XII. Appeals, Rule 109 on Sept. 20, 1996.
on Sept. 20, 1996. A Record of Appeal dated September 20, 1996 was also filed by
Testate Estate of Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan v. Rosalina Biascan
GR No. 138731 | December 11, 2000 | Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
Facts: On June 3, 1975, Rosalina Biascan filed a petition (SP Proc No. 98037) at CFI
Manila praying for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Florencio
Biascan and Timotea Zulueta. Aug. 13, 1957 CFI Order: appointed Rosalina as regular
administratrix of the estates.
On October 10, 1975, Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, the legal wife of Florencio
Biascan entered her appearance as Oppositor-Movant in SP. Proc. No. 98037 and she
filed a pleading containing several motions including a motion for intervention, a motion
for the setting aside of private respondents appointment as special administratrix and
administratrix, and a motion for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of
Florencio Biascan.
Nov. 13, 1975 CFI Omnibus Order: granted Maria's intervention and set for trial the
motion to set aside the Orders appointing respondent as administratrix.
*April 2, 1981 CFI Order: (1) Maria is the lawful wife of Florencio; (2) Rosalina and her
brother are the acknowledged natural children of Florencio; (3) all 3 are the legal heirs of
Florencio who are entitled to participate in the settlement proceedings; (4) the motion to
set aside the order appointing Rosalina as administratrix is denied; and (5) the motion to
approve inventory and appraisal of private respondent be deferred. Maria, through her
counsel, received a copy on April 9, 1981.
58 days after her receipt of the April 2, 1981 Order, Maria filed MR dated June 6, 1981.
Rosalina opposed.
On November 15, 1981, the 4th floor of the City Hall of Manila was completely gutted by
fire. The records of the settlement proceedings were among those lost in the fire. Thus,
on January 2, 1985, Rosalina filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the said records. Due
to the delay caused by the fire and the reconstitution of the records, it was only on *April
30, 1985 that RTC Manila issued an Order denying Maria's MR.
Maria died and her testate estate also became the subject of settlement proceedings.
Interim special administrator, Atty. Marcial F. Lopez engaged the services of the Siguion
Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Offices on behalf of the estate.
On August 21, 1996, the law firm was allegedly made aware of and given notice of the
April 30, 1985 Order when its associate visited RTC Manila to inquire about the status of
the case. The associate checked the records if there was proof of service of the April 30,
1985 Order to the former counsel of Maria, Atty. Marcial F. Lopez, but he discovered that
there was none. He was able to secure a certification from the Clerk of Court of the RTC
Manila which stated that there was no proof of service of the Order dated April 30, 1985
contained in the records of SP. Proc. No. 98037.
Maria filed a Notice of Appeal dated April 22, 1996 from the Orders* dated April 2, 1981
and April 30, 1985 of the trial court. While the NoA was dated April 22, 1996, the stamp
of the RTC on the first page of the NoA clearly indicated that it was received by the RTC
petitioner.
October 22, 1996 RTC Order: denied Maria's appeal on the ground that the appeal was
filed out of time. The April 2, 1981 Order which was the subject of the appeal already
became final as the MR thereof was filed 65 days after Maria received the same. In
addition, the notice of appeal itself was filed manifestly late as the same was filed more
than 11 years after the issuance of the June 11, 1985 Order denying petitioners MR. MR
denied.
CA: denied petition for certiorari and MR.
Issue: WoN CA erred in affirming RTC finding that April 2, 1981 order became FAE
Held: No. Rule 109, Sec. 1 enumerates the orders/judgments in specpro which may be
the subject of an appeal:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. An interested person
may appeal in a special proceeding from an order or judgment rendered by a Regional
Trial Court or a Juvenile and domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive shares
of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows, or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower
court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the
appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights
of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for new trial
or for reconsideration.
Only Final Orders are Appealable
An appeal is allowed since these orders, decrees or judgments issued by a court in a
special proceeding constitute a final determination of the rights of the parties so
appealing. In contrast, interlocutory orders are not appealable as these are merely
incidental to judicial proceedings. In these cases, the court issuing such orders
retains control over the same and may thus modify, rescind, or revoke the same on
sufficient grounds at any time before the final judgment.
CAB: April 2, 1981 CFI Order that Maria, Rosalina Biascan and German Biascan were
entitled to participate in the settlement proceedings falls squarely under Rule 109, Sec.
1, para (b), as a proper subject of appeal. The CFI has effectively determined that the 3
persons are the lawful heirs of the deceased. As such, the same may be the proper
subject of an appeal.
Similarly, the RTC Order denying petitioner's motion to set aside the order appointing
private respondent as the regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio Bisacan is
likewise a proper subject of an appeal. We have previously held that an order of the TC
appointing a regular administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final
determination of the rights of the parties thereunder, and is thus, appealable. This
is in contrast with an order appointing a special administrator who is appointed only for a
limited time and for a specific purpose. Because of the temporary character and special
character of this appointment, the Rules deem it not advisable for any party to appeal
from said temporary appointment. Considering however that private respondent has
already been appointed as regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan, her
appointment as such may be questioned before the appellate court by way of appeal.
Period of Appeal is 30 days from Final Order
In special proceedings, the period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered
therein is 30 days, a NoA and a RoA being required. The appeal period may only be
interrupted by the filing of a MfNT or MR. Once the appeal period expires without an
appeal or a MR or MfNT being perfected, the decision or order becomes final.
CAB: copy of April 2, 1981 Order was received by Maria on April 9, 1981. Applying these
rules, Maria or her counsel had 30 days or until May 9 within which to file a NoA with
RoA. She may also file a MR, in which case the appeal period is deemed interrupted.
Considering that it was only June 6, 1981, or 58 days after receipt of the order, that a
MR was filed, it is clear that the same was filed out of time. As such, when the said MR
was filed, there was no more appeal period to interrupt as the Order had already become
final.
Judgment Becomes Final by Operation of Law, not Judicial Declaration
Maria: April 2, 1981 Order did not become FAE as no opposition on its timeliness was
filed and no ruling as regards its timeliness was made. The denial of MR was made on
grounds other than its failure to ask for a reconsideration within the period prescribed by
law. As such, any procedural defect attending the MR was deemed cured when the RTC
Order on April 30, 1985, took cognizance of the same and rendered its ruling thereon.
SC: No. Judgment/orders become FAE by operation of law and not by judicial
declaration. Thus, finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or MR of MfNT is filed. The
RTC need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes final by
operation of law. In fact, RTC could not even validly entertain a MR filed after the lapse
of the period for taking an appeal. The subsequent filing of the MR cannot disturb its
finality.
Even if we assume that the MR had the effect of suspending the running of the appeal
period for the April 2, 1981 Order, it is clear that NoA of the orders of the trial court was
still filed out of time. (Look at RTC stamp, not date put by petitioner)
Under Section 3, Rule 41 of the ROC then applicable, the time during which a motion to
set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial shall be deducted from the period from
which to make an appeal. The rule further states that where the motion was filed during
office hours of the last day of the appeal period, the appeal must be perfected within the
day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said
motion.
The Order of the trial court denying MR of the April 2, 1981 Order was issued on April
30, 1985. Allegedly, petitioner was only made aware of this April 30, 1985 Order on
August 21, 1996 when it inquired from the RTC about the status of the case. Giving
petitioner the benefit of the doubt that it had indeed received notice of the order denying
its MR on August 21, 1996, it follows that petitioner only had until the following day or on
August 22, 1996 to perfect the appeal.
Petition dismissed for lack of merit. CA affirmed.
Lucilda Dael, Evergisto Dael, Domingo Dael, Jr., Conrado Dael, Federico Durana,
Jr., Fredisvinda Durana, Fleurdelizada Durana, Fabian Durana And Fe Patricio
Durana, Petitioners,
Vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, Carmencita Cabutihan, Nonilon Cabutihan, Romulo
Cabutihan, Lermo Cabutihan, And Bienvenido Cabutihan, Respondents.
GR L-68831 | March 31, 1989 | Regalado
Cesario Cabituhan had 2 marriages. The first was with Bienvenido Durana which sired
respondent children. The second marriage was with a Victorina Durana (the sister of
Bienvenido), they did not have any children but Victorina had grandnephew/nieces
(petitioners). The heirs are fighting over who gets what in the estate of Victorina who
died intestate.
Anywho, during the pendency of the estate proceeding respondent Carmencita filed a
motion in the CFI to withdraw funds from the estate to be partitioned among the heirs.
Such motion was granted. The petitioners are assailing this order of the CFI. SC found
that the order allowing the advance was proper citing R109 S2.
The CFI in ruling for the allowance believed that the estate had sufficient assets to
ensure an equitable distribution of the inheritance in accordance with law and final
judgment in the proceedings nor did it appear that there are unpaid obligations, as
contemplated in Rule 90, for which provisions should have been made or a bond
required.
Facts
1. Victorina Durana died intestate in August 1977 in Manila. She was the wife of an
earlier deceded Cesario Cabutihan who died on June 9, 1972.
2. Cesario was first married to Bienvenida Durana who died in May 1957.
a. Cesario then married Victorina, the sister of his wife Bienvenida a year
later on April 1958.
3. Cesario and Bienvenida’s legitimate children are respondents Nonilon, Carmencita,
Romulo, Lermo and Bienvenido
4. Cesario and Victorina’s marriage did not have any heirs BUT Victorina had several
nieces and nephews (from 2 sisters and a brother) namely: Bienvenida, Soledad
and Federico
a. Federico had children which consisted of petitioners Federico Jr,
Flordelizada, Fredizvinda, Fabian and Fe Patricio
b. Soledad had children which consisted of Evaristo, Domingo Jr, Lucilda and
Conrado
5. During the 2nd marriage of Cesario, they were engaged in a copra business and
public transportation business with Victorina as the managing the business.
6. When Cesario died, Victorina and private respondents entered into an extra-judicial
settlement of his estate in December 1973.
a. Part of the properties adjudicated to Victorina was the copra business and
vehicles used in the business
7. These vehicles were subsequently transferred to respondents by a “deed of sale”
dated July 24, 1978.
8. In 1977, Carmencita Cabutihan (one of the respondents) filed in the CFI of Quezon
a petition for the settlement of the estate of Victorina and prayed that she be
appointed as administratrix.
a. Petitioners filed an opposition asking that the letters of administration be
issued instead to petitioner Lucilda
b. Respondents claim that they are the ones entitled to 2/3 portion of the
estate of Victorina, considering that their predecessors-in-interest are the
brother and sisters of Victoriana
c. The 1/3 should devolve to the petitioners
9. December 1977: Honesto Cabituhan, Democrito Cabutihan and David Cabutihan
filed their claim against the estate for the payment of the harvest of their property
which had been entrusted to Victorina for the purposes of her copra business which
she filed to pay due to he death amounting to P70,350.82.
a. This claim was approved by the Probate court in December 1980.
10. The court appointed an Amado Zoleta as special administrator of Victoria’s estate in
May 1978.
a. The special administrator submitted an inventory of the properties of the
estate which consisted of 20 parcels of land, cash, cattle and livestock,
furniture and fixtures, and other miscellaneous items with a total aggregate
value of P237,940.
11. Jan 1979: a Supplementary Inventory was filed by the special administrator
consisting of undivided shares in the inheritance of Cesario Cabutihan from his
parents Bartolome and Natividad for P4,700.
12. Respondents moved for the disapproval of the inventories claiming:
a. that the properties listed were either acquired during the first marriage of
Cesario
b. merely the products or fruits of the properties of the first marriage or
otherwise acquired through the funds thereof.
13. CFI: Victorina had no paraphernal properties brought or contributed to their
marriage with Cesario.
a. Disapproved both inventories and annulled the EJS and deed of sale for
being fictitious (the deed of sale) and for involving conjucal properties of
the first marriage, including properties of Bienvenida to which Victorina is
not and heir.
14. Petitioners appealed to the IAC on Dec 8 1980.
15. On the same day, respondent Carmencita filed a motion to withdraw funds
from the estate to to be partitioned among the heirs.(im assuming in the CFI)
i. Such motion was granted
16. December 12, 1980: petitioners filed a motion asking the lower court to order the
return of the amount of 70K paid to claimants Democrito and David for claims
against the estate.
17. IAC: affirmed the decision of the CFI
18. P contends:
a. CFI erred in concluding that the copra business and properties listed in the
inventories are assets of the conjugal partnership of the first marriage
between Cesario and Bienvenida.
b. Questioning the approval of the claims of Democrito and David.
c. Petitioners question the order of the court allowing the withdrawal of
funds for distribution to the heirs as advance inheritance.
Issue:
1. W/N the properties listed in the inventory all belonged to the assets of Cesario
and Bienvenida: NO
2. W/N the approval of the claims of Democrito and David is proper. YES
3. [SPECPRO]W/N the order of the court allowing the partial distribution of the
estate is valid: YES
Held/Ratio:
1. The estate of Victorina for distribution to her heirs shall consist of her one-half (1/2)
share in the conjugal properties of the aforesaid second marriage and her one-sixth
(1/6) share in the estate of Cesario as an heir.
The first marriage existed for abuout fifteen (15) years (1942 to 1957), while the second
marriage lasted for about fourteen (14) years (1958 to 1972).
- The first conjugal partnership will be prorated a share of fifteen twenty-ninths
(15/29) of the properties included in the inventory submitted on August 30,
1978, while the second conjugal partnership will get fourteen twenty-ninths
(14/29) thereof.
- Not to be included, however, are the real properties listed in the supplementary
inventory filed on January 16, 1979, because they definitely belong to the
estate of Cesario as the latter's inheritance from his parents, Bartolome
Cabutihan and Natividad Daelo.
One-half (1/2) of the properties that pertain to the first conjugal partnership belong to
Cesario as his conjugal share therein, while the other half shall be considered as
inherited by him and his five children as the heirs of Bienvenida.
The properties pertaining to the second partnership shall also be equally divided, one-
half (1/2) to belong to Cesario and the other to Victorina as their respective shares in
their conjugal partnership properties. The share of Cesario should then be divided
among his heirs, namely, Victorina and his five (5) children.
2. P: approval of Democrito and David’s claim should be disallowed because of the
testimony of Democrito is inadmissible under Dead Man’s Statute
SC: Even assuming the dead man’s statute apply the testimony of other witnesses like
Urbano Prado and Tirso Linosa are more than sufficient to establish the claim and
support the documentary evidence in support thereof.
