G.R. No.
208790 January 21, 2015 Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not
GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner,
vs.
MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 rendered on January
29, 2013 and Resolution2 issued on August 7,
2013 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 96448. The CA set aside the Decision3 dated
January 29, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 30, in Civil Case
No. SP-6564(09), which declared the marriage
between Glenn Vifias (Glenn) and Mary Grace
Parel-Vifias (Mary Grace) as null and void.
Antecedents
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25
and 23 years old, respectively, got married in civil
rites held in Lipa City, Batangas.4 Mary Grace was
already pregnant then. The infant, however, died
at birth due to weakness and malnourishment.
Glenn alleged that the infant’s death was caused
by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking
during her pregnancy.
The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn
worked as a bartender, while Mary Grace was a
production engineer.
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the
home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn
subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to
work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was
filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5 for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary
Grace.He alleged that Mary Grace was insecure,
extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly
resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the
house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and
drank and smoked heavily even whenshe was
pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to perform
even the most essential household chores of
cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary
Grace had not exhibited the foregoing traits and
behavior during their whirlwind courtship.6
In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained
remorseful about the death of the infant whom she
delivered. She lived as if she were single and was
unmindful of her husband’s needs. She was self-
centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn
confronted her about her behavior, she showed
indifference. She eventually left their home without
informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that she left
for an overseas employment in Dubai.7
Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary
Grace, he consulted the latter’s friends. They
informed him that Mary Grace came from a broken
family and was left to be cared for by her aunts and
nannies. The foregoing circumstance must have
contributed to her sense of insecurity and difficulty
in adjusting to married life.8
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought
professional guidance and submitted himself to a
psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist
Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as
"amply aware of his marital roles" and "capable of
maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual
relationship."9
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary
Grace’s personality through the data she had
gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito
Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Graceway back
in college.
Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She
is a college graduate. She belongs to a middle
class family. Her father is an overseas contract
worker, while her mother is a housewife. At the
time Dr. Tayag prepared her report, Mary Grace
was employed in Dubai and romantically involved
with another man.10
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally
abused and physically harmed Glenn during the
couple’s fights. Mary Grace is also ill-tempered
and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and family-
oriented.11
Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering
from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-
social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace
and Glenn’s relationship is not founded on mutual
love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to
each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the
propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s
marriage.12
essence of morality [and] has certainly learned set
that:
The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to
be severe, serious, grave, permanent and chronic
in proportion and is incurable by any form of
clinical intervention. It has already been deeply
embedded within her system as it was found to
have started as early as her childhood years.
Because of such, it has caused her to be inflexible,
maladaptive and functionally[-]impaired especially
with regards to heterosexual dealings.
Such disorder of [Mary Grace]is mainly
characterized by grandiosity, need for admiration
and lack of empathy[,] along with her pattern of
disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,]
which utterly distorted her perceptions and views
especially in terms of a fitting marital relationship.
Such disorder manifested in [Mary Grace] through
her unrelenting apathy, sense of entitlement and
arrogance. Throughout her union with [Glenn], she
has exhibited a heightened sense of self as seen
in her marked inability to show proper respect for
her husband. x x x She is too headstrong that most
of the time[,] she would do things her own way and
would not pay close attention to what her husband
needed. She had been a wife who constantly
struggled for power and dominance in their
relationship and [Glenn], being too considerate to
her, was often subjected to her control.x x x She is
into many vices and loved hanging out with her
friends at night[,] and she even got involved in an
illicit relationship[,] which was still going on up to
the present time. x x x.
The root cause of [Mary Grace’s]personality
aberration can be said to have emanated from the
various forms of unfavorable factors in her milieu
way back as early as her childhood years[,] which
is the crucial stage in the life of a person as thisis
the time when the individual’s character and
behavior are shaped. [Mary Grace] came from a
dysfunctional family with lenient and tolerating
parents[,] who never impose any restrictions
[upon] their children. Considering such fact, she
apparently failed to feel the love and affection of
the nurturing figures that she had[,] who were
supposed to bethe first to show concern [for] her.
x x x She has acquired a domineering character as
she was not taught to have boundaries in her
actions because of the laxity she had from her
caregivers and also because she grew up to be the
eldest in the brood. She sees to it that she is the
one always followed with regards to making
decisions and always mandates people to submit
to her wishes. She has not acquired the very
of unconstructive traits that further made her too
futile to assume mature roles. Morals and values
were not instilled in her young mind that as she
went on with her life, she never learned to restrain
herself from doing ill-advised things even if she
isamply aware of the depravity of her actions.
The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of
a juridical antecedence as it was already inher
system even prior to the solemnization of her
marriage with [Glenn]. x x x.13 (Underlining ours)
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC
a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of his
marriage with Mary Grace. Substituted service of
summons was made upon Mary Grace through
her aunt, Susana Rosita.14 Mary Grace filed no
answer and did not attend any of the proceedings
before the RTC.
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr.
Tayag and Rodelito were offered as evidence.
Glenn and Rodelito described Mary Grace as
outgoing, carefree, and irresponsible. She is the
exact opposite of Glenn, who is conservative and
preoccupied with his work.15 On her part, Dr.
Tayag reiterated her findings in the psychological
report dated December 29, 2008.
Ruling of the RTC
On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its
Decision16 declaring the marriage between Glenn
and Mary Grace as null and void on account of the
latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC cited
the following as grounds:
The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn]
warrants [the] grant of the petition. Reconciliation
between the parties under the circumstances is nil.
For the best interest of the parties, it is best that
the legal bond between them be severed.
The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness
[Rodelito] portray the miserable life [Glenn] had
with [Mary Grace] who is a Narcissistic Personality
Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and who
does not treat him as her husband. [Glenn] and
[Mary Grace] are separated in fact since the year
2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned [Glenn] without
telling the latter where to go. x x x Had it not for the
insistence of[Glenn] that he would not know the
whereabouts of his wife. The law provides that [a]
husband and [a] wife are obliged to live together,
[and] observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. x x
x For all intents and purposes, however, [Mary
Grace] was in a quandary on what it really means.
x x x.
From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established
that [Mary Grace] failed to comply with the basic
marital obligations of mutual love, respect, mutual
help and support. [Glenn] tried his best to have
their marriage saved but [Mary Grace] did not
cooperate with him. [Mary Grace] is x x x,
unmindful of her marital obligations.
The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of
[Dr. Tayag], a clinical psychologist with sufficient
authority to speak on the subject of psychological
incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and was able to
gather sufficient data and information about [Mary
Grace]. x x x This [Narcissistic] personality
disorder of[Mary Grace] is ingrained in her
personality make-up, so grave and so permanent,
incurable and difficult to treat. It is conclusive that
this personal incapacity leading to psychological
incapacity is already pre-existing before the
marriage and was only manifested after. It has
become grave, permanent and
incurable.17 (Underlining ours and italics in the
original)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved
for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC
in its Order18dated December 1, 2010.
The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA
On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no
competent evidence exist proving that Mary Grace
indeed suffers from a Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her
marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision
failed to cite the root cause of Mary Grace’s
disorder. Further, the RTC did not state its own
findings and merely relied on Dr. Tayag’s
statements anent the gravity and incurability of
Mary Grace’s condition. The RTC resorted to mere
generalizations and conclusions sansdetails.
Besides, what psychological incapacity
contemplates is downright incapacity to assume
marital obligations. In the instant case,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were
shown, but these do not warrant the grant of
Glenn’s petition. Mary Grace may be unwilling to
assume her marital duties, but this does not
translate into a psychological illness.19
Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of
the OSG’s appeal.
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein
assailed decision reversing the RTC ruling and
declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary
Grace as valid and subsisting. The CA stated the
reasons below:
In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
held that "psychological incapacity" should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, asso expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity"
to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated. The
psychological condition must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.
In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that
[Mary Grace] was carefree, outgoing, immature,
and irresponsible which made her unable to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. He
likewise alleged that she refused to communicate
with him to save the marriage and eventually left
him to work abroad. To Our mind, the above
actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out a case
of psychological incapacity on her part.
While it is true that [Glenn’s] testimony was
corroborated by [Dr. Tayag], a psychologist who
conducted a psychological examination on
[Glenn], however, said examination was
conducted only on him and no evidence was
shown that the psychological incapacity of [Mary
Grace] was characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability.
Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be
of persuasive value in determining the
psychological incapacity of a person as she would
be in the best position to assess and evaluate the
psychological condition of the couple, she being
an expert in this field of study of behavior. Although
the psychologist stated that respondent was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
she did not fully explain the root cause of the
disorder nor did she makea conclusion as to its
gravity or permanence. Moreover, she admitted
that she was not able to examine the respondent[,]
hence, the information provided to her may be
subjective and self-serving. Essential in this
petition is the allegation of the root causeof the
spouse’s psychological incapacity which should
also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the
decision. The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriageand shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the parties
to assume the essential obligations of marriage as
set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225
of the Family Code and such non-complied marital
obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition,
established by evidence and explained in the
decision.
Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of
his witness did not establish the root cause of the
psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] nor was
such ground alleged in the complaint. We reiterate
the ruling of the Supreme Court on this score, to
wit: the root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be: a) medically or clinically identified; b)
alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently proven by
experts; and d) clearly explained in the decision.
Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
and Molina, has this to say:
"Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological– not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis x x x[,] nevertheless[,]
suchroot cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists."
The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim,
that"Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves". It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party evenbefore the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume." Psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage.
From the foregoing, We cannot declare the
dissolution of the marriage of the parties for the
obvious failure of [Glenn] to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability; and for his failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in the afore-cited cases.
Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to [Glenn]. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted from the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family.20 (Citations
omitted, underlining ours and emphasis and italics
in the original)
The CA, through the herein assailed
Resolution21 dated August 7, 2013, denied the
Motion for Reconsideration22filed by Glenn.
Issue
Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court
the issue of whether or not sufficient evidence exist
justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Mary Grace.
In support thereof, Glenn points out that each
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
should be judged according to its own set of facts,
and not on the basis of assumptions, predilections
or generalizations. The RTC judge should pains
takingly examine the factual milieu, while the CA
must refrain from substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court.23 Further, Glenn argues that
in Marcos v. Marcos,24 the Court ruled that it is not
a sine qua non requirement for the respondent
spouse to be personally examined by a physician
or psychologist before a marriage could be
declared as a nullity.25 However, if the opinion of
an expert is sought, his or her testimony should be
considered as decisive evidence.26 Besides, the
findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of
the witnesses should be respected.27
In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the
OSG emphasizes that the arguments Glenn raise
for our consideration are mere reiterations of the
matters already resolved by the CA.28
Ruling of the Court
The instant petition lacks merit.
The lack of personal examination orassessment of
the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is
not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to."29
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative
testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and
the documentary evidence offered do not
sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and
incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The
evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is
outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to perform
household chores. Further, she is employed in
Dubai and is romantically-involved with another
man. She has not been maintaining lines of
communication with Glenn at the time the latter
filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the
other hand, is conservative, family-oriented and is
the exact opposite of Mary Grace. While Glenn
and Mary Grace possess incompatible
personalities, the latter’s acts and traits do not
necessarily indicate psychological incapacity.
Rumbaua v. Rumbaua30 is emphatic that:
In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that
respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his
marital obligations, or was unwilling toperform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor – an adverse integral element in
the respondent’s personality structure that
effectively incapacitated him from complying with
his essential marital obligations – had to be shown
and was not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn
refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was
doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven
to be rooted in some psychological illness. x x x
Likewise, the respondent’s act of living with
another woman four years into the marriage
cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no
specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was
a trait already existing at the inception of marriage.
In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent
was caring and faithful when they were going
steady and for a time after their marriage; their
problems only came in later.
x x x To use the words of Navales v. Navales:
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance ofand to assume basic
marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of marital obligations
or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness. Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage and not due to
some psychological illness that is contemplated by
said rule.31 (Citations omitted, underlining ours
and emphasis in the original)
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived
with each other for more or less seven years from
1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact
shows that living together as spouses under one
roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace’s departure
from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal
or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to
comply with her obligation to live with her husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not
personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a
greater burden to present more convincing
evidence to prove the gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability of the former’s
condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect.
Glenn’s testimony is wanting in material details.
Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of
Glenn. Glenn’s statements are hardly objective.
Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to
Mary Grace’s traits and acts, which she exhibited
during the marriage. Hence, there isnary a proof
on the antecedence of Mary Grace’s alleged incurable" – is an unfounded statement, not a
incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months necessary inference from her previous
before they got married, they saw each other characterization and portrayal of the respondent.
almost everyday.32 Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring While the various tests administered on the
and well[-]educated person"33 in Mary Grace. petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to
assess her own psychological condition, this same
statement cannot be made with respect to the
Anent Dr. Tayag’s assessment of Mary Grace’s
respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and
condition, the Court finds the same as
generalizations on the respondent’s psychological
unfounded.1âwphi1 Rumbaua34provides some
condition based on the information fed by only one
guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the
side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of
petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage,
the content of such evidence.
viz:
xxxx
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s
conclusions about the respondent’s psychological
incapacity were based on the information fed to A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals
her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias that she failed to establish the fact that at the time
in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this the parties were married, respondent was already
circumstance alone does notdisqualify the suffering from a psychological defect that deprived
psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, him of the ability to assume the essential duties
testimony and conclusions deserve the application and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she
of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the adequately explain howshe came to the
manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. conclusion that respondent’s condition was grave
Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the and incurable. x x x
prism of a third party account; she did not actually
hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he
xxxx
would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s
probes.
First, what she medically described was not
related or linked to the respondent’s exact
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the
condition except in a very general way. In short,
petitioner’s narrations, and on this basis
her testimony and report were rich in generalities
characterized the respondent to be a self-
but disastrously short on particulars, most notably
centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person
on how the respondent can besaid to be suffering
who "believes that the world revolves around him";
from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to
and who "used love as a…deceptive tactic for
what extent the disorder is grave and incurable;
exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended
how and why it was already present at the time of
towards him." x x x.
the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the
respondent’s awareness of and his capability to
We find these observations and conclusions undertake the duties and responsibilities of
insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to marriage. All these are critical to the success of the
warrant the conclusion that a psychological petitioner’s case.
incapacity existed that prevented the respondent
from complying with the essential obligations of
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis
marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on
respondent’s narcissistic personality disorder and
what the petitioner related toher. x x x If a
to prove that it existed at the inception of the
psychological disorder can be proven by
marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating
independent means, no reason exists why such
nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the
independent proof cannot be admitted and given
respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
credit. No such independent evidence, however,
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological,
appears on record to have been gathered in this
not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but
case, particularly about the respondent’s early life
conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report
and associations, and about events on orabout the
– i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic
time of the marriage and immediately thereafter.
Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial
Thus, the testimony and report appearto us to be
Personality Disorder declared to be grave and
no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the
one-sided and meagre facts that the petitioner BIENVENIDO L. REYES
related, and were all slanted to support the Associate Justice
conclusion that a ground exists to justify the
nullification of the marriage. We say this because
only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life
were examined and given focus; none of these
qualities were weighed and balanced with the
better qualities, such as his focus on having a job,
his determination to improve himself through
studies, his care and attention in the first six
months of the marriage, among others. The
evidence fails to mention also what character and
qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage,
for example, why the respondent’s family opposed
the marriage and what events led the respondent
to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother,
if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these
are important because not a few marriages have
failed, not because of psychological incapacity of
either or both of the spouses, but because of basic
incompatibilities and marital developments that do
not amount to psychological incapacity. x x
x.35 (Citations omitted and underlining ours)

In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general

references to Mary Grace’s status as the eldest
among her siblings,36her father’s being an
overseas contract worker and her very tolerant
mother, a housewife.37 These, however, are not
sufficient to establish and explain the supposed
psychological incapacity of Mary Grace warranting
the declaration of the nullity of the couple’s
marriage.

The Court understands the inherent difficulty

attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses
who can attest to the antecedence of a person’s
psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does
not exempt a petitioner from complying with what
the law requires. While the Court also
commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes, the
totality of the evidence presented provides
inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that
Mary Grace is indeed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her obligations as
Glenn’s spouse.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

The Decision dated January 29, 2013 and
Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 109975. February 9, 2001]
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA
MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision[1]of
the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 34378, which affirmed the decision of
the Regi onal Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil
Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of
Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16
years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20
years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent
Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.[2] The marriage
certificate was issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino begot two children,
namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16,
1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21,
1982.[3] Their birth certificates were issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on
October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in
District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the
back of the house of their in-laws.[4] A week after
the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family
without explanation. He would disappear for
months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then
disappear again. During the times when he was
with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with
friends and would return home drunk. He would
force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and
if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on
her.[5]
On October 1993, he left his family again
and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda
was constrained to look for a job in Olongapo City
as a manicurist to support herself and her
children. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was
imprisoned for some crime,[6] and that he escaped
from jail on October 22, 1985.[7] A certification
therefor dated February 14, 1990, was issued by
Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-
large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code.[8] Since Avelino could not
be located, summons was served by publication in
the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general
circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17,
1990.[9] Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to
establish jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on
December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation
of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel
appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her
sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the
brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in
Olongapo City but they spend their vacations at
the house of Avelinos parents in Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino always
quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long
at the couples house. She knew that Avelino had
been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied
Erlinda and the children.[10]
Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial
court issued an Order giving the investigating
prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in
writing whether or not he would present
controverting evidence, and stating that should he
fail to file said manifestation, the case would be
deemed submitted for decision.
In compliance with the Order, the
investigating prosecutor conducted an
investigation and found that there was no collusion
between the parties. However, he intended to
intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of
evidence.[11]
On December 27, 1990, without waiting for
the investigating prosecutors manifestation dated
December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a
decision[12] declaring the marriage of Erlinda and
Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code,
disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing
considerations, the Court hereby declares the
marriage celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija
between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7
September 1975 to be null and void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija
is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of
Marriage this declaration after this decision shall
have become final and executory.
SO ORDERED.
On January 29, 1991, the investigating
prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment
on the ground that the decision was prematurely
rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991
to manifest whether he was presenting
controverting evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision
on the ground that the same is not in accordance
with the evidence and the law. After requiring
Erlinda to comment, the trial court denied the
Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated
August 21, 1991 as follows:[13]
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of
the Decision of this Honorable Court dated
December 27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General.
The observation of the movant is to the effect that
Mere alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough
to show psychological incapacity. Nor is
abandonment. These are common in marriage.
There must be showing that these traits, stemmed
from psychological incapacity existing at the time
of celebration of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged
as the husband left his wife and children since
1983. The defendant, while in jail escaped and
whose present whereabouts are unknown. He
failed to support his family for the same period of
time, actuations clearly indicative of the failure of
the husband to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage defined and enumerated
under Article 68 of the Family Code. These
findings of facts are uncontroverted.
Defendants character traits, by their nature,
existed at the time of marriage and became
manifest only after the marriage. In rerum natura,
these traits are manifestations of lack of marital
responsibility and appear now to be incurable.
Nothing can be graver since the family members
are now left to fend for themselves. Contrary to the
opinion of the Solicitor-General, these are not
common in marriage.
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the
New Family Code, to assuage the sensibilities of
the more numerous church, is a substitute for
divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p.
36) in order to dissolve marriages that exist only in
name.
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the
motion for Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court
of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error
that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING
APPELLEES MARRIAGE TO AVELINO DAGDAG
NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE
LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE
FAMILY CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE
CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING
BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.[14]
On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision[15] affirming the decision of the
trial court, disposing thus:
Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated
not only because he failed to perform the duties
and obligations of a married person but because
he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an
alcoholic, and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff
is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code. Defendants constant non-
fulfillment of any of such obligations is continously
(sic) destroying the integrity or wholeness of his
marriage with the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family
Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p.
46).[16]
Hence, the present petition for
review,[17] filed by the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General contends that the
alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino
Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated by
Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him,
the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase psychological
incapacity and an incorrect application thereof to
the facts of the case. Respondent, in her
Comment, insists that the facts constituting
psychological incapacity were proven by
preponderance of evidence during trial.
At issue is whether or not the trial court and
the Court of Appeals correctly declared the
marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, on the ground that the husband
suffers from psychological incapacity as he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual
alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides -
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field
of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In
regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case
is on all fours with another case. The trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and
the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court.[18]
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,[19] the Court laid down the following
GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis,
233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their I dos. The
manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code[20] as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code[21] in regard to parents and their children. autonomous social institution and marriage as the
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV,
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
included in the text of the decision. favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, supra.)[24]
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, WHEREFORE, the present petition is
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CV No.
34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to No pronouncement as to costs.
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General SO ORDERED.
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[22]
Taking into consideration these guidelines,
it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the
above-mentioned evidentiary requirements.
Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which
requires that the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified
and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the
alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.
Further, the allegation that the husband is a
fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In
fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not
even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was
likewise not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence since the trial courts
decision was prematurely rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals,[23] we affirmed the dismissal of the trial
court and Court of Appeals of the petition for
annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence
presented. We further explained therein that -
Moreover, expert testimony should have been
presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in
order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is
mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic

[G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002]
LENI O. CHOA, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO
C. CHOA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Though interlocutory in character, an
order denying a demurrer to evidence may
be the subject of a certiorari proceeding,
provided the petitioner can show that it was
issued with grave abuse of discretion; and
that appeal in due course is not plain,
adequate or speedy under the
circumstances. Indeed, when the plaintiffs
evidence is utterly and patently insufficient to
prove the complaint, it would be capricious
for a trial judge to deny the demurrer and to
require the defendant to present evidence to
controvert a nonexisting case. Verily, the
denial constitutes an unwelcome imposition
on the courts docket and an assault on the
defendants resources and peace of mind. In
short, such denial needlessly delays and,
thus, effectively denies justice.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the March 16, 2000
Decision[1] and the May 22, 2000
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR SP No. 53100. The decretal portion
of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.[3]
The assailed Resolution denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[4]
The Facts
Petitioner and respondent were
married on March 15, 1981. Out of this
union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne
and Albryan. On October 27, 1993,
respondent filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch
51, a Complaint[5] for the annulment of his
marriage to petitioner. The Complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 93-
8098.Afterwards he filed an Amended
Complaint[6] dated November 8, 1993 for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner based on her alleged
psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial with respondent
presenting his evidence in chief. After his
last witness testified, he submitted his
Formal Offer of Exhibits[7] dated February
20, 1998. Instead of offering any objection
to it, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
(Demurrer to Evidence)[8] dated May 11,
1998. The lower court then allowed a number
of pleadings to be filed thereafter.
Finally, the RTC issued its December
2, 1998 Order[9] denying petitioners
Demurrer to Evidence. It held that
[respondent] established a quantum of
evidence that the [petitioner] must
controvert.[10] After her Motion for
Reconsideration[11] was denied in the March
22, 1999 Order,[12] petitioner elevated the
case to the CA by way of a Petition for
Certiorari,[13] docketed as CA-GR No.
53100.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the denial of the
demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence,
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court was not available. The proper remedy
was for the defense to present evidence;
and if an unfavorable decision was handed
down later, to take an appeal
therefrom.[14] In any event, no grave abuse
of discretion was committed by respondent
judge in issuing the assailed Orders.[15]
The CA also ruled that the propriety of
granting or denying a demurrer to evidence
rests on the sound exercise of the [trial]
courts discretion.[16] Further, the [p]etitioner
failed to show that the issues in the court
below [had] been resolved arbitrarily or
without basis.[17]
Hence, this Petition. [18]
The Issues
In her Memorandum,[19] petitioner
submits the following issues for our
consideration:
1) Upon the denial of petitioners demurrer
to evidence under Rule 33 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, is she under
obligation, as a matter of inflexible rule, as
what the Court of Appeals required of her,
to present her evidence, and when an
unfavorable [verdict] is handed down,
appeal therefrom in the manner authorized
by law, despite the palpably and patently
weak and grossly insufficient or so
inadequate evidence of the private
respondent as plaintiff in the annulment of
marriage case, grounded on psychological
incapacity under Art. 36 of The Family
Code? Or under such circumstances, can
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be
directly and immediately resorted to by the
petitioner; and
2) In upholding the lower courts denial of
petitioners demurrer to evidence, did the
Court of Appeals wantonly violate, ignore
or disregard in a whimsical manner the
doctrinal pronouncements of this Court in
Molina (G.R. No. 108763, February 13,
1997, 268 SCRA 198) and Santos (G.R.
No. 112019, January 14, 1995, 58 SCRA
17)?[20]
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is
certiorari available to correct an order
denying a demurrer to evidence? and (2) in
its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse
of discretion by violating or ignoring the
applicable law and jurisprudence?
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Resort to Certiorari
Petitioner argues that the RTC denied
her Demurrer to Evidence despite the patent
weakness and gross insufficiency of
respondents evidence. Thus, she was
entitled to the immediate recourse of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Echoing
the CA, respondent counters that appeal in
due course, not certiorari, is the proper
remedy.
We clarify. In general, interlocutory
orders are neither appealable nor subject to
certiorari proceedings.
However, this rule is not
absolute. In Tadeo v. People,[21] this Court
declared that appeal -- not certiorari -- in due
time was indeed the proper
remedy, provided there was no grave abuse
of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or
oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules
of Court expressly recognize this exception
and allow certiorari when the lower court
acts with grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of an interlocutory order. Rule 41
provides:
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxxxxxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxxxxxxxx
In all the above instances where the
judgment or final order is not appealable,
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65. [22]
In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as
follows:
SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.[23]
Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
may be assailed through a petition for
certiorari.[24] In Cruz v. People, this
exception was stressed by the Court in this
wise:
Admittedly, the general rule that the
extraordinary writ of certiorari is not
available to challenge interlocutory orders
of the trial court may be subject to
exceptions. When the assailed
interlocutory orders are patently erroneous
or issued with grave abuse of discretion,
the remedy of certiorari lies.[25]
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no
personal knowledge of the facts he testified
to, as these had merely been relayed to him
by respondent. The former was working on
pure suppositions and secondhand
information fed to him by one
side. Consequently, his testimony can be
dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility
by asserting that he was able to assess
petitioners character, not only through the
descriptions given by respondent, but also
through the formers at least fifteen
hours[50] of study of the voluminous
transcript of records of this case. Even if it
took the good doctor a whole day or a whole
week to examine the records of this case,
we still find his assessment of petitioners
psychological state sorely insufficient and
methodologically flawed.
As to respondents argument -- that
because Dr. Gauzons testimony had never
been objected to, the objection raised
thereafter was deemed waived -- the her to go needlessly through a protracted
Supreme Court has already ruled on the trial, which would further clog the court
matter. It held that although the question of dockets with another futile case.[55]
admissibility of evidence could not be raised
for the first time on appeal, hearsay or WHEREFORE, the Petition is
unreliable evidence should be disregarded hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA
whether objected to or not, because it has Decision REVERSED and SET
no probative value.[51] ASIDE. Respondents Demurrer to Evidence
is GRANTED, and the case for declaration
We are, of course, mindful of the of nullity of marriage based on the alleged
ruling that a medical examination is not psychological incapacity of petitioner
a conditio sine qua non to a finding of is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
psychological incapacity, so long as the costs.
totality of evidence presented is enough to
establish the incapacity SO ORDERED.
adequately.[52] Here, however, the totality of
evidence presented by respondent was
completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity -- more so without
any medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination.
The trial court should have carefully
studied and assessed the evidence
presented by respondent and taken into
account the prevailing jurisprudence on the
matter. It could then have easily concluded,
as we conclude now, that it was useless to
proceed further with the tedious process of
hearing contravening proof. His evidence
was obviously, grossly and clearly
insufficient to support a declaration of nullity
of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of
discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer
and to violate or ignore this Courts rulings in
point. Indeed, continuing the process of
litigation would have been a total waste of
time and money for the parties and an
unwelcome imposition on the trial courts
docket.
We have already ruled that grave
abuse of discretion may arise when a lower
court or tribunal violates or contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.[53] Any decision, order or
resolution of a lower court tantamount to
overruling a judicial pronouncement of the
highest Court is unmistakably a very grave
abuse of discretion.[54]
There is no reason to believe that an
appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the case at bar. An
appeal would not promptly relieve petitioner
from the injurious effects of the patently
mistaken Orders maintaining the baseless A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC March 4,
action of respondent. It would only compel 2003
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON (b) Where to file. - The petition shal be filed (3) The injured party whose consent was between the parties, the
DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY in the Family Court. obtained by fraud, within five years after the petitioner may apply for a
OF VOID MARRIAGES AND discovery of the fraud, provided that said provisional order for spousal
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE party, with full knowledge of the facts support, the custody and support
(c) Imprecriptibility ofaction or defense. -
MARRIAGES constituting the fraud, has not freely of common children, visitation
An Action or defense for the declaration of
cohabited with the other as husband or wife; rights, administration of
absolute nullity of void marriage shall not
community or conjugal property,
RESOLUTION prescribe.
and other matters similarly
(4) The injured party whose consent was
requiringurgent action.
obtained by force, intimidation, or undue
Acting on the letter of the Chairman of (d) What to allege. - A petition under Article
influence, within five years from the time the
the Committee on Revision of the Rules of 36 of Family Code shall specially allege te
force intimidation, or undue influence (3) It must be verified and
Court submitting for this Court's complete facts showing the either or both
disappeared or ceased, provided that the accompanied celebration of
consideration and approval the Proposed parties were psychologically incapacitated
force, intimidation, or undue influence marriage. (b) Where to file.-The
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of from complying with the essential marital
having disappeared or ceased, said party petition shall be filed in the Family
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable obligations of marriages at the time of the
has not thereafter freely cohabited with the Court.
Marriages, the Court Resolved to celebration of marriage even if such
other as husband or wife;
APPROVE the same. incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration. Section 4. Venue. - The petition shall be
(5) The injured party where the other spouse filed in the Family Court of the province or
The Rule shall take effect on March
is physically incapable of consummating the city where the petitioner or the respondent
15, 2003 following its publication in a The complete facts should allege the
marriage with the other and such has been residing for at least six months
newspaper of general circulation not later physical manifestations, if any, as are
incapability continues and appears to be prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a
than March 7, 2003 indicative of psychological incapacity at the
incurable, within five years after the non-resident respondent, where he may be
time of the celebration of the marriage but
celebration of marriage; and found in the Philippines at the election of the
expert opinion need not be alleged.
March 4, 2003 petitioner.
(6) Te injured party where the other party
Section 3. Petition for annulment of
Davide, C.J. Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible Section 5. Contents and form of petition. -
voidable marriages. -
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, disease found to be serious and appears to (1) The petition shall allege the complete
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria- be incurable, within five years after the facts constituting the cause of action.
Martinez, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and (a) Who may file. - The following persons celebration of marriage.
Azcuna may file a petition for annulment of voidable
(2) it shall state the names and
Ynares-Santiago, on leave marriage based on any of the grounds under
(b) Where to file. - The petition ages of the common children of
Corona, on official leave article 45 of the Family Code and within the
shall be filed in the Family Court. the parties and specify the regime
period herein indicated:
governing their property relations,
RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE as well as the properties involved.
Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be
NULLITY OF VOID MARIAGES AND (1) The contracting party whose parent, or
filed in the Family Court of the province or
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE guardian, or person exercising substitute
city where the petitioner or the respondent If there is no adequate
MARRIAGES parental authority did not give his or her
has been residing for at least six months provision in a written agreement
consent, within five years after attaining the
prior to the date of filing. Or in the case of between the parties, the
age of twenty-one unless, after attaining the
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern non-resident respondent, where he may be petitioner may apply for a
age of twenty-one, such party freely
petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of found in the Philippines, at the election of provisional order for spousal
cohabitated with the other as husband or
void marriages and annulment of voidable the petitioner. support, custody and support of
wife; or the parent, guardian or person
marriages under the Family Code of te common children, visitation
having legal charge of the contracting party
Philippines. rights, administration of
, at any time before such party has reached Section 5. Contents and form of petition. -
community or conjugal property,
the age of twenty-one; (1) The petition shall allege the complete
and other matters similarly
The Rules of Court shall apply facts constituting the cause of action.
requiring urgent action.
suppletorily.
(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge
of the other's insanity; or by any relative, (2) It shall state the names and
(3) it must be verified and
Section 2. Petition for declaration of guardian, or person having legal charge of ages of the common children of
accompanied by a certification
absolute nullity of void marriages. the insane, at any time before the death of the parties and specify the regime
against forum shopping. The
either party; or by the insane spouse during governing their property relations,
verification and certification must
the a lucid interval or after regaining sanity, as well as the properties involved.
(a) Who may file. - A petition for be signed personally by me
provided that the petitioner , after coming to
declaration of absolute nullity of void petitioner. No petition may be
reason, has not freely cohabited with the
marriage may be filed solely by the If there is no adequate filed solely by counsel or through
other as husband or wife;
husband or the wife. (n) provision in a written agreement an attorney-in-fact.
 If the petitioner is in a
foreign country, the verification
and certification against forum
shopping shall be authenticated
by the duly authorized officer of
the Philippine embassy or
legation, consul general, consul
or vice-consul or consular agent
in said country.
(4) it shall be filed in six copies.
The petitioner shall serve a copy
of the petition on the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of
the City or Provincial Prosecutor,
within five days from the date of
its filing and submit to the court
proof of such service within the
same period.
Failure to comply with any
of the preceding requirements
may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition.
Section 6. Summons. - The service of
summons shall be governed by Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court and by the following
rules:
(1) Where the respondent cannot
be located at his given address or
his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry, service of
summons may, by leave of court,
be effected upon him by
publication once a week for two
consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines and in such
places as the court may order In
addition, a copy of the summons
shall be served on the respondent
at his last known address by
registered mail or any other
means the court may deem
sufficient.
(2) The summons to be published
shall be contained in an order of
the court with the following data:
(a) title of the case; (b) docket
number; (c) nature of the petition;
(d) principal grounds of the
petition and the reliefs prayed for;
and (e) a directive for the
respondent to answer within thirty
days from the last issue of
publication.
Section 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to
dismiss the petition shall be allowed except
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter or over the parties; provided,
however, that any other ground that might
warrant a dismissal of the case may be
raised as an affirmative defense in an
answer.
Section 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent
shall file his answer within fifteen days from
service of summons, or within thirty days
from the last issue of publication in case of
service of summons by publication. The
answer must be verified by the respondent
himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-
fact.
(2) If the respondent fails to file an
answer, the court shall not
declare him or her in default.
(3) Where no answer is filed or if
the answer does not tender an
issue, the court shall order the
public prosecutor to investigate
whether collusion exists between
the parties.
Section 9. Investigation report of public
prosecutor. - (1) Within one month after
receipt of the court order mentioned in
paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public
prosecutor shall submit a report to the court
stating whether the parties are in collusion
and serve copies thereof on the parties and
their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds
that collusion exists, he shall
state the on the finding of
collusion within ten days from
receipt of a copy of a report The
court shall set the report for
hearing and If convinced that the
parties are in collusion, it shall
dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports
that no collusion exists, the court
shall set the case for pre-trial. It
shall be the duty of the public
prosecutor to appear for the State
at the pre-trial.
Section 10. Social worker. - The court may
require a social worker to conduct a case
study and submit the corresponding report
at least three days before the pre-trial. The
court may also require a case study at any
stage of the case whenever necessary.
Section 11. Pre-trial. -
(1) Pre-trial mandatory. - A pre-
trial is mandatory. On motion
or motu proprio, the court shall
set the pre-trial after the last
pleading has been served and
filed, or upon receipt of the report
of the public prosecutor that no
collusion exists between the
parties.
(2) Notice of pre-trial. - (a) The
notice of pre-trial shall contain:
(1) the date of pre-trial conference;
and
(2) an order directing the parties to file
and serve their respective pre-trial
briefs in such manner as shall ensure
the receipt thereof by the adverse
party at least three days before the
date of pre-trial.
(b) The notice shall be served
separately on the parties and their
respective counsels as well as on the
public prosecutor. It shall be their duty
to appear personally at the pre-trial.
(c) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to
the respondent even if he fails to file
an answer. In case of summons by
publication and the respondent failed
to file his answer, notice of pre-trial
shall be sent to respondent at his last
known address.
Section 12. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The
pre-trial brief shall contain the following:
(a) A statement of the willingness
of the parties to enter into
agreements as may be allowed
by law, indicating the desired
terms thereof;
(b) A concise statement of their
respective claims together with
the applicable laws and
authorities;
(c) Admitted facts and proposed
stipulations of facts, as well as the
disputed factual and legal issues;
(d) All the evidence to be
presented, including expert
opinion, if any, briefly stating or
describing the nature and
purpose thereof;
(e) The number and names of the
witnesses and their respective
affidavits; and
(f) Such other matters as the court
may require.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to
comply with its required contents shall have
the same effect as failure to appear at the
pre-trial under the succeeding paragraphs.
Section 13. Effect of failure to appear at the
pre-trial. - {a) If the petitioner fails to appear
personally, the case shall be dismissed
unless his counsel or a duly authorized
representative appears in court and proves
a valid excuse for the non-appearance of
the petitioner.
(b) If the respondent has filed his
answer but fails to appear, the
court shall proceed with the pre-
trial and require the public
prosecutor to investigate the non-
appearance of the respondent
and submit within fifteen days
thereafter a report to the court
stating whether his non-
appearance is due to any
collusion between the parties. If
there Is no collusion, the court
shall require the public prosecutor
 to intervene for the State during
the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of
evidence.
Section 14. Pre-trial conference. -At the
pre-trial conference, the court:
(a) May refer the issues to a
mediator who shall assist the
parties in reaching an agreement
on matters not prohibited by law.
The mediator shall render a
report within one month from
referral which, for good reasons,
the court may extend for a period
not exceeding one month.
(b) In case mediation is not
availed of or where it fails, the
court shall proceed with the pre-
trial conference, on which
occasion it shall consider the
advisability of receiving expert
testimony and such other makers
as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the petition.
Section 15. Pre-trial order. - {a) The
proceedings in the pre-trial shall be
recorded. Upon termination of the pre-trial,
the court shall Issue a pre-trial order which
shall recite in detail the matters taken up In
the conference, the action taken thereon,
the amendments allowed on the pleadings,
and except as to the ground of declaration
of nullity or annulment, the agreements or
admissions made by the parties on any of
the matters considered, including any
provisional order that may be necessary or
agreed upon by the parties.
(b) Should the action proceed to
trial, the order shall contain a
recital of the following;
Section 16. Prohibited compromise. - The
court-shall not allow compromise on
(1) Facts undisputed,
prohibited matters, such as the following:
admitted, and those
which need not be
proved subject to
Section 16 of this Rule;
(2) Factual and legal
issues to be litigated;
(3) Evidence, including
objects and
documents, that have
been marked and will
be presented;
(4) Names of witnesses
who will be presented
and their testimonies in
the form of affidavits;
and
(5) Schedule of the
presentation of
evidence.
(c) The pre-trial order shall also
contain a directive to the public
prosecutor to appear for the State
and take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties at
any stage of the proceedings and
fabrication or suppression of
evidence during the trial on the
merits.
(d) The parlies shall not be
allowed to raise issues or present
witnesses and evidence other
than those stated in the pre-trial
order.
The order shall control the trial of
the case, unless modified by the
court to prevent manifest
injustice.
(e) The parties shall have five
days from receipt of the pre-trial
order to propose corrections or
modifications.
(a) The civil status of persons;
(b) The validity of a marriage or of
a legal separation;
(c) Any ground for legal
separation;
(d) Future support;
(e) The jurisdiction of courts; and
(f) Future legitime.
Section 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge
shall personally conduct the trial of the case.
No delegation of the reception of evidence
to a commissioner shall be allowed except
as to matters involving property relations of
the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No
judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or
confession of judgment shall be
allowed.
(3) The court may order the
exclusion from the courtroom of
all persons, including members of
the press, who do not have a
direct interest in the case. Such
an order may be made if the court
determines on the record that
requiring a party to testify in open
court would not enhance the
ascertainment of truth; would
cause to the party psychological
harm or inability to effectively
communicate due to
embarrassment, fear, or timidity;
would violate the right of a party
to privacy; or would be offensive
to decency or public morals.
(4) No copy shall be taken nor any
examination or perusal of the
records of the case or parts
thereof be made by any person
other than a party or counsel of a
party, except by order of the
court.
Section 18. Memoranda. - The court may
require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of
the Solicitor General, to file their respective
memoranda support of their claims within
fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the
Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or
papers may be submitted without leave of
court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered
submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.
Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court
renders a decision granting the petition, it
shall declare therein that the decree of
absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall
be issued by the court only after compliance
with Article 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
(2) The parties, including the
Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with
copies of the decision personally
or by registered mail. If the
respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the
action, the dispositive part of the
decision shall be published once
in a newspaper of general
circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final
upon the expiration of fifteen days
from notice to the parties. Entry of
judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new
trial, or appeal Is filed by any of
the parties the public prosecutor,
or the Solicitor General.
(4) Upon the finality of the
decision, the court shall forthwith
issue the corresponding decree if
the parties have no properties.
If the parties have properties, the court
shall observe the procedure prescribed in
Section 21 of this Rule.
The entry of judgment shall be
registered in the Civil Registry where the
marriage was recorded and In the Civil
Registry where the Family Court'granting
the petition for declaration of absolute nullity
or annulment of marriage is located.
Section 20. Appeal. -
(1) Pre-condition. - No appeal
from the decision shall be allowed
unless the appellant has filed a
motion for reconsideration or new
trial within fifteen days from notice
of judgment.
(2) Notice of appeal. - An
aggrieved party or the Solicitor
General may appeal from the
decision by filing a Notice of
Appeal within fifteen days from
notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the
notice of appeal on the adverse
parties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and
distribution, custody, support of common
children and delivery of their presumptive
iegltimes. - Upon entry of the judgment
granting the petition, or, in case of appeal,
upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the
appellate court granting the petition, the
Family Court, on motion of either party, shall
proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,
including custody, support of common
children and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of
the Family Code unless such matters had
been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
Section 22. Issuance of Decree of
Declaration of Absolute Nullity or Annulment
of Marriage." (a) The court shall issue the
Decree after;
(1) Registration of the
entry of judgment
granting the petition for
declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage
in the Civil Registry
where the marriage
was celebrated and in
the Civil Registry of the
place where the Family petitioner and respondent as well
Court is located; as the properties or presumptive
legitimes delivered to their
common children.
(2) Registration of the
approved partition and
distribution of the Section 24. Effect of death of a party; duty
properties of the of the Family Court or Appellate Court. - (a)
spouses, in the proper In case a party dies at any stage of the
Register of Deeds proceedings before the entry of judgment,
where the real the court shall order the case closed and
properties are located; terminated, without prejudice to the
and settlement of the estate in proper
proceedings in the regular courts.
(3) The delivery of the
children's presumptive (b) If the party dies after the entry
legitimes in cash, of judgment of nullity or
property, or sound annulment, the judgment shall be
securities. binding upon the parties and their
successors in interest in the
settlement of the estate in the
(b) The court shall quote in the
regular courts.
Decree the dispositive portion of
the judgment entered and attach
to the Decree the approved deed Section 25. Effectlvity. - This Rule shall
of partition. take effect on March 15, 2003 following its
publication in a newspaper of general
circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
Except in the case of children under
Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the
court shall order the Local Civil Registrar to
issue an amended birth certificate indicating
the new civil status of the children affected.
Section 23. Registration and publication of
the decree; decree as best evidence. - (a)
The prevailing party shall cause the
registration of the Decree in the Civil
Registry where the marriage was
registered, the Civil Registry of the place
where the Family Court is situated, and in
the National Census and Statistics Office.
He shall report td the court compliance with
this requirement within thirty days from CARLOS V SANDOVAL
receipt of the copy of the Decree.
GR 179922, DECEMBER 16, 2008
Doctrine: ONLY a spouse can initiate an
(b) In case service of summons action to sever the marital bond for
was made by publication, the marriages solemnized during the effectivity
parties shall cause the publication of the Family Code, except cases
of the Decree once in a commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The
newspaper of general circulation. nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot
be declared in a judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of
(c) The registered Decree shall
judgment.
be the best evidence to prove the
declaration of absolute nullity or
FACTS:
annulment of marriage and shall
· Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia
serve as notice to third persons
concerning the properties of died intestate. They left six
 parcels of land to their compulsory
heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De
Dios Carlos.
· Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad and their son. Upon
Teofilo’s death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6
(registered in the name of Teofilo) were
registered in the name of respondent
Felicidad.
· In August 1995, petitioner commenced an
action against respondents for the
declaration of nullity of marriage. Petitioner
asserted that the marriage between his late
brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad
was a nullity in view of the absence of the
required marriage license.
· On the grounds of lack of cause of action
and lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the case before the trial
court. But before the parties could even
proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for
summary judgment.
· Petitioner opposed the motion for
summary judgment and lodged his own
motion for summary judgment.
· RTC rendered judgment: defendants
(respondents) Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs
(petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby granted and summary
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as follows: Declaring the marriage
between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and
Teofilo Carlos null and void ab initio for lack
of the requisite marriage license.
· In the appeal, respondents argued that the
trial court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment
annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and
Felicidad.
· CA reversed and set aside
the RTC ruling.
ISSUES:
1) Whether a marriage may be declared
void ab initio through a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment and
without the benefit of a trial. NO
2) Whether one who is not a spouse may bring
an action for nullity of marriage. Yes if the
marriage was celebrated prior to the
effectivity of the Family code and the plaintiff
is a real party-in-interest.
HELD:
I. The grounds for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage must be
proved. Neither judgment on the
pleadings nor summary judgment is
allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, the question on the
application of summary judgments or even
judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity
or annulment of marriage has been stamped
with clarity. The significant principle laid
down by the said Rule, which took effect
on March 15, 2003 is found in Section
17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding
judge shall personally conduct the trial of the
case. No delegation of evidence to a
commissioner shall be allowed except as to
matters involving property relations of the
spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage
must be proved. No judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment shall be allowed.
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial
court has divested the State of its lawful
right and duty to intervene in the case. The
participation of the State is not terminated
by the declaration of the public
prosecutor that no collusion exists between
the parties. The State should have been
given the opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment
was rendered.
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code
ordain that the court should order the
prosecuting attorney to appear and
intervene for the State. It is at this stage
when the public prosecutor sees to it that
there is no suppression of
evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no
suppression of evidence, the public
prosecutor has to make sure that the
evidence to be presented or laid down
before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the
preservation of marriage, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages reiterates the duty of the public
prosecutor, viz.: SEC. 13. Effect of failure to
appear at the pre-trial. (b) x x x If there is no
collusion, the court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State during
the trial on the merits to prevent suppression
or fabrication of evidence.
Truly, only the active participation of the
public prosecutor or the Solicitor General
will ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings
for declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing the fabrication or suppression of
evidence.
II. A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or
wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage
cases commenced before the effectivity
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the
effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. The Rule made it
exclusively a right of the spouses [Sec.
2(a)]. The innovation incorporated in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation
line between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under
the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to
marriages entered into during the effectivity
of the Family Code which took effect
on August 3, 1988. The advent of the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages marks
the beginning of the end of the right of the
heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a
nullity of marriage case against the surviving
spouse.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife, it does not mean that
the compulsory or intestate heirs are
without any recourse under the law. They
can still protect their successional right, for,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration
of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in
a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule
does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15,
2003 although the marriage involved is
within the coverage of the Family
Code. This is so, as the new Rule which
became effective on March 15, 2003 is
prospective in its application.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of
marriage case against respondent Felicidad
in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law
would govern depends upon when the
marriage took place. The marriage
having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable law is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to
who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any
person can bring an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage? NO. The
absence of a provision in the Civil Code
cannot be construed as a license for any
person to institute a nullity of marriage
case. Such person must appear to be the
party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Plaintiff must
be the real party-in-interest.
DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and
TADEO R.
BENGZON, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
 The Case
The Petition for Review before us
assails the 30 May 1997 Decision[1] as well
as the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
43393. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Order[2] dated 21 January 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The
Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss
private respondents Petition for Annulment
of Marriage for failure to state a cause of
action and for violation of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The
assailed Resolution denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 29 March 1995, private
respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent
Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage against petitioner Diana M.
Barcelona (petitioner Diana). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445
(first petition) before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 87.[3] On 9
May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion
to Withdraw Petition which the trial court
granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo
filed anew a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage against petitioner Diana. This
time, the case was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-95-24471 (second petition) before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 106 (trial court).
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to
Dismiss the second petition on two grounds.
First, the second petition fails to state a
cause of action. Second, it violates
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on forum
shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed the
Motion to which petitioner Diana filed
Additional Arguments in Support of the
Motion.
The trial court, through Judge Julieto
P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996
an Order (first order) deferring resolution of
the Motion until the parties ventilate their
arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana
filed a motion for reconsideration. However,
the trial court, through Pairing Judge
Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21
January 1997 an Order (second order)
denying the motion. In denying the motion
for reconsideration, Judge Pison explained
that when the ground for dismissal is the
complaints failure to state a cause of action,
the trial court determines such fact solely
from the petition itself. Judge Pison held that
contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a
perusal of the allegations in the petition
shows that petitioner Diana has violated
respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise to
a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected
petitioner Dianas claim that respondent
Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in filing the
second petition. Judge Pison explained that
when respondent Tadeo filed the second
petition, the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-
95-23445) was no longer pending as it had
been earlier dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals
assailing the trial courts first order deferring
action on the Motion and the second order
denying the motion for reconsideration on
14 February 1997. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and denied the
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with
petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first
order erred in deferring action on the Motion
until after a hearing on whether the
complaint states a cause of
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals
pointed out that the trial courts second order
corrected the situation since in denying the
motion for reconsideration, the trial court in
effect denied the Motion. The appellate
court agreed with the trial court that the
allegations in the second petition state a
cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid
judgment if proven to be true.
The Court of Appeals also held that Petitioner Dianas contention that the
there was no violation of Circular No. 04- second petition fails to state a cause of
94. To determine the existence of forum action is untenable. A cause of action is an
shopping, the elements of litis act or omission of the defendant in violation
pendentia must exist or a final judgment in of the legal right of the plaintiff.[5] A
one case must amount to res judicata in the complaint states a cause of action when it
other. In this case, there is no litis contains three essential elements: (1) a
pendentia because respondent Tadeo had right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
caused the dismissal without prejudice of means and under whatever law it arises; (2)
the first petition before filing the second an obligation of the defendant to respect
petition. Neither is there res such right; and (3) the act or omission of the
judicata because there is no final decision defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.[6]
on the merits.
We find the second petition
sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The
petition sought the declaration of nullity of
Issues the marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code.[7] The petition alleged that
respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana
were legally married at the Holy Cross
In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown
raises the following issues: by the marriage contract attached to the
petition. The couple established their
I. WHETHER THE residence in Quezon City. The union begot
ALLEGATIONS OF five children, Ana Maria, born on 8
THE SECOND November 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October
PETITION FOR 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March
ANNULMENT OF 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7 March
MARRIAGE 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February
SUFFICIENTLY 1978. The petition further alleged that
STATE A CAUSE OF petitioner Diana was psychologically
ACTION; incapacitated at the time of the celebration
of their marriage to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage and such
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT incapacity subsists up to the present time.
TADEO VIOLATED The petition alleged the non-
SUPREME COURT complied marital obligations in this manner:
ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 04-94
IN FAILING TO xxx
STATE THE FILING
OF A PREVIOUS 5. During their marriage, they had frequent
PETITION FOR quarrels due to their varied
ANNULMENT OF upbringing. Respondent, coming from a
MARRIAGE, ITS rich family, was a disorganized
TERMINATION AND housekeeper and was frequently out of the
STATUS.[4] house. She would go to her sisters house
or would play tennis the whole day.
6. When the family had crisis due to
The Courts Ruling
several miscarriages suffered by
respondent and the sickness of a child,
respondent withdrew to herself and
The petition has no merit. eventually refused to speak to her
husband.
Sufficiency of Cause of Action
7. On November 1977, the respondent,
who was five months pregnant with Cristina
Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating
her feelings with petitioner, requested the
latter to temporarily leave their conjugal
dwelling. She further insisted that she
wanted to feel a little freedom from
petitioners marital authority and
influences. The petitioner argued that he
could occupy another room in their
conjugal dwelling to accommodate
respondents desire, but no amount of plea
and explanation could dissuade her from
demanding that the petitioner leave their
conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family
and to safeguard the respondents
pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to
leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in
a condominium located in Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete
estrangement between the petitioner and
the respondent. The petitioner waived his
right to the conjugal dwelling in
respondents favor through an extrajudicial
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains. The separation in fact between the
petitioner and the respondent still subsists
to the present time.
10. The parties likewise agreed on the
custody and support of the children. The
extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is hereto attached as
Annex C and taken as an integral part
hereof.
11. The respondent at the time of the
celebration of their marriage was
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligation of marriage
and such incapacity subsisted up to and
until the present time. Such incapacity was
conclusively found in the psychological
examination conducted on the relationship
between the petitioner and the respondent.
12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code,
the marriage between the petitioner and
the respondent is void ab initio and needs
to be annulled. This petition is in
accordance with Article 39 thereof.
xxx.[8]
The second petition states the
ultimate facts on which respondent bases
his claim in accordance with Section 1, Rule
8 of the old Rules of Court.[9] Ultimate facts
refer to the principal, determinative,
constitutive facts upon the existence of
which the cause of action rests. The term
does not refer to details of probative matter
or particulars of evidence which establish
the material elements.[10]
Petitioner Diana relies mainly[11] on
the rulings in Santos v. Court of
Appeals[12] as well as in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina.[13] Santos gave
life to the phrase psychological incapacity, a
novel provision in the Family Code, by
defining the term in this wise:
xxx psychological incapacity should refer to
no less than mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of
incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. xxx.
Molina additionally provided procedural
guidelines to assist the courts and the
parties in cases for annulment of marriages
grounded on psychological incapacity.[14]
Petitioner Diana argues that the
second petition falls short of the guidelines
set forth
in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she
contends that the second petition is
defective because it fails to allege the root
cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. The second petition also fails to
state that the alleged psychological
incapacity existed from the celebration of
the marriage and that it is permanent or
incurable. Further, the second petition is
devoid of any reference of the grave nature
of the illness to bring about the disability of
the petitioner to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Lastly, the second
petition did not even state the marital
obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly
failed to comply due to psychological
incapacity.
Subsequent
to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted
the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (new
Rules).[15]Specifically, Section 2, paragraph
(d) of the new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages
x x x.
the Family Code shall specifically allege
the complete facts showing that either or
both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage
even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the
physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at
the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage.[16] The obvious effect of the new
Rules providing that expert opinion need
not be alleged in the petition is that there is
also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. Only experts in
the fields of neurological and behavioral
sciences are competent to determine the
root cause of psychological incapacity.
Since the new Rules do not require the
petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that
there is also no need to allege in the petition
the root cause of the psychological
incapacity.
Science continues to explore,
examine and explain how our brains work,
respond to and control the human body.
Scientists still do not understand everything
there is to know about the root causes of
psychological disorders. The root causes of
many psychological disorders are still
unknown to science even as their outward,
physical manifestations are evident. Hence,
what the new Rules require the petition to
allege are the physical manifestations
indicative of psychological
incapacity. Respondent Tadeos second
petition complies with this requirement.
The second petition states a cause of
action since it states the legal right of
respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation
of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission
of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal
right. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,[17] the
Court held:
In determining whether the allegations of a
complaint are sufficient to support a cause
of action, it must be borne in mind that the
complaint does not have to establish or
allege the facts proving the existence of a
cause of action at the outset; this will have
to be done at the trial on the merits of the
case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA,
supra). If the allegations in a complaint can
furnish a sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed regardless of the
defenses that may be assessed by the
defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211
SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank
& Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
action, the complaint must show that
the claim for relief does not exist rather
than that a claim has been defectively
stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27
SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
A defendant moving to dismiss a
complaint on the ground of lack of cause of
action hypothetically admits all the factual
averments in the complaint.[18] Given the
hypothetically admitted facts in the second
petition, the trial court could render
judgment over the case.
Forum Shopping
Similarly untenable is petitioner
Dianas contention that the second petitions
certificate of non-forum shopping which
does not mention the filing of the first
petition and its dismissal without prejudice
violates Circular No. 04-94.[19] Petitioner
Diana refers to this portion of Circular No.
04-94-
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or
principal party seeking relief in the
complaint, petition, application or other
initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in
such original pleading, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth
of the following facts and
undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore
commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in
the Supreme court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge,
no action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is
any such action or proceeding which is
either pending or may have been
terminated, he must state the status
thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding
has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
any other tribunal or agency, he
undertakes to report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court or agency
wherein the original pleading and sworn
certification contemplated herein have
been filed.[20]
Petitioner Diana points out that
respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his
certificate of non-forum shopping that he
had previously commenced a similar action
based on the same grounds with the same
prayer for relief. The certificate of non-forum
shopping should have stated the fact of
termination of the first petition or its status.
The Court has consistently held that a
certificate of non-forum shopping not
attached to the petition or one belatedly filed
or one signed by counsel and not the party
himself constitutes a violation of the
requirement. Such violation can result in the Circular No. 04-94,[23] now Section 5,
dismissal of the complaint or Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petition. However, the Court has also must be interpreted and applied to achieve
previously held that the rule of substantial its purpose. The Supreme Court
compliance applies to the contents of the promulgated the Circular to promote and
certification.[21] facilitate the orderly administration of
justice. The Circular should not be
In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,[22] the interpreted with such absolute literalness as
Court squarely addressed the issue of to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
whether the omission of a statement on the
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure
prior filing and dismissal of a case involving which is to achieve substantial justice as
the same parties and issues merits expeditiously as possible.[24]
dismissal of the petition. In Roxas, the
Court ruled: A final word. We are ever mindful of
the principle that marriage is an inviolable
social institution and the foundation of the
xxx an omission in the certificate of non-
family that the state cherishes and
forum shopping about any event that would
protects.[25] In rendering this Decision, this
not constitute res judicata and litis
Court is not prejudging the main issue of
pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal
whether the marriage is void based on
as to merit the dismissal and nullification of
Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court
the entire proceedings considering that the
must resolve this issue after trial on the
evils sought to be prevented by the said
merits where each party can present
certificate are not present. It is in this light
evidence to prove their respective
that we ruled in Maricalum Mining Corp. v.
allegations and defenses. We are merely
National Labor Relations Commission that
holding that, based on the allegations in the
a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court
second petition, the petition sufficiently
Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping
alleges a cause of action and does not
would be more in keeping with the
violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus,
objectives of procedural rules which is to
the second petition is not subject to attack
secure a just, speedy and inexpensive
by a motion to dismiss on these grounds.
disposition of every action and proceeding.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the
The dismissal of the first petition petition. The assailed Decision dated 30
precluded the eventuality of litis May 1997 as well as the Resolution dated 7
pendentia. The first petitions dismissal did August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
not also amount to res judicata. Thus, there G.R. SP No. 43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs
is no need to state in the certificate of non- against petitioner.
forum shopping in the second petition (Civil
SO ORDERED.
Case No. Q-95-24471) about the prior filing
and dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
No. Q-95-23445). Vitug, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on leave.
The first petition was dismissed
without prejudice at the instance of
respondent Tadeo to keep the peace
between him and his grown up children. The
dismissal happened before service of
answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly,
there is no litis pendentia since respondent
Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused
the dismissal of the first petition when he Iyoy vs. Iyoy
subsequently filed the second
petition. Neither is there res
In this Petition for Review
judicata because the dismissal order was
not a decision on the merits but a dismissal on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
without prejudice. Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, prays for the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 62539, dated 30 July
2001,1 affirming the Judgment of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the
marriage between respondent Crasus L.
Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void
on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC
commenced with the filing of a
Complaint3 for declaration of nullity of
marriage by respondent Crasus on 25
March 1997. According to the said
Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely
on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial
Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a
result of their union, they had five children –
Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and
Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After
the celebration of their marriage,
respondent Crasus discovered that Fely
was "hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the
Philippines for the United States of America
(U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the
youngest then being only six years old, to
the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a
year after Fely left for the U.S.A.,
respondent Crasus received a letter from
her requesting that he sign the enclosed
divorce papers; he disregarded the said
request. Sometime in 1985, respondent
Crasus learned, through the letters sent by
Fely to their children, that Fely got married
to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the
Philippines with her American family,
staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.
Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to
Fely because he was afraid he might not be
able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had
caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines
several times more: in 1990, for the wedding
of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for
the brain operation of their fourth child,
Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons.
Fely continued to live with her American
family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been
openly using the surname of her American
husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A.
For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself
had invitations made in which she was
named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the
time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13
years since Fely left and abandoned
respondent Crasus, and there was no more
possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his
Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger
and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity
to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable
and continuing, constitutes a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and
72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and
Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June
1997. She asserted therein that she was
already an American citizen since 1988 and
was now married to Stephen Micklus. While
she admitted being previously married to
respondent Crasus and having five children
with him, Fely refuted the other allegations
made by respondent Crasus in his
Complaint. She explained that she was no
more hot-tempered than any normal person,
and she may had been indignant at
respondent Crasus on certain occasions but
it was because of the latter’s drunkenness,
womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find
employment and to contribute to the
maintenance of their household. She could
not have been extravagant since the family
hardly had enough money for basic needs.
Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial
reasons as respondent Crasus had no job
and what she was then earning as the sole
breadwinner in the Philippines was
insufficient to support their family. Although
she left all of her children with respondent
Crasus, she continued to provide financial
support to them, as well as, to respondent
Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to
bring her children to the U.S.A., except for
one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for
medical reasons. While she did file for
divorce from respondent Crasus, she
denied having herself sent a letter to
respondent Crasus requesting him to sign
the enclosed divorce papers. After securing
a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely
married her American husband and
acquired American citizenship. She argued
that her marriage to her American husband
was legal because now being an American
citizen, her status shall be governed by the
law of her present nationality. Fely also
pointed out that respondent Crasus himself
was presently living with another woman
who bore him a child. She also accused
respondent Crasus of misusing the amount
of ₱90,000.00 which she advanced to him
to finance the brain operation of their son,
Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely
also prayed that the RTC declare her
marriage to respondent Crasus null and
void; and that respondent Crasus be
ordered to pay to Fely the ₱90,000.00 she
advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral
and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees,
and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed
their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC
afforded both parties the opportunity to
present their evidence. Petitioner Republic
participated in the trial through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following
pieces of evidence in support of his
Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08
September 1997, in which he essentially
reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13
April 1989, by the Health Department of
Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage
Contract between respondent Crasus and
Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
marriage celebration taking place on 16
December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to
the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son,
wherein Fely openly used her American
husband’s surname, Micklus.9
Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on,
a Motion,11 to take the deposition of
witnesses, namely, Fely and her children,
Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written
interrogatories, before the consular officers
of the Philippines in New York and
California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses
reside. Despite the Orders12 and
Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the
Philippine Consuls of New York and
California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of
the witnesses upon written interrogatories,
not a single deposition was ever submitted
to the RTC. Taking into account that it had
been over a year since respondent Crasus
had presented his evidence and that Fely
failed to exert effort to have the case
progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated
05 October 1998,14 considering Fely to have
waived her right to present her evidence.
The case was thus deemed submitted for
decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC
promulgated its Judgment declaring the
marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely
null and void ab initio, on the basis of the
following findings –
The ground bearing defendant’s
psychological incapacity deserves a
reasonable consideration. As observed,
plaintiff’s testimony is decidedly credible.
The Court finds that defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of
psychological incapacity to comply with her
marital duties such as striving for family
unity, observing fidelity, mutual love,
respect, help and support. From the
evidence presented, plaintiff adequately
established that the defendant practically
abandoned him. She obtained a divorce
decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has establish [sic]
another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an
anomalous situation, wherein he is married
to a wife who is already married to another
man in another country.
Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have
been apparent or manifest before the
marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless
allows the annulment of the marriage
provided that these were eventually
manifested after the wedding. It appears to
be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendant’s posture being an
irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very
low regard for that sacred and inviolable
institution of marriage which is the
foundation of human society throughout the
civilized world. It is quite evident that the
defendant is bereft of the mind, will and
heart to comply with her marital obligations,
such incapacity was already there at the
time of the marriage in question is shown by
defendant’s own attitude towards her
marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which
is defendant’s psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations
which already existed at the time of the
marriage in question has been satisfactorily
proven. The evidence in herein case
establishes the irresponsibility of defendant
Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is
decidedly credible, the Court finds that the
defendant had indeed exhibited
unmistakable signs of such psychological
incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive
disposition to material things over and
above the marital stability. That such
incapacity was already there at the time of
the marriage in question is shown by
defendant’s own attitude towards her
marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons
there is a legal ground to declare the
marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and
defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and
void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-
quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary
to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court,
though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001,
affirmed the appealed Judgment of the
RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It
even offered additional ratiocination for
declaring the marriage between respondent
Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit –
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-
appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now
permanently residing in the United States.
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as
one of his reasons for seeking the
declaration of nullity of their marriage…
…
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A
FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS
VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE
IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE
CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE
SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO
REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph
of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the
absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino
citizen still being married to his or her alien
spouse, although the latter is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse because he
or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the
case at bench, the defendant has
undoubtedly acquired her American
husband’s citizenship and thus has become
an alien as well. This Court cannot see why
the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not
be extended to a Filipino citizen whose
spouse eventually embraces another
citizenship and thus becomes herself an
alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under
these circumstances, plaintiff would still be
considered as married to defendant, given
her total incapacity to honor her marital
covenants to the former. To condemn
plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage
that in truth and in fact does not exist and to
remain married to a spouse who is
incapacitated to discharge essential marital
covenants, is verily to condemn him to a
perpetual disadvantage which this Court
finds abhorrent and will not countenance.
Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief
by affirming the trial court’s declaration of
the nullity of the marriage of the parties.16
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution,
dated 08 March 2002,17 denied its Motion
for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic
filed the instant Petition before this Court,
based on the following arguments/grounds
– incapacity becomes manifest only after its
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of
respondent’s wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided
questions of substance not in accord with
law and jurisprudence considering that the
Court of Appeals committed serious errors
of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2
of the Family Code is inapplicable to the
case at bar.18
In his Comment19 to the Petition,
respondent Crasus maintained that Fely’s
psychological incapacity was clearly
established after a full-blown trial, and that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
of the Philippines was indeed applicable to
the marriage of respondent Crasus and
Fely, because the latter had already
become an American citizen. He further
questioned the personality of petitioner
Republic, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, to institute the instant
Petition, because Article 48 of the Family
Code of the Philippines authorizes the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to
the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to
intervene on behalf of the State, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration
of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this
case and the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant
Petition to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during
trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more
controversial provisions of the Family Code
of the Philippines, reads –
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what
constitutes psychological incapacity. In a
series of cases, this Court laid down
guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term
psychological incapacity was defined, thus
–
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated…21
The psychological incapacity must be
characterized by –
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines were
handed down by this Court in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which,
although quite lengthy, by its significance,
deserves to be reproduced below –
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are
to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation
of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,
such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage,
like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job…
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further
clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for
the declaration of nullity of marriage based confused with a divorce law that cuts the
on psychological incapacity. Such marital bond at the time the causes
psychological incapacity, however, must be therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
established by the totality of the evidence serious psychological illness afflicting a
presented during the trial. party even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness
Using the guidelines established by the
of the duties and responsibilities of the
afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28
finds that the totality of evidence presented
by respondent Crasus failed miserably to
establish the alleged psychological The evidence may have proven that Fely
incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there committed acts that hurt and embarrassed
is no basis for declaring their marriage null respondent Crasus and the rest of the
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and
of the Philippines. extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an
American; and even her flaunting of her
The only substantial evidence presented by
American family and her American
respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
surname, may indeed be manifestations of
testimony, which can be easily put into
her alleged incapacity to comply with her
question for being self-serving, in the
marital obligations; nonetheless, the root
absence of any other corroborating
cause for such was not identified. If the root
evidence. He submitted only two other
cause of the incapacity was not identified,
pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on
then it cannot be satisfactorily established
the recording with the Register of Deeds of
as a psychological or mental defect that is
the Marriage Contract between respondent
serious or grave; neither could it be proven
Crasus and Fely, such marriage being
to be in existence at the time of celebration
celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2)
of the marriage; nor that it is incurable.
the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr.,
While the personal examination of Fely by a
their eldest son, in which Fely used her
psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer
American husband’s surname. Even
mandatory for the declaration of nullity of
considering the admissions made by Fely
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
herself in her Answer to respondent
Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this
Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the
Court’s ruling in Marcos v.
evidence is not enough to convince this
Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still
Court that Fely had such a grave mental
have complied with the requirement laid
illness that prevented her from assuming the
down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
essential obligations of marriage.
Molina30 that the root cause of the
incapacity be identified as a psychological
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of illness and that its incapacitating nature be
the Family Code of the Philippines fully explained.
contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in
assume the basic marital obligations; not a
favor of the validity of the marriage.31 No
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the
less, ill will, on the part of the errant
policy to protect and strengthen the family
spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences,
as the basic social institution and marriage
conflicting personalities, emotional
as the foundation of the family.32
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity
or perversion, and abandonment, by II
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code
Article.27
of the Philippines is not applicable to the
case at bar.
As has already been stressed by this Court
in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code of the Philippines –
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2,
refers to a special situation wherein one of
the couple getting married is a Filipino
citizen and the other a foreigner at the time
the marriage was celebrated. By its plain
and literal interpretation, the said provision
cannot be applied to the case of respondent
Crasus and his wife Fely because at the
time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still
a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date
was not established, Fely herself admitted
in her Answer filed before the RTC that she
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus
sometime after she left for the United
States in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same
Answer, she alleged that she had been an
American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino
citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, she was still bound
by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity,
even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
not allow and recognize divorce between
Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to
intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration
of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that
only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to the RTC may intervene on
behalf of the State in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor
General had no personality to file the instant
Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48
provides –
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take
care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention
the Solicitor General does not bar him or his
Office from intervening in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages. Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General
as the principal law officer and legal
defender of the Government.33 His Office is
tasked to represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents
in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. The
Office of the Solicitor General shall
constitute the law office of the Government
and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code
of the Philippines is to ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and
protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or
the fabrication or suppression of evidence;
and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor
General is the principal law officer and legal
defender of the land, then his intervention in
such proceedings could only serve and
contribute to the realization of such intent,
rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the
Solicitor General is authorized to bring or
defend actions on behalf of the People or
the Republic of the Philippines once the
case is brought before this Court or the
Court of Appeals.35While it is the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General takes over
when the case is elevated to the Court of
Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be
eventually responsible for taking the case to
the appellate courts when circumstances
demand, then it is only reasonable and
practical that even while the proceeding is
still being held before the RTC, the Office of
the Solicitor General can already exercise
supervision and control over the conduct of
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to
better guarantee the protection of the
interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized
and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General
in several cases for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages that were
appealed before it, summarized as follows
in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –
In the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court
laid down the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 48 of the Family
Code, one of which concerns the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the State:
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v.
Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the State…37
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,38 which became effective on 15
March 2003, should dispel any other doubts
of respondent Crasus as to the authority of
the Solicitor General to file the instant
Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule
recognizes the authority of the Solicitor
General to intervene and take part in the
proceedings for annulment and declaration
of nullity of marriages before the RTC and
on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent
provisions of the said Rule are reproduced
below –
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –
…
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The
petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition
on the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor,
within five days from the date of its filing and
submit to the court proof of such service
within the same period.
…
Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may
require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of
the Solicitor General, to file their respective
memoranda in support of their claims within
fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the
Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or
papers may be submitted without leave of
court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered
submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision. –
…
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor
General and the public prosecutor, shall be
served with copies of the decision
personally or by registered mail. If the
respondent summoned by publication failed The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy
to appear in the action, the dispositive part and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
of the decision shall be published once in a subsisting.
newspaper of general circulation.
SO ORDERED.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the
expiration of fifteen days from notice to the
parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if
no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or
appeal is filed by any of the parties, the
public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal. –

