SB OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS, v.

PUNONG BARANGAY
SEVERINO MARTINEZ, G.R. No. 170626, March 03, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner, in this case filed with the Sangguniang Bayan an Administrative
Complaint against Severino Martinez Punong Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Respondent failed to file an Answer to the
complaint, Martinez was then declared by the Sangguniang Bayan as in default. And
pending the administrative proceedings, he was placed under preventive suspension for 60
days. The SB rendered its decision which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from
office. This was conveyed to the Municipal Mayor of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija,
Severino Bagasao, for its implementation. But Municial Mayor Bagasao issued a
Memorandum, wherein he stated that the SB is not empowered to order Martinez’ removal
from service. However, the Decision remains valid until reversed and must be executed by
him.

Martinez filed a Special Civil Action with a prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction before
the trial court against petitioner, the Sangguniang Bayan and Mayor Bagasao questioning
the validity of the Decision. The trial court issued an Order declaring the Decision of
the Sangguniang Bayan and the Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It maintained that
the proper courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective local official
from office, in accordance with Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, the Order
of the Sangguniang Bayan removing Martinez from service is void. As a consequence,
Mayor Bagasao cannot prevent Martinez from assuming his office on the basis of a void
order. The trial court further ruled that Martinez properly availed himself of the remedy of
Special Civil Action, where the order assailed was a patent nullity. Motion for
reconsideration was thereafter denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SB may remove an elective local official from office.

HELD: The SB is NOT empowered to remove an elective local official from office. The Local
Government Code (Section 60) confers exclusively on the courts such power. Thus, as the
law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for the
filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from
office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local
Government Code. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a
grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case
should be filed with the regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains
jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a
penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme
penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring
elective barangay official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from
service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court.
PEDRO G. SISTOZA v. ANIANO DESIERTO and ELISEO CO.
G.R. No. 144784. September 3, 2002

FACTS: The case stemmed from a routine purchase of tomato paste to be used as
ingredient in the austere diet of the inmates of the New Bilibid Prison. Then Bureau of
Corrections Director Pedro Sistoza and officers and members of its Supply Division and
PBAC were accused in an affidavit-complaint filed by Eliseo Co. to the Ombudsman,
alleging criminal and administrative charges for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, of conspiring with each other
to cause undue injury to the government and the inmates of the New Bilibid Prison by
giving undue advantage to Elias General Merchandise although its bid was higher in price
and lower in quantity than that offered by Filcrafts Industries, Inc. Alleged undue payment
was given to Elias General Merchandise amounting to P240,800.00 or the reduced price of
P1,120.00 per case for two hundred fifteen (215) cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused in this case is guilty for violation under the Anti-Grft an
Corrupt Practice Act.

HELD: Director Sistoza could not have been guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019, this was affirmed by the Supreme Court that there is no need to “ferret out and expel
public officers whose acts make bureaucracy synonymous with graft in the public eye, and
to eliminate systems of government acquisition procedures which covertly ease corrupt
practices.” The Court adding that “the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who
happens to have signed a piece of document or had a hand in implementing routine
government procurement.” The endorsement to the DOJ the bid of the second highest
bidder taking into account that the first highest bidder was eventually found unqualified by
the Bureau of Correction’s Pre-Qualification, Bid and Awards Committee (PBAC) since it
offered a non-registered brand of tomato paste and that it failed to specify in the bid tender
form the country of origin of the tomato paste it would supply, after a regular review of the
supporting documentation submitted by his subordinates finds accused not at fault.

“… Considering that his duties as Director … entailed a lot of responsibility not only on the
management side but also in the rehabilitation and execution of convicted prisoners, public
relations and other court-imposed duties, it is unreasonable to require (Sistoza) to accomplish
direct and personal examination of every single detail in the purchase of a month-long
supply of tomato paste and to carry out an in-depth investigation of the motives of every
public officer involved in the transaction before affixing his signature on the pro-forma
documents as endorsing authority.”

