WO R " S BY

GEORGE J OHN ROMANES MA . . LL D

. . FR S. . .

D AR WIN , D A R W I N : an E
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o f the D arw i ni an Theo r , a n d a D i scu ss i o n o n Pos t D arwi ni a n -
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A N E X A M I NAT I O N O P W E I S M ANN I S M .

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L O N G M A NS, G R E E N 86
M IND A ND M O T IO N
A ND

M O N IS M

BY THE L A TE

G EO R G E J O HN R O MA NES , MA . .
, LL D , F R S
. . . . .

O O RAR Y
H N E LL OW
F O
O F G N" I LLE A ND CA X U S C O LL E E A R I E
G , C MB DG

"
I );

NE W YO R"

LO NG M A NS ,
G R E E N, A ND c o .

A ND L O ND O N
 P R E FA C E

OF the contents this l ittle volume the section

of

o n M i n d a nd M oti on which forms in accordance

,

with a suggestion of the au thor s a general intro

’

duction was delivered at C amb r idge as the Rede

,

Lecture in 1 885 and was p rinted in the Contempora ry

,

R evi ew for June in that year . The chapter on Tko

Worlo as a n Ejec t was published al most as it now
7
,

stands in the Con tempor a ry R evi ew for Ju ly 1 8 86

, ,
.

A paper o n TIto Fa llacy of M a ter i a li s m of which ,

M r Romanes incorporated the more important pa rts

.

i n the E ssay o n Monism was contributed to the

,

Ni neteen tlz Cen tu ry fo r D ecembe r 1 88 2 The rest

, .

was left in M S and was probab ly written in 1 8 89

.

or 1 89 0 .

The subjects here discussed frequently occupied

M r Romanes k een and ve rsatile mind Had not
’
. .

2 05 4 1 fi 8
vi P rofa co

the hand o f death fal len upon h im while so much

of the ripening g r ain o f his thought stil l remained
to be fi nal ly garnered some modi fications and
,

extensions of the views set forth in the E ssay o n

M onism wou ld probabl y have been int r oduced .

Attention may be drawn fo r example to the , ,

sentence o n p 1 3 9 ita lici z ed by the author himself

.
, ,

in which it is contended that the wil l as agent m us t

be i den tified w i t/z tne pr i neiole of Ca usa li ty I have .

reason to believe that the chapter o n Tb e Wor ld

a s a n E ec t would i n a final revision o f the E ssay
j ,

as a whole have been modified so as to lay stress

,

o n this identification of the human wi ll with the

p r inciple o f C ausality in the worl d at la rge

a doctrine the r elation o f which to the teachings

o f S chopenhauer wil l be evident to students o f

phil o sophy .

But the hand o f death closed on the thin k er ere

his thought had received its ful l and u ltimate
exp ression When in J u ly 1 8 9 3 I r eceived fr om
.
, ,

M r R o manes instructions with regard to the

.

publication of that which now goes fo rth to the

worl d in his name his end seemed very near and
,

he said with falte r ing voice i n tones the pathos

,

o f wh ich l ingers with me still that this and much

,

besides must he fea red be left unfinished H e

, , .

suggested that perhaps I m ight revise the pa rts in

 P rofa co

the light o f the whole But I have thought it

.

best to leave what he ha d written as he w r ote

it save fo r quite unimpo rtant emendations lest in
, ,

revising I shoul d cast ove r it the shadow of my

o w n opinions .

It only remains to add that the conclusions

reached in this E ssay should be studied in con
n ec ti o n with the late r Tnoagnts on R eligi on which

C anon Gore has recently edited .

C LL M
. . .

B RI T
S O L,

M ay, 1 8 9 5 .
 CO NT E NT S

M I ND A ND M O TI ON

M ON I S M
I N TR O D U C TI ON
C HA P T R E I . SM
S P I R IT U AL I
II . M AT E RIALI S M
III . M O NISM

I" . TH E WO RLD A s A N E JEC ’

I
‘

" . THE W I LL I N R E LATI ON O T M AT E

R IA L IS M A ND S P I RIT U ALI SM
"I . THE W I LL IN R ELATI ON To M ON I S M
 M IN D A ND M O T IO N

R E D E L E C T U R E,
" 1 88

TH Eearl iest write r who dese rves to be cal led

a psychologist is H obbes ; and if we conside r the
tim e when he wrote we cannot fai l to be surprised ,

at what I may term his p r evision o f the most i m

po rtant results which have now been established
by science He was the fi r st clearly to sound the
.

note which ha s eve r since constituted the bass o r ,

fundamental tone o f scientifi c thought Let us , .

listen to it through the clea r instrumentality o f his

o w n language

u a liti es ca ll ed s ensibl e are in the object which

A ll the q ,

c us eth th m but so m n y m oti n s f the m tt r by which

a e ,
a o o a e

it p r s s th n ou organ s div rs ly N ith er in u s th t a e

e e o r e e . e a r

p r ssed e th y nythi ng ls e but div ers m oti ns ; fo

e ar e a e o r

m ti on p d c th n thi n g but m ti on
o ro u e o Th c us e of o . e a

se n s e i s th x t rnal b dy or bj ct which p r s s et h the

e e e o o e , e

o rgan p r pe r to ch s n s e eith r i m m di t ly
o ea e , i n t st e e a e ,
as a e

a n d t o uch m di t ly
, or i n h ari ng se i ng
e a e , asn d sm lli ng ;
e ,
e , a e

which p ressu r by the m edi ti n of th n rv s and o th er

e, a o e e e ,

stri n gs n d m emb ranes of the b ody c on ti n u ed i n w rd s t

a ,
a o
2 M i nd a nd Moti on .

the b r i n a nd h r t c useth th ere resist n ce or c o un t er

a ea , a a a ,

p res su r o en d v o u r
e, r A nd b e c us e g i ng sp k i ng
ea . a o ,
ea ,

a n d th e li k v olun t a ry m oti n s d p en d a lw y s up on a p e
e o ,
e a r

c d en t th u g ht of w /z tl w l c/z w y nd w h t ; it i s
e o
'

z zer , zz
'

a , a a

evid en t th t the i m g i n ti n "

a o id e "i s the fi r st i ntern l
a a o r a a

b egi nni ng f all v olunt ary m oti on A nd lthou gh un st u di ed

o . a

m en do n ot c on c iv e a ny m oti on a t a ll to b e th ere wh ere

e ,

th e thi ng m v d i s i n visibl e
o o th e sp c e it i s m v e d i n i s
e r a o ,

fo the sh rtn ess of it i n s en sibl ; y t th t d o th n t hi n d er

r o , e e a o ,

but th t such m ti on s e Th es sm all b g i nn ing s of

a o ar . e e

m o ti n withi n the b o dy of m n b efore th ey pp ar i n

o , a ,
a e

w lk i ng spea k i n g st ri k i n g a nd th er visibl a cti on s are

a , , ,
o e ,

c om m on ly c ll e d EN DE A" O U R
a
’

These quotations a r e su fficient to show that the

syste m o f Hobbes was p r opheti c o f a revelation
afte r wards declared by tw o centuries o f scientifi c
research For they show how plainly he taught
.

that al l ou r k nowledge o f the external world i s

a knowledge o f motion ; and again that al l Ou r , ,

acquisitions o f knowledge and other acts o f m ind

themselves i mply as he elsewhere says some k ind , ,

o f m otion agitation o r alteration which wo r keth

, , ,
’
i n the brain That he conceived such motion
.
,

agitation o r alterati o n to be from i ts ext r eme

, ,

‘ ‘ ’
m inuteness invisible and insensible o r as we
, ,
’
,

should now say molecula r i s likewise evident , , .

I can therefore i magine the d elight with which he

would hear m e speak when I sa y that it is no ,

longer a matte r o f keen sighted speculation but -

,

a matter o f carefully demonstrated fact that al l ,

o u r knowledge o f the external world is nothing

1
L evi a tha n , pt . i . ch ps i a . . a nd vi .
 M ind a nd Mot ion .
3

more than a knowledge o f motion Fo r al l the .

forms o f energy have now been proved to be but

modes o f motion ; and even matter if not in i ts ,

ultimate constitution vo rtical motion at al l events ,

is known to us only as changes o f motion : al l

that we pe r ceive in what we cal l matter is change
in modes of m otion We d o not even kno w
.

what it is that moves ; we only know that when

som e modes o f motion pass i nto other modes we ,

perceive what we unde rstand by matter It would .

take m e too long to j ustify this general statement

so that it should be intel ligible to every o ne but
I am confident that al l persons who understand
such subjects wil l when they think about it accept
, ,

this general statement as one which is universally

t rue A nd if so they wi ll agree with Hobbes that
.
, ,

a ll o u r knowledge o f the external world is a know

ledge O f m o ti o n
.

N ow if it would have been thus a jo y to Hobbes

,

to have heard to day how thoroughly he has bee n

-

j ustified i n h is views touching the external world ,

with no less j oy would he have heard that he has

been equally j ustified in his views touching the
i nternal world Fo r it has now been p r oved beyond
.
,

the p o ssibility o f d ispute that it is only i n vi rtue

,

o f those invisible movements which he inferred

that the nervo us system is enabled to perform i ts
varied functions .

To many among the different kinds of movement

going o n i n the external world the animal body i s
,

adapted to r espond by i ts ow n movements as best

B 2
4 M in d a nd Mot ion .

suits its own wel fare and the m echanism whe r eby
this is e ffected is the neuro m uscula r system - .

Those kind s o f movement going o n i n the e x te r nal

wo r ld which are competent to evoke r esponsive
movements in the ani mal b o dy a r e cal led by physi
ologists sti mul i When a stimulus fal ls upon the
.

appropriate sensory surface a wave o f molecular

,

movement is sent up the attached senso ry ne rve

to a ne rve centre which the r eupon issues anothe r
-
,

wave o f molecu lar movement down a moto r ne rve

to the group o f muscles over whose action it
presides and when the muscles r eceive this wave
o f nervous in fluence they contract This kind o f .

response to sti muli is purely mechanical or no n ,

mental and is ord inarily te r med r eflex action

, .

The whole of the spinal cord and lower part o f the

b rain are made up o f nerve centres o f reflex -

action ; and in the result we have a wonderfully

, ,

p erfect mac hine i n the animal body considered a s

a whole For while the various senso ry surfaces
.

are seve rally adapted t o respond t o d i fferent kinds

o f external movement —the eye to light the ea r to ,

sound and so o n— any o f thes e surfaces m ay be

,

brought into suitable relation with any o f the

muscles o f the body by means o f the cerebro spinal -

nerve centres and their i ntercommunications

-
.

S o much then fo r the machinery of the body

, , .

We must now turn to consider the co r poreal seat

O f the mind o r the only part o f the ne rvous syste m
,

wherein the agitation o f nervous matter is aecom

p a n i ed with consciousness This is composed o f
.
 M ind a nd Mot ion .
5

a double nerve centre which occurs in al l vert e

-
,

b rated animals and the two pa rts o f which are

,

called the cerebral hem ispheres In man this .

double nerve centre is so large that it completely

-

fi lls the arch of the skull as far d own as the level

,

o f the eyebrows The two hemispheres o f which

.

it consists meet face to face i n the m idd le line o f

the skull from the top o f the nose backward s
,
.

E ach hem isphere is comp o sed o f two conspicuously

d istinct pa rts called respect ively the grey matte r
,

and the white matte r The grey matte r is ex .

ternal enveloping the white matter l ike a skul l

,

cap and is composed of an inconceivable numbe r

,

o f nerve cells connected together by ne rve fib res

- -
.

It is computed that in a human brain there cannot

be l ess than a thousand m illions of cel ls and five ,

thousand m il li o ns o f fibres The white matte r .

is composed only o f nerve fib res which pass down -

,

wards i n great strands of conducting tissue to the

lower centres of the brain and spinal cord So that .

the whole constitutes o ne system with the grey ,

matte r of the cerebral hem ispheres at the apex o r

crown .

That the g r ey matte r of the cerebral hemispheres

is the exclusive seat o f mind is proved in two ways .

I n the fi rst place if we look to the animal kingdom

,

as a whole we fi nd that speaking generally the

, , ,

intel ligence o f species varies with the mass o f this

grey matter O r in othe r words we find that the
.
, ,

process o f mental evolution o n i ts physical side , ,

has consisted in the progressive development o f

6 M i nd a nd Motion .

this g r ey matte r supe r imposed upon the p re existing -

nervous machinery unti l it has attained its latest

,

and maximum growth in man .

In the second place we find that when the grey ,

matter is experi mental ly removed from the brain

o f animals the animals continue to l ive ; but are
,

completely deprived o f in tel ligence A ll the lower .

nerve centres continue to perform thei r mechanical

-

adjustments in resp o nse to suitabl e sti mulation ;

but they are no l o nge r under the g o vernment o f
the mind Thus for instance when a bird is muti
.
, ,

late d in this way it will continue to perform all its

,

reflex adj ustments —such as sitting on a perch ,

using its wings when thrown into the ai r and so ,

fo rth ; but it no l o nger remembers its nest o r its

young and will starve to death in the midst o f its
,

fo o d unless it be fed a rtificially

, .

A gain if the grey matter of only one hemisphere

,

be removed the mind is taken away from the

,

correspond ing ( i e the opposite ) side o f the body

. .

while it remains intact on the other side For .

example i f a do g be deprived of o ne hemisphere

,
,

the eye which was supplied from it with n erve

fib res continues able to see o r to transmit i m ,

pressions to the lower ne r ve centre cal led the O ptic -

ganglion ; for this eye will then mechanically

fo llow the hand waved in fro nt of it But if the .

hand should hold a piece of meat the dog wil l ,

show no mental r ec o gnition o f the meat which of ,

course it will immediately sei z e i f exposed to the

view of its o ther eye The same thing is found to .
 M in d a nd Mot ion .
7

ha ppen in the case of birds : o n the inj u r ed side

sens a ti on o r th e powe r o f respond ing to a sti mulus
, ,

r emains intact ; whil e percepti on or the power o f ,

mental r ecognition is destroyed ,

.

This description applies to the g r ey matte r o f

the cerebral hemispheres as a whole But o f cou rse .

the question ne x t arises whethe r it only acts as

a whole o r whether there is an y l o calization o f
,

different intel lectual faculties i n di fferent pa rts o f

it N ow in answer to this question it has long
.
, ,

been known that the faculty o f speech is definitely

localized in a pa rt of the grey matter lying j ust
behind the fo rehead for when this pa rt is inj ured , ,

a man loses al l power o f expressing even the m ost

simple ideas i n words while the ideas themselves
,

r emain as clea r as ever It is remarkable that in

.

each individual only this pa rt o f o ne hemisphere

appears to be used and there is some evidence to
sh o w that left handed persons use the opposite sid e
-

fr o m right handed M oreove r when the side which

- .
,

is habitual ly in use is destroyed the corresponding ,

pa rt o f the o the r hemisphere begins to learn its

work so that the patient m ay in time recover his
,

u s e o f language .

Within the last few years the i mportant d is

c overy has been made that by stimulating with
,

electricity the surface o f the g r ey matter o f the

hemispheres muscular movements are evoked and
,

that certain patches o f the grey matter when thus ,

stimulated always throw into action the same

,

groups o f muscles I n other words there a r e

.
,
8 M ind a nd Motion .

definite local areas o f grey matte r which when, ,

stimulated th r ow into action d efinite groups o f

,

muscles The surface of the cereb r al hemisphe r es

.

has now been in large measure explored and

mapped out with r eference to these so called moto r
-

cent r es ; and thus ou r knowledge o f the neuro

muscula r machinery o f the higher ani mals ( including
man ) ha s been very greatly fu rthered H ere I may.

O bserve parenthetically that as the b r ain i s i n

,

sentient to inj uries inflicted upon its own substance ,

none of the experiments to which I have alluded

entai l any su ffering to the animals expe r imented
upon ; and it is evident that the i mpo rtant i n fo r
mation which has thus been gained could not have
been gained by any othe r method I may also .

O bse rve that as these moto r centres occur i n the

-

grey matter of the hemispheres a strong probability

,

arises that they are not only the motor cent r es but -
,

also the voliti o nal centres which originate the

intellectual commands for the contraction o f this
and that group o f muscles Unfortunately we
.

cannot interrogate an animal whether when we ,

stimulate a motor centre we a r ouse i n the animal s

-
,
’

mind an act o f will to throw the cor r esponding

group of muscles int o action but that these m otor
centres are really centres of volition is pointed to
by the fact that elect r ical stimul i have no l onge r
,

any effect upon them when the mental faculties o f

the animal are suspended by an ae sthetics nor i n the ,

case o f young animal s where t h e mental faculties

hav e not yet been su ffi ciently develop ed to ad mit
IO M ind a nd Mot ion .

Such is the rate at which a ne rve cent r e conducts -

its o perations when no consci o usness or vol ition i s

involved But when consciousness and volition are
.

involved o r when the cerebral hemi spheres are

,

ca lled int o play the time required is c o nsiderably

,

greater For the operations o n the pa rt o f the

.

hemispheres which are comprised in pe rceiving

a simple sensation ( such as an elect rical shock ) and
the v o litional act of signalling the perception cannot ,

be perfo rmed in less than 11? of a second which is ,

nearly twice as long as the time required by the

l ower nerve centres fo r the performance o f a reflex
-

action Other experiments prove that the m ore

.

c o mplex an act o f percepti o n th e more ti me i s

,

required for its performance Thus when the

.
,

experiment is made to consist not me rely in ,

signalling a perception but in signalling o ne o f two

,

(
o r more percepti ons such as an electrical shock o n

one o r other o f the two b a nds which o f five letters

,

is suddenly exposed to view ,

a l o nger ti me is
required for the more complex process o f d is
t i ngu ishi ng which o f the tw o o r m ore expected

stimuli is perceived and in dete r mining which of

,

the appropriate signals to make in resp o nse The .

time consumed by the cerebral hemisphe r es in

‘
meeting a dilemma of this kind is from to {0
o f a second l o nger than that which they consum e
 M in d a nd Mot ion . II

me r ely m echanical o r non mental r esponse is

-

needed ; and the more complex the m ental opera

tion the m o re time is necessary Such may be .

termed the physiology o f d eliberation .

S o much then for the rate at which molecula r

, ,

movem ents t rave l through nerves and the t imes ,

which nerve cent r es consume in performing thei r

-

m o lecular adj ustments We may next consider

.

the researches which have been made within the

last few months upon the rates o f these m ovements
themselves o r the nu mber o f vibrations per second
,

with which the particles of nervous matter oscillate .

If by means of a suitable apparatus a muscle is

, ,

mad e to rec o rd its own contraction we fi nd that ,

d uring al l the time it is in contraction it is under ,

going a vibratory m o vement at the rate o f about

nine pulsati o ns pe r second What is the meaning
.

o f this movement ? The meaning is that the act o f

will i n the brain which serves as a sti mulus to the

,

c o ntraction o f the muscle is accompanied by a

,

vibratory m o vement in the grey matter o f the brain ;

that this m ovement is going o n at the rate of nine
pulsations per second ; and that the muscle is giving
a separate o r distinct contraction in resp o nse to
every o ne o f these nervo us pulsations That such .

is the true explanation o f the rhyth m in the muscle

is proved by the fact that if instead of c o ntracting
,

a muscle by an act o f the wil l it be contracted by

,

means o f a rapid series of electrical shocks playing

upon its attached nerve the record then furnished
,

shows a similar trembling going o n in the muscle

12 M i nd a nd Mot ion .

as in the p revious case ; but the t r emo r s o f cont rae

tion are now no longer at the rate o f nine per
second : they correspond be at fo r beat with the
inte r ruptions o f the elect r ical cur r ent That is to
.

sa y the m uscle is responding separately to every

,

separate sti mulus which it receives through the

nerve ; and furthe r experiment sho w s that it is
able thus to k eep time with the separate shocks ,

even though these be made to fol l o w o ne another

so rapidly as pe r second Therefore we can
.

have no doubt that the slow rhyth m of nine pe r

second unde r the influence o f volitional sti mulation ,

represents the rate at which the muscle i s receiving

so many separate i mpulses from the brain : th e
muscle is keeping ti me with the molecula r vibra
t ions g o ing o n in the cerebral hemispheres at the
rate o f nine bea ts per second C areful tracings
.

show that this rate cannot be increased by increasing

the strength o f the volitional stimulus ; but some
individuals —and those usually who are of quic k est
intel ligence —display a somewhat quicker r ate o f
rhythm which may be as high as eleven pe r second
, .

M oreover it is found that by stimulating with

,

strychnine any o f the cent r es o f r eflex action ,

pretty nearly the same rate o f rhythm is exhibited

by the muscles thus th ro wn into cont raction ; so
that all the nerve cells in the body are thus shown
-

to have in their vibrati o ns pretty nearly the sam e

peri o d and not to be able to vibrate with any

,

other Fo r no matter how rapid ly the electrical

.

shocks a r e allowed to play upon the grey matte r

 M in d a nd Mot ion . 13

of the cerebral hemispheres as d istingu ished from ,

the nerve t runks p r oceed ing from them to the

-

muscles the muscles always show the same rhyt hm

,

o f about nine bea ts per second : the nerve cells -

,

unlike the nerve fib res refuse to k eep time with

-
,

the electric shocks and will only respond to them

,

by vibrating at thei r o w n intrinsic rate o f nine

beats per second .

Thus much then fo r the rate of m olecula r

, ,

vibration which goes on in ne rve cent res But the -

.

rate of such vibration which goes o n in senso ry and

motor nerves may be very much more rapid Fo r .

while a ne rve centre is only able to or igi na te a

-

vibration at the rate o f about nine beats pe r

second a motor nerve as we have already seen is
,
-
, ,

able to tr a ns m i t a vibration o f at least beats

per sec o nd ; and a senso ry ne rve which at the
surface o f its expans i on IS able to respond d i fferently
to differences o f musical pitch o f temperature and , ,

even o f colour is probably able to vibrate ve ry

,

much more rapid ly even than this We are not .

,

i ndeed entitled to conclude that the nerves o f

,

special sense vibrate in actual unison o r syn .

c hro n i z e with these external sou r ces o f sti mula

,

ti o n ; but we are I think bound to conclud e that

, ,

they must vibrate in some nu merical propo rtion

to them ( else we should not perceive O bj ective
d ifferences i n sound tem pe rature o r colour) ; and
, ,

even this implies that they are probably able to

vibrate at som e enormous rate .

With fu rther reference to these molecula r move

T M ind a nd Mot ion
4 .

ments in sensory nerves the fol lowing i mpo rtant

,

obse rvation has been mad e —v i z that there is a .

constant ratio between the amount o f agitation

produced in a sensory nerve and the intensity o f ,

the c o rresponding sensation This ratio is not .

A s Fechne r states it ‘
a d irect o ne . Sensation ,

varies not as the stimulus but as the logarith m o f

, ,

the stimulus . Thus fo r instance if

’
, cand les ,

are al l throwing their light upon the same screen ,

we should r equire ten more cand les to be added

before ou r eyes could perceive any d ifference i n
the amount of i llumination But if we begin with .

only 1 00 candles shining upon the screen we ,

should perceive an increase in the i llumination by

adding a single candle And what is true o f sight
.

is equally t r ue of al l the other senses : i f any

stimulus is i ncrea sed the smallest increase o f se nsa
,

tion fi rst occurs when the stimulus r ises o ne pe r

cent above its original intensity S uch being the
. .

law o n the side of sensation suppose that we plac e ,

upon the optic nerve of an animal the wires pro

c eedi n
g from a delicate galvanometer we find that ,

e very time we sti mulate the eye with light the ,

needle o f the galvanomete r moves showing elec ,

tri c a l changes go ing o n in the ne r ve caused by the ,

molecula r agitations N o w these elect rical changes

.

are fo und to vary in intensity with the intensity o f

the light used as a stimulus and they d o so very ,

nearly in acc o rdance with the law of sensation j ust

mentioned So we say that i n sensation the
.
'

ce rebral hemisphe r es are a s it w er e act ing the

, ,
 M i nd a nd Mot ion
.
5

pa rt o f galvanometers in appreciating the amount

o f molecular change which i s going on i n sensory

ne rves and that they r ecord their read i ngs In the

m ind as faithfully a s a galvanometer records its
readings o n the dial .

H ithe rto we have been consideri ng ce rtain features

in the physiology o f nervous action so far as this ,

can be appreciated by means o f physiological

instruments But we have j ust seen that the
.

cerebral hemisphe res may themse lves b e regard ed

as such instruments which reco r d in ou r minds
,

their readings o f changes going o n in o u r nerves .

H ence when othe r physiologica l instruments fail

,

us we may gain m uc h additional insight touching

,

the movements o f nervous matte r by attending to

the thoughts and feelings of o u r o w n m inds ; fo r
these are so many indices o f what is going o n in the
cerebral hemispheres I therefore propose next to
.

contemplat e the mind considered thus as a physio

,

l o gical instrument .

The same scientifi c instinct which led H obbes so

truly to anticipate the pr o gress o f physiol o gy led ,

hi m not less truly to anticipate the progress o f psy

c ho lo
gy . For j ust as he was the fi rst to enunciate
the fundamental principle o f ne rve action in the -

vibration of molecules so was he likewise the fi rst to

,

enunciate the fundamental principl e o f psychol o gy

i n the association of ideas A nd the g r eat advance
.

o f knowledge which has been made si nce his day

with respect to both these p rinciples entitles us to ,

I6 M ind a nd Motion .

be much more confid ent than even he was that th ey

are in some way intimately united M oreover the .
,

manne r i n which they a r e so united we have begun

clearly to understand Fo r we k now from ou r
.

study of nerve action in general that when once a

-
,

wave o f invisible or molecula r movement passes

through any line o f ne rve structu re it leaves behind
-
,

it a change in the st r uctu r e such that it is afte r

wards more easy for a simi la r wave when sta rted ,

from the sam e point to pu rsue the same course

,
.

