Seek not the struggle,

find a way out instead

“Europe” must collapse

DIE ZEIT: You have often been resented for having criticized Europe as a purely economic
association. Meanwhile, it looks as if you were right: in the Greek crisis there was exclu-
sively talk about money. How do you assess the Greek drama, will Europe be torn in half?

Giorgio Agamben: There can be a Europe, as I want it, only if the really existing “Eu-
rope” collapses. That is why Greece – though bitterly disappointed by its political leaders –
could play a crucial role. You have talked about division: but if Greece actually left the Eu-
ropean Union, the true Europe would be in Athens, not Brussels, where – as the majority
of Europeans do not seem to know – every decision is made by commissions, half of which
are representatives of big industry in the related economic sector. First of all, to counter the
lie, this treaty between states, which is issued as a constitution, is to be the only imaginable
Europe, this institutionalized lobby free of ideas and future, which has blindly devoted it-
self to the bleakest of all religions, the religion of money, is to be the rightful heir to the Eu-
ropean spirit.

ZEIT: Does it have a symbolic meaning for you that the crisis comes from Athens? Hei-
degger would probably have said that in Athens a “Western path” comes to an end. What is
the deeper meaning behind the money crisis?

Agamben: That the significance of the crisis is beyond the scope of the economy can not
be ignored. If we reduce it to its economic aspect, we run the risk of missing out on the es-
sentials. Because the real question is: what is behind the global rule of the economic para-
digm? What are the deeper reasons for the suppression[displacement? ousting?] of the po-
litical by the economy? We are dealing with a problem that, beyond the particular interests
of capital owners and bankers, marks a decisive moment not only in the history of Europe
but also in the human species as such. The weakness of the Marxist tradition consists pre-
cisely in the fact that it has stopped at an economic analysis. The historical powers – poli-
tics, religion, art, and philosophy – which have guided the destinies of the West have no
longer been able, since no later than the First World War, to mobilize the peoples of Eu-
rope for specific purposes. Yes, the term “people” itself has lost its meaning, and the popu-
lations that have replaced it have not the slightest intention of taking on any historical task
– and that may be a good thing if you think of the tasks that were intended for the peoples
in the 19th and 20th centuries. This is the context in which the present domination of the
economic stands. In the absence of historical tasks, biological life has been declared the last
political assignment of the West. It turns out, then, that the rule of the economic paradigm
goes hand in hand with what has been commonly called biopolitics since Foucault: taking
care [Besorgung] of life as an eminently political task. However life as such is an empty
generic term, which, as Ivan Illich has shown, can designate both a sperm cell and a person,
a dog or a bee, an embryo or a cell. Therefore, economics either leads nowhere, or, as the
history of totalitarianism of the twentieth century and the currently ruling ideology of un-
limited economic growth shows, to the destruction of the life it has looked after [de
Lebens, dessen sie sich angenommen hat {sich jds. befasen/beschäftigen/kümmern/widmen}]
[administered].

ZEIT: If it is true that the economy leads to nothing and is not useful for anything, then
would one not have to completely turn around the mindset and ask to what extent the eco-
nomic crisis goes back to a spiritual and metaphysical crisis, at least to a crisis of European
culture?