3. P’s are questioning the order allowing the withdrawal of funds for distribution to the
heirs as advance inheritance.
SC: Said order is within the contemplation and authority of Rule 109, Section 2 which
provides:
- Notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the
estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as
it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not
be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs
 or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of
these rules'.
R90 in part provides that:
- No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs."
Partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate or
intestate proceedings should as much as possible be discouraged by the courts and,
unless in extreme cases, should not be allowed
- The reason for this strict rule is obvious because courts should guard with
utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end that the creditors
thereof be adequately protected and all the rightful heirs assured of their shares
in the inheritance.
BUT after duly considering the foregoing rules, We sustain the validity of the questioned
order.
- IAC: "(i)f oppositors would stand to share more in the inheritance than what was
fixed for them in the appealed judgment, We believe the estate has sufficient
assets to ensure an equitable distribution of the inheritance in
accordance with law and final judgment in the proceedings."
- It does not appear that there are unpaid obligations, as contemplated in
Rule 90, for which provisions should have been made or a bond required.
IAC affirmed with modifications
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA,
represented by ZENAIDA SUMERA WATANABE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 186053 | November 15, 2010 | Carpio Morales, J.
SUMMARY: Respondent Nisaida filed a petition for change of name, which was granted
by RTC. OSG for Petitioner filed an appeal. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss appeal
because petitioner did not file a record on appeal as required by Rule 41.2 and 41.3. SC
ruled in favor of petitioner saying that a record on appeal is required only in proceedings
where multiple appeals may arise, a situation not obtaining in the present case. Hence,
Rule 109.1 does not apply in this case because it contemplates multiple appeals during
the pendency of special proceedings.
FACTS: Respondent Nisaida, represented by her mother Zenaida, filed before RTC
Malolos Bulacan, a verified petition for cancellation of birth record and change of
surname. She alleged that:
1. She was born on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mom
Zenaida and Japanese dad Koichi Nishina. Her father later died, and mother
Zenaida married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada.
2. As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry, mom
Zenaida caused the late registration of her birth in 1993 under the surname of
second husband, Hakamada. Anyway, mom and Hakamada eventually
divorced.
3. On May 29, 1996, Zenaida married another Japanese, Takayuki Watanabe
(landi!!), who later adopted Nisaida by a decree issued by the Tokyo Family
Court of Japan. This decree was filed and recorded in the civil registry of Manila
in 2006.
4. In 2007, they found out that her birth was in fact originally registered at the
Malolos Civil Registry under the name Nisaida Sumera Nishina (1 st dad’s
surname), hence, her prayer that: (a) her second birth certificate bearing the
Hakamada be cancelled; and (b) that her surname be changed to Watanabe.
RTC granted the petition. OSG filed an appeal.
Respondent filed a MtDismiss, alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal
since it did not file a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41.
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal…
No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of
multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal...
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
xxxx
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof...
A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the
subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
Petitioner countered that a record on appeal is required only in proceedings where
multiple appeals may arise, a situation not obtaining in the present case.
CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal, holding that since respondents petition before the RTC
is classified as a special proceeding, petitioner should have filed both notice of appeal
and a record on appeal within 30 days from receipt of the October 8, 2007 Order. By not
filing a record on appeal, petitioner never perfected its appeal. MR denied, hence this
review on certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N a record on appeal was necessary - NO
RATIO: Rule 109.1 specifies the orders or judgments in special proceedings which may
be the subject of an appeal (please read provision). It contemplates multiple appeals
during the pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal in addition to the notice
of appeal is thus required to be filed as the original records of the case should remain
with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate
and distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.
CAB: the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter remained
to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting
respondents petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil
registry.
The case of Zayco vs Hinlo, relied upon by CA, was a petition for letters of administration
of a deceased person’s estate, and the decedent’s children appealed TC’s order
appointing the grandson of the as administrator. Their notice of appeal and record on
appeal were denied due course by the trial court on the ground that the appealed order
is interlocutory and not subject to appeal. SC disagreed and held that an order
appointing an administrator of a deceased persons estate is a final determination of the
rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of
the decedents estate, hence, the order is final and appealable.
Zayco cannot be relied upon because, unlike in the present case, a record on appeal
was obviously necessary as the proceedings before the trial court involved the
administration, management and settlement of the decedents estate matters covered by
Section 1 of Rule 109 wherein multiple appeals could, and did in that case, call for them.
On the contrary, in the case at bar, there can be no multiple appeals.
Petition granted.
Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand R. Marcos, II, and Imelda R. Marcos
G.R. Nos. 130371 & 130855 | August 4, 2009 | Peralta, J.
Facts:
On January 11, 1996, the RTC Pasig Branch 156, acting as a probate court, in Special
Proceeding No. 10279, issued an Order granting letters testamentary in solidum to
respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as
executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, upon the filing
of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. Pending the filing of said bond and their oath,
Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato of the Bureau of Internal Revenue was thereby
authorized to continue her functions as Special Administrator of the Estate of Ferdinand
Edralin Marcos.
On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. On the other hand, respondent Imelda Marcos filed her own motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its
existence and validity.
On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion for partial
reconsideration filed by petitioner as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent Imelda Marcos, holding that such motions were but a mere rehash of issues
already raised and passed upon by the Court.
On June 6, 1996, petitioner directly filed with this Court (SC) a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the aforementioned RTC
Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents.
On February 5, 1997, the First Division of this Court (SC) issued a Resolution referring
the petition to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits.
On March 13, 1997, the CA issued a Decision, dismissing the referred petition for having
taken the wrong mode of appeal, in accordance with the same Supreme Court Circular
2-90 which expressly provides that:
4. Erroneous Appeals An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
MR was also denied by the CA. In the meantime, on October 9, 2002, the RTC, acting
on the pending unresolved motions before it, issued an Order appointing as joint
special administrators of the estate of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the nominee of
the Republic of the Philippines (the USec of the DOJ whom the SOJ will designate for
this purpose) and Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Mr. Ferdinand R. Marcos II, to
serve as such until an executor is finally appointed.
Issues:
1. RULE 190: WON it was a wrong mode of appeal. YES.
2. WON respondents are incompetent to be executors of the will of Ferdinand Marcos.
NO.
Held:
1. When the assailed Orders granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents
were issued by the RTC, petitioner sought to question them by filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, which was then in effect, reads:
2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. Except in criminal cases
where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, judgments of
regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision of
the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for
certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The pertinent portions of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 read:
The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or
executive order or regulation is in question;
(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto;
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;
(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided,
however, That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases
mentioned in the three next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and
the final judgment or decision of the latter may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified
or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; and
(5) Final awards, judgments, decision or orders of the Commission on Elections, Court of
Tax Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the
Workmens Compensation Commission.
A reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, clearly shows that the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of
granting letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can
be the subject of a direct appeal to this Court. The CA was thus correct in declaring
that the issues raised by petitioner do not fall within the purview of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the Supreme Court should take cognizance of the instant
case.
Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the
Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be
obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if
it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and
immemorial tradition. Thus, a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision
involving both questions of fact and law must first be brought before the Court of
Appeals.
The petition offered no important or special reason for the Court to take cognizance of it
at the first instance. Petitioner offered no plausible reason why it went straight to this
Court when an adequate and proper remedy was still available. The CA was thus correct
that the remedy that petitioner should have availed of was to file an appeal under Rule
109 of the Rules of Court which states:
Section 1. Orders of judgments from which appeals taken. An interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First
Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: (a)
allows or disallows a will; xxx
XIII. Alternative Dispute Resolution, A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC, 1 September 2009
TUNA PROCESSING, INC., Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC.,
Respondent.
GR No. 185582 | Feb 29, 2012 | J. Perez
SUMMARY: P filed pet for recognition of foreign arbitral award against R. R filed MTD
otg of P’s lack of personality to sue based on corp code, where a corp NOT LICENSED
to do business in the RP cannot sue. HELD: Corp Code (a general law) does not apply
but RA 9285, or the ADR Law (a special law). Per ADR Law, capacity to sue is NOT
among the grounds to deny the recognition of a foreign arbitral award.
FACTS: Herein petitioner Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI) is a corporation formed through a
memorandum of agreement (MOA) among Kanemitsu Yamaoka (the licensor) and five
(5) Philippine tuna processors, namely, Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co.,
Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and respondent
Kingford (collectively referred to as the sponsors/licensees).
Kanemitsu Yamaoka is a co-patentee / patent holder of a US Patent, Philippine Letters
Patent, and Indonesian Patent regarding the processing of tuna. The sponsors (the tuna
corporations) wished to be licensed under the aforementioned patents in order to
practice the processes claimed in those mentioned patents. To be able to do so, the
parties (the licensor-Yamaoka and the sponsors tuna corporations) entered into the
aforementioned MOA, where the parties agreed to incorporate the TPI in order to
implement their agreement. TPI was to be incorporated in California. In using Yamaoka’s
patent, the tuna corporations were obliged to pay TPI royalties (di sinabi kung magkano
rate; there was also no mention of an arbitration clause in the MoA)
For reasons not mentioned in the petition before the SC, the licensees (the tuna
corporations), including respondent Kingford, withdrew from TPI and correspondingly
reneged on their obligations. Hence, Petitioner TPI submitted the dispute for arbitration
before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California, United
States and won the case against respondent. The arbitral award contained the ff:
1) $1.75M actual unpaid royalties;
2) $229k for damages arising from non-payment of the royalties, or 20% of the
unpaid assessment mentioned above;
3) $271k for damages arising from failure to cooperate with the TPI and the
enforcement of the MOA; and
4) $1.25M for violation of the Lanham Act and infringement of Yamaoka’s patent
However, when TPI filed a petition before the RTC Makati for the Confirmation,
Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award, the R-Kingford filed a MTD on
the ground of TPI’s lack of personality to sue, following Sec. 133 of the Corp Code. CC,
Sec 133 states: Doing business without a license. - No foreign corporation transacting
business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be
permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or
administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or
proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause
of action recognized under Philippine laws.
RTC granted the MTD. Hence, this Rule 45 petition before the SC.
ARGUMENTS:
P-TPI: that the Corp Code is not the applicable law but RA 9285 (Alternative Dispute
Resoln Act of 2004), the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards drafted during the United Nations Conference on International
Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law), as none of these laws specifically
require that the party seeking for the enforcement should have legal capacity to sue.
R-Kingford: that Corp Code applies; hence, P without personality to sue, it not being
licensed to do business in the RP
ISSUE (MAIN): WON RTC erred in dismissing the petition for recognition of the foreign
arbitral award
HELD: YES. RTC should NOT have dismissed the case. P may file a petition for the
enforcement of the arbitral award. The question of capacity to sue in the Philippines is
IMMATERIAL in so far as the recognition of the foreign arbitral award is concerned.
RATIO: The Corporation Code is a GENERAL LAW, which cannot prevail over a
SPECIAL LAW (RA 9285). The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in
this case as the Act, as its title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative
Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative
Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes - would suggest, is a law especially enacted
to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the
party to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes. It specifically provides
exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application for recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award.

Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, a municipal law, applies in
the instant petition, we do not see the need to discuss compliance with international
obligations under the New York Convention and the Model Law. After all, both already
form part of the RA 9285, since RA 9285 specifically adopted certain provisions of the
aforementioned international agreements. In particular, see the ff. section of the ADR
Law:
SEC. 42. Application of the New York Convention. - The New York Convention shall
govern the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards covered by the said
Convention.
SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award. - A party to a foreign arbitration
proceeding may oppose an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral
award in accordance with the procedural rules to be promulgated by the Supreme Court
only on those grounds enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention…
Art. V of the NY Convention states:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the
party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent
authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to
them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which
the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the
country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms
of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of
the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced;
or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which,
that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought
finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under
the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of
that country.
Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of the party
seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.
Even the SC’s Special Rules of Court on ADR provides that any party to a foreign
arbitration may petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award. The
contents of such petition are enumerated in Rule 13.5, wherein capacity to sue is not
included. It is only in the enforcement of LOCAL ARBITRAL AWARDS, where the place
of arbitration in the Philippines, that capacity to sue and be sued has to be alleged.
Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award, we deny availment by the losing party of the rule that bars foreign
corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our
courts. When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as
in this case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the
arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of
the other party to enter into the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the
implementation of the result.
FALLO: RTC’s order of dismissal is set aside. The case is REMANDED for further
proceedings (re determination of validity of the foreign arbitral award)
OTHER ISSUES (in case she asks)
AS to R’s MTD of the rule 45 petition otg that it raises questions of fact – SC: No
question of fact. Question in this case is a PURE Q of LAW as the Q is wrt WHAT IS
THE APPLICABLE LAW: ADR Law or the Corp Code.
As to instant petition being dismissible due to lack of prior MR before the RTC – SC: No
prior MR is required for a Rule 45 petition
As to dismissal otg of failure to observe hierarchy of courts – SC: the case falls within the
exc where only Qs of LAW are involved; also, TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE to
guide the bench wrt recognition of foreign arbitral awards
As to WON the foreign arbitral award is valid and enforceable – SC: remanded to the
RTC as this issue requires trial on the merits.
As to WON RTC Makati branch 61 was duly served a copy of the motion to file petition
for review before the SC – SC: Yes. Typo lang yung nasa petition before the SC (Branch
67 yung nalagay instead of Branch 61. Also, Branch 61 confirmed receipt of a copy of
said motion)
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR) vs.
UNITED PLANNERS CONSULTANTS , INC. (UPCI)
G.R. No. 212081 | February 23, 2015 | PERLAS-BERNABE |
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
SUMMARY: Petitioner asserts that it was denied the opportunity to be heard when the
Arbitral Tribunal failed to consider its draft decision and merely noted its motion for
reconsideration. It also denied receiving a copy of the Arbitral Award by either electronic
or registered mail. Respondent moved for the confirmation of the Arbitral Award in
accordance with the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special
ADR Rules). The RTC confirmed the Arbitral Award pursuant to Rule 11.2 (A) of the
Special ADR Rules. The CA dismissed the certiorari based on Rule 19.7 of the Special
ADR Rules. Th issue is WON the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Special ADR
Rules, resulting in the dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari. The Court
ruled that it did not. By its referral to arbitration, the case fell within the coverage of the
Special ADR Rules. However, with respect to the arbitration proceedings itself, the
parties had agreed to adopt the CIAC Rules before the Arbitral Tribunal in accordance
with Rule 2.3 of the Special ADR Rules. Under Section 17.2, Rule 17 of the CIAC Rules,
no motion for reconsideration or new trial may be sought, but any of the parties may file
a motion for correction of the final award, which shall interrupt the running of the period
for appeal. Records do not show that any of the foregoing remedies were availed of by
petitioner. Instead, it filed the May 19, 2010 MR of the Arbitral Award, which was a
prohibited pleading under the Section 17.2, Rule 17 of the CIAC Rules, thus rendering
the same final and executory.