O r to adopt a simile from H obbes j ust as wate r

, ,

upon a table flows most readily i n the lines which

have been wetted by a p r evious flow so the ,

i nvisible waves o f nerve action pass most readi ly in

-

the lines o f a previous passage This i s the reason .

why in any exercise requiring muscular co ord ina -

tion o r dexterity p r actice makes perfect : the

,
‘
,

ne rve centres concerned learn to perfo r m thei r

-

wo r k by frequently repeating it because in this ,

way the needful lines o f wave movement in the -

structu r e o f the ne rve centre a r e rende red more and

-

more pe r meable by use No w we have seen that

.

in the nerve cent res cal led the cereb ral hemispheres
-
,

wave m o vement o f this k ind is accompanied with

-

feeling C hanges o f consci o usnes s follo w step by

.

step these waves o f movement in the b rain and ,

therefore when o n two successiv e occasions the

waves of movement pu rsue the same pathway i n
the brain they are attended with a succession o f
,

the same ideas in the m ind Thus we see that the .

tend ency o f ideas to recu r in the same order a s that

18 M i nd a nd Mot ion .

to say that whether o r not these footsteps wil l

,

ever admit of being thus tracked in detail they a r e ,

al l ce r tainly present in the cerebral structu res of

each o ne o f us What we know o n the side o f
.

mind as l o gical sequence is o n the side o f the

,

nervous system nothing more than a passage o f

nervous energy through one series o f cell s and
fib r es rather than through anothe r : what we
r ecognize as truth is merely the fact of the b r ain
vibrating in tune with Nature .

Such being the intimate r elation between nerve

action and mind action it has becom e the scienti
-
,

fica lly o rthodo x teaching that the two stand to o n e

another in the relati o n o f cause t o effect O ne of .

the most distinguished of my predecessors in this

place the President of the Royal Society has said
, ,

in one of the most celebrated o f his lectures

‘
We have as much r eason fo r regarding the mode
o f motion of the nervous system as the cause o f the

state o f consciousness as we have for regard ing any

,
’
event as the cause o f another And by way of
.
,

perfectly logical deduction from this statement ,

P rofessor H uxley argues that thought and feeling

have nothing whatever to d o with determining
action : they a r e merely the bye products o f cere -

b rati o n o r as he expresses it the indices o f changes

, , ,

which a r e going o n in the brain Under this view .

we are al l what he term s conscious aut omata o r ,

machines which happen as it we r e by chance to be

, ,

conscious o f some o f thei r own movements But .

 M ind a nd Mot ion . 19

the consciousness is altogether adv entitious and ,

bea rs the same ine ffectual r elation to the activity

o f the brain as a steam whistle bears to the activity -

o f a locomotive o r the striking of a cloc k to the ,

t ime keeping adjustments o f the clock work H ere

- -
.
,

again we meet with an echo o f H obbes who

, ,

o pens his work on the C om monwealth with these

words
Na tu re, the a n wh ereby Go d h th a ma d e a nd g v rn
o e s the
w rld is by the t f m n s i n m ny oth r thi n gs in thi s
o ,
ar o a ,
a a e ,

als o i m it t d th a t it c n m k n rtifici l an i m l Fo
a e ,
a a e a a a a . r

see i ng lif is but m ti on f li m bs the b gi nn i n g wh reof i s

e a o o , e e

i n the p ri n cip l p rt withi n ; why m y w e n t s y th t ll

a a a o a , a a

a ut m to ( n gi n s th t m v e th m selv s by sp ri n gs n d
a a e e a o e e a

wh l s s d th w tch ) h v n tifici a l life ? F wh a t

ee a o a a , a e a ar or

is the ne rt but p i ng ; nd the n rv but o m n y

a , a s r a e es, s a

t i ng ;
s r snd the j i n t a but m n y w n l givi n g m oti on
o s, so a ee s,

to the wh l b dy s uch a s w as i n t en d ed by th
1
o e o rti fice
, e a r

N ow this theo ry o f conscious automatism i s not

,

merely a legiti mate outcome of the theory that

ne rvous changes are the causes of mental changes ,

but it is logi cal ly the only possible outcom e No r .

d o I see any way in which this theory can be

fought on grounds o f physiology I f we persist i n .

r egard ing the association between brai n and thought

exclusively from a physiological point of " iew we ,

must of necessity be materialists Further s o far .

,

as we a re physiologists o u r material ism can d o us

no harm O n the contra ry it is to us o f the
.
,

utmost se rvice as at once the simp lest physiologica l

,

l evi a tha n , I t ducti

n ro on .

C 2
20 M ind a nd Mot ion .

e x planation o f facts al ready known and the best ,

working hypothesis to guide us in ou r furthe r

researches But it d o es n o t follow from this that
.

the theory of materialis m is true The bells o f .

St Ma ry s over the way always ring fo r a qua rte r

.
’

o f an hour befo re the University s ermon yet the

ringing o f the bel ls is no t the cause o f the serm on ,

although as l o ng as the association remains constant

, ,

there would be no harm in assum ing fo r any ,

practical pu r poses that it i s so But j ust as w e

,
.

should be wrong in concluding i f we did not ,

happen to know so much about the matte r as we

do that the University sermon is produced by the
,

vibration o f bells in the towe r o f St M ary s C hurch .

’

so we may be sim ilarly wrong if we were definite ly

to conclude that the sermon is produ ced by the
vibrat ion of a number o f little nerve cells in the -

brain o f the preacher .

N ow if time perm itted and if I supposed that

, ,

you w o uld al l care to go with me into matters o f

some abstruseness I could ce rtainly prove that
,

whatever the connexion between body and m ind

may be we have the best possible reasons fo r con
,

clud ing that it is no t a causal connexion These .

reasons a r e o f cou rse extra physiological ; but

, ,
-

they are not on this account less conclusive .

Within the l imits of a lecture however I can , ,

onl y undertake to give an outline sketch of what

I take to be the overwhelm ing argument against
materialism .

We have fi rst the gene r al fact that al l ou r know

 M in d a nd Mot ion .
21

l edge o f motion and so o f matter is merely a

, ,

knowledge o f the modifications of mind That is .

to say al l o u r knowledge of the e x ternal worl d

,

in cluding the knowledge of o u r o w n brains — is

merely a knowledge o f ou r ow n m ental states .

Let it be observed that we d o not e ven r equire to

go so far as the irrefutable position o f Berkeley ,

that the existence o f an external world without the

mediu m of m ind o r o f being without knowing is
, ,

inconceivable It is enough to take ou r stand on a

.

lowe r l evel of abstraction and to sa y that whether

.

o r not an external world can exist apa rt from mind

in any absol ute o r inconceivable sense at any rate ,

it cannot d o so f or a s We cannot think any of

.

the facts o f external nature without presupposing

the existence o f a m ind which thinks them ; and
therefore so fa r at least as we are concerned m ind
, ,

i s necessarily prior to eve rything else It is for us .

the only mode o f ex istence which is real in its o w n

r ight ; and to it as to a standard all oth e r m o des
, ,

o f ex istence which may be i n ferred must be r eferred .

Therefore if we sa y that m ind is a function o f

,

motion we are only saying in somewhat confused

, ,

term inology that mind is a function of itself

, .

Such then I take to be a general refutation o f

, ,

materialism T o u se but a m ild epithet we must

.
,

conclude that the theo ry is unphi losophical seeing ,

that it assumes o n e thing to b e produced by another

thing in spite o f an obvious demonstration that
,

the alleged e ffect is necessarily prio r to its cause .

Such I sa y is a general r efutation o f mate r ialism

, , .
22 M i nd a nd Mot ion .

‘
But this is fa r from being al l
’

M otion says .
,

Hobbes p rodu c eth nothing but motion

,
‘
and
yet he immed iately proceeds t o assum e that in
the case o f the brain it produces not only m otion , ,

but mind H e was pe r fectly right in saying that

.

with respect to its movements the animal body

resembles an engine o r a watch ; and i f h e had
been acquainted with the products o f highe r
evolution in watch making he m ight with ful l
-
,

propriety have a rgued for instance that in the

, ,

compensating balance whereby a watch adj usts

,

its o w n m ovements in adaptation to external

changes o f tempe rature a watch i s exhibiting ,

the mechanical aspect o f volition A nd si mila r ly .

, ,

i t is perhaps possible to conceive that the principles

o f mechanism m ight be more and more extended

i n thei r effects until in so marvellously perfected

, ,

a st ructure as the human brai n al l the voluntary ,

movements o f the body might be originated in the

same mechanical manne r as are the compensating
movements of a watch ; for this indeed as we , ,

have seen is no more than happens in the case

,

of all the nerve centres othe r than the cereb ral

-

hemispheres I f this were so m otion would be

.
,

producing nothing but motion and upon the ,

subject o f b rain acti o n there would be nothing

-

further to say Without consc iousness I should

.

be delivering this lectu r e ; without consciousness

y ou would be hearing it ; and all the busy brains
in this University would be conducting thei r
researches o r prepa r ing fo r thei r e x am inations
, ,
 M in d a nd Mot ion . 23

mindlessly Strange as such a state o f things

.

might be stil l m oti o n would be pr o ducing nothing

,

but moti o n ; and therefore if there were any m ind

, ,

to contemplate the facts it would encounter no

,

philosophical parad o x : it would merely have to

conclude that such were the astonishing possibilities
of mechanism But as the facts actually stand we
.
, ,

fi nd that this is not the case We find indeed .

, ,

that up to a ce rtain level o f c o mplex ity mech anism

alone is able to perform al l the compensations or
adj ustments which are performed by the animal
body but we also fi nd that beyond this level such ‘

compensations or adj ust ments a re never perform ed

without the intervention of c o nsciousness There .

fore the theo ry o f automatism has to meet the

,

unanswerable questi o n —H ow is it that in the

machinery o f the brain motion produces this
something which is not motion ? Science has now
definitely pro ved the correlation of al l the forces
and this means that i f any kind o f motion cou ld
produce anything else that is not motion it would ,

be producing that which science wou ld be bound

to regard as i n the strictest sense o f the word
a miracle Therefo re if we are to take our stand
.
,

up o n science —and this is what materialism pr o fesses

to d o —w e are logically bound to conclude not ,

merely that the evidence o f causation from body

to mind is not so cogent as that o f causation i n any
other case but that in this pa rticular case causation
,

may be proved again i n the st rictest sense o f the

,

term a physical i m possibility

, .
24 M i nd a nd Mot ion .

To adduce only one othe r conside ration A pa rt .

from al l that I have said is it not i n itself a

,

stri k ingly suggestive fact that consciousness only ,

yet always appea rs upon the scene when the

,

adj ustive actions o f any animal body r ise above

the ce rtain level o f intricacy to which I have
al luded ? S urely this large and general fact points
with ir r esistible force to the conclusion that i n the
,

pe r fo rmance o f these more com plex adj ustments ,

c o nsciousness —o r the powe r of feeling and the

powe r o f willing— is o f some u se A ssured ly o n
.

the principles o f evolution which materialists at

,

al l events cannot a fford to disregard it would be a

,

wholly anomalous fact that so wide and i mpo rtant

a class o f faculties as those o f mind should have
become developed in constantly ascending degrees
throughout the animal kingdom i f they were entirely
,

without use to ani mals . A nd be it O bserved this

, ,

consideration holds good whatever vi ews we may

happen to ente rtain upon th e special theory o f
natural selection Fo r the conside r ation stands
.

upon the general fact that al l the o rgans and

fun ctions o f animals a r e o f use to ani mals : we
never meet o n any large o r general scale with
, ,

organs and functions which are wh o lly adventitious .

Is it to be supposed that this gene r al principle fai ls

j ust where its presence is most r equi r ed and that ,

the highest functions of the highest organs o f the

highest animals stand o ut o f analogy with al l other
functions in being themselves functionless ? To
this question I fo r o ne can only answe r and
, , ,
26 M i nd a nd Mot ion .

im mediate k nowledge instead o f fr om the r eflection

,

o f that knowl edge i n what we cal l the external

world Seeing that the ex ternal wo r ld is known

.

to us only as motion it is logically i mpossible fo r

,

the mind to infer its o w n causation fr om the

external world ; fo r this would be to infer tha t it
is an e ffect o f m otion which would be th e sam e ,

as saying that it is an e ffect o f its o w n knowledge ;

and this would be absu rd But o n the other hand .
, ,

it is not thus logically impossible fo r the m ind to

infer that it may be the cause o f some of its o w n
knowledge o r in othe r words that it may have in
, , ,

som e measu r e the power o f producing wha t it

knows as motion A n d when the mind does i nfe r
.

this no logic o n ea rth is able to touch the inference ;

,

the position o f pure ideal ism is beyond the r each

o f argument N eve rtheless it is opposed to the
.
,

whole momentum o f science Fo r if mind is .

supposed o n no matter how smal l a scale to be

, ,

a cause of motion the fundamental ax iom of science

,

is impugned This fundamental axiom is that

.

energy can neither be created nor destroyed

that j ust as motion can produce nothing but m otion ,

5 0 conversely motion can be p r oduced by nothing

, ,

but motion Regarded therefo r e fr om the stand

.
, ,

point o f physical science the theory o f spiritualism ,

is in precisely the same case as the theory o f

materialism : that is to sa y i f the supposed causa ,

tion takes place it can only b e supposed to do so

,

by way o f miracle .

And this is a conclusion which the mo r e clea r

 M ind a nd Mot ion . 27

sighted o f the idealists ha ve expressly r ecognized .

That subtle and most ente rtain ing thinker for ,

e x ample the late P rofesso r G ree n of Oxford has

, ,

‘
said that the self conscious volition o f man does
-

not consis t in a series O f natural events 18 not

natural in the ordina ry sense o f that term ; not

natu ral at any rate in any sense in which natural
ness would imply i ts d etermination by antecedent
events o r by conditions o f which it is not itself the
,

source .
’

Thus the theory o f spiritual ism although not ,

directly refutabl e by any process o f logic is ,

certainly enfeebl ed by i ts collision with the instincts

O f physical science I n necessarily hold ing the facts
.

of consciousness and volition supe r natural extra -

,

natural or non natural the theory is opposed to

,
-
,

the principle o f continuity .

S pirit ualism being thus unsatisfactory and mate ,

ria lism impossible i s there yet any thi rd hypothesis

,

in which we may hope to fi nd intellectual rest ?

I n my opinion the r e is I f we unite in a higher
.

synthesis the elements both o f spiritualism and o f

material ism we obtain a product which satisfies
,

eve ry fact of feeling on the o ne hand and o f ,

o bse rvation o n the other The manner in which

.

this synthesis may be effected is perfectly si mple .

We have only to suppose that the antithesis between

mind and motion —subject and obj ect is itsel f —
phenomenal o r apparent : not absolute o r real .

We have only to suppose tha t the seeming duality

i s relative to o ur modes o f apprehension ; and ,
28 M in d a nd Mot ion .

the r efo re that any change taking place i n t h e

,

m ind and any corresponding change taking p lace

,

i n the b rain are r eally not two changes but o ne

, ,

change When a violin is played upon we hear

.

a musical sound and at the sam e ti me we see

,

a vibration o f the st r ings R elatively to o u r .

consciousn ess therefo re we have he r e two sets o f

, ,

changes which appea r to be very di fferent in kind

,

yet we know that in an absolute sense they are one

and the same : we know that the d iversity in
consciousness is created only by the di fference in
o ur modes of perceiving the same event —whether

w e see o r whether we hear the vibration o f the

strings S imilarly we may suppose that a vibra
.
,

tion of nerve strings and a process o f though t

-

a r e really o ne and the same event which is dual ,

o r diverse only in r elation to o u r modes o f per

c ei v i n
g it .

The great advantage of this theory is that it

supposes only o ne stream o f causation i n which ,

both m ind and motion are simultaneously concerned .

The theory therefore es capes al l the di ffi culties

, ,

and contradictions with which both spiritualism

and materialism are beset Thus motion is sup .
,

posed to be producing nothing but motion ; m ind

changes nothing b u t m i nd changes both prod ucing
,
-

both simultaneously neither could be what it is ,

without the other because without the other neithe r

,

could be the cause which i n fact it i s I mpossible .

therefore is the su ppositi o n o f the material ist that

,

consciousn ess is adventitious o r that in the absence ,

 M i nd a nd Mot ion . 2
9

of mind changes o f b rain could be what they a re ; for

it belongs to the ve ry causat ion o f these changes that
they should have a mental side The use o f mind .

to animals i s thus rende r ed appa r ent for intel l igent

vol ition is thus shown to be a true cause of adj u stive
movement in that the ce rebration which it involves
,

could not othe rwise be possible : the causation

would not otherwise be complete .

A si mple i llustration may serve at once t o render

this doctrine more easily intelligible and to show ,

that if accepted the doctrine as it appea r s to m e

, , , ,

terminates the othe rwise inte r m inable contr o versy

o n the freedom o f the will .

In an E d ison lamp the light which is emitted

from the burner may be said indi fferently to be
caused by the number o f vibrations per second
going o n in the carbon o r by the temperatu r e o f
,

the carbon fo r this rate o f vib ration could not take

place in the carbon without constituting that degree
o f temperature which a ffects o u r eyes as luminous .

S imilarly a train o f thought may be said i ndif

,

ferently to be caused by brain action or by m ind -

act io n ; fo r ex lzypotnesi the o ne could not take

, ,

place without the othe r Now when we contem

.
,

plate the phenomena of volition by themselves ,

it is as though we were contemplating the pheno

mena o f light by themselves : volition is p r od uced
by mind in b rain j ust as light is p r oduced by
,

temperature in carb o n And j ust as we may

.

correctly speak o f l ight as the cause say o f a , ,

photograph so we may cor r ectly speak o f volition

,
3 0 M ind a nd Moti on .

as the cause o f bodily m ovem ent Tha t pa rt i

.

c u la r k ind o f physical activity which ta k es place

in the carbon could not take place without the

l ight which causes a photograph ; and sim ilarly , ,

that pa rticular kind o f physical activity which takes

place in the brain could not ta k e place without the
vol ition which causes a bodi ly movement S o that .

volition is as t ru ly a cause o f bodily movement as

is the physical activity o f the b rain ; seeing that ,

i n an absolute sense the cause is o ne and the same

,
.

But if we once clea r ly pe r ceive that what in a r elative

sense we k now as volition is in a s imila r sense the
, ,

cause of bodily movement we term inate the question

,

touching the freedom o f the wi ll For t h is question

.

in its l ast reso rt —and apa rt from the ambigu ity

which has been thrown around it by some o f ou r
m etaphysicians — is me rely the question whethe r
the will is to be regard ed as a cause o f Nature .

And the theo ry which we have now before us sanc

tions the doct rine that it may be so regarded if only ,

we r emember that its causal activity depends upon

i ts identity with the obverse aspect k nown as ce re
bration without which identity in apparent duality
,

neither volition no r cerebration could be the cause

'

which i n fa ct they a r e It thus becomes a mere

.

matter of phraseology whethe r we speak o f the will

determ ining o r being dete r m ined by changes going
, ,

o n in the external world j ust as it is but a matte r

o f ph raseolo y whethe r we speak o f temperatu r e
g
determ ining o r being dete r mined by molecular
,
,

vibration A ll the requi rements alike o f the fr ee

.
 M in d a nd Mot ion 1
.
3

will and o f the bond will hypotheses are thus satisfied

-

by a synthesis which comprises them both O n the .

o n e hand it would be as impossible fo r an u n c o n

,

scious automaton to do the work o r to perform the

adj ustments of a conscious agent as it would be ,

for an E dison lamp to give o ut l ight and ca use a

photograph when not heated by an electri c current .

On the other hand it would be as impossible fo r

,

the wil l to originate bod ily m ovement without the

occurrence o f a strictly physical p rocess of ce r ebra
tion as it would be fo r light to shine in an E d ison
,

lamp which had been deprived of its carbon burner -

.

It may be said of this theo ry that it i s highly

'

s peculative not verifiable by any possible ex peri

,

m ent and therefore at best is but a me r e guess

, .

A ll which is no doubt perfectly true but o n the

, , ,

other hand we must r emember that this theo ry

,

comes to us as the only o ne which is logical ly

possible and at the same time competent to satisfy
,

the facts al ike of the outer and of the inne r world .

It is a speculation in the sense o f not being verifiabl e

by expe r iment but it has much more value tha n
ordinarily attaches to an u nveri fia b le speculation ,

in that there is real ly no alternative hypothesis to

be considered : if we choose to cal l it a gu ess we ,

must at the same time r emember it is a guess where

it does not app ear that any other is open Once .

more to quote H obbes wh o as we have s een

, , ,

w as hi msel f a r emarkable instance o f what he he r e

says : The best prophet na tu rally is the best
‘

guesse r ; and the best guesse r he th at is m ost ,

3 2 M i nd a nd Mot ion .

versed and studied i n the matte r s he guesses at

’
.

I n this case therefore the best prophet is not the

, ,

physiologist whose guess ends i n materialism ; n or

,

the purely m ental philosophe r whose guess ends in ,

spiritual ism but rathe r the man who being versed ,

and studied in all the facts appe rtaining to both

’

sides o f the matte r ends in the on ly alte r native

,

guess which remai ns open And if that most .

t roublesome individual the plain man o f Locke

‘
,
’

shoul d say it seems at least opposed to common

sense to suppose that there is anything in a burning
cand le o r a rol ling billiard ball substa ntially the
-

same as mind the answer is that i f he could

,

lo o k into my brai n at this moment he would see

nothing there but motion o f molecules o r motion ,

of m asses ; and apa rt from the accident o f my

‘ ’
being able to tel l him so his com mon sense ,

could never have divined that these motions i n my

b rain are concerned in the genesis o f my spoken
thoughts .

It is obvious that from this hypothesis a s to the

substa ntia l identity o f m ind and m otion two impor ,

tant questions arise ; and I feel that some r eference

to these questions is in present circumstances forced
upon m e because they have both been considered
,

in preci sely the same connexion by one o f th e m ost

powe rful intel lects that w as eve r sent o u t into the
world by this U niversity I mean the late Profess o r
.

C li fford A s my intimate and valued friend I desire

.
,

to mention h is name in this place with al l the a ti c e

l M ind a nd Mot ion
3 a,. .

insist upon the o ne point which is i mm ed iately c on

n ec ted with my subject ; and this is that whethe r
,

o r not C l ifford w as right i n his conclusions these ,

conclusions certainly d id not follow by way o f

any logical sequence from his premises Because .

within the l imits o f human ex perience m ind is

only known as associated with brain it clea r ly does
,

not follow that m ind cannot exist in any othe r

mode It d oes not even follow that any probability
.

upon this matte r can be thus established The bas is .

o f analogy o n which C li fford sought t o rear an

inference o f cosm ical ex tent was restricted to the

,

o n e instance of mind as known upon o ne planet ;

and therefore it is hard to imagine a mo r e pre

, ,

cari o us use o f that precarious method which is

called by logicians simple enumeration Indeed .
,

even for what it is worth the inference m ay be

,

p o inted with quite as much effect in precisely

the O pp o site direction . Fo r we have seen how
l ittle it is that we unde rstand o f the o n e mode in
which we ce rtainly know that m ind d oes exist ; and
i f fr om this little we feel i mpelled to conclude that
there is a mode o f m ind which is not r estricted to
brain but c o ex tensive with motion is con sub
,
-
,
-

sta nt ia l and c o eternal with all tha t was

-
and is , ,

and is to come ; have we not at least a suggestion ,

that high as the heavens are above the ea rth so ,

high above o u r thoughts may be the thoughts o f

such a m ind as this ? I o ffe r no opinion upon the
question whethe r the general orde r o f Nature does
not require some one explanatory cause ; no r upon
 M in d a nd Mot ion .
35

the question whether the m ind o f m a n itself does

n o t point to something kind red in the self e x isting -

origin o f things I am not concerned to argue any

.

point up o n which I feel that O pinions may legi ti

mately d i ffer I am only concerned to show that
.
,

in so far as any deductions can be d rawn from the

theory which is before us they make at least as ,

much against as in favou r o f the cosmical conclu

sions arrived at by C li fford .

O n February 1 7 in the yea r 1 600 when th e

, ,

streets o f Rom e were thronged with pilgrims from

al l the qua rters o f C h r istendom while no less than ,

fi fty card inals were congregated for the jubilee ;

i nto the d ensely c rowded C ampo di Fio r i a man
‘
was led to the stake where silent and self , ,

sustained before the eyes o f al l nations he

,
’

pe r ished in the flames That death was the d eath

.

of a ma rtyr : it was met voluntarily in attestation

o f truth . But most nobl e o f al l the nobl e army
to which he belonged the name o f that man is ,

written large in histo ry as the name o f o ne wh o,

had fo rt itude to d ie not in the cause o f religious

,

belief but in that o f scientific conviction Fo r why

,
.

d id B runo suffe r ? H e su ffered as we al l know , ,

because he refused to recant his persuasion o f the

truth o f the C ope r nican theory Why then d o I .
, ,

adduce the name of Bruno at the close o f this

lecture ? I do so because as fa r as I have been ,

able to asce rtain he was the fi rst clearly to enun

,

ciate the monistic theory o f things to which the

consideration o f my subj ect ha s conducted u s .

D 2
3 6 M ind a nd Mot ion .

This theory —o r that as to the substantial identity

of mind and m otion—was afte rwards espoused in ,

d ifferent guises by sundry othe r writers ; but to

,

B runo belongs the merit o f its original publication ,

and it was pa rtly for his adherence to this pub lica

tion that he died To this day Bruno is ordinarily
.

termed a pantheist and his theory which i n the

, ,

light o f much fuller knowledge I a m advocating ,

Pantheism I do not care to consider a d i fference

.

o f terms where the only d istinction r esid es in so

,

unintelligibl e an idea as that o f the creation of

substance It is more to the purpose to observe
.

that in the mind o f its fi rst originator— and this

a mind which was su fli ciently clear in its thought
t o di e fo r its percepti o n of astronomical truth —the
theory of Pantheism was but a sublime extension of
the then contracted views o f Theism A nd I think .

that we of to day when we l o ok to the teaching o f

-
,

this marty r o f science will find that in his theory

,

alone d o we m eet with what I may term a philo

sophically adequate conception o f Deity I f the .

advance o f natural science is now st eadily leading

us to the con clusion that there is no motion without
mind must we not see ho w the independent con
,

elusion of mental science is thus independently

c o n firm ed—the conclusion I m ean that there is no
, ,

being without knowing ? T o m e at least it does , ,

appear that the time has come when we may begin ,

as it were in a dawning light to see that th e study

,

o f Nature and the study o f M ind are meeting upon

this greatest o f possible t ruths And if this is the .

