PROJECT INDICATORS

Designed by Nicolas Villa

Introduction
Within the Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE) project requirements, it becomes necessary
to design a set of indicators that identify the organization’s capacity building strategy, and also
demonstrate dissemination of research results. Furthermore, the project also requires that a set of
indicators that allow to objectively identify, measure and evaluate the patterns and relationships
between the anticorruption statute, and awarded contracts during the 2016-2017 to financing
parties in the 2015 local elections, be created. In consequence, these indicators should serve to
reliably test the project’s working hypotheses, and also function as functional inputs to better
achieve general and specific objectives concerning dissemination, visibility and political agenda
setting.

Indicators for monitoring and measuring the execution of the project

1. Periodic meetings between MOE and different stakeholders in order to share research
findings.
2. Periodic field trips to those areas that are most affected by electoral irregularities (including
the ones in the anticorruption statute) in order to corroborate and update the statistical findings
and databases.
3. On line publications regarding electoral corruption analysis
4. Conducting a high-level meeting with the Attorney General's Office to share the findings of
the research, and the drafting of a Document of Recommendations on criminal policy regarding
issues of electoral corruption.
5. Informative pieces (for example, a video by Magic Markers) to train citizens in the detection
and denunciation of electoral corruption, as well as strategies to prevent electoral corruption.

Indicators for methodological design of the research

1. Carrying out of 4 methodological framework construction meetings with academic experts, to
achieve optimal methodological design.
2. Hiring of three international experts to come to Colombia and, through workshops and
conferences, provide inputs to the MOE officials for methodological design, where account is
given of lesson learning opportunities in relation to international experiences.
3. Update and analysis of the two input databases every four months, plus the completion of the
respective report.
4. Identification of patterns and relationships between the anti-corruption statute and the
contracts awarded during the 2016-2017 period to the financers of the 2015 local elections
(theses verification)
If we consider that MOE has access to the database that registers al campaign contributors and
the database that registers all State contractors. We can define the following variables:
Px= A politician elected in the 2015 election in a given administrative level X, who at the end of 2017 is still in
power.
P= A politician in elected in the 2015 election in ANY administrative level different than X, who at the end of 2017
is still in power and has verifiable links to P x in terms of political party, family ties, or commercial links.
Cx= A natural or juridical person that was awarded contracts during the 2016-2017 period, in the respective
administrative level X.
C= A natural or juridical person that was awarded contracts during the 2016-2017 period, in in ANY administrative
level different than X.
Npx= An individual (natural person) who contributed more than 2% of the total amount of Px’s political campaign
for the 2015 elections.
Jpx= A juridical person that contributed more than 2% of the total amount of P x’s political campaign for the 2015
elections.
Fcx = Persons who are in the second degree of consanguinity, second of affinity, or first degree of civil relationship
with Cx.
Scx= The existing companies or those that come to be constituted, in which the legal representative or any of its
partners have financed directly, or by an interposed person, the political campaign of P x.
Ix= The verifiable number of times that P x met with State entities, NGOs, International Organizations, academic
number of institutions, and/or any other institution that informed him/her of the anti-corruption statute.
I= The verifiable number of times that P met with State entities, NGOs, International Organizations, academic
number of institutions, and/or any other institution that informed him/her of the anti-corruption statute.
Inp= The verifiable number of times that Npx met with State entities, NGOs, International Organizations, academic
number of institutions, and/or any other institution that informed him/her of the anti-corruption statute.
Ijp= The verifiable number of times that J px met with State entities, NGOs, International Organizations, academic
number of institutions, and/or any other institution that informed him/her of the anti-corruption statute.
Given this set of variables, for any elected politician Px , the before defined variables and
their comparison will validate the MOE’s hypotheses, and serve as tools to achieve the
MOE’s objectives:
1. The score on Ix ,I, Inp ,Ijp will show the level of ignorance regarding the knowledge of
politicians and their campaign financiers in terms of their inhabilites their inhabilites and
potential crimes when financing and contracting with the State.
2. By cross-referencing the remaining variables Px, P, Cx,C, Npx, Jpx, Fcx, Scx we can identify
relationships and establish patterns.
If the following table is constructed:
Politicians Campaign Financers Campaign Financer Relationships State Contractors
Px Npx Fcx Cx
P Jpx Scx C

Px, P

Npx, Jpx, Fcx,Scx Cx,C

We are able to detect matches between campaign finances, contractors, and politicians, (the
common space in the Venn diagram). This allows for alarms to be raised, and thus when these
indicators are at their most useful stage.