 60, the bond filed is to insure the
return of the property to the defendant if the return thereof is adjudged.
---oo0oo---

Smart Communication V. Astorga G.R No. 148132 January 28, 2008

Facts:
Regina M. Astorga was employed by respondent Smart Communications, Incorporated
on May 8, 1997 as District Sales Manager of the Corporate Sales Marketing Group/ Fixed
Services Division. Astorga enjoyed additional benefits, namely, annual performance
incentive equivalent to 30% of her annual gross salary, a group life and hospitalization
insurance coverage, and a car plan in the amount of P455,000.00.5
SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient operations and
Astorga’s employment was terminated.
Astorga filed a Labor case against Smart while the latter filed before the MTC a civil case
for the recovery of the car, the car plan, against Astorga.
Astorga filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction over the case. She contended that the issuance of the car is part of the
employer-employee relationship and the proper court who has jurisdiction to the case is
the labor tribunal.

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Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the court has jurisdiction in cases where the property sought to be
recovered arises from an employer-employee relationship.
Ruling:
Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or
chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or
taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one
having right to possession to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully
taken or detained the property.

That the action commenced by SMART against Astorga in the RTC of Makati City was
one for replevin hardly admits of doubt.

In reversing the RTC ruling and consequently dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction,
the CA made the following disquisition, viz.:

[I]t is plain to see that the vehicle was issued to [Astorga] by [Smart] as part of the
employment package. We doubt that [SMART] would extend [to Astorga] the same
car plan privilege were it not for her employment as district sales manager of the
company. Furthermore, there is no civil contract for a loan between [Astorga] and
[Smart]. Consequently, We find that the car plan privilege is a benefit arising out
of employer-employee relationship. Thus, the claim for such falls squarely within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiters and the NLRC. 32

We do not agree. Contrary to the CA’s ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed
jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga’s motion
to dismiss. SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the
alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the
relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations.33 As such,
the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante,34 this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
replevin suit, explained:

Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the
plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property in specie
wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to
adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question of
whether or not a party has the right of possession over the property involved and
if so, whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said
property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a
labor tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.

xxxx

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The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case.
The respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved independently on the
other. In fact in 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the case before it had issued an
Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from blocking the free ingress and egress
to the Vessel and ordering the petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of
the controversy is properly settled under the Labor Code. So also with petitioners’
right to picket. But the determination of the question of who has the better right to
take possession of the Vessel and whether petitioners can deprive the Charterer,
as the legal possessor of the Vessel, of that right to possess in addressed to the
competence of Civil Courts.

In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining avenues of
jurisdiction as laid down by pertinent laws.

The CA, therefore, committed reversible error when it overturned the RTC ruling and
ordered the dismissal of the replevin case for lack of jurisdiction.

---oo0oo---

REYNALDO SEBASTIAN, complainant, vs. SHERIFF ALBERTO A.


VALINO, respondent. A.M. No. P-91-549 July 5, 1993

Facts:
Marblecraft, Inc., represented by its Assistant General Manager, Reynaldo Sebastian,
charges Alberto A. Valino, Senior Deputy Sheriff, Office of the Regional Sheriff, Pasig,
Metro Manila, with (1) gross abuse of authority committed in connection with the
implementation of the writ issued by the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila, in
Civil Case No. 89-3368, and (2) refusal to enforce the trial court's for the return of the
seized items.

On March 3, 1989, Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) filed a


replevin suit against Marblecraft, Inc., in Civil Case No. 89-3368, in order to foreclose the
chattels mortgaged by Marblecraft. On March 30, 1989, the Regional Trial Court, Makati,
issued a writ of seizure directed against Marblecraft covering the chattels sought to be
replevied.

In the course of the implementation of the writ, which lasted for four days, several pieces
of machinery and equipment were destroyed or taken away by respondent.

Respondent turned over the seized articles to the counsel of PDCP and allowed these
items to be stored in PDCP's warehouse in Taguig, Metro Manila.

On November 14, 1990, complainant posted a counterbond. In an order issued on the


same day, the Regional Trial Court, Makati, approved the bond and directed the
immediate return of the seized items. After denying PDCP's motion to set aside the

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November 14 Order, the trial court reiterated the directive for the return of the seized
items in its November 26 Order. Respondent did not implement the orders.

PDCP filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 26 Order, which was denied in
an Order dated December 11, 1990.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the thing seized be delivered directly to the prevailing party.

Ruling:
Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to
be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. The sheriff must retain it in his custody for five
days and shall return it to the defendant, If the latter, as in the case, requires its return
and files a counterbond (Sec. 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court). In violation of said
Rule, respondent immediately turned over the seized articles to PDCP. His claim that the
Office of the Regional Sheriff did not have a place to store the seized items, cannot justify
his violation of the Rule. As aptly noted by the Investigating Judge, the articles could have
been deposited in a bonded warehouse.

---oo0oo---

Rule 61- Support Pendente Lite

|Espedilla, Carl Angelo|

Lucina Baito vs. Anatalio Sarmiento G.R no. L-13105 August 25, 1960

Facts:
Failing to secure a reconsideration of the order entered by the Court of First Instance of
Samar that dismissed her complaint for support on the ground that it has no jurisdiction,
the amount demanded as support being only P 720 and not more than P 2,000 (now
P5,000), the plaintiff Lucina Baito appeals from the order, contending that the Court has
jurisdiction over the action she brought against her husband Anatalio Sarmiento.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over an action for support if the
amount claimed or demanded for support is only P 720, or not more than P 2,000 (now P
5,000)?
Ruling:
An action for support does not involve the determination of the amount to be given as
support, but also the relation of the parties, the right to support created by the relation,
the needs of the claimant, the financial resources of the person from whom the support

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is sought, all which are not capable of pecuniary estimation. For this reason, an action for
support falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.
---oo0oo---

August Caezar R. Gan vs. Hon. Antonio C. Reyes G.R. No. 145527 May 28, 2002

Facts:
Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school her three (3)-year old
daughter Francheska Joy S. Pondevida, Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote petitioner
Augustus Caezar R. Gan demanding support for their "love child." Petitioner, in his reply,
denied paternity of the child. An exasperated Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of
her daughter a complaint against petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente
lite.
After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, the trial court
rendered its Decision on 12 May 2000 ordering petitioner to recognize private respondent
Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support her with P20,000.00
every month to be paid on or before the 15th of each month starting 15 April 2000.
Likewise petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the accumulated
arrears of P20,000.00 per month from the day she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees and P25,000.00 for expenses of litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of
every month from 15 May 2000 as alimony pendente lite should he desire to pursue
further remedies against private respondent.

On 9 June 2000 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate
execution of the judgment.

Issue:
Whether or not the remedy of appeal may be availed in cases for support pendent lite?

Ruling:
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns.

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Under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are
immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal.

This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays
the execution of the judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there
are urgent reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate
execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between those which are
the subject of an appeal and those which are not. To consider then petitioner's argument
that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate
the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution.

---oo0oo---

Carlos J. Torres vs. Hon. Jose Teodoro et. Al G.R. Nos. L-10093 and L-10356, April
30, 1957

Facts:
Decision was rendered on October 28,1955 declaring the petitioner to be the illegitimate
father of the plaintiff minors and ordering him, among other things, to give each of them
a monthly support of P100, the same to be deposited with the clerk of court on the first of
each month notwithstanding any appeal that might be interposed, and on November 14
of the same year a special order for execution was issued pursuant to section 2 of Rule
39, because the court had been made aware that the minors were in urgent need of
support, the court furthermore believing that paternity and filiation had been established
by irrefutable evidence and that any appeal that the petitioner might interpose would only
be in line with his previous maneuvers for delay. As despite this special order the
petitioner made no deposit in court for the support of the minors, he was, at their instance,
cited for contempt, and the court having after hearing that though possessed of adequate
means he really had made no deposit, an order was handed down under date of
December 17 declaring him guilty of indirect contempt and sentencing him to fine of
P1,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than six months, at the same time directing his
incarceration till he should perform the act required. From this order petitioner appealed,
and on January 7, 1956 the court approved his record on appeal and bond and ordered
the case elevated to the SUPREME COURT.

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On January 24, 1956, upon complaint of the minors that the pension corresponding to
that month had not been deposited, the court, over petitioner's objection, handed down
another order again declaring him guilty of contempt and directing his incarceration till he
should make the deposit, the order explaining that the previous conviction for contempt
was for his failure to make the deposit corresponding to the preceding month of
December. It is this last order that the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-10356 seeks to
annul.

Issue:
Whether or not the incarceration of petitioner was necessary and proper in that the
judgment for support could have been satisfied through levy on petitioner's property if he
had any?

Ruling:
The petitioner having disobeyed the order to pay support although, as found by the court,
he had the means to do so, section 6 of Rule 63 is applicable, for that section expressly
provides that should defendant in an action for alimony "appear to have means to pay
alimony and refuses to pay, either an order of execution may be issued or a penalty for
contempt may be issued, or both."
---oo0oo---
|Gabor, Rex Bernard|
PROCESO VINLUAN, Petitioner, v. THE HON. JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS — EDMUNDO S. PICCIO, ANTONIO CAÑIZARES and HERMOGENES
CONCEPCION, JR. and JOSEFINA RAMOS, Respondents. G.R. No. L-25029.
August 28, 1968.

Facts:
In a prior case, Josefina Ramos filed against her husband, Proceso Vinluan a case for
legal separation and separation of property. Pending final determination of that case,
Ramos filed a petition for alimony pendente lite alleging that they were separated since
1960 and that their children needed money for support. This was denied by the court

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presided by Judge Bello on October 3, 1964 on the ground that it was premature to order
the payment of alimony pendente lite.
This denial was questioned by the wife before the Court of appeals in an original action
for certiorari against the husband and Judge Bello to annul the Judge’s order and secure
a decree of alimony pendente lite.
The CA granted the writ prayed for and required the husband to provide monthly alimony.
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT Certiorari (before the Court of Appeals) was the proper action to
question denial of petition for alimony pendente lite (as the plaintiff allegedly had another
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which is review by
appeal).

Ruling:
Yes. It is true that plaintiff could have sought a review by appeal of Judge Bello’s order of
October 3, 1964, but since the same is interlocutory, plaintiff would have had to wait, for
its review by appeal, until the rendition of judgment on the merits, which may not be
forthcoming until months or years later. Meanwhile, plaintiff and her children needed
alimony, to live somehow. Hence, an appeal would not have been a speedy and adequate
remedy.
---oo0oo---

ANTONIO VASCO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, LEONOR INES LUCIANO, as


Presiding Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, Quezon City;
NICANOR SALAYSAY, as Sheriff for the Province of Rizal, and ANGELINA REYES
Y BAJACAN, REYNALDO VASCO and LOLITA VASCO, Respondents. [G.R. No. L
46763. February 28, 1978.

Facts:
This case is about the trial court’s jurisdiction to execute a judgment for support pending
appeal.
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon in a decision found that Reynaldo
and Lolita Vasco are illegitimate children of Antonio Vasco and Angelina Reyes. The
Court ordered Antonio to pay the children the sum of P200 as monthly allowance for
support (plus attorney’s fees).

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Antonio Vasco appealed to the CA from that decision. Two months after the approval of
the record on appeal, the children filed a motion for the execution of the said judgment
pending appeal.
The lower court granted the motion.
Antonio Vasco assailed such order of execution in his petition for certiorari in the CA.
The CA upheld the order of execution pending appeal in the “interest of substantial
justice”.
Thus, Antonio Vasco filed before the SC the instant petition for certiorari.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the trial court has jurisdiction to issue an order of execution pending
appeal.
Ruling:
No. The general rule is that an appeal stays the execution of judgment.
After the perfection of the appeal, the trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case, except
to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not
involve any matter litigated by the appeal xxx (Sec. 9, Rule 11, Rules of Court). An order
for execution pending appeal does not fall within the said exception because it is a
proceeding involving the very matter litigated by the appeal.
However, before the rendition of judgment, the plaintiffs could have availed themselves
in the lower court of the provisional remedy of support pendente lite.

---oo0oo---

BUENAVENTURA SAN JUAN, Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, Judge


of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and DOROTEA MEJIA, Respondents. G.R. No.
L-59906. October 23, 1982. G.R. No. L-59906. October 23, 1982
Facts:
The marriage between San Juan and Mejia was declared null and void by the CFI of Rizal
on the ground of a prior and subsisting marriage of San Juan. Mejia instituted an action
seeking support for herself and her two minor children. Judge Valenzuela granted the
support pendente lite fixed at P2,500 a month. A motion for reconsideration was denied;
thus, San Juan brought this petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of Judge
Valenzuela. During the pendency of said petition, San Juan filed with the trial court a
manifestation proposing a scheme of payment for the amount of support which had
accrued, and seeking to reduce the amount of support pendente lite to P1,000 on the

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ground that the sum previously fixed by respondent judge is now beyond his means to
pay. The payment scheme was approved but the reduction of the monthly support was
denied because the judge left for abroad.

Issue:
1) WHETHER OR NOT San Juan’s petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order
of Judge Valenzuela is rendered moot and academic by petitioner’s proposal and
willingness to pay the same.
2) WHETHER OR NOT the order fixing the amount of support pendente lite is final in
character.
Ruling:
1) Yes. The petitioner’s willingness to pay the amount of support pendente lite in
the manner indicated in his manifestation in the lower court, and the approval thereof by
the respondent judge renders the certiorari petition to annul Judge Valenzuela’s order
moot and academic.
2) No. The order fixing the amount of support pendente lite is not final in character
but subject to modification depending on obligor’s ability to pay the amount fixed
for support.
---oo0oo---
|Gacho, Leo|
MANUEL J. C. REYES, petitioner, vs. HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, as Judge of the
Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, Quezon City, COURT OF APPEALS and
CELIA ILUSTRE-REYES, respondents.

Facts:
The private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Quezon City a complaint against her husband, Manuel J. C. Reyes, for legal
separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill the plaintiff.

The plaintiff asked for support pendente leti for her and her three children. The defendant-
petitioner opposed the application for support pendente leti on the ground that his wife
had committed adultery with her physician.

The respondent Judge granted the plaintiff’s prayer for alimony pendente leti in the
amount of Php5,000.00 a month. It was affirmed by the CA but the amount was reduced
to Php4,000.00 a month.

Hence, this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA.

Issue:

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WHETHER OR NOT the mere allegation that the wife has committed adultery will bar her
from the right to receive support pendente leti.

Ruling:
No.

It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support. However, the
alleged adultery of the wife must be established by competent evidence. The allegation
that wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right to receive support pendente
lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the action.

In the case at hand, the petitioner did not present any evidence to prove the allegation
that his wife had committed adultery with any person.
---oo0oo----

MA. CARMINIA C. CALDERON represented by her Attorney-In-Fact, Marycris V.


Baldevia, Petitioner, vs. JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS and COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas were
married on December 4, 1985 and their union produce four children. On January 16,
1998, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an Order granting petitioner’s application for
support pendente lite which ordered the defendant, among others, to contribute to the
support of their minor children in the sum of Php42,292.50 per month.

On February 11, 2003, private respondent filed a Motion to Reduce Support citing that
the Php42,292.50 monthly support for the children as fixed by the court was higher than
his then Php20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor.

On March 7, 2005, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion to reduce support
and denying petitioner’s motion for spousal support, increase of the children’s monthly
support pendente lite and support-in-arrears.

Petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration of the March 7, 2005 Order was denied on
May 4, 2005.

On June 14, 2005, petitioner through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal from the Orders
dated March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005.

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On September 9, 2008, the CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that granting the
appeal would disturb the RTC Decision of May 16, 2005 which had long become final
executory. The CA further noted that petitioner failed to avail of the proper remedy to
question an interlocutory order. Likewise, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied by the CA.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT the ordinary Notice of Appeal is the proper petition to assail the
order of support pendente lite.

Ruling:

No.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate


special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong
remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner’s appeal was
correctly dismissed by the CA.

Rule 62- Interpleader


MARCELO A. MESINA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, in his capacity as Judge of
Regional Trial Court — Manila (Branch VIII), JOSE GO, and ALBERT
UY, respondents.

Facts:

Jose Go purchased from Associate Bank a Cashier’s Check, which he left on


top of the manager’s desk when left the bank. The bank manager then
had it kept for safekeeping by one of its employees. The employee was then in
conference with one Alexander Lim. He left the check in his desk
and upon his return, Lim and the check were gone. When Go inquired about his check,
the same couldn't be found and Go was advised to request for the stoppage of payment
which he did. He executed also an affidavit of loss as well as reported it to the police.

The bank then received the check twice for clearing. For these two times,
they dishonored the payment by saying that payment has been stopped.

After the second time, a lawyer contacted it demanding payment. He refused to


disclose the name of his client and threatened to sue. Later, the
name of Mesina was revealed. When asked by the police on how he possessed
the check, he said it was paid to him Lim. An information for theft was then filed against
Lim.

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A case of interpleader was filed by the bank and Go moved to participate


as intervenor in the complaint for damages. Mesina moved for the
dismissal of the case but was denied. The trial court ruled in the interpleader case
ordering the bank to replace the cashier’s check in favor of Go.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT the filing of an interpleader was proper in this case considering that
the party who filed the case had been earlier sued on the same case.

Ruling:

Yes.

It has been shown that the interpleader suit was filed by the respondent bank because
petitioner and Jose Go were both laying their claims on the check, petitioner asking
payment thereon and Jose Go as the purchaser or owner. Considering the facts and
circumstances, respondent bank merely took the necessary precaution not to make a
mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its proper remedy. The
allegation of petitioner that respondent bank had effectively relieved itself of its primary
liability under the check by simply filing a complaint for interpleader was belied by the
willingness of respondent bank to issue a certificate of time deposit in the amount of
Php800,000.00 representing the cashier’s check in question in the name of the Clerk of
Court of Manila to be awarded to whoever will be found by the court as validly entitled to
it.
---oo0oo---
|Gervacio, Melton Fredrick|
OCAMPO VS TIRONA , G.R. No.147812. April 6, 2005
Facts:
Ocampo bought a parcel of land from Rosauro Breton. Ocampo then possessed and
administer the subject land although the TCT is not yet in his name. Ocampo notified
Tirona, who was a lessee occupying a portion of the subject land, about the sale. Tirona
religiously paid her rents to Ocampo. However, when the subject premises were declared
under area for priority development, Tirona invoked her right to first refusal and refused
to pay her rent until the NHA processed her papers. Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer. In her Answer, Tirona‘s asserted that Dona Yaneza was the owner of the land
and not Ocampo. She likewise reiterated that she has the right of first refusal over the
land as it was included in the area of priority development under PD 1517. The MTC ruled
in favor of Ocampo.
In the RTC, Tirona changed her theory and disclosed that Alipio Breton is the registered
owner of the subject land. When Alipio Breton died, his children, Rosauro Breton and

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Maria Lourdes Breton Mendiola, inherited the subject land. Tirona claims she has never
stopped paying her rent to Maria Lourdes. Tirona also stated that Rosauro could not
transfer ownership to the subject land to Ocampo because Rosauro executed a deed of
conveyance and waiver in favor of Maria Lourdes. The RTC affirmed the decision of the
MTC.
The CA considered partition of the estate of Alipio Breton as a prerequisite to Ocampo’s
action; hence, it dismissed the case.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for interpleader is proper in this case
Ruling:
Yes. Tirona should have filed an interpleader and need not wait for the actual filing of a
suit by petitioner against her. The action is proper when a lessee does not know who to
pay to the rentals due to conflicting claims in the subject property.
This remedy is afforded not to protect anyone against double liabilities but to protect him
against double vexation with respect to one's liability.
When a court orders that claimants litigate among themselves there arises a new action.
The pleading which initiates the action is referred to as the complaint of interpleader and
not a cross-complaint.
---oo0oo---
Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club vs. Whether or not, G.R. No. L-23851, March 26,
1976
Facts:
Wack Wack Golf and Country Club filed a complaint for interpleader against Whether or
not and Tan who both claim ownership over membership fee certificate 201. Whether or
not claims its ownership stemming from a decision rendered in Civil Case 26044 entitled
"Lee E. Whether or not alias Ramon Lee vs. Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc."
Meanwhile, Tan claims ownership from the assignment made by the alleged true owner
of the same certificate. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of res
judicata by reason of the previous civil case that issued Whether or not the right to the
certificate. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Was the remedy of interpleader proper and timely?
Ruling:
It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a position to ask for an
order of interpleader, he must be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he

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has not become independently liable to any of the claimants. Indeed, if a stakeholder
defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed to
final judgment against him, he cannot later on have that part of the litigation repeated in
an interpleader suit.
A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an
interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants,
as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.
In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already
been made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application
for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said
civil case; the appellee Lee had already established his rights to membership fee
certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and therefore, this interpleader suit would compel
him to establish his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations,
which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possibility that the benefits
of the final judgment in the said civil case might eventually be taken away from him; and
because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said case, its
action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches
or unreasonable delay.
---oo0oo---
MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS PEDRO TANJUATCO G.R. No. L-
26443 MARCH 25, 1969
Facts:
Makati Development Corporation, MDC for brevity, and Tanjuatco entered into a contract
where Tanjuatco bound himself to construct a reinforced concrete covered water reservoir
at Forbes Park furnishing the materials necessary. Before making the final payment of
consideration, MDC inquired from the suppliers of materials, who had called its attention
to unpaid bills of Tanjuatco, whether Tanjuatco had settled his accounts with them.
Concrete Aggregate (supplier) answered by making a claim of P5,198 representing the
cost of transit-mixed concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco. With Tanjuatco’s consent,
MDC withheld the same amount from the final payment made to the former. MDC then
filed an action against Tanjuatco and the Supplier to compel them to interplead their
conflicting claims. Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the court had
no jurisdiction because the amount involved less than P10K. The lower court granted the
Motion to dismiss. Hence this appeal. MDC claims that the subject matter of the litigation
is not the 5K sum but the right to compel to litigate among themselves in order to protect
MDC against a double vexation in respect to one liability.
Issue:
Is MDC’s contention correct?

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Ruling:
We find no merit in this contention. There is no question in this case that plaintiff may
compel the defendants to interplead among themselves, concerning the aforementioned
sum of P5,198.75. The only issue is who among the defendants is entitled to collect the
same. This is the object of the action, which is not within the jurisdiction of the lower court.
The latter relies upon Rule 63(Now rule 62 on Interpleader) prescribing the procedure in
cases of interpleading. This fact does not warrant, however, the conclusion drawn
therefrom by plaintiff therein. To begin with, jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-
matter of justiciable controversies is governed by RA 296(Now BP129).
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed.
---oo0oo---

|Golgota, Glenn|
URSULA MAGLENTE, et. al. Petitioners, v. HON. PRISCILLA PADILLA,
Respondents. G.R. NO. 148182 : March 7, 2007
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, dated April 20, 2001,
denying petitioners' motion for the issuance of a writ of possession in their favor.
Facts:
On January 1985, Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC), owner of parcel of land entered
into a contract of lease for three years with one of the petitioners, Ursula Maglente. In the
contract, Maglente would be given the first priority (right of first refusal) to buy it. However,
after the execution of the lease contract, petitioner Maglente subleased portions of the
property to respondents.
When the lease contract was about to expire, PRC sent a written offer to sell the leased
property to Maglente. In response, the latter intimated that she would exercise her right
of first refusal to purchase the property with co-petitioners as her co-buyers. In February
1989, PRC received a letter from respondents expressing their desire to purchase the
same property.
On February 1989, PRC filed a complaint for interpleader in the RTC against both
petitioners and respondents so they could litigate among themselves on who had the right
to purchase the property. On March 11, 1991, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners
and declared them as the rightful parties to purchase PRC's property.
Dissatisfied with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

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Undaunted, respondents found their way to this Court, assigning as sole error the ruling
of the CA upholding the right of petitioners.
In the case under consideration, the contract of sale was already perfected. Thus, there
was already an offer and acceptance giving rise to a valid contract. On April 11, 2000, we
ordered entry of judgment.

As ordered, PRC executed a "deed of sale" in favor of petitioners. The latter then filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession but respondents (who were occupying the
property) objected on the ground that the trial court's decision on the interpleader case
merely resolved petitioners' right to purchase the leased property but did not declare them
as the owners entitled to possession.
Issue:
Whether or not they are entitled to a writ of possession after being adjudged (in the
interpleader case) as the proper parties to buy the subject property, considering that a
"deed of sale" has already been executed in their favor.
Ruling:
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration
proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial
foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party
has intervened, and (4) execution sales. Here, petitioners seek the writ as a consequence
of the trial court's decision ordering the execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in
their favor. The writ does not lie in such a case.
Furthermore, the trial court's decision in the interpleader case (affirmed by both the CA
and the SC) merely resolved the question of who, between petitioners and respondents,
had the right to purchase PRC's property. The directive was only for PRC to execute the
necessary contract in favor of petitioners as the winning parties, nothing else.
It was clear that, at that point, petitioners were not yet the owners of the property. The
execution of the "deed of sale" in their favor was only preliminary to their eventual
acquisition of the property. Pending the execution of the deed of sale or delivery of the
property, ownership had yet to transfer to them at that time.
A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the right of possession
or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to either. The
interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.
We thus cannot fault the trial court for refusing to issue a writ of possession to petitioners
as its issuance would not be in conformity with the trial court's judgment in the interpleader
case.