FACTS: On July 26, 1993, petitioner, through the Land Management Bureau (LMB),
entered into an Agreement for Consultancy Services (Consultancy Agreement) with
respondent United Planners Consultants, Inc. (respondent) in connection with the LMB' s
Land Resource Management Master Plan Project (LRMMP). Under the Consultancy
Agreement, petitioner committed to pay a total contract price of P4,337,141.00, based on
a predetermined percentage corresponding to the particular stage of work accomplished.
In December 1994, respondent completed the work required, which petitioner formally
accepted on December 27, 1994. However, petitioner was able to pay only 47% of the
total contract price in the amount of P2,038,456.30.
On October 25, 1994, the Commission on Audit (COA) released the Technical Services
Office Report (TSO) finding the contract price of the Agreement to be 84.14%
excessive. This notwithstanding, petitioner, in a letter dated December 10, 1998,
acknowledged its liability to respondent in the amount of P2,239,479.60 and assured
payment at the soonest possible time.
For failure to pay its obligation under the Consultancy Agreement despite repeated
demands, respondent instituted a Complaint against petitioner before the RTC of QC.
Upon motion of respondent, the case was subsequently referred to arbitration pursuant
to the arbitration clause of the Consultancy Agreement, which petitioner did not
oppose. As a result, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Architect Armando N. Alli, and Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) Accredited Arbitrator Engr. Ricardo B. San Juan
were appointed as members of the Arbitral Tribunal. The court-referred arbitration was
then docketed as Arbitration Case No. A-001.
During the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to adopt the CIAC Revised Rules
Governing Construction Arbitration (CIAC Rules) to govern the arbitration
proceedings. They further agreed to submit their respective draft decisions in lieu of
memoranda of arguments on or before April 21, 2010, among others.
On the due date for submission of the draft decisions, however, only respondent
complied with the given deadline, while petitioner moved for the deferment of the
deadline which it followed with another motion for extension of time, asking that it be
given until May 11, 2010 to submit its draft decision. Petitioner filed its draft decision only
on May 7, 2010.
The Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Award dated May 7, 2010 in favor of respondent.
Petitioner filed an MR, which the Arbitral Tribunal merely noted without any action,
claiming that it had already lost jurisdiction over the case after it had submitted to the
RTC its Report together with a copy of the Arbitral Award.
Consequently, petitioner filed before the RTC an MR and a Manifestation and Motion,
asserting that it was denied the opportunity to be heard when the Arbitral Tribunal failed
to consider its draft decision and merely noted its motion for reconsideration. It also
denied receiving a copy of the Arbitral Award by either electronic or registered mail. For
its part, respondent filed an opposition thereto and moved for the confirmation of the
Arbitral Award in accordance with the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution (Special ADR Rules).
RTC: confirmed the Arbitral Award pursuant to Rule 11.2 (A) of the Special ADR Rules
and ordered petitioner to pay respondent the costs of confirming the award, as prayed
for, in the total amount of P50,000.00. From this order, petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration. RTC granted respondent’s motion for issuance of writ of execution.
CA: dismissed the certiorari petition on two (2) grounds, namely: (a) the petition
essentially assailed the merits of the Arbitral Award which is prohibited under Rule
19.7 of the Special ADR Rules; and (b) the petition was filed out of time, having been
filed way beyond 15 days from notice of the RTC’s July 9, 2012 Order.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Special ADR Rules,
resulting in the dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari. NO.
RULING:
Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 2004," institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System (ADR
System) in the Philippines. The Act, however, was without prejudice to the adoption by
the Supreme Court of any ADR system as a means of achieving speedy and efficient
means of resolving cases pending before all courts in the Philippines.
Accordingly, A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC was created setting forth the Special Rules of Court
on Alternative Dispute Resolution (referred herein as Special ADR Rules) that shall
govern the procedure to be followed by the courts whenever judicial intervention is
sought in ADR proceedings in the specific cases where it is allowed.
Rule 1.1 of the Special ADR Rules lists down the instances when the said rules shall
apply, namely: "(a) Relief on the issue of Existence, Validity, or Enforceability of the
Arbitration Agreement; (b) Referral to Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR"); (c) Interim
Measures of Protection; (d) Appointment of Arbitrator; (e) Challenge to Appointment of
Arbitrator; (f) Termination of Mandate of Arbitrator; (g) Assistance in Taking Evidence;
(h) Confirmation, Correction or Vacation of Award in Domestic Arbitration; (i) Recognition
and Enforcement or Setting Aside of an Award in International Commercial Arbitration; (j)
Recognition and Enforcement of a Foreign Arbitral Award; (k) Confidentiality/Protective
Orders; and (l) Deposit and Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreements."
Notably, the Special ADR Rules do not automatically govern the arbitration proceedings
itself. A pivotal feature of arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute resolution is that it
is a product of party autonomy or the freedom of the parties to make their own
arrangements to resolve their own disputes. Thus, Rule 2.3 of the Special ADR Rules
explicitly provides that "parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed in the
conduct of arbitral proceedings. Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may
conduct arbitration in the manner it considers appropriate."
CAB: The Consultancy Agreement contained an arbitration clause. Hence, respondent,
after it filed its complaint, moved for its referral to arbitration which was not objected to
by petitioner. By its referral to arbitration, the case fell within the coverage of the
Special ADR Rules. However, with respect to the arbitration proceedings itself, the
parties had agreed to adopt the CIAC Rules before the Arbitral Tribunal in
accordance with Rule 2.3 of the Special ADR Rules. Under Section 17.2, Rule 17 of
the CIAC Rules, no motion for reconsideration or new trial may be sought, but any
of the parties may file a motion for correction of the final award, which shall
interrupt the running of the period for appeal, based on any of the following grounds,
to wit: a. an evident miscalculation of figures, a typographical or arithmetical error; b. an
evident mistake in the description of any party, person, date, amount, thing or property
referred to in the award; c. where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not
submitted to them, not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted; d.
where the arbitrators have failed or omitted to resolve certain issue/s formulated by the
parties in the Terms of Reference (TOR) and submitted to them for resolution, and e.
where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy. The motion shall be acted upon by the Arbitral Tribunal or the
surviving/remaining members. Moreover, the parties may appeal the final award to the
CA through a petition for review under Rule43 of the Rules of Court.
CAB: Records do not show that any of the foregoing remedies were availed of by
petitioner. Instead, it filed the May 19, 2010 MR of the Arbitral Award, which was a
prohibited pleading under the Section 17.2, Rule 17 of the CIAC Rules, thus
rendering the same final and executory. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the
RTC for confirmation proceedings pursuant to Rule 11 of the Special ADR Rules which
requires confirmation by the court of the final arbitral award. This is consistent with
Section 40, Chapter 7 (A) of RA 9285 which similarly requires a judicial confirmation of a
domestic award to make the same enforceable: EC. 40. Confirmation of Award.– The
confirmation of a domestic arbitral award shall be governed by Sec. 23 of R.A. 876.
A domestic arbitral award when confirmed shall be enforced in the same manner as final
and executory decisions of the regional trial court. The confirmation of a domestic award
shall be made by the regional trial court in accordance with the Rules of Procedure to be
promulgated by the Supreme Court. A CIAC arbitral award need not be confirmed by the
regional trial court to be executory as provided under E.O. No. 1008.
CAB: During the confirmation proceedings, petitioners did not oppose the RTC’s
confirmation by filing a petition to vacate the Arbitral Award under Rule 11.2 (D) of the
Special ADR Rules. Neither did it seek reconsideration of the confirmation order in
accordance with Rule 19.1 (h) thereof. Instead, petitioner filed only on September 10,
2012 a special civil action for certiorari before the CA questioning the propriety of (a) the
RTC Order dated September 12, 2011 granting respondent’s motion for issuance of a
writ of execution, and (b) Order dated July 9,2012 denying its motion to quash. Under
Rule 19.26 of the Special ADR Rules, "[w]hen the Regional Trial Court, in making a
ruling under the Special ADR Rules, has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a party
may file a special civil action for certiorari to annul or set aside a ruling of the Regional
Trial Court." Thus, for failing to avail of the foregoing remedies before resorting to
certiorari, the CA correctly dismissed its petition.
CAB: Petitioner asserts that its petition is not covered by the Special ADR Rules
(particularly, Rule 19.28 on the 15-day reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari)
but by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (particularly, Section 4 thereof on the 60-day
reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari), which it claimed to have suppletory
application in arbitration proceedings since the Special ADR Rules do not explicitly
provide for a procedure on execution. The position is untenable. Execution is fittingly
called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted,
would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. While it appears that the
Special ADR Rules remain silent on the procedure for the execution of a confirmed
arbitral award, it is the Court’s considered view that the Rules’ procedural mechanisms
cover not only aspects of confirmation but necessarily extend to a confirmed award’s
execution in light of the doctrine of necessary implication which states that every
statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right
or privilege.
Execution is but a necessary incident to the Court’s confirmation of an arbitral
award. To construe it otherwise would result in an absurd situation whereby the
confirming court previously applying the Special ADR Rules in its confirmation of
the arbitral award would later shift to the regular Rules of Procedure come
execution. Irrefragably, a court’s power to confirm a judgment award under the
Special ADR Rules should be deemed to include the power to order its execution
for such is but a collateral and subsidiary consequence that may be fairly and
logically inferred from the statutory grant to regional trial courts of the power to
confirm domestic arbitral awards.
Since the Special ADR Rules are intended to achieve speedy and efficient resolution of
disputes and curb a litigious culture,every interpretation thereof should be made
consistent with these objectives. Thus, with these principles in mind, the Court so
concludes that the Special ADR Rules, as far as practicable, should be made to apply
not only to the proceedings on confirmation but also to the confirmed award’s execution.
Petitioner cannot be said to have been denied due process as the records
undeniably show that it was accorded ample opportunity to ventilate its position.
There was clearly nothing out of line when the Arbitral Tribunal denied petitioner’s
motions for extension to file its submissions having failed to show a valid reason
to justify the same or in rendering the Arbitral Award sans petitioner’s draft
decision which was filed only on the day of the scheduled promulgation of final
award on May 7, 2010.
Nevertheless, while the Court sanctions the dismissal by the CA of the petition for
certiorari due to procedural infirmities, there is a need to explicate the matter of
execution of the confirmed Arbitral Award against the petitioner, a government
agency, in the light of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1445 otherwise known as the
"Government Auditing Code of the Philippines." Section 26 of PD 1445 expressly
provides that execution of money judgment against the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities is within the primary jurisdiction of
the COA.,
January 11, 2016 | LEONEN, J.:
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. DMCI PROJECT
DEVELOPERS, INC.
NORTH LUZON RAILWAYS CORPORATION, v. DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS,
INC.
Facts:
On 1995, the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) with Philippine National Railways (PNR) and other foreign
corporations for the establishment of North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail).
Under the JVA, the parties agreed to construct a railroad system from Manila to Clark
with possible extensions to Subic Bay and La Union and later, possibly to Ilocos Norte
and Nueva Ecija. The JVA provided for an arbitration clause.1
Upon BCDA’s invitation, “DMCI and/or its nominee” was included in the JVA, whereby
DMCI shall be an additional investor of Northrail. It shall subscribe to 20% of the
increase in Northrail's authorized capital stock. BCDA and the other parties to the JVA
also entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), where an initial seed capital of
P600 million shall be infused to Northrail. Of that amount, DMCI will contribute P200
million which was later increased to P300 million.
DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) then deposited P300 million into Northrail’s
account with Land Bank of the Philippinesfor its "future subscription of the Northrail
shares of stocks." In several letters to PNR and the other parties to the JVA, DMCI
announced that DMCI-PDI shall be its designated nominee for all the agreements.
Later, Northrail withdrew from the SEC its application for increased authorized capital
stock. Moreover, according to DMCI-PDI, BCDA applied for Official Development
Assistance from Obuchi Fund of Japan. This required Northrail to be a 100% GOCC.
Thus, DMCI-PDI started demanding the return of its P300 million deposit. DMCI-PDI
cited Northrail's failure to increase its authorized capital stock as reason for the demand.
BCDA and Northrail refused to return the deposit because it believed that DMCI is a joint
venture partner that must share in profits and losses. DMCI-PDI then served a demand
for arbitration to BCDA and Northrail, citing the arbitration clause but they failed to
respond. This prompted DMCI-PDI to file a Petition to Compel Arbitration against BCDA
and Northrail. BCDA and Northrail filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that DMCI-PDI was
not a party to the Joint Venture Agreement containing the arbitration clause.
RTC Ruling: In favor of DMCI-PDI.
The parties were ordered to present their dispute to arbitration in accordance with the
JVA. The arbitration clause in the JVA should cover all subsequent documents including
the amended JVA and MOA. The three documents constituted one contract for the
formation and funding of Northrail. Even though DMCI-PDI was not a signatory to the
JVA and MOA, it was an assignee of DMCI's rights. Therefore, it could invoke the
arbitration clause.
1 Article XVI. 16. If any dispute arise hereunder which cannot be settled by mutual
accord between the parties to such dispute, then that dispute shall be referred to
arbitration. The arbitration shall be held in whichever place the parties to the dispute
decide and failing mutual agreement as to a location within twenty-one (21) days after
the occurrence of the dispute, shall be held in Metro Manila and shall be conducted in
accordance with the Philippine Arbitration Law (Republic Act No. 876) supplemented by
the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce. All
award of such arbitration shall be final and binding upon the parties to the dispute.
In a Rule 45 Petition, the SC decided the case.
Issue: Whether DMCI-PDI may compel BCDA and Northrail to submit to arbitration
Argument of BCDA
- only the parties to an arbitration agreement can be bound by that agreement
and DMCI-PDI was not a party to the JVA. There was no evidence that the right
to compel arbitration was assigned to DMCI-PDI. If there was such an
assignment, BCDA did not consent to or recognize it.
- The RTC decided the Motion to Dismiss in violation of the parties' right to due
process.
Argument of Northrail
- Northrail cannot be compelled to submit itself to arbitration because it was not a
party to the arbitration agreement. DMCI-PDI itself was not a party to the
arbitration agreement. DMCI-PDI was not DMCI's assignee because BCDA did
not consent to that assignment.
Argument of DMCI
- Rule 45 is a wrong mode of appeal. The issues raised by BCDA did not involve
questions of law.
- BCDA committed breach when it did not apply the P300 million to Northrail
subscriptions.
- DMCI-PDI is an assignee and nominee of DMCI. Therefore, it is also a party to
the arbitration clause. Further, the arbitration agreement extended to all
documents relating to the project.
- Even though the agreement was expressed only in the Joint Venture
Agreement, its effect extends to the amendment to the Joint Venture
Agreement and Memorandum of Agreement.
- BCDA had always recognized it as DMCI’s assignee in its correspondences
with the OGCC and with the President of DMCI where BCDA described DMCI-
PDI as a "joint venture partner . . . and co-investor." Hence, it is now estopped
from denying its personality in this case.
SC Ruling: In favor of DMCI-PDI
Rule 45 is the correct remedy because the issues involved purely questions of law.
1. The state has a policy in favor of arbitration
Arbitration is a mode of settling disputes between parties. Like many alternative dispute
resolution processes, it is a product of the meeting of minds of parties submitting a pre-
defined set of disputes. They agree among themselves to a process of dispute resolution
that avoids extended litigation.
The state adopts a policy in favor of arbitration. This is in RA 9285,2 Civil Code,3 RA 8764
Consistent with the above-mentioned policy of encouraging alternative dispute resolution
methods, courts should liberally construe arbitration clauses. Provided such clause is
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute, an order to arbitrate
should be granted. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration.
2 Towards this end, the State shall encourage and actively promote the use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as an important means to achieve speedy and
impartial justice and declog court dockets
3 Arts. 2028-2046
4 An Act to Authorize the Making of Arbitration and Submission Agreements, to Provide
for the Appointment of Arbitrators and the Procedure for Arbitration in Civil
Controversies, and for Other Purposes (1953)
Hence, the issue of whether DMCI-PDI may compel BCDA and Northrail to submit to
arbitration proceedings must be resolved in light of the policy in favor of arbitration.
Three documents — JVA, amended JVA and MOA represent the agreement between
the parties. Among the three documents, only the JVA contains the arbitration clause. To
determine the coverage of the arbitration clause, the relation among the three
documents and DMCI-PDI's involvement in these documents must first be understood.
[The SC quoted the pertinent provisions of the JVA. The quotations would take 5-6
pages, please see original.]
There is no rule that a contract should be contained in a single document. A whole
contract may be contained in several documents that are consistent with one other.
Moreover, at any time during the lifetime of an agreement, circumstances may arise that
may cause the parties to change or add to the terms they previously agreed upon. These
changes may cause effects that are inconsistent with the prior contract. In that case, the
changes shall be deemed to have taken effect and the provisions that are not affected by
the changes usually remain effective.
A reading of all the documents of agreement shows that they were executed by the
same parties. Each document was executed to achieve the single purpose of
implementing the railroad project. They should be treated as one contract because they
all form part of a whole agreement. Hence, the arbitration clause in the JVA should not
be interpreted as applicable only to the JVA’s original parties. The arbitration clause
should extend to all the agreements and its parties since it is still consistent with all the
terms and conditions of the amendments and supplements.
2. BCDA and Northrail’s consent to the assignment is not needed.
Section 17.1 of the JVA provides that rights under the agreement may not be assigned
without the consent of the other party. However, Section 17.2 of the JVA provides that
the agreement shall be binding on nominees
Based on DMCI-PDI’ss letter to BCDA and Northrail, DMCI designated DMCI-PDI as its
nominee for the agreements. Thus, lack of consent to the assignment is irrelevant
because there was no assignment or transfer of rights to DMCI-PDI.
Assignment involves the transfer of rights after the perfection of a contract. Nomination
pertains to the act of naming the party with whom it has a relationship of trust or agency.
In Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic, "nominee"
was defined as one who is designated to act for another. Thus, the agreement's
prohibition against transfers without the consent of the other party does not apply to
nomination.
3. Northrail is also bound by the arbitration agreement
In Lanuza v. BF Corporation, we recognized that there are instances when non-
signatories to a contract may be compelled to submit to arbitration. Among those
instances is when a non-signatory is allowed to invoke rights or obligations based on the
contract.
Therefore, Northrail cannot deny understanding that its existence are tied to the
agreements. When Northrail demanded for the amount of DMCI's subscription and later
accepted the latter's funds, it proved that it was bound by the agreements' terms. Hence,
when BCDA and Northrail decided not to proceed with Northrail's privatization, any
obligation to return its supposed subscription attached not only to BCDA but primarily to
Northrail as beneficiary that impliedly accepted the terms of the agreement.
A beneficiary who communicated his acceptance to the terms of the agreement before
its revocation may be compelled to abide by the terms of an agreement, including the
arbitration clause.
Dispositive: in favor of DMCI-PDI
Ruling of the RTC is affirmed.
XIV. Writ of Habeas Corpus, Rule 102
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE HABEAS CORPUS OF EDMUNDO
RAMIREZ, ATTORNEY ABDON A. ARRIBA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
GR 57069 | Aug 31 1981 | Fernando, CJ
Synopsis: The illegality of the continued detention of one accused of attempted rape but
unable to post his bail bond even after two years and five months had elapsed since the
termination of the trial was raised in this habeas corpus petition. The case was set for
hearing, the Court dispensing with the appearance of the detainee. The Solicitor General
was required to inquire as to whether release can be ordered. In answer, information
was relayed to the Court that the detainee had been released by virtue of an order
issued by Judge Tago M. Bantuas who had already promulgated a decision in the
aforementioned criminal case acquitting the detainee of the charge. In view of this
development, the Solicitor General prayed to consider the petition moot and academic.
detainee Edmundo Ramirez had been released on June 29, 1981, by virtue of an order
issued by Judge Tago M. Bantuas who, on the same date, allegedly promulgated a
decision in the aforementioned criminal case acquitting Edmundo Ramirez of the charge
of attempted rape and that the foregoing is incorporated in the return which he allegedly
filed with this Honorable Court.
Facts:
1. Thewrit of habeas corpus was relied upon by a member of the Philippine Bar, Abdon
A. Arriba, as counsel for Edmundo Ramirez, on the ground that the continued
detention of his client, charged with attempted rape but unable to post his bail bond
even after two years and five months had elapsed since the termination of the trial,
was illegal.
a. On the day after the petition was filed, on June 11, 1981, this Court issued
the writ applied for, required respondent to make a return on or before
Friday July 3, 1981, and set the hearing of the petition on Tuesday, July 7,
1981 at 11:00 o’clock in the morning.
b. It further required the Solicitor General to inquire as to "whether under the
circumstances, release can be ordered and, if so, inform the Court.”
2. The Sol Gen complied and immediately released telegrams and made long distance
phone calls to the Provincial Warden to comply with this.
3. However, the Sol Gen was informed through a phone call that detainee Edmundo
Ramirez had been released on June 29, 1981, by virtue of an order issued by Judge
Tago M. Bantuas who, on the same date, allegedly promulgated a decision in the
aforementioned criminal case acquitting Edmundo Ramirez of the charge of
attempted rape and that the foregoing is incorporated in the return which he
allegedly filed with this Honorable Court.
a. Hence, the Sol Gen pleaded that the petition be considered moot and
academic.
Issue:
WoN the petition for writ of habeas corpus is moot and academic. YES.
Ratio:
 The release was ordered. The writ of habeas corpus had thus served its purpose as
a means for securing the liberty of an individual whose continued detention finds no
support in law.
 Chief Justice Marshall correctly characterized habeas corpus as "a high prerogative
writ, known to the common law, the great object of which is the Liberation of those
who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause." 6 Correctly then was it described
by Justice Malcolm as having been "devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom." 7 Not so long ago this Court expressed a similar
view: "The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of habeas
corpus under the circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to assure that
illegality of restraint and detention be avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is
not known as the writ of liberty for nothing. The writ imposes on judges the grave
responsibility of ascertaining whether there is any legal justification for a deprivation
of physical freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby
cease. If there be a valid sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be extended
beyond the period provided for by law. Any deviation from the legal norms calls for
the termination of the imprisonment.
 It can be said that the accused obtained justice ultimately but at too high a cost. Had
the case been terminated promptly as the law requires, he would have been set free
much sooner. In the traditional sense, the right to a speedy trial cannot be invoked
after the termination of the proceedings. Nor is mandamus the only appropriate
remedy for a decision to be rendered if the statutory period set forth by law had
been exceeded. There could be cases where the writ of liberty would, in the
language of Justice Malcolm, "be the most efficacious remedy." The judgment of
acquittal, long overdue, reinforces such an approach.
G.R. No. L-23253 March 28, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR BETTY CHUA SY ALIAS "GRACE
CABANGBANG" FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. PACITA
CHUA, petitioner-appellant, vs.MR. & MRS. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG ET AL.,
respondents-appellees.
Child: Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangabang
Rs Has custody of the child. They were claiming that they found the child wrapped in a
bundle at the gate of their residence. And that it was only after 5 ½ years when P
claimed custody over the child (child was already 11 YO then)
P mother of the child who filed HC praying that the court grants her custody of her
child
SC: There was abandonment because she never reported her disappearance and she
said she wanted the child back to vindicate Villareal for giving the child to the
Cabangbangs or if she won’t get the child from them, Cabangbangs will give her jeep or
some money. It was proper to deprive P of parental authority.
SC: SC ruled that the absence of kinship alone cannot bar the awarding of custody to
them
SC: SC ruled that ROC 102 Sec 1 provides that except as expressly provided by law, the
writ of HC shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person
is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto. P has not proven that she is entitled to the rightful custody of
the child. By completely shunting aside her legal and moral obligations, she must be
deemed as having forfeited all legitimate and moral claim to her custody.
FACTS:
Pacita Chua supported herself by working in nightclubs as a hostess. She first lived with
Chua Ben by whom she had a child who died in infancy. She later cohabited with SySia
Lay by whom she had 2 kids (Robert and Betty Chua Sy). After the birth of Betty, they
separated. After, she met Victor Tan Villareal who was married. But she became his
mistress and another girl was born to her. When she gave birth to her last child, they got
separated. Since she didn’t have money, she gave her last child away to a comadre in
Cebu
BartolomeCabangbangand his wife, a childless couple, had custody over the child
Betty who was 4 mos old. They later had her christened as Grace Cabangbangon Sept
12, 1958
CONTENTIONS:
Pacita Chua avers that while she and Villarealwere sill living together, the latter took the
child away and gave her to the Cabangbangs. She said she only came to know of the
whereabouts of her daughter when she was 3YO who was brought to her by Villareal but
later returned to the Cabangbangs thru threats and intimidation.
Cabangbangshowever asserted that MrsCabangbang found the child, wrapped in a
bundle at the gate of their residence and that she reared her as her own and that nobody
ever molested them until the child was 5 ½ YO.
LC ruled that the child was given to the Cabangbangs by Villareal with the consent of
Pacita Chua.
Pacita demanded the surrender to her of the custody of the child. Pacita then filed a
petition for habeas corpus with CFI Rizal to grant her custody of her child and
recognize her parental authority over the girl.
A writ was issued commanding the sheriff to produce the body of Betty Chua Sy or
Grace Cabangabangon June 17, 1963 at 8:30am. But the child was not produced.
ISSUE: (3)
I. WON LC erred when it awarded the custody of P’s daughter who is less than 7
YO, in favor of RESPs Cabangbang couple and illegally deprived P of parental
authority over her daughter - NO
RULING: SC ruled against the P.
P contends that under CC363, she cannot be separated from her child who was less
that 7YO and that she cannot be deprived of her parental authority over the child
because not one of the grounds for the termination, loss, suspension or deprivation of
parental authority under CC332.
SC ruled that since she was born on Dec 15, 1957, the child is now 11 YO. CC 363
which prohibits separation under 7YO has no relevance. True, the reasons relied by LC
(‘not exactly an upright woman” and “it will be for the welfare of the child”) are not proper
grounds to deprive a mother of her parental authority. SC ruled that minor children,
legitimate, natural, adopted or natural by legal fiction or illegitimate are by law under the
parental authority of both the father and the mother or either the father or the mother. But
P can be deprived of her parental authority as provided for under CC 313. SC ruled that
there are valid grounds for depriving the P of parental authority.
SC ruled that the child was given by Villareal to the Cabangbangs with the
knowledge of P. Supporting facts: P never reported to the authorities the alleged
disappearance of her daughter and had not taken any step to see the child when she
discovered that she was in the custody of the Cabangbangs. (P claims that
Cabangbangs are powerful and influential) But since she appealed directly to the SC,
she has waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by TC.
CC 332 provides that “courts may deprive the parents of their authority or suspend the
exercise of such if they should treat their children with excessive harshness or should
give them corrupting orders or examples or should make them beg or abandon them. “
Abandonment is therefore one of the grounds.
Mere acquiescence is not sufficient to constitute abandonment. But the record shows, in
their totality, unmistakably betray the P’s settled intention to completely forego all
parental responsibilities and forever relinquish all parental claim.
SC ruled that she surrendered the custody to the Cabangbangs in 1958 and waited until
1963 or after 5 years before bringing an action to recover custody. A mother who really
loves her child would go to any extent to be reunited with her. The normal reaction of the
P should’ve been to move heaven and earth to recover her. Yet she lifted not a finger.
Also, the record reveals that during the pre-trial, she expressed her willingness that the
child remain with the Cabangbangsprovided the latter would in exchange give her a jeep
and some money.
The inconsistent demands reveal that her motives do not flow from the wellsprings of a
loving mother’s hear. She was selfish. She needs the child as a leverage to obtain
concessions – financial or otherwise – either from the alleged father or the
Cabangbangs. If she gets the child back, support for her would be forthcoming so she
thinks – from the alleged father, SySia Lay. But if the Cabangbangs would keep the
child, she would agree provided they gave her a jeep a money.