(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party

or the Solicitor General may appeal from the
decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within
fifteen days from notice of denial of the
motion for reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of
appeal on the adverse parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a

conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals, and sustains the
validity and existence of the marriage
between respondent Crasus and Fely. At
most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity,
and bigamy, give respondent Crasus
grounds to file for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the same
Code. While this Court commiserates with
respondent Crasus for being continuously
shackled to what is now a hopeless and
loveless marriage, this is one of those
situations where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answer to every G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
individual problem.39
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED vs.
and the assailed Decision of the Court of ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 TE, Respondent,
July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case
No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is DECISION
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this
petition. Psychological incapacity, since its
incorporation in our laws, has become a clichéd
subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The
Court treats this case, however, with much ado,
it having realized that current jurisprudential
doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a
perspective by which psychological incapacity
should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the
way the concept was formulated—free in form
and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867. The petition further assails the January
19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a
glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez
Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-
Chinese association in their college. Edward was
then initially attracted to Rowena’s close friend;
but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the
young man decided to court Rowena. That was
in January 1996, when petitioner was a
sophomore student and respondent, a
freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the
two understood one another and developed a
certain degree of closeness towards each other.
In March 1996, or around three months after their
first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they
elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was
young and jobless. Her persistence, however,
made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed
to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel
money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.4
However, Edward’s ₱80,000.00 lasted for only a
month. Their pension house accommodation and
daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could
not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go
back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s
house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his
family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would
commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with
Rowena at her uncle’s place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the
two to a court to get married. He was then 25
years old, and she, 20.6 The two then continued
to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was
treated like a prisoner—he was not allowed to go
out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed
Edward his guns and warned the latter not to
leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to
call home and talk to his brother who suggested
that they should stay at their parents’ home and
live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena
who, however, suggested that he should get his
inheritance so that they could live on their own.
Edward talked to his father about this, but the
patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be
disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go
home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house
of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents.
His family then hid him from Rowena and her
family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to
Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they
should live with his parents, she said that it was
better for them to live separate lives. They then
parted ways.10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000,
Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court,
on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate
whether there was collusion between the
parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on
its behalf and assist it in the scheduled
hearings.13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an
investigation report stating that it could not
determine if there was collusion between the
parties; thus, it recommended trial on the
merits.14
The clinical psychologist who examined
petitioner found both parties psychologically
incapacitated, and made the following findings
and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL
HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old]
Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again
Christian at Manila. He finished two years in
college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and
is currently unemployed. He is married to and
separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE.
He presented himself at my office for a
psychological evaluation in relation to his petition
for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by
the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is
now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon
City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now
in business and one deceased sister. Both his
parents are also in the business world by whom
he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and
patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to
each of the family member. He generally
considers himself to be quiet and simple. He
clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting
people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a
Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence,
as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay
long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on
becoming a full servant of God by being a priest
or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his
friends even during his childhood days as he only
loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family
despite having a lazy father and a disobedient
wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her
collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual
moments with her boyfriend prior to that with
petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her
kindness to petitioner and this became the
foundation of their intimate relationship. After a
month of dating, petitioner mentioned to
respondent that he is having problems with his
family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she
also hates her family and that she actually
wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time
on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that
they should elope and live together. Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are
both young and inexperienced, but she insisted
that they would somehow manage because
petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996,
respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping
and she already bought tickets for the boat going
to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea
and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are
supposed to stay at the house of a friend of
respondent, but they were not able to locate her,
so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment.
The parties tried to look for a job but could not
find any so it was suggested by respondent that
they should go back and seek help from
petitioner’s parents. When the parties arrived at
the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was
all out of the country so respondent decided to go
back to her home for the meantime while
petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a
few days of separation, respondent called
petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk
to him. Petitioner responded immediately and
when he arrived at their house, respondent
confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be
cold, respondent acted irrationally and even
threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got
scared so he went home again. Respondent
would call by phone every now and then and
became angry as petitioner does not know what
to do. Respondent went to the extent of
threatening to file a case against petitioner and
scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner
asked her how he would be able to make amends
and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the
idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in
life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April
23, 1996, respondent’s uncle brought the parties
to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,]
petitioner was made to sign the Marriage
Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually
never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at
their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner
arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to
go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many
ways with her uncle showing to him many guns.
Respondent even threatened that if he should
persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent
even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he
should perish, the authorities should look for him
at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses.
Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to
escape and he went home. He told his parents
about his predicament and they forgave him and
supported him by giving him military escort.
Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he
signed a marriage contract with respondent.
When they knew about it[,] petitioner was
referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent.
Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the
home of petitioner’s parents while they are still
studying. Respondent refused the idea and
claimed that she would only live with him if they
will have a separate home of their own and be
away from his parents. She also intimated to
petitioner that he should already get his share of
whatever he would inherit from his parents so
they can start a new life. Respondent demanded
these not knowing [that] the petitioner already
settled his differences with his own family. When
respondent refused to live with petitioner where
he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to
tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents.
He told her already that he was disinherited and
since he also does not have a job, he would not
be able to support her. After knowing that
petitioner does not have any money anymore,
respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and
informed petitioner that they should live separate
lives.
The said relationship between Edward and
Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck
and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused
by both parties[’] unreadiness to commitment and
their young age. He was still in the state of finding
his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still
egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach’s Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be
emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of
them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this
case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so
as to commit himself to marriage. He is still
founded to be on the search of what he wants in
life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not
really sociable and displays a lack of interest in
social interactions and mingling with other
individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of
lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting
to commit himself to a relationship especially to
that of respondent, as aggravated by her
dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of
the reserved and timid type of person, as he
prefer to be religiously attached and spend a
solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent,
is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of
woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative
in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She
is seen to take move on marriage as she thought
that her marriage with petitioner will bring her
good fortune because he is part of a rich family.
In order to have her dreams realized, she used
force and threats knowing that [her] husband is
somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that
there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly
finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to
know himself and marry himself before
submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not
be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a
serious institution solemnized by religious and
law. In the case presented by petitioner and
respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both
parties have impulsively taken marriage for
granted as they are still unaware of their own
selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of
weakening their relationship by his weak
behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,]
is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to
be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring
in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent
that she is suffering the grave, severe, and
incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder that started since childhood
and only manifested during marriage. Both
parties display psychological incapacities that
made marriage a big mistake for them to take.15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its
Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties
null and void on the ground that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.17 The Republic,
represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of
appeal.18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed
August 5, 2003 Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867, reversed and set aside the trial court’s
ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The
clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information
provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In
sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the
requirements stated in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina21 needed for the declaration
of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.22 The CA faulted the lower court for
rendering the decision without the required
certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the
OSG’s reasons for its agreement with or
opposition to, as the case may be, the
petition.23 The CA later denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration in the likewise assailed
January 19, 2004 Resolution.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the
instant petition for review on certiorari. On June
15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the
CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared
the marriage void, not only because of
respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather
due to both parties’ psychological incapacity.
Petitioner also points out that there is no
requirement for the psychologist to personally
examine respondent. Further, he avers that the
OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because
the latter represented it during the trial; and it had
been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the
trial court orders and notices.27
For its part, the OSG contends in its
memorandum,28 that the annulment petition filed
before the RTC contains no statement of the
essential marital obligations that the parties failed
to comply with. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged
in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically
identified. The purported incapacity of both
parties was not shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. And the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine the
respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the
requirements in Molina29 were not satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of
whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code,
the marriage between the parties is null and
void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its
origin and charting the development of
jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil
Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family
Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available
in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in
Santos v. Court of Appeals:33
However, as a member of both the Family Law
Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision
Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add
some observations. The letter dated April 15,
1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written
in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code
Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman
Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the
background of the inclusion of the present Article
36 in the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law
Committee had thought of including a chapter on
absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family
Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to
prepare. In fact, some members of the
Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce
between the spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous
years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and
(b) whenever a married person would have
obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another
country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name.
Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee
took time to discuss the proposal of Justice
Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code
Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation
of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed
and formulated the definition of marriage as —
‘a special contract of permanent partnership
between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law.’
With the above definition, and considering the
Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon which the
family and society are founded, and also realizing
the strong opposition that any provision on
absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our
citizenry to whom the great majority of our people
belong, the two Committees in their joint
meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute
divorce and, instead, opted for an action for
judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based
on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was
thought that such an action would not only be an
acceptable alternative to divorce but would also
solve the nagging problem of church annulments
of marriages on grounds not recognized by the
civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus,
requested to again prepare a draft of provisions
on such action for celebration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the
present Civil Code and those proposed by
Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law,
the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family
Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals
of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of
an additional kind of void marriage in the
enumeration of void marriages in the present
Civil Code, to wit:
‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may
be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34.’
‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe.’
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken
marriages in our country today may already be
dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed
by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity
as well as annulment of marriages, thus
rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary.
In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald
Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another
meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the
Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee
was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been declaring marriages null and
void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for
causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear
grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature
marriages; marriage to a man who, because of
some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot
support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice
of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal
person; marriage to a woman who refuses to
cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have
children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal
work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon
their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness,
drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly.34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she
expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the
draft provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing
discussion took finally produced the following
revised provision even before the session was
over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding
formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was
explained that these phrases refer to "defects in
the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not
the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's
marital obligation." There being a defect in
consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the
insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing
to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage."
My own position as a member of the Committee
then was that psychological incapacity is, in a
sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the
term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier
February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists
but not canonists, that is why it is considered a
weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon
Law would rather express it as "psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice
Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person
may be psychologically impotent with one but not
with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority
opinion for the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera,
considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista
commented that this would give rise to the
question of how they will determine curability and
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more
problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be
cured after the psychological incapacity becomes
manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by
Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was
to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for
determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential
requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was
subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence, its special treatment in Art. 36
in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage
is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances
existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is
capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or
lack of essential requisites, some marriages are
void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code,
particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in
keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the
relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the
following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of
a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon
Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the
Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it
actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e.,
it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved.
Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics
can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure
with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not
recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage
ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully
into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid
down by Canon Law, the former being more
strict, quite a number of married couples have
found themselves in limbo—freed from the
marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic
Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages
or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution
to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the
Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity
into the Family Code—and classified the same as
a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or
totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law
(1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect,
recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081
required persons to be ‘capable according to law’
in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082
required that persons ‘be at least not ignorant’ of
the major elements required in marriage; and
Canon #1087 (the force and fear category)
required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line
of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment called ‘lack of due
discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’ Lack of
due discretion means that the person did not
have the ability to give valid consent at the time
of the wedding and, therefore, the union is
invalid. Lack of due competence means that the
person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during
the wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman
Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader
approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota
had reasoned for the first time in several cases
that the capacity to give valid consent at the time
of marriage was probably not present in persons
who had displayed such problems shortly after
the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota
itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to
use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began
to accept proof of serious psychological problems
that manifested themselves shortly after the
ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any
examples of psychological incapacity for fear that
by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
The Committee desired that the courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision itself was
taken from the Canon Law.37 The law is then so
designed as to allow some resiliency in its
application.38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase
"psychological incapacity" is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
refers to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as
expressed by Article 6840 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity; and render
help and support. The intendment of the law has
been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.41 This interpretation
is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A
sharp conceptual distinction must be made
between the second and third paragraphs of
C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to
assume the essential obligation. Mario
Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference
by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose
wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the
assumption that they are capable according to
positive law to enter such contract, there remains
the object of the contract, viz, the house. The
house is located in a different locality, and prior
to the conclusion of the contract, the house was
gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them.
This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third
paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph
does not deal with the psychological process of
giving consent because it has been established a
priori that both have such a capacity to give
consent, and they both know well the object of
their consent [the house and its particulars].
Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the
consent/contract which does not exist. The
contract is invalid because it lacks its formal
object. The consent as a psychological act is both
valid and sufficient. The psychological act,
however, is directed towards an object which is
not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this
distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the
positing of consent but with positing the object of
consent. The person may be capable of positing
a free act of consent, but he is not capable of
fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a
result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of
the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic
incapacity with respect to marriage arising from
pathological conditions, there has been an
increasing trend to understand as ground of
nullity different from others, the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage,
especially the incapacity which arises from
sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample
which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied
under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized,
thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every
case imply a grave psychopathological condition
which affects the higher faculties of intellect,
discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual
anomalies that are purely so – that is to say, they
arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the
hormonal system, and they affect the sexual
condition, leaving intact the higher faculties
however, so that these persons are still capable
of free human acts. The evidence from the
empirical sciences is abundant that there are
certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may
impel a person towards sexual activities which
are not normal, either with respect to its
frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the
nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism,
homosexuality]. However, these anomalies
notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the
higher faculties remain intact such that a person
so afflicted continues to have an adequate
understanding of what marriage is and of the
gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can
choose marriage freely. The question though is
whether such a person can assume those
responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although
he may be able to understand them. In this latter
hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage issues from the
incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather
than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if
not actually confused, in this regard. The initial
steps taken by church courts were not too clear
whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of
consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at
the conclusion that the intellect, under such an
irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This
line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at
the moment of consent, is under the influence of
this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable
conclusion that such a decision, made as it was
under these circumstances, lacks the necessary
freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a
decision made under duress, such as this
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But
this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of
fact, true that the intellect is always and
continuously under such an irresistible
compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and
certainly more reasonable, to think that there are
certain cases in which one who is sexually
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and
evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and
what it implies; his consent would be juridically
ineffective for this one reason that he cannot
posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in
corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with
usually regularity. It would seem more correct to
say that the consent may indeed be free, but is
juridically ineffective because the party is
consenting to an object that he cannot deliver.
The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground.
Sabattani seems to have seen his way more
clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as
he did a clear conceptual distinction between the
inability to give consent on the one hand, and the
inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the
other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs
usually understand the meaning of marriage, and
they are usually able to evaluate its implications.
They would have no difficulty with positing a free
and intelligent consent. However, such persons,
capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and
free consent, experience difficulty in another
sphere: delivering the object of the consent.
Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise treated
the difference between the act of consenting and
the act of positing the object of consent from the
point of view of a person afflicted with
nymphomania. According to him, such an
affliction usually leaves the process of knowing
and understanding and evaluating intact. What it
affects is the object of consent: the delivering of
the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the
Object of Consent. From the selected rotal
jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a
certain progress towards a consensus doctrine
that the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal
object of consent) can coexist in the same person
with the ability to make a free decision, an
intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and
weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani
concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such
a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard
to the moment of consent but also, and
especially, with regard to the matrimonium in
facto esse. The decision concludes that a person
in such a condition is incapable of assuming the
conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may
have no difficulty in understanding what the
obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing
and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon
Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this
ground as moral impotence or psychic
impotence, or similar expressions to express a
specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies and
disorders in the personality. These anomalies
leave intact the faculties of the will and the
intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic,
obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that
constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084.
Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject
incapable of binding himself in a valid
matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly
renders that person incapable of fulfilling the
essential obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology:
nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is
incapacity when either or both of the contractants
are not capable of initiating or maintaining this
consortium. One immediately thinks of those
cases where one of the parties is so self-centered
[e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not
even know how to begin a union with the other,
let alone how to maintain and sustain such a
relationship. A second incapacity could be due to
the fact that the spouses are incapable of
beginning or maintaining a heterosexual
consortium, which goes to the very substance of
matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when
a spouse is unable to concretize the good of
himself or of the other party. The canon speaks,
not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of
realizing or contributing to the good of the other
party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would
be deemed incapable of contracting marriage.
Such would be the case of a person who may be
quite capable of procuring the economic good
and the financial security of the other, but not
capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the
other. These are general strokes and this is not
the place for detained and individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where
the concrete circumstances of the case concerns
a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious
sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of
the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage,
he was not capable of assuming them because
of his "constitutional immorality."
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and
capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment
of responsibilities is determined not only at the
moment of decision but also and especially
during the moment of execution of decision. And
when this is applied to constitution of the marital
consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the
essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
consideration that must be factored into the
question of whether a person was in a position to
assume the obligations of marriage in the first
place. When one speaks of the inability of the
party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is
not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and
especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the]
decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated
the incapacity of the respondent to assume the
essential obligations of marriage in the psychic
constitution of the person, precisely on the basis
of his irresponsibility as regards money and his
apathy as regards the rights of others that he had
violated. Interpersonal relationships are
invariably disturbed in the presence of this
personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability
to recognize and experience how others feel) is
common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable
expectation, especially favorable treatment, is
usually present. Likewise common is
interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others
are taken advantage of in order to achieve one’s
ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations
considered as essential matrimonial obligations.
One of them is the right to the communio vitae.
This and their corresponding obligations are
basically centered around the good of the
spouses and of the children. Serious psychic
anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily
incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to
assume any, or several, or even all of these
rights. There are some cases in which
interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some
characteristic features of inability for
interpersonal relationships in marriage include
affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial
traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was
not very clear under what rubric homosexuality
was understood to be invalidating of marriage –
that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating
because of the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the
inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively,
however, rotal jurisprudence began to
understand it as incapacity to assume the
obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella
was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality
as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say
that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. In
this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial
consent is understood to refer not only to the jus
in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The
third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume
the essential obligations of marriage] certainly
seems to be the more adequate juridical structure
to account for the complex phenomenon that
homosexuality is. The homosexual is not
necessarily impotent because, except in very few
exceptional cases, such a person is usually
capable of full sexual relations with the spouse.
Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so
afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave
lack of due discretion because this sexual
anomaly does not by itself affect the critical,
volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the
homosexual person is unable to assume the
responsibilities of marriage because he is unable
to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In
other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the
defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of
consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that
needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity
specified by the canon: causes of a psychological
nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the
clause is a reference to the personality of the
contractant. In other words, there must be a
reference to the psychic part of the person. It is
only when there is something in the psyche or in
the psychic constitution of the person which
impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that
the person is incapable according to the
hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person
is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to
the extent that he is found to have something
rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes
the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit
deeply engrained in one’s consciousness would
not seem to qualify to be a source of this
invalidating incapacity. The difference being that
there seems to be some freedom, however
remote, in the development of the habit, while
one accepts as given one’s psychic constitution.
It would seem then that the law insists that the
source of the incapacity must be one which is not
the fruit of some degree of freedom.42
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the
courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is
psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower court’s judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43 ruled
that the findings of the trial court are final and
binding on the appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and
declaring that its decision was not a judgment on
the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,45 explained that when private
respondent testified under oath before the lower
court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in the
form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware
of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage
tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
obligation of procreating children is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be
applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended
by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina,46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own
deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychological—not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
such moment, or prior thereto. Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36
(4) Such incapacity must also be
was taken by the Family Code
shown to be medically or clinically
Revision Committee from Canon 1095
permanent or incurable. Such
of the New Code of Canon Law, which
incurability may be absolute or even
became effective in 1983 and which
relative only in regard to the other
provides:
spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be "The following are incapable of
relevant to the assumption of marriage contracting marriage: Those who are
obligations, not necessarily to those unable to assume the essential
not related to marriage, like the obligations of marriage due to causes
exercise of a profession or of psychological nature."
employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in
Since the purpose of including such
diagnosing illnesses of children and
provision in our Family Code is to
prescribing medicine to cure them but
harmonize our civil laws with the
may not be psychologically
religious faith of our people, it stands to
capacitated to procreate, bear and
reason that to achieve such
raise his/her own children as an
harmonization, great persuasive
essential obligation of marriage.
weight should be given to decisions of
such appellate tribunal. Ideally—
(5) Such illness must be grave enough subject to our law on evidence—what
to bring about the disability of the party is decreed as canonically invalid
to assume the essential obligations of should also be decreed civilly void.
marriage. Thus, "mild
characterological peculiarities, mood
This is one instance where, in view of
changes, occasional emotional
the evident source and purpose of the
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root
Family Code provision,
causes. The illness must be shown as
contemporaneous religious
downright incapacity or inability, not a
interpretation is to be given persuasive
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
effect. Here, the State and the
ill will. In other words, there is a natal
Church—while remaining
or supervening disabling factor in the
independent, separate and apart from
person, an adverse integral element in
each other—shall walk together in
the personality structure that
synodal cadence towards the same
effectively incapacitates the person
goal of protecting and cherishing
from really accepting and thereby
marriage and the family as the
complying with the obligations
inviolable base of the nation.
essential to marriage.
(8) The trial court must order the
(6) The essential marital obligations
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
must be those embraced by Articles 68
Solicitor General to appear as counsel
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
for the state. No decision shall be
the husband and wife as well as
handed down unless the Solicitor
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
General issues a certification, which
Code in regard to parents and their
will be quoted in the decision, briefly
children. Such non-complied marital
stating therein his reasons for his
obligation(s) must also be stated in the
agreement or opposition, as the case
petition, proven by evidence and
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
included in the text of the decision.
General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such
(7) Interpretations given by the certification within fifteen (15) days
National Appellate Matrimonial from the date the case is deemed
 submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of
the Court’s membership concurred in the
ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another three—
including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero—took
pains to compose their individual separate
opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
emphasized that "each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions
or generalizations, but according to its own facts.
In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say
that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court."48
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent
cases,49 the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the law’s
clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for
the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one
in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to
the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most
liberal divorce procedure in the world."50 The
unintended consequences of Molina, however,
has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites,
consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from
what was intended by the Court, Molina has
become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has
allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.51
The Court need not worry about the possible
abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for
there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by
the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence.52 The Court should rather
be alarmed by the rising number of cases
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic
violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either
party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is
actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with
a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with
or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed
that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in
Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the
first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply
provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the
freed spouses should not pose too much of a
concern for the Court. First and foremost,
because it is none of its business. And second,
because the judicial declaration of psychological
incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson
learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would
have become vigilant, and never again marry a
person with a personality disorder. On the other
hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically
incapacitated runs the risk of the latter’s disorder
recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting
the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice
Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is
need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the
risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more
the principle that each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts.
And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or
less six (6) months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May,
and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of
dependent personality disorder, and
respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and
antisocial personality disorder.56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite
having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion
on the psychological and mental temperaments
of the parties.57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as
follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the
professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person's entire life, both before
and after the ceremony, were presented to these
experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental capacity at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as
decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new
openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather
was an accommodation by the Church to the
advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide
the all-important connecting link between a
marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its
whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this
was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry.
The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are
now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept
of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage .
. . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the
spouses to each other's body for heterosexual
acts, but is, in its totality the right to the
community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a
developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions
since 1973 have refined the meaning of
psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to
accept the other as a distinct person; that the
spouses must be ‘other oriented’ since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving
love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because
marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends,
according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this interpersonal relationship. A serious
incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support
is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. The marital capacity of one
spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six
elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with
the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability
to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real
freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses
consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach
for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are,
experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the
parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at
the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that at the
time the marriage was entered into civil divorce
and breakup of the family almost always is proof
of someone's failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the
marriage was entered into."581avvphi1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the
importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party’s
psychological incapacity, and to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. And as
Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no
requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity.61 Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention
nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation
of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-
depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis
of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the
Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the
inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge
to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological
state of the parties. This will assist the courts,
who are no experts in the field of psychology, to
arrive at an intelligent and judicious
determination of the case. The rule, however,
does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to
present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the
psychological assessment, which we consider as
adequate, produced the findings that both parties
are afflicted with personality disorders—to
repeat, dependent personality disorder for
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder for respondent. We note that
The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses
personality disorders as follows—
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits
that are characteristic of a person’s recent and
long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and
thinking are not usually limited to isolated
episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible,
maladaptive and severe enough to cause the
individual mental stress or anxieties or to
interfere with interpersonal relationships and
normal functioning. Personality disorders are
often recognizable by adolescence or earlier,
continue through adulthood and become less
obvious in middle or old age. An individual may
have more than one personality disorder at a
time.
The common factor among individuals who have
personality disorders, despite a variety of
character traits, is the way in which the disorder
leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with
personality disorders are perceived by others as
overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even
criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors.
Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along
with other people, as well as difficulties in other
areas of life and often a tendency to blame others
for their problems. Other individuals with
personality disorders are not unpleasant or
difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated
or dependent. Such traits can lead to
interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem
and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental
health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of
personality disorders. These include Freudian,
genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain
wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at
certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as
described in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are
derived from his oral, anal and phallic character
types. Demanding and dependent behavior
(dependent and passive-aggressive) was
thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage.
Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and
emotional aloofness were thought to derive from
fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic
stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an
inability to engage in intimate
relationships.lawphil.net However, later
researchers have found little evidence that early
childhood events or fixation at certain stages of
development lead to specific personality
patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that
there may be a genetic factor involved in the
etiology of antisocial and borderline personality
disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of
other personality disorders. Some family,
adoption and twin studies suggest that
schizotypal personality may be related to genetic
factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have
borderline personality, researchers have found
that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic
acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with
measures of aggression and a past history of
suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has
been associated with low platelet monoamine
oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth
pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in
electroencephalograph (EEG) have been
reported in antisocial personality for many years;
slow wave is the most widely reported
abnormality. A study of borderline patients
reported that 38 percent had at least marginal
EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in
a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed.,
rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders
are categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal
personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric
habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and
narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear overly
emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-
compulsive and passive-aggressive personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders
often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category,
"personality disorder not otherwise specified,"
that can be used for other specific personality
disorders or for mixed conditions that do not
qualify as any of the specific personality
disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality
disorders usually have long-term concerns, and
thus therapy may be long-term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized
in the following manner—
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern
of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear
criticism and are easily hurt by others’ comments.
At times they actually bring about dominance by
others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in
early adulthood. Individuals who have this
disorder may be unable to make everyday
decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend
to agree with people even when they believe they
are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or
doing things on their own, volunteer to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from
other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and are often preoccupied with fears
of being abandoned.65 and antisocial personality
disorder described, as follows—
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of
behavior that is intolerant of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an
inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through
exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent
physical fights and, quite commonly, child or
spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to
blame others. There is often a façade of charm
and even sophistication that masks disregard,
lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and
the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe
criminals, they also may befit some individuals
who are prominent in business or politics whose
habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the
rights of others may be hidden prior to a public
scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality
disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The
term described immoral, guiltless behavior that
was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.lawphil.net
According to the classification system used in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social
personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic"
personality disorders, the others being
borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity
of the disorders considered, the Court, in this
case, finds as decisive the psychological
evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus,
rules that the marriage of the parties is null and
void on ground of both parties’ psychological
incapacity. We further consider that the trial
court, which had a first-hand view of the
witnesses’ deportment, arrived at the same
conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent
personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make
everyday decisions without advice from others,
allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree
with people even when he believes they are
wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in
order to get approval from other people, feels
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is
often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case,
petitioner followed everything dictated to him by
the persons around him. He is insecure, weak
and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has
no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also
be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with
antisocial personality disorder makes her unable
to assume the essential marital obligations. This
finding takes into account her disregard for the
rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and
control of others without remorse, her tendency
to blame others, and her intolerance of the
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by
society.68 Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she
had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her
threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave,
severe and incurable psychological G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
incapacity, the precipitous marriage which
they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus,
declared null and void. EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,
vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the TE, Respondent,
petition for review on certiorari is REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision
and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 DECISION
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision, dated July 30, 2001, NACHURA, J.:
REINSTATED.
Far from novel is the issue involved in this
SO ORDERED. petition. Psychological incapacity, since its
incorporation in our laws, has become a clichéd
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The
Associate Justice Court treats this case, however, with much ado,
it having realized that current jurisprudential
doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a
perspective by which psychological incapacity
should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the
way the concept was formulated—free in form
and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867. The petition further assails the January
19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a
glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez
Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-
Chinese association in their college. Edward was
then initially attracted to Rowena’s close friend;
but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the
young man decided to court Rowena. That was
in January 1996, when petitioner was a
sophomore student and respondent, a
freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the
two understood one another and developed a
certain degree of closeness towards each other.
In March 1996, or around three months after their
first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they
elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was
young and jobless. Her persistence, however,
made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed
to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel
money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.4
However, Edward’s ₱80,000.00 lasted for only a
month. Their pension house accommodation and
daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could
not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go
back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s
house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his
family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would
commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with
Rowena at her uncle’s place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the
two to a court to get married. He was then 25
years old, and she, 20.6 The two then continued
to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was
treated like a prisoner—he was not allowed to go
out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed
Edward his guns and warned the latter not to
leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to
call home and talk to his brother who suggested
that they should stay at their parents’ home and
live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena
who, however, suggested that he should get his
inheritance so that they could live on their own.
Edward talked to his father about this, but the
patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be
disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go
home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house
of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents.
His family then hid him from Rowena and her
family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to
Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they
should live with his parents, she said that it was
better for them to live separate lives. They then
parted ways.10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000,
Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court,
on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate
whether there was collusion between the
parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on
its behalf and assist it in the scheduled
hearings.13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an
investigation report stating that it could not
determine if there was collusion between the
parties; thus, it recommended trial on the
merits.14
The clinical psychologist who examined
petitioner found both parties psychologically
incapacitated, and made the following findings
and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL
HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old]
Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again
Christian at Manila. He finished two years in
college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and
is currently unemployed. He is married to and
separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE.
He presented himself at my office for a
psychological evaluation in relation to his petition
for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by
the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is
now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon
City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now
in business and one deceased sister. Both his
parents are also in the business world by whom
he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and
patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to
each of the family member. He generally
considers himself to be quiet and simple. He
clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting
people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a
Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence,
as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay
long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on
becoming a full servant of God by being a priest
or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his
friends even during his childhood days as he only
loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family
despite having a lazy father and a disobedient
wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her
collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual
moments with her boyfriend prior to that with
petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her
kindness to petitioner and this became the
foundation of their intimate relationship. After a
month of dating, petitioner mentioned to
respondent that he is having problems with his
family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she
also hates her family and that she actually
wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time
on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that
they should elope and live together. Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are
both young and inexperienced, but she insisted
that they would somehow manage because
petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996,
respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping
and she already bought tickets for the boat going
to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea
and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are
supposed to stay at the house of a friend of
respondent, but they were not able to locate her,
so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment.
The parties tried to look for a job but could not
find any so it was suggested by respondent that
they should go back and seek help from
petitioner’s parents. When the parties arrived at
the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was
all out of the country so respondent decided to go
back to her home for the meantime while
petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a
few days of separation, respondent called
petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk
to him. Petitioner responded immediately and
when he arrived at their house, respondent
confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be
cold, respondent acted irrationally and even
threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got
scared so he went home again. Respondent
would call by phone every now and then and
became angry as petitioner does not know what
to do. Respondent went to the extent of
threatening to file a case against petitioner and
scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner
asked her how he would be able to make amends
and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the
idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in
life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April
23, 1996, respondent’s uncle brought the parties
to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,]
petitioner was made to sign the Marriage
Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually
never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at
their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner
arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to
go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many
ways with her uncle showing to him many guns.
Respondent even threatened that if he should
persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent
even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he
should perish, the authorities should look for him
at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses.
Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to
escape and he went home. He told his parents
about his predicament and they forgave him and
supported him by giving him military escort.
Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he
signed a marriage contract with respondent.
When they knew about it[,] petitioner was
referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent.
Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the
home of petitioner’s parents while they are still
studying. Respondent refused the idea and
claimed that she would only live with him if they
will have a separate home of their own and be
away from his parents. She also intimated to
petitioner that he should already get his share of
whatever he would inherit from his parents so
they can start a new life. Respondent demanded
these not knowing [that] the petitioner already
settled his differences with his own family. When
respondent refused to live with petitioner where
he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to
tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents.
He told her already that he was disinherited and
since he also does not have a job, he would not
be able to support her. After knowing that
petitioner does not have any money anymore,
respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and
informed petitioner that they should live separate
lives.
The said relationship between Edward and
Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck
and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused
by both parties[’] unreadiness to commitment and
their young age. He was still in the state of finding
his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still
egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach’s Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be
emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of
them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this
case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so
as to commit himself to marriage. He is still
founded to be on the search of what he wants in
life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not
really sociable and displays a lack of interest in
social interactions and mingling with other
individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of
lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting
to commit himself to a relationship especially to
that of respondent, as aggravated by her
dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of
the reserved and timid type of person, as he
prefer to be religiously attached and spend a
solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent,
is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of
woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative
in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She
is seen to take move on marriage as she thought
that her marriage with petitioner will bring her
good fortune because he is part of a rich family.
In order to have her dreams realized, she used
force and threats knowing that [her] husband is
somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that
there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly
finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to
know himself and marry himself before
submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not
be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a
serious institution solemnized by religious and
law. In the case presented by petitioner and
respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both
parties have impulsively taken marriage for
granted as they are still unaware of their own
selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of
weakening their relationship by his weak
behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,]
is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to
be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring
in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent
that she is suffering the grave, severe, and
incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder that started since childhood
and only manifested during marriage. Both
parties display psychological incapacities that
made marriage a big mistake for them to take.15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its
Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties
null and void on the ground that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.17 The Republic,
represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of
appeal.18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed
August 5, 2003 Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867, reversed and set aside the trial court’s
ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The
clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information
provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In
sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the
requirements stated in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina21 needed for the declaration
of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.22 The CA faulted the lower court for
rendering the decision without the required
certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the
OSG’s reasons for its agreement with or
opposition to, as the case may be, the
petition.23 The CA later denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration in the likewise assailed
January 19, 2004 Resolution.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the
instant petition for review on certiorari. On June
15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the
CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared
the marriage void, not only because of
respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather
due to both parties’ psychological incapacity.
Petitioner also points out that there is no
requirement for the psychologist to personally
examine respondent. Further, he avers that the
OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because
the latter represented it during the trial; and it had
been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the
trial court orders and notices.27
For its part, the OSG contends in its
memorandum,28 that the annulment petition filed
before the RTC contains no statement of the
essential marital obligations that the parties failed
to comply with. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged
in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically
identified. The purported incapacity of both
parties was not shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. And the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine the
respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the
requirements in Molina29 were not satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of
whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code,
the marriage between the parties is null and
void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its
origin and charting the development of
jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil
Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family
Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available
in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in
Santos v. Court of Appeals:33
However, as a member of both the Family Law
Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision
Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add
some observations. The letter dated April 15,
1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written
in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code
Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman
Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the
background of the inclusion of the present Article
36 in the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law
Committee had thought of including a chapter on
absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family
Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to
prepare. In fact, some members of the
Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce
between the spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous
years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and
(b) whenever a married person would have
obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another
country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name.
Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee
took time to discuss the proposal of Justice
Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code
Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation
of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed
and formulated the definition of marriage as —
‘a special contract of permanent partnership
between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law.’
With the above definition, and considering the
Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon which the
family and society are founded, and also realizing
the strong opposition that any provision on
absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our
citizenry to whom the great majority of our people
belong, the two Committees in their joint
meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute
divorce and, instead, opted for an action for
judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based
on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was
thought that such an action would not only be an
acceptable alternative to divorce but would also
solve the nagging problem of church annulments
of marriages on grounds not recognized by the
civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus,
requested to again prepare a draft of provisions
on such action for celebration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the
present Civil Code and those proposed by
Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law,
the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family
Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals
of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of
an additional kind of void marriage in the
enumeration of void marriages in the present
Civil Code, to wit:
‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may
be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34.’
‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe.’
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken
marriages in our country today may already be
dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed
by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity
as well as annulment of marriages, thus
rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary.
In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald
Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another
meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the
Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee
was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been declaring marriages null and
void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for
causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear
grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature
marriages; marriage to a man who, because of
some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot
support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice
of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal
person; marriage to a woman who refuses to
cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have
children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal
work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon
their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness,
drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly.34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she
expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person
draft provision read: may be psychologically impotent with one but not
with another.
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to opinion for the interpretation and application of
understand the essential nature of marriage or Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to to be medically or clinically permanent or
discharge the essential marital obligations, even incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
the celebration." not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex."
The twists and turns which the ensuing
discussion took finally produced the following The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera,
revised provision even before the session was considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is
over: incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista
commented that this would give rise to the
question of how they will determine curability and
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more
of the celebration, was psychologically
problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
cured after the psychological incapacity becomes
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by
becomes manifest after the celebration."
Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was
Noticeably, the immediately preceding to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for
judgment to understand the essential nature of
determining void marriages, viz.:
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was
explained that these phrases refer to "defects in
the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not 1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites
the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's of marriage as contract;
marital obligation." There being a defect in
consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for
2. reasons of public policy;
voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are 3. special cases and special situations.
lucid intervals and there are cases when the
insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity
The ground of psychological incapacity was
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing
subsumed under "special cases and special
to do with consent; it refers to obligations
situations," hence, its special treatment in Art. 36
attendant to marriage."
in the Family Code as finally enacted.
My own position as a member of the Committee
then was that psychological incapacity is, in a Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage
sense, insanity of a lesser degree. is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the
term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier
existing at the time of the marriage, such
February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an
marriage which stands valid until annulled is
invention of some churchmen who are moralists
capable of ratification or convalidation.
but not canonists, that is why it is considered a
weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon
Law would rather express it as "psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or
lack of essential requisites, some marriages are
void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code,
particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in
keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the
relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the
following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of
a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon
Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the
Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it
actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e.,
it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved.
Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics
can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure
with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not
recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage
ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully
into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid
down by Canon Law, the former being more
strict, quite a number of married couples have
found themselves in limbo—freed from the
marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic
Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages
or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution
to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the
Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity
into the Family Code—and classified the same as
a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or
totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law
(1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect,
recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081
required persons to be ‘capable according to law’
in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082
required that persons ‘be at least not ignorant’ of
the major elements required in marriage; and
Canon #1087 (the force and fear category)
required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line
of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment called ‘lack of due
discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’ Lack of
due discretion means that the person did not
have the ability to give valid consent at the time
of the wedding and, therefore, the union is
invalid. Lack of due competence means that the
person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during
the wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman
Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader
approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota
had reasoned for the first time in several cases
that the capacity to give valid consent at the time
of marriage was probably not present in persons
who had displayed such problems shortly after
the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota
itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to
use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began
to accept proof of serious psychological problems
that manifested themselves shortly after the
ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any
examples of psychological incapacity for fear that
by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
The Committee desired that the courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision itself was
taken from the Canon Law.37 The law is then so
designed as to allow some resiliency in its
application.38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase
"psychological incapacity" is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
refers to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as
expressed by Article 6840 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity; and render
help and support. The intendment of the law has
been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.41 This interpretation
is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A
sharp conceptual distinction must be made
between the second and third paragraphs of
C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to
assume the essential obligation. Mario
Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference
by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose
wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the
assumption that they are capable according to
positive law to enter such contract, there remains
the object of the contract, viz, the house. The
house is located in a different locality, and prior
to the conclusion of the contract, the house was
gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them.
This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third
paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph
does not deal with the psychological process of
giving consent because it has been established a
priori that both have such a capacity to give
consent, and they both know well the object of
their consent [the house and its particulars].
Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the
consent/contract which does not exist. The
contract is invalid because it lacks its formal
object. The consent as a psychological act is both
valid and sufficient. The psychological act,
however, is directed towards an object which is
not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this
distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the
positing of consent but with positing the object of
consent. The person may be capable of positing
a free act of consent, but he is not capable of
fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a
result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of
the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic
incapacity with respect to marriage arising from
pathological conditions, there has been an
increasing trend to understand as ground of
nullity different from others, the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage,
especially the incapacity which arises from
sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample
which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied
under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized,
thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every
case imply a grave psychopathological condition
which affects the higher faculties of intellect,
discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual
anomalies that are purely so – that is to say, they
arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the
hormonal system, and they affect the sexual
condition, leaving intact the higher faculties
however, so that these persons are still capable
of free human acts. The evidence from the
empirical sciences is abundant that there are
certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may
impel a person towards sexual activities which
are not normal, either with respect to its
frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the
nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism,
homosexuality]. However, these anomalies
notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the
higher faculties remain intact such that a person
so afflicted continues to have an adequate
understanding of what marriage is and of the
gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can
choose marriage freely. The question though is
whether such a person can assume those
responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although
he may be able to understand them. In this latter
hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage issues from the
incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather
than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if
not actually confused, in this regard. The initial
steps taken by church courts were not too clear
whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of
consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at
the conclusion that the intellect, under such an
irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This
line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at
the moment of consent, is under the influence of
this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable
conclusion that such a decision, made as it was
under these circumstances, lacks the necessary
freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a
decision made under duress, such as this
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But
this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of
fact, true that the intellect is always and
continuously under such an irresistible
compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and
certainly more reasonable, to think that there are
certain cases in which one who is sexually
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and
evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and
what it implies; his consent would be juridically
ineffective for this one reason that he cannot
posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in
corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with
usually regularity. It would seem more correct to
say that the consent may indeed be free, but is
juridically ineffective because the party is
consenting to an object that he cannot deliver.
The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground.
Sabattani seems to have seen his way more
clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as
he did a clear conceptual distinction between the
inability to give consent on the one hand, and the
inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the
other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs
usually understand the meaning of marriage, and
they are usually able to evaluate its implications.
They would have no difficulty with positing a free
and intelligent consent. However, such persons,
capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and
free consent, experience difficulty in another
sphere: delivering the object of the consent.
Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise treated
the difference between the act of consenting and
the act of positing the object of consent from the
point of view of a person afflicted with
nymphomania. According to him, such an
affliction usually leaves the process of knowing
and understanding and evaluating intact. What it
affects is the object of consent: the delivering of
the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the
Object of Consent. From the selected rotal
jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a
certain progress towards a consensus doctrine
that the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal
object of consent) can coexist in the same person
with the ability to make a free decision, an
intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and
weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani
concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such
a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard
to the moment of consent but also, and
especially, with regard to the matrimonium in
facto esse. The decision concludes that a person
in such a condition is incapable of assuming the
conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may
have no difficulty in understanding what the
obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing
and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon
Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this
ground as moral impotence or psychic
impotence, or similar expressions to express a
specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies and
disorders in the personality. These anomalies
leave intact the faculties of the will and the
intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic,
obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that
constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084.
Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject
incapable of binding himself in a valid
matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly
renders that person incapable of fulfilling the
essential obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology:
nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is
incapacity when either or both of the contractants
are not capable of initiating or maintaining this
consortium. One immediately thinks of those
cases where one of the parties is so self-centered
[e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not
even know how to begin a union with the other,
let alone how to maintain and sustain such a
relationship. A second incapacity could be due to
the fact that the spouses are incapable of
beginning or maintaining a heterosexual
consortium, which goes to the very substance of
matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when
a spouse is unable to concretize the good of
himself or of the other party. The canon speaks,
not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of
realizing or contributing to the good of the other
party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would
be deemed incapable of contracting marriage.
Such would be the case of a person who may be
quite capable of procuring the economic good
and the financial security of the other, but not
capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the
other. These are general strokes and this is not affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial
the place for detained and individual description. traits.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was
the concrete circumstances of the case concerns not very clear under what rubric homosexuality
a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious was understood to be invalidating of marriage –
sociopathy. He concluded that while the that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating
respondent may have understood, on the level of because of the inability to evaluate the
the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, responsibilities of marriage, or because of the
he was not capable of assuming them because inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively,
of his "constitutional immorality." however, rotal jurisprudence began to
understand it as incapacity to assume the
obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and
was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality
capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment
as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say
of responsibilities is determined not only at the
that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to
moment of decision but also and especially
assume the essential obligations of marriage. In
during the moment of execution of decision. And
this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial
when this is applied to constitution of the marital
consent is understood to refer not only to the jus
consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the
in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The
essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume
consideration that must be factored into the
the essential obligations of marriage] certainly
question of whether a person was in a position to
seems to be the more adequate juridical structure
assume the obligations of marriage in the first
to account for the complex phenomenon that
place. When one speaks of the inability of the
homosexuality is. The homosexual is not
party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is
necessarily impotent because, except in very few
not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and
exceptional cases, such a person is usually
especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the]
capable of full sexual relations with the spouse.
decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated
Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so
the incapacity of the respondent to assume the
afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave
essential obligations of marriage in the psychic
lack of due discretion because this sexual
constitution of the person, precisely on the basis
anomaly does not by itself affect the critical,
of his irresponsibility as regards money and his
volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the
apathy as regards the rights of others that he had
homosexual person is unable to assume the
violated. Interpersonal relationships are
responsibilities of marriage because he is unable
invariably disturbed in the presence of this
to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In
personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability
other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the
to recognize and experience how others feel) is
defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of
common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable
consent.
expectation, especially favorable treatment, is
usually present. Likewise common is
interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others 3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that
are taken advantage of in order to achieve one’s needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity
ends. specified by the canon: causes of a psychological
nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the
clause is a reference to the personality of the
Authors have made listings of obligations
contractant. In other words, there must be a
considered as essential matrimonial obligations.
reference to the psychic part of the person. It is
One of them is the right to the communio vitae.
only when there is something in the psyche or in
This and their corresponding obligations are
the psychic constitution of the person which
basically centered around the good of the
impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that
spouses and of the children. Serious psychic
the person is incapable according to the
anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily
hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person
incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to
is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to
assume any, or several, or even all of these
the extent that he is found to have something
rights. There are some cases in which
rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes
interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some
the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit
characteristic features of inability for
deeply engrained in one’s consciousness would
interpersonal relationships in marriage include
not seem to qualify to be a source of this
invalidating incapacity. The difference being that
there seems to be some freedom, however
remote, in the development of the habit, while
one accepts as given one’s psychic constitution.
It would seem then that the law insists that the
source of the incapacity must be one which is not
the fruit of some degree of freedom.42
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the
courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is
psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower court’s judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43 ruled
that the findings of the trial court are final and
binding on the appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and
declaring that its decision was not a judgment on
the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,45 explained that when private
respondent testified under oath before the lower
court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in the
form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware
of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage
tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
obligation of procreating children is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be
applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended
by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina,46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own
deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict
on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological—not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the obligations
he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes
of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in
our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally— subject to our
law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident
source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.
Here, the State and the Church—while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each
other—shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of
the Court’s membership concurred in the
ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another three—
including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero—took
pains to compose their individual separate
opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
emphasized that "each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions
or generalizations, but according to its own facts.
In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say
that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court."48
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent
cases,49 the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the law’s
clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for
the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one
in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to
the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most
liberal divorce procedure in the world."50 The
unintended consequences of Molina, however,
has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites,
consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from
what was intended by the Court, Molina has
become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has
allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.51
The Court need not worry about the possible
abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for
there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by
the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence.52 The Court should rather
be alarmed by the rising number of cases
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic
violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either
party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is
actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with
a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with
or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed
that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in
Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the
first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply
provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the
freed spouses should not pose too much of a
concern for the Court. First and foremost,
because it is none of its business. And second,
because the judicial declaration of psychological
incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson
learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would
have become vigilant, and never again marry a
person with a personality disorder. On the other
hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically
incapacitated runs the risk of the latter’s disorder
recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting
the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice
Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is
need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the
risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more
the principle that each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts.
And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or
less six (6) months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May,
and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of
dependent personality disorder, and
respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and
antisocial personality disorder.56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite
having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion
on the psychological and mental temperaments
of the parties.57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as
follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the
professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person's entire life, both before
and after the ceremony, were presented to these
experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental capacity at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as
decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new
openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather
was an accommodation by the Church to the
advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide
the all-important connecting link between a
marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its
whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this
was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry.
The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are
now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept
of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage .
. . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the
spouses to each other's body for heterosexual
acts, but is, in its totality the right to the
community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a
developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions
since 1973 have refined the meaning of
psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to
accept the other as a distinct person; that the
spouses must be ‘other oriented’ since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving
love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because
marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends,
according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this interpersonal relationship. A serious
incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support
is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. The marital capacity of one
spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six
elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with
the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability
to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real
freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses
consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach
for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are,
experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the
parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at
the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that at the
time the marriage was entered into civil divorce
and breakup of the family almost always is proof
of someone's failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the
marriage was entered into."581avvphi1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the
importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party’s
psychological incapacity, and to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. And as
Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no
requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity.61 Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention
nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation
of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-
depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis
of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the
Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the
inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge
to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological
state of the parties. This will assist the courts,
who are no experts in the field of psychology, to
arrive at an intelligent and judicious
determination of the case. The rule, however,
does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to
present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the
psychological assessment, which we consider as
adequate, produced the findings that both parties
are afflicted with personality disorders—to
repeat, dependent personality disorder for
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder for respondent. We note that
The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses
personality disorders as follows—
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits
that are characteristic of a person’s recent and
long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and
thinking are not usually limited to isolated
episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible,
maladaptive and severe enough to cause the
individual mental stress or anxieties or to
interfere with interpersonal relationships and
normal functioning. Personality disorders are
often recognizable by adolescence or earlier,
continue through adulthood and become less
obvious in middle or old age. An individual may
have more than one personality disorder at a
time.
The common factor among individuals who have
personality disorders, despite a variety of
character traits, is the way in which the disorder
leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with
personality disorders are perceived by others as
overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even
criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors.
Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along
with other people, as well as difficulties in other
areas of life and often a tendency to blame others
for their problems. Other individuals with
personality disorders are not unpleasant or
difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated
or dependent. Such traits can lead to
interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem
and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental
health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of
personality disorders. These include Freudian,
genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain
wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at
certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as
described in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are
derived from his oral, anal and phallic character
types. Demanding and dependent behavior
(dependent and passive-aggressive) was
thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage.
Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and
emotional aloofness were thought to derive from
fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic
stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an
inability to engage in intimate
relationships.lawphil.net However, later
researchers have found little evidence that early
childhood events or fixation at certain stages of
development lead to specific personality
patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that
there may be a genetic factor involved in the
etiology of antisocial and borderline personality
disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of
other personality disorders. Some family,
adoption and twin studies suggest that
schizotypal personality may be related to genetic
factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have
borderline personality, researchers have found
that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic
acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with
measures of aggression and a past history of
suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has
been associated with low platelet monoamine
oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth
pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in
electroencephalograph (EEG) have been
reported in antisocial personality for many years;
slow wave is the most widely reported
abnormality. A study of borderline patients
reported that 38 percent had at least marginal
EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in
a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed.,
rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders
are categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal
personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric
habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and
narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear overly
emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-
compulsive and passive-aggressive personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders
often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category,
"personality disorder not otherwise specified,"
that can be used for other specific personality
disorders or for mixed conditions that do not
qualify as any of the specific personality
disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality
disorders usually have long-term concerns, and
thus therapy may be long-term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized
in the following manner—
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern
of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear
criticism and are easily hurt by others’ comments.
At times they actually bring about dominance by
others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in
early adulthood. Individuals who have this
disorder may be unable to make everyday
decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend
to agree with people even when they believe they
are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or
doing things on their own, volunteer to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from
other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and are often preoccupied with fears
of being abandoned.65 and antisocial personality
disorder described, as follows—
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of
behavior that is intolerant of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an
inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through
exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent
physical fights and, quite commonly, child or
spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to
blame others. There is often a façade of charm
and even sophistication that masks disregard,
lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and
the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe
criminals, they also may befit some individuals
who are prominent in business or politics whose
habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the
rights of others may be hidden prior to a public
scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality
disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The
term described immoral, guiltless behavior that
was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.lawphil.net
According to the classification system used in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social
personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic"
personality disorders, the others being
borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity
of the disorders considered, the Court, in this
case, finds as decisive the psychological
evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus,
rules that the marriage of the parties is null and
void on ground of both parties’ psychological
incapacity. We further consider that the trial
court, which had a first-hand view of the
witnesses’ deportment, arrived at the same
conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent
personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make
everyday decisions without advice from others,
allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree
with people even when he believes they are
wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in
order to get approval from other people, feels
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is
often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case,
petitioner followed everything dictated to him by
the persons around him. He is insecure, weak
and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has
no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also
be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with
antisocial personality disorder makes her unable
to assume the essential marital obligations. This
finding takes into account her disregard for the
rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and
control of others without remorse, her tendency
to blame others, and her intolerance of the
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by
society.68 Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she
had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her
threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe
and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on
April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August
5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the Decision, dated July 30, 2001,
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Ting vs. Ting
ARTICLE 36 OF FAMILY CODE
FACTS:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met
in 1972 while they were classmates in medical
school. They fell in love and get married on July
26, 1975 in Cebu City when Carmen was
already pregnant with their first child. They
resided first at Benjamin’s family at
Mandaue City. When their second child was
born, the couple decided to move to Carmen’s
family home in Cebu City. In September 1975,
Benjamin passed the medical board
examinations. On 1980, he began working
for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen’s family,
as member of its active staff, while Carmen
worked as the hospitals treasurer. The couple
were blessed with six (6) children. On October
21, 1993, after being married for more than 18
years. Carmen filed a verified petition before the
RTC of Cebu City for nullifying their marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Carmen
claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however,
only became manifest thereafter. In her
complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their
marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin
used to drink and gamble occasionally with his
friends. But after they were married, petitioner
continued to drink regularly and would go home
at about midnight .Benjamin physically assault
her and force her to have sex with him. There
were also instances Benjamin’s job as
anesthesiologist was affected. Respondent
tried to talk to her husband about the latters
drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to
acknowledge the same. Carmen also
complained that petitioner deliberately refused
to give financial support to their family. Aside
from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive
gambling. Benjamin denied being
psychologically incapacitated. He maintained
that he is a respectable person. He also pointed
out that it was he who often comforted and took
care of their children, while Carmen played
mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both
presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to
refute each others claim. On January 9, 1998,
the TRIAL COURT DECLARED the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and
void. The RTC found him to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. Petitioner appealed to
the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered
a Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling. It
faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no
proof was adduced to support the conclusion
that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated at the time he married Carmen
since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on
theories and not on established fact, contrary to
the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of
Appeals and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals and Molina. Carmen filed a MR, it was
denied then she filed a petition for certiorari with
the SC, SC directed CA to decide onCarmen’s
case. On review, CA reversed it’s earlier ruling
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the
requirement of proof of psychological incapacity
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code has
been liberalized?
HELD:
The Case involving the application of Article 36
must be treated distinctly and judged not on the
basis of a prior assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
The Supreme Court did not grant the nullity of
marriage. As between the psychiatrist
presented by the petitioner and the one
presented by the respondent, the Supreme
Court adhered to the findings of the latter that
respondent was not psychologically
incapacitated considering that the psychiatrist of
the respondent, aside from analysing the
transcripts of the respondent’s deposition, was
able to consider the psychiatric finding of
another psychiatrist who personally examined
the respondents and also to interview the
respondent’s brothers compared. The
psychiatrist of the petitioner however merely
evaluated the respondents by only analysing his
deposition.
SUAZO v. SUAZO
G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010
FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were
married when they were 16 years old
only. Without any means to support
themselves, they lived with Angelito’s parents
while Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito
refused to work and was most of the time drunk.
Petitioner urged him to find work but this often
resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their
marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito
thereafter found another woman with whom he
has since lived. 10 years later, she filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn
testified on the alleged physical beating she
received. The expert witness corroborated
parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both
her psychological report and testimony
concluded that Angelito was psychologically
incapacitated. However, B was not personally
examined by the expert witness. The RTC
annulled the marriage on the ground that
Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital
obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an
effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants
(like refusal of the husband to support the
family or excessive dependence on parents
or peer group approval) and habitual
alcoholism, or the condition by which a
person lives for the next drink and the next
drinks” but the CA reversed it and held that
the respondent may have failed to provide
material support to the family and has resorted
to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to
show that they were manifestations of a deeper
psychological malaise that was clinically or
medically identified. The theory of the
psychologist that the respondent was
suffering from an anti-social personality
syndrome at the time of the marriage was
not the product of any adequate medical or
clinical investigation. The evidence that she
got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could
equally show that the behavior of the
respondent was due simply to causes like
immaturity or irresponsibility which are not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the
failure or refusal to work could have been the
result of rebelliousness on the part of one who
felt that he had been forced into a loveless
marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify
Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article
36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of
merit. The CA committed no reversible error of
law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no
basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with
Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish
Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The
psychologist evaluated
Angelito’s psychological condition only in an
indirect manner – she derived all her
conclusions from information coming from
Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of
course be doubted. The psychlologist, using
meager information coming from a directly
interested party, could not have secured a
complete personality profile and could not have
conclusively formed an objective opinion or
diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition.
While the report or evaluation may be
conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s
psychological condition, this is not true for
Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from
a psychological disorder. Both the
psychologist’s report and testimony simply
provided a general description of Angelito’s
purported anti-social personality disorder,
supported by the characterization of this
disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The
psychologist was conspicuously silent,
however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization
she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must
be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself. A’s testimony
regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling
and refusal to find a job, while indicative
of psychological incapacity, do not, by
themselves, show psychological incapacity. All
these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere
refusal to perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty
in complying with his marital obligations, or was
unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of
a natal or supervening disabling factor – an
adverse integral element in the respondent’s
personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations – must be
shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on
the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and
the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding
of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a person’s refusal
or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on
certiorari1 filed by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines challenging the October 7, 2005
amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004
decision3(original decision) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA
set aside the June 5, 2002 decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257,
which The Factual Antecedents
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married
Lolita5 and the union bore two children,
Maricar and Manny.6 To support his family,
Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May
15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while
still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had
been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez.
Sometime in 1991,7 Lolita allegedly left the
conjugal home with her children and lived
with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had
been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar
filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita
for the declaration of the nullity of his
marriage based on Lolita’s psychological
incapacity.8
Lolita denied that she had an affair with
Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be
an associate in her promotions business.
She insisted that she is not psychologically
incapacitated and that she left their home
because of irreconcilable differences with
her mother-in-law.9
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of
Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent
abandonment of the family home.10He
testified that he continued to provide
financial support for Lolita and their children
even after he learned of her illicit affair with
Alvin.11
Cesar presented the psychological
evaluation report12 on Lolita prepared by Dr.
Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center
for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that
Lolita was "not suffering from any form of
major psychiatric illness,"13 but had been
"unable to provide the expectations
expected of her for a good and lasting
marital relationship";14 her "transferring from
one job to the other depicts some
interpersonal problems with co-workers as
well as her impatience in attaining her
ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go with her
husband abroad signifies her reluctance to
work out a good marital and family
relationship."16
The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC
declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void,
finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
The petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the
CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s
verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of
the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not
serious cases of personality
disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely
refused to comply with her marital
obligations which she was capable of doing.
The CA significantly observed that infidelity
is only a ground for legal separation, not for
the declaration of the nullity of a marriage.
Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s
decision and, in due course, attained his
objective. The CA set aside its original
decision and entered another, which
affirmed the RTC’s decision. In its amended
decision,20 the CA found two circumstances
indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological
incapacity that resulted in her gross
infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to
perform her marital obligations to Cesar;
and (2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of
abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’
psychological evaluation report did not
disclose that Lolita had been suffering from
a psychological illness nor did it establish its
juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability; infidelity and abandonment do
not constitute psychological incapacity, but
are merely grounds for legal separation.
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and
refusal to perform her marital obligations
established her grave and incurable
psychological incapacity.
The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of
whether there exists sufficient basis to
nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis
exists to annul Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs
psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides
that "a marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have
repeatedly stressed that psychological
incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume the basic marital
obligations";21 not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the juridical
antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time
of the celebration of marriage), gravity and
incurability of the condition of the errant
spouse.23
Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s
psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to
prove Lolita’s alleged psychological
incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates
when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair
and her subsequent abandonment of their
home,24 as well as his continued financial
support to her and their children even after
he learned of the affair,25 but he merely
mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair
with Alvin and her abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even
if true, do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply
grounds for legal separation.26 To constitute
psychological incapacity, it must be shown
that the unfaithfulness and abandonment
are manifestations of a disordered
personality that completely prevented the
erring spouse from discharging the
essential marital obligations.27 No evidence
on record exists to support Cesar’s
allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and
abandonment were manifestations of any
psychological illness.
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’
psychological evaluation report on Lolita to
prove her alleged psychological incapacity.
The psychological evaluation, in fact,
established that Lolita did not suffer from
any major psychiatric illness.28 Dr. Flores’
observation on Lolita’s interpersonal
problems with co-workers,29 to our mind,
does not suffice as a consideration for the
conclusion that she was – at the time of her
marriage – psychologically incapacitated to
enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside
from the time element involved, a wife’s
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot
simply be equated with her
professional/work relationship; workplace
obligations and responsibilities are poles
apart from their marital counterparts. While
both spring from human relationship, their
relatedness and relevance to one another
should be fully established for them to be
compared or to serve as measures of
comparison with one another. To be sure,
the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared
and submitted cannot serve this purpose.
Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal
to go with Cesar abroad signified a
reluctance to work out a good marital
relationship30 is a mere generalization
unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash
conclusion that this Court cannot support.
In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the
existence of Lolita’s psychological
incapacity; thus, the CA committed a
reversible error when it reconsidered its
original decision.1âwphi1
Once again, we stress that marriage is an
inviolable social institution31 protected by
the State. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of its existence its existence and
continuation and against its dissolution and
nullity.32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim
of the parties nor by transgressions made by
one party to the other during the marriage.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and
SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS
respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita
Castillo-Encelan.

Costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In our decision promulgated on September 19,

2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties
upon the following ratiocination, to wit:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no

reversible error in setting aside the trial court's
Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

xxxx

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his

wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on
the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which
had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of
respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery,
and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts
opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the
form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the
bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of
his experts, were not actually proven. In fact,
respondent presented contrary evidence refuting
these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent
constantly played mahjong and neglected their
children as a result. Respondent admittedly played
mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in
mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties
as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five
times a week. She maintained it was only two to
three times a week and always with the permission
of her husband and without abandoning her children
at home. The children corroborated this, saying that
they were with their mother when she played
mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not
present any proof, other than his own testimony,
that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he intimated
that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he
was not able to link this episode to respondent’s
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been
done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s
mahjong-playing during the years when these two
children were in second grade. This was not done.
Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent
played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency
and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about
respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need
for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever
was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons
orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner
presented Mario (an alleged companion of
respondent during these nights-out) in order to
prove that respondent had affairs with other men,
but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to
be dating other men. Even assuming arguendothat
petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
extramarital affair with another man, that one
instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be
equated with obsessive need for attention from
other men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for
legal separation, but it does not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent
actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding
that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated.
Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the
opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts
would show that respondent was not totally remiss
and incapable of appreciating and performing her
marital and parental duties. Not once did the
children state that they were neglected by their
mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took
care of them, was around when they were sick, and
cooked the food they like. It appears that
respondent made real efforts tosee and take care of
her children despite her estrangement from their
father. There was no testimony whatsoever that
shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties.
While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio
and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level
despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their
academic short comings to Malyn’s actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court
finds no factual basis for the conclusion of
psychological incapacity. There is no error in the
CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was
psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision
merely summarized the allegations, testimonies,
and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not
actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the
credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the
evidence. The trial court did not make factual
findings which can serve as bases for its legal
conclusionof psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony
and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have
constrained them from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their children.
There may be grounds for legal separation, but
certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004
Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.2
In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner
implores the Court to take a thorough second look
into what constitutes psychological incapacity; to
uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by
the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and
consequently to find that the respondent, if not both
parties, were psychologically incapacitated to
perform their respective essential marital obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we
resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
I
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even prior to the celebration of the marriage
that is permanent as to deprive the party of the
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.
Although the Family Code has not defined the term
psychological incapacity, the Court has usually
looked up its meaning by reviewing the
deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code
Revision Committee that had drafted the Family
Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It
appeared that the members of the Family Code
Revision Committee were not unanimous on the
meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the
provision "with less specificity than expected" in
order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its
application."4 Illustrative of the "less specificity than
expected" has been the omission by the Family
Code Revision Committee to give any examples of
psychological incapacity that would have limited the
applicability of the provision conformably with the
principle of ejusdem generis, because the
Committee desired that the courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of
church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue
of the provision itself having been taken from the
Canon Law.5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in
Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant
materials on psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious
that the term psychological incapacity as used in
Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been meant
to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances,"
and could not be taken and construed
independently of "but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus
correlated:-
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to
the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage
to be "legitimate."7
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court
set some guidelines for the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, as
follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical,
althoughits manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at
"the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation
of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our
Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that
to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on
evidence — whatis decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, inview of the evident
source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church — while remaining independent, separate
and apart from each other — shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of
protecting and cherishing marriage and the family
as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.9
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid,
such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration
of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article
36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and
too literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted
version of "less specificity" obviously to enable
"some resiliency in its application." Instead, every
court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts" in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on
"all fours" with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity
of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court."10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity
of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not
endowed with expertise in the field of psychology,
must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in
order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus
enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the
malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable
demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.11
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on
the existence or non-existence of a party’s
psychological incapacity should be final and binding
for as long as such findings and evaluation of the
testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not
shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous.12 In
every situation where the findings of the trial court
are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence
presented during trial, the appellate court should
restrain itself from substituting its own judgment.13 It
is not enough reason to ignore the findings and
evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own
as an appellate tribunal only because the
Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage
as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress
that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for
the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution14 only relates to a valid marriage. No
protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null
and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no
legal existence.15
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio,
therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and
promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable
social institution. The foundation of our society is
thereby made all the more strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the
trial court deserved credence because it was in the
better position to view and examine the demeanor
of the witnesses while they were testifying.16 The
position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation
of the evidence showing the psychological
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be
accorded due importance and respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court
brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina
Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the
ground that their conclusions were solely based on
the petitioner’s version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it
improper and unwarranted to give to such expert
opinions a merely generalized consideration and
treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of
the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts
sufficiently and competently described the
psychological incapacity of the respondent within
the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We
uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from
the case records and affidavits, and should not
anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had
accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual
premises.17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the
transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well as on
her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad,
and his son Miguel. Although her findings would
seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it
was not right to disregard the findings on that basis
alone. After all, her expert opinion took into
consideration other factors extant in the records,
including the own opinions of another expert who
had analyzed the issue from the side of the
respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled
that the courts must accord weight to expert
testimony on the psychological and mental state of
the parties in cases for the declaration of the
nullityof marriages, for by the very nature of Article
36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite having
the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties."18
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately
necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly
determine the issue of psychological incapacity of
the respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner).
Consequently, the lack of personal examination and
interview of the person diagnosed with personality
disorder, like the respondent, did not per se
invalidate the findings of the experts. The Court has
stressed in Marcos v. Marcos19 that there is no
requirement for one to bedeclared psychologically
incapacitated to be personally examined by a
physician, because what is important is the
presence of evidence that adequately establishes
the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to."20
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a
certain condition could possibly result from an
assumed state of facts existed in the record, the
expert opinion should be admissible and be
weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such
other evidence on the causation.21 Indeed, an
expert opinion on psychological incapacity should
be considered as conjectural or speculative and
without any probative value only in the absence of
other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s
findings under such circumstances would not
constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion
as evidence.22 This is so, considering that any ruling
that brands the scientific and technical procedure
adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should
be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric
evaluation had been based on the parties’
upbringing and psychodynamics.23 In that context,
Dr. Gates’ expertopinion should be considered not
in isolation but along with the other evidence
presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of
psychological incapacity, the trial court was
expectedto compare the expert findings and opinion
of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own
witness, and those of Dr. Gates.
24
In her Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Dayan
impressed that the respondent had "compulsive and
dependent tendencies" to the extent of being
"relationship dependent." Based from the
respondent’s psychological data, Dr. Dayan
indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be
reserved and seemingly detached in her ways.
Although she likes to be around people, she may
keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her
relationship but she may not be that demonstrative
of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult for
her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to
minimize opportunities for rejection. To others,
Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her
ways. She can be assertive when opinions contrary
to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is
apt to be a dependent person. At a less conscious
level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her.
Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an
enormous value on having significant others would
depend on most times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a
different person— clingy and immature, doubting
his love, constantly demanding reassurance that
she was the most important person in his life. She
became relationship-dependent.25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of
the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory
test26 conducted on the respondent, observing that
the respondent obtained high scores on
dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to
wit:
Atty. Bretania
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory?
A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be
normal is 73 percental round and there are several
scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score
and these are on the score of dependency,
narcissism and compulsion.
Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness,
what is the acceptable score?
A : When your score is 73 and above, that means
that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will
be considered as acceptable.
Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score? seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to
another. There is this need for attention, this need
for love on other people.
A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under
narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84.27
Q : And that led you to conclude?
It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not
contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-
to the effect that the respondent had been afflicted centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a wife
with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with and as a mother.28
AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:
The probative force of the testimony of an expert
ATTY. GONONG does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or
opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can
render to the courts in showing the facts that serve
Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is
as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon
[sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms. So,
which the logic of her conclusion is
more or less, could you please tell me in more
founded.29 Hence, we should weigh and consider
layman’s terms how you arrived at your findings that
the probative value of the findings of the expert
the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?
witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.
A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically,
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a
if you ask about her childhood background, her
canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila
fatherdied in a vehicular accident when she was in
Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a
her teens and thereafter she was prompted to look
consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee.
for a job to partly assume the breadwinner’s role in
Regarding Father Healy’s expert testimony, we
her family. I gathered that paternal grandmother
have once declared that judicial understanding of
partly took care of her and her siblings against the
psychological incapacity could be informed by
fact that her own mother was unable to carry out her
evolving standards, taking into account the
respective duties and responsibilities towards Elena
particulars of each case, by current trends in
Fernandez and her siblings considering that the
psychological and even by canonical thought, and
husband died prematurely. And there was an
by experience.30 It is prudent for us to do so
indication that Elena Fernandez on several
because the concept of psychological incapacity
occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame
adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was
her for being negligent as a mother because she
derived from Canon Law.
herself never experienced the care and affection of
her own mother herself. So, there is a precedent in
her background, in her childhood, and indeed this Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not
seems to indicate a particular script, we call it in the respondent’s level of immaturity and
psychology a script, the tendency to repeat irresponsibility with regard to her own children and
somekind of experience or the lack of care, let’s say to her husband constituted psychological
some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to incapacity, testifying thusly:
sustain it even on to your own life when you have
your own family. I did interview the son because I
ATTY. MADRID
was not satisfied with what I gathered from both
Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young
son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims
could not see, according to the child, the sincerity of that she is not psychologically incapacitated. On the
maternal care on the part of Elena and that he facts as you read it based on the records of this
preferred to live with the father actually. case before this Honorable Court, what can you say
to that claim of respondent?
Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion
that respondent is self-centered and narcissistic? A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological
incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic
irresponsibility with regards to her own children.
A : Actually respondent has some needs which
tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is
still insearch of this. In her several boyfriends, it
Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of
respondent that she is not psychologically
incapacitated is not true?
A : Yes. It should be rejected.
Q : Why do you say so?
A : Because of what she has manifested in her
whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been
manifested running through their life made a doubt
that this is immaturity and irresponsibility because
her family was dysfunctional and then her being a
model in her early life and being the bread winner of
the family put her in an unusual position of
prominence and then begun to inflate her own ego
and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and
that became an obsession and that led to her few
responsibility of subordinating to her children to this
lifestyle that she had embraced.
Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the
children, the impact. How about the impact on the
relationship of the respondent with her husband?
A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her
lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband and
toher children. She had her own priorities, her
beauty and her going out and her mahjong and
associating with friends. They were the priorities of
her life.
Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was
merely secondary?
A : Secondary.
Q : And how does that relate to psychological
incapacity?
A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill
the obligations of marriage which everybody takes
for granted. The concentration on the husband and
the children before everything else would be
subordinated to the marriage withher. It’s the other
way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her
mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.
Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what
specifically do you call this?
A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love
with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman
history.
Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism
is?
A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make
up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of
Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known
in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a
person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and
prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the top
priority in her life.
xxxx
Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove
this narcissism. How do you consider this
narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or
….?
A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of
neglect of her family and that causes serious
obligations which she has ignored and not properly
esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with
herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this
narcissism afflicting respondent was already
existing at the time or marriage or even thereafter?
xxxx
A : When you get married you don’t develop
narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring
with you into the marriage and then it becomes
manifested because in marriage you accept these
responsibilities. And now you show that you don’t
accept them and you are not capable of fulfilling
them and you don’t care about them.
Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by
accident or congenital or what?
A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become
a model and still the family was depended [sic] upon
her and she was a model at Hyatt and then
Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so much that
this became the top priority in her life. It’s her
lifestyle.
Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of
respondent even expanded after the marriage?
A : That could have expanded because it became
very obvious after the marriage because she was
neglecting such fundamental obligations.
Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this
medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that
you mentioned?
A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in
her life. It was found in her family background
situation. Say, almost for sure would be incurable
now.
Q : What specific background are you referring to?
A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was
the breadwinner and her beauty was so important
to give in her job and money and influence and so
on. But this is a very unusual situation for a young
girl and her position in the family was exalted in a
very very unusual manner and therefore she had
that pressure on her and in her accepting the
pressure, in going along with it and putting it in top
priority.31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in
Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and findings
commanded respect. The contribution that his
opinions and findings could add to the judicial
determination of the parties’ psychological
incapacity was substantive and instructive. He
could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees
of the malady that would warrant the nullity of
marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto
the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject as
esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity
has been. We could not justly disregard his opinions
and findings. Appreciating them together with those
of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more
the cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te
v. Yu-Te:32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite
having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the
professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases. Data
about the person's entire life, both before and after
the ceremony, were presented to these experts and
they were asked togive professional opinions about
a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended
to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid
consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new
openness in this area did not amount to the addition
of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances
made in psychology during the past decades. There
was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole
idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that
of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no
longer be assumed in annulment cases that a
person who could intellectually understand the
concept of marriage could necessarily give valid
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and
assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitmentare now considered a necessary
prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of
incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential
obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to
each other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in
its totality the right to the community of the whole of
life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have
refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning
the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to
each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be `other oriented'
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because
marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations ofmarriage depends,
according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity
for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability
to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation
but in reference to the fundamental relationship to
the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six
elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial
to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2)
openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6)
an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors
possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial
personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real
freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently
fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach
for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts
are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability
to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases
seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity
to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised(lack of due competence).
An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family
almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry
out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time
the marriage was entered into."
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the
importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party's
psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed
at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v.
Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated
be personally examined by a physician, if the
totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless
for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment
of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity.33
Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the
unintended consequences of strictly applying the
standards set in Molina,34 the courts should
consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be
applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by
its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina, thus:
xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of
the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia
of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice)
Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in
the result" and another three--including, as
aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose
their individual separate opinions. Then Justice
Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment
of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all
fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent
cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the law's
clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the
Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in
Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution
of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's
exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll
on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very
foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far fromwhat was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all
sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and
the like, tocontinuously debase and pervert the
sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse
of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are
ample safeguards against this contingency, among
which is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion
between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising
number of cases involving marital abuse, child
abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either
party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is
actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or
assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed
that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same
is void from the very beginning. To indulge in
imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36
will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply
declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O.
Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for
emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court
declared as follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was
not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother
and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s
allegations that she played four to five times a week.
She maintained it was only two to three times a
week and always withthe permission of her
husband and without abandoning her children at
home. The children corroborated this, saying that
theywere with their mother when she played
mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner did not
present any proof, other than his own testimony,
that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he intimated
that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he
was not able to link this episode to respondent’s
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been
done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s
mahjong-playing during the years when these two
children were in second grade. This was not done.
Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent
played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency
and adverse effect on the children were not
proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing
should not have delimited our determination of the
presence or absence of psychological incapacity.
Instead, the determinant should be her obvious
failure to fully appreciate the duties and
responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made
her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such
duties and responsibilities, she would have known
that bringing along her children of very tender ages
to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a
culture of gambling and other vices that would erode
their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the
respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely
impacted on her family life, particularly on her very
young children. We do find to be revealing the
disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw37– the
parties’ eldest son – in his deposition, whereby the
son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother
had been hooked on playing mahjong, viz:
ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s
separation, do you remember any habit or activity
or practice which your mother engaged in, before
the separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker
and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I can’t
remember.
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played
mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you
remember?
WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually,
I can’t, I can’t…
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing
mahjong say one session?
WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my
aunt’s house in White Plains and I think we would
get there by lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think
it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON: You,
you went there? She brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and
my brothers & sisters.
ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?
WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes,
I guess she’d go out by herself.38
The fact that the respondent brought her children
with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point
to her neglect of parental duties, but also
manifested her tendency to expose them to a
culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her
children to the culture of gambling on every
occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave
and serious act of subordinating their needs for
parenting to the gratification of her own personal
and escapist desires. This was the observation of
Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and
Dr. Dayan both explained that the current
psychological state of the respondent had been
rooted on her own childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for
her children’s moral and mental development. This
disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard
and protect her children, as expressly defined under
Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to
wit:
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of
parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and
responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing
of such children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral,
mental and physical character and well-being.
Article 220. The parents and those exercising
parental authority shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following
rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support,
educate and instruct them by right precept and good
example, and to provide for their upbringing in
keeping with their means;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual
guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-
discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate
their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their
physical and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome
educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them
from bad company, and prevent them from
acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies
and morals;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly
take into consideration the findings of the RTC to
the effect that both the petitioner and the
respondent had been psychologically incapacitated,
and thus could not assume the essential obligations
of marriage. The RTC would not have found so
without the allegation to that effect by the
respondent in her answer,39 whereby she averred
that it was not she but the petitioner who had
suffered from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological
incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as
follows:
ATTY. BRETAÑA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were
behaviorally immature?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is your basis for your statement that
respondent was behaviorally immature?
A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage
Malyn had noticed already some of those short
temper of the petitioner but she was very much in
love and so she lived-in with him and even the time
that they were together, that they were living in, she
also had noticed some of his psychological deficits
if we may say so. But as I said, because she is also
dependent and she was one who determined to
make the relationship work, she was denying even
those kinds of problems that she had seen.
Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking
here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to
conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally
immature?
A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of
marriage was not duly stable then. He was not really
thinking of marriage except that his wife got
pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry
her. And even that time he was not also a
monogamous person.
Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately
the decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I
think so, Sir.
Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you
mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you
that in his younger years he was often out seeking
other women. I’m referring specifically to page 18.
He also admitted to you that the thought of
commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given
these admissions by petitioner to you, my questions
is, is it possible for such a person to enter into
marriage despite this fear of commitment and given
his admission that he was a womanizer? Is it
possible for this person to stop his womanizing
ways during the marriage?
A : Sir, it’s difficult.
Q : It would be difficult for that person?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the probability of this person giving up
his womanizing after marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is
almost only 20%.
Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent
womanized during his marriage with the
respondent?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on
the part of the petitioner insofar as his psychological
capacity to perform his duties as a husband is
concerned?
A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual
integrity and also to be fully committed to the role of
husband to Malyn.
Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered
my question on whether the petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty as
a husband. You only said that the petitioner was
behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a
mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that question
again and request you to answer that directly?
A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the
burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the
respondent, as the defendant spouse, could
establish the psychological incapacity of her
husband because she raised the matter in her
answer. The courts are justified in declaring a
marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the
respondent who imputes the psychological
incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is
fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological
incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of
them, and if psychological incapacity of either or
both is established, the marriage has to be deemed
null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the
parties parted ways. By now, they must have
already accepted and come to terms with the awful
truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the
eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both
parties had inflicted so much damage not only to
themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their
own children. It would be a greater injustice should
we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and
then force them and their children to endure some
more damage. This was the very same injustice that
Justice Romero decried in her erudite dissenting
opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for
this Court to give a much too restrictive
interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to
continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of
fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical
purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations
involved in the ruling the Court makes
today.1âwphi1 It is not, in effect, directly or
indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner
into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain
illicit relations with another woman or women with
emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply
because he is denied by private respondent, his
wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he
has sought from her and towhich he is legally
entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the
Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I
submit that we should not constrict it to non-
recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to
one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf
in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by
reason of his wife’s psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation. In this case,
the marriage never existed from the beginning
because the respondent was afflicted with
psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of
the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate
to declare the nullity of the marriage between the
parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of
marriage as the basic foundation of our society does
not preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-
equipped to promote family life," thus:
Now is also the opportune time to comment on
another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in
the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and
lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have
favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the
Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he
State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State." These
provisions highlight the importance of the family and
the constitutional protection accorded to the
institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the SO ORDERED.
parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family. It
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
remains the province of the legislature to define all
legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy
and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever
socio-political influences it deems proper, and
subject of course to the qualification that such
legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the
case, it also falls on the legislature to put into
operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment of
the Family Code, which defines marriage and the
family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and
family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
G.R. No. 173138 December 1,
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.
While it may appear that the judicial denial of a 2010
petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such
NOEL B. BACCAY, Petitioner,
action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition
vs.
of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree
MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC OF
of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be
the only constitutional considerations to be taken
into account in resolving a petition for declaration of DECISION
nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in
classifying marriages contracted by a
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this
constitutional protection of marriage. Given the This petition for review on certiorari under
avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the Procedure, as amended, assails the
foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding Decision1 dated August 26, 2005 and
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill- Resolution2 dated June 13, 2006 of the
equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
marriages under Article 36 do not further the
74581. The CA reversed the February 5,
initiatives of the State concerning marriage and 2002 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
family, as they promote wedlock among persons (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, which declared
who, for reasons independent of their will, are not the marriage of petitioner Noel B. Baccay
capacitated to understand or comply with the (Noel) and Maribel Calderon-Baccay
essential obligations of marriage.42 (Emphasis (Maribel) void on the ground of
supplied) psychological incapacity under Article 364 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for
Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
The undisputed factual antecedents of the
the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; case are as follows:
and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent on Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the
November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO Mapua Institute of Technology where both
due to the psychological incapacity of the parties took up Electronics and Communications
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they were
introduced by a mutual friend and became
close to one another. Noel courted Maribel,
No pronouncement on costs of suit. but it was only after years of continuous
pursuit that Maribel accepted Noel’s
proposal and the two became sweethearts.
Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish
and hard-to-get type, which traits he found
attractive.5
Noel’s family was aware of their relationship
for he used to bring Maribel to their house.
Noel observed that Maribel was inordinately
shy when around his family so to bring her
closer to them, he always invited Maribel to
attend family gatherings and other festive
occasions like birthdays, Christmas, and
fiesta celebrations. Maribel, however, would
try to avoid Noel’s invitations and whenever
she attended those occasions with Noel’s
family, he observed that Maribel was
invariably aloof or snobbish. Not once did
she try to get close to any of his family
members. Noel would talk to Maribel about
her attitude towards his family and she
would promise to change, but she never did.
Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with
Maribel because he was already involved
with another woman. He tried to break up
with Maribel, but Maribel refused and
offered to accept Noel’s relationship with the
other woman so long as they would not
sever their ties. To give Maribel some time
to get over their relationship, they still
continued to see each other albeit on a
friendly basis.
Despite their efforts to keep their meetings
strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel
had several romantic moments together.
Noel took these episodes of sexual contact
casually since Maribel never demanded
anything from him except his company.
Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel
informed Noel that she was pregnant with
his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel
grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel
and Maribel were immediately wed on
November 23, 1998 before Judge Gregorio
Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
After the marriage ceremony, Noel and
Maribel agreed to live with Noel’s family in
their house at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City.
During all the time she lived with Noel’s
family, Maribel remained aloof and did not
go out of her way to endear herself to them.
She would just come and go from the house
as she pleased. Maribel never contributed to
the family’s coffer leaving Noel to shoulder
all expenses for their support. Also, she
refused to have any sexual contact with
Noel.
Surprisingly, despite Maribel’s claim of
being pregnant, Noel never observed any
symptoms of pregnancy in her. He asked
Maribel’s office mates whether she
manifested any signs of pregnancy and they
confirmed that she showed no such signs.
Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel
did not go home for a day, and when she
came home she announced to Noel and his
family that she had a miscarriage and was
confined at the Chinese General Hospital
where her sister worked as a nurse.
Noel confronted her about her alleged
miscarriage sometime in February 1999.
The discussion escalated into an intense
quarrel which woke up the whole household.
Noel’s mother tried to intervene but Maribel
shouted "Putang ina nyo, wag kayo
makialam" at her. Because of this, Noel’s
mother asked them to leave her house.
Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel called her
parents and asked them to pick her up.
Maribel left Noel’s house and did not come
back anymore. Noel tried to communicate
with Maribel but when he went to see her at
her house nobody wanted to talk to him and
she rejected his phone calls.6
On September 11, 2000 or after less than
two years of marriage, Noel filed a
petition7 for declaration of nullity of marriage
with the RTC of Manila. Despite summons,
Maribel did not participate in the
proceedings. The trial proceeded after the
public prosecutor manifested that no
collusion existed between the parties.
Despite a directive from the RTC, the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) also did not
submit a certification manifesting its
agreement or opposition to the case.8
On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of Noel. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage of the
parties hereto celebrated on November 23,
1998 at the sala of Judge Gregorio Dayrit of
the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City
as NULL and VOID.
The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and
the Chief of the National Statistics Office are
hereby directed to record and enter this
decree into the marriage records of the
parties in their respective marriage
registers.
The absolute community property of the
parties is hereby dissolved and, henceforth,
they shall be governed by the property
regime of complete separation of property.
With costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.9
The RTC found that Maribel failed to
perform the essential marital obligations of
marriage, and such failure was due to a
personality disorder called Narcissistic
Personality Disorder characterized by
juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability as determined by a clinical
psychologist. The RTC cited the findings of
Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist
presented as witness by Noel, that Maribel
was a very insecure person. She entered
into the marriage not because of emotional
desire for marriage but to prove something,
and her attitude was exploitative particularly
in terms of financial rewards. She was
emotionally immature, and viewed marriage
as a piece of paper and that she can easily
get rid of her husband without any
provocation.10
On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the
decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila Branch 38 declaring as null and void
the marriage between petitioner-appellee
and respondent is hereby REVERSED.
Accordingly, the instant Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.11
The appellate court held that Noel failed to
establish that Maribel’s supposed
Narcissistic Personality Disorder was the
psychological incapacity contemplated by
law and that it was permanent and
incurable. Maribel’s attitudes were merely
mild peculiarities in character or signs of ill-
will and refusal or neglect to perform marital
obligations which did not amount to
psychological incapacity, said the appellate
court. The CA noted that Maribel may have
failed or refused to perform her marital
obligations but such did not indicate
incapacity. The CA stressed that the law
requires nothing short of mental illness
sufficient to render a person incapable of
knowing the essential marital obligations.12
The CA further held that Maribel’s refusal to
have sexual intercourse with Noel did not
constitute a ground to find her
psychologically incapacitated under Article
36 of the Family Code. As Noel admitted, he
had numerous sexual relations with Maribel
before their marriage. Maribel therefore
cannot be said to be incapacitated to
perform this particular obligation and that
such incapacity existed at the time of
marriage.13
Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred
in saying that what Noel should have filed
was an action to annul the marriage under
Article 45 (3)14 of the Family Code.
According to the CA, Article 45 (3) involving
consent to marriage vitiated by fraud is
limited to the instances enumerated under
Article 4615 of the Family Code. Maribel’s
misrepresentation that she was pregnant to
induce Noel to marry her was not the fraud
contemplated under Article 45 (3) as it was
not among the instances enumerated under
Article 46.16
On June 13, 2006, the CA denied Noel’s
motion for reconsideration. It held that
Maribel’s personality disorder is not the
psychological incapacity contemplated by
law. Her refusal to perform the essential
marital obligations may be attributed merely
to her stubborn refusal to do so. Also, the
manifestations of the Narcissistic
Personality Disorder had no connection with
Maribel’s failure to perform her marital
obligations. Noel having failed to prove
Maribel’s alleged psychological incapacity,
any doubts should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.17
Hence, the present petition raising the
following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT THE CASE OF
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF
APPEALS DOES NOT FIND
APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT
CASE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING
THAT THE RESPONDENT IS
NOT SUFFERING FROM
NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY
DISORDER; AND THAT HER
FAILURE TO PERFORM HER
ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE
PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY.18
The issue to be resolved is whether the
marriage between the parties is null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed
to consider Maribel’s refusal to procreate as
psychological incapacity. Insofar as he was
concerned, the last time he had sexual
intercourse with Maribel was before the
marriage when she was drunk. They never
had any sexual intimacy during their
marriage. Noel claims that if a spouse
senselessly and constantly refuses to
perform his or her marital obligations,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity rather
than to stubborn refusal. He insists that the
CA should not have considered the pre-
marital sexual encounters between him and
Maribel in finding that the latter was not
psychologically incapacitated to procreate
through marital sexual cooperation. He
argues that making love for procreation and
consummation of the marriage for the start
of family life is different from "plain, simple
and casual sex." He further stresses that
Maribel railroaded him into marrying her by
seducing him and later claiming that she
was pregnant with his child. But after their
marriage, Maribel refused to consummate
their marriage as she would not be sexually
intimate with him.19
Noel further claims that there were other
indicia of Maribel’s psychological incapacity
and that she consistently exhibited several
traits typical of a person suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder before and
during their marriage. He points out that
Maribel would only mingle with a few
individuals and never with Noel’s family
even if they lived under one (1) roof. Maribel
was also arrogant and haughty. She was
rude and disrespectful to his mother and
was also "interpersonally exploitative" as
shown by her misrepresentation of
pregnancy to force Noel to marry her. After
marriage, Maribel never showed respect
and love to Noel and his family. She
displayed indifference to his emotional and
sexual needs, but before the marriage she
would display unfounded jealousy when
Noel was visited by his friends. This same
jealousy motivated her to deceive him into
marrying her.
Lastly, he points out that Maribel’s
psychological incapacity was proven to be
permanent and incurable with the root
cause existing before the marriage. The
psychologist testified that persons suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder were
unmotivated to participate in therapy
session and would reject any form of
psychological help rendering their condition
long lasting if not incurable. Such persons
would not admit that their behavioral
manifestations connote pathology or
abnormality. The psychologist added that
Maribel’s psychological incapacity was
deeply rooted within her adaptive system
since early childhood and manifested during
adult life. Maribel was closely attached to
her parents and mingled with only a few
close individuals. Her close attachment to
her parents and their over-protection of her
turned her into a self-centered, self-
absorbed individual who was insensitive to
the needs of others. She developed the
tendency not to accept rejection or failure.20
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that
Maribel’s refusal to have sexual intercourse
with Noel did not constitute psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code as her traits were merely mild
peculiarities in her character or signs of ill-
will and refusal or neglect to perform her
marital obligations. The psychologist even
admitted that Maribel was capable of
entering into marriage except that it would
be difficult for her to sustain one. Also, it was
established that Noel and Maribel had
sexual relations prior to their marriage. The
OSG further pointed out that the
psychologist was vague as to how Maribel’s
refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel
constituted Narcissistic Personality
Disorder.
The petition lacks merit.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The Court held in Santos v. Court of
Appeals21 that the phrase "psychological
incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly noncognitive
of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as expressed by Article 6822 of
the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and
support. The intendment of the law has
been to confine it to the most serious of
cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals,23 the Court laid down the
guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing
it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as
legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability an
d solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article
36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be
psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person
could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be
identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their
"I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent
or incurable.1avvphi1 Such
incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.1avvphi1
(5) Such illness must
be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the
personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital
obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included
in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted
in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095. (Emphasis ours.)
In this case, the totality of evidence
presented by Noel was not sufficient to
sustain a finding that Maribel was
psychologically incapacitated. Noel’s
evidence merely established that Maribel
refused to have sexual intercourse with him
after their marriage, and that she left him MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
after their quarrel when he confronted her
about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to
prove the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity and establish the
requirements of gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. As correctly
observed by the CA, the report of the
psychologist, who concluded that Maribel
was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder traceable to her experiences
during childhood, did not establish how the
personality disorder incapacitated Maribel G.R. No. 173138 December 1,
from validly assuming the essential 2010
obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the
same psychologist even testified that
NOEL B. BACCAY, Petitioner,
Maribel was capable of entering into a
marriage except that it would be difficult for vs.
her to sustain one.24 Mere difficulty, it must MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC OF
be stressed, is not the incapacity THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
contemplated by law.
DECISION
The Court emphasizes that the burden falls
upon petitioner, not just to prove that private
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
respondent suffers from a psychological
disorder, but also that such psychological
disorder renders her "truly incognitive of the This petition for review on certiorari under
basic marital covenants that concomitantly Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
must be assumed and discharged by the Procedure, as amended, assails the
parties to the marriage."25 Psychological Decision1 dated August 26, 2005 and
incapacity must be more than just a Resolution2 dated June 13, 2006 of the
"difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
performance of some marital obligations. An 74581. The CA reversed the February 5,
unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and 2002 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, which declared
Marcos:26 the marriage of petitioner Noel B. Baccay
(Noel) and Maribel Calderon-Baccay
(Maribel) void on the ground of
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is
psychological incapacity under Article 364 of
not to be confused with a divorce law that
the Family Code of the Philippines.
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a The undisputed factual antecedents of the
party even before the celebration of the case are as follows:
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness
Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the
of the duties and responsibilities of the
Mapua Institute of Technology where both
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x
took up Electronics and Communications
x x.
Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they were
introduced by a mutual friend and became
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The close to one another. Noel courted Maribel,
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. but it was only after years of continuous
CV No. 74581 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD. pursuit that Maribel accepted Noel’s
proposal and the two became sweethearts.
Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish
Costs against petitioner.
and hard-to-get type, which traits he found
attractive.5
SO ORDERED.
Noel’s family was aware of their relationship
for he used to bring Maribel to their house.
Noel observed that Maribel was inordinately
shy when around his family so to bring her
closer to them, he always invited Maribel to
attend family gatherings and other festive
occasions like birthdays, Christmas, and
fiesta celebrations. Maribel, however, would
try to avoid Noel’s invitations and whenever
she attended those occasions with Noel’s
family, he observed that Maribel was
invariably aloof or snobbish. Not once did
she try to get close to any of his family
members. Noel would talk to Maribel about
her attitude towards his family and she
would promise to change, but she never did.
Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with
Maribel because he was already involved
with another woman. He tried to break up
with Maribel, but Maribel refused and
offered to accept Noel’s relationship with the
other woman so long as they would not
sever their ties. To give Maribel some time
to get over their relationship, they still
continued to see each other albeit on a
friendly basis.
Despite their efforts to keep their meetings
strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel
had several romantic moments together.
Noel took these episodes of sexual contact
casually since Maribel never demanded
anything from him except his company.
Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel
informed Noel that she was pregnant with
his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel
grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel
and Maribel were immediately wed on
November 23, 1998 before Judge Gregorio
Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
After the marriage ceremony, Noel and
Maribel agreed to live with Noel’s family in
their house at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City.
During all the time she lived with Noel’s
family, Maribel remained aloof and did not
go out of her way to endear herself to them.
She would just come and go from the house
as she pleased. Maribel never contributed to
the family’s coffer leaving Noel to shoulder
all expenses for their support. Also, she
refused to have any sexual contact with
Noel.
Surprisingly, despite Maribel’s claim of
being pregnant, Noel never observed any
symptoms of pregnancy in her. He asked
Maribel’s office mates whether she
manifested any signs of pregnancy and they
confirmed that she showed no such signs.
Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel
did not go home for a day, and when she
came home she announced to Noel and his
family that she had a miscarriage and was
confined at the Chinese General Hospital
where her sister worked as a nurse.
Noel confronted her about her alleged
miscarriage sometime in February 1999.
The discussion escalated into an intense
quarrel which woke up the whole household.
Noel’s mother tried to intervene but Maribel
shouted "Putang ina nyo, wag kayo
makialam" at her. Because of this, Noel’s
mother asked them to leave her house.
Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel called her
parents and asked them to pick her up.
Maribel left Noel’s house and did not come
back anymore. Noel tried to communicate
with Maribel but when he went to see her at
her house nobody wanted to talk to him and
she rejected his phone calls.6
On September 11, 2000 or after less than
two years of marriage, Noel filed a
petition7 for declaration of nullity of marriage
with the RTC of Manila. Despite summons,
Maribel did not participate in the
proceedings. The trial proceeded after the
public prosecutor manifested that no
collusion existed between the parties.
Despite a directive from the RTC, the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) also did not
submit a certification manifesting its
agreement or opposition to the case.8
On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of Noel. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage of the
parties hereto celebrated on November 23,
1998 at the sala of Judge Gregorio Dayrit of
the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City
as NULL and VOID.
The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and
the Chief of the National Statistics Office are
hereby directed to record and enter this
decree into the marriage records of the
parties in their respective marriage
registers.
The absolute community property of the
parties is hereby dissolved and, henceforth,
they shall be governed by the property
regime of complete separation of property.
With costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.9
The RTC found that Maribel failed to
perform the essential marital obligations of
marriage, and such failure was due to a
personality disorder called Narcissistic
Personality Disorder characterized by
juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability as determined by a clinical
psychologist. The RTC cited the findings of
Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist
presented as witness by Noel, that Maribel
was a very insecure person. She entered
into the marriage not because of emotional
desire for marriage but to prove something,
and her attitude was exploitative particularly
in terms of financial rewards. She was
emotionally immature, and viewed marriage
as a piece of paper and that she can easily
get rid of her husband without any
provocation.10
On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the
decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila Branch 38 declaring as null and void
the marriage between petitioner-appellee
and respondent is hereby REVERSED.
Accordingly, the instant Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.11
The appellate court held that Noel failed to
establish that Maribel’s supposed
Narcissistic Personality Disorder was the
psychological incapacity contemplated by
law and that it was permanent and
incurable. Maribel’s attitudes were merely
mild peculiarities in character or signs of ill-
will and refusal or neglect to perform marital
obligations which did not amount to
psychological incapacity, said the appellate
court. The CA noted that Maribel may have
failed or refused to perform her marital
obligations but such did not indicate
incapacity. The CA stressed that the law
requires nothing short of mental illness
sufficient to render a person incapable of
knowing the essential marital obligations.12
The CA further held that Maribel’s refusal to
have sexual intercourse with Noel did not
constitute a ground to find her
psychologically incapacitated under Article
36 of the Family Code. As Noel admitted, he
had numerous sexual relations with Maribel
before their marriage. Maribel therefore
cannot be said to be incapacitated to
perform this particular obligation and that
such incapacity existed at the time of
marriage.13
Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred
in saying that what Noel should have filed
was an action to annul the marriage under
Article 45 (3)14 of the Family Code.
According to the CA, Article 45 (3) involving
consent to marriage vitiated by fraud is
limited to the instances enumerated under
Article 4615 of the Family Code. Maribel’s
misrepresentation that she was pregnant to
induce Noel to marry her was not the fraud
contemplated under Article 45 (3) as it was
not among the instances enumerated under
Article 46.16
On June 13, 2006, the CA denied Noel’s
motion for reconsideration. It held that
Maribel’s personality disorder is not the
psychological incapacity contemplated by
law. Her refusal to perform the essential
marital obligations may be attributed merely
to her stubborn refusal to do so. Also, the
manifestations of the Narcissistic
Personality Disorder had no connection with
Maribel’s failure to perform her marital
obligations. Noel having failed to prove
Maribel’s alleged psychological incapacity,
any doubts should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.17
Hence, the present petition raising the
following assignment of errors:
 I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT THE CASE OF
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF
APPEALS DOES NOT FIND
APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT
CASE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING
THAT THE RESPONDENT IS
NOT SUFFERING FROM
NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY
DISORDER; AND THAT HER
FAILURE TO PERFORM HER
ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE
PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY.18
The issue to be resolved is whether the
marriage between the parties is null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed
to consider Maribel’s refusal to procreate as
psychological incapacity. Insofar as he was
concerned, the last time he had sexual
intercourse with Maribel was before the
marriage when she was drunk. They never
had any sexual intimacy during their
marriage. Noel claims that if a spouse
senselessly and constantly refuses to
perform his or her marital obligations,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity rather
than to stubborn refusal. He insists that the
CA should not have considered the pre-
marital sexual encounters between him and
Maribel in finding that the latter was not
psychologically incapacitated to procreate
through marital sexual cooperation. He
argues that making love for procreation and
consummation of the marriage for the start
of family life is different from "plain, simple
and casual sex." He further stresses that
Maribel railroaded him into marrying her by
seducing him and later claiming that she
was pregnant with his child. But after their
marriage, Maribel refused to consummate
their marriage as she would not be sexually
intimate with him.19
Noel further claims that there were other
indicia of Maribel’s psychological incapacity
and that she consistently exhibited several
traits typical of a person suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder before and
during their marriage. He points out that
Maribel would only mingle with a few
individuals and never with Noel’s family
even if they lived under one (1) roof. Maribel
was also arrogant and haughty. She was
rude and disrespectful to his mother and
was also "interpersonally exploitative" as
shown by her misrepresentation of
pregnancy to force Noel to marry her. After
marriage, Maribel never showed respect
and love to Noel and his family. She
displayed indifference to his emotional and
sexual needs, but before the marriage she
would display unfounded jealousy when
Noel was visited by his friends. This same
jealousy motivated her to deceive him into
marrying her.
Lastly, he points out that Maribel’s
psychological incapacity was proven to be
permanent and incurable with the root
cause existing before the marriage. The
psychologist testified that persons suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder were
unmotivated to participate in therapy
session and would reject any form of
psychological help rendering their condition
long lasting if not incurable. Such persons
would not admit that their behavioral
manifestations connote pathology or
abnormality. The psychologist added that
Maribel’s psychological incapacity was
deeply rooted within her adaptive system
since early childhood and manifested during
adult life. Maribel was closely attached to
her parents and mingled with only a few
close individuals. Her close attachment to
her parents and their over-protection of her
turned her into a self-centered, self-
absorbed individual who was insensitive to
the needs of others. She developed the
tendency not to accept rejection or failure.20
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that
Maribel’s refusal to have sexual intercourse
with Noel did not constitute psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code as her traits were merely mild
peculiarities in her character or signs of ill-
will and refusal or neglect to perform her
marital obligations. The psychologist even
admitted that Maribel was capable of
entering into marriage except that it would
be difficult for her to sustain one. Also, it was
established that Noel and Maribel had
sexual relations prior to their marriage. The
OSG further pointed out that the
psychologist was vague as to how Maribel’s
refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel
constituted Narcissistic Personality
Disorder.
The petition lacks merit.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The Court held in Santos v. Court of
Appeals21 that the phrase "psychological
incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly noncognitive
of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as expressed by Article 6822 of
the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and
support. The intendment of the law has
been to confine it to the most serious of
cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals,23 the Court laid down the
guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing
it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as
legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability an
d solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article
36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be
psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person
could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be
identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their
"I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent
or incurable.1avvphi1 Such
incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.1avvphi1
(5) Such illness must
be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the
personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital
obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included
in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted
in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095. (Emphasis ours.)
In this case, the totality of evidence
presented by Noel was not sufficient to
sustain a finding that Maribel was
psychologically incapacitated. Noel’s
evidence merely established that Maribel
refused to have sexual intercourse with him
after their marriage, and that she left him
after their quarrel when he confronted her
about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to
prove the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity and establish the
requirements of gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. As correctly
observed by the CA, the report of the
psychologist, who concluded that Maribel
was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder traceable to her experiences
during childhood, did not establish how the
personality disorder incapacitated Maribel
from validly assuming the essential
obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the
same psychologist even testified that
Maribel was capable of entering into a
marriage except that it would be difficult for
her to sustain one.24 Mere difficulty, it must
be stressed, is not the incapacity
contemplated by law.
The Court emphasizes that the burden falls
upon petitioner, not just to prove that private
respondent suffers from a psychological
disorder, but also that such psychological
disorder renders her "truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage."25 Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. An
unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and
void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v.
Marcos:26
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is
not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x
x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74581 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-
FERRARIS, petitioner,
vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-
Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9,
2004 denying the petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003
and February 24, 2004, respectively, for
failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show
that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a
Decision1 denying the petition for
declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage
with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that
suffering from epilepsy does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Civil Code and the evidence on record
were insufficient to prove infidelity.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied in an Order2 dated April 20, 2001
where the trial court reiterated that there
was no evidence that respondent is mentally
or physically ill to such an extent that he
could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the
trial court. It held that the evidence on record
did not convincingly establish that
respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity or that his "defects"
were incurable and already present at the
inception of the marriage.4 The Court of
Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's
testimony failed to establish the substance
of respondent's psychological incapacity;
that she failed to explain how she arrived at
the conclusion that the respondent has a
mixed personality disorder; that she failed to
clearly demonstrate that there was a natal
or supervening disabling factor or an
adverse integral element in respondent's
character that effectively incapacitated him
from accepting and complying with the
essential marital obligations.5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a
petition for review on certiorari with this
Court. As already stated, the petition for
review was denied for failure of petitioner to
show that the appellate tribunal committed
any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for
reconsideration.7 The Court required
respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment8but
failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have
waived the opportunity to file comment.
Further, the Court directed the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on
petitioner's motion for reconsideration which
it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the
petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves
to deny petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological
incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of marriage depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts
of the case.9 Such factual issue, however, is
beyond the province of this Court to review.
It is not the function of the Court to analyze
or weigh all over again the evidence or
premises supportive of such factual
determination.10 It is a well-established
principle that factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on this Court,11 save
for the most compelling and cogent reasons,
like when the findings of the appellate court
go beyond the issues of the case, run
contrary to the admissions of the parties to
the case, or fail to notice certain relevant
facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; or when there
is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are
unavailing in the instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a
ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.13 As all people may have certain
quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
14
significance to the marriage. It is for this
reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding
of the human personality. However, the root
cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature must be
fully explained,15 which petitioner failed to
convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic
consideration in the resolution of
marital annulment cases is the
presence of evidence that can
adequately establish
respondent's psychological
condition. Here, appellant
contends that there is such
evidence. We do not agree.
Indeed, the evidence on record
did not convincingly establish that
respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity. There is
absolutely no showing that his
"defects" were already present at
the inception of the marriage, or
that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly
self-serving, petitioner's evidence
showed that respondent's alleged
failure to perform his so-called
marital obligations was not at all a
manifestation of some deep-
seated, grave, permanent and
incurable psychological malady.
To be sure, the couple's
relationship before the marriage
and even during their brief union
(for well about a year or so) was
not all bad. During that relatively
short period of time, petitioner
was happy and contented with
her life in the company of
respondent. In fact, by petitioner's
own reckoning, respondent was a
responsible and loving husband.
x x x. Their problems began when
petitioner started doubting
respondent's fidelity. It was only
when they started fighting about
the calls from women that
respondent began to withdraw
into his shell and corner, and
failed to perform his so-called
marital obligations. Respondent
could not understand petitioner's
lack of trust in him and her
constant naggings. He thought
her suspicions irrational.
Respondent could not relate to
her anger, temper and jealousy. x
x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not
explain how she arrived at her
diagnosis that respondent has a
mixed personality disorder called
"schizoid," and why he is the
"dependent and avoidant type." In
fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that
one suffering from such mixed
personality disorder is dependent
on others for decision x x x lacks
specificity; it seems to belong to
the realm of theoretical
speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's
information that respondent had
extramarital affairs was supplied
by the petitioner herself. Notably,
when asked as to the root cause
of respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity, Dr.
Dayan's answer was vague,
evasive and inconclusive. She
replied that such disorder "can be
part of his family upbringing" x x
x. She stated that there was a
history of respondent's parents
having difficulties in their
relationship. But this input on the
supposed problematic history of
respondent's parents also came
from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan
clearly demonstrate that there
was really "a natal or supervening
disabling factor" on the part of
respondent, or an "adverse
integral element" in respondent's
character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting,
and, thereby complying with, the
essential marital obligations. Of
course, petitioner likewise failed
to prove that respondent's
supposed psychological or
mental malady existed even
before the marriage. All these
omissions must be held up
against petitioner, for the reason
that upon her devolved the onus
of establishing nullity of the
marriage. Indeed, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage and the
indissolubility of the marital
vinculum.16
We find respondent's alleged mixed
personality disorder, the "leaving-the-
house" attitude whenever they quarreled,
the violent tendencies during epileptic
attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band
mates than his family, are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition
but a mere refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
In Republic v. Court of
Appeals,17 where therein respondent
preferred to spend more time with his
friends than his family on whom he
squandered his money, depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was
dishonest to his wife regarding his finances,
the Court held that the psychological defects
spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations
and that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in
no wise constitute psychological incapacity;
it is not enough to prove that the parties review on certiorari for failure of the
failed to meet their responsibilities and petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court
duties as married persons; it is essential that of Appeals committed any reversible error,
G.R. No. 150677 June 5, 2009
they must be shown to be incapable of is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
doing so, due to some psychological, not
physical, illness. RENATO REYES SO, Petitioner,
SO ORDERED.
vs.
LORNA VALERA, Respondent.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo,
Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual
Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment DECISION
do not by themselves constitute grounds for
declaring a marriage void based on
BRION, J.:
psychological incapacity.

While petitioner's marriage with the For our review is the Petition for Review
respondent failed and appears to be without on Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Renato Reyes So
(petitioner) against the Decision dated July 4,
hope of reconciliation, the remedy however
is not always to have it declared void ab 20012 and the Resolution dated October 18,
initio on the ground of psychological 20013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 65273. The challenged decision reversed
incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage,
however, is not a null and void the decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
marriage.19 No less than the Constitution Branch 143, Makati City declaring the marriage
of the petitioner and respondent Lorna Valera
recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the
unity of the family; it decrees marriage as (respondent) null and void on the ground of the
legally "inviolable" and protects it from latter’s psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code. The assailed resolution
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be denied the petitioner’s motion for
"protected" by the state.20 reconsideration.