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WHEREFORE, the assailed order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, is
hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED.
---oo0oo---
ANGELES S. SANTOS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. PATERIO AQUINO, et.
al., Respondents-Appellees. G.R. No. L-5101. November 28, 1953

This action purports to obtain a declaratory relief but the prayer of the petition seeks to
have Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946, and Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, of the
Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, declared null and void.
Facts:
The petitioner is the manager of a theater known as "Cine Concepción," located and
operated in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, and the respondents are the
Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Council and the Municipal Treasurer, of Malabon.
The petitioner avers Ordinance No. 61, adopted by the Municipal Council of Malabon,
which imposes a license tax of P1,000 per annum on the said theater in addition to a
license tax on all tickets sold in theaters and cinemas, and Ordinance No. 10, imposing a
graduated municipal license tax on theaters and cinematographs from P200 to P9,000
per annum and that ordinances was submitted for approval to the Department of Finance,
which reduced the rate of taxes provided therein, and the ordinance with the reduced rate
of taxes was approved; and that notice of reduction of the tax rate and approval by the
Department of Finance of said graduated municipal license tax, was served on the
petitioner.
That Ordinance No. 61, is ultra vires and repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution
on taxation; that its approval was not in accordance with law; that Ordinance No. 10, is
also null and void, because the Department of Finance that approved it acted in excess
and against the powers granted it by law, and is unjust, oppressive and confiscatory; and
that the adoption of both ordinances was the result of persecution of the petitioner by the
respondents because from 20 July 1946 to 8 December 1947, or within a period of less
than one and a half years, the Municipal Council of Malabon adopted ordinances
increasing the taxes on cinematographs and theaters and imposing a penalty of 20 per
cent surcharge for late payment.
Petitioner had filed a protest with the Secretary of Finance against such increase of taxes,
but the Department of Finance upheld the legality thereof; and that the petitioner brought
this action for declaratory relief with the evident purpose of evading payment of the unpaid
balance of taxes due from the "Cine Concepción.
Issue:

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Whether or not the remedy of declaratory relief filed by the petitioner will be entertained
by the court.
Ruling:
This is not an action for declaratory relief, because the terms of the ordinances assailed
are not ambiguous or of doubtful meaning which require a construction thereof by the
Court. And granting that the validity or legality of an ordinance may be drawn in question
in an action for declaratory relief, such relief must be asked before a violation of the
ordinance be committed. When this action was brought on 12 May 1949, payment of the
municipal license taxes imposed by both ordinances, the tax rate of the last having been
reduced by the Department of Finance, was already due, and the prayer of the petition
shows that the petitioner had not paid them. In those circumstances the petitioner cannot
bring an action for declaratory relief.
The action is not for declaratory relief if the terms of the ordinances assailed are not
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning which require a construction thereof by the Court.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the Appellant.
---oo0oo---
BENJAMIN P. GOMEZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, et. al,
respondent-appellants. G.R. No. L-23645 October 29, 1968
Facts:
This appeal puts in issue the constitutionality of Republic Act 1635, as amended by
Republic Act 2631 intended to help raise funds for the Philippine Tuberculosis Society.
The Director of Posts shall order for the period from August 19 to September 30 every
year the printing and issue of semi-postal stamps of different denominations with face
value showing the regular postage charge plus the additional amount of five centavos for
the said purpose, and during the said period, no mail matter shall be accepted in the mails
unless it bears such semi-postal stamps. The additional proceeds realized from the sale
of the semi-postal stamps shall constitute a special fund and to be expended by the
Philippine Tuberculosis Society in carrying out its noble work to prevent and eradicate
tuberculosis.
The respondent Postmaster General, in implementation of the law, thereafter issued four
(4) administrative orders.
On September l5, 1963 the petitioner Benjamin P. Gomez mailed a letter at the post office
in San Fernando, Pampanga. This letter did not bear the special anti-TB stamp required
by the statute, it was returned to the petitioner.
In view of this development, the petitioner brough suit for declaratory relief in the CFI of
Pampanga, to test the constitutionality of the statute, as well as the implementing
administrative orders issued, contending that it violates the equal protection clause of the

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Constitution as well as the rule of uniformity and equality of taxation. The lower court
declared the statute and the orders unconstitutional; hence this appeal by the respondent
postal authorities.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s choice of remedy for declaratory relief is correct despite
the fact that the breach or violation of statute has already been committed.

Ruling:
While conceding that the mailing by the petitioner of a letter without the additional anti-TB
stamp was a violation of Republic Act 1635, the trial court nevertheless refused to dismiss
the action on the ground that under section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, "If before
the final termination of the case a breach or violation of ... a statute ... should take place,
the action may thereupon be converted into an ordinary action."
The prime specification of an action for declaratory relief is that it must be brought "before
breach or violation" of the statute has been committed. Section 6 of the same rule, which
allows the court to treat an action for declaratory relief as an ordinary action, applies only
if the breach or violation occurs after the filing of the action but before the termination
thereof.
Hence, if, as the trial court itself admitted, there had been a breach of the statute before
the filing of this action, then indeed the remedy of declaratory relief cannot be availed of,
much less can the suit be converted into an ordinary action.
Nevertheless, we are of the view that the petitioner's choice of remedy is correct because
this suit was filed not only with respect to the letter which he mailed on September 15,
1963, but also with regard to any other mail that he might send in the future. Thus, be it
noted, in his complaint, the petitioner prayed that due course be given to "other mails
without the semi-postal stamps which he may deliver for mailing ... if any, during the
period covered by Republic Act 1635, as well as other mails hereafter to be sent by or to
other mailers which bear the required postage, without collection of additional charge of
five centavos prescribed by the same Republic Act."
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
---oo0oo---
|Granados, Brian Steve|
Almeda vs Bathala Marketing industries, Inc. G.R. No. 150806
Facts:

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Sometime in May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee,


represented by its president Ramon H. Garcia, renewed its Contract of Lease[4] with
Ponciano L. Almeda (Ponciano), as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of
petitioner Romel Almeda. Under the said contract, Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of
the Almeda Compound, located at 2208 Pasong Tamo Street, Makati City, consisting of
7,348.25 square meters, for a monthly rental of P1,107,348.69, for a term of four (4) years
from May 1, 1997 unless sooner terminated as provided in the contract.
On January 26, 1998, respondent received another letter from petitioners informing the
former that its monthly rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of
the contract and Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Respondent opposed petitioners demand
and insisted that there was no extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article
1250 in light of the pronouncement of this Court in various cases.
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by petitioners but
continued to pay the stipulated amount set forth in their contract.
On February 18, 1998, respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes
of determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to
prevent damage and prejudice. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-411 before
the RTC of Makati.
Petitioners later moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief case for being an
improper remedy considering that respondent was already in breach of the obligation and
that the case would not end the litigation and settle the rights of the parties. The trial court,
however, was not persuaded, and consequently, denied the motion.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER SINCE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE WAS IN BREACH WHEN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
WAS FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.
Ruling:
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may
be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified,
as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.
Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1)
the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said
documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there

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must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual
justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between persons whose interests are
adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that
petitioners insist that respondent was already in breach of the contract when the petition
was filed.

After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed,
respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by
paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to
petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that
respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus,
respondent is not barred from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory
relief.
---oo0oo---
Delumen vs Republic, G.R. No. L-5552, January 28, 1954
Facts:
On October 9, 1951, Antonio, Juan and Julito, surnamed Delumen, filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance of Samar, alleging that they are legitimate children of Pacencia
Pua, a Filipino woman, and Mariano Delumen who was declared a Filipino citizen by the
same court in an order dated August 7, 1950, and praying said court to determine whether
they are Filipino citizens and to declare their corresponding rights and duties. It is further
alleged in the petition that the petitioners have continuously resided in the Philippines
since their birth, have considered themselves as Filipinos, had exercised the right to vote
in the general elections of 1946 and 1947, and were registered voters for the elections in
1951. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed an answer
alleging that the petition states no cause of action, there being no adverse party against
whom the petitioners have an actual or justiciable controversy. After hearing, the Court of
First Instance of Samar rendered a decision declaring the appellees to be Filipinos by
birth and blood. From this decision the Solicitor General has appealed.
Under the first assignment of error, the appellant cites our decision in Hilarion C. Tolentino
vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al.* G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951, wherein we
held that: "A petition for declaratory relief must be predicated on the following requisites:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interest are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial
determination.”

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Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECLARATORY RELIEF GRANTED BY THE CFI TO THE
PETITIONER IS CORRECT
Ruling:
No, it becomes unnecessary to discuss either the second contention of the Solicitor
General that the trial court erred in holding that the petition for declaratory relief may be
utilized to obtain a judicial pronouncement as to appellees' citizenship, or his third
contention that the evidence does not support the conclusion in the appealed decision
that the appellees are Filipino citizens.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and the petition dismissed without
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
---oo0oo---

TEODORO TANDA vs. NARCISO N. ALDAYA, G.R. Nos. L-9322-23, January 30,
1956.
Facts:
On April 10, 1948, Appellant instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cavite an action
for the annulment of a certain contract of sale with pacto de retro (Civil Case No. 4606).
On May 11, 1949, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the contract valid and
absolving Appellee of the complaint. After a motion to set aside judgment and a motion
for new trial filed by Appellant were denied by the trial court, Appellant brought the case
on appeal to the Supreme Court. On July 23, 1951, the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision appealed from particularly with regard to the validity of the contract which is
disputed by Appellant. After the two motions for reconsideration filed by Appellant were
denied, the decision became final and executory and the record was returned to the court
of origin; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut, on November 8, 1951, Appellant initiated the
present case for declaratory relief. Considering that this action is purposeless because,
while outwardly its aim is to seek a declaratory relief on certain matters but in effect its
purpose is to nullify the judgment rendered in the previous case (Civil Case No. 4606)
which was affirmed by the Supreme Court (G. R. No. L-3278), * Appellee filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the case states no cause of action. In the meantime,
Appellee moved to withdraw the original of Title No. 114 which was presented in the case
as evidence in order that his ownership may be consolidated and a new title issued in his
name it appearing that case has been finally terminated (Civil Case No. 4606). The trial
court, acting on the two motions, entered an order on June 12, 1953 granting the motion
to dismiss and allowing the withdrawal of the original title as already adverted to in the
early part of this decision.

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The purpose of the case which gave rise to the present appeal is avowedly for declaratory
relief instituted under Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court which provides that “Any
person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his
rights or duties thereunder.” And, it is claimed, this case comes under its purview because
its purpose is to obtain a clarification of the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-3278
which in the opinion of Appellant, is vague and susceptible of double interpretation.
Appellant contends that the words “other written instrument” should be interpreted as
including a court decision regardless of whether it is final in character or otherwise.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT DECLARATORY RELIEF GRANTED BY THE LOWER COURTS
CORRECT?
Ruling:
Yes, The Supreme Court held in favour of the decisions of the lower courts, With regard
to the portion of the order which allows the withdrawal of the original certificate of title in
order that the Register of Deeds may effect the consolidation of ownership and issuance
of a new title in favor of Appellee as requested, we do not also find any justification for its
reversal, as we are urged, it appearing that the decision in the original case (Civil Case
No. 466) has become final and executory and no further step need be taken therein
affecting the equities of the parties. The case is closed and no reason is seen why the
evidence that has been presented cannot be withdrawn.
Finding no merit in this appeal, we hereby affirm the order appealed from, with costs
against Appellant.
---oo0oo---
|Guino, Aishell|
Monetary Board vs. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 189571
Facts:
Philippine Veterans Bank established a pension loan product for bona fide veterans or
their surviving spouses, as well as salary loan product for teachers and low-salaried
employees pursuant to its mandate under Republic Act (RA) Nos. 3518 and 7169 to
provide financial assistance to veterans and teachers. As these clientele usually do not
have security to cover their pension or salary loan, other than their continuing good health
and/or employment, respondent devised a program by charging a premium in the form of
a higher fee known as Credit Redemption Fund (CRF) from said borrowers. Resultantly,
Special Trust Funds were established by respondent for the pension loans of the veteran-
borrowers, salary loans of teachers and low-salaried employees. These trust funds were,

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in turn, managed by respondent's Trust and Investment Department, with respondent as


beneficiary. The fees charged against the borrowers were credited to the respective trust
funds, which would be used to fully pay the outstanding obligation of the borrowers in
case of death.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) found that respondent's collection of CRF violated
Section 54 of RA No. 8791 which states that banks shall not directly engage in insurance.
Thus, it wrote PVB justifying the existence of the CRF and that it should be discontinued.
PVB then stopped collecting the fees.
The Monetary Board issued Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 1139 directing
respondent's Trust and Investment Department to return to the borrowers all the balances
of the CRF and to preserve the records of borrowers who were deducted CRFs from their
loan proceeds pending resolution or ruling of the Office of the General Counsel of the
BSP. The BSP denied PVB’s request for reconsideration, hence it filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Makati City.
In response, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the petition for declaratory
relief cannot prosper due to respondent's prior breach of Section 54 of RA No. 8791. The
RTC dismissed petition for declaratory relief ruling that the issue of whether or not
petitioner violated the foregoing law can only be fittingly resolved thru an ordinary action.
For which reason, the Court has no recourse but to put an end to this case.
Almost a year later, respondent filed a Motion to Admit its Motion for Reconsideration
against said order alleging that it did not receive a copy thereof until September 3, 2008.
Petitioners opposed said motion on the ground that per Certification of the Philippine
Postal Office, an official copy of the RTC's Order was duly served and received by
respondent on October 17, 2007.
The RTC ruling on the motion for reconsideration reversed itself and ruled that the
collection of CRF by PVB did not constitute engaging in the issuance business as an
insurer, hence, not a violation of Sec 54 of RA 8791. Accordingly, it declared the Monetary
Board Resolution No. 1189 null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper.
Ruling:
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may
be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute.
In the same manner that court decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a petition for
declaratory relief, decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot be subjects of a petition for
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declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either
on questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies provided by the Rules
of Court. (CJH Dev’t. Corp. vs BIR)
The decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject matter for a petition
for declaratory relief since it was issued by the BSP Monetary Board in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial powers or functions.
A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of government other than a court and other
than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule-making. The very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with
quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to
administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative
agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies
which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. A "quasi-judicial function" is a term
which applies to the action, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who
are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and
draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion
of a judicial nature.
Lastly, also worth noting is the fact that the court a quo's Order dated September 24,
2007, which dismissed respondent's petition for declaratory relief, had long become final
and executory.
---oo0oo---

Rule 64- Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions


of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 162731-32
Facts:
This case was originally an urgent petition ad cautelam praying, among others, for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate.
On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a resolution in GR No. 104704. The above mentioned
resolution was received by respondent COMELEC on May 6, 1992 and on the same day,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to disseminate through the fastest available means and
order said Election Officials to delete the name Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified
list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and count all votes in favor of Fransisco I.
Chavez. But petitioner assailed that COMELEC failed to perform its mandatory function
thus the name of Melchor Chavez remained undeleted.
Petitioner prays not only for a restraining order but the judgment be rendered requiring
the COMELEC to reopen the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces including

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Metro Manila, scan the ballots for “Chavez” votes which were invalidated or declared stray
and credit said scanned “Chavez” votes in favor of petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition.
Ruling:
It is quite obvious that petitioner’s prayer does not call for the correction of “manifest
errors” in the certificates of canvass or election returns before the COMELEC but for the
ballots contained therein. Indeed, petitioner has not even pointed to any “manifest error”
in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being
none, petitioners proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the
constitution and the Omnibus Election code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral
Tribunal.
Thus, Sec. 17 Art. Vl of the constitution provides that “the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members…”
(Emphasis supplied). The word sole underscores the exclusivity of the tribunal’s
jurisdiction over election contest relating to their respective members. It is therefore
crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the
Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of
petitioner relating to the election of a member of the Senate.
As the authenticity of the certificates of canvass or election returns are not questioned,
they must be prima facie considered valid for purposes of canvassing the same and
proclamation of the winning candidates.
Premises considered, the Court resolved to dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.
---oo0oo---
TEODORO JUMAMIL VS. COMELEC G.R. NOS. 167989-93
Facts:
Petitioner Jumamil and private respondent Purog both ran as candidates for the position
of Mayor of the Municipality of Victoria, Northern Samar, during the 10 May 2004
synchronized national and local elections. Petitioner Centino and private respondent
Verde were vice mayoralty candidates therein; whilst petitioners Castillo, Millano and
Francisco and private respondents Aliluyah, Medice, Subiaga and Aucente all ran for slots
as Board Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Victoria, Northern Samar.
On 11 August 2004, private respondents Purog, et al., were all proclaimed the winning
candidates in the respective positions they ran for. Contending an assortment of election
anomalies, irregularities and fraud alleged to have been committed by respondents

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Purog, et al., petitioners Jumamil, et al., individually filed election protest cases on 24
August 2004, which were later on consolidated, before the RTC of Allen, Northern Samar,
Branch 23, docketed as EPC Nos. A-82 to A-86. Therein complainants cast doubt on the
results of the just concluded elections, particularly respecting 7 out of the 36 functioning
precincts in the subject municipality.
Private respondents Purog, et al., moved for the dismissal of the cases. They included in
their Answer with Affirmative Defense and Counter-Protest/Counter-Claim a prayer for
the conduct of a hearing and pre-trial prior to the commencement of the revision process.
On 9 November 2004, the RTC issued a Resolution basically denying the motion to have
the cases dismissed for lack of cause of action as well as the prayer that a hearing or pre-
trial be required before the revision of the challenged ballots. Their Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the RTC for being bereft of merit and almost a rehash of
the previous pleading filed by protestees' counsel. Revision of ballots should continue as
hereby ordered until ordered otherwise.
Private respondents Purog, et al., elevated to the COMELEC, via a Petition for Certiorari,
the denial of their motion to dismiss and to conduct hearing, as well as pre-trial, prior to
the commencement of the revision of the ballots. They likewise asked for the issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
order to suspend the revision proceedings ordered by the RTC.
On 13 November 2006, public respondent COMELEC filed its Comment that the assailed
Order is not the kind contemplated by Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that:
“A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.”
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition filed.
Ruling:
In the case of Ambil v. COMELEC, the Court took great pains to elucidate the meaning
of "final order or resolution" contemplated by the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court.
The Court ruled that for a decision to be elevated to the Supreme Court, it must be a final
decision or resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, not of a division. Section 7 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides that a decision, order or ruling of COMELEC may be
elevated to the Supreme Court on certiorari by an aggrieved party. Final order or
resolution interpreted to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The Supreme Court

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has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a
Division of the COMELEC.
The instant case was resolved to DISMISS the consolidated Petitions for Certiorari for
utter lack of merit, over and above the fact that they have already become moot. No costs.
---oo0oo---
|Ilao, Joemarl|
NOEL Y. REPOL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VIOLETO CERACAS,
G.R. No. 161418. April 28, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Repol and private respondent Violeto Ceracas (Ceracas) were candidates for
Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar . Ceracas was proclaimed as the duly elected
mayor with 66 votes more than Repol. The petitioner herein filed an election protest before
the Regional Trial Court of Tarangnan, Samar. Claiming that fraud and other irregularities
marred the elections in Precincts 3A, 5A and 71. Repol prayed for revision of the ballots
in these precincts. Judge Francisco Mazo dismissed the election protest.
However, on certiorari, the COMELEC First Division reversed the dismissal order of
Judge Mazo in a Resolution for being issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC First Division directed the trial court to reinstate the
subject election protest, conduct the revision of ballots from the protested precincts and
render its Decision with immediate dispatch.
The COMELEC en banc denied Ceracass motion to reconsider the Resolution dated 22
May 2002. The COMELEC en banc affirmed in toto the reinstatement of Repols election
protest. This time around, trial and revision of the ballots ensued with Judge Roberto A.
Navidad presiding.
After a very careful study and meticulous and painstaking appraisal of the contested
ballots, the Court found and held that the cheating and commission of various frauds and
irregularities in these three contested precincts was massive, used many people to fill up
the ballots including the voters, connivance with those perpetrating the fraud and the
members of the Board of Election Inspectors, thus, on 30 December 2003, the trial court

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declared Ceracass proclamation void and proclaimed Repol the duly elected mayor of
Pagsanghan, Samar in the May 2001 elections with a majority of 77 votes.
Repol filed before the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court
granted Repols motion and issued a writ of execution. Meanwhile, Ceracas appealed the
trial courts judgment to the COMELEC.
Repol took his oath of office as the duly elected mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar. On the
same date, Ceracas filed before the trial court an omnibus motion to reconsider, set aside
and quash the writ of execution.
During the pendency of Ceracass appeal with the COMELEC and without waiting for the
trial court to resolve his omnibus motion, Ceracas filed with the COMELEC a Petition for
Certiorari (with prayer for temporary restraining order, writ of preliminary injunction and/or
status quo ante) assailing the writ of execution. The COMELEC First Division issued the
assailed Order directing the parties to maintain the Status Quo Ante filed by Petitioner
Ceracas through counsel, the Commission (First Division) directs respondents to file their
Answer within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
The COMELEC contended that in the interest of justice so as not to render the issues
moot and academic, directed the parties to maintain Status Quo Ante, and ordered Noel
Repol, to cease and desist from assuming the duties and functions of Municipal Mayor of
Pagsanghan, Western Samar until further orders from this Commission. In the meantime,
petitioner Violeto Ceracas shall assume the post of Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan,
Western Samar .
The Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar and the Provincial Director of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), Catbalogan, Samar, was directed to immediately implement the
Order and make a return of service within five (5) days from the implementation thereof.
The Clerk of Commission was directed to serve a copy of this Order together with a copy
of the Petition to each of the respondents.
In the hearing for the application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction prayed for, both
parties argued on their respective legal positions and was given five (5) days to file their
respective memoranda on the issue of whether this Commission can resolve on the
Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction despite the pendency of the said petition.
Hence, the instant petition.

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Issues:
Whether the COMELEC is empowered under any statute, rule, or jurisprudence to issue
a status quo ante in effect overturning the effective enforcement of the writ of execution
issued by the trial court and suspending indefinitely, without prior notice and hearing, the
implementation of such writ.
Ruling:
Validity of the Status Quo Ante Order
The main issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the COMELEC First Division
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the status quo ante Order which effectively overturned the trial courts grant of execution
pending appeal in Repols favor. This issue is not mooted even if the next elections are
just a few weeks away. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our
democratic government. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone
a task that could well crop up again in future elections.
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
First. Rule 30 of the 1993 COMELEC Rule of Procedure provides the metes and bounds
on the COMELECs power to issue injunctive relief as follows:
SECTION 1. Preliminary Injunction. - The Commission or any of its Divisions may grant
preliminary injunction in any ordinary action, special action, special case, or special relief
pending before it.
SECTION 2. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction
may be granted at any time after the commencement of an action or proceeding and
before judgment when it is established that:
(a) The petitioner or protestant is entitled to the relief demanded and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained
of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually.
(b) The commission or continuance of some act complained of during the pendency of
the action or the non-performance thereof would work injustice to the petitioner or
protestant.

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(c) The respondent or protestee is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring to


be done, some act in violation of petitioners/protestants rights respecting the subject of
the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
SECTION 3. Grant of injunction discretionary. -
The grant of the preliminary injunction is entirely left to the sound discretion of the
Commission or its Divisions.
SECTION 4. Bond for preliminary injunction. -
No writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued unless the applicant shall file a bond, in
an amount to be fixed by the Commission or the Division concerned, to the effect that the
petitioner/protestant will pay to such party all damages which the latter may sustain by
reason of the injunction if the Commission or the Division concerned shall finally decide
that the petitioner/protestant was not entitled thereto.
SECTION 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; issuance of restraining
order. -
No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the adverse party. If it shall
appear from the facts shown by affidavits or the verified petition that great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the
Commission or any Division to which the application for preliminary injunction was made,
may issue a restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty days from date of
its issuance. Within the said twenty-day period, the Commission or the Division, as the
case may be, must cause an order to be served on the respondent requiring him to show
cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, and
determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
granted and shall accordingly issue the corresponding order. In the event that the
application for preliminary injunction is denied, the restraining order is deemed
automatically vacated.
A cursory reading of the Order dated 12 January 2004 or the so-called status quo ante
Order reveals that it was actually a temporary restraining order. It ordered Repol to cease
and desist from assuming the position of municipal mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar and
directed Ceracas to assume the post in the meantime.

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The status quo ante Order had a life span of more than 20 days since the directive was
qualified by the phrase until further orders from this Commission. This violates the rule
that a temporary retraining order has an effective period of only 20 days and automatically
expires upon the COMELECs denial of the preliminary injunction. Thus, the status quo
ante Order automatically ceased to have any effect after the COMELEC First Division
did not issue a writ of preliminary injunction.
While the hearing on Ceracass application for a writ of preliminary injunction was held,
the COMELEC First Division failed to resolve the application. Instead, it issued an Order
directing the parties to file their memoranda on their respective positions on the life span
of status quo ante orders and whether a writ of preliminary injunction should be granted
in the case. Clearly, the COMELEC First Divisions in deciding on the matter not only
worked injustice to Repol but also failed to dispel the uncertainty beclouding the real
choice of the electorate for municipal mayor.
Second . The decision of the trial court in Election Case No. T-001 was rendered on 30
December 2003, or after almost one year of trial and revision of the questioned ballots. It
found Repol as the candidate with the plurality of votes. The grant of execution pending
appeal was well within the discretionary powers of the trial court. In the recent case of
Edgar Y. Santos v. Commission on Elections (First Division) and Pedro Q. Panulaya , we
ruled:
Between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates Whether or not the
elections and the finding of the Board of Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the
courts decision that should prevail.
All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending
appeal was that the immediate execution should be based upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order. The rationale why such execution is allowed in election cases
is, to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judges decision as that which is
initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers.
To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would, bring
back the ghost of the grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest techniques so often
resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an
elective office. This would, as a consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate.

