CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., plaintiffs-
Without special pronouncement as to
appellees, vs. DR. MANUEL SINGSON, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
Action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion
Florentino and Francisco Crisologo against Manuel Singson in
connection with a residential lot located at Plaridel St., Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square meters, and the
improvements existing thereon, covered by Tax No. 10765-C. Their
complaint alleged that Singson owned one half pro-indiviso of said
property and that Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by virtue
of the provisions of the duly probated last will of Doña Leona Singson,
the original owner, and the project of partition submitted to, and
approved by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in Special
Proceeding No. 453; that plaintiffs had made demands for the partition
of said property, but defendant refused to accede thereto, thus
compelling them to bring action.
Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a
mere usufructuary of, and not owner of one half pro-indiviso of the
property in question, and that, therefore, she was not entitled to demand
partition thereof.
After trial upon the issue thus posed, the lower court rendered
judgment as follows:
'1. Declaring that the plaintiff is a co-owner pro-
indiviso with the defendant of the house and lot
described in the complaint to the extent each of an
undivided 1/2 portion thereof;
"2. Ordering the aforesaid co-owners to
execute an agreement of partition of the said property
within 30 days from receipt of this judgment unless it be
shown that the division thereof may render it
unserviceable, in which case the provisions of Art. 498
of the New Civil Code may be applied;
"3. That in the event the said parties shall fail to
do so, this Court will appoint the corresponding
commissioners to make the partition in accordance with
law; and
"4.
costs."
From the above judgment, defendant Singson appealed.
It is admitted that Doña Leona Singson, who died single on
January 13, 1948, was the owner of the property in question at the time
of her death. On July 31, 1951 she executed her last will which was
admitted to probate in Special Proceeding No. 453 of the lower court
whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in G. R. No. 3605-
R. At the time of the execution of the will her nearest living relatives
were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, and her
nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolacion,
all surnamed Florentino.
Clause IX of her last will reads as follows:
"NOVENO. — Ordeno que se de a mi nieta por
parte de mi hermana mia y que al mismo tiempo vive en
mi casa, y, por tanto, bajo mi proteccion, y es la
CONSOLACION FLORENTINO: —
"(A). La mitad de mi casa de materiales fuertes
con techo de hierro galvanizado, incluyendo la mitad de
su solar, ubicado en la Poblacion de Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
Calle Plaridel, actualmente arrendada por los hermanos
Fortunato, Teofilo y Pedro del apellido Kairuz. Pero si
falleciere antes o despues que yo mi citada nieta, esta
propiedad se dara por partes iguales entre mis tres
hermanos Evaristo, Manuel y Dionisio, o a sus
herederos forzosos en el caso de que alguno de ellos
muriere antes. . . . . (Exhibit F)."
The issue to be decided is whether the testamentary
disposition above quoted provided for what is called sustitucion
vulgar or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria. This issue is, we believe,
controlled by the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code in force in the
Philippines prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code, in view of the
fact that the testatrix died on January 13, 1948. They are the following:
"ART. 774. The testator may designate one or
more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in
case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should
not wish or should be unable to accept the inheritance.
"A simple substitution, without a statement of
the cases to which it is to apply, shall include the three
 mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, unless the
testator has otherwise provided."
"ART. 785. Fidei-commissary substitutions by
virtue of which the heir is charged to preserve and
transmit to a third person the whole or part of the
inheritance shall be valid and effective, provided they do
not go beyond the second degree, or that they are made
in favor of persons living at the time of the death of the
testator."
"ART. 785. The following shall be inoperative:
1. Fiduciary substitutions not made expressly,
either by giving them this name or by imposing upon the
fiduciary the absolute obligation of delivering the
property to a second heir." . . . .
In accordance with the first legal provision quoted above, the
testator may not only designate the heirs who will succeed him upon his
death, but also provide for substitutes in the event that said heirs do not
accept or are in no position to accept the inheritance or legacies, or die
ahead of him.
The testator may also bequeath his properties to a particular
person with the obligation, on the part of the latter, to deliver the same
to another person, totally or partially, upon the occurrence of a particular
event (6 Manresa, p. 1112) .
It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under
consideration provides for a substitution of the heir named therein in this
manner: that upon the death of Consolacion Florentino — whether this
occurs before or after that of the testatrix — the property bequeathed to
her shall be delivered ("se dara") or shall belong in equal parts to the
testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced
heirs should anyone of them die ahead of Consolacion Florentino. If this
clause created what is known as sustitusion vulgar, the necessary result
would be that Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix,
became the owner of one undivided half of the property, but if it
provided for a sustitusion fideicomisaria, she would have acquired
nothing more than usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former
case, she would undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the latter.