SC ruled that she had intentions to abandon the child. Abandonment took place when
the child, barely 4 mos, was at the most fragile stage of life and needed utmost care of
the mother. For 5 years, she did not move to recover the child. She continuously
shunned her obligations and denied her support. Her inaction have been prolonged to
such a point that her abandonment of the child and her total relinquishment of parental
claim should be inferred as a matter of law.
Also, she gave away her youngest child, Betty Tan Villareal to her comadre in Cebu
because she could not support it.
She wanted her back not because she loves her but she want to embarrass R Villareal
who gave the child to the Cabangbangs. And she wanted jeep and money in exchange
of her child.
SC affirmed LC upon a ground which LC overlooked: ABANDONMENT.
Also, P has no regular source of income to provide the child with basic necessities of life.
II (SPECPRO) Another issue: P asserts that the couple are not related by
consanguinity or affinity to the child.
SC ruled that the absence of kinship alone cannot bar the awarding of custody to
them. Law provides that a child can be awarded even to strangers. Courts may
designate some reputable and discreet person to take charge of such child.
ROC 99 Secs 6 & 7 belie that P’s contention that CC 363 (“ In all questions on the care,
custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount.....”)
applies only when the litigation involving a child is between the father and the mother. It
is wrong to say that if the suit is between a parent and a stranger the law must award
such to the parent. ROC 99 Sec 7 contemplates a suit between a parent and a stranger
who is some reputable resident of the province. If it is for the best interest of the child,
court may take child away from its parents and commit it to a benevolent person.
Also, P claims that the answer of spouses contains no prayer for the custody of the child.
SC ruled that even if it has no prayer for custody, there are several acts to show such.
First, they asked for her custody pendent lite; then added a general prayer for other
reliefs.
III. (SPECPRO) SC ruled that ROC 102 Sec 1 provides that except as expressly
provided by law, the writ of HC shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which a person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. P has not proven that she is
entitled to the rightful custody of the child. By completely shunting aside her legal and
moral obligations, she must be deemed as having forfeited all legitimate and moral claim
to her custody.
Burgos v. Macapagal-Arroyo
Petitioner Editha Brugos filed a petition for habeas corpus and writ of amparo in CA, for
the abduction and disappearance of his son Jonas Burgos by military elements, and
contempt due to the botched investigations conducted by the investigatory agencies of
the State. CA dismissed the HC and contempt actions but partially granted amparo. SC
ruled that further investigations be made in line with amparo but dismissed it with respect
to GMA due to prez immunity.
The established facts show that at around one oclock in the afternoon of April 28, 2007,
Jonas Joseph T. Burgos a farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa
Bulacan (a chapter of the militant peasant organization Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas) was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from
the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever
Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. On his way out of the restaurant,
Jonas told the manager, Maam aktibista lang po ako! When a security guard tried to
intervene, after he noticed that the group was forcibly dragging a male person out of the
restaurant, he was told, Pare, pulis! The guard then backed off but was able to see that
Jonas was forced into the rear portion of a plain maroon colored Toyota Revo with plate
number TAB 194.
Mother Brurgos held a press conference and announced that her son Jonas was
missing. That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the person
abducted was her son Jonas. Upon subsequent police investigation and LTO
verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu
XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong which was seized on June 24, 2006
by Cpl. Castro Bugalan and Pfc. Jose Villea of the 56th Infantry Battalion (IB) of the
Philippine Army for transporting timber without permit. As agreed upon by the DENR
employees and officers of the 56th IB, the vehicle with the license plate no. TAB 194 was
impounded in the 56th IB headquarters whose commanding officer at that time was Lt.
Col. Noel Clement. Prior to Jonas abduction, Mudlongs 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle
remained impounded at the 56th IBs Headquarters. In May 2007, right after Jonas
abduction was made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of this 1991
Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing, and the engine and other spare parts were cannibalized.
CA found that the evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her claimed direct
connection between the abductors of Jonas and the military. The CA noted that the
evidence does not show how license plate number TAB 194 (supposedly attached to the
1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle impounded at the 56th IB Headquarters) came to be attached to
the getaway Toyota Revo on April 28, 2007, and whether the two license plates are one
and the same at all. The CA emphasized that the evidence does not indicate whether the
abductors are members of the military or the police or are civilians; if they are civilians,
whether they acted on their own or were following orders, and in the latter case, from
whom.
The CA also found that the investigations by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the PNP leave much to be desired as they did not fully exert their effort to unearth
the truth and to bring the real culprits before the bar of justice. The CA held that since
the petitioner has established that the vehicle used in the abduction was linked to a
vehicle (with license plate number TAB 194) impounded at the headquarters of the 56th
IB, it became the burden of the AFP to exercise extraordinary diligence to determine the
why and the wherefore of the loss of the license plate in their custody and its
appearance in a vehicle (a maroon Toyota Revo) used in Jonas abduction.
The CA also ruled that the AFP has the burden of connect[ing] certain loose ends
regarding the identity of @Ka Ramon (as referred to by the petitioners witnesses) and
the allegation that @Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the Order of Battle.
As for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as rather shallow and conducted
haphazardly. The CA took note that P/Supt. Estomos investigation merely delved into
the administrative liability of Lt. Col. Clement, Lt. Col. Feliciano and Lt. Col. Caga of the
56th IB, and failed to consider them as suspects in the abduction of Jonas. The CA
emphasized that the PNP-CIDGs investigation should focus on the criminal aspect of the
present case pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, which mandates the PNP
to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders
to justice and assist in their prosecution.
Held
Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we
conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and
meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the
extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the
case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.
From the records, we note that there are very significant lapses in the handling of the
investigation - among them the PNP-CIDGs failure to identify the cartographic sketches
of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas based on their interview
of eyewitnesses to the abduction. This lapse is based on the information provided to the
petitioner by no less than State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the DOJ who identified
the persons who were possibly involved in the abduction, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas
(Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo
(Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence
Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP. No search and certification were ever made
on whether these persons were AFP personnel or in other branches of the service, such
as the Philippine Air Force. As testified to by the petitioner, no significant follow through
was also made by the PNP-CIDG in ascertaining the identities of the cartographic
sketches of two of the abductors despite the evidentiary leads provided by State
Prosecutor Velasco of the DOJ. Notably, the PNP-CIDG, as the lead investigating
agency in the present case, did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these
aspects of the case.
We note, too, that no independent investigation appeared to have been made by the
PNP-CIDG to inquire into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was
abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla
unit RYG. The records do not indicate whether the PNP-CIDG conducted a follow-up
investigation to determine the identities and whereabouts of @KA Dante and @KA
ENSO. These omissions were aggravated by the CA finding that the PNP has yet to
refer any case for preliminary investigation to the DOJ despite its representation before
the CA that it had forwarded all pertinent and relevant documents to the DOJ for the
filing of appropriate charges against @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO.
Based on these considerations, we conclude that further investigation and monitoring
should be undertaken. While significant leads have been provided to investigators, the
investigations by the PNP-CIDG, the AFP Provost Marshal, and even the Commission
on Human Rights (CHR) have been less than complete. The PNP-CIDGs investigation
particularly leaves much to be desired in terms of the extraordinary diligence that the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. For this reason, we resolve to refer the present
case to the CHR as the Courts directly commissioned agency tasked with the
continuation of the investigation of the Burgos abduction and the gathering of evidence,
with the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. We
take into consideration in this regard that the CHR is a specialized and independent
agency created and empowered by the Constitution to investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal
measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines.
Duty of CHR
Under this mandate, the CHR is tasked to conduct appropriate investigative
proceedings, including field investigations acting as the Courts directly commissioned
agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo with the tasks of: (a) ascertaining
the identities of the persons appearing in the cartographic sketches of the two alleged
abductors as well as their whereabouts; (b) determining based on records, past and
present, the identities and locations of the persons identified by State Prosecutor
Velasco alleged to be involved in the abduction of Jonas, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas
(Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo
(Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence
Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP; further proceedings and investigations, as
may be necessary, should be made to pursue the lead allegedly provided by State
Prosecutor Velasco on the identities of the possible abductors; (c) inquiring into the
veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA
DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (d) determining based on
records, past and present, as well as further investigation, the identities and
whereabouts of @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO; and (e) undertaking all measures, in the
investigation of the Burgos abduction that may be necessary to live up to the
extraordinary measures we require in addressing an enforced disappearance under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Dispositive
1) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate investigative
proceedings, including field investigations acting as the Courts directly commissioned
agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
(2) REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police to make available and to provide copies, to the Commission
on Human Rights, of all documents and records in their possession and as the
Commission on Human Rights may require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph T.
Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing
laws;
(3) DIRECT the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the Commission on
Human Rights the records and results of the investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to
have forwarded to the Department of Justice, which were not included in their previous
submissions to the Commission on Human Rights, including such records as the
Commission on Human Rights may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this
Resolution;
(4) Further DIRECT the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance to the
Commission on Human Rights as it may require, pursuant to the authority granted under
this Resolution;
(5) AUTHORIZE the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive and
exhaustive investigation that extends to all aspects of the case (not limited to the specific
directives as outlined above), as the extraordinary measures the case may require under
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and
(6) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court a Report with its
recommendations, copy furnished the petitioner, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within ninety (90) days from receipt of
this Resolution.
BUSCAYNO vs MILITARY COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-58284 || November 19, 1981 || AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
Bernabe Buscayno alias Commander Dante and Jose Ma. Sison alias Amado Guerrero,
alleged subversives, were wanted by the authorities since 1971. They were included in
the "National Target List" of active participants in the conspiracy to seize political and
state power and to take over the government by force. Their arrest was ordered under
'General Order No. 2 dated September 22, 1972.
Buscayno's case
 Subversion under RA 1700 (before Military Commission No. 2) - as ranking
leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arms, the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) and the New People's Army (NPA),
constituting an organized conspiracy to overthrow the government by force or
placing it under the control of an alien power, they committed subversive acts
(ie sponsoring NPA demonstrations in Malacanang and the US Embassy;
giving guns and ammunition to certain people for use against the government;
providing shelter to HMB and NPA members)
 Murder - Aquino, Buscayno, Peter Ilocano and Puriok, as conspirators, were
also charged with murder before Military Commission No. 2 in a charge sheet
dated August 7, 1973 for taking Cecilio Sumat, a barrio captain,, from his house
and killing him in Barrio San Miguel, Tarlac, Tarlac.
 Rebellion - Buscayno, with ninety-one other persons including Sison and his
wife, Juliet de Lima, Saturnino Ocampo and Mila Astorga-Garcia, were charged
with rebellion before Military Commission No. 1 in a charge sheet dated March
18, 1977.
o By organizing the Karagatan Fishing Corporation and operating the
M/V Karagatan a fishing vessel, to procure firearms and ammunition
for the CPP and NPA as in fact war materials and armanents were
landed at Digoyo Point, Palanan, Isabela on July 2, 1972 from
Communist China and were used against the army.)
o From August, 1973 to February, 1974- by acquiring, purchasing and
operating vessels, motor vehicles, beach houses, lots and other real
and personal properties for use in distributing firearms and ammunition
for the CPP and NPA to be utilized in resisting the army and
overthrowing the government.
Buscayno was arrested and detained in the Constabulary Security Unit at Camp Crame.
When he was informed that his presence at the hearing was necessary, Buscayno wrote
a letter to the President of the MC No. 2 and declared that he had no intention of
appearing before the tribunal; that he did not need a lawyer; that he would not contest
the tribunal's jurisdiction. He also waived his right to be present and to have counsel. He
said that he was not challenging any member of the tribunal. He just wanted to have a
record of the trial. He pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution had finished the
presentation of its evidence, Buscayno was asked whether he wanted to present
evidence. He answered in writing that he did not want to present evidence.
On July 18, 1977, Juan T. David entered his appearance as counsel for Buscayno and
filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition. Because there was no restraining order
issued, the case continued, without Buscayno presenting any evidence. He was found
guilty as charged and imposed death by firing squad. The complete records of the cases
were transmitted to the Secretary of National Defense.
But 4 days later, the President of the Philippines directed the Commission to reopen the
trial and give Aquino and Buscayno another chance to present their evidence. SC
enjoined the MC from rehearing their cases but no restraining order was actually issued.
SC dismissed Buscayno’s petition, reiterating the rule that a military tribunal has
jurisdiction to try civilians and that the proceeding in a military commission is not violative
of procedural due process and would not be vitiated by partiality.
On March 27, 1981, Military Commission No. 2 convened to hear Buscayno's evidence
in the subversion and murder cases. His counsel asked for postponement on the ground
that he requested the President of the Philippines to transfer the two cases to the civil
courts and that he should be furnished with the transcripts of the hearings held on
November 25 and December 5, 1977. The truth is that he was furnished with those
transcripts on January 8, 1978.
The postponement was granted. The hearing was reset for April 23. At the hearing on
that date, Buscayno's counsel again asked for postponement because the President had
not yet acted upon his request for the transfer of his cases to the civil courts. He
challenged the competency of the president of the Commission on the ground of lack of
adequate knowledge of the two cases. The challenge was rejected. Buscayno did not
present any evidence. The Commission considered the cases re-submitted for decision.
On May 4, 1981, the Commission denied Buscayno's motion for the reconsideration of
the ruling that his case was already submitted for decision. It reaffirmed its 1977 decision
imposing on Buscayno the penalty of death by firing squad.
Cases against Sison and spouses
 Rebellion – see Buscayno case
 Subversion before MC No. 6 under charge sheet dated Nov 16, 1972 - Juliet
Sison, with 55 others, became and have remained officers and ranking leaders
of the CPP and the NPA, the CPP's military arm, and the CPP's front
organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), Samahang
Demokratikong Kabataan (SDK), Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka
(MASAKA), Student Alliance for National Democracy (STAND), Movement for
Democratic Philippines (MDP) and Malayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan
(MAKIBAKA), whose objective is the overthrow of the government for the
purpose of establishing a totalitarian regime and placing the government under
the control and domination of an alien power.
 Subversion under PD No. 885 (which superseded RA 1700) before MC No. 25
in Case No. 113 as shown in the charge sheet dated October 3, 1978.