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Applying Santos to this petition, the court held that the COMELEC First Division
committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the trial courts order granting
execution pending appeal.
Ceracas was Guilty of Forum Shopping
We must point out that Ceracas is guilty of forum-shopping. At the time he instituted SPR
Case No. 1-2004 with the COMELEC, he had a pending omnibus motion to reconsider,
set aside and quash the writ of execution with the trial court. In addition, Ceracass appeal
of the trial courts adverse decision was also pending before the COMELEC. Forum
shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another
forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari . It may also be the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
Due to a clear showing that Ceracas was forum-shopping, the COMELEC First Division,
should have dismissed outright instead of giving due course to Ceracass petition in SPR
No. 1-2004.
---oo0oo---
Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 20578, January 21, 2015
Facts:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six
feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring
to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin
is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote”
and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or
“(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as
the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as
comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for
the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but
were not candidates for that election.
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Issues:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Courtʼs power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitionersʼ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitionersʼ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

Ruling:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted
to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even
assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right
to expression. Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an
issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the
existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the
body to the scrutiny and review of this court. In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the
utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged
demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question
brings.

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SECOND ISSUE: No.


The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper
in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the
controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something
had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of
government before a court may come into the picture.” Petitionersʼ exercise of their right
to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance
especially during the elections. COMELECʼs letter threatening the filing of the election
offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitionersʼ speech. In the
context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested
in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that
they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates.
Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to
regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a
non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizenʼs expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection. Moreover, the respondentʼs argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitionersʼ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH
Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water. The Court held that while the
tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not
paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-
list group. By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the
other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than
propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

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Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter


of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech. The
Court held that the regulation involved at bar is contentbased. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its
medium. Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court
has used the clear and present danger rule as measure. Under this rule, “the evil
consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high.ʼ” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present
danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.” Even with the clear and present danger
test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial
state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the
right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of
non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the
tarpaulin does not affect anyone elseʼs constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise
protected by the
Constitution. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of
private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights
is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws. The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates
where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the
citizenʼs private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of
law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon
this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law
does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious
speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not
religious speech.
Important Points of the Amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the Rules of Court

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Researched by Joemarl Ilao

Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts)


* Under the former provision, no appeal may be taken from “[a]n order denying a motion
for new trial or reconsideration.” This was already removed in the amendment. In Neypes
vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 141524, 14 September 2005) the SC noted that to
“standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.” The
SC also stated that “henceforth, this ‘fresh period ruleʼ shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42
on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.”

Rule 45 (Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court)


* Section 1 of Rule 45 was amended to include the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in the list
of courts from which an appeal may be taken directly to the SC. The previous mode of
appeal from a CTA decision is to the Court of Appeals (CA), through Rule 43. This is no
longer the case since the CTA is of the same rank as the CA. Republic Act No. 9282
(2004) provides that the CTA “shall be of the same level as the Court of Appeals.”
* Section 1 now provides that the “petition may include an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies” and that “[t]he petitioner may seek
the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding
at any time during its pendency.”

Rule 58 (Preliminary Injunction)


* The following provision had been added to Section 5 of Rule 58: “The trial court, the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Tax Appeals that issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against a lower court, board, officer, or quasi-judicial agency shall
decide the main case or petition within six (6) months from the issuance of the writ.”
* Before the amendment, the language used with respect to the effectivity for a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) issued by lower courts is 20 days (or 60 days when issued by

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the CA) “from notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined.” The amendment uses
“service,” instead of “notice.”
---oo0oo---

Rule 65- Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus


* The Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari “shall be filed in the Supreme
Court or xxx.” The amendment removed the SC form the enumeration of courts where
the petition may be filed (Section 4). This amendment, however, does not mean that no
petition for certiorari may be filed with the SC, as the Constitution (Sec. 5, Article VIII)
explicitly provides that the SC has original jurisdiction over “petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.”
* The amendment also removed the provision on extension of time to file the petition. This
provision is no longer existent: “No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted
except for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.”
* The amendment added this provision in Sec. 4: “In election cases involving an act or an
omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with
the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.”
* The amendment also added this provision in Sec. 7 (“Expediting proceedings; injunctive
relief”): “The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days
from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public
respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative
charge.”
* The old provision in Sec. 8 (“Proceedings after comment is filed”) provides that “the
court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.” The amendment provides for additional sanctions in case of abuse of the
process, thus: “In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs
solidarily against the petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to
administrative sanctions under Rules 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court.” This is a clear
warning on parties and their counsels.
* Such warning is made even clearer with the addition of this provision, also in Sec. 8:
“The Court may impose motu proprio, based on res ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary
sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions
for certiorari.”
---oo0oo---
|Maat, Butch|

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ELSIE S. CAUSING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERNAN D.


BIRON, SR., respondents. G.R. No. 199139. September 9, 2014.
Facts:
Elsie S. Causing was a Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo Iloilo, since January
1993. On May 28, 2010, Mayor Hernan D. Biron Sr. ordered Causing to be detailed at the
Office of the Municipal Mayor. The purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to
closely supervise the performance of her functions after complaints regarding her
negative behavior in dealing with her co-employees and with the public transacting
business in her office had been received. Furthermore, Causing was not being stripped
of her functions as the Municipal Civil Registrar; that she was not transferred or detailed
to another office in order to perform a different function; and that she was not demoted to
a lower position that diminished her salary and other benefits.
In view of the foregoing issuances by Mayor Biron, Causing filed the complaint-affidavit
dated June 8, 2010 in the Office of the Regional Election Director, Region VI, in Iloilo City,
claiming that Office Order No. 12 dated May 28, 2010 issued by Mayor Biron ordering her
detail to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the election period and
without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and violative of Section 1,
Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with Section 6(B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737,
Series of 2009,
Issue:
Whether or not the relocation of the petitioner by respondent Municipal Mayor during the
election period from her office as the Local Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor just
a few steps away constituted a prohibited act under the Omnibus Election Code and the
relevant Resolution of the Commission on Elections.
Ruling:
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution states that unless otherwise provided by the
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy
thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court (1997) contains a separate rule (Rule 64) on
the review of the decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Rule 64 is
generally identical with certiorari under Rule 65, except as to the period of the filing of the
petition for certiorari, that is, in the former, the period is 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed but, in the latter, not later than
60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution assailed.
The well-established rule is that the motion for reconsideration is an indispensable
condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The filing of the motion for reconsideration before the resort
to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the public respondent the opportunity to correct
any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of reexamination of the legal and factual
aspects of the case. The rule is not absolute, however, considering that jurisprudence

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has laid down exceptions to the requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari without
first filing a motion for reconsideration, namely: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same
as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity
for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government, or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where the petitioner was deprived of due process, and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent, and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court
are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of
law or public interest is involved.
---oo0oo---
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ROGELIO LAZO and DOLORES LAZO,
respondents.
Facts:
Respondents spouses Rogelio Lazo and Dolores Lazo are the owners and developers of
Monte Vista Homes (Monte Vista), a residential subdivision located in Barangay Paing,
Municipality of Bantay, Ilocos Sur. Sometime in 2006, they voluntarily sold to the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) a portion of Monte Vista for the construction of an open
irrigation canal that is part of the Banaoang Pump Irrigation Project (BPIP). The
consideration of the negotiated sale was in a total amount of P27,180,000.00 at the rate
of P2,500.00 per square meter. Subsequently, respondents engaged the services of
Engr. Donno G. Custodio, retired Chief Geologist of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to conduct a geohazard study on the
possible effects of the BPIP on Monte Vista. Engr. Custodio later came up with a
Geohazard Assessment Report (GAR),7 finding that ground shaking and channel bank
erosion are the possible hazards that could affect the NIA irrigation canal traversing
Monte Vista.
The petitioner was not acting on the petition to give respondent an additional
compensation that the project may affect the property of the Lazos, hence, this petition to
the Supreme Court for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the case for just compensation with damages is one of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue such that unless a preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction is issued grave injustice and irreparable injury on the part of
respondents will arise.

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Ruling:
A petition for certiorari may be given due course notwithstanding that no motion for
reconsideration was filed in the trial court. Although the direct filing of petitions for
certiorari with the CA is discouraged when litigants may still resort to remedies with the
trial court, the acceptance of and the grant of due course to a petition for certiorari is
generally addressed to the sound discretion of the court because the technical provisions
of the Rules may be relaxed or suspended if it will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo
to correct any error attributed to it by a reexamination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid
down the following exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper
notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for reconsideration: (a) where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised
in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court,
or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is
an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
petition is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and
the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;(h) where the proceeding was ex parte
or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is
one purely of law or public interest is involved.
---oo0oo---
ALFREDO TAGLE, petitioner, vs. EQUITABLE PCI BANK (Formerly Philippine
Commercial International Bank) and the HONORABLE HERMINIA V. PASAMBA,
Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 82, City of Malolos, Bulacan,
respondents. G.R. No. 172299. April 22, 2008.
Facts:
According to petitioner Alfredo, the subject property is registered in his name and was
constituted as a Family Home in accordance with the provisions of the Family Code. He
and his wife Arsenia Bautista Tagle (Arsenia) never mortgaged the subject property to
respondent Equitable PCI Bank (respondent E-PCI) whether before or after the subject
property was constituted as their Family Home. It was Josefino Tagle (Josefino), who was
not the owner of the subject property, who mortgaged the same with respondent E-PCI.
Josefino was religiously paying the installments on his mortgage obligation and had paid
more than half thereof. Josefino, however, passed away. Petitioner Alfredo was then
forced to assume Josefino’s outstanding mortgage obligation tion. Even as petitioner

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Alfredo was already paying Josefino’s mortgage obligation in installments, respondent E-


PCI still foreclosed the mortgage on the subject property.
Petitioner Alfredo urges this Court to set aside, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the 4 April 2005 Order6 of the RTC in LRC
Case No. P-71-2004, which denied petitioner Alfredo’s Motion to Stop Writ of Possession.
He prays that this Court certify “for review with prayer for preliminary injunction to stop
the writ of possession [of] the property located at Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag,
Bulacan and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-143715 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Bulacan [subject property] and after due hearing, let judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of the Honorable Regional Trial Court
Branch 82, [City of Malolos, Bulacan,] and the Court of Appeals as the law requires with
costs.”
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property subject of the mortgage being a family home is
exempt from foreclosure of mortgage and certiorari under rule 65 is a proper remedy on
the proceedings.
Ruling: A special civil action for Certiorari, or simply a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office
is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such cannot be
used for any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within
the bounds of its jurisdiction. For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites
that have to concur are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
---oo0oo---
|Marquez, Camille Anne|
Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao vs. Secretary of Justice, Raul M.
Gonzales
Facts:
Celso Delos Angeles and his asssociates in the Legacy Group allegedly defrauded its
investors through its “buy back agreement.”

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It was said that the supposed check payments earned by the investors through the
agreement were dishonoured. The petitioners in this case, the Spouses Dacudao, were
one of those aggrieved by the Legacy Group. The spouses gave written demands for the
return of their investments but to no avail. Like other defrauded investors from all over the
Philippines, the spouses initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos
Angeles and his associates in the Legacy Group. Subsequently, the Secretary of Justice
issued a department order (DO No. 182) which directed all Regional, Provincial, and City
Prosecutors to foreward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles and his associates
to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila with the exemption of those filed in
Cagayan de Oro. Pursuant to the mentioned order, the spouses’ complaints were
forwarded to the DOJ Special Panel. Feeling aggrieved by this turn of events, the spouses
DIRECTLY came to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus alleging that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the questioned order. The spouses were claiming that the department order
violated their constitutional rights to due process, right to equal protection of the laws, and
right to the speedy disposition of cases. They further insisted that the questioned order
was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with
retroactive effect.
Issues:
Whether or not the direct resort of their petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
to the Supreme Court proper.
Ruling:
The direct resort to the Supreme Court was IMPROPER.
The spouses have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the
court without tendering any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct
filing of the petition. The concurrence of jurisdiction among the SC, CA, and the RTC to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and
injuction did not give the petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An
undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the court will cause the dismissal of
the recourse.
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum
from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court
is a court of last resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant must be
mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts.
---oo0oo---
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY
B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA,
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF

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THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents. G.R. No. 131457. April


24, 1998
Facts:
This case involves a land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the
Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one
of the petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 of
the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing
Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a
period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated
in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed
the land value at P2.38 million.
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it
discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found
out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with
Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the
President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation,
caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 of the Registry of
Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the
name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bukidnon.
NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon
docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title, damages
and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary
Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997, restraining the
DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the
possession of the subject land.
Meanwhile, an Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying
DARs motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision
had already become final and executory.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene was filed by alleged farmer-
beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were
previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-

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hectare property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed by the
petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office
of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed
hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or
politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely political
decision to appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March
1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997. Thus,
petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona
committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction when he issued
the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. They availed of this extraordinary writ of
certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution
because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek
reconsideration.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for
review directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules
of Court;

(2) Whether or not the petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
Win-Win Resolution before filing the present petition
Ruling:
1. In order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary
to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction.
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction
is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial
body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions
of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including the Office of the
President, may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, whether
the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

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However, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable


considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution
is patently illegal and was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his
(respondent Secretary Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction when said resolution substantially
modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and
executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction,
not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the
appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. The
pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings
of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases in which the act
of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed
illegal act may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court
where the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or,
if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not
the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only
by the Court of Appeals.
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional
Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the
challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the
act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of
Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly

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discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al.,
through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by
this Court with Regional Trial Courts , which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part
of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court,
with the Court of Appeals, although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,
the latter’s competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice
of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition
filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues rose,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present
petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly
put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has
sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the
issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the
assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with
the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
2. The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the
Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as
otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof
is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained,
save in exceptionally meritorious cases.
It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the
Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion
for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case,
more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no
more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution.
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from
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the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was
permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second
paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained
considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby
allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office
of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996
Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the
rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. we held:
Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President
had long become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts.
It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts
of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as
to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or
quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The
noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle
in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect
and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power
of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.
---oo0oo---
GERVACIO DAUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. FELIPE T. ELEOSIDA, ET AL.,
respondents-appellees. GR No. L-15950. April 20, 1961.
Facts:
Appellant was prosecuted before the justice of the peace of Kidapawan, Cotabato, for
willfull his failure to pay the second, third and fourt quarter fees for the year 1958 pursuant
to local Ordinance No. 21, series of 1956. Summoned to answer, Gervacio Dauz filed a
motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a criminal offense.
The justice of the peace denied such motion prompting the Dauz to file a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the court of first instance contending that the remedy of
the government upon his failure to file the second, third and fourt installment was
collection by civil action with interest and surcharges as imposed by said ordinance and
not a criminal action.
Issues:

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Whether or not certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedy in the instant case.
Ruling:
The court dismissed the petition holding that the remedy of the appellant was to appeal if
upon hearing of merits, he is convicted of the offense. It ruled that where appeal is
available, certiorari and prohibition do not lie.
---oo0oo---
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, represented by HIS HEIRS: ROSALIA, ELEUTERIO, JOE,
ERNESTO, HARRISON, ALL SURNAMED DE GUZMAN; and GINA DE GUZMAN,
respondents.
Facts:
Respondent Gina de Guzman obtained a P300,000.00 loan from petitioner, Philippine
National Bank, secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land registered in her
name. Gina acquired the property from her father, Francisco de Guzman, through a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1978. Gina’s sister, Rosalia de Guzman, the
beneficiary of the family home standing on the said lot, gave her consent to the mortgage.
Later, Rosalia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Document, Cancellation of
Title, Reconveyance, Cancellation of Mortgage, and Damages4 against Gina and
petitioner, alleging that the purported sale of the property by Francisco to Gina was
fraudulent. The Complaint was then amended to replace respondent Intestate Estate of
Francisco de Guzman as plaintiff. This case rose up to the CA from the RTC and
petitioners assailed that CA erred in rendering judgment regarding the case.
Thus a for review on certiorari of Court ofAppeals (CA) Decision dated October 22, 2007
and Resolution3 dated April 14, 2008, which affirmed the denial of petitioner’s motion to
dismiss.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling the case on the ground of res judicata and forum-
shopping.
Ruling:
Litigants should not be allowed to file identical motions repeatedly, speculating on the
possible change of opinion of the court or of its judges. We emphasize this principle in
the present case and warn the parties to desist from the practice of filing several motions
to dismiss which allege the same ground.
In any case, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that the trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. However, we do not agree
that the judgment of dismissal in the first case was not on the merits. A ruling on a motion
to dismiss, issued without trial on the merits or formal presentation of evidence, can still

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be a judgment on the merits. Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court is explicit that a
dismissal for failure to comply with an order of the court shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits. In other words, unless the court states that the dismissal is
without prejudice, the dismissal should be understood as an adjudication on the merits
and is with prejudice.
Bearing in mind the circumstances obtaining in this case, we hold that res judicata should
not be applied as it would not serve the interest of substantial justice. Proceedings on the
case had already been delayed by petitioner, and it is only fair that the case be allowed
to proceed and be resolved on the merits. Indeed, we have held that res judicata is to be
disregarded if its rigid application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality,
particularly in this case where there was actually no determination of the substantive
issues in the first case and what is at stake is respondents’ home.
---oo0oo---
| Muñoz, Samantha Jo|
ISMAEL V. SANTOS, ALFREDO G. ARCE and HILARIO M. PASTRANA, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILS., INC., LUIS P.
LORENZO, JR. and FREDERICK DAEL, respondents.
Facts:
 Private respondent Pepsi Cola Products, Inc. (PEPSI) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the production, distribution, and sale of beverages.
 Petitioners were employed by PEPSI as Complimentary Distribution Specialists.
 PEPSI informed its employees that due to poor performance of its metro manila
sales operations it would restructure and streamline certain physical and sales
distribution systems to improve its warehouse efficiency. Certain positions,
including that of petitioners, were declared redundant and abolished.
Consequently, employees with affected positions were terminated.
 Petitioners left their respective positions, accepted their separation pays and
executed the corresponding releases and quitclaims. However, before the end of
the year, petitioners learned that PEPSI created new positions called Account
Development Managers (ADM) with substantially the same duties and
responsibilities as the CDS.
 Aggrieved, petitioners filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal
with a prayer for reinstatement, back wages, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees. petitioners alleged:
o That the creation of the new positions belied PEPSI’s claim of redundancy.
o Qualifications for both the CDS and ADM positions were similar and that the
employees hired for the latter positions were even less qualified than they
were.

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o They claimed that while they were notified of their termination, PEPSI had
not shown that the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) was also
notified as mandated by Art. 283 of the Labor Code.

Pepsi’s defense:
 Maintained that termination due to redundancy was a management prerogative the
wisdom and soundness of which were beyond the discretionary review of the
courts.
 Thus, it had the right to manage its affairs and decide which position was no longer
needed for its operations.
 The redundancy program was made in good faith and was not implemented to
purposely force certain employees out of their employment
 Job descriptions of both the CDS and ADM positions would show that the two (2)
were very different in terms of the nature of their functions, areas of concerns,
responsibilities and qualifications.

 Labor Arbiter Romulus S. Protacio dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
 National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter.
 Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
 CA dismissed the petition outright for failure to comply with a number of
requirements mandated by Sec. 3, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 65, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 CA found that the verification and certification against forum shopping were
executed merely by petitioners’ counsel and not by petitioners
 The petition also failed to specify the dates of receipt of the NLRC Decision as well
as the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Under the aforecited Rules, failure
of petitioners to comply with any of the requirements was sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT there was failure to comply with the requirements of the rules in
filing their petition for certiorari.
Ruling:
 It is true that insofar as verification is concerned, we have held that there is
substantial compliance if the same is executed by an attorney, it being presumed
that facts alleged by him are true to his knowledge and belief. However, the same
does not apply as regards the requirement of a certification against forum
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 It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the certification must be made by
petitioner himself and not by counsel since it is petitioner who is in the best position
to know whether he has previously commenced any similar action involving the
same issues in any other tribunal or agency.
 Moreover, the petition failed to indicate the material dates that would show the
timeliness of the filing thereof with the Court of Appeals. There are three (3)
essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule
65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or Resolution was
received; second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and
third, when notice of the denial thereof was received. Petitioners failed to show the
first and second dates, namely, the date of receipt of the impugned NLRC Decision
as well as the date of filing of their motion for reconsideration.
 Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice.
These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus
effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

---oo0oo---
Joaquin Ga, Jr., Judith Ga Gadnanan and Jesusa Ga Esmaña, Petitioners, vs.
Spouses Antonio Tubungan and Rosalinda Tubungan and Norberto Ga,
Respondents
Facts:
Petitioner Joaquin Ga, Jr. filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property and Ownership of a
parcel of land against respondent Norberto Ga before the COSLAP. Subsequent
complaint was re-filed by Joaquin’s children also in the COSLAP. The decision of
COSLAP declared Joaquin and his children as lawful owners of the disputed lot. Thus,
respondent Norberto Ga moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Together with the
other respondents, they sought for the reversal of the judgment of COSLAP in the trial
court. Yet, it held that it had no jurisdiction to nullify the COSLAP decision, as the same
would be an interference with a co-equal and coordinate body. Having a denied motion
for reconsideration, the respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals which
was later on granted. According to the appellate court, respondents should have directly
filed the petition with the Court of Appeals, and not the trial court. Moreover, the appellate
court held that COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint filed
by petitioners. Hence, herein petitioner sought relief before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the appellate court erred in relaxing the rules on appeal considering its findings
that respondents failed to avail of the proper remedy before the appropriate court from
the adverse decision of the COSLAP.

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Ruling:
The Court of Appeals was correct when it said that the proper remedy from the decision
of COSLAP is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the lack of jurisdiction over
the disputed lot. Thus, it should have been directly filed before the Court of Appeals not
the trial court. In other words, while respondents availed of the correct remedy, they
sought the same from the wrong court. This mistake would have rendered the assailed
COSLAP decision final and executory, were it not for its patent nullity and invalidity.
Administrative agencies like COSLAP are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only
wield powers which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. Under Section 3
of E.O. No. 561, COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged
before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for
settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated
in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking
into account the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social
unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether
to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned,
the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties
to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent
action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The
law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem. Thus,
the COSLAP may resolve land disputes that involve only public lands or lands of the
public domain or those covered with a specific license from the government such as a
pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation grant.
However, the lot subject of the instant petition was not shown to fall under any of these
categories of land and appears to be a private unregistered land. Neither is the dispute
between petitioners and respondents critical and explosive in nature nor does it involve a
large number of parties that could result to social tension and unrest. It can also hardly
be characterized as involving a critical situation that requires immediate action.
---oo0oo---
BANK OF COMMERCE, petitioner, vs. RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC.,
INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION, and BANAHAW
BROADCASTING CORPORATION, THRU BOARD OF ADMINISTRATOR, and
SHERIFF BIENVENIDO S. REYES, JR., Sheriff, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 98, respondents.
Facts:
 In late 2001 the Traders Royal Bank (TRB) proposed to sell to petitioner Bank of
Commerce for ₱ 10.4 billion its banking business consisting of specified assets
and liabilities. Bancommerce agreed subject to prior BSP's approval of their
Purchase and Assumption (P & A) Agreement. On November 8, 2001 the BSP

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approved that agreement subject to the condition that Bancommerce and TRB
would set up an escrow fund of PSO million with another bank to cover TRB
liabilities for contingent claims that may subsequently be adjudged against it, which
liabilities were excluded from the purchase.
 To comply with the BSP mandate, on December 6, 2001 TRB placed ₱50 million
in escrow with Metrobank to answer for those claims and liabilities that were
excluded from the P & A Agreement and remained with TRB. Accordingly, the BSP
finally approved such agreement on July 3, 2002.
 On October 10, 2002, acting in G.R. 138510, TRB v. RPN Inc., this Court ordered
TRB to pay RPN actual damages of ₱10 million plus 12% legal interest and some
amounts. Rather than pursue a levy in execution of the corresponding amounts on
escrow with Metrobank, RPN filed a Supplemental Motion for Execution where
they described TRB as "now Bank of Commerce" based on the assumption that
TRB had been merged into Bancommerce.
 Bancommerce filed its Special Appearance with Opposition to the same
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over Bancommerce and denying that there
was a merger between TRB and Bancommerce. The RTC issued an Order
granting and issuing the writ of execution to cover any and all assets of TRB,
including those subjects of the merger/consolidation in the guise of a Purchase
and Sale Agreement with Bank of Commerce, and/or against the Escrow Fund
established by TRB and Bank of Commerce with the Metrobank.
 Bancommerce filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the RTC’s Order,
but was denied. The CA pointed out that the Decision of the RTC was clear in that
Bancommerce was not being made to answer for the liabilities of TRB, but rather
the assets or properties of TRB under its possession and custody. In the same
Decision, the CA modified the Decision of the RTC by deleting the phrase that the
P & A Agreement is a farce or " a mere tool to effectuate a merger and/or
consolidation between TRB and BANCOM.”
 RPN then filed with the RTC a motion to cause the issuance of an alias writ of
execution against Bancommerce based on the CA Decision. The RTC granted the
motion on February 19, 2010 on the premise that the CA Decision allowed it to
execute on the assets that Bancommerce acquired from TRB under their P & A
Agreement.
 Bancommerce sought reconsideration of the RTC Order considering that the
December 2009 CA Decision actually declared that no merger existed between
TRB and Bancommerce. But, since the RTC had already issued the alias writ,
Bancommerce filed a motion to quash the same, followed by supplemental Motion.
 The RTC then issued the assailed Order denying Bancommerce pleas and, among
others, directing the release to the Sheriff of Bancommerce’s "garnished monies
and shares of stock or their monetary equivalent.” Aggrieved, Bancommerce

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appealed to the CA. However, the CA dismissed the petition outright for the
supposed failure of Bancommerce to file a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed order.