Thus, in determining the import of ANTECEDENT FACTS

"psychological incapacity" under Article 36,
it must be read in conjunction with, although The petitioner and the respondent first met at a
to be taken as distinct from Articles party in 1973 after being introduced to each other
35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would by a common friend. The petitioner at that time
likewise, but for different reasons, render was a 17-year old high school student; the
the marriage void ab initio, or Article respondent was a 21-year old college student.
4525 that would make the marriage merely Their meeting led to courtship and to a 19-year
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a common-law relationship,5 culminating in the
petition for legal separation. Care must be exchange of marital vows at the Caloocan City
observed so that these various Hall on December 10, 1991.6 They had three (3)
circumstances are not applied so children (Jeffrey, Renelee, and Loni)7 in their
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent relationship and subsequent marriage.
on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor On May 14, 1996, the petitioner filed with the
manifest themselves.27 Neither it is to be RTC a petition for the declaration of the nullity of
equated with legal separation, in which the his marriage with the respondent.8 The case was
grounds need not be rooted in psychological docketed as JDRC Case No. 96-674. He alleged
incapacity but on physical violence, moral that their marriage was null and void for want of
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, the essential and formal requisites. He also
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual claimed that the respondent was psychologically
infidelity, abandonment and the like.28 incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage, as shown by the
following circumstances: the respondent failed
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the and refused to cohabit and make love with him;
motion for reconsideration of the Resolution did not love and respect him; did not remain
dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for faithful to him; did not give him emotional,
spiritual, physical, and psychological help and
support; failed and refused to have a family
domicile; and failed and refused to enter into a
permanent union and establish conjugal and
family life with him.9
The petitioner presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to substantiate his
charges.
The petitioner testified that he and the
respondent eloped two (2) months after meeting
at a party.10 Thereafter, they lived at the house of
his mother’s friend in Bulacan, and then
transferred to his parents’ house in Caloocan
City. They stayed there for two (2) months before
transferring to Muntinlupa City.11
The petitioner likewise related that respondent
asked him to sign a blank marriage application
form and marriage contract sometime in 1986.
He signed these documents on the condition that
these documents would only be used if they
decide to get married. He admitted not knowing
what happened to these documents, and
maintained that no marriage ceremony took
place in 1991.12 As noted below, the petitioner,
however, submitted a certified true copy of their
marriage contract as part of his documentary
evidence.
The petitioner further alleged that the respondent
did not want to practice her profession after
passing the dental board exam; and that she sold
the dental equipment he bought for her.13 He also
claimed that when he started his own
communication company, the respondent
disagreed with many of his business decisions;
her interference eventually led to many failed
transactions with prospective clients.14
The petitioner narrated that he often slept in the
car because the respondent locked him out of the
house when he came home late. He felt
embarrassed when his employees would wake
him up inside the car. When he confronted the
respondent the next morning, she simply ignored
him. He also claimed that respondent did not care
for their children, and was very strict with clients.
Moreover, the respondent went out with his
employees to gamble whenever there were no
clients.
Lastly, he testified that sometime in 1990, he
found all his things outside their house when he
came home late after closing a deal with a client.
He left their house and stayed at a friend’s house
for two (2) months. He tried to go back to their
house, but the respondent prevented him from
entering. The respondent also told him she did
not love him anymore. He attempted to reconcile
with her for the sake of their children, but she
refused to accept him back.15
Summons was served on the respondent on July
17, 1996, but she failed to file an answer. The
RTC ordered the public prosecutor to investigate
if there had been collusion between the parties
and to intervene for the State to see to it that
evidence was not fabricated. Prosecutor Andres
N. Marcos manifested that he was unable to
make a ruling on the issue of collusion since the
respondent failed to appear before him. 16
Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also
presented certified true copies of the birth
certificate of their three children;17 certified true
copy of their marriage contract;18 and the
testimony, original curriculum vitae,19 and
psychological report20 of clinical psychologist Dr.
Cristina Rosello-Gates (Dr. Gates).
In her Psychological Report, Dr. Gates noted as
follows:
xxx
PARTICULARS
- Parties met in a party when Petitioner
was 17 years and Respondent was 21
years old; both were studying but
Petitioner was also working in his
father’s business;
- During the first time they met,
Respondent hugged Petitioner and
stayed close to him; she also taught
him how to smoke marijuana; after
their first meeting, Respondent would
fetch petitioner from school, and they
would go out together;
- Within the next two months,
Respondent dropped out of school
without informing her parents; she
and concluded that:
applied for a job and was purportedly
raped by her employer;
- When Respondent’s parents found
out that she quit school, she sought
petitioner’s help to look for a place to
stay; Renato brought her to his friend’s
house in Bulacan but her hosts did not
like her frequent outings and parties;
Respondent then asked Petitioner to
live with her in a rented apartment; she
told him to execute an Affidavit of Loss
so he can withdraw his savings with a
new bankbook without the knowledge
of his father;
- Parties were fetched by Petitioner’s
parents to live with them in Caloocan;
petitioner sent Respondent to school to
wean her away from her friends; when
she passed the Dentistry Board
Examinations, he put up a dental clinic
for her; after 2 months, she quit her
dental practice and joined Petitioner in
his communications business;
- Respondent had problems dealing
with Petitioner’s clients; she interfered
with his decisions, and resented his
dealings with clients which would, at
times, last till late at night; one incident
in 1990, Respondent locked Petitioner
out of house prompting the latter to
sleep in the car; other similar incidents
followed where employees would wake
up Petitioner when they report for
work; one night, Petitioner found all his
things thrown out of the house by
Respondent;
- Respondent was not the one who
took care of their children; the second
child, for instance, cries whenever said
child sees Respondent as the latter is
not familiar with the former;
- While parties lived together since
1973, they applied for a marriage
license only in 1986; Respondent
asked Petitioner to sign both license
and marriage contract without any
public appearance at City Hall; their
marriage was registered in 1991 after
the couple separated.21
An examination of the parties’ respective family
background and upbringing, as well as the events
prior to their marriage point to psychological
impairment on the part of Respondent Lorna
Valera.
From a simple existence in the province, Lorna
Valera was thrust in the big city for her college
education. It was in Sampaloc, Manila where she
lived and groped, and eventually found herself in
bad company. Thus, her so-called "culture
shock" was abated by pot sessions lasting
several days at a time – making her temporarily
forget the harsh reality in the metropolis. Her
escapist and regressive tendencies stunted her
psychological growth and prevented her from
fully functioning as a responsible adult.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
(DSM IV), the international standards of
psychological disorders, Respondent Lorna
Valera is plagued with an Adjustment Disorder as
manifested in her impulsiveness, lack of restraint,
lack of civility and a sense of decency in the
conduct of her life. Compulsive Behavior Patterns
are also evident in her marijuana habit, gambling
and habitual squandering of Petitioner’s money.
Lorna Valera’s Adjustment Disorder and
Compulsive Behavior Patterns were already
existing prior to her marriage to Petitioner Renato
So. Continuing up to the present, the same
appears to be irreversible.22
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the marriage of petitioner and
respondent in its decision of November 8, 1999.
The decision, a relatively short one at four (4)
pages, single-spaced, including the heading and
the signature pages, made a short summary of
the "testimonies of the witness" with the
statements that –
Petitioner and respondent became common law
husband and wife from 1973 to 1991. Out of this
relationship were born three children, namely
Jeffrey, Renelee and Lino all surnamed Varela.
Sometime in 1987 petitioner was induced by
respondent to sign a blank Marriage Contract and
a blank application for marriage license. The
petitioner freely signed the documents with the
belief that the documents will be signed only
when they get married.23
Thereafter, the RTC decision wholly dwelt on the
question of the respondent’s psychological
incapacity based on the testimony of the
petitioner and Dr. Gates, his expert witness. The
decision’s concluding
paragraphs stated:
Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced
that respondent Lorna Valera is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligation of marriage, which incapacity existed
at the time of the celebration thereof (Art. 36
F.C.).
It should be borne in mind that marriage is a
special contract of permanent union and the
foundation of the Family. The husband and the
wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
help and support (Art. 68 F.C.). It includes the
giving of love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding (Art. 230
F.C.). Respondent failed to observe all these
things.24
The dispositive portion of the decision that
immediately followed reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of petitioner and against respondent:
1. Declaring respondent
psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations under Art. 36 of the Family
Code;
2. Declaring the marriage contracted
by Renato Reyes So and Lorna Valero
on December 10, 1991, null and void
ab initio;
3. Dissolving the conjugal partnership
between the spouses in accordance
with the pertinent provisions of the
Family Code;
4. Awarding the custody of the minor
children to petitioner.
xxx
SO ORDERED.25
The CA Decision
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
through the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed the RTC decision to the CA, docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 65273. The CA, in its
Decision dated July 4, 2001, reversed and set
aside the RTC decision and dismissed the
petition for lack of merit.26
The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to prove
the respondent’s psychological incapacity.
According to the CA, the respondent’s character,
faults, and defects did not constitute
psychological incapacity warranting the nullity of
the parties’ marriage. The CA reasoned out that
"while respondent appears to be a less than ideal
mother to her children, and loving wife to her
husband," these flaws were not physical
manifestations of psychological illness. The CA
further added that although the respondent’s
condition was clinically identified by an expert
witness to be an "Adjustment Disorder," it was not
established that such disorder was the root cause
of her incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The prosecution also failed to
establish that respondent’s disorder was
incurable and permanent in such a way as to
disable and/or incapacitate respondent from
complying with obligations essential to marriage.
The CA likewise held that the respondent’s
hostile attitude towards the petitioner when the
latter came home late was "a normal reaction of
an ordinary housewife under a similar situation";
and her subsequent refusal to cohabit with him
was not due to any psychological condition, but
due to the fact that she no longer loved him.
Finally, the CA concluded that the declaration of
nullity of a marriage was not proper when the
psychological disorder does not meet the
guidelines set forth in the case of Molina.
The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision,
but the CA denied his motion in its
resolution27 dated October 18, 2001.
The Petition and Issues
The petitioner argues in the present petition that
the CA seriously erred28 –
1. in reversing the RTC decision
without ruling on the trial court’s factual
and conclusive finding that the
marriage between petitioner and
respondent was null and void ab initio;
2. in departing from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings
that factual findings of the trial courts
are entitled to great weight and respect
and are not disturbed on appeal; and
3. in totally disregarding the
undisputed fact that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital
obligations.29
The Republic, as intervenor-appellee, alleged in
its comment that: (a) the trial court never made a
definitive ruling on the issue of the absence of the
formal and essential requisites of the parties’
marriage; and (b) petitioner was not able to
discharge the burden of evidence required in
Molina.30
The petitioner filed a reply;31 thereafter, both
parties filed their respective memoranda
reiterating their arguments. Other than the issue
of the absence of the essential and formal
requisites of marriage, the basic issue before us
is whether there exists sufficient ground to
declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent
null and void.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold
that no sufficient basis exists to annul the
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code. No case of lack of essential and formal
requisites of marriage has been proven or validly
ruled upon by the trial court.
1. The CA did not err in not ruling on the alleged
lack
of the essential and formal requisites of marriage
The petitioner cites as ground for this appeal the
position that the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC decision without touching on the trial court’s
ruling that there was absence of the essential and
formal requisites of marriage.
We find this argument baseless and misplaced
for three basic reasons.
First. The argument stems from the mistaken
premise that the RTC definitively ruled that
petitioner’s marriage to respondent was null and
void due to the absence of the essential and
formal requisites of marriage.
A careful examination of the RTC decision shows
that the trial court did not discuss, much less rule
on, the absence of the formal and essential
requisites of marriage; it simply recited the claim
that "[S]ometime in 1987 petitioner was induced
by respondent to sign a blank Marriage Contract
and a blank application for marriage license. The
petitioner freely signed the documents with the
belief that the documents will be signed only
when they get married." The trial court did not
even mention the certified true copy of the
Marriage Contract signed by the officiating
minister and registered in the Civil Registry of
Kalookan City. The petitioner introduced and
marked this copy as his Exhibit "D" to prove that
there is a marriage contract registered in the Civil
Registry of Kalookan City between petitioner and
respondent.32
Out of this void came the dispositive portion
"[D]eclaring the marriage contracted by Renato
Reyes So and Lorna Valera on December 10,
1991 null and void."33 Faced with an RTC
decision of this tenor, the CA could not have ruled
on the validity of the marriage for essential and
formal deficiencies, since there was no evidence
and no RTC ruling on this point to evaluate and
rule upon on appeal. Even if it had been a valid
issue before the CA, the RTC’s declaration of
nullity should be void for violation of the
constitutional rule that "[No] decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based."34
Second. The same examination of the RTC
decision shows that it concerned itself wholly with
the declaration of the nullity of the marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code. After its
recital of the "testimonies of witnesses," part of
which are the facts relied upon to support the
claimed psychological incapacity, the decision
dwelt on the evidence of Dr. Gates, the expert
witness, and, from there, proceeded to its
conclusion that psychological incapacity existed.
In this light, the dispositive portion declaring "the
marriage...on December 10, 1991, [is] null and
void," must be based on psychological incapacity
as found by the trial court, not on the absence of
the essential and formal requisites of marriage.
Third. We note that the petitioner himself offered
the Marriage Contract as evidence that it is
registered with the Civil Registry of Kalookan
City.35 As a duly registered document, it is a
public document, and is prima facie evidence of
the facts it contains, namely, the marriage of the
petitioner with the respondent. To contradict
these facts and the presumption of regularity in
the document’s favor, the petitioner’s contrary
evidence must be clear, convincing, and more
than merely preponderant.36 To be sure, a
married couple cannot simply nullify their
marriage through the non-appearance of one
spouse and the uncorroborated declaration by
the other spouse that the marriage did not really
take place. If the biased and interested testimony
of a witness is deemed sufficient to overcome a
public instrument, drawn up with all the
formalities prescribed by the law, then there will
have been established a very dangerous doctrine
that would throw the door wide open to fraud.37 At
the very least, the declaration that the marriage
did not take place must be supported by
independent evidence showing a physical
impossibility, a forgery, or the disavowal by the
supposed participants, to name a few possible
reasons.
2. Petitioner failed to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity
As the CA did, we hold that the totality of
evidence presented by petitioner failed to
establish the respondent’s psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code
which provides that "a marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization." In Santos
v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court first declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. It should refer to "no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It
must be confined to "the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage."39
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines were handed down by this
Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals40 (the
Molina case) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,41 further clarified
that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no
longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a
petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
totality of evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established.42
The factual background of this case covers at
least 18 years. The petitioner and the respondent
first met in 1973 and lived together as husband
and wife, without the benefit of marriage, before
they got married in 1991. In the course of their
relationship, they had three (3) children;
established a business, and even incurred
indebtedness amounting to ₱4 million; had
differences due to what the CA described as
"character faults and defects"; and had a well-
described quarrel which the CA observed to be
the "common reaction of an ordinary housewife
in a similar situation." Thus, unlike the usual
Article 36 cases this Court encountered in the
past, where marriage, cohabitation, and
perception of psychological incapacity took place
in that order, the present case poses a situation
where there had been a lengthy period of
cohabitation before the marriage took place. To
be sure, this factual unique situation does not
change the requirement that psychological
incapacity must be present at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. It does, however,
raise novel and unavoidable questions because
of the lapse of time the couple has been together
and their intimate knowledge of each other at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
Specifically, how do these factors affect the claim
of psychological incapacity that should exist at
the time of the marriage, considering that
marriage came near or at the end of the parties’
relationship?
Ideally, the best results in the determination of
psychological incapacity are achieved if the
respondent herself is actually examined. This
opportunity, however, did not arise in the present
case because the respondent simply failed to
respond to the court summons and to cooperate
in the proceedings. Thus, only an indirect
psychological examination took place through the
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings
and clinical interviews of the petitioner which
lasted for about three (3) hours.43 In light of the
differences in the appreciation of the
psychologist’s testimony and conclusions
between the trial court and the appellate court,
we deem it necessary to examine the records
ourselves, as the factual allegations and the
expert opinion vitally affect the issues submitted
for resolution.
Our own examination of the psychologist’s
testimony and conclusions leads us to conclude
that they are not sufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented
the respondent from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage. In the first place,
the facts on which the psychologist based her
conclusions were all derived from statements by
the petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause
cannot be doubted. It does not appear to us that
the psychologist read and interpreted the facts
related to her with the awareness that these facts
could be slanted. In this sense, we say her
reading may not at all be completely fair in its
assessment. We say this while fully aware that
the psychologist appeared at the petitioner’s
bidding and the arrangement between them was
not pro bono.44 While this circumstance does not
disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias,
her reading of the facts, her testimony, and her
conclusions must be read carefully with this
circumstance and the source of the facts in mind.
In examining the psychologist’s Report, we find
the "Particulars" and the "Psychological
Conclusions" disproportionate with one another;
the conclusions appear to be exaggerated
extrapolations, derived as they are from isolated
incidents, rather than from continuing patterns.
The "particulars" are, as it were, snapshots,
rather than a running account of the respondent’s
life from which her whole life is totally judged.
Thus, we do not see her psychological
assessment to be comprehensive enough to be
reliable.
For example, the psychologist’s statements
about the parties’ sexual relationship appear to
us to be rash, given that no parallel examination
of the petitioner’s own pattern of sexual behavior
has been made. Sex with a partner is a two-way
affair and while one partner can be more
aggressive than the other, aggressiveness is not
per se an aberrant behavior and may depend on
the dynamics of the partners’ relationship. To
infer prior sexual experience because the
respondent allegedly initiated intimate behavior,
and to cite an unverified incident of a previous
rape to characterize the respondent’s sexual
behavior, are totally uncalled for. That the
respondent did pass her Dental Board Exam was
glossed over and unverified unsavory incidents
related to her exam were highlighted. Her alleged
failure to practice was stressed, without
emphasizing, however, that "she quit her dental
practice and joined petitioner in his
communications business."
The respondent’s business behavior is a matter
that needed full inquiry, as there could be
reasons for her interference. With respect to
employees, while the petitioner charged the
respondent with being strict, he, at the same time,
alleged that she gambled with the employees
when there were no clients. The psychologist did
not pursue these lines and, significantly, the
petitioner’s testimonies on this point are
uncorroborated. The respondent’s reaction to her
husband’s nights out was singled out and slanted
to indicate negative traits. It took the CA to
observe that her hostile attitude when the
petitioner stayed out late at night "is merely a
usual common reaction of an ordinary housewife
in a similar situation." To further quote the CA
citing the transcripts, "[I]n fact, petitioner-
appellee admitted that the reason respondent got
angry and threw his things outside is because he
came home late and drunk, which petitioner-
appellee had done several times already on the
pretext of closing business deals, which
sometimes included going out night-clubbing with
clients."45 Why and how the couple incurred
indebtedness of about ₱4 million may be usual in
the communications business, but is certainly a
matter that the psychologist should have further
inquired into in relation with her alleged strictness
in business affairs.1avvphi1
As against the negatives in viewing the
respondent, we note that she lived with the
petitioner for 18 years and begot children with
him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 – developments
that show a fair level of stability in the relationship
and a healthy degree of intimacy between the
parties for some eleven (11) years. She finished
her Dentistry and joined her husband in the
communications business – traits that do not at
all indicate an irresponsible attitude, especially
when read with the comment that she had been
strict with employees and in business affairs. The
petitioner’s Memorandum46 itself is
revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage
Contract was a sham, the petitioner interestingly
alleged that (referring to 1987) "[S]ince at that
time, the relationship between the petitioner and
respondent was going well, and future marriage
between the two was not an impossibility, the
petitioner signed these documents."
More than all these, the psychologist’s testimony
itself glaringly failed to show that the
respondent’s behavioral disorder was medically
or clinically permanent or incurable as
established jurisprudence requires. Neither did
the psychologist testify that the disorder was
grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. RODOLFO BRITANICO
Q: All right, what was basically your
conclusion in your qualitative research
with regards to the psychological
incapacity of the respondent to comply
with the marital obligation?
DR. CRISTINA R. GATES
A: There is a strong indication that the
respondent was not able to carry out
her marital obligation – her marital
duties and responsibilities. And going
through the TSN, it is evident that in
their conjugal relation, it was petitioner
who was responsible, but he in fact
gave her opportunity to develop and to
become responsible herself. [sic]
For instance, he sent her back to school to take
Dentistry, he supported her during that time and
during the exam and after that he built her a clinic.
In all these, the respondent proved to be
irresponsible. [sic]
When she was taking pre-dental, most of the time
she was out of the house, and in one instance
petitioner discovered that respondent was having
an extra-marital affair with her classmate. And in
her board exam she failed the first time. And even
if it is questionable, petitioner approached one of
the commissioners and through his efforts the
respondent was able to pass the second time
around. [sic]
very
And in the matter of dental clinic, after merely two
months respondent refused to practice, she not
only refused and without the knowledge of the
petitioner sold all the dental equipments at a loss.
[sic]
Q: How about their relationship?
A: From the start respondent is older,
she had, like, prior sexual experience,
and she was the one who introduced to
him the use of marijuana. x x x x
Q: How about respondent. How would
the respondent compliment the
responsibility?
A: There is no mutuality, because if
she run away and asked for petitioner
to rent an apartment for them to live
together, petitioner continued to work
and study and went home to her in the
evening, but respondent on the other
hand she quit schooling and she did
push through with working, and worst
she allowed her friend to live with
them, allegedly in that apartment, and
respondent and friend would engage in
pot sessions. [sic]
Q: What did you find out with regards
to the duty of respondent to live
together with the petitioner? [sic]
A: She was frequently out, in [sic] her
friends. .
Q: How about love and respect?
A: Love is rather complicated. Because
she made love to him in her own will.
[sic]
Q: But did they show respect?
A: No, because she had extra-marital
affair, and demanding lot of money.
Q: How about to render emotional,
spiritual and physical help? How would
respondent comply?
A: She was not able to comply, except
maybe for the sexual obligation, but in
terms of physical and emotional
support she was not there for him.
When she quit, she hang out with him
on their business, but instead of
helping him, she would quarrel him,
interfere in his decisions, she would
embarrass petitioner in front of his
clients and employees, and if petitioner
would have a deal with his clients and
sometimes would come home late, she
would refuse to listen to his
explanation and would lock him out
and shout at him. [sic]
Q: And in your Psychological findings,
when did this [incapacity] of the
respondent start, her incapacity to
comply with the marriage obligation?
A: In the testimony of the petitioner, I
think he did mention that she came to
Manila for her studies, and during the
interview I found out that upon arrival
in Manila she was alone, by herself,
she had difficulty adjusting to city life,
because all her life were spent in the
province with her parents and siblings,
and she lived in Sampaloc where she
got herself in the company of bad
friends like going into marijuana and
frequent parties and pot sessions,
[which] would last for 3 to 4 days, and
in effect disallowed her from going to
school regularly.
Q: In clinical psychologist [sic], what is
the effect?
A: It is traumatic for her, because there
is a separation of her parents, and not
only that she was thrown to a situation
of her being alone, at that time she had
no guidance, it would assume that she
would just study…[sic]
Q: In your conclusion of your
Psychological Report, you stated here
and I quote: "Based on the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), the
international standards of
psychological disorders, Respondent
Lorna is plagued with an Adjustment
Disorder as manifested in her
impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of
civility and a sense of decency in the
conduct of her life." Can you please
explain to us.
A: Lorna Valera is like a person who is
not in control of herself, impulsive. x x
x was rooted in the respondent’s medical or
Q: How about lack of restraint?
A: Impulses. Like for example, when
the husband comes home late, instead
of looking means and ways to
rationalize, she would just shout and
lock him out.
Q: And what about lack of civility, what
is your basis?
A: She did not consider the welfare of
her children, her frequent outings, like
she would conduct her extra marital
affairs through phone calls. When they
separated, I understand that she was
always out of the house, gambling at
night. In fact, petitioner in one of his
visits to respondent and children
intercepted the letter of a younger child
asking for an appointment to see the
mother because the child’s report is
that he hardly sees the mother.
xxxx
Q: You mentioned also in your
psychological conclusion that
Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive
Behavior of Lorna Valera existed prior
and continuous up to the present, can
you please explain?
A: If Lorna Valera somewhere in her
life changes all of a sudden, then the
psychological incapacity is not
obtaining but in mal-adopting behavior,
like you remove the stimulus of the
petitioner in her life. Then the same
behavior pattern as I learned from the
children, then the incapacity is
irreversible because it is there.47[sic]
These statements, lopsided as they are as we
observed above, merely testify to the
respondent’s impulsiveness, lack of restraint, and
lack of civility and decency in the conduct of her
life. The psychologist, however, failed to
sufficiently prove that all these emanated from a
behavioral disorder so grave and serious that the
respondent would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage; that it
psychological history before her marriage; and
that a cure was beyond the respondent’s capacity
to achieve.
Speaking of the root of the alleged disorder, the
psychologist could only trace this to the time the
respondent came to Manila; the psychologist
concluded that the disorder was due to her
separation from her parents and lack of
guidance. Will common human experience,
available through the thousands of students who
over the years trooped from the provinces to
Manila, accept the conclusion that this
experience alone can lead to a disorder that can
affect their capacity to marry?
In terms of incurability, the psychologist could
only cryptically say -
A. If Lorna Valera somewhere in her life changes
all of a sudden, then the psychological incapacity
is not obtaining but in mal-adopting behavior, like
you remove the stimulus of the petitioner in her
life. Then the same behavior pattern as I learned
from the children, then the incapacity is
irreversible because it is there.48
Does this convoluted statement mean that Lorna
Valera can still change, and that change can
happen if the "stimulus of the petitioner" is
removed from her life? In other words, is the
incapacity relative and reversible?
In Molina, we ruled that "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes and occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
indicative of psychological incapacity. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, the root cause should
be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to
marriage." In the present case, the psychologist
simply narrated adverse "snapshots" of the
respondent’s life showing her alleged failure to
meet her marital duties, but did not convincingly
prove her permanent incapacity to meet her
marital duties and responsibilities; the root or
psychological illness that gave rise to this
incapacity; and that this psychological illness and
consequent incapacity existed at the time the
marriage was celebrated.
In light of the wide gaps in the facts the
psychologist considered and of the patent
deficiencies of her testimony tested under the
standards of established jurisprudence, we
cannot accord full credence and accept the
psychologist’s Report as basis for the declaration
of annulment of the parties’ marriage under
Article 36. In the absence of any contradictory
statements from the respondent, the fairer
approach is to read between the lines of this
Report and discern what indeed happened
between the parties based on common human
experience between married couples who have
lived together in the way the parties did. From this
perspective, we have no problem in accepting the
CA decision as a fairer assessment of the
respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity,
and for being a more realistic appreciation of the
evidence adduced in light of the requirements of
Article 36:
Such character faults and defects, We believe,
do not constitute psychological incapacity as a
ground for the declaration of marriage between
petitioner-appellee and respondent. While she
appears to be less than ideal mother to her
children and loving wife to her husband, herein
petitioner-appellee, the same are not physical
manifestations of a psychological illness as
described in Molina. Although the expert witness
had clinically identified respondent’s condition as
"Adjustment Disorder," allegedly resulting from
respondent’s separation from her parents when
she studied in Manila before she met petitioner-
appellee, it was not established that such
disorder or illness allegedly manifested in her
carefree and outgoing behavior as a means of
coping with her emotional and psychological
stresses, was the root cause of her incapacity to
fulfill the essential marital obligations. Moreover,
such alleged disorder was not shown to be of a
serious nature, "a supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effective incapacitates"
the respondent from "really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage." The clinical findings on
respondent’s alleged Adjustment Disorder have
not established such illness to be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. And, as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, although the
Psychological Report stated that respondent’s
condition "appears to be irreversible," the expert
witness did not substantiate her conclusion that
respondent’s condition was indeed incurable or
permanent. Nowhere in the testimony of
petitioner-appellee was it shown that
respondent’s allegedly carefree ways (and
smoking of marijuana) while she was younger
and had no children yet, continued throughout
their marriage until their separation in 1990. On
the contrary, her strict attitude towards the clients
and employees is a clear indication that she
takes their business concerns seriously, such
attitude being a reflection of a mature and
responsible personality.49
Shorn of any reference to psychology, we
conclude that we have a case here of parties who
have very human faults and frailties; who have
been together for some time; and who are now
tired of each other. If in fact the respondent does
not want to provide the support expected of a
wife, the cause is not necessarily a grave and
incurable psychological malady whose effects go
as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital
support promised and expected when the marital
knot was tied. To be tired and to give up on one’s
situation and on one’s husband are not
necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither
can falling out of love be so labeled. When these
happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital
knot to allow the parties to go their separate
ways. This simple remedy, however, is not
available to us under our laws. Ours is still a
limited remedy that addresses only a very
specific situation – a relationship where no
marriage could have validly been concluded
because the parties, or one of them, by reason of
a grave and incurable psychological illness
existing when the marriage was celebrated, did
not appreciate the obligations of marital life and,
thus, could not have validly entered into a
marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is
powerless to provide any permanent remedy. To
use the words of Navales v. Navales:501avvphi1
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume
basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the
spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition or
illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only
be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage and
not due to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by said rule.51 [Emphasis ours]
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations,
we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July
4, 2001 and October 18, 2001, respectively, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 65273. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 168335
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
NESTOR GALANG, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on
Certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner), challenging the decision2 dated
November 25, 2004 and the resolution3 dated
May 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 70004. The challenged decision
affirmed the decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 62, Angeles City, declaring the
marriage of Nestor Galang (respondent) and
Juvy Salazar null and void on the ground of the
latter’s psychological incapacity. The assailed
resolution denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
On March 9, 1994, the respondent and Juvy
contracted marriage in Pampanga. They resided
in the house of the respondent’s father in San
Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The
respondent worked as an artist-illustrator at the
Clark Development Corporation, earning
₱8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, on the other hand,
stayed at home as a housewife. They have one
child, Christopher.
On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with
the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the
Family Code, as amended. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 9494. He alleged that
Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to
exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as
she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler. He
claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his
parents’ money, and often asked money from
their friends and relatives on the pretext that
Christopher was confined in a hospital. According
to the respondent, Juvy suffers from "mental
deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted
discernment and total lack of care, love and
affection [towards him and their] child." He
posited that Juvy’s incapacity was "extremely
serious" and "appears to be incurable."5
June 6, 2011
 The RTC ordered the city prosecutor to
investigate if collusion existed between the
parties. Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama
formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he
found no evidence of collusion between the
parties. The RTC set the case for trial in its Order
of October 20, 1999. The respondent presented
testimonial and documentary evidence to
substantiate his allegations.
In his testimony, the respondent alleged that
he was the one who prepared their breakfast
because Juvy did not want to wake up early; Juvy
often left their child to their neighbors’ care; and
Christopher almost got lost in the market when
Juvy brought him there.6
The respondent further stated that Juvy
squandered the ₱15,000.00 he entrusted to her.
He added that Juvy stole his ATM card and
falsified his signature to encash the check
representing his (the respondent’s) father’s
pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy
playing "mahjong" and "kuwaho" three (3) times.
Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money
from their relatives on the pretense that their son
was confined in a hospital.7
Aside from his testimony, the respondent also
presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist,
who testified that she conducted a psychological
test on the respondent. According to her, she
wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but
the latter did not respond.8 In her Psychological
Report, the psychologist made the following
findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client
Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-
matured individual. He is well-adjusted to the
problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major
irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration
tolerance which means he has a little ability to
endure anxiety and the client manifests
suppressed feelings and emotions which resulted
to unbearable emotional pain, depression and
lack of self-esteem and gained emotional
tensions caused by his wife’s behavior.
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested
[in] such a manner that the defendant-wife: (1)
being very irresponsible and very lazy and
doesn’t manifest any sense of responsibility; (2)
her involvement in gambling activities such as
mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador
which exhibits her behavioral and personality
disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care
attitude towards her husband and child; (5) her
immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of
initiative to change and above all, the fact that
she is unable to perform her marital obligations
as a loving, responsible and caring wife to her
family. There are just few reasons to believe that
the defendant is suffering from incapacitated
mind and such incapacity appears to be
incorrigible.
xxx
The following incidents are the reasons why
the couple separated:
1. After the marriage took place, the
incapacity of the defendant was manifested on
such occasions wherein the plaintiff was the one
who prepared his breakfast, because the
defendant doesn’t want to wake up early; this
became the daily routine of the plaintiff before
reporting to work;
2. After reporting from work, the defendant
was often out gambling, as usual, the plaintiff was
the one cooking for supper while the defendant
was very busy with her gambling activities and
never attended to her husband’s needs;
3. There was an occasion wherein their son
was lost in the public market because of the
irresponsible attitude of the defendant;
4. That the defendant suffers from personality
and behavioral disorders, there was an occasion
wherein the defendant [would] steal money from
the plaintiff and use them for gambling;
5. Defendant, being an estafador had been
manifested after their marriage took place,
wherein the defendant would come with stories
so that people [would] feel pity on her and give
her money. Through false pretenses she [would]
be able to deceive and take money from
neighbors, relatives and other people.
6. That the plaintiff convinced the defendant
to stop her unhealthy lifestyle (gambling), but the
defendant never listened to his advices;
7. That the plaintiff was the one who [was]
taking care of their son, when the plaintiff will
leave for work, the defendant [would] entrust their
son to their neighbor and go [to] some place. This
act reflects the incapacity of the defendant by
being an irresponsible mother;
8. That the defendant took their son and left
their conjugal home that resulted into the
couple’s separation.
Psychological findings tend to confirm that
the defendant suffers from personality and
behavioral disorders. These disorders are
manifested through her grave dependency on
gambling and stealing money. She doesn’t
manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty
and these disorders appear to be incorrigible.
The plaintiff tried to forget and forgive her
about the incidents and start a new life again and
hoping she would change. Tried to get attention
back by showing her with special care, treating
her to places for a weekend vacation, cook[ing]
her favorite food, but the defendant didn’t care to
change, she did not prepare meals, wash clothes
nor clean up. She neglected her duties and failed
to perform the basic obligations as a wife.
So in the view of the above-mentioned
psychological findings, it is my humble opinion
that there is sufficient reason to believe that the
defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to
perform her marital duties as a wife and mother
to their only son.9
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its
decision of January 22, 2001. The trial court saw
merit in the testimonies of the respondent and the
psychologist, and concluded that:
After a careful perusal of the evidence in the
instant case and there being no controverting
evidence, this Court is convinced that as held in
Santos case, the psychological incapacity of
respondent to comply with the essential marital
obligations of his marriage with petitioner, which
Dr. Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by
(a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out
the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and
family shouldered by any average couple existing
under ordinary circumstances of life and work; (b)
antecedence, because the root cause of the
trouble can be traced to the history of the subject
before marriage although its overt manifestations
appear over after the wedding; and (c)
incurability, if treatments required exceed the
ordinary means or subject, or involve time and
expense beyond the reach of the subject – are all
obtaining in this case.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is granted and the marriage
between petitioner and defendant is hereby
declared null and void pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.10
The CA Decision
The petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to
the CA. The CA, in its decision dated November
25, 2004, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
The CA held that Juvy was psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. It explained that Juvy’s indolence
and lack of sense of responsibility, coupled with
her acts of gambling and swindling, undermined
her capacity to comply with her marital
obligations. In addition, the psychologist
characterized Juvy’s condition to be permanent,
incurable and existing at the time of the
celebration of her marriage with the
respondent.11
The petitioner moved to reconsider this
Decision, but the CA denied his motion in its
resolution dated May 9, 2005.12
The Petition and the Issues
The petitioner claims in the present petition
that the totality of the evidence presented by the
respondent was insufficient to establish Juvy’s
psychological incapacity to perform her essential
marital obligations. The petitioner additionally
argues that the respondent failed to show the
juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of
Juvy’s condition.13 The respondent took the exact
opposite view.
The issue boils down to whether there is
basis to nullify the respondent’s marriage to Juvy
on the ground that at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological
incapacity that prevented her from complying
with her essential marital obligations.
 The Court’s Ruling
After due consideration, we resolve to grant
the petition, and hold that no sufficient basis
exists to annul the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under the terms of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 of the Family Code
and Related Jurisprudence
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that "a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization."14
In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et
al.,15 the Court first declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity;
(b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The
defect should refer to "no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage." It must be
confined to "the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage."16 We laid down
more definitive guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code
in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
and Roridel Olaviano Molina, whose salient
points are footnoted below.17 These guidelines
incorporate the basic requirements we
established in Santos.18
In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G.
Marcos,19 we further clarified that it is not
absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion
in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code
if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be
duly established. Thereafter, the Court
promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages)20 which
provided that "the complete facts should allege
the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time
of the celebration of the marriage but expert
opinion need not be alleged."
Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te
v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te21 placed some
cloud in the continued applicability of the time-
tested Molina22 guidelines. We stated in this case
that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina
unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced
all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit
into and be bound by it. This is contrary to the
intention of the law, since no psychological
incapacity case can be considered as completely
on "all fours" with another.
Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-
Ting23 and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito
Suazo,24 however, laid to rest any question
regarding the continued applicability of
Molina.25 In these cases, we clarified that Ngo
Te26 did not abandon Molina.27 Far from
abandoning Molina,28 Ngo Te29 simply suggested
the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We
also explained that Suazo30 that Ngo Te31 merely
stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity.32
The Present Case
In the present case and using the above
guidelines, we find the totality of the respondent’s
evidence – the testimonies of the respondent and
the psychologist, and the latter’s psychological
report and evaluation –insufficient to prove Juvy’s
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.
a. The respondent’s testimony
The respondent’s testimony merely showed
that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare
breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their
neighbors when she went out of the house; (c)
squandered a huge amount of the ₱15,000.00
that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the
respondent’s ATM card and attempted to
withdraw the money deposited in his account; (e)
falsified the respondent’s signature in order to
encash a check; (f) made up false stories in order
to borrow money from their relatives; and (g)
indulged in gambling.
These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to
the level of psychological incapacity that the law
requires. We stress that psychological incapacity
must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. In Republic of the Philippines v.
Norma Cuison-Melgar, et al.,33 we ruled that it is
not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet
his responsibility and duty as a married person; it
is essential that he or she must be shown to be
incapable of doing so because of some
psychological, not physical, illness. In other
words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person – an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage – had to be shown.34 A
cause has to be shown and linked with the
manifestations of the psychological incapacity.
The respondent’s testimony failed to show
that Juvy’s condition is a manifestation of a
disordered personality rooted in some
incapacitating or debilitating psychological
condition that rendered her unable to discharge
her essential marital obligation. In this light, the
acts attributed to Juvy only showed indications of
immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility,
resulting in nothing more than the difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations. In Ricardo B. Toring v. Teresita M.
Toring,35 we emphasized that irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the
like do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity, as these may only be
due to a person's difficulty, refusal or neglect to
undertake the obligations of marriage that is not
rooted in some psychological illness that Article
36 of the Family Code addresses.
In like manner, Juvy’s acts of falsifying the
respondent’s signature to encash a check, of
stealing the respondent’s ATM, and of
squandering a huge portion of the ₱15,000.00
that the respondent entrusted to her, while no
doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be
equated with a psychological disorder, especially
when the evidence shows that these were mere
isolated incidents and not recurring acts. Neither
can Juvy’s penchant for playing mahjong and
kuwaho for money, nor her act of soliciting money
from relatives on the pretext that her child was