Like Buscayno, they also filed petitions for habeas corpus
On October 2, 1981, Buscayno and the Sison spouses filed the instant omnibus catchall
petition for habeas corpus, prohibition and mandamus couched in repetitious, involuted
and obfuscatory verbiage. They prayed that the decision of Military Commission No. 2
convicting Buscayno of subversion and murder and sentencing him to death by firing
squad, be declared void because he was denied his constitutional right to present
evidence and that he be released from detention.
They also prayed that the charges of rebellion and subversion be dismissed for being in
contravention of the rule on double jeopardy, that Military Commissions Nos. 1, 6 and 25
be enjoined from proceeding with the trial of the petitioners and that the petitioners be
released. They also prayed that they be granted bail.
ISSUE:
(Since this is a petition for HC) W/N they are legally detained - YES
RATIO:
Proclamation No. 2045 dated January 17, 1981, which terminated martial law, sanctions
the continued confinement of the petitioners. It provides (77 OG 441): “Provided, that in
the two autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the residents therein, the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall continue; and in all other
places the suspension of the privilege of the writ shall also continue with respect to
persons at present detained as well as others who may hereafter be similarly detained
for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or
on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith;”
Proclamation No. 2045 explicitly provides that persons, like Ps who are under detention
for rebellion and the capital offense of subversion, cannot enjoy the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. Because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to
them, they are not entitled to bail.
Re: Review of rulings of MC
Ordinarily, this Court cannot review the rulings and proceedings of the military
commission. The National Security Code, Presidential Decree No. 1498, which was
issued on June 11, 1978 (74 OG 11066), provides in its sections 86(f) and 87(e) that
what this Court can review are the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals in cases
appealed to it from the military commission.
So, the issue as to whether Buscayno was denied his constitutional right to present
evidence should first be passed upon by the reviewing military authority and not by this
Court. The propriety of the perpetuation proceedings in the rebellion case and the
conduct of the trial in the Commission cannot at this stage be passed upon by this Court.
Re: Alleged Repeal of Subversion Law
Juliet de Lima Sison contends that her criminal liability for subversion was extinguished
when PD No. 885 (which took effect on May 11, 1976, 72 OG 3826) repealed Republic
Act No. 1700. This contention is bereft of merit.
That decree, which is the Revised Anti-Subversion Law, in repealing or superseding RA
No. 1700, expressly provides in its section 7 that "acts committed in violation" of the
former law before the effectivity of the said decree "shall be prosecuted and punished in
accordance with the provisions of the former Act" and that nothing in the said decree
"shall prevent prosecution of cases pending for violation of" Republic Act No. 1700. That
saving or transitory clause is reenacted in section 14(i) of the National Security Code.
RE: Double Jeopardy
For an accused to be in jeopardy, it is necessary (1) that a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction is filed
against him; (2) that the charge is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and (3) that
after he had pleaded to the charge, he was convicted or acquitted or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
To be in jeopardy, the case against the accused must be terminated by means of a final
conviction, acquittal or dismissal without his express consent, If the case is not yet
terminated, then jeopardy does not set in.
As stated earlier, Buscayno was charged with subversion together with Aquino in a 1973
charge sheet. Jose Ma. Sison was charged with subversion in a 1978 charge sheet. His
wife, Juliet de Lima, was charged with subversion in a 1972 charge sheet. The three
petitioners were all charged with rebellion in an amended charge sheet dated November
8, 1977. Only the subversion case against Buscayno was decided but the decision is still
subject to review.
Because no case against the petitioners has been terminated, it is once evident that they
cannot invoke the rule on double jeopardy. The petitioners have not yet been placed in
jeopardy.
Petitioners contend that rebellion is an element of the crime of subversion. That
contention is not correct because subversion does not necessarily include rebellion.
Subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security. Rebellion is a crime against
public order.
The petitioners were accused of rebellion for having allegedly undertaken a public
uprising to overthrow the government. In contrast, they were accused of subversion for
being allegedly officers and ranking members of the Communist Party and similar
subversive groups. The alleged overt acts of resisting the armed forces were only
incidental to the main charge of being leaders of subversive or revolutionary
organizations collaborating with an alien power to make the country a satellite thereof,
like Cuba, North Korea and North Vietnam in relation to Soviet Russia.
In the instant case, the rebellion charge against the petitioners embraced the acts
committed by them on or about February 4, 1972 and during the period from August,
1973 to February, 1974. The subversion charge against Buscayno involved his acts
committed in 1965, 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1971. The subversion charge against the
Sison spouses referred to their acts committed in 1968 and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto. The common denominator of the rebellion and subversion charges
is that the petitioners committed overt acts as alleged communists or leftists. The overt
acts in the two charges are different.
Rebellion is an offense that has existed in the Penal Code for a long time. It may be
committed by non-communists without collaborating with the agents of an alien power. In
contrast, the crime of subversion came into existence when the communists sought to
dominate the world in order to establish a new social economic and political order.
XV. Writ of Amparo, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC; Writ of Habeas Data, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC
In the Matter of Petition for Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Favor of
Noriel Rodriguez
Rodriguez v Macapagal-Arroyo
GR 191805 | 16 April 2013 | Sereno, J.
FACTS
Petitioner narrated that at dawn on 9 September 2009, he noticed a soldier with the
name tag "Matutina," who appeared to be an official because the other soldiers
addressed him as "sir. He saw Matutina again at 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009,
when his abductors took him to a military operation in the mountains. He positively
identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his
abduction, detention and torture. These facts were further corroborated by Hermie
Antonio Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16 September 2009, wherein he
recounted in detail the circumstances surrounding the victim’s capture.
15 September 2009, at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, Wilma H. Rodriguez
appeared before the Gonzaga Police Station and requested to enter into the blotter that
her son, Noriel, was allegedly missing in Sitio Comunal, Gonzaga, Cagayan.
15 November 2011: SC promulgated its Decision in the present case affirming CA's
grant of writ of amparo with modification and granting the Petition for Partial Review in
G.R. No. 191805 and denying the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. Case was
dismissed with respect to PGMA, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W.
Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vincent Callagan
for lack of merit. SC directed the Ombudsman and the DOJ to take the appropriate
action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal
competence, that may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor lbrado, PDG.
Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De
Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ
ordered to submit to this Court the results of their action within a period of 6 months from
receipt of this Decision. In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their
respective posts, the directives mandated were enforceable against the incumbent
officials holding the relevant positions.
SC was convinced that CA correctly found sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of
the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military abducted P on 6
September 2009, and detained and tortured him until 17 September 2009.
6 January 2012: Rs filed their MR arguing that the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry
Division of the military cannot be held accountable for authoring the abduction and
torture of P. Their arguments revolve solely on the claim that Rs were never specifically
mentioned by name as having performed, permitted, condoned, authorized, or allowed
the commission of any act which would violate or threaten with violation the rights to life,
liberty, and security of P.
23 May 2012: Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales sent this Court requesting an
additional 2 month period, or until 24 July 2012, within which to submit a report.
Ombudsman stated P and his family refused to cooperate for security reasons.
18 January 2013: Ombudsman submitted the Investigation Report concluding that no
criminal, civil, or administrative liabilities may be imputed to Rs. It was reflected therein
that the lawyers for P stated that the latter are hesitant to appear before them for security
reasons, viz:
Karapatan (a non-governmental organization that provides legal assistance to victims of
human rights violations and their families) could not locate Noriel and Rodel. As of this
writing, the Rodriguezes refused to participate in the present fact-finding investigation
‘for security reasons.’
Recent information, however, revealed that Noriel and his family are no longer interested
in participating in the case.

The other accounts – specifically that of respondent Antonino C. Cruz, Special
Investigator II of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), as well as the claims of
respondents Mina and De Vera that they had disclosed to the CHR that Noriel had
become an agent ("asset") of the 17th Infantry Battalion – have been thoroughly
evaluated and ruled upon in SC's Decision.
We deny the MR.
ISSUE
WON grant of writ of amparo was proper – YES
RULING
The purported unwillingness of P to appear or participate at this stage of the proceedings
due to security reasons does not affect the rationale of the writ granted by the CA, as
affirmed by this Court. In any case, the issue of the existence of criminal, civil, or
administrative liability which may be imputed to the Rs is not the province of amparo
proceedings -- rather, the writ serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing
the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that
it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is
curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably
leading to subsequent investigation and action. In this case then, the thrust of ensuring
that investigations are conducted and the rights to life, liberty, and security of the
petitioner, remains.
The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the
petitioner. It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or even
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence.
No reversible error may be attributed to the grant of the privilege of the writ by the CA,
and the present motion for reconsideration raises no new issues that would convince us
otherwise.
Rs’ claim that they were not competently identified as the soldiers who abducted and
detained the petitioner, or that there was no mention of their names in the documentary
evidence, is baseless. The CA rightly considered Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay as
a meticulous and straightforward account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing
the manner in which he was captured and maltreated on account of his suspected
membership in the NPA.
Rs’ main contention in their Return of the Writ was correctly deemed illogical and
contradictory by the CA. They claim that Rodriguez had complained of physical ailments
due to activities in the CPP-NPA, yet nevertheless signified his desire to become a
double-agent for the military. The CA stated:
In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that P confided to his
military handler, Cpl. Navarro, that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he
experienced in the wilderness, and that he wanted to become an ordinary citizen again
because of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in the same Return,
respondents state that P agreed to become a double agent for the military and wanted to
re-enter the CPP-NPA, so that he could get information regarding the movement directly
from the source. If P was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to become an
ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that he would agree to become an undercover agent
and work alongside soldiers in the mountains to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA
comrades.
Rs conveniently neglect to address the findings of both the CA and SC that aside from
the abduction of Rodriguez, Rs, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened
the former’s right to security when they made a visual recording of his house, as well as
the photos of his relatives. The CA found that the soldiers even went as far as taking
videos of the photos of P's relatives hung on the wall of the house, and the innermost
portions of the house. There is no reasonable justification for this violation of the right to
privacy and security which strikes at the very heart and rationale of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo. More importantly, Rs also neglect to address our ruling that the failure to
conduct a fair and effective investigation similarly amounted to a violation of, or threat to
Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty, and security.
The writ’s curative role is an acknowledgment that the violation of the right to life, liberty,
and security may be caused not only by a public official’s act, but also by his omission.
Accountability may attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to
the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry,
but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance. The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective
The CA found that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG Verzosa, LT. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen.
Ochoa, Col. De Vera, and Lt. Col. Mina conducted a perfunctory investigation which
relied solely on the accounts of the military. Thus, the CA correctly held that the
investigation was superficial, one-sided, and depended entirely on the report prepared
by 1st Lt. Johnny Calub. No efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioner’s version of the
incident, and no witnesses were questioned regarding it. The CA also took into account
the palpable lack of effort from respondent Versoza, as the chief of the Philippine
National Police.
In the Matter of Petition for Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Favor of
Noriel Rodriguez
Rodriguez v Macapagal-Arroyo GR 191805 | 15 Nov 2011 | Sereno, J.
NATURE 2 consolidated cases:
(1) Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari dated 20 April 2010 (G.R. No. 191805),
(2) Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 19 August 2010 (G.R. No. 193160).
Both assail the 12 April 2010 CA Decision granting the writ of amparo and writ of habeas
data.
FACTS
P is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
Rs Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina
were officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan were
Special Investigators of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Region II.
P claims the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay
Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
6 September 2009: 5:00 p.m., P reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a tricycle
driven by Hermie Carlos when four men forcibly took him and forced him into a car.
Inside were several men in civilian clothes, one with a .45 caliber pistol. 3 more persons
arrived, 1 with a gun at his side. 2 men boarded the car, others rode on the tricycle. They
tied P, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back and started punching him. Car
moved around and travelled towards Sta. Teresita-Mission until about 2:00 a.m. The
men forced P to confess to being NPA, but he remained silent.
7 September 2009: Madaling-araw: Car entered a a military camp with soldiers all over
the area, and a banner with the word "Bravo". Camp belonged to the 17th Infantry
Battalion of the Philippine Army. Made to confess to being NPA and suffered repeated
hitting. His stomach was tied to a papag. Feared food might be poisoned, so he refused
to eat anything.
8 September 2009: Driven to Bugey and Mission. While passing houses along the way,
the men asked him if his contacts lived in those houses. When he failed to answer, a
soldier pointed a gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family. More
interrogation and beating.
9 September 2009: Soldiers with rifles took P and made him their guide to an NPA camp
in Birao. Harry, who, according to the soldiers, was an NPA member who had
surrendered called P a member of the NPA. Harry told the soldiers that P knew the area
well and was acquainted with a man named Elvis. Driven to Tabbak, Bugey. While
walking, P noticed a soldier with the name tag "Matutina," who appeared to be an official
because the soldiers addressed him as "sir." Soldiers located Elvis and forced P to
convince him to disclose the location of the NPA camp. P told them that he would reveal
the location of the NPA camp if they let Elvis go. Released Elvis around 3:00 p.m. that
day. Next three nights in the mountains.
12 September 2009: Mauling, driven to original military camp, mauled him again. In the
afternoon, they gave him an Alaxan tablet. Given a pen and a piece of paper, ordered to
write down his request for rice. Refused. Mauled.
13 September 2009: P forced to sign documents declaring that he had surrendered in an
encounter in Cumao, and that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a
military asset in May. Refused. Beaten. Compelled to sign, but used a different signature
to show coercion. P asked to identify photographs of persons. Refused. Asked to write
the name of his school and organization. Refused. Soldiers wrote something on the
paper, making it appear that he was the one who had written it, and forced him to sign.
Took photographs of him while he signing. No beating, just electrocution for 1 hour.
15 September 2009: 11 pm: P brought to a military operation in the mountains, where he
saw Matutina.
16 September 2009: During descent, soldiers took his picture and asked him to name
the location of the NPA camp. Returned to camp. Told to bathe and wear a white polo
shirt handed to him. Brought to the Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Ramil examined
him. Lied and told her that he merely slipped. Medical certificate indicated four
hematomas in the epigastric area, chest and sternum. At camp, soldiers took pictures of
him while he was eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in front of him
and again took his photograph. Odered to sign a piece of paper stating that he was a
surrenderee and was never beaten up. Signed. Warned not to report to media.
17 September 2009: 6am told to take a bath. Given jeans and perfume. During
breakfast, 2 soldiers reminded him not to disclose to media. 9am mom and bro arrived.
Bro told him the men accompanying them were from CHR: Pasicolan, Cruz and
Callagan. Cruz instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the CHR employees took
photographs of his bruises. A soldier tried to convince mom Wilma to let P stay for 2
weeks to prevent NPA from taking revenge on him. Refused. P and family missed flight
home. Soldiers accompanied them to CHR office, where P was made to sign an affidavit
stating that he was neither abducted nor tortured. Agreed. Rode CHR's Toyota Tamaraw
FX service vehicle. Lt. Matutina boarded. Upon reaching a mall in Isabela, P, his family,
Callagan, Matutina and two other soldiers transferred to an orange Toyota Revo with
plate number WTG 579. Upon reaching the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva
Viscaya, 1st Lt. Matutina alighted and called P to a diner. A certain Alan handed him a
cellphone with a SIM card. P and family then went home.
18 September 2010: Reached house in Sta. Ana, Manila. Callagan and two soldiers
went inside the house, and took photographs and a video as evidence of safe arrival.
19 September 2009: Dr. Pamugas, a physician trained by the International Committee
on Torture and Rehabilitation, examined P and issued a Medical Certificate stating that
the latter had been a victim of torture.
3 November 2010: P and GF Aileen Robles, noticed several suspicious-looking men
followed them at the MRT, in the streets and on a jeepney.
7 December 2009: P filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition
for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009. The petition
prayed for the following reliefs:
a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering Rs to desist from violating P's right to life,
liberty and security.
b. The issuance of an order to enjoin Rs from doing harm to or approaching P , his family
and his witnesses.
c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th
Infantry Division.
d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report
on P
e. Ordering records in any way connected to P, in custody of Rs, to be expunged,
forever barred from use.
15 December 2009: Writs granted, CA directed to hear petition.
Rs' DEFENSE: P had surrendered to the military on 28 May 2009 after he had been put
under surveillance and identified as "Ka Pepito" by former rebels. Wanting to bolt from
the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and Cpl. Navarro that he would help the military in
exchange for his protection. P signed an Oath of Loyalty and an Agent’s
Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society and become a military
asset. Acted as a double agent. Feared his NPA comrades were beginning to suspect
him so with his knowledge and consent, the soldiers planned to stage a sham abduction.

Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan: Exercised extraordinary diligence in locating P, facilitating
his safe turnover to his family and securing their journey back home to Manila. After
Wilma sought their assistance in ascertaining the whereabouts of her son, Cruz made
phone calls to the military and law enforcement agencies to determine his location. Cruz
spoke to Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that P was in their custody. CHR Regional
Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga ordered Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan to accompany
Wilma to the 17th Infantry Division. CHR officers observed his casual and cordial
demeanor with the soldiers. In any case, Cruz asked him to raise his shirt but did not see
any traces of torture.
12 April 2010: CA rendered its assailed Decision.
28 April 2010: Rs filed MR. Before CA could resolve this MR, P filed the instant Petition
for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 191805), raising the following assignment of
errors:
a. CA erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary protection order.
b. CA erred in saying: "(H)owever, given the nature of the writ of amparo, which has the
effect of enjoining the commission by respondents of violation to petitioner’s right to life,
liberty and security, the safety of petitioner is ensured with the issuance of the writ, even
in the absence of an order preventing respondent from approaching petitioner."
c. CA erred in not finding that GMA had command responsibility.
Rs comment that P had not presented competent or substantial evidence.
19 August 2010: PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Lt.
Col. Mina, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking
the reversal of the 12 April 2010 Decision for lack of competent evidence that they have
violated, are violating or threatening with violation his rights to life, liberty and security, as
well as his right to privacy; hence, he is not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo
and habeas data and their corresponding interim reliefs (i.e., inspection order, production
order and temporary protection order).
EXPLANATORY NOTES ON WRITS
Writs of amparo and habeas data were promulgated to ensure the protection of the
people’s rights to life, liberty and security in light of the alarming prevalence of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo took
effect on 24 October 2007, and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data on 2 February
2008.
The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the
petitioner. It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings. Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is
preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators
by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.
The writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. As an independent
and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy – especially the right to informational
privacy – the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any
finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are
proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the
database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or
information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or
rectification.
1st ISSUE and RULING
WON interim reliefs may be granted even if writs already granted – NO
P prays for the issuance of a temporary protection order. It must be underscored that this
interim relief is only available before final judgment according to Section 14 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo. [They cited entire section, please read it]
Yano v. Sanchez: "[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it
arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition." Being interim reliefs, they
can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must
be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails
the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant the writ of amparo, there is no
need to issue a temporary protection order. The order restricting respondents from going
near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.
2nd ISSUE and RULING
WON petition against GMA should be dismissed based on presidential immunity – NO
It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal
liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as
ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or
extrajudicial killing.
CA dismissed the petition with respect to former President GMA on account of her
presidential immunity from suit. P contends, though, that she should remain a
respondent in this case to enable the courts to determine whether she is responsible or
accountable therefor. CA's rationale for dropping her from the list of respondents no
longer stands since her presidential immunity is limited only to her incumbency.
[Constitutional Commission discussions regarding impeachment, immunity, and tenure
quoted here].
3rd Issue and Ruling
WON command responsibility doctrine available in petitions for writs of amparo and
habeas data – YES
Rubrico v. Arroyo: command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of commanders
for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons
subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." Although originally
used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also
found application in civil cases for human rights abuses in other jurisdictions like the
United States.
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold
military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or
threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command
responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary
international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it
should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable
for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so
as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate to protect
rights covered by the writ of amparo. The determination should not be pursued to fix
criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to
administrative disciplinary proceedings.
Nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in
amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances. The Separate Opinion of Justice Conchita Carpio-
Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus: That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative liability should not abate the
applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility. Indeed, one can imagine the
innumerable dangers of insulating high-ranking military and police officers from the
coverage of reliefs available under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The explicit adoption
of the doctrine of command responsibility in the present case will only bring Manalo and
Tagitis to their logical conclusion.
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command
responsibility in amparo cases to instances of determining the responsible or
accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order
to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement
whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court
does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to
be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of
the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of
criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate
government agency.
As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the
actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever
way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in
the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry,
but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance.
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo
proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of
the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior
and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the
command responsibility doctrine.
On the issue of knowledge, in the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and
superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. This view is buttressed by the
enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the Institutionalization of the
Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government Offices, particularly at all Levels
of Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies.
Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the
doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be
committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others
within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive
or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission.
Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a)
the acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts
have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c)
members of his immediate staff or office personnel are involved.
Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively
command, control and discipline the military.
4th Issue and Ruling
WON P has proven through substantial evidence that former President GMA is
responsible or accountable for his abduction – NO
P anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo
Commission" and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had
knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a climate of enforced
disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the NPA. Without even attaching,
or at the very least, quoting these reports, P contends that the Melo Report points to
rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a
policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not
automatically impute responsibility to former President GMA for each and every count of
forcible disappearance. No piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or
accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she
should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she
had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.
5th Issue and Ruling
WON P's rights to life, liberty, and property were violated by Rs – YES BY SOME
RESPONDENTS
CA correctly found sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry
Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military abducted Rodriguez on 6 September 2009,
and detained and tortured him until 17 September 2009.
P's Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and
straightforward account. Corroborated by Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay.
As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr.
Pamugas validate the physical maltreatment P suffered. They both concluded that P was
the victim of torture.
If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he
should have unhesitatingly assured his family on 17 September 2009 that he was among
friends. Instead, he vigorously pleaded with them to get him out of the military facility. In
fact, in the Sinumpaang Salaysay Wilma executed, she made the following averments:
18. Na nang Makita ko ang aking anak ay nakaramdam ako sa kanya ng awa dahil sa
mukha syang pagod at malaki ang kanyang ipinayat.
19. Na niyakap ko sya at sa aming pagkakayakap ay binulungan nya ako na wag ko
syang iiwan sa lugar na iyon;
Also, Rodel made the following supporting averments in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
3 December 2009:106
24. Na nang makita ko si Noriel, hindi sya makalakad ng diretso, hinang-hina sya, malaki
ang ipinayat at nanlalalim ang mga mata;
25. Na nang makita ko ang aking kapatid ay nakaramdam ako ng awa dahil nakilala ko
syang masigla at masayahin;
26. Na ilang minuto lang ay binulugan nya ako ng "Kuya, ilabas mo ako dito, papatayin
nila ako."
R's evidence contradictory: In the Return of the Writ, R AFP members alleged that P
confided to his military handler, Cpl. Navarro, that P could no longer stand the hardships
he experienced in the wilderness, and that he wanted to become an ordinary citizen
again because of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in the same Return,
Rs state that P agreed to become a double agent for the military and wanted to re-enter
the CPP-NPA. I
Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction,
detention and torture of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had
violated and threatened the former’s right to security when they made a visual recording
of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives. Matutina, by taking the said videos,
did not merely intend to make proofs of the safe arrival of petitioner and his family in their
home. 1Lt. Matutina also desired to instill fear in the minds of petitioner and his family by
showing them that the sanctity of their home, from then on, will not be free from the
watchful eyes of the military, permanently captured through the medium of a seemingly
innocuous cellhpone video camera.
As to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan, there was no substantial evidence to
show that they violated, or threatened with violation, Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and
security. Despite the dearth of evidence to show the CHR officers’ responsibility or
accountability, this Court nonetheless emphasizes its criticism as regards their capacity
to recognize torture or any similar form of abuse. The CHR, being constitutionally
mandated to protect human rights and investigate violations thereof, should ensure that
its officers are well-equipped to respond effectively to and address human rights
violations.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not
only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty
on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty.
In this case, respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina
are accountable, for while they were charged with the investigation of the subject
incident, the investigation they conducted and/or relied on is superficial and one-sided.
The records disclose that the military, in investigating the incident complained of,
depended on the Comprehensive Report of Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by 1Lt.
Johnny Calub for the Commanding Officer of the 501st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army. Such report, however, is merely based on the narration of the
military. No efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioner’s version of the subject incident
and no witnesses were questioned regarding the alleged abduction of petitioner.
Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the
governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the
arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution." In
this case, PDG Verzosa failed to order the police to conduct the necessary investigation
to unmask the mystery surrounding petitioner’s abduction and disappearance.
Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of
Rodriguez violated his right to security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must
be held responsible or accountable.
Nevertheless, it must be clarified that P was unable to establish any responsibility or
accountability on the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Calog
and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt. Tolentino had already retired when the abduction
and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while P/SSupt. Santos had already been
reassigned and transferred to the National Capital Regional Police Office six months
before the subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were
maintained against respondents Calog and Palacpac.
From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through
substantial evidence that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj.
Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible
and accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty and security on the
basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September
2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his allegations.
Thus, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor.
As a result, there is no longer any need to issue a temporary protection order, as the
privilege of these writs already has the effect of enjoining respondents in G.R. No.
191805 from violating his rights to life, liberty and security.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George
Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to take the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or
liabilities, within their respective legal competence, that may have been incurred by
respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen.
Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col.
Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the
results of their action within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.
In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the
directives mandated in this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against
the incumbent officials holding the relevant positions. Failure to comply with the
foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.
MERALCO, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA, Petitioners, vs.
ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent (G.R. No. 184769; October 5, 2010; J. Carpio-
Morales
FACTS. Rosario Lim (respondent), aka Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at
MERALCO. On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the
Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at
which respondent is assigned. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN
AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG
GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA
LOOB….
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen.
Respondent then reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of PNP.
Petitioner Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s HR Staffing, via a memorandum dated July 4,
2008, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa
as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of "…reports that
there were accusations and threats directed against her from unknown individuals and
which could possibly compromise her safety and security."
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Sapitula, VP and Head of
MERALCO’s HR Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so
she could voice her concerns on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the
transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel from her
residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the CBA provisions
on job security, respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security
in this wise:
I feel that it would have been better… if you could have intimated to me the nature of the
alleged accusations and threats so that at least I could have found out if these are
credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and
the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats
to be highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the
management apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and
environment which will make me a "sitting duck" so to speak, seems to betray the real
intent of management which is contrary to its expressed concern on my security and
safety… Thus, it made me think twice on the rationale for management’s initiated
transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the management supposedly
extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a
punitive one.
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer
pending resolution of said issues.
Since there was no response to her request, respondent filed a petition for the issuance
of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the RTC (Bulacan).
 According to respondent, petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of
their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details about the alleged
report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety
and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and
security, correctible by habeas data.
 Respondent prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a
written return containing the ff.:
o a full disclosure of the info. about respondent in relation to the report
purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety
and security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;
o the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such
data or information; and
o the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.
 Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO enjoining
petitioners from effecting her transfer.
The RTC directed petitioners to file their verified written return and then granted
respondent’s application for a TRO.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the ff.
grounds:
o resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and
o the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the NLRC.
The RTC granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a WPI directing
petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s transfer until such time that
petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
o RTC: Recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims of
extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like
respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners’
refusal to provide her with info. on the reported threats to her person.
Hence, the present petition for review under R45 and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data.
MERALCO’s Arguments:
o RTC has no jurisdiction over what is clearly a labor dispute. Although
ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially
questioning the transfer of her place of work by her employer and the terms and
conditions of her employment which arise from an employer-employee
relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under LC 217 have
jurisdiction. Thus, RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the
Memorandum transferring respondent’s place of work which is purely a
 management prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-2003expressly
prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in labor-related cases.
o The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ only
against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an
aggrieved party’s person, family or home. MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly
not engaged in such activities.
ISSUE: May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an
employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous
letter posted therein ─ imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to
leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?
RULING: NO. Petition is GRANTED. Respondent’s plea that she be spared from
complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum, under the guise of a quest for information or
data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of
habeas data.
Discussion on the Writ of Habeas Data
Sec. 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint
the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is
meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy,
thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and
security against abuse in this age of information technology.
Like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of
effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to
the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under
prevailing Rules.
Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario that the
writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful.
As applied in this case
Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of
the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her
transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment
- are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction
over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed
any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to
life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of
reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of
her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and
accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008
letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all." And she
even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betrays the real intent of
management" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the
issue is labor-related.
XVI. Writ of Kalikasan, Rule of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-
8-SC, Rule 7, Secs. 1-17
OPOSA v FACTORAN (G.R. No. 101083; July 30, 1993; J. Davide)
*Case title is so long that's why I didn't copy the whole thing.