Issues:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT TRB and Bancommerce were validly merged.
(2) WHETHER OR NOT the RTC could regard Bancommerce as RPN’s judgment debtor.
Ruling: (1) NO. (2) NO.
 Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari may
only be filed when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course
of law. Since a motion for reconsideration is generally regarded as a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy, the failure to first take recourse to is usually regarded as
fatal omission.
 This Court has ruled that execution may issue only upon a person who is a party
to the action, and not against one who did not have his day in court. In Atilano v.
Asaali, 680 SCRA 345 (2012), We held thus: It is well-settled that no man shall be
affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are
not bound by a judgment rendered by the court. Execution of a judgment can only
be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not
being a party thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process dictates that a
court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against innocent third
parties.
 Jurisdiction over the person still requires the existence of a coercive process
issued by the court to such party or its voluntary submission to the court. Neither
had been done in this case. Note that Bancom made its entry to the case but by
way of special appearance precisely to question the trial court’s jurisdiction over
its person. Thus, without any summons issued by the trial court, jurisdiction over
Bancom’s person had never been obtained by the trial court in this case. Any
pronouncement against it is void for lack of jurisdiction.
 In the execution of final and executory judgments, the trial court is bound by the
terms of the decision. Thus, to order the execution against a non-party to an
already concluded action is beyond the powers of the trial court and ergo illegal. It
needs to be emphasized that once a judgment becomes final and executory, that
judgment may not be amended. Upon finality of the judgment, however, the courts
lose the jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The judgment can neither
be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. This is the
principle of immutability of final judgment, which We emphasized in Fermin v.
Esteves, 549 SCRA 424 (2008): The generally accepted principle is that no man
shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a
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case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court. Execution of a judgment
can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one
who, not being a party in the case, did not have his day in court. Due process
requires that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against
one who did not have his day in court.
 In Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association of The Philippine Islands Doing
Business Under The Name Of Manila Downtown YMCA v. Remington Steel
Corporation, 550 SCRA 180 (2008), this Court explained the concept of stare
decisis et non quieta movere, thus: Under the doctrine, when the Supreme Court
has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same. The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the legal
principle or rule involved and not upon judgment which results therefrom. In this
particular sense stare decisis differs from res judicata which is based upon the
judgment. The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity
for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus: Time and again, the
court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when
a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions
and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow
if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule
of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
---oo0oo---

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY


MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY, respondents.
Facts:
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated
between Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway,
Mandaluyong City. On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong
City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin
S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the
petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but
deserving city inhabitants.

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Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step in the
City’s exercise of its power of eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due
to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.
On January 31, 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition for
lack of merit, opining that certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City
Government. However, on February 19, 2002, the RTC, acting upon the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration, set aside its decision and declared that Resolution No. 552
was null and void. The RTC held that the petition was not premature because the passage
of Resolution No. 552 would already pave the way for the City to deprive the petitioners
and their heirs of their only property.
Aggrieved, the City appealed to the CA.
In its decision promulgated on October 18, 2002, the CA concluded that the reversal of
the January 31, 2001 decision by the RTC was not justified because Resolution No. 552
deserved to be accorded the benefit of the presumption of regularity and validity absent
any sufficient showing to the contrary.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion. Thus, they
appeal to the Court
Issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT A MERE RESOLUTION OF SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD
IS SUFFIECIENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF INITIATING AN EXPROPRIATION
PROCEEDING
2. WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR PROHIBITION WILL LIE AGAINST
EXPROPRIATION.
Ruling:
1. NO.
2. NO
 For certiorari to prosper, therefore, the petitioner must allege and establish the
concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (a) The writ is directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) Such
tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) There is no
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
 It is further emphasized that a petition for certiorari seeks solely to correct defects
in jurisdiction, and does not correct just any error or mistake committed by a court,

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board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless such court,


board, or officer thereby acts without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with
such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
 The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of
legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. The
writ of prohibition is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For grave abuse
of discretion to be a ground for prohibition, the petitioner must first demonstrate
that the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, has exercised its or his power in an arbitrary
or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be so
patent and gross as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. On the other hand, the term
excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board, or officer has jurisdiction over
a case but has transcended such jurisdiction or acted without any authority.
 The petitioner must further allege in the petition and establish facts to show that
any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. A remedy is plain, speedy
and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of
that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court.
 Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate
possession of the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided
always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment
of just compensation to the owner. This bar against prohibition comes from the
nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land
intended for public use, and the interest of the affected landowner is thus made
subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power
of eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the
courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be
paid to the affected landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just
compensation for the taking of their property or when there has been no agreement
on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become
available.

WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP


No. 70618
---oo0oo---
|Palamos, Edrelyn Joy|

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Francisco Q. Aurillo, Jr., petitioner, vs. Noel Rabi and the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9, Tacloban City, respondents., G.R. No. 120014, 2001 November 26,2 nd
Division

Facts:
On January 10, 1995, Noel Rabi was arrested without a warrant f arrest and charged in
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Tacloban City with violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 (possession of unlicensed firearm). Pubic prosecutor conducted inquest
investigation and recommended dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.
However, Regional State Prosecutor, Francisco Aurillo, Jr, decided to assume jurisdiction
over the case and to order the conduct of a new preliminary investigation thereof. He
issued a Regional Memorandum Order to the City prosecutor directing him to elevate to
his office the complete records of the case. The assistant regional prosecutor issued a
subpoena notifying Noel Rabi and Margot Villanueva of the preliminary investigation not
only for violation of PD 1866 but also for the crimes of “ Violation of Comelec Resolution
No 2323 9gun banned), Batas Pambansa Bilang 9 (possession of deadly weapon) and
Malicious Mischief.
Rabi filed with RTC a petition for prohibition with prayer of a temporary restraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction. RTC issued the Temporary restraining order. RTC failed
to issue resolution on whether the court will issue a writ of preliminary injunction. Assistant
regional prosecutor continued with the preliminary investigation. With Aurillo’s approval,
he filed an information with RTC against Rabi for violation of PD 1866.
RTC decide in favor of Rab. Aurillo filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT Aurillo is empowered motu proprio take over and conduct
preliminary investigation.
2. WHETHER OR NOT prohibition will give complete relief, not only by preventing
what remains to be done but by undoing what has been done.

Ruling:
Aurillo's reliance on Section 8, paragraph (b) of PD 1275 is misplaced. Said law provides
that a regional state prosecutor exercises immediate administrative supervision over all
provincial and city fiscals and other prosecuting officers of provinces and cities comprised
within his region and prosecutes any case arising within his region.

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The "administrative supervision" which shall govern the administration relationship


between a department or its equivalent and an agency under its jurisdiction is limited to
the authority of such department to generally oversee the operation of the agency under
it to insure that the same is managed effectively and economically, without interfering with
its day-to-day activities; and to take such action as may be necessary for the proper
performance of official functions, including the rectification of violations, abuses or other
forms of maladministration.[17] It bears stressing that in administrative law, administrative
supervision is not synonymous with control.
In this case, when Aurillo motu proprio took over the preliminary investigation of I.S. No.
95-043 after the same had already been dismissed by the city prosecutor and ordered
the assistant regional state prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation of the case,
he exercised not only administrative supervision but control over the city prosecutor in the
performance of the latter's quasi-judicial functions.
The office of the regional state prosecutor does not conduct any preliminary investigation
or prosecute any criminal case in court at all.
The pendency of the special civil action for prohibition before the trial court did not
interrupt the investigation in I.S. No. 95-043. It goes without saying, however, that in
proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and terminating the same,
Aurillo did so subject to the outcome of the petition for prohibition. In this case, the RTC
granted the petition of Rabi, declared Aurillo bereft of authority to take over the preliminary
investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and nullified the preliminary investigation conducted by
Aurillo as well as the Information thereafter filed by him. The RTC is possessed of residual
power to restore the parties to their status before Aurillo proceeded with the preliminary
investigation, and grant in favor of the aggrieved party such other relief as may be proper.
Jurisprudence has it that prohibition will give complete relief not only by preventing what
remains to be done but by undoing what has been done. The Court has authority to grant
any appropriate relief within the issues presented by the pleadings of the parties:
Generally, the relief granted in a prohibition proceeding is governed by the nature
of the grievance proved and the situation at the time of judgment. Although the general
rule is that a writ of prohibition issues only to restrain the commission of a future act, and
not to undo an act already performed, where anything remains to be done by the court,
prohibition will give complete relief, not only by preventing what remains to be done but
by undoing what has been done. Under some statutes, the court must grant the
appropriate relief whatever the proceeding is called if facts stating ground for relief are
pleaded. Although prohibition is requested only as to a particular matter, the court has
authority to grant any appropriate relief within the issues presented by the pleadings. If
the application for prohibition is too broad, the court may mould the writ and limit it to as
much as is proper to be granted. In the exercise of its jurisdiction to issue writs, the court
has, as a necessary incident thereto, the power to make such incidental order as may be
necessary to maintain its jurisdiction and to effectuate its final judgment. The court may

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retain jurisdiction of the cause to enable it to make an appropriate order in the future,
even though the petition for a writ of prohibition is dismissed.
Hence, the RTC did not commit any error in nullifying not only the preliminary investigation
by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor in I.S. No. 95-043 for want of authority but
also the Information approved by Aurillo and filed with the Regional Trial Court.
---oo0oo----

THE NACIONALISTA PARTY, Petitioner, vs. FELIX ANGELO BAUTISTA, Solicitor


General of the Philippines, Respondent. G.R. No. L-3452, December 7, 1949

Facts:

It is averred, in support of the prayer, that on 9 November 1949, while the respondent
held, as he still holds, the office of Solicitor General of the Philippines, the President
designated him as acting member of the Commission on Elections, and on that same
date the respondent took the oath of office and forthwith proceeded to assume and
perform the duties of the office; that at the time of the respondent's designation he had
not resigned from the office of Solicitor General of the Philippines nor does he intend to
do so but continues to exercise all the powers and duties of the last mentioned office.

Issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT the designation of the respondent as Acting Member of the


Commissions on Elections, in addition to his duties as Solicitor General, pending
the appointment of a permanent of Commissioner Francisco Enage, is unlawful
and unconstitutional.ch
2. WHETHER OR NOT prohibition is the proper remedy.

Ruling:

The independence and impartiality of the office may be shaken and destroyed by a
designation of a person or officer to act temporarily in the Commission on Elections. And,
although Commonwealth Act No. 588 provides that such temporary designation "shall in
no case continue beyond the date of the adjournment of the regular session of the
National Assembly (Congress) following such designation does not remove the cause for
the impairment of the independence of one designated in a temporary capacity to the
Commission on Elections. It would be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim
of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent Commissioner than to
designated, tested by the nature and character of the functions he has to perform in both
offices, but in the broad sense there is an incompatibility, because his duties and functions
as Solicitor General require that all his time be devoted to their efficient performance.
Nothing short of that is required and expected of him.

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Strictly speaking, there are no proceedings of the Commission on Elections in the


exercise of its judicial or ministerial functions, which are being performed by it or without
or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of its discretion. Strictly speaking, there
are no proceedings of the Commission on Elections in the exercise of its judicial or
ministerial functions, which are being performed by it or without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of its discretion. This special civil action as our Rule call
it, or this extraordinary legal remedy following the classical or chancery nomenclature, is
in effect to test the validity or legality of the respondent's designation in a temporary
capacity as member of the Commission on Elections pending the appointment of a
permanent member or Commissioner. It is in the nature of a quo warranto, and as such
it may only be instituted by the party who claims to be entitled to the office (sec. 6, Rule
680 or by the Solicitor General (sec. 3,4, Rule 68).

The authorities and decisions of courts are almost unanimous that prohibition will not lie
to determine the title of a de facto judicial officer, since its only function is to prevent a
usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court .That as no one is entitled to the office
there is no party who in his name may institute quo warranto proceedings, and that the
respondent the only other party who may institute the proceedings in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, would not proceed against himself. Were it not for this
anomalous situation where there would be no remedy to redress a constitutional
transgression, we would adhere strictly to the time-honored rule that to test the right to an
office quo warranto proceedings is the proper remedy. Petitioner was ordered to amend
its petition so as to substitute the real parties in interest for it (the petitioner), or to show
that it is a juridical person entitled to institute these proceedings.

---oo0oo---

MARCELO ENRIQUEZ, petitioner, vs.HIGINIO B. MACADAEG, Judge of the Court of


First Instance of Cebu, MELITON YBURAN, and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, respondents. G.R. No. L-2422, September 30, 1949

Facts:

The civil action in question is for the recovery of a piece of real property situated in Negros
Oriental, the complaint alleging that the said property had been bought by plaintiff at an
execution sale but that, notwithstanding the sale, the judgment debtor, as supposed
owner of said property, subsequently mortgaged the same to the Philippine National Bank
and refused to surrender possession thereof to plaintiff, whereupon, the latter brought suit
(Meliton Yburan vs. Marcelo Enriquez and The Philippine National Bank, civil case No.
R-552 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu) to have himself declared owner of said
property and placed in possession thereof. Before filing their answer, the defendants in
that case moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground, among others, that, as
the action concerned title to and possession of real estate situated in Negros Oriental,
venue was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The motion having been
denied, the defendants filed the present petition for mandamus to compel the respondent
judge to dismiss the action.

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Answering the petition, the respondent judge puts up the defense that the act sought to
be ordered involves the exercise of judicial discretion and that petitioner has another
adequate remedy, which is by appeal.

Issue:

1. WHETHER OR NOT mandamus is the proper remedy.

Ruling:

Motion to dismiss was proper for actions affecting title to real property must be filed with
the court where the subject property is located.

But, while the respondent judge committed a manifest error in denying the motion,
mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting that error, for this is not a case where
a tribunal "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office" or "unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right.

It is rather a case where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing
to dismiss an action which would not be maintained in his court. The remedy in such case
is prohibition (section 2, Rule 67), and that remedy is available in the present case
because the order complained of, being merely of an interlocutory nature, is not
appealable.

---oo0oo----

|Pelingon, Lysandre|

Enares Jr. vs. LTFRB, G.R. No. 158290 – October 23, 2006

Facts:

Petitioners petitioned for the Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondent
LTFRB and the DOTC to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural
gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. The petitioners cited various studies such as the UP studies
in 1990-91 and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to
the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases and the Philippine Environment
Monitor 2002 stating that in 4 of the country’s major cities, exposure to harmful emissions
causes health problems and deaths with losses valued at US$140 million. Asserting their
right to clean air, petitioners proposed CNG as alternate fuel because it is colorless and
odourless and produces up to 90 percent less CO.

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Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to bring the present action
2. Whether or not the present action is supported by law
3. Whether or not the respondent can be compelled to require PUVs to use CNG
through a Writ of Mandamus

Ruling:

The Court held that there is no dispute as to the petitioners having locus standi to institute
the case. The Court acknowledges the right of the petitioners to clean air which is an
issue of paramount importance impressed with public interest. Technicalities were
brushed aside under the principle of transcendental importance of the issue to the public.

On the issue whether mandamus is the proper remedy, the Court reminded the petitioners
that the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy being sought through the writ of mandamus
is unavailing as mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically
enjoined by law as a duty. In the case, there is no law that mandates the respondents to
order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Also, the need for future changes in both
legislation and its implementation cannot be pre-empted by orders of the Court.

Therefore, the petition was dismissed.

---oo0oo---

Uy Kiao Eng vs. Nixon Lee, G.R. No. 176831 – January 15, 2010

Facts:
Respondent Nixon Lee alleged that petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, the former’s mother, is in
custody of the holographic will executed by his late father. The respondent is compelling
the petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance could be
instituted and that the patriarch’s estate could be settled and liquidated and delivered to
the legal heirs.

During the hearing of Civil Case No. 224-V-00 before the RTC, the respondent was able
to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will.

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In her counterclaim, the petitioner posited that there is no cause of action and that
photocopies of the will were given to the respondent and his siblings. Petitioner denied
the allegation that she is in custody of the original will and that she knew of its
whereabouts. She contended that the respondent should have first exerted efforts to
amicably settle the controversy.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the petition of mandamus is the proper remedy

Ruling:

The Court held that mandamus cannot be used for redress of private wrongs, but
only in matters relating to the public. The petition for a writ of mandamus as a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy cannot be availed because there is a remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Rules 75 and 76 of the Rules of Court provides for remedies
regarding the production of wills.

There being a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
the Court reversed and set aside the resolution of the CA and dismissed the Civil Case
before the RTC.

---oo0oo---

Enriquez vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 174902-06 – February 15, 2008

Facts:

On May 9, 2000, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman filed administrative and criminal cases against petitioners Alfredo R.
Enriquez, LRA Administrator, Gener C. Endona, LRA Legal Officer, and Rhandolfo B.
Amansec, LRA Inspection and Investigation Division Chief.

On March 24, 2006, or 6 years from the filing of the complaints-affidavits and more than
4 years after the parties formally offered their evidence on January 29, 2002, petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of inordinate delay which constitutes a violation of
their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their case .

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Because of the continued inaction, petitioners filed on October 20, 2006 a petition for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus praying that the administrative and criminal cases filed
against them be dismissed for failure of the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the cases
within the required period.

Issues:

1. Whether the petition for mandamus is an appropriate remedy


2. Whether respondent violated petitioners’ constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of their cases

Ruling:

The Court ruled that mandamus is an appropriate remedy by reason that if the questioned
act was done with grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
authority, the writ will be issued to control the exercise of such discretion. Mandamus is
a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated by the Constitution.

The Court also ruled that the petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
their cases was violated. The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
requires that the hearing officer is given a definite period of not later than 30 days to
resolve the case after the formal investigation shall have been concluded. Despite the
consistent follow-up of the petitioners regarding their case, the Office of the Ombudsman
neglected to act on it. Clearly, respondent’s inaction violates its role as the vanguard in
the promotion of efficient service by the government to the people and in ensuring
accountability in public office.

The Court granted the petition and dismissed the cases filed against the petitioners.

---oo0oo---

Calim vs. Hon. Guerrero, G.R. No. 156527- March 5, 2007

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Facts:
Petitioner Nemesio M. Calim operates Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Services in
Siniloan, Laguna which was given a Mayor’s Permit and was registered with the DTI.

On August 6, 2001, he received an invitation from private respondent Vice-Mayor Acoba


to appear before the Sangguniang Bayan to answer for the letter-complaint of a certain
Amador Igos alleging of the absence of a franchise of public conveyance on the part of
the petitioner’s tour service company. The SB issued Kapasiyahan Bilang 81 T-2001
unanimously recommending the cancellation of the municipal licence and permit issued
to Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Services.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon alleging
that the cancellation injured his business incurring him losses. He alleged further that the
SB had not answered his letter inquiring the reason for the cancellation of his permit
issued on September 6, 2001 up to the filing of the letter-complaint on November 18,
2001, in gross violation of RA 6713. The Deputy Ombudsman dismissed the complaint
for lack of probable cause.

Petitioner filed the present petition for mandamus seeking to compel public respondents
to file the appropriate information for violation of Section 5 of RA 6713 against private
respondents SB members of Siniloan, Laguna.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the public respondents unlawfully neglected to perform an act


which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office
2. Whether or not there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary court of law

Ruling:

The Court held that petitioner was not able to establish his entitlement to a writ of
mandamus. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory powers without good and compelling reasons
to indicate otherwise. To compel the Ombudsman to further pursue a criminal case

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against the private respondents is outside the ambit of the courts. The Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in Civil Service provides that a penalty for failure to act promptly on
letters and requests within 15 days from receipt is only a reprimand for the first offense.
The Ombudsman already admonished the private respondents.

The Court also held that the petitioner took a route that is antagonistic to prevailing rules
and jurisprudence as appeals for administrative cases decided by the Ombudsman
should be filed first with the Court of Appeals.

---oo0oo---

|Polidario, Aira|
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGA¬GAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
CREDIT UNION, INC., PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE, G.R. No. L-25316, February 28, 1979,
Facts:
Petitioner-appellant seek a reversal of a decision relying on what it considered to be a
right granted by Section 62 of Republic Act No. 2023, more specifically the first two
paragraphs thereof:
"* * * (1) A member of a co-operative may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws,
execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative authorizing his employer to deduct
from the salary or wages payable to him by the employer such amount as may be
specified in the agreement and to pay the amount so deducted to the co-operative in
satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the member to the co-operative. (2)
Upon the execution of such agreement the employer shall, if so required by the co-
operative by a request in writing and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of
it remains unpaid, make the deduction in accordance with the agreement and remit
forthwith the amount so deducted to the co-operative.”
The petitioner contends that under the above provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans
granted by credit unions to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from
the respondent's employees' wages and salaries. There is nothing in the provision of Rep.
Act 2023 hereinabove quoted which provides that obligations of laborers and employees
payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees'
wages and salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct
from the salaries or wages payable to members of the employees' cooperative credit
unions the employees' debts to the union and to pay the same to the credit union.
In other words, the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the employer
to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this over to

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the employees' credit union but this manda¬tory character does not convert the credit
union's credit into a first priority credit. If the legislative intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of
Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the
obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so
expressly declared.
The respondent-appellee, succinctly pointed out "that there is nothing in said pro¬vision
from which it could be implied that it gives top priority to obligations of the nature of that
payable to petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent company did not violate the above-
quoted Section 62 of Republic Act 2023.
Issue:
Whether or not mandamus will lie
Ruling:
No, mandamus will not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right.
The very law on which he would base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition.
A more rigorous analysis would have prevented him from instituting a suit of this
character. The SC held: "Mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there
was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the
law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of
a right to which he is entitled." The only specific legal rights may be enforced by
mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights of the petitioner are not well
defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed.
It is fundamental that the duties to be enforced by mandamus must be those which are
clear and enjoined by law or by reason of official station, and that petitioner must have a
clear, legal right to the thing demanded and that it must be the legal duty of the defendant
to perform the required act.' As expressed by the then Justice Recto in a subsequent
opinion: 'It is well established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus,
that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ not issue
in cases where the right is doubtful.' To the same effect is the formulation of such doctrine
by former Justice Barrera: 'Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It
neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power
already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.’
---oo0oo---
STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC., CELSO A.
FERNANDEZ AND MANUEL V. FERNANDEZ VS. PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, MAYOR
EDWARD HAGEDORN AND CITY COUNCIL OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, G.R. NO.
181792, APRIL 21, 2014,
Facts:

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Petitioners were the owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Puerto Princesa City.
Before Puerto Princesa became a city, the national government established a military
camp in Puerto Princesa, known as the Western Command. In building the command’s
facilities and road network, encroachment on several properties of petitioners resulted.
Petitioners’ property was used as a road right-of-way leading to the military camp. This
road was named the "Wescom Road." Soon after, the City of Puerto Princesa decided to
develop the "Wescom Road" because local residents started to build their houses
alongside it.
In view of the encroachment, petitioners filed an action for Payment of Just Compensation
against the respondents Puerto Princesa City, Mayor Hagedorn and the City Council of
Puerto Princesa City before the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC rendered a decision in
favor of petitioners.
After the RTC Decision became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued. The
money judgment amounted was reduced to P12,000,000.00, subject to the condition
agreed by the parties. Petitioners claimed that respondents paid the initial P2,000,000.00
but failed to give further payments after. However, records show that the total negotiated
amount of P12 million was already fully paid and received by petitioners on the basis of
the certification issued by then City Treasurer of Puerto Princesa.
Nevertheless, petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC-Br. 223 against respondents
for collection of unpaid just compensation, including interests and rentals, in accordance
with the RTC-Br. 78 Decision. If also filed complaints before the COA, Ombudsman and
DILG to compel the respondents to pay the judgment but COA countered that it does not
have jurisdiction over the matter.
The petitioners filed the present petition for mandamus seeking to direct, command and
compel the respondents to enforce, implement or pay the petitioners the judgment award
of the Decision of the Quezon City RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy in compelling the respondents to pay the
just compensation
Ruling:
Mandamus is NOT the proper remedy to compel the respondents to pay the just
compensation. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court,
tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a
particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to
whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public
character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the
purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The
writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
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performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated
by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which
is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to
which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a
mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious.
As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that
the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office,
trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded
petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled.
On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty
of respondent to perform the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to
enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private
contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature
of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private
right against an individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act,
when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating
to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its
prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only
in matters relating to the public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should
be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the
remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in
cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford
relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its
issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of
mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.
The legal remedy is to seek relief with the COA pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative
Circular 10-2000 dated October 25, 2000, which enjoined judges to observe utmost
caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money
judgments against government agencies and local government units. Under
Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is the COA
which has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle "all debts and claims of any
sort" due from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and

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instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their


subsidiaries.
Hence, petition for mandamus is not proper. Petitioners are enjoined to file its claim with
the Commission on Audit.
---oo0oo---

Rule 66- Quo Warranto


ERNESTO CAMPOS AND FLORENCIO OROC VS. ESTEBAN DEGAMO AND FELINO
PALARCA, G.R. NO. L-18315, SEPTEMBER 29, 1962.
Facts:
Petitioners Ernesto Campos and Florencio Oroc were elected and proclaimed councilor
No. 1 and councilor No. 2, respectively, of the municipality of Carmen, Agusan.
Respondents Esteban Degamo and Felino Palarca were proclaimed Mayor and Vice
Mayor, respectively, of the said municipality, notwithstanding the protest and request that
the proclamation be suspended on the ground that the Board of Canvassers used in their
canvass for election in Precinct 6, the election return coming from the Provincial
Treasurer's Office, inspite of the fact that the copy of election return in the hands of the
municipal treasury of Carmen was available. There was no valid canvass for the offices
of Mayor and Vice Mayor effected and the respondents could not legally occupy the said
positions. The respondents stalled their own offices in a temporary building near the
municipal hall, and appointed policemen, with the approval of the Provincial Treasurer.
Petitioner made verbal demands upon respondents to stop forming the duties and
functions of said offices, but respondents denied and refused, thereby making the public
believe they were the lawful officials of said municipality.
Petitioners, therefore, prayed (a) that a writ quo warranto be issued ousting and excluding
respondents Degamo and Palarca from the office of mayor and vice-mayor of Carmen,
respectively; and that they be declared entitled to said offices and placed forthwith
possession thereof.
Respondents averred that the Board of Canvassers was created and appointed by and
acted upon instruction of, the Commission on Elections and that they were duly elected
by the people and validly proclaimed by the said Board. Respondents claimed that (1) the
petition was filed outside the reglementary period; (2) there was no sufficient cause of
action; (3) the petitioners had no legal personality or authority to file the present case; 4)
the court had no jurisdiction over the petition and the petitioners; (5) there was a pending
case of the same nature and of substantially the same allegations against the
respondents, before the same court; and (6) the respondents took their oaths of office
and performed their respective duties starting January 1, 1960. In their counterclaim,
respondents prayed for moral damages and attorneys fees.

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The lower court ruled in favor of respondents. Hence, petitioners appealing directly to this
Court on purely questions of law, claiming in their brief that the lower court erred (1) in
declaring that they are not entitled to the said positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor; and (2)
in declaring that the petition states no cause of action.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are the proper party to institute the quo warranto case
Ruling:
No, petitioners are not the proper party to institute the quo warranto case.
Under the theory that Special Civil Action No. 117 comes under the provisions of the
Revised Election Code, its filing violates section 173 thereof which states:
When a person who is not eligible is elected to a provincial or Municipal Office, his right
to the Office may be contested by any registered candidate for the same office before the
Court of First Instance of the province, within one week after the proclamation of his
election, by filing a petition for quo warranto. The case shall be conducted in accordance
with the usual procedure and shall be decided within thirty days from the filing of the
complaint. A copy of the decision shall be furnished the Commission on Elections.
Petitioners Campos and Oroc were not registered candidates for the offices of mayor and
vice-mayor, and the quo warranto was not filed within one week after the proclamation of
the persons sought to be ousted - the respondents herein. The proclamation of the
respondents was made on December 7, 1959, and the present quo warranto complaint
was filed on September 27, 1960, about a year later.
On the assumption that the present action is presented as an ordinary quo warranto case
(Rule 68, Rules of Court), same cannot also prosper. Section 7, Rule 68, provides:
What complaint for usurpation to set forth, and who may be made parties. — When the
action is against a person for usurping an office or franchise, the complaint shall set forth
the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, if any, with an averment of his
right to the same and that the defendant is unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons
who claim to be entitled to the office or franchise may be made parties, and their
respective rights to such office or franchise determined, in the same action.
Petitioners-appellants Campos and Oroc, having been candidates and elected for the
office of councilors and not for the office of mayor and vice-mayor, they are not the proper
parties to institute the present action.
The appeal is dismissed and the order appealed from is affirmed.
---oo0oo---
|Pomida, Kristian Ray|

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ABRAHAM C. SISON, vs. HON. EPI REY PANGRAMUYEN


FACTS:
The case is petition for quo warranto and certiorari by seeking the annulment of the
Regional Director and Commissioner of Civil Service in affirming Eureka Maliwanag as
Assistant City Assessor of Olongapo City. Petitioner Sison would want the Court to hold
that since at the time of the appointment, he was Chief Deputy Assessor exercising,
immediate administrative control and supervision over Maliwanag, who was Senior
Deputy Assessor, and inasmuch as he has superior educational and appropriate civil
service eligibilities to those of said respondent, the appointment by respondent City Mayor
is illegal and contrary to law being violative of the rule of next-in-rank. He maintains that
upon the promotion of the Assistant City Assessor to the position of City Assessor, he
should have been appointed.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not Sison should be appointed instead of Maliwanag
RULING:
NO. The most fatal drawback of Sison is that he came to the courts out of time. As already
stated, the appointment in controversy was made on November 23, 1973 and Maliwanag
assumed office on the strength thereof, albeit she claims she has not been paid her
salary. On the other hand, the petition was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more
than one year after the pretended right of petitioner to hold the office in question arose.
This single circumstance has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his favor.
SIson contends in regard to this point that Section 16 of Rule 66 invoked by Maliwanag
refers to actions of quo warranto and since his petition is also for certiorari and
mandamus, said rule is inapplicable. The court held that such contention is not correct.
As earlier noted, the allegations supporting Sison’s cause or causes of action boil down
to no more than the removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position to which she has
been appointed in order to be replaced by him, with a new appointment in his favor.
Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo warranto has to be based on a nullification
o her appointment, which petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari. His ultimate
remedy, therefore, is quo warranto. Besides, even if it could be also viewed as
mandamus, it is already settled that his latter remedy prescribes also after one year. And
it is of no avail to petitioner that during the intervening period of more than one year, he
was seeking relief from the corresponding administrative authorities. The resort to such
administrative remedy does not abate the period for the judicial action.
---oo0oo---

Municipality of San Narciso vs. Mendez

Facts:
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On 20 Aug 1959 Pres. C.P Garcia issued EO No. 353 creating the municipal district of
San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same
province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, etc. along with their respective sitios. EO
353 issued upon the request of the municipal council of San Narciso in its Res. No. 8 of
24 May 1959. On Oct 05 1965 by virtue of EO No. 174 issued by Pres. Diosdado
Macapagal, municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained
the status of a 5th class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Sec 2 of RA
1515. On June 05 1989 the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto
with the RTC in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres.
Such petition sought the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 & prayed that respondent
local officials be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties & functions of
their respective offices. Using the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General, Municipality of San
Narciso contended that EO No. 353 was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the
legislature & in violation of the constitutional principle of SOP. Respondents then filed for
dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner is deemed estopped from questioning the
creation of the new municipality and because Municipality of San Narciso had existed
since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed, and municipality was
not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting
through the Solicitor General. The trial court resolved to defer action on the Motion to
Dismiss and to deny judgment on the proceedings Municipality of San Andres filed anew
a MTD alleging the case had become moot & academic w/ the enactment of RA No. 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991).

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in denying judgment in the proceedings

Ruling:

SC: No. The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the
Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office
or exercises a public franchise." When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a
body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any
other credit proceeding. It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by the
President of the Philippines . . . ." Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring
such an action "at the request and upon the relation of another person" with the
permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an
action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to
be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another." While the quo warranto proceedings filed has so named only the officials of the
Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the
authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that
capacity.

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EO No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 Aug 1959 but
it was only after 30 years that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge
the legality of the EO. In the meantime, the Municipal District, & later the Municipality of
San Andres, began & continued to exercise the powers & authority of a duly created LGU.
In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of
another to hold a position within a 1-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed,
so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding
assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest
demands it.

All doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the
Ordinance (adopted on 15 Oct 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Rep, the
Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be 1 of the 12 municipalities
composing the 3rd District of Quezon. Equally significant is Sec 442(d) of the Local
Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders & which have their respective sets of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Sec
442(d) of the LGC is preferred. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of
the legislature. Congress did just that when it incorporated Sec 442(d) in the Code.
Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, & aimed at giving "validity to acts done
that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied
with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against
impairment of vested rights.
---oo0oo---

Rule 67- Expropriation


City of Manila vs The Arellano Law Colleges Inc.
Facts:
RA 267 provides that cities and municipalities are authorized to contract loans from
Reconstruction Finance Corporation for the purpose of purchasing or expropriating
homesites within their territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents. The
court below ruled that this provision empowers cities to purchase but not expropriate and
so dismissed the present action, which seeks to condemn several parcels of land situated
in Legarda St. Manila.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT the necessity for condemnation is shown to justify the
expropriation.
Ruling: No. The SC is inclined to believe that Act No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate
as well as to purchase lands for homesites. The word "expropriating," taken singly or with
the text, is susceptible of only meaning. But this power to expropriate is necessarily
subject to the limitations and conditions. The National Government may not confer its
instrumentalities authority which itself may not exercise. A stream cannot run higher than

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its source. To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the power
of eminent domain, a necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses
and purposes. Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated
must be necessary. It does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical
necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least
inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and property owner consistent with
such benefits. The land in question has cost the owner P140, 000. The people for whose
benefit the condemnation is being undertaken are so poor they could ill afford to meet this
high price, unless they intend to borrow the money with a view to disposing of the property
later for a profits. Cheaper lands not dedicated to a purpose so worthy as a school and
more suited to the occupants' needs and means, if really they only want to own their own
homes, are plenty elsewhere the defendant not only has invested a considerable amount
for its property but had the plans for construction ready and would have completed the
project a long time ago had it not been stopped by the city authorities.
---oo0oo---
|Sabalberino, Roy Narciso|
Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay, 148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29
Apr 1987
Facts:
The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export
Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San
Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without
them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then
issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio
would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under
PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market
value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor,
whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were
denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then
filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further
hearing the case.
Issue:
Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in
PD 1533 is unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533
is unconstitutional.

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The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment


to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may
only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but
it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination
but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private
party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the
decreed compensation.
---oo0oo---
ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. NATIONAL POWER CORP. 315 SCRA 150
(1999)
Facts:
Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of about 17,746.50 sq.
mtrs. Which the National Power Corporation (NPC, for brevity) is seeking to expropriate.
The property forms part of a proposed low-cost housing project in Inawayan, Binugao,
Toril, Davao City.
On June 6, 1997, NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain against Robern. Instead of
filing an answer, Petitioner countered with a Motion to Dismiss, alleging, among other
things, that the choice of property to be expropriated was improper.
Issue:
Whether the Motion to Dismiss should prosper?
Ruling:
No. The issues raised by Petitioner are affirmative defenses that should be alleged in an
answer, since they require presentation of evidence aliunde. Section 3 of the Rules of
Court provides that “if a defendant has any objections to the filing of or the allegations in
the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property,” he should include
them in his answer. Naturally, these issues will have to be fully ventilated in a full-blown
trial and hearing. Dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial of
due process if, from a consideration of the pleadings, it appears that there are issues that
cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits.
---oo0oo---
LINTAG vs NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, GR. NO. 158609 9JULY 27, 2007

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Facts:
Lintag and Arrastia are the registered owners of a property with an area of 80,001 sq.
mtrs, covered by the TCT No. T-24855 and located at Brgy. Bibincahan, Sorsogon.
On December 4, 1996, respondendt National Power Corporation (NPC, for brevity) filed
a complaint for Eminent Domain against petitioners in order to acquire an easement of a
right of way over a portion of the said property, consisting of 8,050 sq. mtrs. (subject
property) with an initial assessed value at 2,468.09. NPC averred that such acquisition
was necessary and urgent for the construction and maintenance of NPC’s 350 KV Leyte-
Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project.
On January 17, 1997, after the deposit of the initial assessed value of the subject property
amounting to Ᵽ2,468.09 with the Philippine National Bank, the RTC, upon an ex-parte
motion of NPC, ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession on the subject property
consonant with PD No. 42.
On September 13, 2000, pre-trial was held and pre-trial order was issued. The case was
set for trial on the merits on November 15, 2000.

However, on November 7, 2000, RA No. 8974 entitled “An act to facilitate the acquisition
of right of way, site or location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and for
other purposed” was approved.
On February 14, 2001, petitioners filed a motion asking the RTC to direct the NPC to
comply with RA No. 8974. In the said motion, petitioners asseverated that pursuant to
sec. 4 of RA No. 8974, they are entitled to 100% of the value of the subject property based
on the current relevant zonal valuation made by the BIR, which at the time was pegged
at Ᵽ700.00 per sq. mtr. Thus, petitioners prayed that NPC be directed to pay
Ᵽ5,635,000.00 for the subject property.
Issue:
Whether or not NPC should be required to pay full market value as just compensation
despite the fact that the petitioner was only acquiring an easement of right-of-way
Ruling:
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just
compensation to which the owner is entitled to is the market value, which is “the sum of
money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner wiling but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor.” When
only a part of a property is expropriated, the owner is also entitled to recover for the
consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property, from which value of
consequential benefits must be deducted. In fixing the valuation at P500/m², the CA noted
that the trial court had considered the reports of the commissioners and proofs submitted

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by the parties. The trial court found that the land sought to be expropriated are agricultural
land with minimal improvements. It is the nature and character of the land at the time of
the taking that is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner.
Without any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or otherwise unjustified, factual
finding of the CA is binding on the parties. The petition is denied for lack of merit. CA’s
decision is affirmed.
---oo0oo---
|Salentes, Aureen Kim|
Republic of the Philippines vs Far East Enterprises G.R. No. 176487. August 25,
2009.
FACTS:
Petition for Review on Certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision of the
Court of Appeals which dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ Petition for
Certiorari, and its Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The Court
of Appeals held that the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, did not act with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering petitioner to
make an additional payment of P425.00 per square meter for the subject properties of
respondents Far East and the Bernasconis before the issuance of an order to take
possession of the subject properties, and a writ of possession. The Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain before the Regional Trial Court
of Nasugbu, Batangas against Far East Enterprises, Inc. (Far East).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court is the proper venue in which to resolve any dispute involving the
classification of lands?
RULING:
The court agrees with the petitioner that the courts have judicial discretion to determine
the classification of lands, because such classification is one of the relevant standards for
the assessment of the value of lands, subject of expropriation proceedings. It is one factor
that the courts consider in determining just compensation. The determination of just
compensation is a function addressed by the courts of justice and may not be usurped by
any other branch or official of the government. However, we would like to make it clear
that Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974 lists the relevant standards that are to be
considered in determining just compensation for and not classification of lands, as
petitioner would like us to believe.
The Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert lands
through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB.
Discretion is vested in the appropriate government agencies to determine the suitability

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of a land for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes. It is also a settled rule
that an ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. Having the power to classify lands,
the local government unit may consider factors that are just, reasonable and legal, for it
is within the local government unit’s power to determine these. However, if they abuse
their authority in the performance of this duty, the courts, if prompted, can step in.
In the case at bar, the lands in question had long been (almost 20 years) reclassified as
residential before the instant case was filed. All those years, no one questioned the
ordinance reclassifying the lands. If petitioner would like to have the reclassification of the
lands involved changed to agricultural, the just and reasonable way of doing it is to go to
the municipal council -- not the courts -- that enacted the ordinance and to ask that the
lands be reclassified again as agricultural. Technical matters such as zoning
classifications and building certifications should be primarily resolved first by the
administrative agency whose expertise relates therein. The jurisprudential trend is for
courts to refrain from resolving a controversy involving matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies, “even if the questions involved are also judicial
in character”. In this manner, the court give the respect due to these agencies (the
municipal council and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission [now HLURB]),
which unquestionably have primary jurisdiction to rule on matters of classification of lands.
---oo0oo---
City of Iloilo vs Besana G.R. No. 168967. February 12, 2010.
FACTS:
In an expropriation case filed by petitioner against private respondent (Javellana), the
plaintiff was able to take possession of two parcels of land owned by Javellana for the
purpose of making the said lots the site for Lapaz High School. A writ of possession was
issued to plaintiff after it allegedly made a deposit of the amount of the value of the said
lots (Php 40,000). Such was issued by the trial court in an order dated May 17, 1983.
On April 2000, private respondent found out that the amount of Php 40,000 was not
deposited by the petitioner when he tried to withdraw the said amount (as proved by a
certification issued by the PNB).When no amicable resolution and a negotiated sale was
successful, he (Javellana) filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession, Fixing and
Recovery of Rental and Damages. He alleged that since he was not compensated for the
expropriation of his property, the possession by the plaintiff was illegal. This argument
was opposed by the petitioner, claiming that Javellana can no longer file an action for the
recovery of the possession of the lots since the same was already utilized for public use,
therefore can only demand for the payment of just compensation.
The RTC then issued an order (2003 order) which nullified the 1983 order, ordering the
petitioner to immediately deposit the 10% of the just compensation after determining the
value of the property at the time the complaint was filed.

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This was amended six months later (2004 order), changing the reckoning point from the
time of the filing of the complaint to the date of the issuance of this order. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioner, arguing that there was no legal basis for its
issuance. This was denied by the trial court, ruling that since no deposit was made, the
reckoning point for the determination of the fair market value of the property should be
the date of the issuance of the order.
City of Iloilo assailed the aforementioned orders claiming that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in overturning the 1993 order which was already final and executory,
and that the just compensation for the expropriation should be based on the fair market
value of the property at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Private respondent argued that there was no error committed by the trial court, and that
the said orders were subject to amendment and nullification at the court’s discretion.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an expropriation order becomes final?
2. Whether or not the reckoning point of the determination of just compensation is the
time of the taking or the time of the filing of the complaint?
RULING:
1. The court held that expropriation proceedings have two stages. The first phase
ends with an order of dismissal, or a determination that the property is to be acquired for
a public purpose. Either order will be a final order that may be appealed by the aggrieved
party. The second phase consists of the determination of just compensation. It ends with
an order fixing the amount to be paid to the landowner. Both orders, being final, are
appealable. An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of
whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.
Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to
expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned. In this case, Javellana did not
bother to file an appeal from the May 17, 1983 Order which granted petitioner’s Motion
for Issuance of Writ of Possession and which authorized petitioner to take immediate
possession of the Subject Property. Thus, it has become final, and the petitioner’s right
to expropriate the property for a public use is no longer subject to review. On the first
question, therefore, we rule that the trial court gravely erred in nullifying the May 17, 1983
Order.

2. As established in a long line of cases, the Court constantly affirmed that:


x x x just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution
of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained
as of the time of the filing of the complaint.

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Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure also provides that, under which the
complaint for expropriation was filed, just compensation is to be determined "as of the
date of the filing of the complaint." Here, there is no reason to depart from the general
rule that the point of reference for assessing the value of the Subject Property is the time
of the filing of the complaint for expropriation.
For more than twenty (20) years, the MIAA occupied the subject lot without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings and without the MIAA exerting efforts to ascertain ownership
of the lot and negotiating with any of the owners of the property. To our mind, these are
wanton and irresponsible acts which should be suppressed and corrected. Hence, the
award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is in order.
Petition is GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 32 is DIRECTED to
immediately determine the just compensation due to private respondent Elpidio T.
Javellana based on the fair market value of the Subject Property at the time Civil Case
No. 14052 was filed, or on September 18, 1981 with interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the time of filing until full payment is made. The City of Iloilo is
ORDERED to pay private respondent the amount of ₱200,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
---oo0oo---
APO Fruits Corporation vs LBP G.R. No. 164195. February 6, 2007.
FACTS:
APO Fruits Corporation, Inc. (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) were owners of 5
parcels of land (1338.60 has.) located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On 12 October 1995,
the two voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. DAR offered P86.9 million for
AFC’s land and P164.40 million for HPI’s land (total of about P251.3 million). AFC, HPI
and DAR cannot agree on a price hence the Complaint for Determination of Just
Compensation was filed before the DAR Adjudication Board on 14 February 1997. The
DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation of the land for three years. But
nevertheless, the government, through the Land Bank of the Philippines, deposited P26M
into AFC’s account and P45M into HPI’s account as down payment in 1996. The DAR
also caused the titling of the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines in
December 1996. Later, titles were given to farmers under the CARP (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program).
Due to DARAB’s failure to adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a complaint for determination of
just compensation before the RTC of Davao which rendered a decision in favor of AFC
and HPI. The RTC ruled, based on the reports it gathered from assessors, that the
purchase price should be higher than what was offered by DAR; that the purchase price
should be at P103.33/ sq. m; that DAR is to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1.38 billion. DAR
appealed to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not there was just compensation?

RULING:
No. AFC’s and HPI’s land were taken in 1996 without just compensation. DARAB, an
agency of the DAR which was commissioned by law to determine just compensation, sat
on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases
before the RTC. The RTC’s finding is to be sustained as it based it’s ruling on evidence.
DAR was given chance to support its ruling on why the purchase price should be at a
lower amount but DAR failed to present such evidence. To allow the taking of landowners’
properties, and to leave them empty-handed while government withholds compensation
is undoubtedly oppressive.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered “just” inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a
decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure
is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning
of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
The power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute).
The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that “private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation” and in the abundant jurisprudence that
has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a
proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) provides:
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of
Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified
by this Act
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it does
the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads, as follows:

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Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the


cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use
and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment
made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property
as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.
Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent improvements on AFC’s
and HPI’s lands have been introduced and found existing, e.g., all weather-road network,
airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses, among others, wherein substantial
amount of capital funding have been invested in putting them up.
The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a stone’s throw from the residential
and/or industrial sections of Tagum City, a fact DAR should never ignore. The market
value of the property (plus the consequential damages less consequential benefits) is
determined by such factors as the value of like properties, its actual or potential use, its
size, shape and location. Therefore, AFC and HPI is entitled to the amount of just
compensation (Php 1.38 billion) as computed with 12% interest per annum plus attorney’s
fees amounting to 10% of the just compensation or P138 million.
---oo0oo----
|Separra, Liezl|
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JESUS ALSUA,
represented by BIBIANO C. SABINO, Respondents. G.R. No. 211351, February 4,
2015
FACTS:
Jesus Alsua (Jesus) owned a 62.1108 has. parcel of unregistered agricultural land known
as Lot No. 8882, Cad-201, situated in Malidong, Pioduran, Albay, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 99-13-001-0067 in his name.
On March 6, 1994, respondents Heirs of Jesus Alsua and their representative Bibiano C.
Sabino (respondents) voluntarily offered to sell7 the entire parcel of land to the
government under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, as amended, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988," but only 47.4535 has. thereof, consisting
of 43.7158 has. of cocoland and 3.7377 has. of unirrigated riceland (subject lands), were
acquired.
Upon receipt from the DAR of the Claim Folder (CF) on April 20, 2001, albeit containing
incomplete documents, petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued the subject
lands at 1,369,708.02 (LBP’s valuation) using the formula1 stated in DAR AO No. 5,
series of 1998, as follows:

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Cocoland 43.7158 ha. x ₱29,018.46 ₱1,268,565.19


Unirrigated Riceland 3.7377 ha. x 27,060.18 101,142.83
₱1,369,708.02
The DAR then offered to respondents the LBP’s valuation as just compensation for the
lands, but the latter rejected the valuation. Thus, the LBP was prompted to deposit the
said amount in cash and in Agrarian Reform Bonds in respondents’ name.
After summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation,
docketed as DARAB Case No. 05-01-0059-A’-2001, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD), in a Decision dated January 29, 2004, fixed the value of the subject
lands at ₱5,479,744.15. The LBP moved for reconsideration but was denied in a
Resolution dated March 11, 2004. Dissatisfied with the PARAD’s valuation, the LBP filed
a petition for determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 3 (RTC), docketed as Agrarian Case No. 04-02, averring that the
PARAD’s valuation was excessively high and is contrary to the legally prescribed factors
in determining just compensation.
On the other hand, respondents maintained the correctness of the PARAD’s valuation,
insisting that it considered all the factors that may be used as basis in order to arrive at a
just and equitable valuation of the subject lands, including their potential use and
corresponding increase in value.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision dated August 17, 2012, the RTC rejected the valuation of both the LBP and
the PARAD and fixed the just compensation for the subject lands at ₱4,245,820.53 as
follows:
LV for Cocoland = ₱3,654,285.91
LV for Riceland = 350,072.98
LV for Trees = 241, 461.64
₱4,245,820.53
================
The RTC used the formula under DARAO No. 5, series of 1998, as amended, i.e., LV =
(CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1), utilizing production data or values within the 12-month period
preceding the presumptive date of taking on June 30, 2009 pursuant to DAR AO No. 1,
series of 2010, which "currentizes" the bases for the production data and values and does
away with the payment of interest that will compensate for the loss of purchasing power
due to inflation.
The CA Ruling

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In a Decision dated October 31, 2013, the CA fixed the just compensation of the subject
lands at 2,465,423.02, less the initial valuation already paid in the amount of
1,369,708.02,plus legal interest at the rate of 12% p.a. from November 13, 2001 to June
30, 2013, and at 6% p.a. from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed any reversible error in fixing the just compensation for
the subject lands.
RULING:
Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, such as in this
case where the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled, just
compensation should be determined and the process be concluded under RA 6657. For
purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the "time
when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property," such as when
title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries, as in this case.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA applied the provisions of DAR AO No. 5, series of
1998 in computing the just compensation for the subject lands. Under the said AO, there
shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands.
To reiterate, just compensation is the fair market value of an expropriated property at the
time of taking, in this case, the value of the subject lands upon the issuance of the OCTs
in the name of the beneficiaries on November 29, 2001.
The factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657 must be considered in computing
just compensation, (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like
properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property and the income therefrom, (d) the
owner’s sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by
government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers
and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h) the non-payment of
taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any,
must be equally considered.
Accordingly, the Court finds a need to remand Agrarian Case No. 04-02 to the RTC for
the determination of just compensation in accordance with these factors. Relative thereto,
the RTC is further directed to observe the following guidelines in the remand of the case:
1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the "time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, in this case, upon the
issuance of OCT Nos. C-27721 and 27722 in the names of the agrarian reform
beneficiaries on November 29, 2001.