 M in d a nd Mot ion .
37

case —i f there is no motion w ithout m ind no being ,

without knowing —shall we infer with C li fford that , ,

universal being is mind less o r answe r with a dog ,

matic negative that most stupendous o f questions

Is there knowledge with the Most H igh ? I f there
is no motion without m ind no be ing without know ,

ing may we not rather infer with Bruno that it is

, , ,

i n th e m edium o f mind and i n the med ium o f

,

k nowledge we l ive and move and have o ur

, , ,

being P
This I think is the d irection in which the infer
, ,

ence points if we are careful to set the logical

,

conditions with compl ete impa rtiality But the .

ulterior question remains whethe r so fa r as science

, ,

i s conce r ned it is he r e possible to p o int any inference

,

at al l : the whole orbit o f human knowledge may

be too narrow to a fford a parallax for measurements
s o vast. Yet even here if it be true that the voice
,

o f science must thus o f necessity speak the lan uage

g
of agnosticism at least let us see to it that the
,

language is pure let us not tolerate any barbarisms

introduced from the side o f aggressive dogma S o .

shal l we fi nd that this new gram ma r o f thought

does not admit o f any constructi o ns rad ical ly o p
posed to more venerable ways o f thinking even if
we d o n ot find that the o ften quoted words o f its -

earliest fo rmulato r apply with special force to its

latest dialects —that if a little knowledge o f physi
ology and a little knowledge o f psychology dispose
men to atheism a deeper knowledge o f both and
, , ,

stil l more a d eeper thought upon thei r relations to

,
3 8 Mi nd a nd Mot ion .

o ne another wil l lead men back to som e fo r m of

,

religion w hich if it be m ore vague may also be

, , ,

m ore wo rthy than that o f earlier days .

It
‘
isb e uteou s ev n i ng ca l m and free ;
a a e ,

T he h oly ti m e i s q ui et s n n a a u ,

Bre thl e ss with d r ti n ; the b ro d s n

a a o a o a u

Is si nk i ng d ow n i n i ts t r n q uillity ;
a

T h g en tl en ess o f h e v n i s n the se
e a e o a

L ist n " the m i g hty b ei ng is wake

e a ,

A nd d th with his et ern l m ti n m a k e

o a o o

A s un d li k e thun d r ev erl sti ng ly

o e , a .
’
 M O N IS M

Da s I ch ist n icht a us L eib und S eele z u sammengesetz t ,

son d ern es ist e i n e b e sti mm t e E n twic klu n g sst ufe des W e sen s
,

das von v er schi ed enem S t an dpu nk t b et ra cht e t i n k Orperli ches

u nd gei stig es Da sei n ausein anderfallt — Wun dt "orlesu ngen
’
.
,

icoer di e M ensc/zen a nd 77ti erseele, i . 29 3 .

42 Monis m .

it is enough to say that the fact i s established to

the satisfaction of eve r y physiologist .

Now when once the r elation betwee n mate r ial

,

changes and mental changes has been thus recog

n i z ed as quantitative — o r which is the same thing
, ,

when once the association has been recogni z ed as

both invariable and exact —there a r ises the question
as to how this relation is to b e explained Formal ly
.

considered —o r conside r ed as a m atte r o f logical

statement ir r espective o f e r elative p r obabilities
which they may p r esent eithe r to the m inds o f
,

d i ffe r ent ind ividuals o r to the general intelligence

o f the r ace —i t appea r s to me that the possible
hypotheses are here seven in numbe r .

I The mental changes may cause the material

.

changes .

The mate r ial changes may cause the mental

changes .

There m ay be no causation either way b e ,

cause the association m ay be only a

ph enomenal association —the tw o apparently
d iverse classes o f phenomena being r eal ly
o ne and the same .

The r e may be n o causation eithe r way ,

because the association may be due to

a harmony p r e established by a supe r ior
-

mind .

V There may be no causation either way b e

.
,

cause the association may always be due

to chance .
 In trodu ct ion .
43

There may be no causation either way b e ,

cause the material orde r may not have any

r eal ex istence at al l being me r el y an id eal
,

creation o f the mental order .

Whethe r o r not there be any causation either

way the ass o ciation may be o ne which
,

it is necessarily beyond the powe r o f the

human m ind to explain .

S o fa r as I can s ee this li st o f possible answe r s

,

to the question before us is exhaustive I wil l .

n ext show why in my opinion

, the last fou r o f
,

them may be excluded i n li m i ne .

The suggestion o f pre established ha r mony ( IV )

-

merely p o stpones the question it a ssu m es a higher

m i nd as adj usting c o rrespondencies between known
m inds and animal bod ies with r espect to the
activities o f each ; and therefo r e it either leaves
, ,

untouched the ultimate question conce rning the

relation o f mind ( as such ) to matte r o r else it ,

answers this questi o n in terms o f spiritualism ( I ) .

The suggestion o f chance ( V ) is effectual ly

excluded by the d oct rine o f chances : even in any
o ne ind ividual m ind the associati o n between
,

mental changes and material changes is much too

intimate c o nstant and detailed to admit o f any
, ,

o ne reasonably supp o sing that it can be d ue only

to chance .

The suggestion o f pure idealism ( VI ) ultimately

implies that the thinking E go is itself the s o le
existenc e —a position which cannot indeed be , ,
44 Monis rn .

tu r ned by any assau l t o f logic ; but o ne which is

neve rtheless too obviously opposed to common
sense to ad mit of any serious defence its i m munity
from di r ect attack a r ises only from the gratuitous
natu r e o f its c hal l enge to prove a negative ( namely ,

that the thinking E go is not the sole existenc e ) ,

and this a negative which i s necessarily beyond

th e r egion o f p r oo f .

Lastly the suggestion that the p r oblem is

,

necessarily insoluble ("II) d oes not dese r ve to b e

r egarded as an hypothesis at all ; fo r to suppose
that the p r oblem is necessarily insoluble is m e r ely
to exclude the supposition of the r e being any
hypothesis available .

I n view o f these several conside r ations it appea r s ,

to me that although in a formal sense we may say

,

the r e are altogethe r seven possibl e answers to the

question before us i n r eality o r fo r the pu r poses o f
, ,

practical discussion there a r e now a d ays but th r ee

,
- -

— namely those which head the above list and ,

which I will now proceed to conside r .

I have named these th r ee hypotheses in the

orde r o f thei r appearance during the histo r y o f
philos o phical thought The ea r liest i s the spirit
.

u a li sti c
. A s fa r back as we can trace the co n
c epti o ns o f primitive man we meet with an
,

unquestioning belief t h at it is his spirit which

a n i m a tes his body ; and sta rt ing fro m this bel ief
,

as explanatory o f the movements o f his own body ,

he readily attributes movements elsewhere to

analogous agencies —the theory o f a n i mi s m in
 Introdu ct ion .
45

Nature thus becoming the u nive r sal theory in all

early sta ges of culture I t also appears to be the
.

theo ry most natural to ou r ow n children during the

early years o f thei r dawning intelligence and ,

would d o ubtless continue through life in the case o f

eve ry ind ividual human being were he not sub
,

sequently instructed in the r easons which have led

to its rej ection by many othe r m embers o f his
race These reasons as already observed have
.
, ,

been furnished i n their entirety only within com

p a ra ti v el
y r ecent times ; not unti l Physiology was
able to prove how intimate is the association
betwee n cerebral processes and mental p roces ses
d id it become possibl e for materialism to tu r n the
tables up o n spiritualism by simply inve rting the
,

hypothesis Lastly although the theo ry of M onism

.
,

( I I I ) may be traced back at least as fa r as the

pantheistic thought o f Buddhism it there had ,

reference to theology as distinguished from

psychology A nd even as presented i n the writings
.

of Brun o Spinoza and othe r so cal led m onists

, ,
-

prior to the present century the hypothesis ,

necessarily lacked completeness o n account o f the

absence o f knowledge afterwards supplied by
physiology For M onism i n the sense o f this
.
,

term as I shall use it may be metaphorica l ly

,

rega r ded as the chi ld of the two pre ex isting -

theories Spiritualism and Materialism The bi rth

,
.

o f this child was necessarily i mpossible before

both its parents had reached mature age On .

the o ne hand it was necessary that the theory o f

46 Mon ism .

Spiritualism shoul d have outgrown its infancy as

A nimism its childhood a s Polytheism before it
entered upon i ts youth as M onotheism —o r before
, ,

it was able to supply material fo r the con ception

o f Monism as a theory o f cosmical extent On the .

o ther hand Materialism required to grow into the

,

fullness o f manh ood under the nursing influence of

,

Science before it was possible to engender this

,

new born o ffspring ; fo r this o ffspring is new

-

born The theo ry o f Monism as we are ab o ut to

.
,

consider it is a creature o f o ur o w n generation ;

,

and it is only a s such that I desire to call attention

to the ch ild In order however to d o this I must
.
, , ,

fol low the example o f biographe r s i n general and ,

begin by giving a brief sketch o f both the parents .

 C HA PTER I .

S PI R I T U A LIS M .

I N proceeding to conside r the opposite theories of

Spiritualism and M aterialism it is before al l else
,

desirable to be perfectly clear upon the point o f

theo ry whereby they are essentially distinguished .

This point is that which is r aised by the question

whether m ind is the cause or the e ffect o f motion .

Both theories are dualistic and the r efore agree

,

in holding that the r e is causation as between mind

and motion : they d iffe r only in their teaching as
to the d irection i n which the causation proceeds .

Of c ourse out o f this fundamental difference the r e

,

arise many seconda ry d i fferences The most i m

.

p o rtant o f these seconda ry d ifferences has reference

to the nature o f the eternal o r self existi ng substance
-
.

Both theories agree that there is such a substance

but on the questio n whether this substance be mental
o r mater ial the two theories give contrad icto r y
,

answers and l o gically so Fo r if mind as we d irectly

, .
,

kn o w it ( namely in ourselves ) is taken to be a cause

,

of motion within o u r experience m ind is accredited

,

with priority ; and hence the inference that else

48 Monis m .

where o r unive rsal ly m ind is p rio r to motion

, ,
.

Fu rthermore as mot ion cannot take place without

,

something which moves this something is li k ewise ,

supposed to have been the result of mind : hence

the doctrine o f the creation by mind both o f matte r
and of energy On the other hand the theo ry o f
. ,

materialism by refusing to assign priority to m ind as

,

known directly in ourselves natural ly concludes that ,

mind is elsewhere o r universal ly the result o f matte r

, ,

in motion —i n other wo r ds that matte r in motion is ,

the eternal o r self existing substance and a s such

-
, , ,

the cause o f mind whereve r m ind occu r s .

I may obse rve in passing that although this

, ,

cosmical deduction fro m the theory o f materialism is ,

as I have sa id natural it is not (as is the case with

, ,

the corresponding deduction fro m the theo ry o f

spiritualism ) inevitable Fo r it is logically possible
.

that even though all known m inds be the results o f

matter in motion matte r in motion may neve rtheless
,

itsel f be the result of an unknown m ind This .

,

i ndeed is the position vi rtually adopted by Locke

,

in his celebrated controversy with the Bishop o f

Worceste r Having been taken to task by this
.

d ivine fo r the materialistic tendency o f his writings ,

Locke defends himself by denying the necessary

cha racte r of the deduction which we are now con
s i deri n
g . Fo r example he insists ‘
I see no con
, ,

t ra di cti o n in it that the fi r st eternal thinking being

should i f he pleased give to ce rtain systems o f

, ,

created senseless matter put togethe r as he thin k s ,

fit some degrees O f sense pe r ception and thought

, , ,
5 0 Monis m .

spiritualists and mate r ialists it is often lost sight

o f : nay in some cases it is even expressly igno r ed
, ,
.

Obvi o usly when it is either intentionally or u ni nten

,

ti o na lly disregarded the debate ceases to be d irected

,

to the question under d iscussion and may then ,

wande r aimlessly over the whole field o f collateral

speculation Throughout the present essay there
.
,

fore the d iscussi o n will be restricted to the only

,

—
topic which we have to d iscuss namely whether ,

mind is the cause o f motion motion the cause o f ,

m ind o r neither the cause o f the other .

The view to be fi rst c o nsidered —namely that

,

m ind is the cause o f motion— obviously ha s o ne

great advantage over the opposite view it supposes
the causality to proceed from tha t which is the
s o urce o f ou r idea of causal ity ( the mind ) not from
that into which this idea has been r ead by the m ind .

H ence it is so far less d i ffi cult to imagine that mental

,

changes are the cause of bod ily changes than vi ce

ver sa ; fo r upon this hypothesis we a r e sta rting at

l east from the substance o f i m mediate knowledge ,

and not from the reflection o f that k nowledge in what

we call the external world .

On the other hand the theory o f Spiritualism

,

labours unde r certain speculative d i ffi culties which

appea r to me ove rwhelming The most formidable o f.

these d i fficulties arises from the inevitable coll ision o f

the theo ry with the scientific d octrine o f the conser
vation of energy Whether o r not we adopt the view
.

that all causation o f a physical k ind is ultimately

an expression of the fact that matter and energy
 Sp ir itu ali sm .
5 1

are indest ructible it is equally ce rtain that this ‘

,

i nd estructibility is a necessary condition to the

occurrence o f causation as natural Therefore if .
,

the mind o f man is capable o f breaking in as an

independent cause upon the othe rwise uniform
system o f natu ral causation the only way in which ,

it could d o so would be by either destroying o r

creating ce rtain qu a n ta of either matter or energy
o r both But to S uppose the mind capable of d oing
.

any o f these things would be to suppose that the

mind is a cause in some othe r sense than a physical
o r a natural cause ; it would be to suppose that the

mind is a super natural cause o r more plainly that -

, , ,

al l mental activity so far as it is an e ffi cient cause ,

o f bodily movement is of the nature o f a miracle , .

This conclusion which appears to m e unavoidably ,

impl icated in the spiritualistic hyp o thesis is not ,

merely impro bable per se but ad mits o f being ,

shown vi rtually impossible if we p r oceed to con

sider the consequences to which it necessarily
leads A sp o rtsman fo r e x ample pulls the trigge r
.
, ,

pi i f s m m d w it s th i d st ucti b i l ity f
In the o n on o o e o ern r er e n e r o

m tta d th c s v ti
er a n f gy e l suffici t t xpl i
o n er a on o ener are a one en o e a n

ll th f cts f tu l c us ti i t is u g d i f i yc s
‘
’
a e a o F na ra a a on . or, r e ,
n an a e

si mi l t d t di d t d t m i si m i l c s qu ts
a r a n ece en s no e er ne ar on e en ,
o n one or

oth f th s cc si s s m q t m f f c
er o e e o on f m tt f ua n u o r e, o r o a er, o r o

b th m st h v di pr d— which is th s m th i g th l w
a o e o

o ,
u a e sa eare o r, e a e n , e a

of c us ti
a c t h v b c st t I futu ch pt I s h l l
a on ann o a e een on an .
’
n a re a er a

h v t cu t th is vi w M wh i l I h v ly t b s v th t
a e o re r o e . ea n e a e on o o er e a

w h th e t th l w f c us ti
er o r n o is th i g m th
e a o tt a a on no n o re an a re-s a e

m t f th f ct th t m tt
en o e d agy i d st ucti b l it i
a a er an en er are n e r e, s

equ lly ta t h t th is f ct i t l st
rue ac ss y di ti t th
a s a ea a ne e ar con on o e

op ti f th t l w
era on o a a .
52 M
of a gun the r eby initiating a long t r ain o f physical
,

causes which we may take up at the point whe r e

,

the powde r is d ischarged the shot propelled and

, ,

the bird d r opped . H e r e the man s vol ition is

’

supposed t o have broken in upon the othe rwise

—
cont inuous st rea m o f physical causes first by
mod ifying the molecular movements of his b rain ,

so as to produce the pa rticula r c o o r d ination o f

-

neuro muscula r movement required to ta k e accu r ate

-

aim and to fi r e at the right moment ; ne x t by

conve rting a quantity o f gunpowder into gas ,

propelling a quantity o f lead th r ough the ai r ; and

fi nal ly by k illing a bird Now without tracing
, .
,

the matte r fu rthe r than this let us conside r how

,

enormous a change the wil l o f the man ha s int r o

duced even by so trivial an exercise o f its act ivity
, .

N o doubt the fi rst change in the material world w as

exceedingly sl ight : the molecular movement in
the co rte x o f his b rain w a s probably not mo r e
than might be dynam ically r ep r esented by some
small fraction o f a foot pound But so intricate
-
.

is the nexus o f physical causal ity th r oughout the

whole d omain o f Nature that the inte rvention o f
,

even so m inute a disturbance a b ex tra is obviously

bound to continue to asse rt an influence o f eve r
widening extent as wel l as o f everlasting duration .

The heat gene rated by the explosion of the powde r ,

the changed disposition o f the shot the d eath o f

the bird —lead ing to innume rabl e physical changes
,

as to stoppage o f many mechanical p rocesses

p r eviously going o n in the bi r d s body loss O f
’

,
 Sp iri tu ali sm .
53

a nimal heat & c and also to innumerable vita l

,
.
,

changes leading to a stoppage o f al l the mechanica l

,

changes which the bird would have helped t o

condition had it lived to die some other death ,

to propagate i ts ki nd and thus ind irectly cond ition

,

an incalculable numbe r o f future changes that

would have been b r ought about by the eve r
i ncreasing number o f its descendants —these and
an indefinite numbe r o f other physical changes
must all be hel d to have followed as a d irect
’
consequence o f the man s volition thus suddenly
breaking i n as an independent cause upon the
othe rwise uniform course o f Nature N o w I say .
,

that apa rt from some system o f pre established

,
-

harmony it appears simply in c onceivabl e that the

,

o rde r o f Nature could be maintained at all if it ,

were thus l iabl e to be interfered with at any

moment in a ny numbe r o f p o ints And i f the .

spiritualist takes refuge in the fu rther hypothesis

of a pre established harmony between acts o f
-

human ( not to add b rute) vol ition an d causes o f

a natural ki nd we have only to O bse rve that h e
,

thus lands himself in a speculative position which

is practically identical with that occupied by the
material ist Fo r the only d i ffe rence between the
.

two positions then is that the necessity which the

materialist takes to be imposed o n human volition
by the system o f natural causation is now taken ,

by the spiritualist to be equally i mposed by a super

natural volition The necessity which binds the
.

human volition must be equally r igid in either

54 Monism .

case ; and therefore it can make no p ractical .

di ffe rence whethe r the source o f it be regarded

a s natu r al o r super natural mate r ial o r mental so
-
,

that a man be fated to wi ll only in ce rtain ways

and this with all the rigou r which belongs to causa
tion as physical —it is sca r cely wo rth while to
dispute whethe r the p redestination i s o f Go d o r
o f Nature . The r e can be no question howeve r , ,

that in this matte r the possibility which I have

supposed to be suggested by the spiritual ist is
more fa r fetched than that which obviously lies
-

to the hand o f the materialist and moreove r that , ,

it too p lainly wears the appearance o f a d esperate

device to save a hollow theory .

It r emains to add that this great di ffi culty against

the spiritual istic theory has been r evealed in al l its
fo r ce only during the present generation Since .

the days o f fetishism indeed the d i fficulty ha s

, ,

always been an inc reasing o ne—growing with the

growth o f the perception of uniformity o n the o ne
hand and o f mechanical as d istinguished fr o m
,

volitional agency o n the othe r But it was not

.

until the correlation of al l the physical forces had

been proved by actual experiment and the scienti fi c
,

doctrine of the conservation o f ene rgy became a s

a consequence fi rmly established that the di fficulty
,

in question assumed the impo rtance o f a logical

barrier to the theo ry o f mental changes acting as
e ffi cient causes o f mate r ial changes .
 C HA PTER II .

MAT E R I A LIS M .

T HIS is the theo ry which pre sents g r eat fasci

nation to the stud ent o f physical science By .

labo rious investigation physiology has established

the fact beyond the reach o f ra tional dispute that ,

there is a constant relati o n o f con c o mitancy

between cerebral action and t hought Withi n .

experience mind is found i n constant and definite

association with that highly complex and pecul iar
disposition o f matter called a living brain The .

size and elaboration o f this peculiar structure

throughout the ani mal kingdom stand i n c o n
s p i cuous propo rtion to the degree o f intelligence

displayed ; while the impairment o f this structure ,

whethe r by congenital defect m uti lation anaemia

, , ,

decay o r appropria te poison entails c o rrespond ing

, ,

i mpairment o f mental p rocesses Thus much being

.

established no r easonable man can hesitate in

,

be lieving the relation between neurosis and psy

c hos is to b e a c o nstant and concom itant relat i o n ,

so that the step between this and r egard ing it as

,

a causal r elation seems indeed a small o ne For

, .
,

in al l matte r s o f physical inquiry wheneve r we ,

5 6 Monism .

have p r oved a constant r elation o f concom itancy

i n a sequence A B we cal l A the cause o f B ; and
, ,

therefore it has been frequently said that the

,

evidence of causation between neurosis and psychosi s

is recognized causation Lastly to fo rtify this
.
,

hypothes is materialists point to the doct r ine o f the

,

conse rvation o f ene rgy which is S upplied by the

,

science o f physics as a so rt o f buttress in this

matter to the teachings o f physiology For as .
,

this d octrine compels us to believe that the chain

o f physical causation involved i n cerebral processes

can nowhe r e be broken or d eflected a b ex tr a we ,

are compelled to believe that the mental processes ,

which are co r relatively associated with these cerebral

‘
processes can nowhere escape fr o m the charmed
,

ci rcle o f the forces so that whether we look to the

’

d etailed teachings o f physiology o r to the more ,

general teachings o f physics we alike pe r ceive that

,

natu ral science appea r s to leave no locus for m ind

othe r than as a something which is in some way
a r esult of motion .

The position o f Materialis m being thus at fi rst

sight so natu ral ly strong and having been in recent
,

years so fo rtified by the lab o u r s o f physiol o gy it is ,

not surprising that in the present generation

M aterialism should be i n the ascendant It is .

the simple truth as a learned and temperate

,

author speaking from the side o f theology has

, ,

r ecently said that ,

is a d ng r to which i ndivid u ls nd soci ti es

M a teri a lis m a e a a e

will lw y s b e m ore o l ess ex posed The p res n t g n r ti on

a a r . e e e a ,
58 Monis m .

mental processes so long no ha r m can accrue to

,

physical science by assuming fo r its o w n purposes

, ,

that this relation is a causal o ne But as soon as

.

the question c oncerning the val id ity o f this a ssu m p

tion is raised into the region o f philosophy it receives ,

the answe r that the assumpt ion cannot b e al lowed

to pas s Fo r where the question becomes o n e not
.

as to the fac t o f the association but a s to i ts

na tu r e philosophy which must have r egard to the
, ,

fact s o f m ind no l ess than to those o f matte r must ,

pronounce that the hypothesis is u ntenable fo r the

hypothesis o f this association being o ne o f causality
acting from neurosis to psychosis cann o t be ,

accepted without doing violence no t merely to o u r

,

faculty o f r eason but to ou r very id ea o f ca usation

,

itsel f
.

A ve ry smal l amount o f thinking is enough to

show that what I cal l my knowledge o f the
external world i s merely a knowledge o f my ow n
,

mental modifications A step fu rther and I find

.

that my idea o f causation as a principle in the

external world i s derived from my knowledge o f
this principle in the inte r nal world Fo r I fi nd .

that my idea o f force and energy in the exte r nal

world is a mere proj ection o f the idea which I have
o f effort within the r egion o f my o w n consciousness

and therefo r e my only idea o f causation is that

which is originally d erived from the experience
which I have o f this principle as obtain ing among
my o w n mental mod ificat ions .

If once we see plainly that the idea o f causation

 59

is derived fro m within and that what we cal l the

,

evidence o f physical causation is real ly the evidence

of mental modificati o ns fol lowing o ne anothe r in
a d efinite sequence we shal l then clea r ly see not
, ,

merely that we have no evidence but that we ca n ,

lza ve no evidence o f causation as proceed ing from

obj ect to subj ect H owever cogent the evidence
.

may appear at first sight to be it i s found to vanish

,

like a cloud as soon as it is exposed to the light

o f adequate contemplation I n the very act o f
.

thinking the evidence we are vi rtual ly denying

,

its possibility as evidence ; fo r as evidence it

appeals only to the mind and since the m ind can
,

only know its o w n s equences the evidence must be

,

presenting to the mind an account o f its ow n

mod ifications ; fr om the mere fact therefore o f its , ,

being accepted as thinkable the evidence is proved

,

to be illusory.

To uneducated men it appears an ind isputabl e

fact of com mon sense that the colou r o f a flower
exists as perceived in the flower apa rt fr om any ,

r elation to the percipient m ind A physiologist .

has gone further into the thicket o f things and ,

finds that the way is not so simple as this H e .

regards the qual ity o f colour as necessarily related

to the faculty of visual perception does not suppose
that the colour exists a s suclt in the flower but ,

thinks o f the something there as a ce rtain order o f

vibrations which when brought into relation with
,

consciousness through the med ium of ce rtain nerves ,

gives rise to the per ception experienced ; and in

60 Monis m .

orde r to account fo r the t ranslation into visual

feeling o f an event so unlike that feeling as is
the p rocess taking place in the flowe r physiologists ,

have recourse to an elabo rate theory such as that ,

o f Hel mholtz o r H ering I n othe r wo r ds physio

.
,

logists here fully r ecognize that colour o r any othe r ,

thing perceived only exists as percei ved in vi rtue o f

,

a subj ective element blending with an obj ective ;

the thing a s percei ved is r ecognized as having no
existence apart fr om i ts relation to a perci pient
.

mind N ow although physiologists are at o ne

.
,

with the philosophers thus fa r it is to be feared ,

that very frequently they a re in the sa me position

’
as the above mentioned uned ucated men when it
-
,

becomes needful to press sti ll fu rthe r into the

thicket Fo r after having distinguished the meces
.

s ity o f r ecognizing a mind element in any possible -

theo ry o f perception they fo rthwith proceed to

,

d isregard this element when passing fr om the

ground o f pe rception to that o f thought Although .

the ideas o f matte r motion causation and so on are

, , , ,

themselves as m uch the o ffspring o f a thinking mind ,

with its environment as the perception o f colour is

,

a conceiving of the percipient mi nd with i ts envi r on ,

m ent these ideas are inconsistently supposed to

,

stand fo r equivalent realities o f the external world

to t ruly rep resent things that are virtually i ndepen
dent o f any necessary relation to mind O r as the .
,

case has recently been wel l put by Principal C aird '

‘
Y ou c t g t m in d a s an ulti m ate p roduct f m tt r
a n no e o a e ,

fo r i n the v e y tt em pt to do so yo h v e a l re dy b egun with

r a u a a
 Materi alism . 61

m ind . i t st p f ny s u ch i nq u i ry i n v olv es c a te
The ea s es e o a

g rio f th ught a nd it i s in t rm s o f th ought th t the

es o o ,
e a

very p r bl em you e i nv stig ti n g c n b e m u ch s st t d

o ar e a a so a a e .

Y u c ann o t s t rt i n y ur i n v estig a ti n s with a b ar

o a self o o e,

id n tica l bjective f ct st ripp ed of every id l l men t o

e ,
o a , ea e e r

c nt ributi n fr m th ought T h l st n d l w st p rt of
o o o . e ea a o e a

o utw r d bs rv ti n i s n ot a n i nd p en d n t ntity —fa ct m i n us

a o e a o e e e

m i n d nd o t of which m i n d m y s m ewh r
, a u th r b e a , o e e or o e ,

s en to em erg e ; but it is f c t
e bject it ppe r s t a n a or o as a a o

obs rvi ng m i n d i n the m di um f th ught h vi ng m i n d o

e , e o o , a r

th ught
o n i n s ep r bl e f ct r of it
as a Wh th er th ere b e a a a o . e

such a thi n g an bs lut e w o ld out sid e f t h ught wh th er

as a o r o o ,
e

ther b such thi ng s m tt er a nd m t ri l t m s ex i sti ng

e e as a a e a a o

in th em selves bef re a ny m i n d b egi n s to p rc eiv e o thi nk

o e r

ab o ut th em i s not t he q u esti n b f re u
,
I f it wer p o s sibl e o e o s . e

t c n c iv e o f such a t m s a t a ny r t e y
o o e b for yo begi n o ,
a ou , e e u

t m k e n ythi n g of th em m u st thi nk th em ; a n d you c n

o a a , a

n v r by thi nk i ng b ut t m s p rov e th t th er i s n o such

e e ,
a o a o ,
a e

thi ng th ought th er t h n
as n ulti m t p roduct of t m s
o a as a a e a o .

Bef re you c ould r ch th ought o m i n d s a la st result y u

o ea r a o

m ust n e ds eli m i n a t f rom it th d t of th p r bl m with

e e e a a e o e

which y u start nd th t y u n n ver do ny m re th an

o , a a o ca e , a o

yo c n st n d o n y u r wn sh ould r s o
u a a utstrip y u r own o o e r o o

sh d o wa In o n w d t c on sti tut e th
. e lity of the
e or , o e r a

outw rd w orld —t m k e p ssibl the m i n i m u m of k n wl dg

a o a o e o e e,

n y th
a ve y xist nce f u of m l ecul s nd t m s —y u
, e r e e or s o e a a o o

m u st n eed s p r supp ose th t th ught e thi nk i ng s elf which a o or ,

s m e w ould p r su d e us i s to b
o educ e d
e ev lv e d fr om
a e or o

th em T o m k e th u g ht
. fun cti n of m tt r i s thus
a o a o a e ,

si m ply t m k e th u g ht
, ofun cti n of its lf
a o a o e

From this reasoning there can be no escape ;

and it is more rational fo r a man to believe that
c o l o ur ex ists as such in a flower than afte r hav ing ,

plainly seen that such cannot be the case forthwith ,

1
P /z i losop/zy f
o R eli gi on , pp .
9 5, 9 9 , an d 1 01 .
62 Mon is m .

to disregard the teaching o f this analogy and to ,

imagine that any apparent evidence o f m ind as

a result o f matter or motion can possibly be enter
ta i ned as real evidence .

Remembering then that fr o m the nature o f this

, ,

pa rticular case it is as impossible fo r mind to prove

its ow n causat ion as it is for wate r to rise above its
source it may stil l be wel l for the sake of fu rthe r
, ,

argument to sink this general considerati o n and to

, ,

rega r d such spurious evidence o f causation as is

p resented by Materialism with o ut prej ud ice a r ising
,

from its being pr i m e?fac i e inad m issible .

Materialists as alrea dy obse rved are fond of

, ,

saying that the evidence o f causation from neu r osis to

psychosis is as good as such evidence can be proved
to be in any othe r case Now quite apa rt from the
.
,

general considerations j ust adduced to sh o w that

from the pecul iar nature o f this case the r e can here
be no such evidence at al l — quite apa rt from this ,

and treating the problem o n the lower ground o f

the supposed analogy it may be cl early shown that
,

the statement is untrue For a l ittle thought will

.

show that in point o f fact the only resemblance

between this supp o sed case of causation and al l
othe r cases of recogni z ed causation cons ists in the ,

invariability o f the cor relation between cerebral

processes and mental processes ; i n al l othe r points
the analogy fails Fo r in all cases of r ecognized
.

causation there is a perceived connex i on between

the cause and the e ffect ; the antecedents are
physical and the consequents are physical But in
, .
 Mater ialism . 63

the case befo r e us there is no perceived o r even ,

c o nceivable c o nnexion between the cause and the

,

e ffect ; fo r the causes are supp o sed to be physical

and the e ffects mental A nd the antithesis thus .

p o sited is alone su fficient t o separate toto coelo the

case o f causat ion supposed from that of al l cases o f
causation recognized From the sin gularly clear .

and wel l balanced statement of this subj ect given by

-

Professor A l lman in his Presidential Add r ess befo re

the British A ssociat ion I may here fitly quote the
fo l lowing .

‘
If c uld e ny n l g y b tw n th ugh t nd ny
we o s e a a a o e ee o a a

o ne f the d m itt d ph n m en of m tt r w sh uld b

o a e e o a a e , e o e

justifi d i n th fi r st f th es e c n clusi on s ( i
e e oth t f o . e. a o

M t e i lis m ) a the si m pl st n d s a ff ding hyp oth sis

a r a s e ,
a a or a e

m s t in a cc d n c e with the c m p r h en siv en ss f n tu r l

o or a o e e o a a

l ws ; but b tw en th ught a n d th physica l ph n m n f

a e e o e e o e a o

m tt r th ere i s n t nly n
a e n l gy but no c n c iv ble
o o o a a o , o e a

a n a l gy ;o n d th obvi o us a n d c n ti nu u s p th which w
a e o o a e

h v e hith rt f ll w ed up in
a e o e s n i n g s fr m
o o the our r a o o

ph n om n f lif l ss m tter thr u g h th o s e f livi ng m tter

e e a o e e a o o a

h r c m s sudd enly to an n d T he ch s m b etw een

e e o e e . a

u n c n sci us lif nd th ught i s d p and i m p ss bl e nd n

o o e a o ee a a ,
a o

t r n siti on l ph n m en n b e f u n d by which s by a b ridg e

a a e o a ca o , a ,

w m y sp n it o v r
e a a e

not unduly to multiply quotations I shal l

A nd, ,

only adduce one more from anothe r o f the few

eminent men of science who have seen their way
clearly in this matte r and have exp ressed what they ,

have seen in language as clea r as thei r vision .

P r ofesso r Tyndall writes

B itish A ss ci ti
r o a on Rp e o rt , 1 8
79 , p . 28 .
64 Monis m .

‘
The p a s s ge from the physics f the b r in to the c orre
a o a

sp ndi ng f cts
o f c o n sci us n s s i s u n thi nk ble
a o o G r n t ed e a . a

th t d efin it e th ught n d a d fi nit e m l cul a r cti n i n the

a a o a e o e a o

br i n o ccur si m ult n ously w d n t p sses s the i nt ell ctu l

a a e ,
e o o o e a

o rg n a n , a pp r ntly a ny ru di m n t
or a e f the o rg n which e o a ,

w uld en bl e s t p a ss by p r c ss of re s ni ng from the

o a u o , a o e a o ,

o n ph en om en n to the
e th r Th y a pp r t g th r but w
o o e . e ea o e e e

do not kn w why oWere o m i n d s nd s n s s so xp an d d

. ur a e e e e ,

st ren g th en d n d illu m i n t ed
e ,
as to en bl e s to a nd f l
, a a u see a ee

th e v ery m ol ecul s f the b r i n wer w e c p bl f f llowi ng

e o a e a a e o o

a ll th ei r m ti n s ll th ei r g oupi n g s
o o , a ll th e i r l c tric l di s
r , a e e a

ch a rges if such th re b
,
n d w r e w e i n ti m t ely
e e c q u i nted
a e a a a

with the c rr sp ndi ng sta t s of th ught n d f li n g w e

o e o e o a ee ,

s h o uld b e s f v er fr m the s o luti n of the p robl em

a ar a s e o o .

H ow a e th ese phy sic l p ro c s s s c nnect ed with the f ct s

r a e e o a

o f c n sci u snes s ? The ch s m b etw n the tw cla ss es f

o o a ee o o

ph enom en w uld still r ma i n i n t ll ect u lly i m p ssabl

a o e e a a e
1 ’

N ex t in al l cases o f r ec ogni z ed causation there

,

is a perceived equ i va lency between cause and e ffect ,

such equivalency belonging to the very essence of

that in which we conceive causation to consist .

B ut as between matte r and moti o n o n the o ne side ,

a nd feeling and thought o n the other the r e can be ,

no such equivalency conceivable That no such .

equivalency is conceivabl e may be rendered apparent

o n grounds of Materialis m itself Fo r Materialis m .

is bound to accept the fundamental doctrine o f

m o dern physics —that viz as to the conse rvation .

of ene rgy —and the r efore it becomes evident that

,

unless we assi milate thought with energy there is ,

no possibility of a causal r elation o r a r elation of ,

equivalency as obtaining between the o ne and the

,

1
B itish A ss ci ti
r o a on Rp te or ,
1 8 68 . T s ran . of S cti s p
e on ,
.
5 .
66 Mon i s m .

that physiologists should d iscove r a m echanica l equ i

valent o f thought so that we might esti mate the
,

value o f a calcu lation in thermal units o r the labou r ,

o f love in foot pounds : still we should not b e

’
-

ou t of o u r di fficulties ; we should on ly have to cut

a twist o f fl a x to fi nd a lock of i r on For by thus .

assimilating thought with energy we should in no ,

wise have explained the fundamental antithesis b e

tween subj ect and obj ect The fact would r emain
.
,

i f possible m ore unaccountable than eve r that

, ,

mind should p resent absolutely no point o f real

analogy with motion I nvolved with the essential
.

idea o f motion is the idea o f extension ; suppress

the latter and the forme r must necessarily van ish ,

for m otion only means t ransition i n space o f

something itsel f extended But thought as fa r
.
,

as we can possibly k now it is known and distin ,

u ished by th e very peculiarity of not having

g
extension The refore even i f we were to fi nd
.
,

a mechanical equ ivalent o f thought thought would ,

stil l not be p roved a mode o f motion O n the .

contrary what would be proved would be that in

, ,

becoming t ransformed into thought energy had ,

ceased to be ene r gy ; i n passing o ut o f its r elati o n

to space it would cease to exist as energy and if ,

it again passed into that relation it would only be

by starting de novo on a new course of history .

Therefore the proof that thought has a mechanical

equivalent wou ld simply amount to the p roof n o t ,

that thought i s energy but that thought des tr oys

,

energy And if Mate r ialism we r e to prove this

.
,
 Mater ialism
'

. 67

Materia l ism would com mit suicide Fo r if once it .

we r e proved that the relation o f ene rgy to thought

is such that thought is able to absorb o r tempo
ra ri ly to annihilate ene r gy the whole argument
,

o f Materialism would b e inve rted and whatever ,

evidence the r e is o f causation as between m ind

and matte r would become available in all its force
o n the side o f Spi r itualism This seems plain
.
,

fo r if it even we r e conceivable —which most

d istinctly it is not —that a moto r could ever
become a motive and so pass fr om the sphe re o f
,

dynamics into the sphere o f consciousness the ,

fact would go to p r ove not that the motor was

,

the cause o f the motive but rathe r that the motive

,

w as the cause o f destroying the moto r ; so that at

that point the othe rwise unbroken chain of physical
sequences w as inter rupted by the motive striking
in upon it and in vi rtue o f the myste r ious power
,

supposed to have been proved by physiology ,

cancelling the moto r so allowing the ne rve centre

,
-

to act as d eterm ined by th e motive .

O f course I wish it to b e unde rstood that I believe

we are here deal ing with what I may cal l in perhaps ,

suitably cont radictory te rms inconceivab le concep

,

tions. But let it be r emembered that I am no t

responsible fo r th is ambigu ity ; I am only showing
wha t must be the necessa ry outcome o f analysis if
we begin by endeavouring phenomenally to unite
the most antithetical o f elements —mind and motion .

Materialism at least will not be the gainer should

, ,

it eve r be proved that in the complex O pe rations

F 2
68 Monism .

of the b rain a unique exception occu r s to the

otherwise unive rsal law o f the conse rvation of ene rgy
i n space .

We may the r efo r e quit the suggestion that the

, ,

d i fficulty experienced by M ate r ialism o f showing

an equivalency between neu r osis and psychosis
can eve r be met by assuming that some day
mental processes may admit of being exp r essed
i n terms o f physical B ut be fo r e l eaving this
.

di fficulty with regard to equivalency I may ,

mention o ne other point that seems to m e o f

i mpo rtance in connex ion with it I have al ready .

said that if we suppose causation to p roceed from

brain to m ind we must suppose this essential
,

r equirement o f equivalency between the ce r eb ral

causes and the mental effects to be satisfied some
where But where a r e we to sa y that it is satisfied ?
.

E ven i f we suppose th a t thought has a mechanical

equivalent and that causation proceeds i n the
,

d irection from energy to thought sti l l when we , ,

have regard to the supposed effects we fi nd that ,

even yet they bear no k ind o f equivalency to thei r

supposed causes The brain o f a Shakespeare
.

probably did not as a system exhibit so much

, ,

energy as does the brain o f an elephant ; and the

cerebral operations o f a D a r win may not have had
a very perceptibly larger mechanical equivalent
than th o se o f a banke r s cler k Yet in the world
’

o f thought the difference between ou r estimate o f

the results or wo r k done in these cases is such

,
‘
,
’

as to d r ive al l ideas o f equivalency to the winds .

 Materi alism . 69

Doubtless , a mate r ialist wil l answe r that it is not

fai r to take ou r estimate o f wo rk d one in the
‘ ’

world of m ind as the rea l equivalent o f the energy

supposed to have passed over from the world o f
motion seeing that o u r estimate is based n o t o n
, ,

the quantitative amount o f thought produced but ,

rather o n its qualitative character with refe r ence

to the social requirements o f the r ace But to this .

it is enough to answer that we have no means o f

gauging the quantity o f thought produced other
than by having regard to i ts effects in th e world
o f m ind and this we cannot do except by having
,

r egard to its qualitative character M any a man .

,

fo r instance must have consumed more than a

,

thousand times the brain substance and brain

-

‘
energy that Shel ley expended over his Ode to
a S kylark and yet as a result have produced an
’
,

utterly wo rthless poem N ow i n what way are we

.
,

t o estimate the wor k done in two such cases

‘ ’
,

except by looking to the relative effects produced

i n the only region where they are produced viz , .

i n the r egion o f m ind ? Yet when we d o s o,

estimate them what becomes of the evidence o f

,

equ ivalency between the physical causes and the

psychical effects
N ow if thus whether o r not we t ry to fo rm an
,

estimate it is i mpossible to show any semblance

,

of equivalency between the supposed causes and

the alleged e ffects how can any o ne be found to
,

say that the evidence o f causation is he re a s valid

as i t i s in any othe r case ? The t r uth r athe r is
30
7 Monism .

that the a l leged effects stan d o ut O f eve ry relation

to the supposed causes with the e x ception only o f
,

being associated in time .

There stil l r emains o ne othe r eno r mous d i ffi culty

i n the way o f the theo ry o f M ate r ialis m ; it neces
sa ri ly embod ies the theo ry o f consci ous a u toma ti sm ,

and i s therefo r e called upon to explain why con

s c i ou sness and thought have eve r appea r ed upon

the scene o f things at all That this i s the necessa ry

.

position o f Mate r ialism is easily p r oved a s fol lows .

We have al ready seen that M aterialism would

com mit suicide by supposing that ene rgy could
be t ransmuted into thought for this woul d a mount
,

t o nothing sho rt o f supposing the dest r uction o f

energy as such ; and to suppose ene r gy thus
destruct ible would be to O pen wide the doo r o f
spiritualism . M aterialism the refo re is logically
, ,

bound to a rgue i n this way : We cannot conceive

o f a conscious idea o r mental change as in any way
, ,

a ffecting the course o f a ce reb r al r eflex o r material ,

change ; while o n the other hand o ur k nowledge

, ,

o f the conservation o f energy teaches us as an

axiom that the cereb ral changes must dete r mine

ea ch other in thei r sequence as i n a continuous
se ries
. N owhe r e can we suppose the physical
process to be inte rru pted o r d ive rted by the
psychical p r ocess ; and the r efo r e we must conclud e
that thought and volition real ly play no pa rt
whateve r in dete r m ining action Thoughts and
.

feelings are but indices which show in the m ir r or

o f the m ind ce rtain c hanges that a r e p r oceeding
 Mater iali sm .
7 1

in the matter o f the b rain and a re as ineffi cient

,

in influencing those changes as the shadow o f

a cloud is powerless to direct the movements
o f that o f which it is the shadow .

B ut when Materialism reaches in a clea r and ,

articulate manner this inference as a conclusion

,

necessary from its p r emises it becomes O pposed

,

at once to comm on sense and to the r equi re ments

of m eth o dical reason It becomes O pposed to
.

com mon sense because we al l feel it is practical ly

impossible to be lieve that the wo r l d would now
have been exactly what it is even if consciousness ,

thought and vol ition had never appeared U pon

,

the scene — that railway t rains woul d have been

r unn ing fi lled with m indless passengers o r that ,

teleph o nes woul d have been invented by brains

that could not think to speak to ears that could
not hea r A nd the conclusion is opposed to the
.

requirements o f m ethodical reas o n because reason ,

to be method ical is bound to have an answe r to

the question that i mmediately arises from th e
conclusion This question simply is Why have
.
,

consciousness thought and vol ition ever been

, ,

called into existence ; and why are they related ,

as they are related to cerebral acti o n ? Materialism

, ,

by here undertaking to pr o ve that these things

stand uselessly is o lated fro m al l o ther things is ,

b ound to show som e reason why they ever came

t o be and to be what they are For observe
,
.
,

it is not merely that these things exist in a su p

posed unnecessary relation to al l othe r things ;
7 2 Mon is m .

the fact to be explained is that they exist i n

a most intimately woven and i nvariable connexion
with ce rtain highly complex forms o f organic
st ructure and certain h ighly peculiar d istributions
o f physical fo rce Yet these unique and extra
.

ordina ry things are supposed by automat ism to

be always results and never causes ; in the theat r e
o f things they are supp o sed to be always spectators

and never act o rs ; in the laborato ry o f life they

are supposed to be always b y products ; and -

therefo re in the order o f nature th ey are supposed

to have n o r a i son d etr e Such a state of matte rs
’ ‘
.

woul d be accountable enough if the stream o f

mental changes were but pa rtly occasionally and , ,

i mperfectly associated with the st r eam o f material

changes ; but a s the association is s o minute ,

invariable and prec ise the hypothesis o f the

, ,

association being me rely accid ental o r not r equ i r i ng ,

exp la n a ti on becomes at the bar o f methodical

, ,

reasoning self convicted of absurdity

,
-
.

Th e state o f t he case then simply is that two dis

, ,

t inct facts stand to be explained by the theory o f

consci o us automatism —first why psychosis sh o uld ,

ever have been developed as a mysterious appen

dage to neurosis ; and secondly why the associa
, ,

tion between these things should be so intimate

and precise A ssuredly o n the principles o f
.
,

evol ution which materialists at least cannot afford

,

t o d isregard it would be a whol ly anomalous fact

,

that so wide and gene ral a class o f phenomena as

those o f mind should have become developed in
74 Monism .

conclusion ( if we argue he r e as w e should i n the

case o f any othe r function ) that consciousness
and volition are functions o f ne rve tissue supe r
-

added to its p r evious functions in o r de r to meet

,

new and mo r e comple x demand s o n its powers

of adaptation .

Neithe r is it o f any a rgumentative use to point

t o the fact that adaptive actions which o r iginal ly
a r e perfo r med with conscious volition may by
p ractice come to be perform ed without conscious
volition Fo r it is ce rtain that no adaptive action
.

o f qu ite a novel kind i s eve r perfo r med fr om th e

fi rst without consciousness o f i ts performance ,

and therefo r e although it is t r ue that by repeti

,

tion its performance may b ecome mechanical o r

unconscious this does not prove that consciousness
,

was without use i n prod ucing the adaptive action .

It only proves that after a ne rvous mechanism

has been elaborated by the help o f consciousness ,

consciousness may be withd rawn and leave th e

fi nished mechanis m to w o r k alone ; the st r ucture
having been completed the sca ffolding necessary
,

to its completion may be removed .

But passing ove r this di ffi culty which the theory

o f conscious automatism s eems bound to encounter

in its collision with the theory o f natural selection ,

the most insupe rable o f al l its d i ffi culties arises

from the ba re fact which it cannot explain that
, ,

conscious i ntelligence exists and exists i n the

,

m ost inti mate relation with o ne peculia r kind o f

material st r uctu r e Fo r automatists must concede
.
 Mater ialism .
75

that the evidence o f causation i n the r egion o f

mind i s at least a s cogent as it is in the region
of m atte r seeing th at the whole science of
,

p sychology is only r ende r ed possible as a science

by the fundamental fact o f obse rvation tha t men tal
antecedents determine menta l consequents There .

fore i f we ca l l a physical sequence A B C and

, , , ,

a mental sequence a o c automatists have to , , ,

explain no t merely why the r e should be such

,

a thing as a mental se quence at all but also why ,

the sequence a b c should always proceed l in k

, , ,

fo r link with the sequence A B C I t c learly

, , , .

is no answer to say that the sequence A B C , ,

i mplies the successive activity of ce rta in defi nite

ne rve cent r es A B C which have fo r thei r
-
’

,
'
,
’
,

subjective effects the sequence a b c so that , , ,

wheneve r the sequence A B C occurs the sequence , ,

a b c must
, , likewise occu r This is no answe r .
,

bec ause it me rely restates the hypothesis o f

automatism and begs the whole question to be
,

d iscussed What method ical r ea son demands a s

.

an answe r is simply w lzy the sequence A B C , , ,

even though we freely grant it due to the

successive activity o f ce rtain defin ite nerve centres -
,

should be attended by the sequence a b 6 , , .

Reason perceives clearly enough that the sequence

a 6 c belongs to a wholly d i f
, , fe r ent catego ry from
the sequence A B C the one being immed iately
, , ,

k nown a s a process taking p lace in a something

which is without extension o r physical prope rties
o f any k ind and the othe r taking place in a
,
76 Mon ism .

something which when translated by the previous

something we recognize as having e x tension and
,

the othe r antithetical prope rties wh ich we class

togethe r a s physical The r e would o f course b e no
.

di fficulty i f the sequence A B C continu ed , ,

th r ough any amount o f complexity i n the sam e

conceivable catego ry o f being ; so that there
would be nothing actual ly inconceivable i n ce r eb ral
sequenc e —changes running th r ough D E F & c , , ,
.
,

to an extent su fficient to cause u n conscious

automatism o f any degree o f complex ity But .

that which does r equire ex planation from auto

m ati sts is why automatism should have become
associated with consciousness and this so inti mately
,

that every change in the sequence A B C & c , , ,

.
,

is accompanied by a pa rticula r and cor responding

change in the sequence a b c & c Thus to
, , ,
.
,

take a d efi nite i llust ration if o n seeing the su n

,

I think o f a pape r o n solar physics and from this ,

pass to thinking of M r N orm an Loc k ye r and

.
,

fr om this to speculating o n the p robabi lity o f

ce rtain supposed elements being r eally compounds ,

there i s here a d efinite causal connexion in the

sequence of my thong/i ts B ut it is the last ex trav a
.

gance of absurdity to tel l m e that the accompanying

causal sequences going on i n my b rain happen to
have e x actly corresponded to the sequences which
were taking place in the m ind the two trains o f se
,

u en c es being each defi nite and coherent in them

q
selves and yet each proceeding lin k fo r l ink i n l ines
,

pa ral lel with the othe r . Without som e theo ry

 77

of p r e established harmony —which o f c ourse

'

-
, ,

it is no part o f automatism to ente rtai n — i t would ,

on the d octrine of chances alone be impossible ,

to suppose that the causal sequences i n the brain

always happen t o be j ust those which by running ,

l ink fo r l ink with another set o f causal sequences

taking place i n the m ind enable both the series
,

to be definite and coherent i n themselves There .

fore before reason can al low the theory o f auto

,

m a ti sm to pass it must be told how this wonde rful

,

fact o f parallelism is to be explained There .

must be some connexion between the i ntrinsically

coherent series A B C and the no less intrinsically
, ,

coherent sequence a o c which may be taken as

, , ,

an explanation why they coincide each to each .

What i s this connexion ? We do not know ;

but we have now see n that whateve r it is it , ,

cannot b e an ordina ry causal connexi o n — first ,

because the doctrine o f the c o nse rvation o f energy

makes it incumbent on us to beli eve that the
procession o f physical cause and effect is complete
within the region o f brain —a closed circle as ,

it were from which no energy can without

, ,

argumentative suicide be supposed to escape

,

into the r egion o f mind ; and next because , ,

even were this di fficulty d isregarded it is u n ,

accountable that the causative influence ( whatever

it is supposed to be) which passes o ver from the
,

region o f physics into that o f psychics sh o uld be ,

such as to render the psychical series coherent in

i tsel f when o n the physical side the series must be
,
78 Monis m .

determined by pu rely physical cond itions h aving,

no r eference wha tsoeve r to psychical r equi r ements

.

Thus it i s a rgumentatively impossible fo r M a

teri a li s m to elude the necessity o f exp laining the
kind of connexion which it supposes to subsist
between neurosis and psychosis ; and fo rasmuch
as the above conside r ations clea r ly show this
connexion cannot be accepted as o ne o f o r d inary
causal ity without some answe r being given to the
questions which reason has to ask Materialism ,

must be ruled o u t of cou r t i f she fails to r espond

to the demand B ut it i s no less clearly i mpossibl e
.

that she can respond to the demand and therefore

,

at the bar of Philosophy M ate r ialis m must be

pronounced fo r this as wel l as fo r the r easons
,

previously cited conspicuously inadequate to a c

,

count for the facts .

 C HA PTE R III .

MON IS M .

W E have seen then that both the alte rnative

, ,

theories Spiritualism and Materialism are found

of ,

when ca r efully e x amined to be so beset with ,

d i ffi culties o f a necessa ry and fundamental kind that ,

it is impossible to ente rtain eithe r without closing

o u r eyes to ce rtain contrad ictions which they
seve rally and inhe r ently present We may i ndeed .
, ,

go even fu rthe r than this and a ffi rm that to suppose ,

m ind the cause o f motion o r m otion the cause o f

mind is equally to suppose that which in its ve ry
natu re as a S upposition i s neither t rue no r untrue ,

but nonsensical Fo r as Prof C lifford ha s said i n

.
,
.

hi s essay o n Body a nd M i nd ,

‘
It ma y b e con ceiv d th t t th s m ti m e with v ry
e a , a e a e e e

exer cis f v liti on th re i s a distu b n c o f th phy sic al

e o o , e r a e e

la ws ; but this di stu rb n ce b i ng p er c eptibl e to m wo uld b

a , e e, e

a physic l f ct cc m p nyi ng th v liti on a nd c ould n t b e

a a a o a e o ,
o

v liti n its lf which is n ot p rc ptibl t m e W h eth r th r

o o e , e e e o . e e e

i s s uch di stu rb n ce f th physic l l w s n o is a q u esti n

a a o e a a or o

of f ct to which w e h v
a the b st of r a son s f
e g i i ng e ea or v

n eg a tiv e an swer ; but th s serti on tha t an th er m n s ’

a e a o a
80 Monism .

f eling i n his c on sci ousnes s which I c annot p erceive

v oli ti on , a e ,

is p rt of th t ra i n of physic a l f ct s which I m ay p er c ive

a e a e ,

thi s i s neith er t ru no un t ru e b ut non s ns e ; it i s c m

e r , e a o

bi n ti on f w rd s wh os c o r spon di ng id e s will n ot go
a o o e r e a

t g th er
o e
1

And seeing that the co r relatives are in each case

th e sam e it is si mi larly nonsense to asse rt the
‘ ’

converse proposition : o r in othe r words it is , ,

equal ly nonsense to speak o f mental action causing

cerebral action o r of cerebral action causing m ental
,

action — nonsense o f the same kind as it would be

to speak o f the P i ckw i ck P apers causing a storm at
sea o r the e r uption o f a volcano causing the fo rty
,

seventh proposition in the fi rst boo k o f E uclid .

We see then that two o f the three possible

, ,

theories o f things contain the elements o f thei r o w n

d estruction : when careful ly analy z ed both these ,

theories are found to present i nherent cont radictions .

On this account the thi rd o r only alternative theory , ,

comes to us with a large antecedent presumption i n

its favour For it comes to us as it were o n a clear
.
, ,

fi eld o r with the negative advantage o f having no

,

logical ri vals to contend with The other two .

suggestions having been weighed i n the balance and

fo und wanting we a r e free to l ook to the new come r
,
-

as quite unopposed This new com er m ust indeed .

-
, ,

be interrogated as carefully as his p r edecesso rs and , ,

like them m ust b e j udged upon his own merits

, .

But as he constitutes o u r last possible ho p e o f

solving the question which he professes hi msel f able
1
Lectu res an dE ssays, vol l l
. . pp
.
56 7
-
.
82 Monism .

l ogic whethe r such an escape is supposed to ta k e

,

place fr om the physical chain ( materialis m ) o r from

the mental cha in (spi r itualism ) : in either case the
fundam ental p rinciple o f causality is alike impugned
-
the principle that i s o f there being an eq u iva
, ,

len ey between cause and e ffect such that you

,

cannot get mo r e o ut of you r e ffect than you have

put into you r cause Both these dualistic theories
.
,

although they take opposite views as to whi ch o f

the two chains o f causation is the cause o f the othe r,

neve rth eless agree i n supposing that there a re tw o

chains of causation and that o ne o f them does act
,

causal ly upon the othe r : and it is i n this matter

o f thei r common consent that they both com mit

suicide E ve ry process in the physical sphere

.

must be supposed to have its equations satisfied

within that sp he r e else the doct r ine o f the conse r
vation o f ene rgy would be contravened and thus
,

the causation contemplated could no longe r be

contemplated as physical S imi larly eve ry process
.
,

in the m ental sphere m ust be supposed to have its

equations satisfied within that sphere else the causa
tion contemplated could no longer be contemplated
as mental some o f the equations must be supposed
not to have been satisfi ed within the m ental sphere
,

but to have been ca rr ied ove r into the physical

—
sphere thus to have eithe r created o r dest r oyed
ce rtain quantities of energy within that sphe r e and
,

thus also to have i nt r oduced elements o f endless

, ,

c o nfusion into the otherwise o rde r ly system of

Natu r e .
 Moni s m . 83

F rom this vi c e o f r adical contradiction to which ,

both the dualistic theo ries a r e com mi t ted the ,

mon istic theory is free Moreover as we shal l

.
,

i m mediately find it is free to combine the elements

,

of truth which severally belong to both the othe r

theories These other theories are each concerned
.

with what they see upon d iffe rent sides o f the

same shield The facts which they seve r ally receive
.

they severally repo rt and thei r repo rts appea r

,

t o contradict each other But truth can never be

.

real ly in c o ntradiction with othe r truth ; and it is

reserved fo r M onism by taking a simu ltaneous view
,

of both sides to reconcile the previ o usly apparent

,

c ont radi ctions Fo r these and othe r reasons which

.
,

will unfold themselves as we proceed I fully agree ,

with th e late P rofesso r C li fford where he says o f

‘
this theory It is not merely a speculation but ,

is a result to which all the greatest minds that have

stud ied this question (the r elation between body
and m ind ) in the right way have gradually been
’
approximating fo r a long time This theo ry is .
’
,

as we have already seen that mental phenomena ,

and physical phenomena although appar ently ,

d iverse a r e really identical

, .

I f we thus unite in a highe r synthesis the elements

b o th o f spiritualism and o f materialism we obtain a ,

product which satisfies every fact o f feeling on the

one hand and o f obse rvation o n the othe r We
,
.

have only to supp o se that the antithesis between

m ind and motion —subj ect and obj ect —is itself
phenomenal or apparent not absolute or real We .

G 2
84 Monism .

hav e only to suppose that the seeming d uality is

r elative to ou r modes o f app rehension : and the r e ,

fore that any change taking place in the m ind and

, ,

any corresponding change taking place in the brain ,

are really not two changes but one change When

,
.

a violin is played upon we hea r a musical sound ,

and at the same tim e we see a vib ration o f the

st r ings Relatively to our consciousness therefore
.
, ,

we have here two sets of changes which appea r to

,

be ve ry d i fferent in kind ; yet we k now that i n an

absolute sense they are o ne and the same : we know
that the diversity in consciousness i s c r eated only
by the di fference in ou r mod e o f perceiving the
same events— whethe r we see o r whethe r we hear
the vib ration o f the strings Si milarly we may
.
,

suppose that a vibration o f nerve strings and a -

p rocess o f thought are really o ne and the sam e

event which is dual o r d iverse only in r elation to
,

o u r modes o f perceiving it .

O r to take another and a bette r i llustration in an

, ,

E dison lamp the light which i s em itted from the

’

bu r ner may be said indi fferently to be caused by the

numbe r o f vibrations pe r second going o n in the
carbon o r by the temperature o f the ca rbon ; fo r
,

this rate o f vib ration coul d n ot take place in the

carbon without constituting that degree o f tem pera
ture which a ffects our eyes as luminous S im ila r ly
.
,

a train o f thought may be said ind iffe rently to be

caused by brain action o r by m ind action ; for ex
- -
,

n ypotnesi the one could not ta k e place without the

,

othe r N ow when we contemplate the phenomena

.
 Monis m . 85

of vol ition by themselves it is as though we we r e

,

contemplating the phenomena o f l ight by them

selves : volition is produced by mind i n brain j ust ,

as light is produced by tempe rature i n carbon .

A nd j ust as we may correctly speak of l ight as the

cause say o f a photog raph so we may correctly
, , ,

spea k o f vol ition as the cause o f bodily movement .

That pa rticular kind of physical activity which takes

place in the carbon could not take place without the
l ight which causes a photograph ; and similarly , ,

that pa rt icular kind o f physical activity which takes

place in the b rain could not take place without the
volition which causes a bodi ly m ovement S o that .

v o lition is a s truly a cause o f bodily movement as is

the physical act ivity o f the b rain ; seeing that in an ,

absolute sense the cause is one and the same But

,
.

if we once clearly perceive that what in a relative

sense we know as vol ition is i n a si milar sense
, ,

the cause o f bod ily m ovement we te r minate the

,

question touching the freed om o f the will It thus .

becomes a mere matte r of phraseology whethe r

we speak o f the wil l dete r mining o r being d eter
,

mined by changes going o u in the external world

,

j ust as it is but a matte r of phraseology whether we

speak o f temperature dete r mining o r being dete r
,

m ined by molecular vib ration A ll the requi r e

,
.

ments alike o f the free will and of the bond wil l

- -

hypotheses are thus satis fied by a synthes is which

comprises them both O n the o n e hand it would
.
,

be as i mpossible fo r an u n conscious automaton to

do the work o r to perform the adj ustments o f a
86 Mon is m .

conscious agent a s it would be for an E d ison lam p

,

to give o ut light and cause a photograph when not

heated by an electri c current O n the o the r hand
.
,

it would b e as i mp o ssible for the will to originate

bodily motion without the occurrence of a strictly
physical p rocess o f cereb ration as it would be fo r
,

l ight to shine in an E dis o n lamp which had been

deprived o f its carbon bu rner -
.

The great advantage o f this theory is that it ,

supposes only o n e st r eam o f causation in which ,

both mind and motion are si multaneously c o ncerned .

The theory therefore escapes al l the di fficu lties

, ,

and contradictions with which both spiritualism and

materialism are beset Thus m otion is supposed to
.
,

be producing nothing but motion ; mind changes -

nothi ng but m ind changes —both p ro ducing both

-

simultaneously : n either could be what it is with

out the othe r because with o ut the other neither
,

could be the cause which i n fact it i s I mpossibl e . .

therefore is the supposition o f the materialist that

,

consciousness is adventitious or that i n the absence

,

o f m ind the changes o f the brain c o uld be what

they are ; fo r it belongs to the ve r y causation o f

these movements that they should have a mental
side A nd equal ly i mpossible i s the supposition o f
.

the spiritualist that the ce rebral pro cesses are

adventiti o us o r that in the absence o f brain the
,

changes o f the m ind could be what they are ; fo r it

belongs to th e very causation o f these changes that
they should have a material side Furthermore the .
,

use o f mind to animals and to m en is thus rendered

 Monis m . 87

appa rent ; for intelligent volition is thus shown to

be a true cause o f adj ustive movement in that the
,

cerebration which it involves could not otherwise

be possible : the causation would not othe rwise be
c o mplete
.
 C HA PTE R I" .

T HE WOR L D A S AN E J EC T .

I N the Int roduction to this essay I have sought to

show that the re a r e fo r the purposes o f p r actical
,

d iscussion but th r ee theories o f the World of Being

,
.

The re is first the theory o f Mate r ial ism which

, , ,

supposes matter i n motion t o be the ultimate o r

self existing Reality and the refore the cause o f
-
, , ,

m ind Ne x t the r e is the theo r y o f S pi r itualism

.
, ,

which supposes mind to be the ultimate Real ity ,

and therefore the cause o f matte r in m otion

, ,
.

Lastly there is the theo ry o f M onism whi ch

,

supposes matte r in motion to be substantially

identical with mind and therefore that as between
, , ,

mind and matte r i n m otion the r e is no causal

relation eithe r way I n the fo regoing chapte rs I have
.

conside r ed these th r ee theo r ies and argued that ’

,

o f them the last mentioned is th e only o ne whi ch

-

satisfies all the facts o f feeling o n the one hand ,

and o f obse rvation on the othe r The theory o f .

Monism alone i s able to explain without i nherent ,

cont radiction the phenomena both o f the sub

,

jective and obj ective sphe res .

9 0 Moni sm .

teaches that what we perceive as matte r in motion ,

x, is the obverse o f what we k now as mind 2 ,

.

What then d o we know o f 2 ? I n the fi rst place

, , ,

we wel l kno w that this is the only entity with

which we are acquainted so to speak at fi rst hand
, ,

al l o u r knowledge O f x (which i s the only other

knowledge we possess ) is possible only in so far as
we are able to t ranslate it into terms o f e I n the .

next place we k now that z is itself an entity o f the

,

most enormous complexity Standing as a symbol

.

o f the whole range o f ind ividual subj ectivity it may ,

be said to constitute fo r each ind ividual the symbol

of his o wn pe r sonality—o r the su m total o f his
conscious li fe N ow each ind ividual k nows by
.

d irect knowledge that his conscious life i s a s I have ,

said o f enormous complexity and that numberless

, ,

ingredients o f feeling thought and volition are

, ,

therein combined in numberless ways The r efo r e .

the symb o l z may be conside r ed as the su m o f

innume r able constituent pa rts grouped i n ter se i n
,

numberless systems o f more or less complexity .

From these considerations we arrive at the

fol lowing conclusions The theory o f M onis m
.

teaches that al l z is x ; but it does not therefore , ,

necessa r ily teach that al l x is 3 N eve rtheless it .

,

does teach that if all x is not z this m ust be because

,

x is z p s something more than 2 as a little

lu, ,

thought wil l be sufficient to show Thus the four .

,

annexed d iagrams exhaust the logical possibilities

o f any case where the question i s as to the inclusion
,

or e x clusion o f o ne quantity by anothe r I n Fig 1 . .

 The World as an Eject .
91

the two quantities are coincident in Fig 2 the o ne

is wh o l ly included by the other ; i n Fig 3 it is .

pa rtially included ; and in Fig 4 wholly excluded

. .

N ow in the present case and upon the data ,

supplied the logical possibilities are exhausted by

,

Figs 1 and 2 Fo r upon these data Figs 3 and 4

. .
, , .

o bviously represent logical impossibilities ; no part

o f M ind can accord ing to these data stand outside

, ,

Fig 3
.

the l imits of M atter and Motion The r efore if the .

,

E go is not coincident with the N on ego ( or if all x -

is no t 3 as in Fig
, this can only be because the
.

E go is less extensive than the N on ego ( o r because -

x is e p lu s something more than a as in Fig ,

.

Of these tw o logical possibilities Idealism in its ,

most extreme fo rm may adopt the fi rst Fo r

,
.

Ideal ism in this form may hold that apa rt fr om the

E go there is no external world ; that outside o f 3
the re is no x ; that the only esse is the per cipi .
9 2 Monism .

But as ve ry few pe rsons nowadays a r e prepa r ed to

,

go the length o f seriously maintaini ng that in actua l

fact there is no externa l world save i n so fa r as th is
is pe r ceived by the indi vidual mind I need not ,

wait to conside r this possibility We are thus .

practically shut up to a consideration o f the pos

s ib i li t
y marked 2
.

The theo ry o f Monism then teaches that x is 3

, ,

plu s something m o r e than 2 ; and therefore it

becomes a matter o f great moment to consider the
probable nature o f the ove rplus Fo r it obviously
.

d o es not follow t hat because x is greater tha n 3 in

a logical sense therefore x must be greater than 2
,

i n a psychologica l sense Save upon the theo ry o f

.
94 Monism .

teaching as to how fa r they may di ffer in degree .

W e may howeve r at once allow that bet ween the

, ,

psychological value of z and that o f y there is a

wide difference o f degree ; and also that while the
,

value o f e i s a fixed quantity that of y va ries g r eatly

,

in the di ffe r ent pa rts o f the area y Our scheme

.
,

therefore will now adopt this fo r m

,

But the i mportant question remains how we

o ught to shade x According to C li ff o r d this
.
,

o ught scarcely to be shaded at al l while according

,

to theologians ( and theists generally) it ought to be

 The World as an Eject .
95

shaded so much more deeply than either y o r e ,

that the j oint rep r esentation in o ne d iagram would

only be possible by choosing fo r the shad i ng o f x
a colou r di fferent fr om that employed for y and z ,

and assigning to that colou r a rep resentative value

higher than that assigned to the other i n the ratio
o f o n e to infinity It wil l be my obj ect to estimate
.

the r elative p r obability o f these rival estimates o f

the psychological value o f x .

Sta rting fr om x a s o u r cent r e we k now that this

,

is an isolated system o f subjectivity and hence we ,

infe r that all y is composed o f analogous systems ,

resembling o ne anothe r a s to their isolation and ,

di ffering only i n thei r degrees of psychological

'

value Now this translated into terms o f x (o r

.
,

into te r ms o f objectivity) means that z is an

,

isolated syste m o f matter i n m otion and that the ,

same has to be said o f al l the constituent pa rts o f

y. In othe r words both subj
,
ectivity and ej ectivity
are only known unde r the cond ition o f being
isolated from obj ectivity ; which O bvers ely c o n,

s idered ,
means that the matte r i n motion he re
concerned is temporarily separated o ff from the
rest o f the obj ective world in such wise that it
,

fo rms a d istinct system o f its ow n I f any pa rt o f

.

the obj ective w o r ld rud ely forces its way withi n

the machine ry o f that system it is at the ris k o f
,

disar r anging the m achinery and stopping its wor k

as is the case when a bullet enters the brain Such .

converse a s the brai n normally holds with the

exte r nal world is held through the appointed
,
96 Mon ism .

channels o f the senses whe reby app r op r iate causa

,

tion is supplied to keep the otherwise isolated

system at work We know from physiological
.
,

evidence that when such external causation is

,

withheld the isolated system ceases to work the r e

,

fore the isolation although comp lete unde r o ne

, ,

point o f view unde r anothe r point o f view is

,

incomplete . It is complete only i n the sense i n

which the isolation o f a machine is complete— i e . .

it is in itself a working system yet i ts working is ,

ultimately dependent upon causation supplied fr om

without in ce rtain app r op r iate ways This truth is .

li k ewise testified to on the obve r se aspect o f

psychology . Fo r analysis shows that al l o u r
mental processes ( howeve r comple x they may be
internal ly ) a r e ultimately d ependent o n impressions
o f the external world gained th r ough the senses .

Whether regarded obj ectively or subj ectively ,

therefore we find that it is the business of the

,

isolated system to elaborate by i ts internal pro

,

cesses the raw materials which a r e supplied to i t

,

from without S eeing then that the isolation o f the

.
, ,

system i s thus only partial we may best apply,

to it the term circumsc r ibed Such pa rtial isolation

.

o r circumscription o f matte r in motion — so that

it shall in itself constitute a little working mic r o

c o s m — appears to be the fi r st condition to the
being of a subj ective personality Why then does .
, ,

not the working o f a machine present a subjective

side ?
Ou r answer t o this question is to be found in the
98 Monis m .

is conscious volition — Le ho w deeply we o ught to

.

shade x .

Wel l the fi rst thing to be considered i n answer

,

i ng this question is that acc o rding to the the o ry o f

,

M o nism we k now that it is within the r ange o f

,

possibility fo r matter i n motion to reach a level of

i ntricacy which shal l yield consci o us volition and ,

even self c onscious thought of an extrem ely high

-

orde ro f development Therefore the only questio n

.
,

is as to whether it is possible or in any way probable

, ,

that matter in moti o n as occurring i n x resembles in ,

point of intricacy matter in motion as occurring in 3

, .

P rofessor C lifford perceived that this is the co r e of

the question and staked the wh o le answe r to it
,

o n an extremely simple issue H e said that unless

.

we can sh o w in the disp o sition o f heavenly bodies

s o m e m orphol o gical rese mblance t o the structure
o f a human brain we are precluded from r ational ly
,

entertaining any pro bability that self consci o us -

voliti o n belongs to the universe Obviously this .

,

way o f presenting the case is so grossly il logical

that even the exigencies o f popular exposition can
not be held to j usti fy the presentation For aught .

that we can kn o w to the c o ntrary not merely the ,

highly specialized structure o f the human brain but ,

even that of nervous matter in general may only ,

be o ne of a thousand possible ways in which the

material and dynamical cond itions required for the
apparition o f s elf cons c iousness can be secured To
-
.

imagine that the human brain o f necessity exhausts

these possibilities is i n the last degree absurd .
 The World as an Eject .
99

The r efore we may suggest the fo l lowing presenta

,

’
ti o n o f C li fford s case as one that is less obviously
inadequate -
if any resemblance to the material
and dynamical conditions o f th e microcosm can be
d etected in the macrocosm we should have good
,

reason t o ascribe to the latter those attributes o f

subj ectivity which we know as belonging to the
fo rmer ; but if n o such resemblance can be traced ,

we shal l have some reason to suppose that these

attributes do not belong to the universe E ven this .
,

however I should regard as much to o wide a state

,

ment o f the case To take the pa rticula r conditions

.

unde r which alone subj ectivity is known to oc c ur

upon a single planet as exhausting the possibilities
o f its o ccurrence elsewhere is too flagrant a use of
,

the method o f simple enume ration to admit o f a

m o ment s countenance E ven the k n o wledge that
’
.

we have o f the two great cond iti o ns unde r which

te r restrial subj ectivities o ccur— circumscription and
c o mplexity— is only empirical It may well be .

that elsewhere ( or apa rt fr o m the conditi o ns imposed

b y nerv o us tissue ) subjectivity is possible irrespective
both of circumscription and of c o mplexity There .

fo re prope rly o r logi cal ly regarded the great use

, ,

o f the o ne exhibition o f subj ectivity furnished to

human experience is the proof thus furnished that

,

subj ectivity is possible under some conditions and

the utmost which o n the gro unds o f such proof
human e x perience is entitled to argue is that ,

pr oba bly if subjectivity is p o ssible elsewhere its

, ,

possibility is given by th o se conditions of circu m

H 2
1 00 Mon is m .

scription and complexity in the material and

dynam ical relations concerned which we fi nd to be ,

the invariable and quantitative concom itants of

subj ectivity within experience But this is a widely .

d ifferent thing from saying that the only kind o f

such circumscription and comple x ity— o r the only
disposition o f these relations —which can present a
subjective sid e is that which is found i n the
structures and functions o f a nervous system .

N ow i f we fix o u r attention merely o n this

,

matter o f complexity and refu se to be led astray ,

by obviously false analogies o f a mo r e special kind ,

I think there can be no question that the macrocosm

does furnish amply su fficient opportunity as it ,

were for the presence of subj ectivity even i f it be

, ,

assumed that subj ectivity can only be yielded by an

order of complexity analogous to that o f a ne rvous
system For considering the material and dynamica l
.
,

system of the universe as a whole it is obvious that ,

the c o mplexity presented is greater than that o f

any o f its parts Not only is it true that all these
.

parts are included in the whole and that even the ,

visibl e sidereal system alone presents m ove ments of

enormous intricacy but we fi nd for instance that
1
, , ,

even within the limits o f this small planet there is

If w i m gi th visi b l sid l syst m c m p ss d with i th
e a ne e e erea e o re e n e

l i m its f h um o s ku ll a th t ll i t m v m ts wh ich w w
an , so a a s o e en e no

re ocgi m l sh u l d b c m m l cu l th c mpl xity f such

n z e as o ar o e o e o e a r, e o e o

m v m t w uld p b b l y b
o e en o g t th t w h ich t k s p l c i
ro a e as rea as a a e a e n

a h um b i Y t t th is m ust b dd d ll th m l cul m v
an ra n . e o e a e a e o e ar o e

m ts w h ich
en w g i g i th sid
a re no l syst m visi b l
o n d on n e erea e , e an

i visi bl
n e .
102 Mon is m .

C omte may have been even mo r e j ustified than his

followe r s suppose in teaching the personification o f
,

H u manity .

But in the next place if the social organism is

, ,

not e ndowed with pers o nality this may be for ,

either o ne o f two reasons Al l the cond itions

.

requi r ed fo r attaining so high a level o f psychica l

perfection may not be here present ; o r else the
level o f psychical perfection m ay be higher than
that which we know as personality This latte r .

alternative wil l be c o nsidered in another relation

b y and b y so I wil l not dwel l upon it now
- -
,
But .

with reference to al l these possible contingencies ,

I m ay observe that we are not without clear indica

tions of the great fact that the high o rde r o f
c o mplexity which has been reached by the social
organism i s acc o mpanied by evidence o f something
which we may least d i mly define as resembling sub
j ec tiv i t
y I
. n numberless ways which I need not
,
wait
to enumerate we perceive that society exhibits the
,

phenomena both of thought and conduct And these .

phenomena cannot always be explained by regard

i ng them as the su m o f the thoughts and actions
o f its constituent individuals — o r at least they can , ,

o nly be so r ega r ded by conced ing that the thoughts

and actions of the constituent individuals when ,

thus su m m a ted yield a di fferent p roduct from that

,

which would be o btained by a merely arithmetical

computation o f the c o nstituent parts : the composite
product di ffers from its component elements as ,

H z O di ffe r s from 2 H + O The gene r al t r uth o f

.
 The World as an Eject . 1 03

this r emar k will I believe be appreciated by al l

, ,

historians Seeing that ideas are o ften as it is said

.
, ,

‘
in the air befo re they are c o ndensed in the m ind
’

of individual genius we habitual ly speak o f the,

‘
"eit geist as the product of a kind of collective
’
-

psych o logy which is something other than the mere

,

sum of all the ind ividual m inds o f a generati o n That .

is to say we regard society as an ej ect and the

, ,

more that a man studies the th o ught and conduct o f

society the more does he bec o me convinced that
,

we a r e right in so r egarding it O f course this .

ej ect is manifestly unlike that which we fo rm o f

another individual mind : it is much more general ,

vague and so far unlike the pattern o f o ur o w n

,

subj ectivity that even to ascribe to it the i mportant

attribute of personality is felt as we have j ust seen , ,

to approach the grotesque Still i n this vague and .

,

general way we do ascribe to s o ciety ej ective

existence : we habitual ly think o f the whole w o rld
o f human th o ught and feeling as a psychological

complex which is o ther than and m o re than a

, , ,

mere sh o rthand enumeration o f al l the thoughts and

feelings o f al l ind ividual hu man beings .

The ej ective existence thus ascribed to society

serves as a stepping stone t o the yet more vague
-

and general ascription o f such e x istence to the

C osm o s A t fi rst indeed o r during the earliest
.
, ,

stages o f culture the ascription of ej ective existence

,

to the external w o rld is neither vague nor general

o n the c o ntra ry it is m ost distinct and speci fic
,
.

B eginning in the rudest forms o f ani mism where ,

1 04 Mon is m .

eve ry natural process ad mits o f being i mmediatel y

attributed to the vol itional agency o f an unseen
spirit anth r opomorphism sets out upon i ts long
,

course of development which proceeds pa r t passu

,

with the d evelop ment o f abstract thought Man .