sick, warrant a conclusion that she suffered from
a mental malady at the time of the celebration of
marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling
her marital duties and obligations. The
respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy engaged
in these behaviors (gambling and what the
respondent refers to as "swindling") only two (2)
years after their marriage, and after he let her
handle his salary and manage their finances. The
evidence also shows that Juvy even tried to
augment the family’s income during the early
stages of their marriage by putting up a sari-sari
store and by working as a manicurist.
b. The Psychologist’s Report
The submitted psychological report hardly
helps the respondent’s cause, as it glaringly
failed to establish that Juvy was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital
duties at the material time required by Article 36
of the Family Code.
To begin with, the psychologist admitted in
her report that she derived her conclusions
exclusively from the information given her by the
respondent. Expectedly, the respondent’s
description of Juvy would contain a considerable
degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation
based on this one-sided description alone can
hardly be considered as credible or sufficient. We
are of course aware of our pronouncement in
Marcos36 that the person sought to be declared
psychologically incapacitated need not be
examined by the psychologist as a condition
precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If the
incapacity can be proven by independent means,
no reason exists why such independent proof
cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of
psychological incapacity, independently of a
psychologist’s examination and report. In this
case, however, no such independent evidence
has ever been gathered and adduced. To be
sure, evidence from independent sources who
intimately knew Juvy before and after the
celebration of her marriage would have made a
lot of difference and could have added weight to
the psychologist’s report.
Separately from the lack of the requisite
factual basis, the psychologist’s report simply
stressed Juvy’s negative traits which she
considered manifestations of Juvy’s
psychological incapacity (e.g., laziness,
immaturity and irresponsibility; her involvement in
swindling and gambling activities; and her lack of
initiative to change), and declared that
"psychological findings tend to confirm that the
defendant suffers from personality and
behavioral disorders x x x she doesn’t manifest
any sense of responsibility and loyalty, and these
disorders appear to be incorrigible."37 In the end,
the psychologist opined – without stating the
psychological basis for her conclusion – that
"there is sufficient reason to believe that the
defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to
perform her marital duties as a wife and mother
to their only son."38
We find this kind of conclusion and report
grossly inadequate. First, we note that the
psychologist did not even identify the types of
psychological tests which she administered on
the respondent and the root cause of Juvy’s
psychological condition. We also stress that the
acts alleged to have been committed by Juvy all
occurred during the marriage; there was no
showing that any mental disorder existed at the
inception of the marriage. Second, the report
failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvy’s
alleged condition, specifically, why and to what
extent the disorder is serious, and how it
incapacitated her to comply with her marital
duties. Significantly, the report did not even
categorically state the particular type of
personality disorder found. Finally, the report
failed to establish the incurability of Juvy’s
condition. The report’s pronouncements that
Juvy "lacks the initiative to change" and that her
mental incapacity "appears incorrigible"39 are
insufficient to prove that her mental condition
could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond her means to undertake.
c. The Psychologist’s Testimony
The psychologist’s court testimony fared no
better in proving the juridical antecedence,
gravity or incurability of Juvy’s alleged
psychological defect as she merely reiterated
what she wrote in her report – i.e., that Juvy was
lazy and irresponsible; played mahjong and
kuhawo for money; stole money from the
respondent; deceived people to borrow cash; and
neglected her child – without linking these to an
underlying psychological cause. Again, these
allegations, even if true, all occurred during the
marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any
information or insight into Juvy’s early life and
associations, how she acted before and at the
time of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a
disordered personality developed. Simply put,
the psychologist failed to trace the history of
Juvy’s psychological condition and to relate it to
an existing incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the
elements of gravity and incurability.1âwphi1 In
these respects, she merely stated that despite
the respondent’s efforts to show love and
affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From this
premise, she jumped to the conclusion that Juvy
appeared to be incurable or incorrigible, and
would be very hard to cure. These unfounded
conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or
incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code
requires. To be declared clinically or medically
incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to
change is another. To hark back to what we
earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers
only to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.40
The Constitution sets out a policy of
protecting and strengthening the family as the
basic social institution, and marriage is the
foundation of the family. Marriage, as an
inviolable institution protected by the State,
cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In
petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage,
the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage
lies with the plaintiff.41 Unless the evidence
presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties, or one of them, could not have validly
entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and
serious psychological illness existing at the time
it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.42
WHEREFORE, in view of these
considerations, we GRANT the petition. We SET
ASIDE the Decision and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated November 25, 2004 and
May 9, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
70004. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent
Nestor Galang’s petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Costs against
respondent Nestor Galang.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the Decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, Branch 24 nullifying the marriage of
respondent, Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio
(Lynnette), to Martini Dico Baguio (Martini), the
Republic through the Office of the Solicitor
General filed the present petition for review.
Lynnette and Martini contracted marriage on
August 12, 1997. Less than three years later or
on October 12, 2000, Lynnette filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a
complaint1 for declaration of nullity of marriage,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 25700, on the
ground of Martini’s psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital duties and
obligations under Articles 68-702 of the Family
Code.
Despite service of summons upon Martini, he
never filed any responsive pleading to the
complaint.3 No collusion was established
between the parties.4 Upon the authority of the
Solicitor General, the provincial prosecutor of
Cebu City appeared in the case under the
former’s supervision and control.5
From the deposition of Lynnette taken before
Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Monalila S. Tecson
on January 10, 2001,6the following are
gathered:
Lynnette and Martini, a seaman working
overseas, became pen pals in 1995.
In 1996, the two met in person during Martini’s
vacation after the expiration of his contract on
board an ocean-going vessel.
On August 12, 1997, Martini, then 32, and
Lynnette, then 34, contracted
marriage,7 following which they moved to the
house of Lynnette’s parents at 33-B La Guardia
G.R. No. 171042 June 30, 2008 Extension, Lahug, Cebu City. Martini, however,
stayed there only on weekends, and during
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, weekdays he stayed with his parents in Looc,
vs. Lapu-lapu City. While Lynnette suggested that
LYNNETTE CABANTUG- the two of them stay in the house of Martini’s
BAGUIO, respondent. parents, Martini disagreed, claiming that there
were many already living with his parents.
Lynnette noticed that every time she conversed
with Martini, he always mentioned his mother
and his family, and she soon realized that he
was a "mama’s boy." And she noticed too that
when she would call up Martini at his parent’s
house and his mother was the one who
answered the call, she would deny that he was
around.
In 1998, after Martini again returned following
an almost 10-month contract overseas,8 he
stayed with Lynnette. When in 1999 Martini
again disembarked, he stayed with his parents.
On the insistence of his mother, Martini’s
monetary allotment was shared equally
between her and Lynnette.
Lynnette had since January 1999 not heard
from Martini. And since April 1999, Lynnette
stopped receiving her share of the allotment,
drawing her to inquire from Martini’s employer
who informed her that he had already
disembarked on even month. She soon found
out that Martini was in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
When Lynnette and Martini finally met in Cebu
City, he told her that they are not compatible and
should just part ways.
The last time the couple talked was on October
14, 1999 when Martini was at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) about to depart for
abroad. Since then, Martini never
communicated with Lynnette. On investigation,
Lynnette learned that Martini declared in his
employment records that he was "single" and
named his mother as principal allottee.9
Hence, Lynnette’s filing of the complaint for
declaration of nullification of marriage.
Aside from her deposition,10 Lynnette presented
her Certificate of Marriage,11 Martini’s undated
Seafarer Information Sheet,12 the letter of
clinical psychologist Dr. Andres S. Gerong (Dr.
Gerong) to Martini requesting for a personal
interview,13 Dr. Gerong’s testimony,14 and the
Psychological Evaluation Report15 prepared by
Dr. Gerong after his interview of Lynnette and
her sister Dr. Rosemarie Sistoza.16
In the Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr.
Gerong noted as follows:
1. The couples [sic] were married on August 12,
1997 in Danao City, Cebu[;]
2. After the wedding the couple stayed at the
petitioner’s residence, but the defendant would
always go home to his parents in Looc, Lapu-
lapu City;
3. Defendant did not show any directions to
establish their home, [is] happy-go-lucky, and
would just see the plaintiff for his physical and
sexual needs;
4. Plaintiff felt being used, exploited, uncared
for, taken for granted, abandoned;
5. Defendant’s parents appeared to control the
son to the extent of meddling [with] the
finances coming from the income as a seaman;
6. Defendant never showed respect for his
parents-in-law;
7. Parents of the defendant insisted [on] a co-
allot[ment without] any protestations from the
plaintiff who has been generous all the time;
8. Defendant remained immature, could not
stand by his wife and would still depend upon
the decisions of his parents and without any
personal directions as to what to do with his
family;
9. Strictly speaking, the couple never really
live[d] together as husband and wife like any
ordinary couple17(underscoring supplied),
and concluded that
Defendant shows immature personality
disorder, dependency patterns, and self-
centered motives. Th[ese are] the core
personality dysfunctions noted and have been
exaggeratedly expressed which are detrimental
to the familial well-being;
The situation is serious, grave, existing already
during the adolescent period, and
incurable because personality and character
are stable whether or not it is normal and
adaptive.
xxxx
The defendant is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligations in
marriage and family.18 (Underscoring supplied)
Expounding on his findings, Dr. Gerong
testified, thus:
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: In gist, what were your findings as to the
psychological capacity or incapacity of
defendant Martini Dico Baguio?
A: x x x [T]o sum it up, the synopsis of the
findings, the defendant husband appeared to be
[a] dependent person to his family and unable to
[sever . . .] the connection being a married man
and to establish a domicile for his family and to
support his family.
xxxx
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: Dr. Gerong, how grave or serious is the
psychological incapacity of the defendant?
A: Being, I would say in our popular
parlance, "mama’s boy" as alleged, that
will endanger the integrity of the
marriage because instead of establishing a
permanent conjugal relationship with the wife
the husband-defendant would remain
dependent on his family.
xxxx
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: Okay, in terms of the chances that this
incapacity will be cured, what are the chances,
if any?
A: As to curability, since I am using a clinical
term ["]personality or character disorder or
dysfunction["] and as I have said many times
that the personality is stable and pervasive over
time. And if it is established as early as
adolescent period and up to the present it has
remained persistent thru the years and
therefore it’s a permanent trait of the defendant-
husband, therefore it’s incurable.19 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
By Decision20 of January 2, 2002, Branch 24 of
the Cebu City RTC found Martini
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, and
that the same incapacity existed "at the time the
couple exchanged their marriage vows."
The Solicitor General, via appeal,21 challenged
before the Court of Appeals the trial court’s
decision
. . . DECLARING THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE
NULL AND VOID, DEFENDANTS MARTINI
DICO BAGUIO’S PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN
TO EXIST.22
By Decision23 of January 13, 2005, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Addressing the Solicitor General’s argument
that Dr. Gerong’s testimony failed to establish
the cause of Martini’s psychological incapacity
and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage,24 the Court of Appeals held:
x x x [I]n contradiction of the Republic’s
contention and its supporting above-cited
doctrine, this Court cites the more recent
jurisprudence laid down in the case of Marcos
v. Marcos,25 in which the High Tribunal has
foregone with the requirement that the
defendant should be examined by a physician
or psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for
declaration of nullity of marriage. It held thus:
"The x x x guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated x x x – [w]hat is
important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition, [f]or indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination for the person concerned need not
be resorted to."26
Therefore, the oral deposition [of Lynette]
and the Psychological Evaluation Report by
Dr. Andres S. Gerong, Ph.D. as Clinical
Psychologist declaring the defendant
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations in marriage and family life
was sufficient for US to believe that undeniably
the defendant suffers psychological
incapacity.27 (Italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
On the Solicitor General’s contention that
Martini’s abandonment of Lynnette is a ground
for legal separation and not for declaration of
nullity of marriage,28 and that Martini’s alleged
personality traits are not of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family
Code,29 the Court of Appeals declared:
x x x WE note that it was not the
abandonment which was the ground relied upon
by the plaintiff-appellee but the defendant’s
being a mama’s boy.30
xxxx
Being a Mama’s Boy, his uncaring attitude
towards his wife, declaring himself single
and naming his mother as the beneficiary,
spending more time with his family and less
with his wife and ultimately, abandoning her
manifested defendant’s psychological
incapacity. These, to sum it all, to US are
manifestations of severe psychological disorder
rather than a mere obstinate refusal to comply
with his marital obligations.31 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General’s Motion for
Reconsideration32 having been denied by the
33 34
Court of Appeals, the present petition was
filed, faulting the appellate court to have gravely
erred:
I
. . . IN RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR.
ANDRES GERONG THAT DEFENDANT IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED HAVE
LEGAL BASIS.
II
. . . IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO
CONSIDERATION THAT ABANDONMENT BY
ONE’S SPOUSE IS ONLY A GROUND FOR
LEGAL SEPARATION AND NOT FOR THE
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
III
. . . IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT’S BEING A
MAMA’S BOY IS A MANIFESTATION OF A
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDER.35 (Italics in the
original)
The Solicitor General’s arguments persuade.
The Solicitor General argued as follows:
Dr. Gerong merely testified that defendant’s
alleged psychological incapacity (being a
mama’s boy) began in his adolescent stage and
has remained persistent through the years (p.
20, Brief). Dr. Gerong did not detail this finding.
He made no effort to look into and testify on
defendant’s past life, attitudes, habits and
character to explain defendant’s alleged
psychological incapacity as required by this
Honorable Court in the case of Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198
(1998).
Again, while it is true that Dr. Gerong testified
that defendant’s alleged defect is incurable, he
failed to explain why it is clinically or medically
permanent. His only basis for saying that it is
incurable is his finding that defendant has been
a mama’s boy since his adolescence (p. 7, TSN,
June 19, 2001). During the trial, Dr. Gerong
also failed to explain in detail why the
defendant’s alleged psychological incapacity is
grave and to discuss what kind of disorder
defendant is suffering from.36 (Emphasis in the
original; italics and underscoring supplied)
On the doctor’s findings in his Report, the
Solicitor General argued:
The said findings reveal nothing in defendant’s
past life and acts that shows a behavior pattern
that would prove his alleged psychological
incapacity. Dr. Gerong’s finding that defendant’s
parents are too controlling because they were
made co-allottees of the remittances sent by
their son does not prove the alleged
psychological incapacity of defendant. The
report likewise failed to explain the gravity of the
alleged psychological incapacity of defendant
and state whether or not it incapacitates
defendant from carrying out the normal and
ordinary duties of marriage and family. There is
likewise no explanation by Dr. Gerong why he
found defendant’s incapacity to be incurable.
This Honorable Court has held that such illness
must be shown to be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligation of the marriage. Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable and grave
[Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina, supra]. These Dr. Gerong failed to do.
Even when the rules have been relaxed and
the personal examination of the defendant
by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no
longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, the totality of evidence presented during
trial by private respondent must still provethe
gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability of the alleged psychological
incapacity (Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755
[2000]; Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240
SCRA 20 [1995]). (Emphasis in the original;
italics and underscoring supplied)
In fine, the Solicitor General concluded that
there was no showing that Martini’s alleged
personality traits are of the nature contemplated
by Article 36 of the Family Code and the rulings
of this Court in the cited cases,37 and that
Martini’s abandonment of Lynnette constitutes
only a ground for legal separation but not for
declaration of nullity of marriage.38
Article 36 of the Family Code on which Lynnette
anchors her complaint provides that "[a]
marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization."
Article 36 must be read in conjunction with the
other articles in the Family Code, specifically
Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 which provide
different grounds to render a marriage void ab
initio, as well as Article 45 which dwell on
voidable marriages, and Article 55 on legal
separation.39 Care must be observed so that
these various circumstances are not to be
applied indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter.40
And Article 36 should not be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefor manifest themselves, nor
with legal separation in which the grounds need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment, and the like.41
"Psychological incapacity" has been elucidated
on as follows:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a
ground for the nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. As all people may have
certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt
that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. x
x x [T]he root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness, and its incapacitating
nature must be fully explained x x
x.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" does
not constitute psychological incapacity.43 Nor
does failure of the parties to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons.
It is essential that the parties to a marriage must
be shown to be insensitive to or incapable of
meeting their duties and responsibilities due to
some psychological (not physical)
illness,44 which insensitivity or incapacity should
have been existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage even if it becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.45
In fine, for psychological incapacity to render a
marriage void ab initio, it must be characterized
by
(a) Gravity – It must be grave and serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable, or even if
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. 46
Dr. Gerong found that Martini’s "personality
disorders" including his being a "mama’s boy"
are "serious, grave, existing already during the
adolescent period and incurable" and
concluded that Martini "appeared" to be
dependent upon his family and unable "to
establish a domicile for his family and to support
his family."
The doctor’s findings and conclusion were
derived from his interview of Lynnette and her
sister and Lynnette’s deposition. From
Lynnette’s deposition, however, it is gathered
that Martini’s failure to establish a common life
with her stems from his refusal, not incapacity,
to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal
or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,47 which
renders a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. In another vein, how
the doctor arrived at the conclusion, after
interviewing Lynnette and considering her
deposition, that any such personality disorders
of Martini have been existing since Martini’s
adolescent years has not been explained. It
bears recalling that Martini and Lynnette
became pen pals in 1995 and contracted
marriage in 1997 when Martini was already 32
years old, far removed from adolescent years.
Dr. Gerong’s citing of Martini’s appointment of
his mother as a beneficiary and his representing
himself as single in his Seafarer Information
Sheet, without more, as indications of Martini’s
dependence on his family amounting to his
incapacity to fulfill his duties as a married man
does not logically follow, especially given that
the Seafarer’s Information Sheet is not even
dated48 and, therefore, there is no certainty that
it was prepared after Martini contracted
marriage.
While the examination by a physician of a
person in order to declare him/her psychological
incapacitated is not required, the root cause
thereof must be "medically or clinically
identified." There must thus be evidence to
adequately establish the same. There is none
such in the case at bar, however.
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting
and strengthening the family as the basic social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.49 Marriage, an inviolable institution
protected by the State,50 cannot be dissolved at
the whim of the parties.51 In petitions for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of
proof to show the nullity of marriage lies on the
plaintiff.52 Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.53
As reflected above, Lynnette failed to discharge
the onus probandi. While the Court sympathizes
with her predicament, its first and foremost duty
is to apply the law.54 Dura lex sed lex.
Lynnette’s marriage with Martini may have
failed then, but it cannot be declared void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity
in light of the insufficient evidence presented.55
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated January
13, 2005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil
Case No. CEB 25700 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, Branch 24, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 158896
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
01 July 2003, reversing the decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon
City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel
Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner
Juanita") and respondent Manuel were married at
civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the
Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After
discovering that they could not have a child of
their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy
in 1977, who they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24)
years of married life together, respondent Manuel
filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita.
He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his
wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish
attitude towards him which was exacerbated by
her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that
she incessantly complained about almost
everything and anyone connected with him like
his elderly parents, the staff in his office and
anything not of her liking like the physical
arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his
office and with other trivial matters; that she
showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige
and high position of his office as judge of the
Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and
scream at him and throw objects around the
house within the hearing of their neighbors; that
she cared even less about his professional
advancement as she did not even give him moral
support and encouragement; that her
psychological incapacity arose before marriage,
rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of
love and appreciation from her own parents since
childhood and that such incapacity is permanent
and incurable and, even if treatment could be
October 27, 2004
attempted, it will involve time and expense
beyond the emotional and physical capacity of
the parties; and that he endured and suffered
through his turbulent and loveless marriage to
her for twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that
respondent Manuel is still living with her at their
conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he
invented malicious stories against her so that he
could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a
loving wife and mother; that it was respondent
Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family
obligations; that she supported respondent
Manuel in all his endeavors despite his
philandering; that she was raised in a real happy
family and had a happy childhood contrary to
what was stated in the complaint.
In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated
on the following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20
years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand
and elaborated on the allegations in his petition.
He testified that his parents never approved of his
marriage as they still harbored hope that he
would return to the seminary.4 The early years of
their marriage were difficult years as they had a
hard time being accepted as husband and wife
by his parents and it was at this period that his
wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and
temperamental5 to him and his parents.6 She
was also obsessive about cleanliness which
became the common source of their
quarrels.7 He, however, characterized their union
as happy during that period of time in 1979 when
they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed
in furnishing their new house.8 In 1981, when he
became busy with law school and with various
community organizations, it was then that he felt
that he and his wife started to drift apart.9 He then
narrated incidents during their marriage that were
greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to him,
e.g., when his wife quarreled with an elderly
neighbor;10 when she would visit him in his office
and remark that the curtains were already dirty or
when she kicked a trash can across the room or
when she threw a ballpen from his table;11 when
she caused his office drawer to be forcibly
opened while he was away;12 when she
confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused
the tenant of having an affair with him;13 and
other incidents reported to him which would show
her jealous nature. Money matters continued to
be a source of bitter quarrels.14Respondent
Manuel could not forget that he was not able to
celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his
wife did not approve it, ostensibly for lack of
money, but she was very generous when it came
to celebrations of their parish
priest.15 Respondent Manuel then denied that he
was a womanizer16 or that he had a
mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as
to their conjugal properties and obligations.18
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel’s Clerk
of Court, testified that petitioner Juanita seldom
went to respondent Manuel’s office.19 But when
she was there, she would call witness to complain
about the curtains and the cleanliness of the
office.20 One time, witness remembered
petitioner Juanita rummaging through
respondent Manuel’s drawer looking for his
address book while the latter was in Subic
attending a conference.21 When petitioner
Juanita could not open a locked drawer she
called witness, telling the latter that she was
looking for the telephone number of respondent’s
hotel room in Subic. A process server was
requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a
locksmith in the town proper. When the locksmith
arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open
the locked drawer. On another occasion,
particularly in August of 1998, witness testified
that she heard petitioner Juanita remark to
respondent Manuel "sino bang batang
bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa
labas?"22
As his third witness, respondent Manuel
presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose
professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were
admitted by petitioner Juanita.23 From her
psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and
Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco contributed to
the marital collapse. There is a partner relational
problem which affected their capacity to sustain
the marital bond with love, support and
understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in
the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM
IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of both
spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged
themselves in a defective communication pattern
which is characteristically negative and
deformed. This affected their competence to
maintain the love and respect that they should
give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation
from both partners who are expected to use
healthy strategies to solve their disputes and
differences. Whereas Juanita would be
derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive
and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of
avoidance and suppression. In his effort to satisfy
the self and to boost his masculine ego to cover
up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he
became callused to the detrimental effects of his
unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the
marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic
psychological repertoire (along with their other
maladaptive traits), failed to adequately
empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to
each other’s needs and feelings. The matrimonial
plot is not conducive to a healthy and a
progressive marriage. Manuel and Juanita have
shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to
satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties
of marriage. The clashing of their patterns of
maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of
personality disorder not otherwise specified
(PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria)
will bring about more emotional mishaps and
psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which
were in existence before the marriage will tend to
be pervasive and impervious to recovery.25
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied
respondent Manuel’s allegations. She insisted
that they were a normal couple who had their own
share of fights; that they were happily married
until respondent Manuel started having extra-
marital affairs26 which he had admitted to
her.27 Petitioner Juanita professed that she would
wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly
loved her husband.28 She stated further that she
has continuously supported respondent Manuel,
waiting up for him while he was in law school to
serve him food and drinks. Even when he already
filed the present case, she would still attend to his
needs.29 She remembered that after the pre-trial,
while they were in the hallway, respondent
Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have
a new family.30
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a
psychiatrist was admitted by respondent
Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a
psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the
results of which were embodied in his report. Said
report stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of
the psychological tests, respondent Juanita
Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a
mature, conservative, religious and highly
intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than
enough psychological potentials for a mutually
satisfying long term heterosexual relationship.
Superego is strong and she is respectful of
traditional institutions of society like the institution
of marriage. She was also found to be a loving,
nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is
capable of enduring severe environmental stress
in her social milieu. Finally, she is reality-oriented
and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound
decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the
respondent to be psychologically capacitated to
comply with the basic and essential obligations of
marriage.32
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses
Siayngco since 1992 described the Siayngcos as
the ideal couple, sweet to each other.33 The
couple would religiously attend prayer meetings
in the community.34 Both were likewise leaders in
their community.35 Witness then stated that she
would often go to the house of the couple and, as
late as March 2000, she still saw respondent
Manuel there.36
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied
respondent Manuel’s petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita holding
in part that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the
defendant is not preponderantly supported in
evidence. The couple [was] happily married and
after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a
son. Their life together continued years thereafter
in peace and prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been
critical, depressed and obsessive doubtless
arose later in the parties’ relationship sometime
in the early 90’s when the defendant-wife started
receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy.
xxx xxx xxx
The present state of our laws on marriage does
not favor knee-jerk responses to slight stabs of
the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A
wife, as in the instant case, may have
succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant
delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her
husband. But, as our laws now stand, the
dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in
such cases. In contrast to some countries, our
laws do not look at a marital partner as a mere
refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she
sometimes may sound like a firetruck.37
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was
denied in an order dated 04 May 2001.38
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed
the RTC decision, relying mainly on the
psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both
Manuel and Juanita psychologically
incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v.
Court of Appeals.39 Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity of plaintiff
Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that
there is empathy between plaintiff and defendant.
That is – a shared feeling which between
husband and wife must be experienced not only
by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union
is a two-way process. An expressive interest in
each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the
other can go a long way in deepening the marital
relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children
but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love "amore gignit amorem",
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of
Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed
relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows
and unconsummated marital obligations, can do
no less, but reverse and set aside the decision of
the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have
his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity, not only of defendant
but also of himself.40
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
erred –
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER
JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT
SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS
THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE
FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE
PRESENT
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE
GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V.
MOLINA
IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF
HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT
NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The Court’s Ruling
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is
apropos. There, we held that whether or not
psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for the declaration of the nullity of the
marriage depends crucially on the facts of the
case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and
judged according to its own facts as there can be
no case that is on "all fours" with another. This,
the Court of Appeals did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our
ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence
in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi
Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite
sharing the same bed from the time of their
wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their
separation on 15 March 1989, never had coitus.
The perplexed wife filed the petition for the
declaration of the nullity of her marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity of her
husband. We sustained the wife for the reason
that an essential marital obligation under the
Family Code is procreation such that "the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity."
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for
procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we
have here a case of a husband who is constantly
embarrassed by his wife’s outbursts and
overbearing ways, who finds his wife’s obsession
with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet
"irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of
support and respect for his person and his
position as a Judge. In our book, however, these
inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led
respondent Manuel to file a case against her do
not amount to psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals 42 where we
declared that "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.43 In
Republic v. Court of Appeals44 we expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The
Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be: a) medically or clinically identified, b)
alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by
experts and d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.45
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass,
we now resolve the issue of whether or not the
totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity
against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent
Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF
RESPONDENT MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the
preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition
of the sanctity of married life and its mission to
protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.46 With this cardinal
state policy in mind, we held in Republic v. Court
of Appeals47 that the burden of proof to show the
nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff
(respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in holding that respondent
Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The
psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is
respondent Manuel’s own evidence, contains
candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the
person in the best position to gauge whether or
not her husband fulfilled the essential marital
obligations of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, "My husband is
kind, a good provider, cool, intelligent but a liar,
masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what
he has done to me, I take care of him whenever
he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs
because he wants to have a child. I believe that
our biggest problem is not having a child. It is his
obsession to have a child with his girl now. He
started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I
even saw them together in the car. I think that it
was the girl who encouraged him to file the
petition." She feels that the problems in the
relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit," but, that she still
is willing to pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse
and that he is not really psychologically
incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and
Jeremy should give me a chance to have a new
family." She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan
mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang
marriage natin."48
What emerges from the psychological report of
Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the
parties and their witnesses is that the only
essential marital obligation which respondent
Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the
obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se,
however, does not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code.50 It must be shown that respondent
Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality which makes him
completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state51 and not merely
due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own
flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent
Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital]
affairs because I wanted to have a child at that
particular point."52
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF
PETITIONER JUANITA
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in
favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar,
respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s
lack of respect for him, her jealousies and
obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her
controlling nature (especially with respect to his
salary), and her inability to endear herself to his
parents are grave psychological maladies that
paralyze her from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. Neither is there any
showing that these "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose
expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by
respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was
psychologically capacitated to comply with the
basic and essential obligations of marriage.54
The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s
witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does not
help his case any. Nothing in there supports the
doctor’s conclusion that petitioner Juanita is
psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary,
the report clearly shows that the root cause of
petitioner Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not
from the inception of their marriage as required
by law – but from her experiences during the
marriage, e.g., her in-laws’ disapproval of her as
they wanted their son to enter the
priesthood,55 her husband’s philandering,
admitted no less by him,56 and her inability to
conceive.57 Dr. Garcia’s report paints a story of a
husband and wife who grew professionally during
the marriage, who pursued their individual
dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier,
ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness
as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent
Manuel himself during his direct examination.58
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
by both parties, we have been allowed a window
into the Siayngcos’s life and have perceived
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent
therefrom a simple case of a married couple
Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was
drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other,
working in the advertising business of his
with the husband consequently falling out of love
father. The acquaintance led to courtship
and wanting a way out.
and romantic relations, culminating in the
exchange of marital vows before the City
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null Court of Pasay on September 28,
and void marriage. Mere showing of 1966.1 The civil marriage was ratified in a
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting church wedding on May 20, 1967.2
personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.59 As we stated in
The union produced four children, namely:
Marcos v. Marcos:60
Beverly Jane, born on September 18,
1968;3 Stephanie Janice born on September
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to 9, 1969;4 Kenneth David born on April 24,
be confused with a divorce law that cuts the 1971;5 and Ingrid born on October 20,
marital bond at the time the causes therefore 1976.6 The conjugal partnership,
manifests themselves. It refers to a serious nonetheless, acquired neither property nor
psychological illness afflicting a party even before debt.
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
Petitioner avers that during the marriage,
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
and immature wife and mother. She had
extra-marital affairs with several men: a
We are not downplaying the frustration and dentist in the Armed Forces of the
misery respondent Manuel might be experiencing Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential
in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that Security Command and later a Jordanian
is no longer working. Regrettably, there are national.
situations like this one, where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answers to every
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila
individual problem.61
Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes
Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July did not stop her illicit relationship with the
2003 of the Court of Appeals is Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim,
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The whom she married and with whom she had
Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional two children. However, when Mustafa
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to
reinstated and given full force and effect. No petitioner bringing along her two children by
costs. Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and
even considered the two illegitimate
children as his own. Thereafter, on
G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004
December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned
petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their
DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner, two children. Since then, Sharon would only
vs. return to the country on special occasions.
COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L.
CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation
IBRAHIM, Respondents.
with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997
a petition seeking the declaration of nullity
REPUBLIC OF THE of his marriage on the ground of
PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent. psychological incapacity, as defined in
Article 36 of the Family Code, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
DECISION
149. Summons was effected by publication
in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of
general circulation in the country
considering that Sharon did not reside and
could not be found in the Philippines.7
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A.
Dayan, who testified that she conducted a
psychological evaluation of petitioner and
found him to be conscientious, hardworking,
diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks
and projects completed up to the final detail
and who exerts his best in whatever he
does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that
Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her
blatant display of infidelity; that she
committed several indiscretions and had no
capacity for remorse, even bringing with her
the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live
with petitioner. Such immaturity and
irresponsibility in handling the marriage like
her repeated acts of infidelity and
abandonment of her family are indications of
Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting
to psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage.8
After trial, judgment was rendered, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing,
the civil and church marriages between
DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L.
CORPUZ celebrated on September 28,
1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared
null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of the respondent to
perform the essential obligations of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of
gains existing between the parties is
dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of
complete separation of property between
the said spouses is established in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of
the Family Code, without prejudice to rights
previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded
in the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family
Code.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondent Republic of the Philippines,
through the Solicitor General, appealed
alleging that –
I More specifically, does the aberrant sexual
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING THE PETITION
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A
VALID GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE
CHURCH MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER IS
NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
RENDERING A DECISION
WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION
HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL AS
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA
CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside
the judgment of the trial court and ordered
dismissal of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage.10
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated January 8,
2002.11 Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court
gravely abused its discretion and manifestly
erred in its conclusion that the: (1)
respondent was not suffering from
psychological incapacity to perform her
marital obligations; (2) psychological
incapacity of respondent is not attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence and
permanence or incurability; and (3) totality
of evidence submitted by the petitioner falls
short to prove psychological incapacity
suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether
or not the totality of the evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
behavior of respondent adverted to by
petitioner fall within the term "psychological
incapacity?"
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled:
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity of inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other
hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at
the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55
of the Family Code. These provisions,
however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree
and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential
parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing
on the degree, extent and other conditions
of that incapacity must, in every case, be
carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and
persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.13
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in
the fact that a personality disorder is a very
complex and elusive phenomenon which
defies easy analysis and definition. In this
case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can
hardly qualify as being mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that she
could not have known the obligations she
was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given a valid assumption thereof.14 It
appears that respondent’s promiscuity did
not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the
records is a blissful marital union at its
celebration, later affirmed in church rites,
and which produced four children.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion
and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute psychological incapacity within
the contemplation of the Family Code.
Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity.15 It must be shown
that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state,
not merely due to her youth, immaturity16 or
sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by
petitioner are grounds for legal separation
under Article 5517 of the Family Code.
However, we pointed out in Marcos v.
Marcos18 that Article 36 is not to be equated
with legal separation in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. In short, the
evidence presented by petitioner refers only
to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.

