Editorial: 12th Issue October 29th 2018

Blog: http://michaelrdjames.org/

Journal site https://www.aletheiaeducation.eu/

https://joom.ag/SgQa

The first lecture is entitled “The Seventh Centrepiece lecture on The Philosophy
of Education” and it is the Seventh lecture given by Jude Sutton, one of the main
characters in the recently published Philosophical/educational novel “The
World Explored, the World Suffered: The Exeter lectures”.

The lecture explores The Philosophy of the Human Sciences and Theory of
Knowledge from the point of view of the philosophy of education in partly
Wittgensteinian and partly Kantian terms. Sutton claims that Philsophy is not
itself a human or social science but that an understanding of philosophy is
needed if one is to understand the meaning of many of the statements and
judgments one is confronted with in these disciplines. Sutton also rejects the
claim that one is merely using logic in the narrow sense of the term to “purify”
the dialectic of the discipline:

The under-laborer or gardener conception is confused: it identifies Philosophy with a method:

the method, namely, of studying the statements made in the different regions of knowledge,
trying to identify contradictions and then leaving the science in question to carry on doing
whatever it is doing. Let me just say quickly in parenthesis that such a view in relation to
education, namely that education was all about the methods of learning and teaching, would
turn teacher training into a course for mechanics rather than a course for architects. One
readily sees how the above reduction of Philosophy to Logic diminishes its role in the
discussion of the nature of man’s relation to reality. The early Wittgenstein we spoke of in the
beginning of this course, ladies and gentlemen, was guilty of such a conception. As we saw,
he believed that Philosophy was the philosophy of language and that what we could sensibly
say was determined by the language, of the individual and not the language of generations
developed over time in many different communities.

Sutton discusses the debate in the social sciences between the view that the aims
of those who form associations in society often do not contain an understanding
of the causal mechanisms which operate to produce the changes in society the
community needs to understand:

dedicated followers of Durkheim who insist that the insider view of participants in a society
will very likely not refer to or even understand the underlying causal mechanisms which are
responsible for what we are conscious of or experience in our societies. Other sociologist’s
also insist that sociology must disregard the cultural aims of the members of society and all
agree that we must examine the manner in which individuals gather into groups independent
of their subjective cultural aims. The philosopher’s role in this discussion is to ask, for
example, whether it makes any sense to talk about the reasons why individuals gather together
in communities independently of their experience or of the aims they are striving toward.

One can also question whether aims and experiences are necessarily
independent of the causal mechanisms operating in our society. The choice may
not be between an experts or observational view of the society and the
inhabitant of the society. The question may rather relate to the limitation of the
experts causal obsession as much as to the blind concern with aims from the
inhabitants point of view. Both causes and aims will be relevant in the
philosophical perspective.

Meaning may be a more relevant concept than causation in the logic of the
human and social sciences. Sutton has this to say on this topic:

I have talked about the importance of rule following and in doing so have incorporated the
social value of cooperation. According to Wittgenstein’s later conception of Philosophy, the
approach to talking about value is by taking the route of meaning which is a broader notion
involving truth in a complex relation which philosophers have no agreed upon formula for as
yet. Peter Winch in his work “The Idea of a Social Science” which is one of the inspirational
sources of today’s lecture, introduces the following thoughts:
“The notion of following a rule is logically inseparable from the notion of making a mistake.
If it is possible to say of someone that he is following a rule that means that one can ask
whether he is doing what he does correctly or not…the concept of a rule is that it should
enable us to evaluate what is being done.”

The notion of a rule is normative and introduces the idea of value and
understanding value(“verstehen”). Combining this notion with that of meaning
gives rise to the following reasoning:

Wilhelm Dilthey pointed out that the concept of “meaning” is a concept or category of
thinking which is only relevant to the life-world and the historical world. The idea of
“meaningful behavior” emerges as a non- observational concept, where observation means
theoretically determined by scientific concepts and theories. “Meaningful in this context
refers to the comprehension of certain concepts and ideas from within a form of life from a
first person point of view. Weber, in giving his account of “meaningful behavior” uses two
important concepts: “motive” which he defines as “a meaningful configuration of
circumstances which appear to the agent or observer as a meaningful reason for their
behavior” and “reason”

Lecture number 7 of Smiths lecture series on the Cosmonova site discuss

Aristotle’s views of the organic nature of a society involved in a process of
actualisation towards the distant aims of humanity. The isomorphism of the soul
and the city are clearly in play here:
We  become  what  we  become  partly  because  we  are  what  we  are.  Just  as  the  animal  
organ  system  is  determinative  of  the  form  of  life  the  animal  will  lead  so  it  is  with  us  
human  beings.  Our  organ  system  results  in  speech  and  reason  and  a  more  complex  form  
of  life  in  which  it  is  not  sufficient,  as  it  is  in  the  case  of  animals,  to  preserve  one's  life  in  
accordance  with  survival  mechanisms.  The  complexity  of  our  capacities  which  build  
upon  each  other  and  are  integrated  with  each  other  results  in  a  form  of  life  in  which  
survival  and  preservation  are  important  but  only  because  they  are  necessary  conditions  
of  a  natural  striving  which  human  beings  possess  to  lead  the  good  life,  the  flourishing  
life.  In  the  course  of  the  use  of  these  capacities,  truth  becomes  an  important  aspect  of  
speech  because  truthfulness  is  important  for  the  political  animal  leading  his  political  life.  
Here  the  truth  function  of  language  will  obviously  be  integrated  with  the  communicative  
and  expressive  forms  of  language  we  encounter  in  political  discussions.  The  life  of  a  city-­‐
state,  then,  for  Aristotle  is  not  an  arbitrary  conventional  construction  brought  about  by  
the  linear  causal  mechanisms  of  science  but  rather  a  matter  of  Logos,  a  matter  of  logic.  
There  is  a  logical  relation  between  Logos  and  the  political  form  of  life  expressed  thus  by  
Smith:  

Aristotle discusses the various forms of friendship that one encounters in the
city and settles on the categorical form which involves trusting one another.
Smith feels that this pevents the Aristotelian city state from having cosmopolitan
ambitions. The lecture comments thus on this issue:

Smith  does  go  on  to  argue  that  Aristotle  believes  that  only  a  small  city-­‐state  can  house  
the  kind  of  trust  involved  in  the  political  form  of  friendships  required  for  the  polis  to  
fulfill  its  political  functions.  He  asks  specifically  and  rhetorically  :  
 
"Does  this  mean  that  the  city  can  never  be  a  universal  cosmopolitan  state?"  
 
The  implied  answer  is  in  the  negative.  He  goes  on  to  confirm  this  position:  
 
"It  appears  that  Aristotle's  polis  must  be  small  enough  to  be  governed  by  a  common  
language,  common  memories,  and  common  customs.  This  may  imply  a  criticism  of  our  
modern  societies,  this  may  be  a  suggestion  that  our  cities  and  nations  are  not  healthy."  
 
The argument continues that this is not a necessary limitation since it is possible
that the universality of the logos of the political regime could permit a
cosmopolitan regime of the kind envisaged by Kant, i.e. a regime which did not
involve a world government.

Slavery is discussed and Aristotle’s view is defended as appropriate for the

times he lived in: a time when the state did not take responsibility for its
citizens.
The third lecture is part six of Aristotle in the Introduction to Philosophy series.
The issues discussed are “aesthetic”. Art objects are imitations of the character,
emotions and action of man:

The  human  activity  of  Art,  is  an  activity  of  mimesis  or  imitation.  Art  is  imitation  Aristotle  
argues,  not  of  external  nature  but  rather  of  mans  mind,  in  particular  his    character,  
emotions  and  actions.  But  why  does  one  desire  to  imitate?  Because  firstly,there  is  both  
an  instinct  to  imitate  demonstrated  in  the  fact  that  humans  distinguish  themselves  from  
animals  partly  in  the  fact  that  they  learn  from  other  humans  by  imitating  them  and  
secondly  because  we  take  delight  in  imitations.  But  what  then  is  the  telos,  the  purpose  of  
these  mimetic  productions?  The  creation  and  appreciation  of  art  must  be  related  of  
course  to  the  flourishing  life  and  its  explorations  of  regions  of  our  mind  that  seek  for  
understanding  with  universal  intent.  The  idea  of  the  good  object  is  obviously  of  major  
significance  in  the  arena  of  artistic  activity  and  must  be  related  to  both  its  intellectual  
and  emotional  aspects.  "Universal  intent"  here  obviously  refers  to  organising  our  
experiences  such  that  we  connect  emotions  and  actions  that  should  be  connected  and  
differentiate  between  emotions  and  actions  where  there  are  real  differences.  Such  
organisation  also  entails  an  understanding  of  the  role  of  the  subject  and  the  role  of  the  
object  in  this  process  of  trying  to  fathom  the  depths  of  the  mind.  If  we  are  to  believe  
Psychoanalysis,  at  the  bottom  of  these  depths  lie  the  shipwrecks  of  our  experience  
scattered  on  the  ocean  bed  and  the  connection  of  these  fragmented  experiences  are  
often  not  real  or  as  Freud  put  it,  in  accordance  with  the  Reality  Principle.  Death  trumps  
life  in  such  scenes  of  the  unreal.    

Aesthetic objects then seek understanding with universal intent via creations
where the aim is to imitate our life as complex as it is yet at the same time
including a complex relation to the ultimate incomprehensible, namely death.

The structure of imitation translates into the act of appeciation which must now
be construed as acts of interpretation of symbols:

According  to  Adrian  Stokes  in  his  essay  "The  Invitation  in  Art":  
 
"Structure  is  ever  a  concern  of  art  and  must  necessarily  be  seen  as  symbolic,  symbolic  of  
emotional  patterns,  of  the  psyche's  organisation  with  which  we  are  totally  
involved......Patterns  and  the  making  of  wholes  are  of  immense  psychical  significance  in  a  
precise  way  even  apart  from  the  drive  towards  repairing  what  we  have  damaged  or  
destroyed  outside  ourselves......in  every  instance  of  art    we  receive  a  persuasive  
invitation...we  experience  fully  a  correlation  between  the  inner  and  the  outer  world  
which  is  manifestly  structured.  And  so  the  learned  response  to  that  invitation  is  an  
aesthetic  way  of  looking  at  an  object."  

The aesthetic way of looking at an object must address in some way the
shipwrecks of experience which lay deep down on the ocean bed of our
experiences.