**Case is so long also. Sorry for the long digest. 
***No discussion on the writ of kalikasan.
FACTS: The controversy started with a civil case filed before RTC Makati (Branch 66).
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is
the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corp. organized for the purpose of engaging in concerted action geared for the protection
of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was Fulgencio
Factoran, Jr., then DENR Sec. His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary,
Angel Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.
The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are
all citizens of the RP, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed
for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn." Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered
ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
— (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; and (2) Cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements; and granting the plaintiffs . . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION (copied the whole thing in case Ma’am asks)
8. 25 years ago, the Philippines had some 16 ha of rainforests constituting roughly 53%
of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million
hectares of said rainforests or 4.0% of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and
about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 ha per annum or 25 ha per
hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be
bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in par. 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced
and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs —
especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from
and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resource property he holds in trust
for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On
March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging
permits in the country.
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing
serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative
of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is
desertified , bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the
public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of
dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make
full and efficient use of natural resources." (Sec. 1, Art. XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Sec. 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources" (Sec. 14, Article
XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Sec. 16, Art. II, id.).
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law
— and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant
action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth.
Sec. Factoran filed a MtD the complaint based on 2 grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government.
Petitioners opposed and said (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of
action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
The RTC granted the MtD.
o Not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the Judge
further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Hence, the instant special civil action for certiorari under R65.
Petitioners' Arguments:
 The complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on NCC 19, 20
and 21, Sec. 4 of EO 192 creating the DENR, Sec. 3 of PD No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners also rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation per Sec. 4 of EO 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.
 The issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged GAD in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a
judicial question.
 The non-impairment clause does not apply in this case because TLAs are not
contracts. Even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled
that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
Respondents' Arguments:
 Petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. There's nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations do not reveal a valid cause of action.
 The question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political
question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. Therefore, the petitioners' recourse is not to file an action to court, but to
lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
 As to the cancellation of the TLAs, the same cannot be done by the State without due
process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time —
usually for 25 years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the
terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations.
ISSUE: WON the complaint states a cause of action
RULING: YES.
I. Bases of Petitioners' Right (to file the instant case)
A. The 1987 Constitution
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology. Sec. 16 & 15, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of
the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it
is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because
of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation
to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far
when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to
come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary
sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired
between Commissioner Villacorta and Commissioner Azcuna who sponsored the section
in question:
MR. VILLACORTA: Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all
forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA: Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful environment necessarily
carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions
may be provided for impairment of environmental balance.
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Without such forests, the ecological or
environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
B. EO 192 & Administrative Code of 1987
Then Pres. Cory Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 EO 192 (Providing for the
Reorganization of the Dept. of Environment, Energy & Natural Resources, Renaming it
as the DENR & For Other Purposes). Sec. 4 & 3 of this law states that:
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country’s environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the
public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be
provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom
for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos…
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure
the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the
protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of
the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's
natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as
well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system
including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987, specifically in Sec. 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino
people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing
the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development
and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments
of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
Sec. 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to
law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The DENR shall be primarily responsible for the implementation
of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization,
and conservation of the country's natural resources.
C. PD 1151 & 1152
Even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid
special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, PD 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and PD 1152 (Philippine
Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c)
to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity
and well-being.” As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as
trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." The latter statute,
on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
II. Re. Cause of Action
In a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore,
the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted.
In this case, the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, are adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may
thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that
insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
III. Re. Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise
of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions
from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the
Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Justice Cruz says: “… the new provision vests
in the judiciary, and particularly the SC, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with GAD. The catch, of course, is the meaning of
"GAD" which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the
disposition of the judiciary.”
IV. Re. Non-impairment of Contracts
In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not even invoke in his motion to dismiss
the non-impairment clause. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license must be read Sec. 20 of the Forestry Reform Code
(PD 705) which provides: “...Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit,
licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein...”
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Dir. of Forestry, the SC held: “… A timber license is not a
contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as
in this case.”
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant
case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet
be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a
violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose,
such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state
for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect
to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract
would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal,
the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
**Other issues:
Re. Class suit & locus standi
The civil case is a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of RP. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all
of them before the court. Also, the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites
for the filing of a valid class suit under Sec. 12, Rule 3 of the ROC are present both in
the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
Petitioner minors can represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm
and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.
***J. Feliciano's Concurring Opinion
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more
specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality
than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or
failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can
validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court
should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or
rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found
in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the
trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate,
instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause
of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to
have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants
may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words,
there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or
applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on
the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Article VIII of the Constitution.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose
concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel,
must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners'
entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber
companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession
agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate
about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual
nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures
to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
West Tower Condominium Corporation, on behalf of its residents, v. First
Philippine Industrial Corporation, First Gen Corporation, and their respective
Board of Directors and Officers
G.R. 194239 | June 16, 2015 | Velasco, Jr., J.
Facts:
Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: (1) the White Oil Pipeline
(WOPL) System, which covers a 117-kilometer stretch from Batangas to the Pandacan
Terminal in Manila and transports diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene; and (b) the
Black Oil Pipeline (BOPL) System, which extends 105 kilometers and transports bunker
fuel from Batangas to a depot in Sucat, Parañaque. These systems transport nearly 60%
of the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and parts of the provinces of Bulacan,
Laguna, and Rizal.
The two pipelines were supposedly designed to provide more than double the standard
safety allowance against leakage, considering that they are made out of heavy duty steel
that can withstand more than twice the current operating pressure and are buried at a
minimum depth of 1.5 meters, which is deeper than the US Department of
Transportation standard of 0.9 meters.
In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the
residents of West Tower Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within the
condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within the condominium premises led to
the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its inability to
control the flow, WestTower’s management reported the matter to the Police Department
of Makati City, which in turn called the city’s Bureau of Fire Protection.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair.
Eventually, the sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the City of
Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the drainage system of
Barangay Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of WestTower to
abandon their respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condo’s power was shut down.
Petitioner FPIC initially disowned any leak from its oil pipeline. Thus, the residents of
WestTower shouldered the expenses of hauling the waste water from its basement,
which eventually required the setting up of a treatment plant in the area to separate fuel
from the waste water.
On October 28, 2010, the University of the Philippines-National Institute of Geological
Sciences (UP-NIGS), which the City of Makati invited to determine the source of the fuel,
found a leak in FPIC’s WOPL about 86 meters from West Tower. A day after, or on
October 29, 2010, FPIC admitted that indeed the source of the fuel leak is the WOPL,
which was already closed since October 24, 2010, but denied liability by placing blame
on the construction activities on the roads surrounding West Tower.
On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.)
interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the
residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in
Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the
civil society and several people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and
public interest groups who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the
magnitude of the environmental issues involved.
In their petition, petitioners prayed that respondents FPIC and its board of directors and
officers, and First Gen Corporation (FGC) and its board of directors and officers be
directed to: (1) permanently cease and desist from committing acts of negligence in the
performance of their functions as a common carrier; (2) continue to check the structural
integrity of the whole 117-kilometer pipeline and to replace the same; (3) make periodic
reports on their findings with regard to the 117-kilometer pipeline and their replacement
of the same; (4) rehabilitate and restore the environment, especially Barangay Bangkal
and West Tower, at least to what it was before the signs of the leak became manifest;
and (5) to open a special trust fund to answer for similar and future contingencies in the
future. Furthermore, petitioners pray that respondents be prohibited from opening the
pipeline and allowing the use thereof until the same has been thoroughly checked and
replaced, and be temporarily restrained from operating the pipeline until the final
resolution of the case.
To bolster their petition, petitioners argued that FPIC’s omission or failure to timely
replace its pipelines and to observe extraordinary diligence caused the petroleum spill in
the City of Makati. Thus, for petitioners, the continued use of the now 47-year old
pipeline would not only be a hazard or a threat to the lives, health, and property of those
who live or sojourn in all the municipalities in which the pipeline is laid, but would also
affect the rights of the generations yet unborn to live in a balanced and “healthful
ecology,” guaranteed under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan with a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the
members of their Boards of Directors to file their respective verified returns. In
compliance with the writ, FPIC directors Edgar Chua, Dennis Javier, Dennis Gamab and
Willie Sarmiento submitted a Joint Return praying for the dismissal of the petition and the
denial of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan. They alleged that: petitioners had no legal
capacity to institute the petition; there is no allegation that the environmental damage
affected the inhabitants of two (2) or more cities or provinces; and the continued
operation of the pipeline should be allowed in the interest of maintaining adequate
petroleum supply to the public.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 2011, FGC and the members of its Board of Directors and
Officers filed a Joint Compliance submitting the report required by the Writ of
Kalikasan/TEPO. They contended that they neither own nor operate the pipelines,
adding that it is impossible for them to report on the structural integrity of the pipelines,
much less to cease and desist from operating them as they have no capability, power,
control or responsibility over the pipelines. They, thus, prayed that the directives of the
Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO be considered as sufficiently performed, as to them.
On January 21, 2011, FPIC, in compliance with the writ, submitted its 4-page “Report on
Pipeline Integrity Check and Preventive Maintenance Program.” In gist, FPIC reported
that pressure tests were conducted after the repair of the leak and results showed
negative leaks.
On February 9, 2011, petitioners filed, and the Court eventually granted, their Motion to
Set the Case for Preliminary Conference and Hearing pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. On April 15, 2011, the Court conducted an
ocular inspection of the WOPL in the vicinity of West Tower to determine the veracity of
the claim that there were two (2) additional leaks on FPIC’s pipeline. Results of the
ocular inspection belied the claim.
In the meantime, petitioners also filed civil and criminal complaints against respondents
arising from the same incident or leakage from the WOPL. Also, petitioners filed a
manifestation with omnibus motion, invoking the precautionary principle and asserted the
possibility of a leak in the BOPL System.
CA ordered FPIC to submit a certification from the DOE Secretary that the WOPL is
already safe for operation. Also, th creation of a special trust fund was denied for lack of
sufficient basis. It also held that FGC cannot be held solidarily liable under the TEPO.
Also, it ruled that the board of directors and officers cannot be held liable in their
individual capacities.
DOE issued a certification attesting that the WOPL is safe to resume commercial
operations, subject to monitoring and inspection requirements.
Issues:
1. WON West Tower Corp has legal capacity to represent the other petitioners.
Yes.
2. WON a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct
the respondents to desist from performing acts in order to preserve and protect
the affected environment. No.
3. Whether a special trust fund should be opened to answer for future similar
contingencies. No.
4. Whether FGC and the directors and officers of FPIC and FGC may be held
liable. Not answered by the Court.
Held:
1. There can be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of
its owners and residents. As to the residents of Brgy. Bangkal, they are similarly
situated with the unit owners and are real parties-in-interest to the instant case.
2. After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the
parties, the Court adopts the activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter
dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC as conditions for the resumption
of the commercial operations of the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed
with the implementation of the tests. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results
warrant the immediate reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order
allowing FPIC to resume the operation of the WOPL. On the other hand, should the
probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that
its condition is irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among
others, the closure of the WOPL may be ordered.
Moreover, it is notable that the DOE did not only limit itself to the knowledge and
proficiency available within its offices, it has also rallied around the assistance of
pertinent bureaus of the other administrative agencies: the ITDI of the DOST, which
is mandated to undertake technical services including standards, analytical and
calibration services; the MIRDC, also of the DOST, which is the sole government
entity directly supporting the metals and engineering industry; the EMB of the
DENR, the agency mandated to implement, among others, RA 6969 (Toxic
Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990) and RA 9275
(Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004); and the BOD of the DPWH, which is
mandated to conduct, supervise, and review the technical design aspects of projects
of government agencies.
The specialized knowledge and expertise of the foregoing agencies must, therefore,
be availed of to arrive at a judicious decision on the propriety of allowing the
 immediate resumption of the WOPL’s operation. In a host of cases, this Court held
that when the adjudication of a controversy requires the resolution of issues within
the expertise of an administrative body, such issues must be investigated and
resolved by the administrative body equipped with the specialized knowledge and
the technical expertise.
On the dissent by J. Leonen (see below), The following reasons easily debunk his
arguments:
1. The precautionary principle is not applicable to the instant case;
2. The DOE certification is not an absolute attestation as to the WOPL’s
structural integrity and in fact imposes several conditions for FPIC’s
compliance;
3. The DOE itself, in consultation with FPIC and the other concerned
agencies, proposed the activities to be conducted preparatory to the
reopening of the pipeline; and
4. There are no conclusive findings yet on the WOPL’s structural
integrity.
Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, on the Precautionary Principle, provides that “[w]hen there is
lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity
and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in
resolving the case before it.”
4. The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual directors
and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition for a writ of kalikasan,the Court
cannot grant the award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec.
15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA,
the civil case and criminal complaint filed by petitioners against respondents are the
proper proceedings to ventilate and determine the individual liability of respondents,
if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and the management of FPIC relative
to the dire environmental impact of the dumping of petroleum products stemming
from the leak in the WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.Hence, the Court will
not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC and FGC officials which can,
however, be properly resolved in the civil and criminal cases now pending against
them.
Leonen, J. (Dissent):
The dissent’s contentions that the case is already moot and academic, that the writ of
kalikasan has already served its function, and that the delay in the lifting of the TEPO
may do more harm than good are anchored on the mistaken premise that the
precautionary principle was applied in order to justify the order to the DOE and the FPIC
for the conduct of the various tests anew.

The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the
human activity sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the
environment, cannot be established with full scientific certainty. Here, however, such
absence of a link is not an issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence
of defects in the WOPL, which is the issue in the case at bar, is different from
determining whether the spillage of hazardous materials into the surroundings will
cause environmental damage or will harm human health or that of other organisms.
As a matter of fact, the petroleum leak and the harm that it caused to the
environment and to the residents of the affected areas is not even questioned by
FPIC.

It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL’s
compliance with pipeline structure standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a
question of fact that is to be determined on the basis of the evidence presented by
the parties on the WOPL’s actual state. Hence, our consideration of the numerous
findings and recommendations of the CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the
WOPL’s present structure, and not the cited pipeline incidents as the dissent
propounds.

3. Anent petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note that under
Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is
limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the environment. A
reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that
the prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies.This is
clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust fund under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the
environment that has presumably already suffered.