We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals

that the trial court has no jurisdiction to
dissolve the church marriage of petitioner
and respondent. The authority to do so is
exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical
Court of the Roman Catholic Church.

All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb

the ruling of the appellate court.1âwphi1 We
cannot deny the grief, frustration and even
desperation of petitioner in his present
situation. Regrettably, there are
circumstances, like in this case, where
neither law nor society can provide the
specific answers to every individual
problem.19 While we sympathize with
petitioner’s marital predicament, our first
and foremost duty is to apply the law no
matter how harsh it may be.20

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406,
which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban,

and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.
G.R. No. 157610 October 19,
2007
ORLANDO G. TONGOL, Petitioner,
vs.
FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002
in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245, and its
Resolution of March 19, 2003, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The
CA Decision affirmed, in toto, the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 149, which dismissed the
petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by herein petitioner Orlando
Tongol.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas
M. Tongol (Filipinas) were married on
August 27, 1967. Out of their union, they
begot four children, namely: Crisanto, born
in 1968; Olivia, born in 1969; Frederick,
born in 1971, and; Ma. Cecilia, born in
1972.
On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas
filed a petition for dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains, which was
granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 143 on April 24,
1995.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before
the RTC of Makati City a verified petition
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Filipinas on the ground that the latter
is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations.
In his Petition, Orlando contended that he
and Filipinas got married over the
objection of the latter's family; their
marriage was not a happy one because of
her parents' continued interference and
attempt to break up their union; greatly
influenced by her parents, Filipinas, even
at the early stages of their marriage,
already treated Orlando with contempt and
without the love and respect due him as
her husband; when Orlando started a junk
shop business, Filipinas ridiculed him
instead of giving him encouragement; later
on, his business became successful and
he was able to embark upon another
business venture; he put up a
pharmaceutical company which also
became profitable; Filipinas then became
interested and began to interfere in the
operation of the business; however,
because of her bad attitude, the
employees were aloof; she also resented
the fact that her husband got along well
with the employees; as a result, she
quarreled with her husband causing the
latter embarrassment; she even suspected
that the income of the business was being
given to her husband's relatives; their
continued fighting persisted and affected
their children; efforts at reconciliation
proved futile because their differences had
become irreconcilable and their marriage
impossible; in 1990, Orlando decided to
live separately from Filipinas; in 1994, the
spouses filed a petition for dissolution of
their property relationship; and the petition
was granted in 1995.
In her Answer with Counter-Petition,
Filipinas admitted that efforts at
reconciliation have been fruitless and that
their marriage is a failure. However, she
claims that their marriage failed because it
is Orlando who is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a
married man.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own
testimony, that of his sister, Angelina
Tongol, and of Annaliza Guevara, an
employee in the pharmaceutical company
owned by the spouses Tongol. Orlando
also presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a
psychiatrist who conducted a Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
psychological examination of both parties.
Orlando submitted documents evidencing
their marriage, the birth of their four
children, the RTC decision granting the
petition for dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, and the written
evaluation of Dr. Villegas regarding the
spouses' psychological examination. On
the other hand, record shows that respect and fidelity and render help and
evidence for Filipinas only consisted of her support. There is hardly any doubt that the
own testimony. intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity"
to the most serious cases of personality
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City,
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
Branch 149, rendered a Decision
insensitivity or inability to give meaning
dismissing the petition.
and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the
On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the time the marriage is celebrated. x x x4
Decision of the RTC.
Psychological incapacity must be
Hence, herein petition raising the following characterized by:
issues:
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious
1. "WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE such that the party would be incapable of
SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE carrying out the ordinary duties required in
TRIAL COURT AND THE HONORABLE a marriage;
COURT OF APPEALS THAT DRA.
CECILIA VILLEGAS FAILED TO STATE
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S
rooted in the history of the party antedating
INADEQUATE PERSONALITY
the marriage, although the overt
DISORDER WAS GRAVE, PERMANENT
manifestations may emerge only after the
AND INCURABLE" (par. 12, p. 3, Annex
marriage; and
"A", hereof).
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or,
2. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
beyond the means of the party involved.5
DISMISSING THE APPEAL" (p. 7, ibid.).
While the CA has already extensively
3. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE
quoted the ruling in Republic of the
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
DENYING THE MOTION FOR
Molina,6 wherein the guidelines in the
RECONSIDERATION" (Annex "B",
interpretation and application of Article
hereof).2
367 of the Family Code was laid down, this
Court finds it significant to reproduce the
The basic issue to be resolved in the same quoted portion, to wit:
instant case is whether or not the totality of
the evidence presented in the present
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity
case is enough to sustain a finding that
of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
herein respondent is psychologically
doubt should be resolved in favor of the
incapacitated to comply with her essential
existence and continuation of the marriage
marital obligations.
and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,3 the term Constitution and our laws cherish the
psychological incapacity was defined as: validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
[N]o less than a mental (not physical)
foundation of the nation." It decrees
incapacity that causes a party to be truly marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
incognitive of the basic marital covenants protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
that concomitantly must be assumed and
the parties. Both the family and marriage
discharged by the parties to the marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love,
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must
be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.8
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages,9 which took effect on
March 15, 2003, the foregoing guidelines
have been modified. Section 2(d) of the
said Rule provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute She was left to the care of her aunt and
nullity of void marriages.- developed a basic feeling a (sic) rejection.
xxxx The only college graduate among 7
children her operating intellectual ability is
low-average. Sudden change
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article
overwhelmed her. When seized by an
36 of the Family Code shall specifically
impulse, she is likely to give way, even
allege the complete facts showing that
minor pressures upset her and when this
either or both parties were psychologically
happens, emotional control could not be
incapacitated from complying with the
relied upon.
essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage
even if such incapacity becomes manifest In marriage when her husband shows
only after its celebration. good relationship with their employees,
especially with females, she became (sic)
suspicious, jealous, and threatened, and
The complete facts should allege the
this is related to her basic feelings of
physical manifestations, if any, as are
rejection in early life. She coped (sic) up
indicative of psychological incapacity at
with her uncomfortable feelings by
the time of the celebration of the marriage
exhibiting temper tantrums, irritability and
but expert opinion need not be alleged.
dominance, a replica of her mother's
attitude, but to the distaste of her husband.
The new Rule dispensed with the
certification from the Solicitor General,
At present she is depressed, though
stating therein his reasons for his
hostile, and now living in the expectation of
agreement or opposition to the petition.
further rejection. Additionally, she is
Attachment of expert opinions to the
threatened by a neurological illness
petition is also dispensed with.
(tremor of the hands) for which she is
consulting a neurologist.
In the instant case, the RTC and the CA
gave credence to the conclusion of the
Based on the above findings, it is the
examining psychiatrist, Dr. Villegas, that
opinion of the undersigned that Mr.
respondent is suffering from Inadequate
Orlando Tongol is suffering from some
Personality Disorder. However, both
depressive features, which seems to be a
courts ruled that the behavior exhibited by
recent development as a result of marital
respondent does not amount to
problems. On the other hand, Mrs. Tongol
psychological incapacity as contemplated
is suffering from an Inadequate Personality
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Disorder, with hysterical coloring, which
renders her psychologically incapacitated
This Court finds no cogent reason to to perform the duties and responsibilities of
depart from the assessment of the RTC marriage. She is unable to cope with the
and the CA for the following reasons: sudden work and environmental shifts, that
overwhelmed her, due to insufficient
psychological inner resources.10
First, petitioner relies heavily on the
findings of Dr. Villegas who made the
following written evaluation regarding In her testimony, Dr. Villegas explained
respondent's psychological makeup: respondent's personality disorder in this
wise:
xxxx
ATTY. VILLAREAL -
On the other hand, Mrs. Filipinas
Mendoza-Tongol belonged to a xxxx
matriarchal family where the mother
assumed a more active and dominant role.
Q- What exactly do you mean [by]
inadequate personality disorder?
A- Inadequate personality disorder means,
there are not times that in all aspects of her
life, she could not function in the way that
she feels or she is confident. She has
always been very much in doubt of her own
capabilities, Sir.
Q- What about hysterical coloring?
A- Hysterical coloring means, there is
always an exaggeration of her
psychological reactions to any stresses,
Sir.
Q- Exaggeration in what aspect?
A- Exaggeration in any emotional
reactions or situations like if she would be
seeing the husband talking to some
employees then, she is suddenly irritable
and would present some tantrums. In
short, she cannot control her emotion at
the moment of stresses circulations, Sir.11
When asked how such personality
disorder affects respondent's capacity to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage, Dr. Villegas expounded as
follows:
ATTY. RENDOR -
xxxx
Q- How about Mrs. Tongol, what are your
findings?
A- Mrs. Tongol is a college graduate and
she finished commerce. Basically, she has
a feeling of rejection from the start of her
development and this was carried on into
her adult life. When the husband started
having some good relationship with his
employees, then she started to get jealous
and she would embarrass him in front of
their employees and insulted him and
would go into tantrums and this was very
much resented by Mr. Tongol, Sir.
ATTY. RENDOR -
Q- In your expert opinion, Doctor, can you
tell us the reason why Mrs. Tongol acted in
such a way?
A- Because of her basic rejection at that
time, Sir. She was afraid that Mr. Tongol
was already rejecting her as a wife and
being attracted to other people, but it is the
way of how Mrs. Tongol reacted to her own
feelings of rejection, Sir.
xxxx
Q- What made you say that because of
inadequate personality disorder, Mrs.
Tongol rendered her psychological (sic)
incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of the marriage. What is
your basis in saying that?
A- She belongs to a very matriarchal
family. The mother was very dominant.
She always gets what she wanted in the
house. In short, she was the authority in
the house and during her growing up
stage, she was given up to the aunt, for the
aunt to take care of her. She only came
back to the family when she was already a
sort of an early teenager. With this, there
has always been a feeling of rejection
during her personality development.
Besides, she feels that she is one of those
not favor (sic) by the mother during her
growing up stage, Sir.
Q- Based on your examination of the
spouses, what do you recommend as far
as the marriage is concerned, considering
that this is a petition for the annulment of
marriage?
A- I could recommend that they have their
marriage annulled because it will only be
sufferings from (sic) both of them because
on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is
more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is
also suffering from some depression, Sir.12
The Court can only gather from the
foregoing explanations of Dr. Villegas that
as a child, Filipinas had always felt
rejected, especially by her mother; that she
never got rid of those feelings of rejection
even when she became an adult and got
married; that her fits of jealousy and
temper tantrums, every time she sees her
husband having a good interaction with
their employees, are ways of coping up
with her feelings of rejection. However, Dr.
Villegas failed to link respondent's
personality disorder to her conclusion that
respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform her obligations as
wife and mother. The Court cannot see
how respondent's personality disorder
which, according to Dr. Villegas, is
inextricably linked to her feelings of
rejection, would render her unaware of the
essential marital obligations, or to borrow
the terms used in Santos, "to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."
What has been established in the instant
case is that, by reason of her feelings of
inadequacy and rejection, respondent not
only encounters a lot of difficulty but even
refuses to assume some of her obligations
towards her husband, such as respect,
help and support for him. However, this
Court has ruled that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the
performance of some marital
obligations.13 As held in Santos:
There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity"
to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated.14
Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and
satisfactorily explain if the personality
disorder of respondent is grave enough to
bring about her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
Petitioner contends that respondent's
exaggerated reactions to normal
situations, her unreasonable feelings of
rejection brought about by her
dysfunctional upbringing, are all
indications of the gravity of her
psychological condition. Even granting that
respondent's psychological disorder is
serious, the fact remains that there is no
evidence to prove that such condition is of
such nature as to render respondent
incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage.
Third, there is no evidence that such
incapacity is incurable. Neither in her
written evaluation nor in her testimony did
Dr. Villegas categorically and conclusively
characterize respondent's inadequate
personality disorder as permanent or
incurable. Dr. Villegas was not sure of the
permanence or incurability of respondent's
illness as shown by her following
statement:
I could recommend that they have their
marriage annulled because it will only be
sufferings from (sic) both of them because
on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that
is more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol
is also suffering from some depression,
Sir.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Fourth, the psychological incapacity
considered under Article 36 of the Family
Code is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses.16 The fourth
guideline in Molina requires that the
psychological incapacity as understood
under Article 36 of the Family Code must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. In the
present case, the testimonies of both
petitioner and respondent as well as the
other witnesses regarding the spouses'
differences and misunderstanding
basically revolve around and are limited to
their disagreement regarding the
management of their business. In fact,
respondent herself, in her Memorandum
submitted to the trial court, claimed that
their quarrels arose solely from their
disagreement on how to run their
business.17 This is confirmed by the
testimony of petitioner's sister who lived
with the spouses for a considerable period
of time.18 However, a mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.19
In addition, it is true that the marital
obligations of a husband and wife
enumerated under the Family Code
include the mutual responsibility of the
spouses to manage the household and
provide support for the family, which
means that compliance with this obligation
necessarily entails the management of the
income and expenses of the household.
While disagreements on money matters
would, no doubt, affect the other aspects
of one's marriage as to make the wedlock
unsatisfactory, this is not a sufficient
ground to declare a marriage null and void.
In the present case, respondent's
disagreement with her husband's handling
of the family's business and finances and
her propensity to start a fight with petitioner
spouse regarding these matters can hardly
be considered as a manifestation of the
kind of psychological incapacity
contemplated under Article 36 of the
Family Code. In fact, the Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that
disagreements regarding money matters is
a common, and even normal, occurrence
between husbands and wives.
Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a
spouse's obligation to the other spouse but
also one's obligation toward their children.
In the present case, no evidence was
presented to show that respondent had
been remiss in performing her obligations
toward their children as enumerated in
Article 220 of the Family Code.20
In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is
suffering from a psychological
disorder.1âwphi1 However, the totality of
the evidence presented in the present
case does not show that her personality
disorder is of the kind contemplated by
Article 36 of the Family Code as well as
jurisprudence as to render her
psychologically incapacitated or incapable
of complying with the essential obligations
of marriage.
It remains settled that the State has a high
stake in the preservation of marriage
rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of
married life and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.24 Hence,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The September 25, 2002 Decision and
March 19, 2003 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