,

as it has been truly said universal ly makes Go d in

,

his own image ; and it is di fficult to see how the

case could be otherwise Universal ly the ej ect.

must assume the pattern o f the subj ect and it is ,

only in the p r opo rtion that this pattern presents

the features of abstract thinking that the image
which it throws becomes less and l ess man l ike -
.

H ence as M r Fiske has sh o wn in detail so soon

, .
,

as a nthrO po m o rphis m has assu med its highest state

of devel o pment it begins to be replaced by a con
,

ti nu ous g r owth o f d eanthropomorphism

‘
which ,
’

passing through polytheism into m o notheis m even ,

‘
tu a lly ends i n a progressive puri fication of theism
—b y which is meant a p r ogressive metamorphosis
o f the theistic conception tend ing to remove fr o m ,

D eity the attributes of H umanity The last O f .

these attributes to d isappear is that of personality ,

and when this fi nal ecdysis has been performed ,

the ej ect which remains is so unlike its original

subject that as we shal l i mmed iately find it is
, , ,

extremely di fli c u lt to trace any points o f re

semblance between them .

N ow it is with this perfect o r i mago cond ition o f ,

the world ej ect that we have to do M r H erbert

-
,
. .

Spencer in what I conside r the profoundest reaches

,

o f his philosophic thought has wel l sh o wn on the , ,

 M oms m
’

1 06 .

transcend ing personality as personal ity t ranscends

m echanical motion .

N ow although we cannot conceive o f such a

,

m ind actually we may most probably make the

,

nearest approach to conceiving o f it truly by ,

pr ovi si ona lly ascribing to it the highest attributes

o f m ind as known to ourselves o r the attributes ,

which belong to human p ersonality J ust as a .

thinking insect would deriv e a better o r m ore tru e , ,

conception of human personality by considering it

ej ectively than by considering it obj ectively ( o r by
considering the mind processes as distinguished
-

from the brain processes ) so if the re is a fo rm o f

-
, ,

m ind i m measurably superior to o ur o w n we may ,

probably gain a m o r e fa ithful — hows o ever stil l

inadequate —conception of it by contem plating i ts
O perations ej ectively than by doing so o bj ect ively .

I wi ll therefore speak of the world eject as pre

, ,
-

senting conscious volition o n the understand ing,

that i f x does not present either consci o usness o r

volition this must b e —
,
according to the funda
mental assumption o f psychism on which we are now
proceeding—because x p r esents attributes at least
as much highe r than consciousness o r v o lition as
these are higher than mechanical motion For .

when we conside r the utmost that o u r consci o us

v o lition is able to accomplish in the way of
contrivance— how limited its knowledge how short ,

its duration how restricted its range and how

, ,

imperfect its adaptations— w e can only conclude

that if the ultimate constitution o f all things is
 The World as an Eject . 1 07

sc hi ca l,the philosophy of the C osmos becomes a

p y
philos o phy o f the Unconsci o us o nly because it is ’

a philosophy of the S uperconscious .

N ow if once we feel o urselves able to transcend

,

the prelimina ry—and doubtless very considerable

di ffic u lty o f symbolically conceiving the world ej ect -

as supe r conscious and

-
( because not limited ) also
,

super personal I thin k there can be no question

-
,

that the world obj ect furnishes overwhel ming proof

-

o f psychism I candid ly c o nfess that I am n o t

.

myself able to overcome the preliminary di fficulty

i n question By d ischarging the elements o f per
.

so na li ty and conscious v o lition from the world eject -

,

I appear to be d ischarging from my conception

o f mind al l that m ost d istinctively belongs to
that c o nception ; and thus I see m to be brought
back again to the point from which we sta rted
the world ej ect appears to have agai n resolved
-

itself int o the unknown quantity x But here we .

must d istinguish between actual concepti o n and

symbolical conception A lth o ugh it is unquestion
.

ably true that I can form n o actual concepti o n

o f M ind save a s an ej ect o f pers o nality and
conscious v o lition it is a question whether I a m
,

n o t able to form a symbolical conception o f M ind

as thus extended Fo r I know that consciousness

.
,

i mplying as it does continual change in serial ord er

of circumscribed mental processes is not ( sym b o li ,

cally considered ) the highest conceivable exhibiti o n

o f M ind and j ust as a mathematician is able to deal
symbolically with space o f n d imensions while only ,
1 08 Mon ism .

able really to conceive o f space as l i mited to th r ee

di mensions so I feel that I ought not to li mit the
,

abstract possibilities o f mental being by what I may

term the accidental cond itions o f my o w n being .

I need scarcely wait to show why it appears to

me that if this position i s granted the world obj ect,
-

furnishes as I have said overwhel ming proof o f

, ,

psychism ; fo r this p ro of has been ab ly presented

by many other w r iters There is fi rst the
.

antecedent improbability that the human m ind

should be the highest m anifestation o f subj ectivity
in this universe of i nfinite o bjectivity There is .

next the fact that throughout this universe o f

i nfinite obj ectivity s o far at least as human
, ,

observation can e x tend — there is unquestionab le

evidence of some one i ntegrating principle whereby ,

al l its many and c o mplex pa rts are correlated with

o ne another i n such wise that the result i S u ni ve rsa l
'

orde r A nd if we take any pa rt o f the whol e

.

system —such as th at of organic nature on this

planet — to examine in m ore detai l we fi nd that it ,

appears to be instinct with contrivan c e So to .

speak wherever we tap organic nature it seems t o

, ,

flow with purp o se ; and as we shal l presently see

, ,

upon the monistic theory the evidence of purpose is

here in no way attenuated by a ful l acceptance o f
‘
any o f the mechanical explanations furnished
’

by science Now these large and im po rtant facts

.
,

of obse rvation unquestionably point as j ust ,

o bserved to some o ne integrating principle as

,

pervad ing the C osmos ; and if so we can scarcely

, ,
1 10 Mon ism .

given phenomenon has been furnished in terms o f

these causes the r e is no need to go fu rther ; the
,

phenomenon has been rendered i ntelligibl e on its

mechanical side and therefore it is felt that we
,

have no reason to suppose that it presents a mental

side —any supplementary causation of a m ental
kind being regarded as superfluous E ven writers .

who expressly repudiate this reasoning prove them

selves to be habitual ly unde r its influence ; fo r we
c o nstantly fi nd that such writers after conceding ,

the mechanical explanations as far as these hav e

been pr oved take their stand upon the more
,

intricate phenomena o f Nature where as yet the , ,

mechanical explanations are not fo rthcoming .

Whethe r it be at the origi n of life the origin o f ,

sentiency of instinct o f rationality o f m orality or

, , , ,

o f religi o n these writers habitual ly argue that he r e

, ,

at least the purely mechanical interpretations fai l

,

and that here consequently there is stil l room left

, ,

fo r a psyc hical interpretation O f course the .

pleading for theism thus supplied is seen by others

to be of an extremely feeble quality ; for while o n ,

the o ne hand it rests only up o n ignorance o f

,

natural causati o n (as disti nguished from any know

ledge o f S upernatural causation ) o n the other hand, ,

abundant historical analogies are available to show

that it is only a question o f t ime when pleading o f
this kind wil l become more and more restri cted i n
its subj ect matte r ti ll eventually it be altogether
-
,

silenced But the plead ing which Monism is he r e

.

able to supply can neve r be silen ced .

 The World as an Eject . 111

For according to M onism al l matter in motion

, ,

is mind and therefo re matter in motion is merely , ,

the obj ective revelati o n to us and f or us of that , ,

which in its subj ective aspect o r in its u ltimate -

r eality— is mind J ust as the operations of my .

friend s mind can o nly be revealed to me through

’

the m echanical o perati o ns of his body so it may ,

very wel l be that the operati o ns of the Supreme

M ind ( supposing such to exist ) can only be revealed
t o me through the mechanical operations of

Nature The only di fference between the two cases

.

is that while I am able i n the case o f my friend s ,

’

m ind to elicit responses of mechanical movement

,

having a defi nite and intended relati o n to th e

operations o f my o w n m ind similarly expressed to ,

hi m such is not the case with Nature With the .

friend ej ect I am able to con verse ; but not so with

-

the world ej ect 1

This great d ifference however
-
.
, ,

1
It is h w v th b l i f f ll l igi us p s s t h t v th is
, o e er, e e e o a re o er o n a e en

disti cti d s t h ld If th y
n on oe igh t i t h i b l i f th
no o . e a re r n e r e e , e

disti ctin w u ld th b c m
on o t th m d f c v s
en I e o e o ne as o e o e o on er e . n

t h is c s wh t i c ll d c m m u i with th Sup m M i d m ust b

a e a s a e o n on e re e n e

supp s d t b c mmu i
o e oig i e ath c v s f mi d wit h
o n on su en cr s e o n er e o n

m i d is h
n di t d s t qui t b t sl t d i t th
ere rec , or oe no re re o e ra n a e n o e

l gu g f m ch i l sig s i t i su bj ctiv
an a e o e t j ctiv
a n ca Sti ll n : s e e, no e e e .
,

v h w m ust b l i v th t th physic l sp t cc m p i s th
e en ere e e e e a e a a ec a o an e e

psych ic l l th gh t c ss i ly b s v d A t f p y f
a , a ou no ne e ar o er e . n ac o ra er, or

e x mp l i
a i t ph ysic l sp ct
e, s, o n t f cs b ti i th a a e , an ac o ere ra on : so s e

an sw ( supp si g i t g ui ) i
er fo th w s h ipp
n i en ne ,
n as ar a s e or er s con

c d Th us p y d i t sw ( cc di g t M i m) s mbl
erne . ra er an s an er a or n o on s re e e

a ll th th p c ss s f N tu i p s ti g
e o er ro e bj ctiv sid f
e o a re n re en n an o e e e o

st ictly physic l c us ti
r N i i t p s i b l th t th c s c u ld b
a a a on . or s o s e a e a e o e

o t h wis f ll m t l p c ss s c sist i ph ysic l p c ss d

er e, i a en a ro e e on n a ro e , an

vi v s It i bvi us th t th is c sid ti h i mp t t
ce er a . s o o a on era on as or a n
1 12 Mon ism .

although obviously depriving me o f any such

direct cor r oboration o f psychism in the world ej ect -

as that which I thus derive o f psychism i n the

friend ej ect ought not to be r egarded by me as
-
,

amounting in the smal lest degree to di sproof o f

, ,

psychism in the world ej ect The fact that I am -

.

not able to converse with the world ej ect is merely -

a negative fact and should not be allowed to tel l ,

against any probability ( otherwise derived ) in

favour o f psychis m as belonging to that eject .

There may be a th o usand very good reasons why I

should be p r ecluded from such converse —some o f
which indeed I can myself very clearly perceive
, ,
.

The i mportance o f M onism in thus enabling

us rationally to contemplate al l processes o f

b i gs
ear n u sti on t th p hysic l ffic cy f p y
the q e on as o e a e a o ra er.

F m m istic p i t f vi w b th t h s w h ffi m d th s wh
ro a on o n o e o o e o a r an o e o

d y such ffic cy
en q u lly i th i gh t
e a d qu ll y i th w
a re e g a n e r , an e a n e ro n

th y m l y qu ll i g up diff t sid s f th s m sh i ld
e a re ere arre n on eren e o e a e e .

F cc di g t M ism if th th l gi s
o r, a or n igh t i supp si g
o on , e eo o an are r n o n

t h t th Sup m M i d is th b
a e refp y i
e y c s th y
n e ea re r o ra er n a n a e, e a re

a l s ig h t i supp si g th t th M i d m ust c ss i l y b b l t
o r n o n a e n ne e ar e a e o

g t wh t i c ll d physic l sw s s i g th t i d t g t
ra n a s a e a an er , ee n a n o r er o ra n

an y sw ( van f th m st
er pp tl y spi itu l k i d) s m
e en o e o a aren r a n o e

physic l ch g must b p duc d i f it b

a an ly i th b i
e f th e ro e , e on n e ra n o e

p t ti
e i O th
on er th h d th sci tists
. n
q u ll y igh t in
e o er an , e en a re e a r

m i t i i g th t
a n a n n ph ysic l sw t p y a b
no f th tu a an er o ra er c an e o e na re

o f m i cl
a p duc d i d p d tly f st ictly physic l c us t ;
ra e, or ro e n e en en o r a a a i on

fo r, if th p h ysic l
so , d th psych ic l w u l d
e l g b c ia an e a o no on er e o n

e id t But u ti l th sci tists

en .
, b l t p f m th h p l ss
n e en a re a e o er or e o e e

t s k f p vi g wh th p ssi bi liti s f ph y ic l c us ti
a o ro n ere d e o e o s a a a on en ,
as

a m m tt
ere f b st ct sp cu l ti
a er o d g i g up a th th y f
ra e a on an o n on e eo r o

M ism it i vid t th t th th l gi s m y h v y l titud

on , s e en a e eo o an a a e an a e

t h y c h s t cl i m b t h
e oo e g ds th is m tt
o a d th t f ,
o as re a r a er an a o so

c ll d mi cl s
a e ra e .
1 14 Mon ism .

which they serve to convey I n each case a vehicle

.

o f symbols is necessary in orde r that o ne m ind

should com municate with another ; but in both

cases this is a vehicle o f sy mhols and nothing mo r e
, .

E verywhere therefore the reality may be psychical

, , ,

and the physical symbolic ; eve rywhere matter i n

m otion may be the outward and visible sign o f an
inward and spiritual grace .

Take again the case o f moral ity and religion .

Because science by its theo ry o f evolution appears

, ,

to be in a fai r way o f explaining the genesis o f

these things by natural causes theists are taking ,

alarm ; it is felt by them that i f m o rality can be

ful ly explained by utility and religion by supe r
,

st iti o n
,
the reality of both is destroyed But .

M onism teaches that such a view is enti rely

erroneous Fo r acco r d i ng to M onism the natural
.
, ,

causation of m orality and r eligion has nothing

whatever to d o with the ulti mate truth o f either .

The natu r al causation is merely a record of physical

processes serving to manifest the psychical processes
,
.

N or can it make any di fference as r ega r ds the ,

ultimate veracity o f the m oral and religious feelings ,

that they have been developed slowly by natural

causes ; that they were at fi rst g r ossly selfish on
the o ne hand and hideously superstitious o n the
,

other ; that they afterwards went through a long

series o f changes none o f which the r efore can have
,

fully cor responded with external t r uth ; or that

even no w they may be both ext remely fa r from any
such co r respondence All that such considerations
.
 The World as an Eject . 1 15

go to prove is that it bel o ngs to the natural

,

method of mental evolution in man that with

advancing culture his ej ective interpretations o f
Nature should more and more nearly appr ox i ma te
the truth The world eject must necessarily vary
.
-

with the character o f the human subject ; but this

does not p r ove that the ejective interpretation has
throughout been wrong in m ethod : it only proves
tha t such inte rpretation has been impe rfect —and
neces sarily imperfect —i n appli ca ti on .

Such then I conceive to be o ne o f the most

, ,

i mportant consequences o f the monistic theory .

Namely that by regarding physical causation as

,

everywhere but the objective o r phenomenal aspect

o f an ej ective o r ontological reality it furnishes ,

a logical basis for a theory o f things which is at the

same time natural and spiritual On the obj ective .

aspect the explanations furnished by reas o n are

,

o f necessity physical while o n the ej ective aspect

, ,

such ex planati o ns are of ne c essity metaphysical

o r rather let us say hyper physical
, , But these -
.

two o rders o f explanation are d i fferent only because

their modes of interpreting the same events are
d ifferent The obj ective explanation which was
.

given ( as we supposed ) by Helmholtz o f the e ffects

produced o n the human brain by hearing a sonata ,

was no d oubt perfectly sound within its ow n

category ; but the ej ective explanation o f these
sa me e ffects which is given by a musician is equally
sound within i ts catego ry A nd simi larly i f instead
.
,

o f the man obj ect we contemplate the world obj ect

- -

I 2
1 16 Mon ism .

physical causation b ecomes but the phenomenal

aspect o f psychical causation ; the invariability o f its
sequence be comes but the exp r ession o f intentional
orde r the iron rigid ity o f natural law becomes the
se nsuous manifestation o f a n unalte r able consistency
as be longing to the Supreme Volition .

My obj ect in this pape r ha s been to show that

the views o f the late Professo r C li ffo r d concern in g
the influence o f M onism on Theism a r e unsound .

I am in ful l agreement with hi m in believing that

M onism is destined to become the gene rall y
accepted theory o f things seein g that it is the only
,

theo ry o f things which can receive the sanction o f

science o n the o ne hand and o f feeling o n the other .

But I d isagree with hi m in holding that this theo ry

is fraught with implications o f an anti theistic k ind
-
.

I n my opinion th is theo ry leaves the question of

Theism ve ry much where it was befo r e That is .

to say while not furnishing any independent proof

,

o f Theism it likewise fails to furnish any inde

,

pendent disproof The r eason why i n C lifford s

’

hands this theory appeared to furnish independent

d ispr o of was because he pe rsisted in r egard ing the
,

world only as an o bj ect : he did not ente rtain the

po ssibility that the worl d m ight also be regarded
as an ej ect .Yet that the world under the theory
, ,

of M onism is at least as susceptible o f an ej ective

,

as it is of an objective inte rp r etation I trust that

,

I ha ve no w been able to show . A nd this is al l

that I have endea voured to show A s a matter .

of method ical reasoni ng i t appea rs to me that

.
1 18 Monis m .

u ph i l s ph ic l By wh t igh t it b ffi m d th t D i ty i f H ca n e a r e a e

xists m y t v l th f ct f His xist c t m w— d t h is

n o o a . a r , e

e ,
a no re ea e a o e en e o- o rro an

t o th w h l e h um c with ut th p ssi bi l ity f d u b t ? O i f

o e an ra e o e o o o r,

th b G d wh is t y t h t th c t i ly c t b futu
ere e a o , o o sa a ere er a n anno e a re

l if i w h ic h ch i dividu l m m y h v u qu sti
e, n ea nbl p f f a an a a e n e ona e roo o

Th ism It is p f ctly ph i l s ph ic l st t m t f y t m k
e a er e o o a a e en o r an o ne o a e

th t m tt s w st d h
a , as a er vid c f Th ism but t
no an , e c an see n o e en e o e o

sa y t h t h k ws th h u m
a e c vno h v such vid c is
e a n ra e ne er ca n a e e en e,

a m st oph i l s p h ic l st t m t s i g th t it c u ld l y b justi fi d
un o o a a e en , ee n a o on e e

by bs lut k wl dg A d th is cc u t I yth t th d ct i
a o e no e e. n ,
on a o n , sa a e o r ne

o f th U k w b le i
n no f i t di ff s f m th d ct i
a e, f th
n so ar a s er ro e o r ne o e

U k w i th v y v s f g stic
n no n, s e er re er e o a no .

N w th th y f M ism l
o , e eor bs v d i th t xt pp s
o on a o ne, as o er e n e e , a e ar

t b pu l y g
o e stic i th s s ju t xpl i d If i s m p ts
re a no n e en e s e a ne . n o e ar

o f th f g i g ss y I pp t h v b
e o re o n e gui g i f v u f
a a ear o a e een a r n n a o r o

th istic i m pl ic ti s th is h
e ly b a i d t sh w ( g i st
on ,
a s on een n or er o o as a a n

C l i ff d ) th t th w l d d s d m it f b i g
or a e g ddor j ct oe a o e n re ar e as an e e

But i smuch — l igi us f ith p t—w

.

na as t b l t v i fy
re o a a ar e a re n o a e o er

an y such j ctiv i t p t ti w
e e t bl
e t sti m t its
n er re a on , e are n o a e o e a e

v l u M is m s cti s th sh di g f
a e. on d p l y w ch s ;
an on e a n o x as ee as e oo e

b ut th sh di g wh ich i t s cti s is l y p visi l

e a n an on on ro ona .
 C HA PTER " .

TH E W ILL I N R E L AT I ON TO MAT E R I A LIS M

A ND S P I R I T U A LIS M .

I N the fo rego ing chapters I have considered the

theo ry of M onism fi rst in cont rast with the theories
,

o f Materia lism and of Spiritualism and next in rela

,

ti o n to the theory o f T heis m In this chapter and that

.

which succeeds it I propose to conside r M o nism

i n relation to the Wil l To do this it is needful to
.

begin by considering the problems which are

presented by the Will in relation to the older
theories of Materialism o n the o ne hand and o f
S piritualism o n the other .

A lth o ugh the phenomena o f volition have oc cupied

so large a province of phil osophical literature the ,

funda menta l problems which arise in connexion

with them are only two i n number and both ad mit
,

o f being stated in extremely simple terms . The

historical order i n which these two problems have
arisen is the inverse o f their l ogical order . For
while in logi cal orde r the two problems would stand
—
thus Is the Will an agent I f so is it a free agent
? ,
?

— i n actual d iscussion it was long taken fo r granted

120 M o n is m .

that the Wil l is an agent and hence the only

,

controversy gathe r ed r ound the question whether

the Will i s a free a gent D escartes indeed seems
.
, ,

t o have ente rtain ed the prio r question with rega r d

to animals and the r e are passages in the L evi a tha n
,

wh ich may be taken to imply that H obbes ente r

ta i ned this question with r egard to man But it .

was not unti l r ecent yea r s that any such question

could stand upon a basis o f science as d istinguished
from speculation ; the question d id not ad mit o f
being so m uch as stated i n terms o f science unti l
physiology was i n a position openly to challenge
o u r r ight to assume that the Wi ll is an agent .

S uch a chal lenge physiology has now given and ,

even d eclared that any assumption o f volitional

agency is in the presence o f adequate physio
,

logical knowledge impossibl e , .

The two p r oblems which I thus state separately

are often and indeed general ly confused t o gethe r ;
, ,

but fo r the purpose o f clear analysis it is o f the

fi rst impo rtance that they should be kept apa rt .

I n order to show the wide d istinction between

them we may best begin with a brief consideration
,

of what it is that the two problems seve r ally

i nvolve ; and to do this we may best take the
problems in w hat I have cal led their logical
orde r.

First then as r egards the question whethe r the

, ,

Wil l is an agent the r ival theories o f Materialism

,

and Spiritualism stand to one anothe r in a relation

o f contrad iction Fo r it i s o f the essence o f
.
122 Mon ism .

c ausation (whethe r r ega r ded fr om the physical o r

menta l side ) would not be complete .

N ow in my opinion the impo rtance of the

,

view thus presented by the theo ry o f M onism is

fo r al l purposes o f psych o l ogical analysis i n ,

estimable It is i mpossible nowadays that such

.

analysis can proceed very far i n any d irection

without confronting the facts presented by physi
ology : hence it i s i mpossible for such analysis to
con fine itself e x clusively to the spiritual o r
subjective side of psychology O n the other hand
.
,

in so fa r as such analysis has regard to th e

material o r objective side it has hithe rto appeared
,

t o countenance — i n however disguised a form —the

d ogmatic denial o f the Wi l l as an agent H ence .

the supreme importance to psychology o f r econ

c i li n
g the hitherto rival theo r ies of Spiritualism
and Materialism in the higher synthesis which is
furnished by the theo ry o f M onism Fo r obviously
.
, ,

in the absence o f any philosophical j ustification o f

the Wi ll as an agent we are without any guarantee
,

that al l psychological inqui ry is not a vain beating

o f the ai r I f as Materialism necessa r ily i mplies
.
, ,

the Wil l is not a cause i n Natu r e there would be

,

no reason in Nature fo r the agency either o f feeling

o r o f intelligence Feeling and intel ligence would
.
,

therefore stand as ciphe rs in the general constitution

,

o f things ; and any inqui r y touching thei r i nte r nal

system of causation could have no reference to any
scientific inqui ry touching causation in general .

I am aware that this t r uth is habitually ove r loo k ed

 The Will i n re lat ion to Mater ialism . 1 23

by psychol o gists but it is none the less a t ruth o f

fundamental impo rtance to the whole superstructure
o f this science O r in other words unless psycho
.
, ,

logi sts wil l expressly c o nsent to r ea r their science

o n th e ba sis provided by the philosophical theo ry

o f M onism there is noth ing to save it from logical

,

d isintegration ; apa rt from this basis the whole ,

science is so to spea k built in the ai r like an

, , ,

unsubstantial structure o f clouds Psychologists .

,

I repeat habitually ignore this fact and constantly

, ,

speak o f feeling and intelligence as t rue causes o f

adj ustive action but by so doing they merely beg
from this contradicto ry theory o f Spiritualism a flat
denial o f the fundamenta l postu late o n which they
elsewhere proceed — the postulate namely that , ,

mental changes are d etermined by ce r ebral changes .

C onside r for example the fol lowing passage from

, ,

M r Spencer s P r i nciples of P sychology

.
’

which serves to show in brief compass the logical

incoherency which in this matter runs through his
whole work
‘
Th o s e ra c es of b ei ngs only ca n h a v e su rviv ed i n which ,

o n the a v era g e a greea bl e or d e si re d fee li ngs w en t a l on g wi th

,

a cti viti es c o n duciv e to the m a i n t ena n ce of life whil e dis ,

a g reea bl e a n d h a bit ua lly a v o id ed feeli n g s w en t al o ng with

-

a ctiviti e s di re ctly o r i n di re ctly d e stru ctiv e of li fe a nd th ere

m ust ev er h a v e b een o th er thi ng s eq u a l the m o s t n u m ero us

, ,

a n d l o n g c on ti n u e d s urviv a ls a m ong ra ces i n which th es e

-

a dj u st m ent s o f feeli ng s to a cti on s were the b est t en di ng ever ,

to b ri n g a b o ut p erfect a djus tm en t
’
.