As Manresa says, if the fiduciary did not acquire full ownership of the
property bequeathed by will, but mere usufructuary rights thereon until
the time came for him to deliver said property to the fideicomisario, it is
obvious that the nude ownership over the property, upon the death of
the testatrix, passed to and was acquired by another person, and that
person cannot be other than thefideicomisario. (6 Manresa, p. 145).
It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution
that an obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and
transmit to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him,
upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event. For this
reason Art. 785 of the old Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary
substitution shall have no effect unless it is made expressly ("de una
manera expresa") either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon
the first heir the absolute obligation ("obligacion terminante") to deliver
the inheritance to a substitute or second heir. In this connection
Manresa says:
"Para que la sustitucion sea fideicomisaria, es
preciso segun el art. 781, que se ordene o encargue al
primer heredero, cuando sea tal, que conserve y
transmita a una tercera persona o entidad el todo o
parte de la herencia. O lo que es lo mismo, la
sustitucion fideicomisaria, como declaran las
resoluciones de 25 de Junio de 1895, 10 de Febrero de
1899 y 19 de Julio de 1909, exige tres requisitos:
"1.o Un primer heredero llamado al goce de los
bienes preferentemente.
"2.o Obligacion claramente impuesta al mismo
de conservar y transmitir a un tercero el todo o parte del
caudal.
"3.o Un segundo heredero.
"A estos requisitos añade la sentencia de 18
de Noviembre de 1918, otro mas, el del que el
fideicomisario tenga derecho a los bienes de la herencia
desde el momento de la muerte del testador, puesto
que ha de suceder a este y no al fiduciario.
"Por tanto, cuando el causante se limita a
instituir dos herederos, y por fallecimiento de ambos o
de cualquiera de ellos, asigna la parte del fallecido o
fallecidos, a los herederos legitimos o a otras personas,
solo existe una sustitucion vulgar, porque falta el
requisito de haberse impuesto a los primeros herederos
la obligacion de conservar y transmitir los bienes, y el
articulo 789, en su parrafo primero, exige que la
sustitucion sea expresa, ya dandole el testador el
 nombre de sustitucion fideicomisaria, ya imponiendo al
sustituido la obligacion terminante de conservar y
transmitir los bienes a un segundo heredero."
A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under
consideration shows that the substitution of heirs provided for therein is
not expressly made of the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a
clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only
enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked
ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As
already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death — whether
this happens before or after that of the testatrix — her share shall
belong to the brothers of the testatrix.
In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the
last will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson established a
mere sustitución vulgar, the substitution of Consolacion Florentino by
the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the
death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the
testatrix.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed judgment is
affirmed, with costs.
Held:
WILLS AND TESTAMENTS; DESIGNATION OF HEIRS;
PURPOSE OF FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION. — It is of the
essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be clearly
imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to another the
whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon
the happening of a particular event.
Testate Estate of Ramirez v. Vda. de Ramirez, G.R. No. L-27952, [February
15, 1982])
Facts
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain with only his widow
as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch X. The administratrix of the estate submitted a
project of partition giving one part of the estate to the widow "en pleno
dominio'' in satisfaction of her legitime while the other part of the "free
portion" to his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, as the
oppositors-appellants. Furthermore, one third of the free portion is charged
with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in
favor of Wanda Wrobleski. Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed the project
of partition as well as the substitutions provided by the testator as to the
usufructs of the widow and of Wanda. Nonetheless, the lower court
approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. Jorge and
Roberto appealed.
The Supreme Court upheld the vulgar substitution of Wanda's usufruct
despite her having survived the testator as said substitution under Art 859 of
the Civil Code includes not only death but also refusal or incapacity to
accept the inheritance but disallowed the fideicommissary aspect of the
same as the substitutes are not related to the heir as required by Art. 863 of
the said Code. The Court further ruled that: (a) the widow who is entitled to
one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime is not entitled to the
one third usufruct over the free portion, hence the question on its substitution
has become moot and (b) that a usufruct in favor of an alien, albeit a real
right does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and therefore not
contrary to the Constitution.
Order modified.
||| 1. CIVIL LAW; TESTIMENTARY SUCCESSION; WILLS; WHEN
LEGITIME IS MORE THAN TESTATOR'S DISPOSITION; EFFECT. — The
widow who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her
legitime which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to
the one third usufruct over the free portions which is an additional share in
the estate that will run counter to the testator's intention.
2. ID.: ID.; ID.; SUBSTITUTION; DEFINITION. — "Substitution is the
appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in
default of the heir originally instituted" (Art. 857, Civil Code).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; KINDS. — There are several kinds of substitutions,
namely: simple or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and
fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code). According to Tolentino, Although the
Code enumerates four classes, there are really two principal classes of
substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are merely
variations of these two.'' (III Civil Code, p.185 [1973]). The simple or vulgar is
that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code while the fideicommissary
substitution is described in Art. 863 of the same Code.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VULGAR SUBSTITUTION; COVERAGE. — Vulgar
substitution is valid although the heir survived the testator or stated
differently did not predecease the testator because dying before the testator
is not the only case for vulgar substitution. It also includes refusal or
incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION; DEGREE OF
RELATIONSHIP REQUIRED; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Art.