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2. The evidence must conform to Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its


amendment by RA 9700. It bears pointing out that while Congress passed RA 9700 on
July 1, 2009, amending certain provisions of RA 6657, the law should not be retroactively
applied to pending claims/cases. Hence, Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its
further amendment by RA 9700, should be the basis for the valuation of the subject lands.
In the event that the respondents had already withdrawn the amount deposited by the
LBP, the withdrawn amount should be deducted from the final land valuation to be paid
by LBP.

3. The RTC may impose interest on the just compensation as may be warranted by
the circumstances of the case. In previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal
interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment. Legal interest shall
be pegged at the rate of 12% interest p.a. from the time of taking until June 30, 2013 only.
Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, interest shall be at 6% p.a. in line
with the amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799, series of 2013.

4. Finally, the RTC is advised that while it should be mindful of the different formulae
created by the DAR in arriving at just compensation, it is not strictly bound to adhere
thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their application.

The determination of just compensation is a judicial function; hence, courts cannot be


unduly restricted in their determination thereof. To do so would deprive the courts of their
judicial prerogatives and reduce them to the bureaucratic function of inputting data and
arriving at the valuation. The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a
judicial function which is vested in the regional trial court acting as a SAC, and not in
administrative agencies. The SAC, therefore, must still be able to reasonably exercise its
judicial discretion in the evaluation of the factors for just compensation, which cannot be
arbitrarily restricted by a formula dictated by the DAR, an administrative agency. The trial
court may proceed to make its own computation based on the extended list in Section 17
of Republic Act No. 6657, which includes other factors.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as it seeks to sustain the valuation of the
subject lands made by petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines. Accordingly, Agrarian
Case No. 04-02 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 3 for
the proper determination of just compensation in accordance with the guidelines set in
this Decision. The trial court is directed to conduct the proceedings in said case with
reasonable dispatch and to submit to the Court a report on its findings and recommended
conclusions within sixty (60) days from notice of this Decision.

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---oo0oo---
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT
OF APPEALS, Respondents. G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015.
FACTS:
In February 1993, NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro,
Batangas City in order to construct and maintain transmission lines for the 230 KV
Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission Project. Respondents heirs of
Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property, with a total area of 14,257 square meters, which
was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9696 of the Registry of Deeds of
Batangas.3
On May 26, 1995, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the Regional Trial
Court in Batangas City (RTC), seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over
a portion of the property involving an area of only 6,326 square meters, more or less,
alleging that it had negotiated with the respondents for the acquisition of the easement
but they had failed to reach any agreement; and that, nonetheless, it was willing to deposit
the amount of ₱9,790.00 representing the assessed value of the portion sought to be
expropriated. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession upon deposit to enable it
to enter and take possession and control of the affected portion of the property; to
demolish all improvements existing thereon; and to commence construction of the
transmission line project. It likewise prayed for the appointment of three commissioners
to determine the just compensation to be paid.7
In their answer with motion to dismiss, the respondents staunchly maintained that
NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before entering the property and that the entry
was done without their consent in the process, destroying some fruit trees without
payment, and installing five transmission line posts and five woodpoles for its project; that
the area being expropriated only covered the portion directly affected by the transmission
lines; that the remaining portion of the property was also affected because the
transmission line passed through the center of the land, thereby dividing the land into
three lots; that the presence of the high tension transmission line had rendered the entire
property inutile for any future use and capabilities; that, nonetheless, they tendered no
objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just compensation not only for the
portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was greatly
diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project; and that their property was classified as
industrial land. Thus, they sought the dismissal of the complaint, the payment of just
compensation of ₱1,000.00/square meter, and attorney’s fees; and to be allowed to
nominate their representative to the panel of commissioners to be appointed by the trial
court.
The RTC constituted the panel of three commissioners. The two commissioners
appraised the value at ₱550.00/square meter. However, the third commissioner filed a
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separate report dated March 16, 1999, whereby he recommended the payment of "an
easement fee of at least ten percent (10%) of the assessed value indicated in the tax
declaration21plus cost of damages in the course of the construction, improvements
affected and tower occupancy fee.
Accordingly, the RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay the respondents: (1) just compensation
for the whole area of 14,257 square meters at the rate of ₱550.00/square meter; (2) legal
rate of interest from May 5, 1995 until full payment; and (3) the costs of suit.27
NAPOCOR appealed (CA-G.R. No. 72069).
On April 29, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 27, 2000 of Branch
I of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that plaintiff-appellant shall pay only for the occupied 6,326 square
meters of the subject real property at the rate of ₱550.00 per square meter and to pay
legal interest therefrom until fully paid.
On January 3, 2014, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue
Expropriation Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable
agreement and that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for
public purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed
pending appeal.
RULING:
The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper,
but, conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or
discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and
equitable.
The right of eminent domain is "the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate,
not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty,
to public purpose." But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory
requirements should underlie the Government’s exercise of the power of eminent domain,
namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid
to the property owner. "Public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public
interest," "public benefit," and "public convenience."
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation
filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose.

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Indeed, public use is the fundamental basis for the action for expropriation; hence,
NAPOCOR’s motion to discontinue the proceedings is warranted and should be granted.
If, for example, during the trial in the lower court, it should be made to appear to the
satisfaction of the court that the expropriation is not for some public use, it would be the
duty and the obligation of the trial court to dismiss the action. And even during the
pendency of the appeal, if it should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the appellate
court that the expropriation is not for public use, then it would become the duty and the
obligation of the appellate court to dismiss it.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property
to the respondents, there is no need to pay "just compensation" to them because their
property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the property,
therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their
property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of the
possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages.
This should mean that the compensation must be based on what they actually lost as a
result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use, including the
value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of the
transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings is a
development occurring during the appeal, the Court now treats the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of converting the case into an action
for damages. For that purpose, the Court remands the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the expropriation proceedings due to the
intervening cessation of the need for public use; REMANDS the records to the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 1, in Batangas City as the court of origin for further proceedings to be
conducted in accordance with the foregoing instructions; and ORDERS said trial court to
try and decide the issues with dispatch.
---oo0oo---

Rule 68- Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortage


REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ALTO SURETY
and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., oppositor-appellee. G.R. No. L-14303
March 24, 1960
FACTS:
Eustaquio Palma registered owner of a parcel of land with its improvements, located in
San Agustin, Iriga, Camarines Sur, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12—
Camarines Sur, executed a first mortgage to secure a loan of P20,000.00, in favor of the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), and subsequently, with the consent of the
RFC, a second mortgage over the same property, in favor of Alto Surety & Insurance

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Company, Inc. (Alto). Both mortgages were duly registered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Camarines Sur and annotated on the corresponding certificate of title. Upon
failure of the mortgagor to settle the P20,000.00 loan on its maturity, RFC foreclosed the
mortgage extrajudicially under Act 3135 as authorized in the deed of mortgage and the
property was sold in public auction under the direction of the Provincial Sheriff of
Camarines Sur on April 17, 1951 in favor of mortgagee RFC as the highest bidder for the
sum of P11,211.68.
Six months later, mortgagor Palma, by a deed of assignment dated October 15, 1951,
transferred and conveyed all his rights, title and interest in and to the mortgaged property
to the spouses Anacleto Trinidad and Rosa S. de Trinidad, the assignees assuming the
obligation of paying the repurchase price of the auctioned property. Within the year of
redemption, that is, on December 29, 1951, the assignee-spouses and the RFC executed
a "Deed of Resale" whereby the mortgaged property was resold and reconveyed in favor
of the "redemptioners, their heirs, assignees and successors in interest".
On April 3, 1952, Alto, as junior encumbrancer, wrote the RFC inquiring as to the actual
status of the property subject to redemption expiring on April 17, 1952. In its reply dated
April 9, 1952, RFC advised Alto that the auctioned property had already been sold to the
Trinidad spouses "under a deed of redemption on the installment plan"
This notwithstanding, the RFC, on October 2, 1952, executed an affidavit consolidating
ownership on the purchased property, stating therein that the period of redemption had
expired on April 18, 1952 without the debtor or any lien-holder thereon exercising said
right of redemption or repurchase. This affidavit, together with the deed of sale evidencing
its (RFC's) purchase of the property at public auction were registered on December 16,
1953, by virtue of which, RFC was able to secure the cancellation of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 12, in the name of the owner-mortgagor Eustaquio Palma, and the issuance
of a new title in its name (T.C.T. No. 1155). The second mortgage in favor of Alto,
however, was carried and annotated at the back of the new title.
It is this annotation on its certificate of title No. 1155 that the RFC sought to have
cancelled, alleging that with the consolidation and transfer to it as the first mortgagee of
the mortgagee's rights on the property, the junior encumbrancer's lien on the same
property had ceased. Alto, the second mortgagee, opposed the petition contending that
with the execution of the Deed of Resale between RFC and the spouses Anacleto
Trinidad and Rosa S. de Trinidad, assignees of the mortgagor, the mortgaged property
had been completely released from the first mortgage and the second mortgage had been
automatically transformed into a first lien on the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the annotation of the second mortgage in favor of the oppositor on the
back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1155 was made in accordance with law.

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RULING:
The court a quo acted correctly in denying, under the circumstances, the petition to cancel
the annotation of the second mortgage at the back of the title covering the property
originally owned by Eustaquio Palma. It has been consistently held by this Court, that the
relief afforded by Section 112 of the Land Registration Act may only be allowed if "there
is a unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the
part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes controversial and should be
threshed out in an ordinary case.
Granting that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by the RFC is proper and
justified, since the junior encumbrancer was admittedly not notified thereof, the
foreclosure of the first mortgage cannot be considered to have terminated or extinguished
the rights of said junior encumbrancer over the property.
While as a general rule, the junior encumbrancer is not a necessary party to a suit to
foreclose by a senior mortgagee, it is always proper and prudent to join him as a
defendant, both to give an opportunity to defend and to extinguish his right of redemption.
When a senior mortgagee forecloses and becomes the purchaser at his own foreclosure
sale, but the holder of a subsequent mortgage or other subordinate interest has not been
joined or has been eliminated from the proceeding, equity will keep the senior mortgage
alive against the subsequent encumbrance and the senior mortgagee will be entitled to
an action de novo to reforeclose the mortgage as to the omitted persons.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from denying the first mortgagee's petition
to cancel the annotation of the second mortgage at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 1155, is hereby affirmed, without prejudice to the proper adjudication, in an
appropriate ordinary action, of the respective rights of the parties herein as a result of the
execution of the Deed of Resale, Exhibit J. The petitioner-appellant shall pay the costs. It
is so ordered.
---oo0oo---

|Singzon, Eduardo|

BERNARDO TIGLAO, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. ENGRACIO BOTONES, Defendant-


Appellant, G.R. No. L-3619 October 29, 1951

FACTS:

Upon motion of the plaintiff, the Court of First Instance of Tarlac on July 20, 1943,ordered
the issuance of a writ of execution.provincial sheriff sold at public auction the mortgaged
properties to the plaintiff as the highest bidder; the plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for the
confirmation of the sale in his favor. “said sale is hereby APPROVED." plaintiff filed a

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motion for the issuance of a writ of possession.The defendant filed an opposition alleging
(1) that the judgment of March 24, 1943,is null and void, because the defendant's former
counsel had no special authority to settle the case in the manner stated in said judgment,
and (2) that the sheriff's salewas not legally confirmed, because the defendant was not
given notice of themotion for confirmation or its hearing.court granted plaintiff's motion for
the issuance of a writ of possession.The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration and
a motion invoking moratorium under Republic Act No. 342 and praying that all
proceedings be suspended.Court of First Instance of Tarlac denied the motion for
reconsideration. The defendant appealed.

ISSUE:

W/N the trial court erred in sustaining the order confirming the sheriff's sale and inissuing
the corresponding writ of possession in favor of the appellee.

RULING:

1Under section 3 of rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the sale of mortgaged property "when
confirmed by an order of the court . . . shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties
to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption
as may be allowed by law."The effect of confirmation was more elaborately explained in
the case of Raymundo vs Sunico,"As the title to mortgaged real property does not vest in
the purchaser until after the confirmation of the sale, he has, prior to that time, no right to
the possession of such property, and no legal cause of complaint against the defendants,
who remaining possession, exercising the rights of ownership. On the other hand, the
mortgagors have no means, until the confirmation of compelling the purchaser to comply
with the terms of the sale. Should the mortgagors attempt to compel a purchaser to pay
in his money, an answer on the part of the purchaser to the effect that the sale had not
been confirmed would be sufficient. The confirmation operates to divest the title out of the
former owner and to vest it in the purchaser. It is at this time when the rights or title
passes, and not before. Sales of mortgaged real estate should be more strictly scrutinized
than ordinary sales under execution. In the former the title, as we have said, passes to
the purchaser upon confirmation by thecourt, and the defendant or debtor has no right to
redeem within the statutoryperiod granted in cases ordinary execution sales. In some of
the States of theAmerican Union there are statutes permitting the mortgagor to redeem
after theforeclosure sale has been confirmed. There is no such privilege extended to him
bystatute in the Philippine Islands. The right of the mortgagor and those claimingunder
him to redeem for mortgagee is extinguished by the foreclosure when thesame has been
properly made. But, up to the time of confirmation the title remainsin the mortgagor."In
said case this Court held that a hearing "is a very essential part of thoseproceedings
because the hearing gives the interested parties an opportunity to laybefore the court
their reasons why the sale should or should not be confirmed, andit is the result of this
hearing which diverts the title if the sale is confirmed." Velasquez,Notice and hearing of
motion for confirmation are therefore essential to the validityof the order of confirmation,

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not only to enable the interested parties to resist themotion but also to inform them of the
time when their right of redemption is cutoff.

In the case at bar, the lower court undoubtedly had acquired jurisdiction over
theforeclosure proceedings but, in confirming the sheriff's sale without the
essentialrequisite as to notice of the motion for confirmation, it exceeded its power, with
theresult that the order of confirmation is null and void.

---oo0oo--

EPIFANIO CRUZ and EVELINA CRUZ,Petitioners v. INTERMEDIATEAPPELLANT


COURT, CALIXTRO O. ADRIATICO, RUFINO J. SANTIAGO andGODOFREDO
VALMEO, Respondents,GR No. 72806January 9, 1989

Facts:

Petitioners mortgaged certain properties to private respondents whoeventually sued them


for non-payment and for the judicial foreclosure ofaforementioned mortgages under Rule
68 of the Rules of Court. In the courseof the proceedings a compromise agreement was
reached and this becamethe basis of the Judgment on Compromise issued by the
respondent Judge ofthe Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan:

‘3. Upon full payment of the sums of P55,000.00 and P320,000.00 within the

period agreed upon, the plaintiff shall deliver to the defendants TransferCertificate of Title
No. T-32286 (M) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan,Meycauayan Branch, together with
all the documents submitted to theplaintiff;4. Should the defendants fail to pay the sums
agreed upon within the periodstipulated, the defendants shall pay plaintiff the entire sum
of P92,149.00under the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage attached to the complaint as
Annex

‘C’ and an additional sum of P44,700.00 as attorney’s fees;

5. Upon failure of the defendants to pay the sums agreed upon within theperiod
stipulated, plaintiff shall be entitled to a writ of execution directing theforeclosure of all the
mortgages subject matter of this litigation and to theprincipal sum of P300,000.00 in the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage attached to the complaint as Annex ‘B’ shall be added the
sum of P44,700.00 asattorney’s fees.’

For failure of the petitioners to comply with certain provisions of theagreement, private
respondent moved for a writ of execution. The mortgagedproperties were foreclosed upon
in an auction sale and were purchased bythe private respondents as the highest bidder.
The sale was latter judicially confirmed.

Petitioners submitted that the aforestated judgment on compromise wasnull and void ab
initio because it allegedly "denied them their equity ofredemption under Sec. 2, Rule 68

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of the Rules of Court, by not allowing the petitioners to pay ‘into court within a period of
not less than ninety(90) days from the date of the service of said order,’ and that it is only
if the petitioners default in said payment that the property should be soldto pay the
judgment debt.

Issue:
Whether or not the aforestated judgment on compromise was null and void abinitio
because it allegedly denied petitioners their equity of redemption underSec. 2, Rule 68 of
the Rules of Court.

Ruling:
No, the judgment on compromise was not null and void, but valid andenforceable.

The procedure outlined therein obviously refers to the situation where a full-blown trial,
with the introduction of evidence is entailed, such that the trial courthas to thereafter
determine whether the allegations in the complaint have beenproved, then ascertain the
total amount due to the plaintiff, and thereafterrender judgment for such amount with an
order for the payment thereof inaccordance with the prescription of the aforequoted
section, sans theagreement of the parties on those particulars. There being no such
agreement,the specified procedure has necessarily to be followed and the
minimumperiod of ninety (90) days for payment, also referred to as the period for
theexercise of the equity, as distinguished from the right, of redemption has to
beobserved and provided for in the judgment in the foreclosure suit.Jurisprudentially, it
has also been held that the exercise of the equity ofredemption may be made beyond the
90-days period but before theforeclosure sale is confirmed by the court.It stands to
reason, however, that the aforesaid procedure cannot be ofsubstantial application to, and
can be modified by, a valid agreement of theparties, such as in the compromise
agreement subject of and constituting thebasis for the judgment on compromise rendered
in Civil Case No. 7418-M ofthe Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, as hereinbefore stated

The dispositionsof Section 2 of Rule 68 clearly cannot apply since the parties therein had
specifically agreed on the amounts to be paid, when they should be paidand the effects
of non-payment or violation of the terms of theiragreement.

Thus, the petitioners undertook to pay on the obligation subjectof the compromise
agreement, P55,000.00 on or before August 20, 1984 andP320,000.00 on or before
September 30, 1984 and, in case of default on theirpart, the consequences are spelled
out in Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of theiraforequoted compromise agreement, all of which are
premised on the precisecontingency of failure by the petitioners to comply within the
period stipulated.Paragraph 5 lucidly provides that, upon the happening of the
aforesaidcontingency contemplated therein, private respondent Godofredo Valmeoshall
be entitled to a writ of execution directing the foreclosure of all themortgages subject
matter of said litigation. It is noteworthy that this particularproviso is what distinguishes
this case from other judicial foreclosure casesdecided on the bases of compromise
agreements but which did not have thesame specification.

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Ineluctably, therefore, the petitioners herein therebywaived their so-called equity of


redemption and the case wasnecessarily removed from the operation of Section 2, Rule
68 insofar asits provisions are inconsistent with the judgment on compromise.

It is hornbook knowledge that a judgment on compromise has the effect of res judicata
on the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consentor forgery. To
challenge the same, a party must move in the trial court to setaside the said judgment
and also to annul the compromise agreement itself,before he can appeal from that
judgment. Definitely, the petitioners haveignored these remedial avenue.

There can be no pretension that the compromise agreement as formulated and approved
is contrary to law, public policy or morals or that the same was tainted with circumstances
vitiating consent. The petitioners entered into the same duly assisted by competent
counsel and the entire judicial proceeding was under judicial scrutiny and supervision.

Hence, as correctly observed by the respondent court:

(1) Re the 'equity of redemption'. It is true that under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, the
debtor-mortgagor is allowed a period of 90 days within which to pay his debt, to prevent
foreclosure, but this right, to Our mind was impliedly waived when the parties signed the
compromise agreement, which was later embodied in the Judgment. The agreement in
effect says that upon breach of the same (and this fact is not disputed), foreclosure should
be resorted to. The agreement was clear that payment had to be made within the
stipulated period. It would be absurd to say that after said stipulated period, petitioners
would still be given an additional 90-day period for the 'equity'. Had petitioners intended
still an exercise in 'equity', they should have insisted on a clarificatory provision in the
agreement. 14

Petitioners next shift to the writ of execution pursuant to which the foreclosure sale was
conducted by respondent sheriff, stigmatizing it as a falsified writ of execution. This is
unwarranted and baseless.

What actually transpired was that the respondent Branch Clerk of Court issued a writ of
execution on October 9, 1984 containing the following directives:

NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to execute and make effective the
aforequoted decision of this Honorable Court dated August 20, 1984 and make a return
of this writ within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof. But if sufficient property cannot be
found thereon, then we command you that of the land and building of said defendants
you make the said sum of money. 15

This honest and inconsequential mistake on the part of the respondent clerk,
subsequently rectified by the respondent sheriff, was satisfactorily explained by the court
a quo in its order resolving several motions on May 27, 1985 16 as follows:

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As to the alleged defect in the writ of execution, the mortgagors could have moved to
have the writ quashed before the confirmation of the sale, but they failed to raise that
point or any point for that matter. He alleged defect in the writ of execution is that it differs
from that quoted in the notice of sale. The writ issued by the Branch Clerk of Court
included an extra sentence which reads: 'But if sufficient personal property cannot be
found thereon, then we command you that of the land and buildings of said defendants
you make the said sum of money.' The surplusage is understandable and excusable as
these wordings are usually included in the standard form copied by the stenographer in
ordinary writs of execution. It has been held that if the writ of execution does not conform
to the judgment, the writ may be amended so that the judgment may be properly satisfied.
In fact, the slight difference between the writ handed by the Branch Clerk and that
reproduced in the notice of sale was for the reason that the Deputy Sheriff, realizing the
imperfection of the original writ, rectified it by eliminating the surplusage to make it
conform to the terms of the judgment. Although the better step that should have been
taken by the sheriff was to inform the Branch Clerk about it for the proper amendment,
the rectification done by said sheriff, in effect, was confirmed and adopted by the court
when it confirmed the sale without any objection from the herein movants. At any rate,
there is no showing of any detriment to the interest of the mortgagee resulting from this
rectification. 17

Petitioners' complaints about the supposed irregularity in the publication of the notice of
sale involve questions of fact which cannot be resolved by this Court. Furthermore,
petitioners had all the opportunity, in the several motions filed in and heard by the trial
court and especially in the hearing for the confirmation of sale, to ventilate the alleged
irregularities but they never did so.

Neither are We inclined to nor justified in disturbing the factual findings of the respondent
court debunking petitioners' claim that private respondent Valmeo had, subsequent to the
foreclosure sale of the property, agreed to allow petitioners to redeem the property. In
reliance upon the findings of the trial court in its orders of October 8, 1984 18 and March
20, 1985, 19 the respondent court categorically declared:

(5) Re the 'new agreement to redeem'. There was actually NO SUCH AGREEMENT.
True, petitioners had been informed in Court by private respondents' previous counsel
(Atty. Cecilio de la Merced) that he was allowing petitioners 'to redeem'. BUT this was
without any authorization from the private respondents. In fact, in due time, private
respondents were able to inform the respondent Judge of this non-authorization and the
Judge was able to rectify her previous order allowing such 'redemption'. Be it noted that
aforementioned previous counsel's services were TERMINATED by the private
respondents. 20

Petitioners close their jeremiad by an appeal for consideration on ground of equity.


However, We also recognize the principle of countervailing equity in favor of the adverse
party, opposed to that which petitioners seek to be recognized, and which should not be
subordinated because it is of equal strength and equally deserving of consideration.

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WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioners

---oo0oo---

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM(GSIS), petitioner,vs. THE COURT


OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, BRANCH III,ILOILO CITY and NELITA M. VDA. DE
BACALING & MARIATERESA INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,
respondents.. T. Barrera and Associates for respondent MATIDO.Ramon A.
Gonzales for NenitaBacaling. 175 SCRA 19G.R. No. L-45322 July 5, 1989.

FACTS:

1.In 1957, a real estate loan of P600,000 payable inmonthly installments within a period
of ten (10) yearswith 7% interest per annum, was granted to thespouses Ramon and
NelitaBacaling by the petitioner,Government Service Insurance System (hereafter
GSIS)for the development of the Bacaling-Morenosubdivision.

2.To secure the repayment of the loan, the Bacalingsexecuted in favor of the GSIS a real
estate mortgageon four (4) lots owned by them. Out of the approvedloan of P600,000,
only P240,000 had been released tothem by the GSIS as of November 11, 1957.

3.The Bacalings failed to finish the subdivision projectand pay the amortizations on the
loan so the GSIS, onMay 22, 1959, filed in the Court of First Instance ofIloilo a complaint
for judicial foreclosure of themortgage (Civil Case No. 5233). During the pendencyof the
case, Ramon Bacaling passed away.

4.In a decision dated October 5, 1960, the court orderedthe widow, for herself and as
administratrix of theestate of Ramon Bacaling, to pay the GSIS.

5.Mrs. Bacaling failed to pay the judgment debt within90 days after receipt of the decision
of the court.Consequently, the mortgaged lots were sold at publicauction on February 28,
1961. The GSIS was thehighest bidder at the sale.

6.On March 1, 1961, the GSIS filed a motion forconfirmation of the sale of the property to
it (p. 25,Record on Appeal). On October 10, 1961, it reiteratedsaid motion and further
asked for a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor, its bid of P74,558.25being
inadequate to cover the judgment debt whichhad swelled to P339,302.58 as of August
31, 1961.