Agamben: I did not say that economics is not useful for anything. On the contrary: it is
absolutely useful, pure service [Dienst] [ministry], mere utility. With it, human life enters
the sphere of commodities and tools. In combination with technology, it has replaced the
slave, the "living tool" of antiquity. My point is that the economy as such can neither know
nor decide what to serve. The same is true of the crisis that is talked about so much. I do
not remind for the first time that the Greek word crisis means “judgment” or “decision”. In
the medical tradition it refers to the moment in which the doctor has to decide whether the
patient will stay alive or die, in the theological one to the Last Judgement. Today the crisis
that has become daily and unforeseeable chooses only its own persistence, the postpone-
ment of any definitive decision. It is as if the servant who has become master did not know
what he could serve, if not the limitless increase of service and servitude. It is the paradoxi -
cal situation of a tool that has to decide what it should serve, and decides to serve itself.
Walter Benjamin, who spoke of capitalism as a religion, already knew that there is some-
thing religious about this unconditional “service”. In the name of this pseudo-religious ser-
vice are people, as in Greece, told how to live. In this respect one can speak of the fact that
the crisis is not merely economic. The meaning of philosophy – I prefer this word to that
of metaphysics – is to deal with the becoming-human of the human being. Anthropogene-
sis, the becoming-human of the animal, did not happen once and for all in the past; it is an
event, which is incessantly happening, an incomplete process in which it is decided
whether the human being becomes human, or does not remain or become human again.
Thinking is first of all the memory of this event, its repetition. It is concerned with the hu-
manity or inhumanity of the human being, so something that economists and financial ex-
perts have no idea of whatsoever.

The future of Europe is its past

ZEIT: Are all the signs the signs of a threatening decline or of a decadent late period that
could be the beginning of the end of the familiar Western world?
Agamben: When I said that the West is in an epochal situation today, in which the forces
that determined its history seem to have come to an end, I did not mean that they died.
The common ideas on this subject must be reversed into their opposite. Something be-
comes really topical and urgent exactly when it has become obsolete[?ausgedient?]. For
only now does it show itself in its fullness and truth. It may be that politics, religion, art,
and philosophy have come to an end of their historical development, but as long as we can
draw new life from the totality of their history, they are not dead. We are not living in any
posthistorical age, in which nothing can or should happen anymore. Rather, we live in a
time in which everything can occur, in which nothing less is at stake than the recapitulation
of all historical possibilities of the West. Humankind not only faces a paralyzing future that
has nothing to offer, but can also look back on the totality of its past, which gives it the
possibility to make new use of all that has ever been, or to live for the first time what re-
mains unlived in it. In the face of the interest of the ruling powers to outsource the past to
museums and dispose of their spiritual heritage, any attempt to enter into a living relation-
ship with the past is a revolutionary act. For this reason, I believe with Michel Foucault
that archeology – unlike futurology, which by definition is in the service of power – is
above all a political practice. The future of Europe is its past – of course on the condition
that it is at its height.

ZEIT: The western philosophy, that is, the philosophy of progress, usually wants to over-
come the past. We mostly feel superior to our ancestors because we have escaped all kinds
of horrors of the past, the slave society, absolutism, racism, eurocentrism, totalitarianism,
child labor, the oppression of women and so on. In earlier centuries, for example, I would
hardly have had an opportunity to talk to you. Of what forgotten treasures of the past are
you thinking when you say that the future of Europe lies in its past?

Agamben: There is a real misunderstanding here. For what I call living relationship with
the past interests me only insofar as it makes possible an access to the present. Michel Fou -
cault once said that his historical investigations are merely the shadow that his theoretical
questioning of the present casts on the past. I share this view completely. We can never
grasp the present, it will always escape us. Therefore, contemporaneity is the most difficult,
because truly contemporary is – as Nietzsche already knew – only the untimely. You cer-
tainly know Walter Benjamin's thesis that the present is not given as an isolated point in
the temporal continuum, but in a constellation with a moment of the past. It follows that
the relationship to the past poses not only an individual-psychological problem, but also a
collective-political one. Any decision about the present, whether in individual or collective
life, presupposes the relationship to a concrete moment of the past with which it must
come to terms with. Without this critical constellation there is no access to the present, it
remains impenetrable because, as the discourse of power is constantly trying to make us be-
lieve, it reduces itself to a collection of facts and figures which must be accepted without
contradiction. That's why I'm convinced that only archeology enables us access to the
present, because it traces back its course and is on the track of the shadows that the present
casts on the past.
ZEIT: That sounds pretty complicated: so the past that is supposed to revive us does not
exist yet as such?