863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted.'' Hence in the case at bar, appellants are correct in their claim that
the substitution is void because the substitutes are not related to the heir
originally instituted.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; I D.; MEANING OF "ONE DEGREE" EXPLAINED. —
"Scaevola, Maura, and Traviesas construe 'degree' as designation,
substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly
adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can be only one
transmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the
first heir. Manresa, Morell, and Sanchez Roman however, construe the word
'degree' as generation, and the present Code providing that the substitution
shall not go beyond one degree 'from the heir originally instituted.' The Code
thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one
generation from the first heir. From this, it follows that the fideicommissary
can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only
relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary." (Tolentino, I I
I Civil Code pp. 193-194 [1973]).
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION; OBLIGATION OF
FIDUCIARY TO DELIVER THE INHERITANCE TO THE SECOND HEIR. —
Fideicommissary substitution is void where there is no absolute duty
imposed on the first heir to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as
required by Arts. 865 and 857 of the Civil Code but in fact, the appellee
admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary
substitution when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold
upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners."
|||
FACTS
PCIB vs ESCOLIN
Facts:
In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas
made a will. In May 1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines
(Iloilo City), she died.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton
Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her will that should her husband later
die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.
In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here).
Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the probate
court (there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain
Avelina Magno may be appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno
was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada
manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk
in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to have Magno
appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.
Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for
the said will. Since said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as
admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the
probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually still, the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno
refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the
property to Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is her will, the same
must be respected. Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the
time of her death (an alien testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code,
successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas
law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes
(Charles’ share in the estate).
PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws
because Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death
(applying the renvoi doctrine).
ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both
parties failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court
held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be
resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The
Supreme Court however emphasized that Texas law at the time of
Linnie’s death is the law applicable (and not said law at any other time).
N THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED REV. FATHER TEODORO ARANAS, RAMONA
B. VDA. DE ARANAS, ADELIA B. ARANAS-FERNANDEZ,
HEIRS OF THE LATE RODULFO B. ARANAS, ETC., ET
AL., petitioners, vs. VICENTE B. ARANAS AND HON. LUIS
B. MANTA, respondents.
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to declare the orders of
respondent Judge dated July 16, 1980 and September 23, 1980 as an
exercise of a gross abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, by
ruling that the properties under Group C of the testate estate of the late Fr.
Teodoro Aranas are subject to remunerative legacies.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on January
19, 1953. He had executed on June 6, 1946 his Last Will and Testament
which was admitted to probate on August 31, 1956. In said Last Will and
Testament, Fr. Teodoro Aranas stipulated the following:
A. The return to Aniceto Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired by Fr.
Aranas from his brother Aniceto Aranas and ten (10) parcels of land
described in the Will inherited by the testator from his parents.
B. The return to Carmelo Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired by Fr.
Aranas from his brother Carmelo Aranas and ten (10) parcels of land
described in the Will inherited by the testator from his parents.
C. The special administration of the remainder of the estate of the testator by
Vicente Aranas, a faithful and serviceable nephew and designating him also
as recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties after deducting the
expenses for the administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to be given
to the Catholic Church for the eternal repose of the testator's soul. Said
pertinent provision 1 reads as follows:
"Fourth. It is my will that the lands I had bought from
other persons should be converged and placed under a
'special administrator.' The special administrator of
these lands, for his office, should receive one half of all
the produce from which shall be deducted the expenses
for the administration, and the other half of the produce
should be received by the Roman Catholic Church and
should be spent for my soul, Vicente B. Aranas
(Tingting), because he is a faithful and serviceable
nephew, should be the first special administrator of said
properties, without bond, until his death or until he
should not want to hold the said office anymore. Anyone
of the sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the
said office of special administrator, and none other than
they. Their father, my brother Carmelo Aranas shall be
the one to decide who among them shall hold the said
office, but upon the death of my said brother Carmelo
Aranas, his said sons will have power to select the one
among themselves. The special administration is
perpetual."