7.On December 18, 1972, respondent Maria TeresaIntegrated Development Corporation


(MTIDC), asalleged assignee of the mortgagor's "right ofredemption," filed a "Motion to
Exercise the Right ofRedemption" The motion was granted by the trialcourt in an order
dated December 20, 1972. CheckNo. MK-45594 of the China Banking Corporation inthe
amount of P l,100,000 was delivered by MTIDC tothe GSIS as payment of the redemption

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price.However, the check was dishonored by the draweebank because it was drawn
against a closed account.

8.On motion of the GSIS the court issued on February 3,1973 an order declaring null and
void the redemptionof the property by respondent MTIDC.

9.On December 19, 1975, fourteen (14) years after theforeclosure sale on February 28,
1961 and almostthree (3) years after the court had annulled onFebruary 3, 1973 its
redemption of the foreclosedproperty, respondent MTIDC filed a motion
forreconsideration of the court's order and sought therestoration of its right of redemption.
The court, overthe strong opposition of the GSIS, reconsidered onJanuary 19, 1976 its
order of December 8, 1975 andgranted MTIDC a period of one year after the finalityof its
order of January 19, 1976 to redeem theBacaling properties.

10.The GSIS sought a reconsideration of that order onthe ground that the court may not
extend the periodfor the redemption of the propert.

11.On February 12,1976, the court modified its order ofJanuary 19, 1976 by giving MTIDC
one (1) year fromJanuary 19, 1976 within which to redeem the Bacalingproperty, instead
of one year from the finality of theJanuary 19, 1976 order . Petitioner received a copy
ofthis last order on February 12,1976.

12.On March 1, 1976, the GSIS appealed by certiorari tothis Court raising purely legal
questions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not after the judicial foreclosure of a real estatemortgage and the confirmation
of the sale, the trial court maygrant or fix another period for the redemption of
theforeclosed property by the assignee of the mortgagor's equityof redemption?

RULING:

We find merit in the appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court provide:

SEC. 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale. — if upon the trial in such action
the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the
amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and
costs, and shall render judgment for the sum so found due and order that the same be
paid into court within a period of not less than ninety (90) days from the date of the service
of such order, and that in default of such payment the property be sold to realize the
mortgage debt and costs.

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SEC. 3. Sale of mortgaged property; effect. — When the defendant, after being directed
to do so as provided in the last preceding section, fails to pay the principal, interest, and
costs at the time directed in the order, the court shall order the property to be sold in the
manner and under the regulations that govern sales of real estate under execution. Such
sale shall not affect the rights of persons holding prior encumbrances upon the property
or a part thereof, and when confirmed by an order of the court, it shall operate to divest
the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser,subject to
such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.)

There is no right of redemption from a judicial foreclosure sale after the confirmation of
the sale, except those granted by banks or banking institutions as provided by the General
Banking Act (Limpin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70987, Sept. 29,1988).
This has been the consistent interpretation of Rule 68 in a long line of decisions of this
Court.

We may say, furthermore, that this Court has already held that in mortgage foreclosures
the rights of the mortgagee and persons holding under him are cut off by the sale when
duly confirmed, and with them the equity of redemption. The reason for that holding is
that the right of redemption being purely statutory, and there being no statute conferring
that right, it does not exist. (Benedicto vs. Yulo, 26 Phil. 166; Emphasis supplied.)

... When the foreclosure sale is validly confirmed by the court title vests upon the
purchaser in the foreclosure sale, and the confirmation retroacts to the date of the sale
(Binalbagan Estate, Inc. vs. Gatuslao, et al., 74 Phil. 128). Only foreclosure of mortgages
to banking institutions (including the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation) and those made
extrajudicially are subject to legal redemption, by express provision of statute, and the
present case does not come under exceptions. (Villar vs. Javier de Paderanga, 97 Phil.
608-609;Emphasis ours.)

Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of redemption


exists. The law (Sec. 3, Rule 68, Rules of Court) declares that a judicial foreclosure sale,
'when confirmed by an order of the court, ... shall operate to divest the rights of all the
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of
redemption as may be allowed by law.' Such rights exceptionally 'allowed by law' (i.e.,
even after confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by the charter of the
Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A.
337) (See Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1970 Ed., Vol. 3, p. 273, citing Gonzales vs.
PNB, 48 Phil. 824,828; and Martin, Rules of Court, etc., 3rd Ed., Vol. 3, p. 289, citing Villar
vs. Javier de Paderanga, 97 Phil. 64; Piano vs. Cayanong 7 SCRA 397). These laws
confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the
mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on the foreclosure-after confirmation by
the court of the foreclosure sale — which right may be exercised within a period of one
(1) year, counted from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of
Property.

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But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a


mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. In such a case,
the foreclosure sale when confirmed by an order of the court, ... shall operate to divest
the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser.' There
then exists only what is known as the equity of redemption. This is simply the right of the
defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by
paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, in
accordance with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.
(Limpin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70987, September 29, 1988.)

Since the GSIS is not a bank or banking institution, its mortgage is covered by the general
rule that there is no right of redemption after the judicial foreclosure sale has been
confirmed. Hence, Judge Numeriano Estenzo exceeded his jurisdiction and acted with
grave abuse of discretion in granting the respondent, MTIDC, another one-year period to
redeem the Bacaling properties over the opposition of petitioner GSIS as mortgagee-
purchaser thereof at the public sale. His orders dated January 19, 1976 and February 12,
1976 are null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The appealed orders dated January
19, 1976 and February 12, 1976 of Judge Numeriano Estenzo in Civil Case No. 5233 are
hereby annulled.

---oo0oo----

|Tabaranza, Lyle|

SPS. MIGUEL S. KHO and JUANITA KHO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
BANCO FILIPINO, respondents. G.R. No. L-83498 October 22,1991

Facts:

On January 31, 1978, the spouses Kho (private respondents herein) constituted in favor
of herein petitioner Banco Filipino a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land registered
in the name of plaintiff Miguel Kho to guarantee a loan granted to them by petitioner bank.
The real estate mortgage underwent amendments, until it was made to secure private
respondents obligation with the bank in the total amount of TWO MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED SIXTY NINE THOUSAND PESOS (P 2,869,000) Philippine Currency,
payable on or before September 29, 1995.

After managing to pay the sumof P 688,060.00, the Kho spouses defaulted in the payment
of some amortizations. Hence, on May 13, 1982, Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed
the mortgage. As the sole and highest bidder in the auction sale, the petitioner bank
purchased the mortgaged property for the sum of P 4,153,865.47 covering the plaintiff’s
obligations, interests, penalties and attorney’s fees as agreed in the mortgage contract.
The certificate of sale was then duly registered on June 17, 1982.

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Counting one year from June 17, 1982, the petitioners had un til June 17, 1983, within
which to redeem the property. In the meantime, the foreclosed property was leased out
to third parties and the rentals (fruits thereof) were remitted monthlyby petitioners to
respondent bank. Then just about ten (10) days before the end of the redemption period,
on June 7,1983 to be exact, petitioners filed with the RTC of Cebu (raffled off to Branch
IX) a complaint for: “Annulment of Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction, etc.”
against Banco Filipino, which action was actually for the annulment of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage.

Issue:

Whether or not the purchaser at a foreclosure sale could validly obtain possession of the
foreclosed property prior to the expiration of the redemption period.

Ruling:

Yes, the purchaser can obtain possession by writ of possession even prior to the
expiration of the redemption period.

The law and jurisprudence are clear that both during and after the period of redemption,
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale is entitled as of right to a writ of possession,
regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the
foreclosure itself (without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of said case).
Hence, an injunction to prohibit the issuance of the writ of possession is entirely out of
place.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

---oo0oo---

ROXAS v CA G.R. No. 100480 May 11, 1993

Facts:

Petitioner Roxas is the owner of a parcel of land (Lot No. 3108) located at Tanza Norte,
Panay, Capiz and covered by Tax Declaration No. 5129. On December 22, 1969, she
executed a special power of attorney appointing her brother, the late Manuel Roxas, as
her attorney-in-fact for the purpose of applying for an agricultural loan with private
respondent Rural Bank of Dumalag, Inc. using said land as collateral. On December 26,
1969 the agricultural loan was granted and received an amount of P 2,000. As security
for the loan, he executed the corresponding real estate mortgage over the subject land.

October 24, 1973, private respondent foreclosed the real estate mortgage for failure to
pay the loan on maturity and on January 7, 1974, the subject land was sold at public
auction to private respondent. For failure to exercise the right of redemption, private
respondent consolidated its ownership over the subject land and the possession thereof

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was taken from Jennifer Roxas, daughter of Manuel Roxas, and delivered by the sheriff
to private respondent.

Issues:

Whether or not respondent court acted correctly in reversing the decision of the trial court,
despite failure to post notices in the barrio where the land lies;

2. Whether or not respondent court acted correctly in not allowing redemption or


recovery of the land on equitable, if not legal ground; and

3. Whether or not respondent court acted correctly in not passing upon the issue of
gross inadequacy of price.

Ruling:

The statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales


must be strictly complied with, and that a slight deviation there from will invalidate the
notice and render the sale voidable.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 720, as amended by R.A. No. 5939, provides that notices of
foreclosure should be posted in at least three (3) of the most conspicuous public places
in the municipality and barrio where the land mortgaged is situated.

In the case at bar, the Certificate of Posting which was executed by the sheriff states that
he posted three (3) copies of the notice of public auction sale in three (3) conspicuous
public places in the municipality of Panay, where the subject land was situated and in like
manner in Roxas City, where the public auction sale took place. It is beyond dispute that
there was a failure to publish the notices of auction sale as required by law. Section 5
provides further that proof of publication shall be accomplished by an affidavit of the sheriff
or officer conducting the foreclosure sale. In this case, the sheriff executed a certificate
of posting, which is not the affidavit required by law. The rationale behind this is simple:
an affidavit is a sworn statement in writing whereas a certificate is merely a statement in
writing.

2. If recovery cannot be had under the strict provision of law, it must be allowed under
the liberal consideration of equity in view of the special circumstances in this case:

a. private respondent admitted that it was always its practice of notifying mortgagors of
the maturity of their loans, yet, in the case of petitioner, it did not do so;

b. despite earlier requests, private respondent gave the statement of account only in
1981;

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c. even after the supposed foreclosure of the land in 1974, private respondent allowed
petitioner to have possession thereof, paying the taxes in her name until 1982, when
private respondent started to demand possession.

3. The price paid by private respondent was only P3,009.37 while the total area of
the subject land is more than fourteen hectares and a fishpond at the time of the sale in
1974.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

---oo0oo---

Monzon vs Relova G.R. No. 171827 September 17, 2008

Facts:

On October 18,2000 the spouses Relova and the spouses Perez, respondents before this
Court, filed against Atty. Ana Liza Luna, Clerk of Court of Branch 18 of the RTC of
Tagaytay City, and herein petitioner Teresita Monzon an initiatory pleading captioned as
a Petition for Injunction. The case, which was filed before the same Branch 18 of the RTC
of Tagaytay City, was docketed as Civil Case No. TG-2069.

In their Petition for Injunction, respondents alleged that on December 28,1998 Monzon
executed a promissory note in favor of the spouses Perez for the amount of P600,000.00,
with interest of five percent per month, payable on or before December 28, 1999. This
was secured by Lot No. 2A a 300-square meter lot in Barangay Kaybagal, Tagaytay City.

On December 31,1998 Monzon executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel
of land in favor of the spouses Perez. Respondents also claim in their Petition for
Injunction that on March 29, 1999 Monzon executed another promissory note, this time
in favor of the spouses Relova for the amount of P200,000.00 with interest of five percent
per month payable on or before December 31,1999. This loan was secured by Lot No.
2B a 200 square meter lot.

On October 23,1999 the Coastal Lending Corporation extrajudicially foreclosed the entire
9,967-square meter property and subsequently sold to respondents. Monzon was
indebted to the Coastal Lending Corporation. Coastal Lending then extrajudicially
foreclosed the property of Monzon which included Lots 2A and 2B. The winning bidder in
this extrajudicial foreclosure was Addio Properties Inc., there was a residue of
P1,602,393.65 and this amount is in the custody of Atty. Luna.

Monzon likewise claimed that respondents could no longer ask for the enforcement of the
two promissory notes because she had already performed her obligation to them by
dacion en pago as evidenced by the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute
Sale.

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On December 5,2001 the RTC, citing the absence of petitioner and her counsel on said
hearing date despite due notice, granted an oral motion by the respondents by issuing an
order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by respondents.

On April 1,2002 RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents and ordering Atty. Luna
to deliver the residue to the respondents. On April 25,2002 Monzon filed a Notice of
Appeal, which was approved by the trial court. On June 14,2002 Addio Properties, Inc.
filed before the trial court a Motion for Intervention, which was granted by the same court
on July 12,2002 and on September 27,2005 the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision dismissing the appeal.

Issue :

Whether or not there was a cause of action against Atty Luna.

Ruling:

No. Atty. Luna should not deliver the residue to the spouses since Rule 68 governs judicial
foreclosure and the issue at bar is under Act 3135 Extrajudicial Foreclosure. Also, the SC
ruled that the failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period is the
sole ground for an order of default and not the non-appearance during hearing. The case
is remanded back to trial court for respondents to submit a manifestation where the
petition for injunction should be treated as complaint for the collection of money.

Rule 68 governs judicial foreclosure of mortgages. Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages


which was what transpired in the case at bar is governed by Act 3135. Unlike Rule 68,
Act 3135 does not grant to junior encumbrancers the right to receive the balance of the
purchase price. The only right given to second mortgagees in said issuances is the right
to redeem foreclosed property pursuant to Sec 6 of Act 3135 “any person having lien on
the property subsequent to mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold,
may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after date of the
sale.

The decision of CA is reversed and set aside. The petition for Injunction is remanded to
RTC for further proceedings.

---oo0oo---

|Templado, Wendell|

BIENVENIDO ONCE, petitioner, vs. HON. CARLOS Y. GONZALES, Presiding Judge


of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Branch VI; PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Iloilo,
and JUANITO PEÑA, respondents.

Facts:

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The city court of Iloilo City, in a decision dated April 29, 1976, ordered Bienvenido Once
to vacate an apartment in a building owned by Juanita Peña and to pay a monthly rental
of P290 until the premises have been vacated, plus P1,000 as attorney's fees.

Bienvenido Once filed a motion for reconsideration. He alleged that he had been
occupying the apartment since 1966; that he was the only one singled out for ejectment;
that he occupied the apartment as residence and for use as a carinderia which allegedly
was his sole means of livelihood, and that he should be given a preference to reoccupy
the apartment after the completion of the repairs.

The city court denied the motion in its order of June 2, 1976. Bienvenido Once appealed.
He deposited in the city court as rentals.

Juanito Peña, the owner of the apartment, filed a motion for immediate execution of the
city court's judgment. He invoked, as grounds, Once's alleged failure to file a supersedeas
bond and the supposed untenantable condition of the apartment.

Bienvenido Once opposed the motion for execution. Once alleged that he had deposited
the current rentals; that the apartment occupied by him was not in danger or collapsing,
that the building was stable, as shown by the fact that the owner, Peña, and his family
occupied the apartment adjoining the door leased to Once; that, if repairs were needed,
all the occupants of the building should vacate it, and that the commissioner, who reported
on the condition of the building, was not competent to assess its tenantable condition
since he is not an engineer but a court interpreter.

Executive Judge Valerio V. Rovira granted the motion for execution. Bienvenido Once
filed a motion for reconsideration. He reiterated his contention that the execution was
improper because he had deposited in court the current rentals. He cited the rule that a
supersedeas bond is not necessary in case the tenant had deposited in court the rentals
due (Mischiener vs. Barrios, 76 Phil. 55; Bagtas vs. Tan, 93 Phil. 804).

The lower court denied the motion. It issued a writ of execution dated September 21, 1976

On October 14, 1976 Bienvenido Once, through three CLAO lawyers, filed in this Court
the instant special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition in order to set aside the order
and writ of execution. A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court but before
it could be implemented Bienvenido Once was constrained to vacate the apartment in
litigation.

Issue:

Whether the lower court erred in ordering execution of the city court's judgment pending
appeal.

Ruling:

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The lower court committed a patent error in ordering execution of the city court's judgment
on the ground that Bienvenido Once did not file a supersedeas bond. No such bond was
necessary because no back rentals were adjudged in the city court's judgment. The
attorney's fees of P1,000 need not be covered by a supersedeas bond. (De Laureano vs.
Adil, L-43345, July 29, 1976, 72 SCRA 148, 155).

Once's timely deposit of the rentals for April, May, June, July and August, 1976 stayed
the execution of the judgment pending appeal. In such a situation, no supersedeas bond
was required to stay execution of the city court's judgment. (Sison vs. Bayona, 109 Phil.
557, 561).

Consequently, the order of execution was groundless. It was not justified under section
8, Rule 70 of the Rule of Court. Section 8 requires a supersedeas bond only if there are
accrued rentals in arrears. It dispenses with that bond if the defeated tenant deposits in
court the rentals due from time to time. The execution proceeding already mentioned is
void.

It may be noted that according to Once's manifestation of March 22, 1977, the lower court
in its decision of February 5, 1977 reversed the city court's judgment and ordered that
Once be allowed to reoccupy the leased premises.

The lower court's orders of August 9 and September 14, 1976 are set aside with costs
against respondent Peña .

---oo0oo----

RACAZA v. SUSANA REALTY, INC. G.R. No. L-20330 December 22, 1966

Facts:

Petitioner rented a portion of a piece of land owned by respondent. He started renting in


1952 when his wife bought an unfinished house that was built on it. On assurance of
respondent that petitioner's family could stay on the land by paying a monthly rent,
petitioner finished the construction of the house and lived in it. Years later, respondent
asked petitioner to vacate the land because they already needed it. Respondent twice
filed an ejectment suit; only the second was granted.

On February 10, 1956, respondent filed a complaint for ejectment in the MTC against
petitioner. This was however dismissed on November 23, 1956 for failure of respondent
to proceed to trial. On February 19, 1958, another ejectment suit was filed and the court
then ordered petitioner to vacate the premises. Accordingly, petitioner appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Pasay demanding counterclaim for what he had spent to finish
the construction of the house and for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction of the municipal court to try it. But then again, petitioner was ordered evicted
and his counterclaim was thrown out for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, petitioner raised this
issue to the Higher Court.

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On appeal, petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the municipal court to try it. He claimed that the complaint was filed more
than one year after the alleged unlawful detainer or from July, 1955 when he stopped
paying rent. The first complaint for ejectment was dismissed on November 23, 1956, while
the second was not filed until February 19, 1958

Issue:

Issue: W/N the MTC had jurisdiction over the ejectment case though the complaint did
not state the date when the alleged unlawful detainer started.

Ruling:

The case falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC. Municipal courts shall have jurisdiction
over unlawful detainer cases where the defendant’s possession was originally lawful but
ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess and must be brought before it
from the date of last demand. This case, however, was brought not on the theory that
petitioner, as lessee, failed to pay rents, but on the theory that the lease had expired and
that respondent had asked petitioner to vacate the land. The averment that the lease was
on a month-to-month basis is equivalent to an allegation that the lease expired at the end
of every month. It is therefore immaterial that rents had not been paid since July, 1955,
since what made petitioner liable for ejectment was the expiration of the lease. Rule 70,
section 2 requires previous demand only when the action is for failure to pay rent due or
to comply with the conditions of his lease. Where the action is to terminate the lease
because of the expiration of its term, no such demand is necessary. In the latter case,
upon the expiration of the term of the lease, the landlord may go into the property and
occupy it. If the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an action for unlawful detainer
may immediately be brought against him even before the expiration of the fifteen or five
days provided in Rule 70, section 2.

---oo0oo---

San Manuel Wood Products, Inc vs Tupas A.M. No. MTJ-93-892 October 25, 1995

Facts:

Complainant is the defendant in an unlawful detainer case. Respondent judge rendered


decision in favor of the plaintiff therein and against herein conplainant.

Within the reglementary period to appeal, the plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Immediate
Execution"

While the motion for immediate execution was pending in the MTCC, complainant filed a
"Notice of Appeal and Approval of Cash/Supersedeas Bond" to stay the execution and
were approved by respondent judge.

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Plaintiffs filed a "Supplemental Motion for Execution Pending Appeal"

Respondent judge issued a special order granting plaintiffs' motion for a writ of execution
pending appeal. Respondent judge contends that, the mere filing of the notice of appeal,
and the filing or deposit of cash bond with the clerk of court has automatically deprived
the trial court of its jurisdiction over this case, would be to practically nullify the
discretionary power granted said court by section 2, Rule 39

On September 10, 1993, respondent City Sheriff Fidel Casuyon served the writ to
complainant. It was returned unsatisfied.

Complainant contends that, upon perfection of its appeal respondent judge lost its
jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge lost its jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

This is an ejectment case, hence, the applicable rule is Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court.

Should the defendant fail to make the payments from time to time during the pendency of
the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, shall order the execution of
the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such
execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof
on its merits. Judge Tupas had, therefore, NO jurisdiction and authority to issue his
Special Order.

It is only the appellate court — the RTC for ejectment cases — which can order the
issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal but only for the EXPLICIT reason that
the periodic rentals as found in the inferior court decision were not paid, with notice and
hearing mandated.

It is settled that to stay the execution of judgment of an inferior court, the losing defendant
in an ejectment case must: (a) perfect his appeal; (b) file a supersedeas bond; and (c)
make a periodic deposit of the rentals due or the reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the property during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites must
concur. In this case, the complainant herein failed to comply with the third requisite as
related above.

Upon its failure to meet the third requisite prescribed under the rules, the plaintiffs have
the right to move for execution of the judgment appealed from. The order of execution,
however, has to be issued by the appellate court, in this case the Regional Trial Court,
since the respondent judge had lost his jurisdiction over the ejectment case after the

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appeal to the RTC had been perfected. The respondent judge showed gross ignorance,
albeit without any malice or corrupt motive.

Judgment is hereby rendered, holding respondent Judge Ramon B. Tupas


administratively liable for gross ignorance of the rules and ordered to pay a fine of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warning respondent Sheriff Fidel Casuyon against
committing similar violations of the rules in implementing the writ of execution.

---oo0oo---

|Teodosio, Bleizel|

DE AMPIL VS ALVENDIA, GR NO. L-19761

FACTS:

Petitioners, Quintina S. Vda. de Ampil and Domingo Brothers, Inc., pray for a writ directing
the respondent, Judge Carmelino G. Alvendia of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to
order the execution pending appeal of a decision of the Municipal Court directing
respondent Vicente Manuel to vacate the premises held by him as lessee of petitioners.

The decision of the Municipal Court states that the defendant and all persons claiming
under him should vacate the premises and pay the sum of P1,870.00 representing the
rent in arrears from April 1, 1958 up to July, 1960, at the rate of P70.00 a month and
monthly thereafter, within the first five (5) days of each month, beginning August, 1960.

Pending Manuel's appeal from the judgment above-quoted in the Court of the respondent
judge, the petitioners filed motion averring that the appellant-lessee had failed to deposit
the P70.00 monthly set by the lower court within the first five (5) days of each month, as
ordered in the appealed judgment; wherefore, it was played that, as provided by Rule 72,
section 8, of the Rules of Court, the judgment under appeal be executed is to the
possession and the defendant-appellant ordered to vacate the premises under litigation.

After hearing, the respondent judge found that the appellant had been making the monthly
deposits exacted by the appealed judgment "within the first ten days of the month
following that for which the deposit was made", and "it cannot, therefore, be said that the
defendant has failed to make the monthly deposit on time". Thus, denying the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the time for making deposits of current rentals pending appeal in a forcible
entry or detainer case set by the Municipal Court is controlling.

RULING:

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The Supreme Court held that the order of the Court of First Instance is correct, there
being no finding in the decision by the Municipal Court that the contract of lease required
the monthly rent to be paid within the five (5) days of each month. Section 8 of Rule 72
expressly prescribes that the defendant-appellant should pay or deposit, during the
dependency of the appeal, —

the amount of rent from time to time under the contract, as found by the judgment of the
justice of the peace or municipal court to exist, or in the absence of contract, he pays to
the plaintiff or unto the Court, on or before the tenth day of each calendar month, ... .

It was so ruled by this Court, in Yu Phi Khim vs. Teng Giok Yan that where the time for
payment under the contract of lease is not specifically declared in the judgment of the
justice of the peace or municipal court, the ten-day period must be followed. There is no
desire or purpose to permit the court of first instance, in a motion like this, to go beyond
the judgment receiving evidence as to the terms of the contract and the time of payment
(Khim vs. Yan, et al, G.R. No. L-5441, Nov. 29, 1952).

ln the absence of any finding as to the provisions of the lease contract by the Municipal
Court in an unlawful detainer case, the monthly deposit pending appeal may be made
within the first ten days of each succeeding month.

It follows that the portion of the decision of the Municipal Court requiring the appellant to
deposit current rentals within the first five (5) days of each month is not controlling, there
being no pronouncement that the contract calls for such payments. As ruled in the Khim
vs. Yan case (supra), section 8 of the Rules "requires as a condition sine qua non that
the judgment shall make specific findings as to the existence and the terms of the
contract. The words 'as found by the judgment' are very material."

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writ prayed for is denied. Costs against petitioners.

