MHP Garments vs C,

PUNO. C,J

Petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise
to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum
Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." 1

Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman,
and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioner
de Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance
and to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC).

Petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peñafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction
Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon City went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina
Public Market. Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display
at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts
were issued for the seized items. The items were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to petitioner
corporation for safekeeping.

A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. After a preliminary
investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents. On
February 6, 1984, he also ordered the return of the seized items. The seized items were not immediately
returned despite demands.

Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. 51144 against the petitioners for sums of money and
damages.

Issue

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO THE PETITIONERS
WHO DID NOT EFFECT THE SEIZURE OF THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE.

Held Yes

Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our people from unreasonable search and seizure

This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but
are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 6 In the case at bench, the seizure
was made without any warrant.

We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods.
Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items
and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced
by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. They
reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid was made on the stores of private
respondents and the supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression of time between the receipt of the
information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners
and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply
for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for
damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against
unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure were clearly illegal. There
was no probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched." 8 These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their
warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods

T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer
or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and
liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for
damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party.

Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted damages to
private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents
against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the
Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting
supplies. 11 As correctly observed by respondent court:

Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees'

(respondents') merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition
against appellees (respondents) were for the protection and benefit of appellant (petitioner)
corporation. Such being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer from those acts that it
was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation's instance that the PC soldiers conducted the
raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances should answer the trial court's
query — posed in its decision now under consideration — as to why the PC soldiers
immediately turned over the seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation. 12

The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger
to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he
was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. 13 So with the petitioner corporation which even
received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and
refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.

Secretary of defense vs Manalo

PUNO, C.J

Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the
suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture,
the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.

Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining
Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic
rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007.
The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as
amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered
the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court
with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of
official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the
Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of
the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.

HELD:

In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos
right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by
public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape,
the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their
life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured,
and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through
a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained. Distinguish the production order under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo from a search warrant.

The production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo should not be confused with a search warrant
for law enforcement under Art. III, sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It said that the production order should
be likened to the production of documents or things under sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
which states that “upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is
pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or
on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control.

The promulgation of the Amparo Rule was an exercise for the first time of the Supreme Court’s expanded
power to promulgate rules to protect our people’s constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance
in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime; The Amparo Rule
was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances”;
“Extralegal killings” are “killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings,” while enforced disappearances” are “attended by the following chargovernment
official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.”—
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule “in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing
and enforced disappearances.” It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power to
promulgate rules to protect our people’s constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the
1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. “Extralegal killings”
are “killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.”
On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are “attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places
such persons outside the protection of law

BAka itanong ni Sir

Purposes of the Writ of Amparo; In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been
constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under
military juntas.—The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving
into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country. It became, in the words of a justice
of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico’s self-attributed “task of conveying to the
world’s legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived.”
What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights
later evolved for several purposes: (1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent
to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes;
(3) amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4)
amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for the
protection of peasants’ rights derived from the agrarian reform process. In Latin American countries, except
Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses
especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-
encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.
Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of
the writ of amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction
or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102, these
remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances—the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of amparo through summary
proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule offers
a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof;

serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances—preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and, curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably

yield leads to subsequent investigation and action.—While constitutional rights can be protected under the
Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and
a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102, these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve
a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions—borne
out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses—offers a better remedy to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial
relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. The writ of
Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of
these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will
inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive
and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances