Civ

Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 132955, October 27, 2006

In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- Villanueva before a trial court judge
in Puerto Princesa. 4 years after, Orlando filed before the trial court a petition for annulment of his
marriage claiming that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia who was then
pregnant. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of
an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from Lilia and
strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East
after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of
the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by Lilia and who accompanied
him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her. On the other hand Lilia denied Orlando’s
allegations and she said that Orlando freely cohabited with her after the marriage, showing 14 letters
that shows Orlando’s affection and care towards her.
Held: No. The court ruled that vitiation of consent is not attendant in this case. Orlando’s allegation of
fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orlando is only seeking to annul his
marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be
dismissed.

On the merits of the case, Orlando’s allegation of fear was not concretely established. The Court is
not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time
he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his
employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-
defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even
doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought
the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those
who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to
solemnizing their marriage. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never
had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. His counsel also
conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with Lilia.

Marcos v. COMELEC, GR No. 119976, September 18, 1995

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
where she studied and graduated high school. She then pursued her college degree education in
Tacloban, as well as worked therein as a teacher. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos
when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959,
they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"
with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which
she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
Held: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite
her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of
law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the
purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law
does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new
one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that
she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained
her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences
in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestone

Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 125283, February 10, 2006

Capistrano and Cruz executed a letter-agreement whereby Cruz agreed to buy a lot owned by
Capistrano for ₱350,000.00, of which ₱200,000.00 would be paid out of the loan secured by Cruz using
the said lot as a mortgage. 4 years after, the mortgage was still unpaid by Cruz and the lot was in danger
of being foreclosed. Cruz was able to sell it to Pan Pacific, however Capistrano revoked the notarized
Special Power of Attorney and requested the Register of Deeds to withhold any action on the transaction,
claiming that it was spurious. He further contends that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed to Cruz lacks
the acknowledgement. Instead, it only contains a Jurat.

Held: Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that notarial documents celebrated with all the
legal requisites under the safeguard of a notarial certificate is evidence of a high character and to
overcome its recitals, it is incumbent upon the party challenging it to prove his claim with clear, convincing
and more than merely preponderant evidence. Here, Capistrano only testified as to its forgery. At the very
least, he should present corroborating witnesses to prove his assertion. At best, he should present an
expert witness.

The use of a jurat however, instead of an acknowledgement does not elevate the Marital Consent
to the level of a public document but instead consigns it to the status of a private writing. The lack of
acknowledgment nonetheless does not render a deed invalid. The necessity of a public document for
contracts which transmit or extinguish real rights over immovable property, as mandated by Article 1358
of the Civil Code, is only for convenience; it is not essential for validity or enforceability. From the
perspective of the law on evidence, however, the presumption of regularity does not hold true with
respect to the Marital Consent which is a private writing. It is subject to the requirement of proof under
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court (anyone who saw the person writing or evidence of
genuineness of signature). The requirement of proof of the authenticity of the Marital Consent was
adequately met, in this case, through the testimony of Cruz to the effect that, together with the other
witnesses to the document, he was present when Capistrano’s wife affixed her signature thereon before
notary public Benedicto.

Ayala Investment v. Court of Appeals, supra.

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security
agreements aking him jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM however
failed to pay the loan and RTC ruled against PBM and Ching. Upon execution, Magsajo, appointed
deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon Spouses Ching of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of
their conjugal properties. Spouses Ching however filed an injunction against petitioners on the ground
that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership

Held: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the
family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly,
the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his
corporate stockholdings.

Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or services are given to
another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership”. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for
the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of
PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a
business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was
clearly for the benefit of PBM.

The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have resulted
when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of
stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one
directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.

Manacop v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 97898, August 11, 1997

Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on 1972 a residential lot with a bungalow
worth P75,000.00 in Commonwealth, Quezon City. E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint
against Sps Manacop and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. for the collection of
indebtedness. A compromise agreement was reached but the Spouses still failed to pay. They
now contend that the house in Commonwealth is exempt from execution as it is duly constituted
as a family home.
Held: In a prior case involving the same spouses, The Court ruled that since the spouses incurred the
indebtedness in 1987 or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their family home
was not exempt from attachment by sheer force of exclusion embodied in paragraph 2, Article 155 of the
Family Code. Nonetheless, n the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was also not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family
home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family
home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988

The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1960 is not well-taken. Article 162 simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does
not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect. The debt or liability which was
the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976
and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988.
Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code

Jison v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998

Francisco Jison was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he
impregnated Esperanza Amolar. Monina Jison, daughter of Esperanza, instituted a complaint against
Francisco Jison for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years after her
mother’s death and when she was already 39 years of age. She claimed that she had enjoyed the
continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family. It
was likewise alleged that Francisco supported her and spent for her education such that she became a
CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses.

Held: Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and
on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of
evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.

“To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of
the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also
the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously”.

The court ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not a
competent evidence as to the issue of paternity. Francisco’s lack of participation in the preparation of
baptismal certificates and school records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove
paternity. With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that
Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate
child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce
her filiation. Monina’s evidence hurdles the “high standard of proof required for the success of an action
to establish one’s illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous possession”.
Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 11305, March 16, 1995

Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in
Iloilo City and begot one child. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime
thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Three years after, Leouel went to the house of the Bedia household where his 3-year old son is staying.
The grandparents Bedia contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy
and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental. The spouses Bedia
then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City. Granted. Leouel argues that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute
parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable.

Held: The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody
and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence
or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.

The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's parental
authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private respondents' demonstrated
love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents.
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time,
petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it
cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts
to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To
award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son.

The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So
many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are
still the natural guardians of their children.

Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is
likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him

Amadora v. Court of Appeals, No. L-47745, April 18, 1988

Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon
resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The
victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2
other student. The lower Court however absolved the respoendents: (I) Since the school was an
academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades (II) That students were not in the
custody of the school since the semester has already ended (III) There was no clear identification of the
fatal gun, and (IV) In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the
school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on other hand claimed their son was under
school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of
Physics reports).

Held: At the time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school
notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in
the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a
legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be
held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was
exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.

In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he
had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on
his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.

Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher
of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student.
Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with
Alfredo resulting to his death

Tax

126 CIR v BOAC (April 1967/87)

BOAC is a 100% British Government-owned corporation engaged in international airline business and is
a member of the Interline Air Transport Association, and thus, it operates air transportation service and
sells transportation tickets over the routes of the other airline members. From 1959-1971, BOAC had no
landing rights for traffic purposes in the Philippines and thus did not carry passenger and/or cargo to or
from the Philippines but maintained a general sales agent in the Philippines – Warner Barnes & Co. Ltd,
and later Qantas Airways – which was responsible for selling BOAC tickets covering passenger and
cargos. The CIR assessed deficiency income taxes against BOAC

BOAC is a resident foreign corporation. In order that a foreign corporation may be regarded as doing
business within a State, there must be continuity of conduct and intention to establish a continuous
business, such as the appointment of a local agent, and not one of a temporary character. BOAC
maintained a general sales agent in the Philippines which was engaged in (1) selling and issuing
tickets;(2) breaking down the whole trip into series of trips; (3) receiving the fare; (4) consequently
allocating to the various airline companies on the basis of their participation in the services rendered
through the mode of interline settlement of the IATA Agreement. PD 68, in relation to PD 1355, ensures
that international airlines are taxed on their income from Philippine sources. The 2 1/2% tax on gross
Philippine billings is an income tax. If it had been intended as an excise or percentage tax, it would have
been placed under Title V of the Tax Code covering taxes on business.

136 Reederij Amsterdam and Royal Interocean Lines v CIR

In 1963 and 1964, “Amsterdam” called on Philippine ports to load cargoes for foreign destination. The
freight fees for these transactions were paid abroad. In these 2 instance, Royal Interocean Lines acted as
a husbanding agent for a fee. No income tax was however paid for the freight receipts. Deficiency
income taxes in the amounts of around P 193,000 and P 262,000 were assessed but Royal Interocean
lines only paid around P 1,000 and P 9,000 on the assumption that it was a foreign corporation.

Held: Amsterdam should be taxed as a domestic corporation. The law is clear that a resident foreign
corporation is a foreign corporation engaged in trade or business in the Philippines, or having an office
therein. Amsterdam, organized and existing under the laws of Netherlands with principal office in
Amsterdam and not licensed to do business in Philippines, is a non-resident foreign corporation.
Therefore, it is taxable on all income from sources within the Philippines.

146 Filipinas Synthetic Fiber v CA

Petitioner Filipinas Synthetic questions the CIR’s deficiency withholding tax at source assessments for
the (a) the fourth quarter of 1974 to the fourth quarter of 1975, and (b) the fourth quarter of 1975 to
the fourth quarter of 1976. The bulk of the deficiency assessments consisted of interest and
compromise penalties for alleged late payment of withholding taxes due on interest loans, royalties, and
guarantee fees Filipinas Synthetic paid to non-resident corporations. Although Filipinas Synthetic uses
the accrual method of accounting, it still contends that its liability to withhold tax at source arises when
the said amounts have become due and demandable under their respective contracts, and not upon
their “setting-up” or accrual

Held: The liability to withhold tax at source on income payments to non-resident foreign corporations
arises UPON REMITTANCE of the amounts due to the foreign creditors or upon accrual thereof. There
was a definite liability, a clear and imminent certainty that at the maturity of the loan contracts, the
foreign corporation was going to earn income in an ascertained amount, so much so that petitioner
already deducted as business expense the said amount as interests due to the foreign corporation. This
is allowed under the law, petitioner having adopted the ‘accrual method’ of accounting in reporting its
incomes. Petitioner cannot now claim that there is no duty to withhold and remit income taxes as yet
because the loan contract was not yet due and demandable. Having “written-off” the amounts as
business expense in its books, it had taken advantage of the benefit provided in the law allowing for
deductions from gross income. Moreover, it had represented to the BIR that the amounts so deducted
were incurred as a business expense in the form of interest and royalties paid to the foreign
corporations. It is estopped from claiming otherwise now