Agamben: When I speak of the past, I mean neither a timeless origin nor something that
has irrevocably occurred and constitutes a sequence of irrefutable facts that must be col-
lected and stored in archives. Rather, I mean by the past something that is yet to come and
that must be torn from the dominant image of history so that it can happen. When I stud -
ied the genealogy of the state of exception, it was because I wanted to understand what was
occurring around me; when I examined the monastic rules, it was because they seemed to
me to open the possibility of a coming political practice. Moreover, I must confess that I do
not agree with you at all when you say, “the western philosophy, that is, the philosophy of
progress”. I know of no seriously considered philosopher who would have called himself
progressive. Every informed historian knows that the ideology of progress is nothing other
than one of the two sides – the left hand, so to speak – of capitalist ideology, whose death
throes we are just now witnessing. Unfortunately, it coincides with its most ludicrous and
frightening form: the idea of an infinite growth of the process of production.

Seek not the struggle, find a way out instead

ZEIT: Let's try to concretize the idea that Europe's future is in its past by using your exam-
ple of monastic life. Can the Franciscan way of life be a model for the exhausted Europe? Is
there a solution in the Christian ideal of poverty?

Agamben: To say it once again, it is not about a return to the Franciscan ideal, as it once
was, but rather about using it in a new way. My interest in monasticism was aroused
[weckte] by the fact [Umstand] that not infrequently people who belonged to the wealthi-
est and most educated class [Schicht] – as was the case with Basil the Great, Benedict of
Nursia, the founder of the Benedictine order, and later with Francis – took a decision to
drop out of [auszusteigen] the society in which they had lived so far, in order to found a
radically different community or, which in my opinion is the same, a radically different pol-
itics. This began at the same time as the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. The remark-
able thing is that it didn’t occur to these people to reform or improve the state in which
they lived, that is, to seize power in order to change it. [The remarkable thing is that these
people did not come to think of reforming or improving the state in which they lived, that
is, of seizing power to change it.] They simply turned their backs on it.

ZEIT: Like the dropouts [Aussteiger] of today who withdraw [zurückziehen] [move
back?] to the countryside and grow vegetables…

Agamben: I see here a certain analogy to the present situation. We are accustomed to un-
derstand radical political change as an episode [Folge] [result?] of a more or less violent
[gewaltsamen] revolution: a new political subject, called constituent violence [Gewalt]
since the French Revolution, destroys the existing political-legal order and establishes a new
constituted violence. I think the time has come to abandon this obsolete[?] model, to di-
rect our thinking to what might be called “destituent” or “abolishing [aufhebende] force
[Kraft]” — that is, a force that the form of a constituted violence absolutely cannot adopt.
Constituent violence corresponds to revolutions, uprisings and new constitutions, it is a vi-
olence that enforces [durchsetzt] [imposes?] new law. For the destituent force completely
different strategies must be devised, whose details a coming politics must determine [whose
form is to be determined by a coming politics?]. When power [Macht] is overturned only
by constituent violence, it inevitably reemerges from the constant, endless and hopeless
dialectic of constituent and constituted, law-making and law-preserving violence, in a dif-
ferent form.

ZEIT: Would it be advisable to develop a strategy of retreat [Rückzug] and flight [Flucht]
from modernity [der Moderne]?

