[55] Camaya v.
Patulandong denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in
GR No. 144915 | February 23, 204
Carpio-Morales, J.
Doncila
PETITONERS: CAROLINA CAMAYA, FERDINAND CAMAYA, EDGARDO CAMAYA and
ANSELMO MANGULABNAN
RESPONDENTS: BERNARDO PATULANDONG
TOPIC:
 ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS
CASE SUMMARY:
 In this case, testatrix sought to probate her will. During her lifetime, she executed a
codicil modifying her will by devising a property in favor of her four children. When
testatrix died, one of the testatrix’ children sought delivery of the title, but executor
refused due to the codicil. Hence, he filed an action to partition. On the other hand,
executor filed an action to probate the will which was granted, however, the petitioner
caused the TCT to be issued against his name. The probate court allowed the probate
of the codicil at the same time, declared null and void the TCT issued to petitioner.
According to the Court, it elucidated in Cuizon v. Ramolete limited jurisdiction of a
probate court, to wit: It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to
belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and
good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
 Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of
title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have
denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in
question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to
deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. x x x
 RULING:
DOCTRINE:
 In Cuizon v. Ramolete, the Court elucidated the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court, to wit: It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to
belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and
good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
 Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of
title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have
question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to
deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. x x x

FACTS:
 On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein she
devised Lot no. 288-A to her grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan. During her lifetime,
the testatrix herself filed the petition for the probate of her will before the CFI. Later,
on June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying her will by devising the
said Lot 288-A in favor of her four children Bernardo (the executor), Simplicia,
Huillerma and Juan (all surnamed Patulandong), and her grandson Mangulabnan – to
the extent of 1/5 each.
 Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of the title of
Lot 288-A, but Patulandong refused to heed the request because of the codicial which
modified the will of the testatrix. Thus, Mangulabnan filed an ‘action for partition’
against Patulandong in the RTC. The court in this partition ordered the partitioning
of the property. However, the court holds that ‘the partition is without prejudice to
the probate of the codicil in accordance with the Rules of Court.’ So, by virtue of the
decision in partition case, Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title of the
testatrix over Lot 288-A, and another TCT was issued in his name. Mangulabnan later
sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot no. 288-A by a Deed of Sale, and thus, a TCT
was issued under the name of the Camayas.
 However, come now the decision of the probate court admitting the codicil, and
disposing that the Deed of Sale in favor of the Camayas, and the corresponding TCT
issued in their name are null and void, and that the Register of Dees was ordered to
issue instead corresponding certificates of titles to the aforesaid four children of the
testatrix, and her grandson Mangulabnan to the extent of 1/5 each pursuant to the
codicil.
 The Camayas and Mangulabnan filed an MR. But the probate court denied this. The
CA affirmed the decision of the probate court. Thus, the case was brought to the SC
via a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
 (1) Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and void
and ordered the cancellation of the TCT of Camayas and the deed of sale.
 (2) Whether the final judgment in partition case bars the allowance of the codicil.
 Yes. According to the Court, it elucidated in Cuizon v. Ramolete limited
jurisdiction of a probate court, to wit: It is well-settled rule that a probate court or
one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
 Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of
title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have
denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in
 question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to
deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. x x x
 Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared
the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having had the effect of
depriving them possession and ownership of the property.
 Second issue: No. According ot]]to the Court, while the petitioners argue that by
allowing the codicil to probate, it in effect amended the final judgment in the partition
case which is not allowed by law; and that petitioner Camayas are innocent
purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful, the
argument does not persuade the Court. Though the judgment in the partition case had
become final and executory as it was not appealed, it specifically provided in its
dispositive portion that the decision was “without prejudice [to] … the probate of the
codicil.” The rights of the prevailing parties in said case were thus subject to the
outcome of the probate of the codicil. The probate court being bereft of authority to
rule upon the validity of petitioners’ titles, there is no longer any necessity to dwell on
the merits of petitioners Camayas’ claim that they are innocent purchasers for value
and enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful.
Dispositive:
 The decision allowing the codicil is AFFIRMED, but the 1) declaration as null and void of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. NT- 215750 issued on February 7, 1991 by the Register of Deeds of Nueva
Ecija in the name of Anselmo Mangulabnan, the February 19, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by him in favor of the intervenors–herein petitioners Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo Camaya,
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-216446 issued on March 18, 1991 in favor of the petitioners
Camayas, and 2) the order for the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of 8/31/2018
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 423 Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750
and NT- 216446 and reissue the corresponding Certificate of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong,
Juan R. Patulandong, Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan, Simplicia R. Patulandong
Mangulabnan, and Anselmo Mangulabnan to the extent of one-fifth (1/5) each pursuant to the
approved codicil are SET ASIDE, without prejudice to respondent and his co-heirs’ ventilation of
their right in an appropriate action. SO ORDERED.