‘
The argu ment here is that the adj ustments o f
feel ings to actions when once attained leads in
,
’
,
1 24 Moni sm .

turn to an adj ust ment o f actions to feelings —or as ,

I have myself stated the argument in my M en ta l

’
E volu ti on i n A ni ma l s the r a i son d etre o f P leasure
,

and Pain has been that o f furnishing o rganisms with

guides to adj ustive action mo r eove r a s in the case ,

o f di r ect sensation d ictating any si mple adj ustment

fo r the sake o f securing an immediate good so in ,

the case o f instinct d ictating a mo r e intricate action

fo r the sa k e o f eventual ly secu r ing a more r emote
g ood (whether fo r self progeny o r com munity) and
, ,

so likewise in the case o f r e a son d ictating a still more

, ,

intricate adj ustment fo r the sake o f securing a good

still more r emote — i n all cases that i s where , ,

volition i s concerned pleasures and pains are the

,

gu ides o f action B ut thus to a ffi r m that pleasu r es

.
’

and pains are the guides of action is merely anothe r

way o f a ffirming that the Wil l is an agent— a cause
o f bod ily movement and as such a cause i n
, , ,

Nature Now as we have seen M r Spencer no t

.
, ,
.

only a fli rm s this— o r rathe r assumes it—but proceeds

‘

to render an a pr i or i explanation o f the accu racy

o f the guidance Yet he nowhere conside r s the
.

fundamental question Why should we suppose-

that the Will is an agent at al l ? Assured ly the

answe r given by physiology to this question is
a simple denial that we have any j ustification so
to regard the Will : in view o f he r demonst ration
o f conscious automatism she can see no r eason
,

why there should be any conne x ion at al l between

a subjective feeling o f pleasu r e or pain and an
obj ective fact o f agreement o r disag reem ent with the
‘
1 26 Mon is m .

must cease to speak o f motives dete r m ining action ,

’

‘
conduct being gove rned by pleasures and pains ,
’

voluntary movements in their last resort being al l

‘
due to bodily feelings the highest moral ity and ’

th e l o west vice being alike th e result o f a pu rsuit

’
o f happiness &c & c And so far as I can see it
,
. .
, ,

is only in the way above ind icated o r on the theory ,

o f M onism that it is possible without ignoring the

, ,

facts o f physiology on the o ne hand o r those o f

psychology o n the other philosoph ical ly to save ,

the agency o f Will .

From this b r ief exposition it may be gathered

that o n the materialistic theory it is impossible
that the Wil l can be i n any sense of the term an
, ,

agent ; that o n the sp i ritua list ic theo ry the Will

is regarded as an agent but only i n the sense o f ,

a non natural or m iraculous cause ; and lastly

-
, ,

that o n the m onistic theory the Will is saved as an

agent or may be properly regarded and as properly
,

denominated a true cause in the ord inary sense o f ,

that te r m Fo r this as wel l as fo r othe r r easons

.
,

which need not here be specified I accept in ,

philosophy the theory o f M onism ; and am thus

entitled in psych o logy to proceed upon the
doctrine that the Wi ll is an agent We have next .

to consid er the ulterio r question whethe r upon this

theo ry the Wi l l may be properly r ega r ded as
a free agent .

By a free agent is understood an agent that is

able to act without rest r aint o r spontaneously , .

The word free the r efore bears a ve ry d i ffe r ent

’

, ,
 The Will i n re lat ion to Mater ialism . 127

meaning when applied exclusively to the Will and ,

when applied more generally to the l iving organism .

Fo r we may properly say that a man or an animal , ,

is free when he o r it is at liberty to act in

, ,

acc o rdance with desire T o uching the fact of

.

freedom i n this sense there is o f course no question

, , .

We have not to consider the p o ssible freedom o f

man but the possible freedom of Wil l ; we have
,

n o t to contemplate whether a man may be free to

do what he wills but whether he can be free to wil l

,

what he wills Such being the question we have to

.
,

c o nsider it in relation to the three philosophical

theories already stated — M aterialism Spiritualism , ,

and Monism .

Fo r the theory o f Materialism the present

question has no existence If this announcement
.

appears sta rtling it can only be because no mate

,

ri a li st has ever taken the troubl e to formulate his

o w n theory with d istinctness

'
Fo r as previously
.
,

shown Materialism necessarily involves the doctrine

,

o f conscious autom atism ; but if so the Wil l is

, ,

concluded not to be an agent at all and there ,

fore i t becomes id le to discuss whether i n any ,

i mpossible exercise o f its agency it is free o r ,

subj ect to r estraint The most that in this

.

c o nnexion could logically stand to be considered

by the advocates o f M aterialis m would be whether
o r not the adventitious and i neffic a c i ou s feelings o f

subj ectivity which are associated with cereb ral

activity a r e dete r minate o r free ; but this would
probably be regarded o n all hands as a somewhat
1 28 Monism .

useless topic o f discussion and ce rtainly i n any ,

cas e would have no reference to the question o f

free agency The point to b e clearly understood i s
.

that according to the material istic theo ry a m o t o r

, ,

is d istinct from a motive although in some unac ,

countable manner the moto r is able to cause the

m o tive But the motive when thus caused is not
.
, ,

supp o sed to exe rt any causal influence o n bodily

action ; it is supposed to begin and end as a motive ,

o r neve r itself to become a m ot o r I n othe r words .

,

as before stated the Wi l l is not supposed to be an

,

agent ; and the r efo re to this theory the d oct r ine

, ,

o f free wi l l and o f determinism a r e alike irrelevant

-
.

W e need not wait to prove that this i mportant fact

is habitually overlooked by materialists them
selves o r that whenever a materialist espouses the
,

cause o f dete r minism he is thereby and for the

,

ti me being vacating his position as a materialist ;

for if acco rd ing to his theory the Wil l is not an
, ,

agent h e is merely impugning his own doctrines by

,

consent ing to discuss the conditions of its agency .

The theo ry of Spiritualism and the theo ry o f

M onism agree i n holding that the Wil l is an agent ;
and therefore to both o f these theories the
, ,

question whether the Wi l l is a free agent is a real

question H ere then it devolves upon us to con
.
, ,

sider ca refully the logical status o f the r ival

d o ctrines o f so called Libe rty and Necessity Fo r
-
.

convenience o f a rr angement in what follows we ,

may best begin with the doct r ine o f Necessity o r ,

D eterminism .
1 30 Mon is m .

that the doct r ine o f determinism could wel l be

taught in a manner more emphatic .

Thus far then the doctrine o f determinis m is

, ,

seen to be vi ctorious ove r the doctrine o f freed om

al l along the line By Materialism the question
.

o f freedom is excluded a b i n i ti o ; by Spiritualism

and by M onis m so far as yet seen it can be

, ,

l ogically answered only in the negative F r om .

which it follows that the sense o f m oral responsi

b i li ty is o f the natu r e o f a vast i llusion the ,

historical genesis o f which ad mits o f being easily

traced and the authority o f which is thus destroyed
, .

A lthough it m ay stil l serve to supply m otives to

c o nduct it seems that it can d o so only in the way
,

that belongs to superstition—that C o nscience a s ,

I have befo re said is the bogey o f mankind and

, ,

that belief in its authority is li ke belief in witch

craft d estined to dwindle and to fad e befo re the
,

advance o f a better o r m ore complete knowledge

o f natural causation .

But the d iscussion must n o t end here H ithe rto .

I have presented the case Libe rty versus Necessity

with al l the i mpartiality o f which I am capable ;
but I have d o ne s o without travel ling an i nch
beyond those li mits o f d iscussion within which
th e question has been d ebated by previous writers .

I believe indeed that I have p o i nted o ut several

, ,

im po rtant oversights which have been m ade o n

both sides o f the question ; but i n d o ing this
I have not gone fu rthe r than the philosophical
basis upon which the question has been hitherto
 The Will i n re lat ion to Mon ism . 13 1
'

a rgued My obj ect however in publishing these

.
, ,

papers is not that o f dest ructive criticis m ; and

what I have d o ne in this d irection has been done
only in o rder t o prepare the way for what is
n o w to follow H aving shown as it appears to
.
,

me conclusively that upon both the rival theories

,

o f Mate r ialism and Spiritualism —the doctrine o f

Libe rty and therefo re o f M oral Responsibility

,

must logical ly fal l I now hope to show that this

,

doctrine ad mits o f being re established o n a basis

-

furnished by the theory of Monism .

I t often happens that an elabo rate structure o f

argument which is perfectly s o und and c o mplete
,

upon the basis furnished by a given hypothesis ,

“

admits o f being whol ly disintegrated when the

fundamental hypothesis is shown to be either
provisional o r untrue A nd such I believe is the
.
, ,

case with the issue now before us For the issue .

Liberty versu s N ecessity has hitherto been argued

o n the com mon assumption that natural causation

is not merely the most ultimate principle which

the human m ind can reach ; but als o a principl e
which is in some way or another exte r nal to that
, ,

m ind It has been taken for granted by both sides

.

i n the contr o versy that if o u r volitions can be

proved to depend upon natural causation as rigid ,

i n its sequences within the sphere of a human m ind

as within that o f a calculating machine there must be ,

an end o f the controversy ; seeing that our volitions

would be thus p r oved to be rigid ly determined
by those same princi ples o f fi x ed order o r natural ,

" 2
1 32 Moni sm .

la w , which a r e exte r nal to o r i nd ependent o f

’ ‘

, ,

the human mind —quite as much a s they a r e

e x te r nal to o r independent of the cal culating
, ,

machine Now it is this assum ption which I

.
,

chal lenge The theory of M onism entitles o ne

.

to deny that when we have d r iven th e question

d own to the g ranite bed o f natu ral causation ,

nothing m ore remains t o be done ; according to

this theory it sti l l r emains to be asked What is ,

the natu r e o f this natu ral causation ? Is it indeed

the ultimate datum o f experience below which ,

the human mind cannot go ? And is it i ndeed so

fa r external to o r i ndepend ent o f the human
, ,

mind that the latter stands to it in the relation

,

o f a slave to a maste r coerced as to action by

-

the conditions which that maste r ha s laid d own ?

N ow these questions are all vi rtually answered
i n the a ffi r mative by the dual istic theo ry o f
S piritual ism Fo r the Wil l is here rega r ded as
.

an agent bound to act in accordance with those

cond itions of external necessity which dualis m
r ecogni z es a s natu ral causation Its i nterna l .

causation thus becomes but the reflex o f exte r nal ;

and the reflection becomes known inte r nally as
the consciousness o f m otive H ence the Wil l.
,

cannot be philosophical ly l iberated from the toils

of this external necessity so long a s dualism,

recogni z es that necessity as existing independently

o f th e Wil l and thus i mposing i ts conditions o n
,

volitional activity But the theory o f M onism

.
,

by ident ifying e x te r nal with i nte r nal causation

1 34 Mon ism .

on any physiological inqui ry we may altogethe r

,

neglect the p r ocesses of ideation with which any

process o f cerebration may be conce r ned ; while ,

if we happen to be engaged upon any psycho

logical inquiry we may similarly neglect the
,

processes o f cerebration with which any p r ocess

o f ideati o n may be concerned S eeing that each
.

is equally an index o f a common sequence it ,

can make no d ifference which of the m we take

as ou r guide although for purposes o f practical
,

inquiry it is o f cou rse e x pedient to take the

ce rebral inde x when we are dealing with the
o bj ective side of the problem and th e mental ,

index when dealing with the subj ective In the .

fo l lowing pages therefore I shal l altogethe r neglect

, ,

t he cerebral index The inquiry on which we

.

are engaged belongs to the region o f m ind and , ,

therefore after what has j ust been sai d it wil l

, ,

be apparent that I a m entitled to adopt the

standpoint of a spiritualist to the extent o f
,

fastening attention o nly upon the mental side o f

the prob lem Fo r although the theory of M onis m
.

teaches as against Spiritualism that no o ne o f

, ,

t he mental sequences could ta k e place without a

c orrespond ing physical sequence the theory also ,

teaches the converse pr o position ; and therefore

it makes no d ifference which o f the two pheno
menal sequences i s ta k en as o u r inde x o f the
o ntological .

Now it clearly makes a great di ffe r ence whether

,

the mental changes conce r ned in volition a r e

 The Will i n re lat ion to Mon ism . 1
35

r ega r ded e ffects o r a s causes A ccording to

as .

Materialism the mental changes are the e ffects

,

o f cereb ral changes which were themselves the

,

effects o f p r ecedent cerebral changes A ccording to .

Spiritualism these mental changes are the causes

, ,

not only o f the cereb ral changes but also o f o ne ,

an o ther A ccording to M onism the menta l changes

.
,

may be r egarded as the causes of the cerebral or vi ce ,

versa , seeing that in neither case are we stating

—
a r eal truth the rea l truth being that it is only
a cerebro menta l change which can cause any
-

change either of c erebration or o f mentati o n Now .

it is evident that if the menta l processes were

always the e ffects of c erebra l processes ( Materialism ) ,

there could be no fu rthe r question with regard t o

Libe rty and Necessity ; while if the mental pro,

cesses are the causes both o f the cerebral processes

and o f o ne another ( Spiritualism ) the question ,

before us bec o mes rais ed to a higher level The .

causality in questi o n being n o w rega r ded as purely

mental the wil l is no longe r regarded as a passive
,

slave o f the brain and the only thing to be con

,

side red is whether freed o m is c o mpatible with

causation of a purely m ental kind No w at an .
,

earlie r stage o f ou r enqui ry I have argued that it is

not ; but this argument was based entirely upon
spi r itualistic premises or upon the assumption that
,

the principle o f causality is everywhere external to

—
,

or independent o f,the human mind under which

assumption I cannot see that it makes much
di ffe rence whethe r the coercion comes from the
1 36 Monis m .

brain al one o r fro m the whole gene ral system o f

,

things external t o the hu man m ind And here .

it is that I think the theo ry o f M onis m comes to

the rescue .

Fo r i f physical and mental p r ocesses a r e eve ry

,

where consubstantial o r identical in kind it can , ,

make no di fference wh ethe r we rega r d thei r se

n es as o bj ective o r ejective physical o r spi r itual
q ue c ,
.

H ence we are free to r egard al l causation as o f

,

a characte r essentially psychical But if so it .

, ,

must be self contained as psychical ; it cannot b e

-

in any way d eterm i ned by anything from without ,

seeing that outsid e itsel f there is nothing i n

the U niverse N ow if this is true o f the Worl d
.
,

ej ect it m ust also be true o f the M an ej ect as wel l

,
-
,

as of the Man subject o r E go I f al l causation i s

-
, .

psychical that portion of it which belongs to o r i s

, ,

mani fested by my o w n personal ity is not laid upon

,

me by anything from without ; it is merely the

expression o f my o w n psychical activity as this is ,

taking place withi n the circumscribed area of m y

o w n pe r sonality And this activity is spontaneous
.
,

in the sense that it is not coerced from without .

A ll the sequences which that activity displays

within this region a r e self determ ined i n the sense -
,

that they are determ ined by the sel f and not by ,

any agency e x te r nal to it The only influence .

which any external agency can here exe rt is that ,

o f insisting that bodily action —the physical out

come of my psychical processes — shal l be in

acco rdance with the cond itions imposed by the
1
38 Monism .

the theo r y o f Monism entitles us to r egard this

Self as the fons et or igo o f o u r mental causation ,

and thus restores to us the d oct r ine of Liberty with

its attendant consequence o f M oral Resp o nsibi lity .

It may help to elucidate this matter if we regard

it fr om an o the r point o f view A ccordi ng to .

H obbes Liberty is the absence o f al l i mpedi ments

,

to action that are not contai ned i n the nature and

’
intrinsical qualities of the agent N ow if we .
,

accept this definition it is easy to show that the

,

the o ry o f M o nism is really at one with the doctrine

of Libe rty Fo r i n the fi r st place according t o the
.
, ,

theory of M onism the neu r osis o f the brain coul d

,

not be what it i s W ithout the psychosis of the m ind .

C o nsequently as above shown it would be equal ly

, ,

incorrect to say that the neurosis governs the

psychosis as it woul d be to say that the psych 05 1s
,

governs the neurosis But i f so the Wi ll is free in

.
, ,

accordance with H obbes defi nition o f freed om ’

.

Suppose fo r example that o n seeing a b o ne I thin k

, ,

of P rofessor Flower then r eme mber that a long

,

ti me a go I lent his book o n Osteology to a friend ,

and forthwith r esolve to ask my friend what has

become of it ; here my ulti mate volition w o uld be
u nfree if it we r e the effect of physical processes
going on i n my brai n But the volition m ight be
.

free if each o f these mental processes were the

result o f the p r eced ing one seeing that there may,

then have been an absence of al l i mpedi ments to

the occurrence o f these pro cesses .

Of cou rse it wi ll be obj ected —as I have mysel f

 The Will i n lat ion
re to Mon ism . 13
9

urged in the preceding chapter—that causal action o f

any kind is incompatible with freedom o f volition
—that i f there be any such causal action even ,

though it be wholly r estricted within the sphere

o f m ind the Wi l l is real ly compel led to wil l as it
,

d o es will is determined to d etermine as it does

,

determin e and hence that its apparent freedom is

,

illuso ry H obbes definition it may be urged when

.
’

, ,

applied to the case o f the Will is equivocal N o , .

doubt a man is free as to his a c ti on if there be an ,

‘
absence o f al l impediments to his action —o r in
’

othe r wo rds if he is able to act as he wills to act

, .

But it d oes not follow tha t he is free as to his w i ll ,

even though there be an absence of al l impediments

to his willing as he wills to wil l Fo r here the very.

question is as to whether there a r e any impediments

to his willing o therwise than he does wil l The fact .

that he wi lls to wil l as he does wil l proves that there

are no i mpediments to his willing in that directi o n ;
but is there a similar absence of impediments to
his willing to wil l i n any other d irection ? I f so ,

we are stil l within the lines o f d eterminism Thus .

Hobbes definiti o n o f freedom really applies only

’

to freedom o f b o dily action ; n o t to freedom o f

volition seeing that if my wil l is caused I co uld

,

no t have willed to wil l o the rwise than I did

will N ow the answer which M o nism supplies to
.
,

this obj ecti o n is that the wil l itself is here the

ultimate agent and therefor e a n agen t w hi ch m us t
,

be identified w i th the pr i nciple of ca usa li ty In .

othe r wo r ds the ve ry r eason why we feel that

,
1 40 Monis m .

Hobbes definition o f libe rty while pe r fectly valid as

’
,

regard s bodily acti on seems to lack something

,

when applied to volition is because v o lition belongs

,

to the sphere o f m ind — belongs therefo re to that , ,

sphere which the theory o f M onism regards as

identical with causality itself A lthough it is true .

that volitions are caused by motives yet it is the ,

mind which conditi o ns the motives and the r efore ,

its own volitions It is not true that the mind is

.

always the passive slave o f causes known to it as ,

m o tives The human m ind is itself a causal agent

.
,

having the same kind of pri o rity within the micro s

c os m as the World ej ect has i n the mac r ocosm

- .

Therefore its motives are in large part matters o f

-

its o w n c r eation I n the intricat e workings o f it s

.

o w n internal machinery innumerable patterns o f

thought are turned out some of which it sel ects as
,

good while o thers it rej ects as bad ; but n o o ne of

,

which c o uld have com e into being at al l without

this causal agency of the m ind itself .

It wil l probably be obj ected that even though al l

this were granted we cannot thus sav e the d o ctrine
,

of moral resp o nsibility For it may appear that the

.

liberty which is thus acc o rded to the Wil l is

nothing better than libe rty to wi l l at r andom as ,

argued in my previous essay But here we must .

observe that although we are thus shown free to

wi ll at random it does not follow that we are like
,

wise free to act in accordance with o u r volitions .

A n d this is a most i mpo rtant distinction which ,

l iberta r ians have h ithe rto fai led to notice I f we .

1 42 Monis m .

it wil ls neve rtheless it would fai l in i ts essentia l

,

use o r object d id it r efuse to wil l i n acco r dance

with the conditions which a r e i mposed upon its
executive capacity Again to quote St Paul the
.
,
.
,

Wil l might say A ll things for me are lawfu l ; but

,

al l things a r e not exped ient N ow this considera

.
,

tion of expediency is o ne o f constant and far

reaching impo rtance Fo r not on ly as al ready
.
,

obse rved does it lead to volition o n the o ne hand

,

as r ational ; but it also leads to volition o n th e

other hand as mo r al Let us take the two points
.

separately .

Do we sa y that a man i s not free to conduct

a scientific research because i n conducting it he
,

must employ the need ful apparatus ? O r d o we say

that a man is not free to m arry because i n order ,

to do so he m ust go through a ma rr iage ceremony ?

Obviously to sa y such thi n gs would sound ve ry
,

like talking nonsense It is true that i n neithe r

.

case is a man free to gain his o bj ect without

adopting the means which are seen to be necessary
under the system o f external causation in which h e
fi nds himself ; but this does not mean that he is
not free to do as he wil ls unless it so happens that
,

he wills to d o the impossible Thus within the .

,

limits that a r e set by the conditions o f causa tion ,

a man is understood to be free to act a s he wil ls

‘
s o long as h e is not impeded by some o f those ’

conditions T o sa y that he is no t free because

.

he cannot get beyond those conditions would be

absu r d since apa rt fr om these cond itions action o f
, , ,
 The Will i n la t ion
re to Mon i sm . 1 43

any kind would be a pr i or i i mpossible and the ,

man would have as his only alternative no action

, ,
-
.

Hence in d o ing we must conform to the law o f

,

causati o n —which indeed is al l that can he meant

, ,

by doing — and i f in wil ling what we d o we must

also conform to the law of causation where is the ,

d i fference with respect to freed o m ? Such restraint

as there may be is here a restraint upon bodily action ;
not at al l upon the mental action which we cal l
v o l iti o n The Wi l l may wil l in any way that it
.

wi lls to wi l l but the b o dy cannot act in eve ry way

that the Wil l may wil l it to act therefore the Will
fi nds it expedient to wil l o nly in such ways as the
body can act —i e to conform in i ts action to the
. .

external system o f causation I f this c o ndition o f

.

al l acti o n is held to be c o mpatible with freedom in

the one case so in consistency must it be held i n
,

the other . E qually in either case the agent can

o nly be properly said to be unfree if he be subj ect ,

to causal r estraint from with o ut And in neither .

case d o es the unive rsal cond ition o f acting under

the law of causation constitute b o ndage in any ,

othe r sense than that of furnishing the agent with

his conditions to acting in any way at all There .

fore unless i t be said that a man is not free to do

,

as he wills because he wills to d o the impossible it ,

cannot be denied that he is free to will as he wills

because he wills according to law For no action .

of any kind is possible c o ntra r y t o law— a general

fact which goes to constitute an argument a p os

ter i ori fo r the r ationality o f the World ej ect —and -
1 44 Mon ism .

i f volition constituted an exception to this general

statement it could only d o so by be coming no
,

action No w it i s by thus wil ling accord ing to

law—o r with due refe r ence to those external
.
,

conditions o f causality with which the executive

capacity has to d o —that volition is rend ered
rati o nal The r est r aint laid up o n v o liti o n i s not
.

laid U pon it a s volition but only in respect o f

,

execution A man may wi l l to marry a s long and

.

a s hard as he chooses ; but only if he furthe r wil ls

to take the necessa ry m eans can his volition

become rational ; it is irrati o nal i f he wil ls to
marry and at the same tim e wi lls no t to go
,

th rough th e marriage cere mony But alth o ugh

.

ir rational it is n o ne the less free

, C onsidered .

merely as an act o f volition it i s equally free ,

whether it be rational o r irrational .

A nd similarly it is equally free whethe r it be

, ,

moral or immoral The o bj ection that an uncaused

.

v o lition cannot be a r esponsible volition d epends

fo r its valid ity o n the meaning which we attach to
‘
the term uncaused I f it he meant that the
.
’

volition arises without any regard at al l to the

surrounding conditions o f life and is carried into,

e ffect without the agent being ab le to control it by

means o f any other voluntary act ; then i ndeed , ,

whatever else such an agent may be he certainly ,

is not moral But i f it b e meant that among

.

a number o f unc o mpleted volitions d rawing i n

— ‘
d ifferent directions and all uncaused i n the sense ’

o f belonging im mediately to the E o — on e of them

g
1 46 Monis rn .

mental histo ry his action cannot have been othe r

,

than it was But now accord ing to the monisti c

.
,

—
theory al l causation has a psychical basis being
,

but the obj ective expression to us o f the psychical

activity o f the World ej ect C onsequently a o
-
.
,

cording to this theo ry the cou r se o f even st r ictly

,

physical causati o n is inevitable o r necessary only

in so far as the psychical activity o f the World
eject is held to b e uniform o r consistent within ,

itsel f A nd forasmuch as al l ou r knowledge o f

.

physical causation is necessarily e mpirical we have ,

but very inadequate means o f j udging how fa r

th is empirical index is a t r ue gauge o f the real ity .

We can indeed p r ed ict an eclipse centuries in

, ,

advance but we can only do so o n the supposition

that such and such physi cal conditions remain
constant and we have no right to a ffi r m that such
,

must be the case O ur knowledge o f physical

.

causation being but empiri cal i s probably but

, ,

a very inad equate translation o f the psychica l

activity of the World ej ect ; and hence not only
-
,

have we no right to predict a future ecl ipse with

ce rtainty but we have not so much as the r ight to
,

affi rm that even a past eclipse must have taken

place of necessity Fo r we have no right to a ffi r m
.

that at any one period o f cosmic history the actio n

o f the World ej ect must have been what it was
-
,

o r c o uld not have been o ther than it w a s O ur .

knowledge of the obverse aspect of this action (i n

the c o urse o f physical causation ) is as I have said , ,

purely empirical ; and this i s merely anothe r way

 The Will i n re lat ion to Mon ism .
7
14

of saying that although we d o know what the

action o f the World ej ect has been at su c h and such
-

a period o f cosmic histo ry we can have no means

,

o f knowing what else it might have been For .

anything that we can tel l to the contrary the whole ,

histo ry o f the solar system for example m ight

, ,

have been quite d i fferent from what it has been ;

the course which it actually has run may have been
but o ne o u t o f an innumerable number of possible
alternatives any other o f which m ight j ust as w e ll
,

have been ad opted by the W o rld ej ect -

.

Now i f this is true o f natural causation i n the

,

case of the macrocosm it would appea r to be

,

equal ly so o f natural causation in the case o f the

m icrocosm . Indeed p rediction in the case o f
,

human activity is so much less certain than in the

case of c o sm ic activity that the attribute o f free
,

will is generally ascribed to the fo rme r while rarely ,

suggested as possibly belonging to the latter .

A nd similarly as regards past action I f we are .

unable to say that at any period in the past history

o f the solar system the World ej ect might no t have
-

d eflected the whole stream of events into some

othe r channel ho w ca n we be able to say that at
,

any given period o f his past h istory the Man eject -

could not have perfo rmed an analogous act ?