---oo0oo---

City of Manila vs Court of Appeals, GR No. L-42364

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 04293-SP 1 which

voided the Writ of Execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila. It appears
that after the expiration of its contract of lease involving two market stalls (owned by the
City of Manila) in the Lacson Underpass in Quiapo, Manila, the lessor-City wanted to
increase the lease rentals. Despite the refusal of the lessee (herein private respondent)
to agree to the increased rates, it refused to vacate the premises, prompting the City to
file ejectment proceedings against it. The City Court rendered a decision fixing new rental
rates and allowed the eventual ejectment of the lessee in case of non-compliance. The

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City of Manila, as lessor of the stalls appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) because
it was not satisfied with the increased rentals granted by the City Court. In the meantime,
in view of the lessee's adamant refusal to pay the increased rates, the City (without filing
any supersedeas bond), asked for immediate execution of the City Court's judgment
pending appeal. The lessee opposed this execution on the

theory that the judgment was a "conditional" one; that, there must first be a hearing or a
new action for ejectment to determine whether or not the lessee's refusal to pay was
justified; and that there can be no execution pending appeal because the City had not
filed any supersedeas bond. The CFI granted the writ of execution prayed for.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate tribunal reversed the CFI and set aside
the writ of execution, explaining that Sec. 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court (execution
pending appeal in ejectment cases) does not apply for said provision operates only when
it is the lessee (not the lessor) who appeals, for in such a case, it is the lessee who is
supposed to file a supersedeas bond and to deposit the monthly rentals in court, as said
rentals fall due citing the decision in CRUZ, ET AL. vs. FERNANDO JUGO, ET AL., 77
Phil. 18-21; as authority for the ruling. The appellate court further ruled that the proper
provision to apply is section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which ordains that generally
execution can issue only after a judgment becomes final (not during the pendency of the

appeal), unless a special reason therefor exists.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 70 of the Rules of Court applies when the lessor, not the lessee,
is the one who appeals the decision of the lower court.

RULING:

We rule that Sec. 8 of Rule 70 can apply even if it is the lessor who appeals in the sense
that in such a case, if the lessee desires to prevent execution pending appeal, he (the
lessee) must still file the supersedeas bond and deposit in court the accruing rentals. Our
doctrine in CRUZ, ET AL. vs. FERNANDO JUGO, ET AL. (supra) is reversed insofar as
it conflicts with the present case. The rationale for Our ruling is simple: why should the
lessee continue occupying the premises without filing the supersedeas bond and making
the necessary deposit for ensuing rentals (particularly when, by his failure to appeal, the
lessee does not question said accrued and incoming rents).

And even if we were to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (which ordains that generally
execution can issue only after a judgment becomes final (not during the pendency of the
appeal), unless a special reason therefor exists), the very circumstances referred to in
the preceding paragraph (continued stay on the premises, and acquiescence to the new
rates) would constitute "special reasons" for authorizing an execution pending appeal.

---oo0oo---

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San Pedro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114300

FACTS:

Private respondent William Ledesma filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Kalookan
City a complaint against petitioner spouses Pedie and Cecilia Loresto for unlawful
detainer with preliminary injunction. The court rendered judgment against the Lorestos
ordering them to: 1) vacate and surrender to the private respondent the possession of the
premises located at No. 39 Ninong Florentino St., BF Homes, Phase II, Kalookan City; 2)
pay the amount of P12,000.00 monthly as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the said premises from September 6, 1992, up to the time they actually
surrender the premises; and 3) pay P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and P166.00 as
costs of the suit.

From this decision, the spouses appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City.

Later, the Lorestos, together with petitioner Catalino San Pedro, instituted an action for
the annulment of Ledesma's title over the disputed property, premised mainly on the
ground that it had already been titled in the name of Don Mariano San Pedro under Titulo
Propriedad No. 4136 and has been in the possession of the predecessors of petitioner
San Pedro since 1900.

On September 14, 1993, Ledesma filed a motion for execution pending appeal for failure
of the petitioner spouses to make the periodic deposits of P12,000.00 as reasonable
value of the use of the premises as fixed in the appealed decision. The motion was
granted and a writ of execution and notice to vacate were forthwith issued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of


jurisdiction on the part of the respondent court in affirming the order of the Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City authorizing the execution of the decision in the eviction case.

RULING:

Judgments in ejectment cases which are favorable to the plaintiff are immediately
executory. They can be stayed by the defendant only by: a) perfecting an appeal; b) filing
a supersedeas bond; and c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable
compensation for the useand occupation of the property during the pendency of the
appeal.

These requisites must concur. Thus, even if the defendant had appealed and filed a
supersedeas bond but failed to pay the accruing rentals, the appellate court could, upon
motion of the plaintiff with notice to the defendant, and upon proof of such failure, order
the immediate execution of the appealed decision without prejudice to the appeal taking
its course. Such deposit, like the supersedeas bond, is a mandatory require-ment; hence,

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if it is not complied with, execution will issue as a matter of right. The only exceptions are
the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which prevented the
defendant from making the monthly deposit, or the occurrence of supervening events
which have brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and would
make the execution inequitable.

Also, firmly settled is the rule that the pendency of an action questioning the ownership
of property will not abate ejectment suits or bar the execution of the judgments therein.
The rationale for the rule is that an ejectment suit involves only the issue of material
possession or possession de facto while an action for annulment of title, such as the case
at bar, involves the question of ownership. There may be identity of parties and subject
matter but not of the cause of action or the relief prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioners.

---oo0oo---

|Ticao, Diana Thea|

SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, represented by FLORO ARAGAN,


petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE LORIFEL
LACAP PHIMNA, MeTC, Branch 77, Paraaque City and ELISA MAGLAQUI-
CAPARAS, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas, in her capacity as executrix of the testate


estate of Macaria Maglaqui, filed on March 16, 1993 a complaint for unlawful detainer
(Civil Case No. 8550) against Alfredo Mogar and 46 other persons[4] who were occupying
several parcels of land (Lots 1-A, B, C, E, F and G) in Yellow Ville, United Paraaque
Subdivision IV, Metro Manila. These parcels of land are covered by individual transfer
certificates of title[5] registered in the name of Macaria Maglaqui, private respondents
mother.

The MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78, eventually decided in favor of private
respondent. On appeal, the decision of the MeTC was affirmed by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66. Mogar et al. elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals but their petition was dismissed by the appellate court on December 12, 1994.
After the dismissal became final, a writ of demolition was issued by the MeTC of Paraaque
City, Branch 78. The writ, however, was not immediately implemented because the case
was transferred to Branch 77 of the same court. On February 6, 1997, Mogar et al. filed
a petition with the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 257, presided over by Judge Rolando
G. How, to enjoin the implementation of the writ of demolition. However, this petition was
denied and subsequently, an alias writ of demolition was issued by Judge Vivencio G.
Lirio of MeTC Branch 77, the court of origin.

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The alias writ of demolition was, again, not executed, this time due to the ex parte
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by Judge Amelita Tolentino, in connection with
the expropriation case (Civil Case No. 96-0253) filed by the Municipality of Paraaque
against the Testate Estate of Macaria Maglaqui.

Meanwhile, another group of persons occupying portions of the parcels of land (Lots I-F
and I-G) subject of the unlawful detainer case, organized themselves into the Sunflower
Neighborhood Association (Sunflower), the petitioner herein. On November 18, 1996,
Sunflower, represented by one Floro Aragan, filed a complaint for prohibition/injunction
with preliminary injunction against private respondent also with the RTC of Paraaque City,
Branch 257. Sunflower argued that its members should be excluded from the demolition
order as they were not parties to the original unlawful detainer case. To include their
houses in the demolition would be to deprive them of due process. This time, Judge How
granted the injunction and ordered the exclusion of the houses belonging to petitioner
from demolition.

Thus, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the
Court of Appeals (CA GR SP No. 46861) assailing both the injunction orders issued by
Judge Tolentino in the expropriation case and by Judge How in the prohibition case.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent holding that, as the judgment in
the unlawful detainer case had already become final, the execution could not be enjoined.
Consequently, the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 77 issued another alias writ of
demolition on September 14, 1998.

In order to stay the execution of the writ of demolition, Sunflower filed on January 7, 1999
an urgent motion in this Court for the issuance of a status quo order. This we granted in
a resolution dated January 20, 1999. Prior to the issuance of our resolution, however, the
writ of demolition was implemented on January 14, 1999. Petitioner thus filed a motion to
allow its members to return to the premises, which we granted in another resolution dated
April 28, 1999. Thereafter, we required both parties to submit their memoranda.

ISSUE:
The basic issue before us is whether petitioners members, who were not parties to the
unlawful detainer case, may be ejected from the land subject of this case.

RULING:
We rule in the affirmative. It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in
personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and
given an opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not
been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant
fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of
the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) a
sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.

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In the case at bar, the records show that petitioners members are trespassers or squatters
who do not have any right to occupy the property of respondent. Petitioner does not
dispute the ownership of the parcels of land in question. In fact, it even admitted that the
subject property is owned by Macaria Maglaqui, mother of private respondent.[10]
Petitioner failed to establish any right which would entitle its members to occupy the land
in any capacity, whether as lessees, tenants and the like. Petitioners only defense against
the eviction and demolition orders is their supposed non-inclusion in the original detainer
case. This defense, however, has no legal support since its members are trespassers or
squatters who are bound by the judgment.

Petitioners argument that the parcels of land occupied by its members (Lots I-F and I-G)
were not included in the original ejectment complaint has no basis. The complaint private
respondent filed with the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78, clearly included Lots I-F
and I-G as part of the subject matter under litigation in the unlawful detainer case.[11]
Thus, petitioners members, together with all the parties in the unlawful detainer case,
must vacate the disputed land.

The Court commiserates with respondent, already in her twilight years, who has been
unlawfully deprived of her land for a good number of years. Thus, we exhort the court of
origin to execute this decision with reasonable dispatch, consistent with the requirements
of Section 28 of RA 7279 and EO 152, [12] on eviction and demolition.

---oo0oo---

EVA FLOYD v. BENJAMIN GONZALES

FACTS:

Petitioners Eva Floyd and Rodolfo Calixtro are occupants of a lot in Jolo Street,
Tabacuhan Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City. Floyd started occupying the said lot in 1986
while Calixtro started doing so in 1988. The lot forms part of a 1,337.50-square meter
property which was the subject of a complaint[3] for forcible entry filed by respondents
Lilian Nisperos, Linda Nisperos and Salvador Nisperos, through their attorney-in-fact
Virgilio Constantino, against Clemente Abarnas. The complaint, filed on September 25,
1984, charged Abarnas of constructing a house on the subject land in July 1984 through
stealth and strategy. The Nisperoses claimed ownership and prior possession of the land
by succession, alleging that their father, Igmedio Nisperos, occupied and tilled it from
1950 to 1982.

On August 8, 2003, the RTC of San Fernando City, dismissed the injunction complaint. It
considered petitioners as occupants in bad faith and squatters on the lots, making the
judgment in the ejectment case binding on them. The court recognized the Nisperoses'
prior possession and claim over the lots which started in 1950 with their father, Igmedio.
The RTC noted that Floyd and Calixtro admitted that they started occupying the premises
only in 1986 and 1988, respectively. It also concluded that petitioners impliedly admitted
that the lots are part of the Nisperoses' property because instead of claiming the opposite,

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they attempted to prove that they had a better right thereto. It also ordered petitioners to
pay private respondents moral damages and attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Are petitioners bound by the decision in the ejectment case? Are they entitled to an
injunctive writ to prevent the demolition of their houses? Who has a better right of
possession over the land where their houses are erected?

RULING:

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals categorically found that respondents have the
better right to possession of the land. The RTC ruled that "[petitioners'] claim of
possession that started in 1988 must ... yield to that of the Nisperoses who trace their
possession of the property to that of their predecessor-in-interest, their father Igmedio
who began occupying the property in 1950."[26] The Court of Appeals, for its part, ruled
that: Floyd occupied the property only in 1986; [petitioner] Calixtro occupied the property
in 1988 while admitting that the property was owned by I. Hauseco Subd. Appellant
Ongsotto likewise occupied the property in 1988 and expressed that she derived her
alleged title from a waiver and quitclaim executed by Angelina Abarnas, the wife of ...
Clemente Abarnas, defendant in the ejectment case. Thus, she is considered as the
latter's successor-in-interest, bound by the judgment in the ejectment case which is
conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest. The MSAs
[Miscellaneous Sales Applications] and unapproved survey plans presented by ... Floyd
and Ongsotto are self-serving and of little evidentiary value.

In sum, the [petitioners] have not proved a clear and unmistakable right to the possession
of the property. On the other hand, Nisperos' better right was established by final
judgment in Civil Case No. 139-0-86.... We find no cogent reason to overturn the
consistent findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that, as against petitioners,
the Nisperoses are entitled to possession of the subject land where the petitioners'
houses are erected. Applicable to the instant case, which is an offshoot of an ejectment
case and which also in part partakes of an ejectment case, is the following
pronouncement of the Court on the matter of ejectment and possession in Pajuyo v. Court
of Appeals:

Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against
the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his
favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the
property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue
that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.

---oo0oo---

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PAGTALUNAN VS DELA CRUZ July 1974

Contract to Sell between Patricio Pagtalunan and wife of Teodoro Manzano-

House and Lot costing 17,800 (P1500 as DP and P150 as monthly installment)-

Immediate occupation; extrajudicial rescission in case of default after 90 days from due
date of the monthly installment; payments and improvements are considered as rentals
and payment for damages suffered; leave the premises peacefully Dec 1979– respondent
stopped paying the installments without explanation. Only 12,950 has been paid-

Petitioner asserted that she became a lessee by reason of her default and she continued
to possess the property by mere tolerance of Patricio and the petitioner1980 – respondent
claimed that she was paying religiously until she was informed by Patricio that he’s no
longer interested in continuing the contract (refund + recover possession); agreement to
suspend the payment period but there was harassment through demolition Feb 1997–
letter to vacate which she ignored April 1987 complaint for unlawful detainer which the
MTC granted in favor of the petitioner.

The MTC held that respondent’s failure to pay not a few installments caused the resolution
or termination of the Contract to Sell. The last payment made by respondent was on
January 9, 1980 (Exh. 71). Thereafter, respondent’s right of possession ipso facto ceased
to be a legal right, and became possession by mere tolerance of Patricio and his
successors-in-interest. Said tolerance ceased upon demand on respondent to vacate the
property.June 1999

RTC reversed MTC decision. According to the RTC, the agreement could not be
automatically rescinded since there was delivery to the buyer. A judicial determination of
rescission must be secured by petitioner as a condition precedent to convert the
possession de facto of respondent from lawful to unlawful.CA affirmed RTC decision but
applied Maceda Law (RA 6552). The CA held that the Contract to Sell was not validly
cancelled or rescinded under Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 6552, and recognized respondent’s
right to continue occupying unmolested the property subject of the contract to sell.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Maceda Law is applicable? W/N there is a valid rescission?

RULING:

Yes. The CA correctly ruled that R.A No. 6552, which governs sales of real estate on
installment, is applicable in the resolution of this case. This case originated as an action
for unlawful detainer. Respondent is alleged to be illegally withholding possession of the
subject property after the termination of the Contract to Sell between Patricio and

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respondent. It is, therefore, incumbent upon petitioner to prove that the Contract to Sell
had been cancelled in accordance with R.A. No. 6552. The Maceda Law recognizes the
right of the seller to cancel the contract upon non-payment of an installment by the buyer,
which is simply an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
acquiring binding force. The Court agrees with petitioner that the cancellation of the
Contract to Sell may be done outside the court particularly when the buyer agrees to such
cancellation. However, such cancellation must be done in accordance with the law.

Where the buyer has paid at least two years of installments, the buyer is entitled to the
following rights in case he defaults in the payment of succeeding installments:(a) To pay,
without additional interest, the unpaid installments due within the total grace period
earned by him, which is hereby fixed at the rate of one month grace period for every one
year of installment payments made: Provided, That this right shall be exercised by the
buyer only once in every five years of the life of the contract and its extensions, if any.(b)

If the contract is cancelled, the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender value
of the payments on the property equivalent to fifty percent of the total payments made
and, after five years of installments, an additional five percent every year but not to exceed
ninety percent of the total payments made: Provided , That the actual cancellation of the
contract shall take place after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of
cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act and upon full
payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer Petitioner claimed that there was full
compliance with the law to warrant the rescission since the demand letter made by his
counsel is the notice of cancellation by notarial act which the law speaks of. As for the
refund, heal ready appropriated the payments as rentals.

---oo0oo---

IRENE D. OFILADA, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES RUBEN ANDAL AND MIRAFLOR


ANDAL, RESPONDENTS

FACTS

Irene, together with her husband Carlos Ofilada (Carlos), bought from the heirs of Teresita
Liwag (Teresita) a 27,974-square meter parcel of land principally planted with rambutan,
a number of coconut trees and other fruit-bearing plants located in Barrio Puri, Tiaong,
Quezon. The sale is evidenced by a February 13, 1997 Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate with Absolute Sale[8] wherein respondent Miraflor Andal (Miraflor), who brokered
the sale of the property, signed as 'tenant.' Apparently, ten days prior to the sale, Miraflor
appeared before Anastacio Lajara (Anastacio), the then Barangay Agrarian Reform
Council (BARC) Chairman of Barangay Puri, San Antonio, and executed a
Pagpapatunay.

Eight years later or in October 2005, Irene filed against the spouses Andal a
Complaint[14] for Ejectment and Damages before the MTC of San Antonio, Quezon. She
averred that aside from the aforementioned property, she and Carlos also acquired an

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8,640-square meter ricefield located in Pulo, San Antonio, Quezon. For humanitarian
reasons, she acceded to the spouses Andal's request to take care of her two parcels of
land, provided that they would not be considered as tenants. To stress the fact that neither
she nor the spouses Andal intended that the latter be deemed as tenants, Irene pointed
to the following: (1) the condition for her purchase of the property in Tiaong that the same
should not have any tenants; and (2) Miraflor's execution of a Sinumpaang Salaysay
wherein she waived any tenancy rights that she and her husband might have over the
said property.

In their Answer,[15] the spouses Andal denied Irene's allegations and claimed that they
were tenants of Irene's predecessor-in-interest and continued to be such despite the
transfer of ownership of the properties to Irene. They likewise contended that since the
suit is an action to dispossess them as tenants, it is not the MTC which has jurisdiction
over the complaint but the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

Rejecting the tenancy claim, Irene averred in her Memorandum that her real properties
are not covered by agrarian reform laws as they are within the retention limit allowed by
law. She again stressed that the spouses Andal had already voluntarily surrendered their
rights as tenants way back in 1997 as evidenced by the Pagpapatunay and the
Sinumpaang Salaysay. She added the said spouses voluntarily waived their rights and
received P1.1 million as commission for brokering the sale of the Tiaong property to her.
This was after Irene made clear that the sale would not materialize and, consequently
spouses Andal would not get the commission, if the property has tenants. Irene averred
that the spouses Andal's receipt of the said amount of money, being advantageous to
them, is a valid ground for termination of tenancy relations.

ISSUE:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, and the municipal circuit trial
courts.[33] On the other hand, the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and has exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform.[34] As DAR's adjudicating
arm,[35] it is the DARAB that has exclusive and original jurisdiction involving all agrarian
disputes.

RULING:

The Court agrees with the conclusion of both the MTC and the RTC that for dearth of
evidence, tenurial relationship between the parties was not sufficiently shown. Thus, the
said courts correctly assumed jurisdiction over the ejectment case.

The fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of the
existence of agricultural tenancy. For tenancy to be proven, all indispensable elements
must be established, the absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged
tenant a de factoone. These are: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the

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subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent by the landowner; 4) the purpose is


agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of the
harvests.

---oo0oo---

|Vivero, Jamie|

MANALANG VS BACANI

Facts:

Petitioners caused the relocation and verification survey of Lot 4236 and the adjoining
lots, and the result showed that the respondents had encroached on Lot No. 4236 to the
extent of 405 square meters. A preliminary relocation survey by DENR confirmed the
encroachment. When the respondents refused to vacate the encroached portion, the
petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case.

Trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction based on its finding that the action
involved an essentially boundary dispute that should be properly resolved in an accion
reivindicatoria. It stated that the complaint did not aver any contract, whether express or
implied, between the petitioners and the respondents that qualified the case as one for
unlawful detainer; and that there was also no showing that the respondents were in
possession of the disputed area by the mere tolerance of the petitioners due to the latter
having become aware of the encroachment only after the relocation survey held in 1997.

RTC reversed the MTC and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that
because there was an apparent withholding of possession of the property and the action
was brought within one year from such withholding of possession the proper action was
ejectment which was within the jurisdiction of the MTC; and that the case was not a
boundary dispute that could be resolved in an accion reinvidicatoria, considering that it
involved a sizeable area of property and not a mere transferring of boundary.

Upon remand, MTC ultimately dismissed the complaint. Petitioners appealed to RTC.
RTC reversed its decision observing that the respondents had encroached on the
petitioners’ property based on the court-ordered relocation survey.

CA reversed RTC’s decision.

Issues:

WHETHER OR NOT RTC had authority to receive additional evidence on appeal in an


ejectment case

WHETHER OR NOT the case is an ejectment case within the original & exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC

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WHETHER OR NOT MTC has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:

1. No. The RTC violated Section 18 Rule 70 by ordering the conduct of the relocation
and verification survey “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the testimony of
the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation
was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on the survey
and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin.

2. No. CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of
accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about
possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant
formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily
under Rule 70.

3. None. MTC is correct in dismissing since it did not have jurisdiction over the case.
To vest in the MTC the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment from the land of the respondents
as the occupants in unlawful detainer, therefore, the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts clearly showing the attributes of unlawful detainer. However, the
allegations of the petitioners’ complaint did not show that they had permitted or tolerated
the occupation of the portion of their property by the respondents; or how the respondents’
entry had been effected, or how and when the dispossession by the respondents had
started. All that the petitioners alleged was the respondents’ “illegal use and occupation”
of the property. As such, the action was not unlawful detainer.

---oo0oo---

QUITO VS STOP & SAVE CORP

Facts:

Dominga Quito filed an unlawful detainer case against Stop & Save Corp & its sub-
lessees. She alleged that Stop & Save failed to pay the agreed monthly rentals since
June 2003 and, despite repeated verbal and written demands, refused to pay and vacate
the leased building.

Stop & Save denied that it committed a violation of the lease contract, but merely
suspended its payment of rent because of Dominga’s failure to comply with their
subsequent agreement which is to complete the necessary repairs on the 2nd floor of the
leased building.

RTC set aside the MCTC’s decision and ordered the dismissal of Dominga’s unlawful
detainer complaint due to the pending case for annulment of lease contract filed by Stop
& Save with the same RTC.

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CA dismissed Dominga’s petition for review for lack of merit, which, in effect, affirmed the
RTC’s decision dismissing Dominga’s unlawful detainer complaint.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT CA correctly dismissed the subject unlawful detainer case on the
ground of litis pendentia

Ruling:

No. SC find that litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action does not
apply in the present case.

While there is an identity in the facts between the two actions, involving as they do the
same lease contract, the issues and the relief prayed for are different so that the causes
of action remain entirely distinct from each other.

In the unlawful detainer suit, the issue is who between the parties has a better right to
physical possession over the property or possession de facto and the principal relief
prayed for is for Stop and Save to vacate the property for failure to pay the rent. In
contrast, in the annulment of lease contract, the issue is the validity of the lease contract,
where Stop and Save puts in issue Dominga’s ownership.

In other words, the issue of physical possession in the action for unlawful detainer cannot
be identical with the issues of ownership and validity of contract in the action for
annulment.

---oo0oo---

MANZANILLA VS WATERFIELDS INDUSTRIES CORP

Facts:

Manzanilla leased a portion of their lot to Waterfields. However, Waterfields had


committed violations of the lease agreement by not paying the rentals on time.

Waterfields did not deny but alleged that it developed the land. Waterfields claimed that
it did not fail or refuse to pay the monthly rentals but was just utilizing the rental deposit
in the amount of ₱216,000.00 (equivalent to one year rentals) as rental payment in
accordance with Section 4 of the original Contract of Lease.

MTC & RTC ruled in favor of Manzanilla.

CA reversed the decision: since the spouses Manzanilla did not allege that there were
unpaid utilities or incidental expenses for the account of Waterfields as of the termination
of the contract, the whole amount of ₱216,000.00 should have been returned by the

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former to the latter when the contract was terminated. Not having done so, the spouses
Manzanilla therefore, became debtors of Waterfields insofar as the said amount is
concerned. And since Waterfields is also a debtor of the spouses Manzanilla with respect
to the unpaid rentals, compensation should take place. Consequently, [the spouses
Manzanilla] had no cause of action against [Waterfields] for alleged violation of the
Contract, particularly non-payment of rentals.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT CA erred in its decision

Ruling:

Yes.

Here, there is no issue with respect to demand. What is in question is the presence of a
cause of action.

The violation of the lease through non-payment of rent is what constitutes the cause of
action. Hence, once the failure to pay rent is established, a cause of action for unlawful
detainer arises. The CA should have therefore limited itself to the determination of
whether Waterfields failed to pay rents for the months of December 1997 to May 1998 as
complained of by the spouses Manzanilla. Upon coming up with an answer to this, the
CA should have stopped there since at that point, it can already conclude whether there
exists a cause of action for unlawful detainer, which as mentioned is the only contentious
issue involved in this case.

Failure to pay the rent must precede termination of the contract due to nonpayment of
rent. It therefore follows that the cause of action for unlawful detainer in this case must
necessarily arise before the termination of the contract and not the other way around as
what the CA supposed.

---oo0oo---

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