Agamben: Indeed [In der Tat], I believe that the model of the struggle [Kampf] that has
paralyzed the political imagination of modernity should be replaced by the model of the
way out [Ausweg]. That, I think [as it seems to me], has become particularly clear in
Greece. Syriza had to surrender as it embarked on a losing [futile?] struggle and rejected
the only viable path: leaving Europe. Needless to say, this also applies to [one’s?] individual
existence. Kafka repeats it tirelessly: seek not the struggle, find a way out instead. Obviously,
the Faustian model of the struggle and the capitalist model of increasing productivity are
closely linked. What interested me most of all in the phenomenon of the monastic orders
was the appearance of a form-of-life [Lebensform], that is, a politics, based on flight and re-
treat. The Empire collapsed, the monastic orders persisted and preserved for us the heritage
whose transmission the state institutions – just as in our days the European schools and
universities, which are just[gerade][?] massively dismantled – could no longer perform[?].
I see such a thing [so etwa] [something of the kind?] coming our way too. Naturally, that
takes time. But already today this model is more or less openly practiced by young people.
There are more than three hundred communities of this kind in Italy alone. You will object
that what made monasticism possible was the faith that is certainly lacking today. That's
what Heidegger must have meant when he uttered[?] that ever-misunderstood phrase[?]
in the Spiegel interview: “only God can save us”. But what is faith? There is no doubt that
nowadays no intelligent person is willing to have faith in the institutions, including the
church, and in the existing values, especially as [since?] the latter can be reduced to the
euro, as we could very nicely see in Europe. The Greek word for “faith”, pisti, which is
used in the New Testament, originally means "credit" [Kredit], and money is nothing else
but a credit [Kredittitel] [credit guarantee?]. But this title [Titel] [guarantee?] is based –
especially since Nixon has abolished the dollar's gold standard – on nothingness. The Euro-
pean democracies, which call themselves secular, are based on an empty form of faith.
Based on a nothingness, on what is today called, with that seemingly venerable word, “Eu-
rope”. But a credit issued on nothingness cannot persist forever. What interested me in the
Franciscans was not so much poverty as the way in which they make use more important
than property [they take use more seriously than property?] [wichtiger nehmen]. The con-
cept of use is also at the center of my last book L'uso dei corpi (“The Use of Bodies”). To in-
vent a form-of-life that is not founded on deed [Tat {[1] einmalige Handlung, die etwa
Gute oder Böse bewirkt; [2] kurz für “(mutmaßliche) Straftat”}] [act? duty??] and prop-
erty, but on use – yet another[?] task that a coming politics must prescribe itself [must as -
sume?].

The human being is a being of potentiality

ZEIT: A few years ago you came forward with the suggestion of recalling something in the
European political life, what the French philosopher Alexandre Kojève called “the Latin
Empire”. Behind it lies a geophilosophical idea of the Mediterranean man and Mediter-
ranean thought, which also inspired Paul Valéry, Albert Camus and many others. What
you are now saying about the new forms-of-life that are not based on property reminds me
of the Mediterranean utopia, where moderation and modesty were central. Is Mediter-
ranean thinking the path to seek[sought path?] for Europe? Or is the attempt to withdraw
[zurückzuziehen] from the growth society just a dream for poets and a few marginal com-
munities?

Agamben: I understand what you want to say, however I would like to avoid formulations
such as “Mediterranean thinking”, which remain for me too vague. If in linguistics the ety-
mology of an Indo-European or, as one says in Germany, “Indo-German” word can not be
unequivocally clarified, reference is usually made to a “Mediterranean substrate”. We could
as well put down a big X, because we know almost nothing about these languages. On the
other hand, what we can say – without having to remain vague – is that, although for [ad-
mittedly?] complex and yet comprehensible historical reasons, the capitalist mode of pro-
duction, which began to enforce itself after the industrial revolution, encountered obstacles
and resistances in the countries of the Mediterranean region. Here was what Ivan Illich
called the vernacular sphere – those goods that are not bought on the market but produced
by each family on its own –, still largely intact. Capitalism, however, presupposes the com-
plete dependence of each individual on the market. As you know, there is nothing left to-
day that does not have to be bought on the market. So to answer your question: the persis-
tence of the vernacular sphere presupposes the survival of certain ideas and convictions
that, although never entirely eliminated in the countries of the North, were much more
widespread in southern Europe. Incidentally, I prefer to speak of “forms-of-life”, because
contrary to popular opinion it is anything but easy to distinguish between theory and
praxis. To make sense of the formulations “Mediterranean thinking” and “Latin empire”
one has to create a catalog of these ideas and practices or “forms-of-life”. It is the merit of
Ivan Illich to have initiated this work in a very intelligent way. Unfortunately the left tradi-
tion has had exclusively legal (human rights) and economic (labor, production) abstrac-
tions in mind and has never taken on forms-of-life. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is
inferior in all respects to capitalism with which it shares the fundamental concepts. That is
why, apart from the concept of use, a second concept is at the center of my most recent
book: the désœuvrement or inoperativity [Geschäftslosigkeit]. In my book I speak of inoper-
osità. It signifies neither idleness nor leisure, but a special form of activity which consists in
deactivating and abrogating [außer Kraft zu setzen] the works of economics, law, biology,
and so on, in order to open them to a new use. Aristotle once asked the most important
question: is there a work or an activity that is not destined for the human being as a shoe-
maker, architect, sculptor, and so on, but for the human being as such? Or is the human
being in himself workless, without an activity destined for him? I have always taken this
question seriously. The human being is the living being without proper [eigene] work,
since no special vocation can be assigned to it. Consequently, he is a being of possibility, of
mere potentiality. Genuinely human is only the activity that again opens the works
through their abrogation [Außerkraftsetzung] to the possibility and a new use. A striking
example, as it seems to me, is poetry. What is poetry other than a linguistic operation
which[that?] is to neutralize the informative and communicative functions of language in
order to open them to another use: the very use that is called poetry? Another example is
the festival. For the festival cannot be reduced, as in capitalist society, to an interruption of
work: above all, it is about doing [machen] what we usually do in other ways, that is, nulli-
fying it [zunichtezumachen] or rendering it ineffective [unwirksam zu machen]. If you eat,
then not to nourish; if you dress, then not to protect yourself from the cold; if you ex-
change objects, then not to buy or sell. I am firmly convinced that the different types of in -
operativity are as important to a society as the different types of production. Unfortu-
nately, Marx has been concerned exclusively with the investigation of the modes of produc-
tion and has completely neglected the modes of inoperativity. This one-sidedness explains
some aporias in his thinking, especially when it comes to the definition of human activity
in the classless society. From Marx's point of view, one could say that the classless society is
already present here and now in the inoperativity. To get back to your question: as you can
see, everything is already there, that is, the question about the center and the edges is set-
tled. It's about how each society comports itself [behaves?] towards this presence. What
poetry accomplishes for the capability to speak [Sprachvermögen], and the feast for produc-
tivity, politics and philosophy must do for the ability to act [Handlungsfähigkeit]: by abro-
gating [außer Kraft setzen] economic and biological activities, they show what the human
body is capable of [vermag], thus opening new ways of making use of it.

ZEIT: Then your philosophy of exit [Ausstiegs] and inoperativity offers a way out
[Ausweg] of the current crisis. Apparently, we must follow the advice that the poet Rainer
Maria Rilke gives us: “you have to change your life”. Is it about a radical renewal of our
form-of-life [Lebensform]?

Agamben: It's not just about changing our way of life [Lebenwiese]. All living beings obey
a way of life, but not all ways of life are or always are forms-of-life. When I speak of form-
of-life, I mean no other life, no better or truer life than that which we lead: form-of-life
dwells within all lives, a tension permeating every life, which abrogates [außer Kraft setzt]
the social identity and the legal, economic and even bodily circumstances in order to make
another use of them. So it's the same as with vocation: maybe it's good to have a vocation,
to become a writer, architect or whatever you want. But the true vocation is the revocation
of every vocation, it is a force that works within vocation, puts it into question, and lets it
become a true vocation. In the first letter to the Corinthians Paul brings this inner urge to
the formula of “as-if-not”: “he who has a wife behaves as if he has none, he who weeps as if
he does not weep, he who rejoices as if he does not rejoice…” To live in the sign of “as-if-
not” means to lay down [abzulegen] all legal and social qualities, without this laying down
[Ablegen] founding a new identity. In this sense, form of life [Form de Lebens] is that
which lays down all the social conditions under which one lives – by not denying the con -
ditions, but making use of them. Paul writes: “if at the moment you find yourself in a state
of slavery, do not worry about that. Even if you can become free, prefer to use your
bondage.” This, I believe, also applies to life in search of its form, a form from which it can
no longer be separated.

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ausstieg

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