The lower court in its Order 2 dated November 17, 1977 ruled, upon
petitioners' (in Sp. Proc. No. 303) "Motion for the Declaration of Heirs and
Partition; and for Removal of the Administrator (Vicente Aranas) and/or for
his Permission to Resign, and appointment of His Successor" that the
"perpetual inalienability and administration of the portion of the estate of the
late Rev. Fr. Teodoro Aranas, administered by Vicente Aranas, is null and
void after twenty years from January 19, 1954 . . ." and declared in the same
order the heirs of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas. It also declared that "the
removal of Vicente Aranas will, therefore, not serve the ends of justice and
for the best interest of all the heirs, particularly with respect to the portion of
the estate taken by the heirs of Aniceto Aranas, represented by the
petitioners herein and the rest of the heirs of Carmelo, represented by the
intervenors, co-heirs of Administrator Vicente Aranas." 3
However, the abovesaid Order was subsequently set aside upon the "Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration and to Declare Testate and Intestate Heirs of the
late Fr. Teodoro Aranas," filed by the administrator Vicente Aranas on the
allegation that said order was violative of due process and without legal and
factual basis because only the issue for the removal of the administrator was
heard and not the matter of the declaration of heirs. Thus, the lower court
declared in its Order. 4 dated July 16, 1980 that the Order dated November
17, 1977 is "set aside and in the interest of justice, reopened in order that
other heirs, successors-in-interest of Felino Aranas, 5 could likewise assert
their claims, as in the case of the heirs of Aniceto Aranas and Carmelo
Aranas." 6
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the lower court in
its order dated September 23, 1980, petitioners now come before Us by
certiorari raising the issue that the lower court erred in setting aside its order
dated November 17, 1977 and in not applying the provisions on Usufruct of
the New Civil Code with respect to the properties referred to as Group "C" in
the Last Will and Testament. prLL
The court ruled in its questioned order that this particular group of properties
(Group "C") is subject to the following:
"1. Remunerative legacy by way of usufruct of the net
proceeds of 1/2 of the estate after deducting expenses
for administration in favor of Vicente Aranas, during his
lifetime and shall continue an administrator of the
estate, and, who, upon his death or refusal to continue
such usufruct, may be succeeded by any of the brothers
of the administrator as selected by their father, Carmelo
Aranas, if still alive or one selected by his sons if, he,
Carmelo, is dead; Pursuant to the Will. (Article 562, 563,
564 and 603 of the New Civil Code).
"2. Legacy in favor of the Roman Catholic Church,
particularly the Archbishop diocese of Cagayan de Oro
City Represented by the Reverend Archbishop Patrick
H. Cronin over one-half of the proceeds of the
properties under Group "C." (Article 603, New Civil
Code) and to last for a period of Fifty years from the
effective date of the legacy, Article 605, New Civil
Code)." (Annex "L-14," p. 87, Rollo)
Assailing the aforementioned ruling, petitioners rely heavily on the doctrine
laid down in Art. 870 of the New Civil Code to wit:
"Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or
part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years
are void."
A cursory reading of the English translation of the Last Will and Testament
shows that it was the sincere intention and desire of the testator to reward
his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services by allowing
him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's third group of properties
until Vicente's death and/or refusal to act as administrator in which case, the
administration shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his
sons and upon Carmelo's death, his sons will have the power to select one
among themselves. Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right
to enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result from the
normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property, with the obligation
to return, at the designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases
its equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties is
temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his
death or his refusal. Likewise his designation as administrator of these
properties is limited by his refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run
counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners. Be it
noted that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other
benefits arising from the usufruct. Neither are the naked owners (the other
heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of which has been given to Vicente
Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership without prejudice
of course to Vicente's continuing usufruct. To void the designation of Vicente
Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the desire and the
dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and unselfish services
rendered during the time when said testator was seriously ill or bed-ridden.
The proviso must be respected and be given effect until the death or until the
refusal to act as such of the instituted usufructuary/administrator, after which
period, the property can be properly disposed of, subject to the limitations
provided in Art. 863 of the Civil Code concerning a fideicommissary
substitution, said Article says:
"A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the
fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the
obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir
the whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and
shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted,
and provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir and
the second heir are living at the time of the death of the
testator."
It is contended by petitioners that the ruling made by respondent court dated
November 17, 1977 was already final and not subject to correction as what
was set aside and to be reheard was only regarding the determination of
additional heirs. Such contention is not worthy of credence. Respondents in
their Memorandum allege and it is not disputed by petitioners that the order
of November 17, 1977 has not yet become final because it was received
only on January 12, 1978 by the counsel for respondent Vicente Aranas and
the Motion for Reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate
heirs dated January 17, 1978 was filed by the said respondent within the
reglementary period. Besides the validity or invalidity of the usufructuary
dispositions would affect the determination of heirs. cdll
As to petitioners' allegation that the order of July 16, 1980 is without basis,
the record shows that during the hearing of the urgent motion for
reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate heirs, it was
proven conclusively by the said respondent Vicente B. Aranas that he was
instituted as a remunerative legatee per mandate of the Last Will and
Testament by way of usufructuary. Likewise the right of the Roman Catholic
Church as the other usufructuary legatee for the duration of the statutory
lifetime of a corporation, that is, 50 years from the date of the effectivity of
said legacy, was also established. 7