Obviously the o nly reason why we are no t
,

accust o med to ente rtain this supposition i n either

case is because o u r j udgements are beset with the
,

assumption that the principle o f causality is prior

to that of m ind — s o mething o f the natu r e o f Fate
L 2
1 48 Moni s m .

supe r io r even to the gods A nd no less obviously

.
, ,

i f once we s ee any r eason to regard the principle o f

causality as me r ely c o extensive with that o f m ind
-
,

the whole question as between N ecessity and F r ee

will lapses ; the r e is nothing to s how that a man s
’

action in th e past might not have been other than

it was The only outward restraint placed upon
.

the e x e r cise of his Wi ll is then seen to be i mposed

by the conditions o f its executive capacity and ,

this r est raint it is that constitutes man a rational

agent . O n the othe r hand the structure o f ,

c o nscience—howeve r we m ay suppose this t o have

been formed —imposes that furthe r and i nward
restrai nt upon his Will which constitutes man
,

a moral agent But neither of these restraints can

.

properly be said to constitute bondage i n the sense

required by Neces sitarianism because neithe r o f
’
,
’
t he m req u i res that the man s Wi l l must will as

it does wi ll they r equire me r ely that his Will

should act i n ce rtain ways if it is to accomplish
c ertain results ; and to this extent o nly is it
subj ect to law o r to the incidence of those external
,

i nfluences which help to shape o u r motives .

But if this is so is it not obvious that the sense

,

o f moral responsibility is rational ly j usti fied ? This

sense goes upon the supposition that a man s ’

c o nduct in the past might have been di fferent fr o m

what it was . C learly therefo r e no questi o n o f
, ,

m oral responsibility can eve r obtain in cases whe r e

the general system o f ex ternal causation or natural ,

law r endered an alternative line o f action physically

,
1 50 Monis m .

o nly in so far as the executive capacity o f my body

is so d etermined As the whole st ress o f any
.

o bj ection to th e present argument must thus b e

b ro ught to bea r up o n the validity o f this its funda
m ental p remiss a few words may now be said to
,

show that the premiss i s not whol ly gratuitous .

O f course the reason why at first sight it is apt to

appear not only gratuitous but even grotesque is
, , ,

because in these days o f physical science the minds

o f most of us are dom inated by the unthi nking

persuasion that the principle o f causal ity is the

most ultimate principle which ou r m inds can reach .

M ost o f us accept this persuasion as al most o f the

nature o f an axiom and hence the mere suggestion
,

that our o w n volitions are really uncaused appea rs

to us o f the natu r e o f a sel f evident absu rd ity - .

A little thought however is enough to show that

, ,

the only ground o f reason which this strong

prepossession can rest upon is the assumption that ,

th e principl e o f causality is logical ly p r ior to that

o f mind .Therefo r e it is the valid ity o f this
assumption that we have he r e to investigate .

In the fi r st place then the assumption is ipso

, ,

fa cto irrational Fo r it is evident that i n orde r to

.

make the assumption there must al r eady be a mind

t o make it In othe r words the very conception
.
,

of the p rinciple o f causality implies a thinking

substance wherein that conception a r ises and the r e ,

fore as a me r e matte r o f fo r mal statement it is

, ,

impossible to assign logical p r iority to this con

c ep ti on ove r the thing whereby it i s conceived .
 The Will i n re lat ion to Mon ism . 1
5 1

In the next place when we ca refully analyze the ,

nature o f this conception itself we find that it arises ,

i mmediately out o f o u r conception of Being as

B eing This is shown by the idea of equ i va lency
.

between cause and effect which is an essential ,

feature of the c o ncepti o n o f causality as such I n .

other w o rds the statement of any causal relation is

,

merely a statement of the fact that both the matter

and the energy conce r ned in the event were of
a permanent nature and unalterable amount .

Therefore if the ultimate Reality is mental

, ,

C ausation m us t be o ntologically identical with

Voliti o n A nd that the ultimat e Reality is either
.

m ental o r something greate r seems to be proved

, ,

by the consideration that if it be supposed anythi ng

less there must be an end o f the conception o f
,

equivalency as between cause and effect and so ,

o f the conception o f causality itself ; fo r clearly if , ,

my m ind has been caused by anything less than

itself there is an end of any possible equivalency
,

between the activity of that thing as a cause and ,

the occu rrence of my mind as an effect 1

.

1
Wh a ts oever th i gs m ust c ss i ly c t i i t
i s fir st o f a ll n ne e ar on a n ,

and tu lly h v t l st ll th p f cti s t h t

ac a a e, a ea v ft
,
a e er e on a c an e er a er

exist ; n it v
n or ca giv t th y
e er p f cti t h tei t h t h t
o an o er a n er e on a a no

actu lly i its l f

a n t l st i e h igh d g ( L ck ) T th s
, or a ea n a er e ree
’
o e . o i

argum t M ill sw s H w v stl y bl

en an erd m ,
p ci us f
‘
o a no er an ore re o ,
or

i st c
n th v g t b l s
an e, a re d ei m l s t h th 0 1 d m u
e e a e an an a an e 5 1 an an re

ou t f wh i h
o d by th p p t s f w h ich t h y
c ,
an e is d up "
ro er i e o ,
e a re ra e

But th is st ictu i t w thy f M i ll Th s i l d m u d t

r re s no or o . e o an an re o no

c stitut th wh l c u f th pl ts d i m l s W m ust
on e e o e a se o e an an an a . e

t c th s d m y th
ra e e e an c us s ( c di ti s) b ck d b k ti l l
an o er c o n - a e on on a an ac

w c m t
e o wh ts v i fi st f ll thi gs i t is m ly ch ldish t
e o a oe er s r o a n e re i o
1 52 Mon i srn .

Lastly the conception o f causal ity essential ly

,

i nvolves the idea o f fi nal ity as existing somewhere .

H ere I cannot do better than quote some ext racts

from C anon M o z ley s essay o n The Principle o f
‘ ’

C ausation as h e manages very tersely to convey the

’

gist o f p r evious philosophiz ing upon this subj ect .

He (C l rke) b ri ng s o t si m ply t b ottom the m n i ng n d

a u a ea a

s i gn ific n c e o f n id
a i n the hu m n m i n d th t th re is
a ea a ,
a e

i m pli d in the v ry id its elf f c u s fi r stly th t it ca us es

e e ea o a e, , a

som th i n ge ls a nd s con dly th t it i s u n c us d its elf

e e e , a a e .

A n i n fi n it e s r i s f c us es d s n o t m k e a c a us e
e e o an oe a a

i n fin it e succ s si n of c u se s rests by the v ry hyp th si s

e o a , e o e ,

up n n c a us e e ch p r ticul one rests on the one which

o o a a ar

foll ws it b ut the wh l e rests up n n othi ng

o ,
I f fr m ne
o o . o o

c us w e h v to g b ck t anoth er th t which w g b a ck
a e a e o a o , a e o

fr m i s n ot the c u se but th a t which w e go b c k to i s The

o a , a .

v ery id e f c u s s I h v e s id i m pli s st op ; an d
a o a e, a a a , e a

wh rev er w st p i s the c a u s
e e A t r e c u se i s Fi r st
o e . u a a

C a us eTh . th ei stic id thus d oes n ot c rre sp on d to the

e a ea o

id ea of rea s n The th eis t pp r s to a ckn wl ed g the

o . a a ea o e

nec s sity f ca use n d pp rs to p ro vid e f it ; but

e o a ,
a a ea or

wh n w e c m to hi s sch em it f ils x ctly in th t p r t f

e o e e a e a a a o

the id a which cl n ch s it
e n d which i s e ss n ti l t
e i ts e ,
a e a o

i n t gr ity ; it f il s in p r vidi ng a st p ;
e a O n e m ight y to o o sa

hi m W hy d y
, g iv y u rself the troubl e t supply c us ti n
o ou e o o a a o

a t all ? Y ou d b ec u s y c on sid r y u s lf bli ged i n

o so a e ou e o r e o

re s n t do it but if y supply c a us ti on t a ll why n t

a o o , ou a a ,
o

furn ish such c u s s e son ha s i m p r ss ed up n y

a a e a nd r a e o ou , a

which i s i n h r n t i n y u r m i n d— a ca u s which st n ds still

e e o e a ,

an igi na l c u se ? I f y n ev r i nt n d ed t supply this it

or a ou e e o ,

m ust h v b n b c us e ya e th o ught
ee l c us e w s n t
e a ou a re a a a o

w n t d ; but if you th ought c use n t w an t ed why not

a e a a o ,

ch s s oo e om e few c diti s of the on on , an d a r b it i ly t

rar o re a r g d th em as

l
a on e the e ffici t c us s en a e .
1 54 Moni s rn .

occu r rence but that in eve ry mind whe r e it d oes

,

occur it has been d irectly formed o ut o f e x periences

o f effo rt in acts of volition S o that whethe r we .

analyz e the idea of cause as we actual ly d iscove r

it i n o u r o w n minds o r investigate the hist o ry o f
,

its genesis we alike find a s we might have

, ,

antecedently expected that it is d ependent on ou r,

more ulti mate idea o f mind as mind ; the c o n

c epti o n of causality i s n o t as a matter o f fact , ,

original o r primal but de rivative o r second ary

, .

Therefore i f this conception n ecessarily involves

,

the postulation o f a fi rst cause there can be no

'

doubt that such a cause can only be conceived as o f

the nature of m ind From which it follows that
.

each ind ivid ual m ind r equires t o be r egarded — i f it

is regarded at al l —as o f the natu r e o f a fi r st cause .

From this howeve r it does not follow that each

, ,

i nd ividual m ind requires to b e rega r ded as wholly

independent o f al l o ther causes o r as never subj ect ,

t o any causal influence which may be exercised by

othe r minds Although each m ind presents the

.

feature o f finality o r spontaneity this does not ,

hinde r that it also prese nts th e featu re o f r elation

to othe r minds which the r efore are able to act
, , ,

upon it in numberless ways N ow whethe r these .

,

m inds are the m inds of other men of other i ntelligent ,

beings o r o f the whole Wo r ld ej ect the causal

,
-
,

activity which is exerted upon my m ind expresses

itself i n that m ind as a consciousness of motives .

But although these motives may help to determine

my volitions there is no r eason to suppose that
,
 The Will i n re lat ion to Mon ism . 1
55
they are themselves the volitions o r that without ,

them my mind would cease to be itself a causal

agent . O n the cont rary i f this we r e supposed
, ,

the suppositi o n wou ld amount to destroying the

causal agency of my o w n mind which as we have , ,

j ust seen must either be original or not at all

, .

The way therefo r e that the matte r stands is

, ,

this I n so far as the microcosm is a ci r cumscribed

.

system of being —a thinking substance a person ,

ality— it is o f the nature o f a fi rst cause free to ,

act in any d irection as to its thinking and willing ,

even though its thinking should be irrational as

to truth and its willing impossible a s to e x ecu
,

tion But in so fa r as the m icrocosm enters into

.

relation with the mac rocosm the system of ex ,

ternal causation which it encounters determines

the character o f its volitions For although these
.

v o litions are themselves o f the nature o f fi rst

c auses it is no c o nt r ad iction to say that they are
,

— at al l events in large m easure —d etermined by

other and exte r nal causes This is no c o ntra di c
.

tion because although they are thus determined

, ,

it does not fo l low that they are thus determined

n ecessa r i l
y and
,
this makes al l the d ifference
between the theory o f will as bond o r free In .

any st r eam o f seconda ry causation each m ember

o f the series i s understood to determine the next

member o f necessity ; and it is because this n o tion

is i mpo rted into psychology that the theory of
determinism rega rds it as axiomatic that if o u r ,

volitions are i n any way caused at all they can only ,

1 56 Mortis m .

be caused by way o f necessity ; and hence that

under the operation of any given set o f motives
the action o f the wil l can only take place i n the
direction o f th e resu ltant But any such axiom
.

i s valid only within the r egion of second causes .

O n the hypothesis that volitions are fi rst causes ,

the axiom is i rrelevant to them ; fo r although it

may b e true that they are determined by causes
from without it may not be true that they are
,

thus d etermined o f necessity : their int r insi c

characte r as themselves fi rst causes although ,

n o t isolating them from any possibl e contact with

other causes neve rtheless d oes protect them from

,

being necessarily coerced by these causes and ,

therefore from becoming but the mere effects o f

them . Such influence o r determ ination as is
, ,

exerted upon the Wil l by these external causes

i s exerted only because any i nd ividual mind is n ot
itsel f a macrocosm but a m icr o cosm in r elation to
,

a macrocosm I f it were itself a m ac rocosm sta ndi ng

.
,

out of relation to al l othe r being i ts p r ime causa

,

tion would o f course be whol ly u nin fl u enc ed by

, ,

any other causation ; its volitions would then be

concerned only with the determination o f i ts own
thoughts in a constant st r eam o f purely subj ective
contemplation such as that which the H indoo
,

philosophy attributes to G o d But as the hu man.

m ind d iscovers itself as existing i n close and

compl e x relations with an external world o f an
o rd erly cha racter the human m ind finds that it
,

is as before said expedi en t to adapt the cou rs e of

, ,
1 58 Monis rn .

question of mo ral responsibility can possibly obtain ,

the distinction is o ne of fundamental i mpo rtance .

Fo r as already shown any question o f moral

, ,

responsibility can only obtain where two o r more

lines o f action are al ike possible and therefore ,

where no necessity is laid upon the man in respect

o f carrying o u t hi s volitions in whichever d irection
,

they may eventually proceed A lthough in any .

event he is necessari ly bound t o adopt means i n

orde r to secure his ends the moral quality o f his
,

choice has reference only to the e nds which he

chooses ; not at al l to the fact that he has to
employ means for the purpose o f attaining them .

And even though hi s choice be influenced by his

physical and social environm ent — as it m ust be
if it be either r ational on the o n e hand o r moral
o n the o ther —i t d o es not fol low that this influence

is o f a kind to neutralize o r destroy the causal nature

o f his own volition. For the influence which is thus
exe rted cannot be exerted necessarily unless we ,

suppose that the Wil l is not a fi rst cause which is ,

the possibility now under consideration I f the .

Will is a fi rst cause the influences brought to bear

,

upon it by its relation to other causes —and in vi rtue

of which it is constituted not only a cause p ri mal
, ,

but also a cause rational and moral —these influences

d i ffe r toto coelo fr o m those which are exercised by
any members in a series o f secondary causes upon
the next succeeding causes A nd the di fference
.

consists in the absence of necessary or u nc o n

diti o na l sequence in the one case and its presence
,
 The Will i n lation
re to Mon ism . 1
59

in the other H owever strong the determining

.

influence of a motive may be if the Will is a fi rst

,

cause the motive must bel o ng to a d ifferent order

,

of causal relation from a motor ; fo r no matter ,

how strong the determining influence may be ex ,

hypothes i it can never attai n to the strength

of necessity ; the Wil l must eve r remain free
to overc o me such influence by an adequate
exercise o f its o w n power o f spontaneous action ,

o r o f supplying de novo an additional access o f

strength to som e othe r motive O f course as .

,

a general rule the Wil l al lows itself to be i nfl u

,

e n c ed by motives supplied immediately by its

relations with the external world ; but this is so
only because the thinking substance wel l knows
that it is expedient so to fal l in with the general
stream o f external causation Hence as a general
.
,

r ule it is only in cases where the stream o f

,

exte r nal causation is d rawing the will in different

d irections that the causal activity o f the Wil l
itself is called into play O r rather I should say
. , ,

it is only i n such cases that we become conscious

o f the fact . In the case o f eve ry voluntary
movement the pri mal activity of Will must be
concerned ( and this even in the case of the lower
animals ) ; but as the vast maj ority o f such move
ments are perfo rm ed by way o f resp o nse t o
frequently recurring circumstances the response ,

which experience has sh o wn to be most expedient

is given as it were automatically o r without the
, , ,

occurrence of any adverse motive But in cases .

1 60 Monis rn .

whe r e motives a r e drawing i n d i ffe rent d i rections ,

we become conscious o f an effo rt o f Wi l l i n

choosing o ne o r other li ne o f conduct and acco r d , ,

i ng t o our present hypothesis this consciousness o f

,

e fl o rt i s an expression o f the work which t he Wil l

'

is doing i n the way o f spontaneous causation .

Thus upon the whole if we id entify th e p rincipl e

, ,

o f causation with the principl e o f m ind — a s we

are bound to do by the theory o f M onism —w e

thereby d raw a g reat and fundamental d istinction
between causation as this occu r s in the external
world and as it occurs within th e l i mits of o u r
,

o w n subj ectivity A n d the d istinction consists

.

i n the uncond itional nature o f a causal sequence

i n the external wo r ld as against the con ditional
,

nature o f it in the othe r case ; the condition to

the effective operation o f a motive — as d isti n
u i shed from a m otor — is the acquiescence o f the
g
fi rst cause upon which that m otive is O pe r ating .

To the foregoing argu ment it may b e obj ected

that by expressly r egarding the human m ind as
a fi rst cause o f its o w n volitions I i m ply that that
,

mind can itself have had no cause which appea r s ,

t o be self evidently absurd

-
But here again the
.

absurdity only arises from o u r invete r ate habit o f

regarding the principle o f causation a s logical ly
prior to that o f m ind I f we exp r essly refuse to
.

do this there is noth ing absurd in S upposing the

,

principle of m ind whe rever it o ccurs as itsel f ,

uncaused Fo r if as we are now supposing this

.
, ,

principle is identical with that o f causation to say ,

1 62 Monis m .

itself he r investigations must necessari ly cease ;

,

this p r incipl e is for al l the sciences the ulti mate

datum behind which they cannot go without
,

ceasing to be sciences But it d oes not fol low

.

that because the area of science is li mited by that

o f causation therefo r e we a re p recluded from
,

asking any questions as to the nature o f this

ultimate datum O f course any questions which
.

we may thus ask cannot possibly be answe red

by science ; they a r e questions of philosophy ,

i n the conside ration o f which science from her ,

very nature and essential li mitation o f her o ffice ,

can have no voice Now if o n taking up the .

,

principle o f causation Where this is left by science

—viz as the ultimate o r unanalyzable da tu m o f
.

e x perience upon which al l he r investigations are

,

founded and by which they a r e al l li mited

,

philosophy finds any reason to su r mise that it

i s r esolvable into the principle of m ind philosophy ,

is thus ab le to suggest that any distinction between

mental processes as d ete r minate or free is real ly ,

a meaningless distinction Fo r according to this .

,

suggestion the issue is no longe r as to whether

,

these processes are caused or uncaused ; the very

idea of cause has been abolished as o ne which
belongs only to that lower level o f inquiry with
which science o r sensuous expe r ience is concerned
, , .

H ere no doubt the question is a thoroughly r eal

, ,

o ne and
, as shown in previ o us chapters can only
, ,

be answered in the way o f determ inism But so .

soon as we ascend to the philosophical theory o f

 The Will i n re lat ion to Mon ism 16
.
3
M onism and so t ranscend the c o nditions o f
,

sensuous experience the question whether voliti o ns

,

are caused o r uncaused becomes as I ha ve said , ,

a meaningl ess question o r a question the terms

,

of which are not correctly stated If it be the .

case that al l causality is o f a natu r e psychi c al ,

volition and causation are o ne and the same thing ,

differing only in relation to o u r modes o f a pp re

hensi o n
. It would therefore be equally meaningless
to say that either is the cause o f the o ther—just
as it would be equa lly m eaningless to sa y that
neu r osis is the cause of psychosis or that psych osis
,

is the cause o f neurosis O r thus if voliti o n and

.
,

causation are o ne and the same thing the only ,

reason why they ever appear diverse is because the

o n e is known ontol ogical ly while the other is
,

known phenomenally Were it possible that the

.

o rbit o f my own personality could be widened so

as to include within my o w n subjectivity the whole

universe o f causality I should find—according to

,

M onism —that al l causation would become trans

formed into volition H ence the only reason why
.
,

there now appears to be so great an antithesis

between these two principles is because the ,

volition which is going on outside o f my o w n

consciousness can only be known to me objectively ,

—o r at most ej ectively —ou which account the

,

principle o f ca usality appears to me phenomenal ly

as the most ultimate o r most unanalyzable
, ,

principle in the phenomenal universe .

1 64 Mon is rn .

Upon the whole then I conclud e that this is the

, ,

teaching o f M o nis m I f we view the facts of human

.

volition relatively o r withi n the fou r c o r ners of

,

psychological science there i s no escape from the

,

conclusion that they are determi ned with al l the

rigour which belongs to natural causation i n
general Fo r every sequence of mental changes
.

and eve ry sequence o f ce r ebral changes although ,

phenomenally so diverse are taken by this the o ry ,

t o be ontological ly identi cal ; and therefore the

sequence o f mental changes must be determined
’
with the sam e degree o f necessity as is that o f
the cerebral changes I n sho rt mental causation
.
,

is taken to be but th e obverse aspect o f physi cal

causation and as previously remarked it is i m
, , ,

possible that the doctrine o f dete r minis m could be

taught i n a manner m ore emphatic B ut on the .
,

other hand the theory of M o nism is bound to go

,

further than this From the very fact of its having

.

gone so far as to identify all physical processes

with psychical pro cesses it cannot refuse t o take ,

the further and final step o f identifying the most

ulti mate known principl e of the one with the most
ulti mate known principle of the o ther ; it is bound
to recognize i n natural causation the phenomenal
aspect of that which is known ontological ly as
v o liti o n But i f these two principles are thus re
.

garded as identi cal it clearly bec o mes as un meaning

,

t o ask whether the o ne is the cause of the other as ,

it would be to ask whether the o n e wi lls the other .

Fo r ex hyp othesi the two things being one thing

, ,
1 66 Monism .

possib l e e x p l anations d oes n ot its el f r equ i re to b e

,

explained . To suppose that it d oes r equi r e to b e

explained woul d be to suppose that the r e i s
, ,

something stil l more ulti mate into which i f k nown , ,

this I nexplicable coul d be me rged H ence unless .

,

we postulate an infinite se r ies o f possible e x plana

tions there must be a basal myste ry somewhe r e
, ,

which i n virtu e o f its constituting the g r ound

,

o f al l possible explanations cannot be and does no t

, ,

require to be itself explain ed What i s this basal

, .

myste ry ? Mate r ialis m supposes it to be l odged

‘

i n M atte r to the e x clusion o f M ind wh ile ,

I dealism i n i ts ext reme fo r ms ta k es the con

ve r se view Theis m supposes that it i s an intel
.

li ge nt Pe r son who i s held —and logical ly enough

,

not to be able to give any e x planation o f hi s ow n

e x istence ; he is a s it i s said self e x istent and i f
, ,
-
, ,

asked to give any account o f his being would only ,

be able to re state the fact o f his being in the words

-
,
’
I am that I am Lastly Pantheism o r M onism
.
, , ,

S upposes the u ltimate mystery to b e lodged i n th e

universe a s a whol e Now i n the present c on .
,

nex i o n the question before us i s simply this — A r e

we to rega r d the p r inci p le o f causality o r the

pri nciple of m ind as th e ultimat e myste ry ? A nd
t o this question I answ er that to m e it appea r s
m ost r easonable to assign priority to mind Fo r .
,

o n the o ne hand o u r only k no w ledge o f causation

‘

is empirical whi le even as such it i s only possible

,
‘

i n the same way as o u r k nowledge o f obj ective

e x istence i n g ene ral i s possible nam ely by way o f -
,
 The Will i n re lat ion to Monism . 1 67

inference fr om our o w n mental m od ifications which ,

the r efore must necessarily have priority so far as

we are ou rse lves concerned Next o n the othe r .
,

hand even if we we r e to grant that the principle of

,

causality is the prius o r the ultimate and inex ,

plicable mystery I cannot see that it is really

'

available to e x plain the fact o f personality To .

me it appears that within the range of human,

observation this is the fact that most wears the

,

appea r ance o f fi nality or o f that unanalyzable and

,

inexplicable nature which we are bound to believe

must belong to the ultimate myste ry o f Being .

But be this as it may the speculative di fficulty o f

, ,

assigning priority to mind is ce rtainly no greate r

than that of assigning it to causality ; and this as ,

above remarked is a su ffi cient answe r to the

,

que stion befo r e us A cco rd ing to M onism how

.
,

ever there is no need to assign p r iority to either

,

principle seeing that o ne is but a phenomenal ex

,

pression of the othe r .

Only o ne fu rthe r question remains to be c on

s idered From what I have j ust said on the sub
.

j ec t o f Pe r sonality it wil l be apparent

,
that the
th eo ry of Monism is in conflict with that o f Theism
only in so far as personality appea rs to imply
limitation This i s a point which I have previously
.

considered in these pages ( C hapte r iv p ,

.

with the result o f appea r ing to show that the

conflict is one which would probably vanish could
we rise above the necessa ry limi tations of hu man
th ought Therefo re it h er e seems wo rth while to
. ,
1 68 Mon is m .

ask What can be said by th e philosophical theo ry

,

of M onism to the o ld theological d ilem ma touching

free will and predestination ? O r even apa rt from
-
,

an
y question o f Theism what position
, do es
Monis m S uppose the psych ical activity o f man to
hold in relation to that o f th e u nive r se ? O f course
the latte r statement o f the question i s i ncluded in
th e fo r m er ; and th er efore w e may p r esent it
, ,

thus If the hum an wil l is free and the theo ry

-
,

o f Theism substantial ly true how a r e we t o ,

reconcile the fact with the theo ry ?

Acco r ding to the theory o f Theism as sa nction ed
by M onism what we app r eh end a s natu ral causa
,

tion is the obve rse o f a part o f a su mmu m genus

i e the part fal ling withi n human obse rvation whose
. .

whole i s the Absolut e Vol ition This Volition .

,

being absolute can nowhere m eet with r est r aint ;

,

it is therefore absolutely free and can n eve r con ,

t ra di c t itsel f Thus thos e ci r cumsc r ibed po rtions

.
,

of it which we k now as human minds—and

which on account o f being so ci rcumscribed a r e
free within themselves —do not in thei r freed om
, ,

conflict with the Absolute Volition The Absol ute .

Volition and the Relative Volition are always in

unison It is not that the A bsolute Vol ition
.

u nconditiona lly dete r min es the Relative Volition

else the R elative Volition would not b e fr e e but it
i s that t he Abso l ute Volition i nva r iably assents to
the Relat iv e Volition as to the activity o f an integ r al
pa rt o f itself This wi ll be at once evident i f we
conside r that ou r only idea o f dete r mination —i e
.

. .
1 70 Mon is m .

the Relative Volition i s free ; while r ega r ded from

,

the system o f its World ej ect the Relative Volition

-
,

i s p r edestined
. But the freedom is not i nc o m
patible with the predestination no r the predesti
,

nation with the freedom They stand to each

.

o ther in the relation of complementa r y truths ,

th e
apparent contrad iction o f which arises only from
the apparently fundamental antithesis between
mind and cause which it is the privilege o f Monism
t o abolish
.
 “ 1 7 0"
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