To establish a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019,
the prosecution must show not only the defects in the bidding procedure, a circumstance
which we need not presently determine, but also the alleged evident bad faith, gross
inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality of petitioner in affixing his signature on the
purchase order and repeatedly endorsing the award earlier made by his subordinates
despite his knowledge that the winning bidder did not offer the lowest price. One’s position
even it entails great responsibility must not be the basis or starting point of prosecution of
anti-graft and corrupt practices.
YOLANDA S. REYES, v. JUDGE MARVIN B. MANGINO, MTC Tarlac Br.1
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1575. January 31, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Reyes filed a verified Affidavit-Complaint against Judge Marvin B.

Mangino charging the latter with gross ignorance of the law, extortion, graft and corruption,
fraud and deception, relative to Criminal Case No. 200-97 where said complainant was one
of the accused in the said case. In aforementioned criminal case, Reyes was assured by
respondent during a meeting at the Manila Hotel that the case would be dismissed and on
that day an amount of P20,000.00 was paid to Mangino.
Judgement was rendered against petitioner. The respondent Judge, however, admitted that
on the promulgation date of the decision, only the prosecutor, the complainant, the private
prosecutor and the counsel for the accused appeared, and agreed among themselves that
they would just receive copies of the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Mangino is liable for extortion and whether or not he is liable
for gross ignorance of the law.

HELD: Respondent Judge could not be held liable for extortion. It is settled that in
administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant. As a member of the bar, the complainants counsel
should know that even in administrative cases, the Rules of Court requires that if a judge
should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him
should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary to which the
respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted,
competent evidence should be presented, since the charge is penal in character. Thus,
the ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Such is the rule where the charge on which removal is sought is misconduct in
office, willful neglect, corruption, or incompetence. The general rules in regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.
However, the Court finds that the respondent Judge is liable for gross ignorance of the
law in not requiring the presence of the accused during the promulgation of the decision in
the criminal case where the petitioner is the accused. There are two instances when
judgment may be promulgated even without the personal presence of the accused: (1) when
the judgment is for a light offense, in which case, the counsel for the accused or a
representative may stand for him; and (2) in cases where despite due notice to the accused
or his bondsman or warden and counsel, the accused failed to appear at the promulgation
of the decision. The evident purpose of this latter exception is to afford the offended party
the opportunity to enforce the award of civil indemnity which could not otherwise be
effected if the decision cannot be pronounced on account of the absence of the accused.
The criminal case does not fall under any of the exceptions, since the accused therein were
charged and convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, which
is a less grave felony, the imposable penalty being arresto mayor. The SC ruled that
respondent judge is guilty for gross ignorance of the law, and is FINED in the amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Romulo D. Jabon v Judge Sibanah E. Usman
A.M. NO. RTJ-02-1713 October 25, 2005

FACTS: Complaints were filed by complainants Romulo D. Jabon and Plaridel D. Bohol
against Judge Sibanah E. Usman, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court , Branch 28,
Catbalogan, Samar. Jabon alleged in the sworn statement that “When I appeared before his
court to pursue my case for damages against Adolfo Ibaez (Civil Case No. 7082) he placed
me under duress by requiring me to buy from him a set of earrings and ring for P40,000.00
in order for me to be able to testify ex-parte in the absence of defendant Adolfo Ibaez,
despite notice and without formally asking for postponement on valid ground.”

Upon careful evaluation of the evidence presented by the complainant and the respondent judge, the undersigned
investigating Justice finds that the charges against the respondent judge for graft and corruption, the incompentence
and ignorance of the law, dishonesty, partiality and scandalous bias in the conduct of his judicial proceedings,
fraternization with law practitioners affecting the disposition of the cases in the court he presides, and for absenteeism
had not been thoroughly unsubstantiated (sic)

Jurisprudence dictates

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in
office, willful neglect, corruption or incompetence. The general rules with regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.