It is settled that Article 36 of the Family

Code is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefor manifest
themselves.21 It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage.22 It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume.23 In the instant
case, the Court finds no error in the
findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
that the aversive behavior of petitioner and
respondent towards each other is a mere
indication of incompatibility brought about
by their different family backgrounds as
well as their attitudes, which developed
after their marriage.
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-
TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which
to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled
waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over
time, much reliance has been placed in the works
of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a
distraught wife against her uncaring husband in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch
89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court
to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No.
42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied
the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made
by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts
were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married
the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage
Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and
wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they
went and proceeded to the house of defendant's
mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the
same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her
expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just
went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned
his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night.
The same thing happened on the second, third
and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private
place where they can enjoy together during their
first week as husband and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew.
They were all invited by the defendant to join
them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4)
days. But, during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta
time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located
at the living room. They slept together in the same
room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988
until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there
was no attempt of sexual intercourse between
them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for
medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a
urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on
January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were
that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while
that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine was
prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For
her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return
but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent,
a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis.
She said, that she had observed the defendant
using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married her, a
Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her
husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant erection and he found out that from the original
that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the
of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch
wife. and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why
his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable
But, he said that he does not want his marriage
of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1)
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse
that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no
with a woman.
defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested
differences between the two of them, it can still be that there is no collusion between the parties and
reconciled and that, according to him, if either one that the evidence is not fabricated."2
of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the
claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured
dispositive portion of which reads:
by the intervention of medical technology or
science.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by
The defendant admitted that since their marriage
the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at
on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March
the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt.
them. But, the reason for this, according to the
Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a
defendant, was that everytime he wants to have
copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil
sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be
avoided him and whenever he caresses her
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
private parts, she always removed his hands. The
defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have
sex with him only once but he did not continue SO ORDERED.
because she was shaking and she did not like it.
So he stopped.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the
defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against
him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she Hence, the instant petition.
will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of
will consummate their marriage. Appeals erred:
The defendant insisted that their marriage will I
remain valid because they are still very young and
there is still a chance to overcome their
differences. in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that
there was no sexual intercourse between the
parties without making any findings of fact.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical
examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
II
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out
whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr.
Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. in holding that the refusal of private respondent to
(Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no have sexual communion with petitioner is a
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C") thereof is totally absent.
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to III
masturbate to find out whether or not he has an
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage
between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no
collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her complaint;
that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties,
there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that
public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to
invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the
trial court on the admissions and confessions of
the parties in their pleadings and in the course of
the trial is misplaced since it could have been a
product of collusion; and that in actions for
annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged
in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where
an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on
the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The
assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial
court and was cross-examined by oath before the
trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in form of
a testimony. After such evidence was presented,
it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present
his side. He admitted that since their marriage on
May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual intercourse between
them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the
reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a
marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation
of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and
101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such
annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because
petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner
admitted that he and his wife (private respondent)
have never had sexual contact with each other, he
must have been only telling the truth. We are
reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged
resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity
by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-
Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed
by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts.
The issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic
marital obligation was resolved upon a review of
both the documentary and testimonial evidence on
record. Appellant admitted that he did not have
sexual relations with his wife after almost ten
months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is
not suffering from any physical disability. Such
abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of
a serious personality disorder which to the mind of
this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of
Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court
erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical
finding about the alleged psychological incapacity
and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such
refusal which may not be necessarily due to
physchological disorders" because there might
have been other reasons, — i.e., physical
disorders, such as aches, pains or other
discomforts, — why private respondent would not
want to have sexual intercourse from May 22,
1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court
nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses
to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been
coitus between them. At any rate, since the action
to declare the marriage void may be filed by either
party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated,
the question of who refuses to have sex with the
other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent
evidence on record to show that any of the parties
is suffering from phychological incapacity.
Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex
with private respondent; that the reason for private
respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner
could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks
and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least,
there is nothing in the record to show that he had
tried to find out or discover what the problem with
his wife could be. What he presented in evidence
is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the
reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it
became incumbent upon him to prove such a
claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted
refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation
of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that
the husband's plea that the wife did not want
carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief.
Since he was not physically impotent, but he
refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire
time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that
he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out
of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be
doubted for not having asserted his right seven
though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111
Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was
suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant
did not go to court and seek the declaration of
nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted
by the wife whose normal expectations of her
marriage were frustrated by her husband's
inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of
the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she
would expose her private life to public scrutiny and
fabricate testimony against her husband if it were
not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest
her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that
what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or
lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which
is not phychological incapacity, and which can be
achieved "through proper motivation." After almost
ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the
sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love
very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged
approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation,
and of a serious personality disorder that
constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge
the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the
wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code),
the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and
not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno
vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is
an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage
is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The
egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is
a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy

between petitioner and private respondent. That is
— a shared feeling which between husband and
wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's
feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go
a long way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with
love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious
of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed

relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no
less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the

assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ.,

concur.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a consolidation of two separate
petitions for review,1 assailing the 7 July
2005 Decision2 and the 30 September 2005
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74447.
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of
land (property) covered by TCT No.
5357.4 The property is situated in Malabon,
Metro Manila and is registered in the name
of "Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo), married to
Elvira Gozon (Elvira)."
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the
Cavite City Regional Trial Court (Cavite
RTC) a petition for legal separation against
her husband Alfredo. On 2 January 1992,
Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which
was then annotated on TCT No. 5357.
On 31 August 1993, while the legal
separation case was still pending, Alfredo
and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an
Agreement to Buy and Sell5 (Agreement)
involving the property for the price of ₱18
million. Among the stipulations in the
Agreement were that Alfredo would: (1)
secure an Affidavit from Elvira that the
property is Alfredo’s exclusive property and
to annotate the Agreement at the back of
TCT No. 5357; (2) secure the approval of
the Cavite RTC to exclude the property from
the legal separation case; and (3) secure
the removal of the notice of lis
pendens pertaining to the said case and
annotated on TCT No. 5357. However,
despite repeated demands from Mario,
Alfredo failed to comply with these
stipulations. After paying the ₱5 million
earnest money as partial payment of the
purchase price, Mario took possession of
the property in September 1993. On 6
September 1993, the Agreement was
annotated on TCT No. 5357.
Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite
RTC rendered a decision6 in the legal
separation case, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered decreeing the legal separation
between petitioner and respondent.
Accordingly, petitioner Elvira Robles Gozon
is entitled to live separately from respondent
Alfredo Gozon without dissolution of their
marriage bond. The conjugal partnership of
gains of the spouses is hereby declared
DISSOLVED and LIQUIDATED. Being the
offending spouse, respondent is deprived of
his share in the net profits and the same is
awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon
whose custody is awarded to petitioner.
Furthermore, said parties are required to
mutually support their child Winifred R.
Gozon as her needs arises.
SO ORDERED.7
As regards the property, the Cavite RTC
held that it is deemed conjugal property.
On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a
Deed of Donation over the property in favor
of their daughter, Winifred Gozon
(Winifred). The Register of Deeds of
Malabon, Gil Tabije, cancelled TCT No.
5357 and issued TCT No. M-105088 in the
name of Winifred, without annotating the
Agreement and the notice of lis pendens on
TCT No. M-10508.
On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a
Special Power of Attorney9 executed in his
favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for ₱18
million.10 IDRI paid Alfredo ₱18 million,
representing full payment for the
property.11 Subsequently, the Register of
Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-
10508 and issued TCT No. M-1097612 to
IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional
Trial Court (Malabon RTC) a complaint for
Specific Performance and Damages,
Annulment of Donation and Sale, with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order.
On 3 April 2001, the Malabon RTC rendered
a decision,13 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
01. On the preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction:
1.1 The same is hereby made permanent by:
1.1.1 Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon,
Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional Realty,
Inc. and Gil Tabije, their agents,
representatives and all persons acting in
their behalf from any attempt of commission
or continuance of their wrongful acts of
further alienating or disposing of the subject
property;
1.1.2. Enjoining defendant Inter-Dimensional
Realty, Inc. from entering and fencing the
property;
1.1.3. Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon,
Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional Realty,
Inc. to respect plaintiff’s possession of the
property.
02. The Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31
August 1993, between plaintiff and defendant
Alfredo Gozon is hereby approved, excluding
the property and rights of defendant Elvira
Robles-Gozon to the undivided one-half share
in the conjugal property subject of this case.
03. The Deed of Donation dated 22 August
1994, entered into by and between defendants
Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon is hereby
nullified and voided.
04. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26
October 1994, executed by defendant Winifred
Gozon, through defendant Alfredo Gozon, in
favor of defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty,
Inc. is hereby nullified and voided.
05. Defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is
hereby ordered to deliver its Transfer
Certificate of Title No. M-10976 to the Register
of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.
06. The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro
Manila is hereby ordered to cancel Certificate
of Title Nos. 10508 "in the name of Winifred
Gozon" and M-10976 "in the name of Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc.," and to restore
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5357 "in the
name of Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira
Robles" with the Agreement to Buy and Sell
dated 31 August 1993 fully annotated therein
is hereby ordered.
07. Defendant Alfredo Gozon is hereby
ordered to deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of plaintiff over his one-half undivided
share in the subject property and to comply
with all the requirements for registering such
deed.
08. Ordering defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon
to sit with plaintiff to agree on the selling price
of her undivided one-half share in the subject
property, thereafter, to execute and deliver a
Deed of Absolute Sale over the same in favor
of the plaintiff and to comply with all the
requirements for registering such deed, within
fifteen (15) days from the receipt of this
DECISION.
09. Thereafter, plaintiff is hereby ordered to
pay defendant Alfredo Gozon the balance of
Four Million Pesos (₱4,000,000.00) in his one-
half undivided share in the property to be set
off by the award of damages in plaintiff’s favor.
10. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the
defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon the price they
had agreed upon for the sale of her one-half
undivided share in the subject property.
11. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred
Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to
pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the
following:
11.1 Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) as
actual and compensatory damages;
11.2 One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as
moral damages;
11.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱500,000.00) as exemplary damages;
11.4 Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱400,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and
11.5 One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱100,000.00) as litigation expenses.
11.6 The above awards are subject to set off
of plaintiff’s obligation in paragraph 9 hereof.
12. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred
Gozon are hereby ordered to pay Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and severally
the following:
12.1 Eighteen Million Pesos (₱18,000,000.00)
which constitute the amount the former
received from the latter pursuant to their Deed
of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994, with
legal interest therefrom;
12.2 One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as
moral damages;
12.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱500,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
12.4 One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱100,000.00) as attorney’s fees.
13. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred
Gozon are hereby ordered to pay costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the Malabon RTC’s decision with
modification. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 7 July
2005 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
assailed decision dated April 3, 2001 of the
RTC, Branch 74, Malabon is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as
follows:
1. The sale of the subject land by
defendant Alfredo Gozon to
plaintiff-appellant Siochi is
declared null and void for the
following reasons:
a) The conveyance
was done without the
consent of defendant- a) ₱100,000.00 as by the wife for a proper remedy, which must
appellee Elvira Gozon; moral damages; be availed of within five years from the date
of the contract implementing such decision.
b) Defendant Alfredo b) ₱100,000.00 as
Gozon’s one-half (½) exemplary damages; In the event that one spouse is
undivided share has and incapacitated or otherwise unable to
been forfeited in favor participate in the administration of the
of his daughter, conjugal properties, the other spouse may
c) ₱50,000.00 as
defendant Winifred assume sole powers of administration.
attorney’s fees.
Gozon, by virtue of the These powers do not include the powers of
decision in the legal disposition or encumbrance which must
separation case Defendant Winifred Gozon, whom the have the authority of the court or the written
rendered by the RTC, undivided one-half share of defendant consent of the other spouse. In the absence
Branch 16, Cavite; Alfredo Gozon was awarded, is hereby of such authority or consent, the disposition
given the option whether or not to dispose or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
of her undivided share in the subject land. transaction shall be construed as a
2. Defendant Alfredo Gozon shall
continuing offer on the part of the
return/deliver to plaintiff-appellant
consenting spouse and the third person,
Siochi the amount of ₱5 Million The rest of the decision not inconsistent with and may be perfected as a binding contract
which the latter paid as earnest this ruling stands.
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
money in consideration for the
authorization by the court before the offer is
sale of the subject land;
SO ORDERED.15 withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Defendants Alfredo Gozon,
Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are Only Mario and IDRI appealed the decision
of the Court of Appeals. In his petition, Mario In this case, Alfredo was the sole
hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-
alleges that the Agreement should be administrator of the property because
appellant Siochi jointly and
severally, the following: treated as a continuing offer which may be Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in
perfected by the acceptance of the other fact, was unable to participate in the
spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since administration of the conjugal property.
a) ₱100,000.00 as Elvira’s conduct signified her acquiescence However, as sole administrator of the
moral damages; property, Alfredo still cannot sell the
to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to
direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed property without the written consent of Elvira
of Absolute Sale over the property upon his or the authority of the court. Without such
b) ₱100,000.00 as
payment of ₱9 million to Elvira. consent or authority, the sale is void.16 The
exemplary damages; absence of the consent of one of the spouse
renders the entire sale void, including the
c) ₱50,000.00 as
On the other hand, IDRI alleges that it is a portion of the conjugal property pertaining to
buyer in good faith and for value. Thus, IDRI the spouse who contracted the sale.17Even
attorney’s fees;
prays that the Court should uphold the if the other spouse actively participated in
validity of IDRI’s TCT No. M-10976 over the negotiating for the sale of the property, that
d) ₱20,000.00 as property. other spouse’s written consent to the sale is
litigation expenses; still required by law for its validity.18 The
and Agreement entered into by Alfredo and
We find the petitions without merit.
Mario was without the written consent of
e) The awards of actual Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void.
This case involves the conjugal property of As regards Mario’s contention that the
and compensatory
Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of Agreement is a continuing offer which may
damages are hereby
the property occurred after the effectivity of be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before
ordered deleted for
the Family Code, the applicable law is the the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the
lack of basis.
Family Code. Article 124 of the Family Code property was subsequently donated by
provides: Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI
4. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and clearly indicates that the offer was already
Winifred Gozon are hereby withdrawn.
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment
ordered to pay defendant-
of the conjugal partnership property shall
appellant IDRI jointly and
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of However, we disagree with the finding of the
severally the following:
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall Court of Appeals that the one-half undivided
prevail, subject to the recourse to the court share of Alfredo in the property was already
forfeited in favor of his daughter Winifred,
based on the ruling of the Cavite RTC in the
legal separation case. The Court of Appeals
misconstrued the ruling of the Cavite RTC
that Alfredo, being the offending spouse, is
deprived of his share in the net profits and
the same is awarded to Winifred.
The Cavite RTC ruling finds support in the
following provisions of the Family Code:
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall
have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled
to live separately from each other,
but the marriage bonds shall not
be severed;
(2) The absolute community or
the conjugal partnership shall
be dissolved and liquidated but
the offending spouse shall
have no right to any share of
the net profits earned by the
absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, which
shall be forfeited in accordance
with the provisions of Article
43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor
children shall be awarded to the
innocent spouse, subject to the
provisions of Article 213 of this
Code; and
The offending spouse shall be disqualified
from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
intestate succession. Moreover, provisions
in favor of the offending spouse made in the
will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked
by operation of law.
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent
marriage referred to in the preceding Article
shall produce the following effects:
xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or
the conjugal partnership, as the case may
be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if
either spouse contracted said marriage in
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits
of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are
none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or, in default of children,
the innocent spouse; (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, among the effects of the decree of
legal separation is that the conjugal
partnership is dissolved and liquidated and
the offending spouse would have no right to
any share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredo’s
share in the net profits which is forfeited in
favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the
Family Code provides that "[f]or purposes of
computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No.
(2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be
the increase in value between the market
value of the community property at the time
of the celebration of the marriage and the
market value at the time of its dissolution."
Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred
is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal
partnership property but merely in the net
profits of the conjugal partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court
of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a buyer
in good faith. As found by the RTC Malabon
and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances
which should impel a reasonably cautious
person to make further inquiries about the
vendor’s title to the property. The
representative of IDRI testified that he knew
about the existence of the notice of lis
pendens on TCT No. 5357 and the legal
separation case filed before the Cavite RTC.
Thus, IDRI could not feign ignorance of the
Cavite RTC decision declaring the property
as conjugal.
Furthermore, if IDRI made further inquiries,
it would have known that the cancellation of
the notice of lis pendens was highly
irregular. Under Section 77 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529,19 the notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled (a) upon order of
the court, or (b) by the Register of Deeds
upon verified petition of the party who
caused the registration of the lis pendens. In
this case, the lis pendens was cancelled by
the Register of Deeds upon the request of
Alfredo. There was no court order for the
cancellation of the lis pendens. Neither did
Elvira, the party who caused the registration
of the lis pendens, file a verified petition for
its cancellation.
Besides, had IDRI been more prudent
before buying the property, it would have
discovered that Alfredo’s donation of the
property to Winifred was without the consent
of Elvira. Under Article 12520 of the Family
Code, a conjugal property cannot be
donated by one spouse without the consent
of the other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a
buyer in good faith.1avvphi1
Nevertheless, we find it proper to reinstate
the order of the Malabon RTC for the
reimbursement of the ₱18 million paid by
IDRI for the property, which was
inadvertently omitted in the dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions.
We AFFIRM the 7 July 2005 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) We DELETE the portions
regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo
Gozon’s one-half undivided share
in favor of Winifred Gozon and the
grant of option to Winifred Gozon
whether or not to dispose of her
undivided share in the property;
and
(2) We ORDER Alfredo Gozon
and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly
and severally the Eighteen Million
Pesos (₱18,000,000) which was
the amount paid by Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. for the
property, with legal interest
computed from the finality of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
G.R. NO. 155409 June 8, 2007
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner,
vs.
DITA MAQUILAN, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision1dated August
30, 2002 promulgated by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69689,
which affirmed the Judgment on
Compromise Agreement dated January 2,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley,
and the RTC Orders dated January 21,
2002 and February 7, 2002 (ORDERS) in
Civil Case No. 656.
The facts of the case, as found by the CA,
are as follows:
Herein petitioner and herein private
respondent are spouses who once had a
blissful married life and out of which were
blessed to have a son. However, their once
sugar coated romance turned bitter when
petitioner discovered that private
respondent was having illicit sexual affair
with her paramour, which thus, prompted
the petitioner to file a case of adultery
against private respondent and the latter’s
paramour. Consequently, both the private
respondent and her paramour were
convicted of the crime charged and were
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months,
minimum of prision correccional as
minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty one (21) days, medium
of prision correccional as maximum penalty.
Thereafter, private respondent, through
counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and
Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains
and Damages on June 15, 2001 with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed
as Civil Case No. 656, imputing
psychological incapacity on the part of the
petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case,
petitioner and private respondent entered
into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT in the
following terms, to wit:
1. In partial settlement of the conjugal
partnership of gains, the parties agree to the
following:
a. ₱500,000.00 of the money deposited in
the bank jointly in the name of the spouses
shall be withdrawn and deposited in favor
and in trust of their common child, Neil
Maquilan, with the deposit in the joint
account of the parties.
The balance of such deposit, which
presently stands at ₱1,318,043.36, shall be
withdrawn and divided equally by the
parties;
b. The store that is now being occupied by
the plaintiff shall be allotted to her while the
bodega shall be for the defendant. The
defendant shall be paid the sum of
₱50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of the
store in full settlement thereof.
The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy the
bodega until the time the owner of the lot on
which it stands shall construct a building
thereon;
c. The motorcycles shall be divided between
them such that the Kawasaki shall be owned
by the plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall
be for the defendant;
d. The passenger jeep shall be for the
plaintiff who shall pay the defendant the sum
of ₱75,000.00 as his share thereon and in
full settlement thereof;
e. The house and lot shall be to the common
child.
2. This settlement is only partial, i.e., without
prejudice to the litigation of other conjugal
properties that have not been mentioned;
xxxx
The said Compromise Agreement was
given judicial imprimatur by the respondent
judge in the assailed Judgment On
Compromise Agreement, which was
erroneously dated January 2, 2002.2
However, petitioner filed an Omnibus
Motion dated January 15, 2002, praying for
the repudiation of the Compromise
Agreement and the reconsideration of the
Judgment on Compromise Agreement by
the respondent judge on the grounds that
his previous lawyer did not intelligently and
judiciously apprise him of the consequential
effects of the Compromise Agreement.
The respondent Judge in the
assailed Order dated January 21, 2002,
denied the aforementioned Omnibus
Motion.
Displeased, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, but
the same was denied in the assailed Order
dated February 7, 2002.3 (Emphasis
supplied)
The petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court claiming
that the RTC committed grave error and
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction (1) in upholding the
validity of the Compromise Agreement
dated January 11, 2002; (2) when it held in
its Order dated February 7, 2002 that the
Compromise Agreement was made within
the cooling-off period; (3) when it denied
petitioner’s Motion to Repudiate
Compromise Agreement and to Reconsider
Its Judgment on Compromise Agreement;
and (4) when it conducted the proceedings
without the appearance and participation of
the Office of the Solicitor General and/or the
Provincial Prosecutor.4
On August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the
Petition for lack of merit. The CA held that
the conviction of the respondent of the crime
of adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her
from sharing in the conjugal property,
especially considering that she had only
been sentenced with the penalty of prision
correccional, a penalty that does not carry
the accessory penalty of civil interdiction
which deprives the person of the rights to
manage her property and to dispose of such
property inter vivos; that Articles 43 and 63
of the Family Code, which pertain to the
effects of a nullified marriage and the effects
of legal separation, respectively, do not
apply, considering, too, that the Petition for
the Declaration of the Nullity of Marriage
filed by the respondent invoking Article 36 of
the Family Code has yet to be decided, and,
hence, it is premature to apply Articles 43
and 63 of the Family Code; that, although
adultery is a ground for legal separation,
nonetheless, Article 63 finds no application
in the instant case since no petition to that
effect was filed by the petitioner against the
respondent; that the spouses voluntarily
separated their property through their
Compromise Agreement with court approval
under Article 134 of the Family Code; that
the Compromise Agreement, which
embodies the voluntary separation of
property, is valid and binding in all respects
because it had been voluntarily entered into
by the parties; that, furthermore, even if it
were true that the petitioner was not duly
informed by his previous counsel about the
legal effects of the Compromise Agreement,
this point is untenable since the mistake or
negligence of the lawyer binds his client,
unless such mistake or negligence amounts
to gross negligence or deprivation of due
process on the part of his client; that these
exceptions are not present in the instant
case; that the Compromise Agreement was
plainly worded and written in simple
language, which a person of ordinary
intelligence can discern the consequences
thereof, hence, petitioner’s claim that his
consent was vitiated is highly incredible; that
the Compromise Agreement was made
during the existence of the marriage of the
parties since it was submitted during the
pendency of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage; that the application of
Article 2035 of the Civil Code is misplaced;
that the cooling-off period under Article 58
of the Family Code has no bearing on the
validity of the Compromise Agreement; that
the Compromise Agreement is not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order,
and public policy; that this agreement may
not be later disowned simply because of a
change of mind; that the presence of the
Solicitor General or his deputy is not
indispensable to the execution and validity
of the Compromise Agreement, since the
purpose of his presence is to curtail any
collusion between the parties and to see to
it that evidence is not fabricated, and, with
this in mind, nothing in the Compromise
Agreement touches on the very merits of the
case of declaration of nullity of marriage for
the court to be wary of any possible
collusion; and, finally, that the Compromise
Agreement is merely an agreement
between the parties to separate their
conjugal properties partially without
prejudice to the outcome of the pending
case of declaration of nullity of marriage.
Hence, herein Petition, purely on questions
of law, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OF NOT A SPOUSE
CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE
OR ADULTERY, CAN STILL SHARE IN
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;
II
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY
SPOUSES, ONE OF WHOM WAS
CONVICTED OF ADULTERY, GIVING THE
CONVICTED SPOUSE A SHARE IN THE
CONJUGAL PROPERTY, VALID AND
LEGAL;
III
WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT FOR
ANNULMENT AND LEGAL SEPARATION
IS A PRE-REQUISITE BEFORE A
SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER
CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, BE
DISQUALIFIED AND PROHIBITED FROM
SHARING IN THE CONJUGAL
PROPERTY;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE
DISQUALIFICATION OF A CONVICTED
SPOUSE OF ADULTERY FROM SHARING
IN A CONJUGAL PROPERTY,
CONSTITUTES CIVIL INTERDICTION.5
The petitioner argues that the Compromise
Agreement should not have been given
judicial imprimatur since it is against law and
public policy; that the proceedings where it
was approved is null and void, there being
no appearance and participation of the
Solicitor General or the Provincial
Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated;
and that the respondent, having been
convicted of adultery, is therefore
disqualified from sharing in the conjugal
property.
The Petition must fail.
The essential question is whether the partial
voluntary separation of property made by
the spouses pending the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
First. The petitioner contends that the
Compromise Agreement is void because it
circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty
spouse, who was convicted of either
adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the
conjugal property. Since the respondent
was convicted of adultery, the petitioner
argues that her share should be forfeited in
favor of the common child under Articles
43(2)6 and 637 of the Family Code.
To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of
the law to disqualify the spouse convicted of
adultery from sharing in the conjugal
property; and because the Compromise
Agreement is void, it never became final and
executory.
Moreover, the petitioner cites Article
20358 of the Civil Code and argues that
since adultery is a ground for legal
separation, the Compromise Agreement is
therefore void.
These arguments are specious. The
foregoing provisions of the law are
inapplicable to the instant case.
Article 43 of the Family Code refers to
Article 42, to wit:
Article 42. The subsequent marriage
referred to in the preceding Article9 shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of
the affidavit of reappearance of the absent
spouse, unless there is a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring
it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and
circumstances of reappearance shall be
recorded in the civil registry of the residence
of the parties to the subsequent marriage at
the instance of any interested person, with
due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage and without prejudice to the fact of
reappearance being judicially determined in
case such fact is disputed.
where a subsequent marriage is terminated
because of the reappearance of an absent
spouse; while Article 63 applies to the
effects of a decree of legal separation. The
present case involves a proceeding where
the nullity of the marriage is sought to be
declared under the ground of psychological
capacity.
Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly
inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement
partially divided the properties of the
conjugal partnership of gains between the
parties and does not deal with the validity of
a marriage or legal separation. It is not
among those that are expressly prohibited
by Article 2035.
Moreover, the contention that the
Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a
circumvention of the law prohibiting the
guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal
properties is misplaced. Existing law and
jurisprudence do not impose such
disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code,
separation of property may be effected
voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to
judicial approval. The questioned
Compromise Agreement which was
judicially approved is exactly such a
separation of property allowed under the
law. This conclusion holds true even if the
proceedings for the declaration of nullity of
marriage was still pending. However, the
Court must stress that this voluntary
separation of property is subject to the rights
of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of
gains and other persons with pecuniary
interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family
Code.
Second. Petitioner’s claim that since the
proceedings before the RTC were void in
the absence of the participation of the
provincial prosecutor or solicitor, the
voluntary separation made during the
pendency of the case is also void. The
proceedings pertaining to the Compromise
Agreement involved the conjugal properties
of the spouses. The settlement had no
relation to the questions surrounding the
validity of their marriage. Nor did the
settlement amount to a collusion between
the parties.
Article 48 of the Family Code states:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take
care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(e) of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- x x x x
xxxx
(e) Where no defaults allowed.— If the
defending party in action for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it
that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated. (Emphasis supplied
Truly, the purpose of the active participation
of the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor
General is to ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration
of nullity of marriages by preventing
collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of
evidence.10 While the appearances of the
Solicitor General and/or the Public
Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of the
RTC to require their appearance does not
per se nullify the Compromise Agreement.
This Court fully concurs with the findings of
the CA:
x x x. It bears emphasizing that the
intendment of the law in requiring the
presence of the Solicitor General and/or
State prosecutor in all proceedings of legal
separation and annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage is to curtail or prevent any
possibility of collusion between the parties
and to see to it that their evidence
respecting the case is not fabricated. In the
instant case, there is no exigency for the
presence of the Solicitor General and/or the
State prosecutor because as already stated,
nothing in the subject compromise
agreement touched into the very merits of
the case of declaration of nullity of marriage
for the court to be wary of any possible
collusion between the parties. At the risk of
being repetiti[ve], the compromise
agreement pertains merely to an agreement
between the petitioner and the private
respondent to separate their conjugal
properties partially without prejudice to the
outcome of the pending case of declaration
of nullity of marriage.11
Third. The conviction of adultery does not
carry the accessory of civil interdiction.
Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code
provides for the consequences of civil
interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. – Civil interdiction
shall deprive the offender during the time of
his sentence of the rights of parental
authority, or guardianship, either as to the
person or property of any ward, of marital
authority, of the right to manage his property
and of the right to dispose of such property
by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the
penalty for adultery is prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods. Article
333 should be read with Article 43 of the
same Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional – Its accessory
penalties. – The penalty of prision
correccional shall carry with it that of WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The
suspension from public office, from the right Decision of the Court of Appeals is
to follow a profession or calling, and that of AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
perpetual special disqualification from the subject Compromise Agreement is VALID
right of suffrage, if the duration of said without prejudice to the rights of all creditors
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen and other persons with pecuniary interest in
months. The offender shall suffer the the properties of the conjugal partnership of
disqualification provided in this article gains.
although pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been
SO ORDERED.
expressly remitted in the pardon.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by
Associate Justice
the CA, that the crime of adultery does not
carry the accessory penalty of civil
interdiction which deprives the person of the
rights to manage her property and to
dispose of such property inter vivos.
Fourth. Neither could it be said that the
petitioner was not intelligently and
judiciously informed of the consequential
effects of the compromise agreement, and
that, on this basis, he may repudiate the
Compromise Agreement. The argument of
the petitioner that he was not duly informed
by his previous counsel about the legal
effects of the voluntary settlement is not
convincing. Mistake or vitiation of consent,
as now claimed by the petitioner as his basis
for repudiating the settlement, could hardly
be said to be evident. In Salonga v. Court of
Appeals,12 this Court held:
[I]t is well-settled that the negligence of
counsel binds the client. This is based on
the rule that any act performed by a lawyer
within the scope of his general or implied
authority is regarded as an act of his client.
Consequently, the mistake or negligence of
petitioners' counsel may result in the
rendition of an unfavorable judgment
against them.
Exceptions to the foregoing have been
recognized by the Court in cases where
reckless or gross negligence of counsel
deprives the client of due process of law, or
when its application "results in the outright
deprivation of one's property through a
technicality." x x x x13
None of these exceptions has been
sufficiently shown in the present case.
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most
likely, controversial provision introduced by the
Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O.
No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at
the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings
into fore the above provision which is now
invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of
the court a quo1 and the Court of
Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its
application in his attempt to have his marriage
with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held
the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine
Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved
to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On
20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows
before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G.
Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter,
by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with
the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound,
La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave
birth to a baby boy, and he was christened
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did
not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
averred, because of the frequent interference by
Julia's parents into the young spouses family
affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start
a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like
when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia's parents or whenever
Julia would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United
Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven
months after her departure, or on 01 January
1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
long distance telephone. She promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract in July
1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance
to visit the United States, where he underwent a
training program under the auspices of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April
up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to
locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia
but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come
home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court
of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the
Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814).
Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Negros
Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her
answer (through counsel), opposed the
complaint and denied its allegations, claiming,
in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in
fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to
obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was
ruled out by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences
had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully,
by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither
appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The
latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because
of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which
requires a certification of non-shopping, but also
for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return
home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances
that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his
own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for
(him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos failed all these years to communicate
with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her whereabouts for
a period of five years, more or less, is
psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term
"psychological incapacity." The deliberations
during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which has drafted the Code, can,
however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the
Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes
suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient
use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred
to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the
other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they
say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is
that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is
lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added
that lack of judgment would make the marriage
voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked
that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter
would make the marriage null and void and the
former only voidable. Justice Caguioa
suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to
read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was
wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage"
refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph
(7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity"
is also a psychological or mental incapacity,
why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment
and not for declaration or nullity? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there
is the appearance of consent, which is the
reason why it is a ground for voidable
marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not
refer to consent but to the very essence of
marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in
subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be
deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred.
Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word
"mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph
(7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice
(Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person
may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano
said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the
confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the
Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the
Committee used a language which describes a
ground for voidable marriages under the Civil
Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon
Law, there are voidable marriages under the
Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages
Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason
why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the
defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is:
Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that insanity is curable and there are
lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is
not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that
the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest" be modified to read "even if
such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the
time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two
interpretations of the phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there
is vitiation of consent because one does not
know all the consequences of the marriages,
and if he had known these completely, he might
not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making
psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one
who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make
excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting
as if he did not understand the obligations of
marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose
way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that
in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in
the mental faculties, which is less than insanity,
there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of
consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are cases when the insanity is curable. He
emphasized that psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to
do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth
P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as
going to the very essence of consent. She
asked if they are really removing it from
consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained
that, ultimately, consent in general is effected
but he stressed that his point is that it is not
principally a vitiation of consent since there is a
valid consent. He objected to the lumping
together of the validity of the marriage
celebration and the obligations attendant to
marriage, which are completely different from
each other, because they require a different
capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for
marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice
Puno, however, felt that psychological
incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and
that it should not be classified as a voidable
marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it
should be convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as the
defect has not been cured, there is always a
right to annul the marriage and if the defect has
been really cured, it should be a defense in the
action for annulment so that when the action for
annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised
that actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the
action is brought, it is no longer true that he has
no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question:
Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response,
Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of
children and cohabitation should not be a sign
that psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological
incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree.
Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a
psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter.
Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that
psychological incapacity is not a defect in the
mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner
that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are
also momentary periods when there is an
understanding of the consequences of
marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit
remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was
contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequences of
marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical
incapacity to copulate among the grounds for
void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that
in some instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only temporary and
only with respect to a particular person. Judge
Diy stated that they can specify that it is
incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the
term "incurable" has a different meaning in law
and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that
"psychological incapacity" can also be cured.
Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that
"psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present
draft provision, it is enough to show that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, one was
psychologically incapacitated so that later on if
already he can comply with the essential marital
obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio.
Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce,
the psychological incapacity may occur after the
marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the
time of the celebration of marriage. He,
however, stressed that the idea in the provision
is that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations,
which incapacity continues and later becomes
manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed
out that it is possible that after the marriage,
one's psychological incapacity become
manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes
and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in
this case is to allow him to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as
follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage shall
likewise be void from the beginning even if such
incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be
substituted with "although." On the other hand,
Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause
"although such incapacity becomes manifest
after its solemnization" be deleted since it may
encourage one to create the manifestation of
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
pointed out that, as in other provisions, they
cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include
mental and physical incapacities, which are
lesser in degree than psychological incapacity.
Justice Caguioa explained that mental and
physical incapacities are vices of consent while
psychological incapacity is not a species of vice
or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the
matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984
meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that
the phrase "psychological or mental impotence"
is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the
Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge
. . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the
word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from
vice of consent. He explained that
"psychological incapacity" refers to lack of
understanding of the essential obligations of
marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the
last meeting, they have decided not to go into
the classification of "psychological incapacity"
because there was a lot of debate on it and that
this is precisely the reason why they classified it
as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since
there having been annulments of marriages
arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law
should not reconcile with Canon Law because it
is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this
common provision in Civil Law and in Canon
Law, are they going to have a provision in the
Family Code to the effect that marriages
annulled or declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if
Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective
in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its
retroactivity because it is their answer to the
problem of church annulments of marriages,
which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the
other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno
were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to
a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof.
Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit,
Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the
prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
should be filed in court. The Committee
approved the suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code
Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application. Mme.
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr.
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June
1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that the giving
of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the
judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095
of the New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion
of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial
rights and duties, to be given and accepted
mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are
unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even
perhaps all that persuasive for having no
juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence
under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be
dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid,
at least, to the interpretation or construction of
the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his
treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed,
states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not
leave any doubt that the legislator intended,
indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow
norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential
obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract
marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new
canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly
(ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .
(cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text
submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon
1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob
causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly
was altogether eliminated. it would be, however,
incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause
of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and
healthy person should be able to assume the
ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological
incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite
variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries
on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt,
Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a
true inability to commit oneself to the essentials
of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and
other disorders of personality can be the
psychic cause of this defect, which is here
described in legal terms. This particular type of
incapacity consists of a real inability to render
what is due by the contract. This could be
compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter
a binding contract to deliver the crops which he
cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life
and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming
these obligations, which could be overcome by
normal effort, obviously does not constitute
incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a
person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II,
Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if
the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the
person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but
that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at
the moment of giving consent, of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and
consequently of the possibility of being bound
by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the
work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of
the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1),
who opines that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing
disquisitions, including, and most importantly,
the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of
the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's
"Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family
Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.
Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This
pschologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
"legitimate." shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug institution, is the foundation of the family and
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or shall be protected by the State. (Article XV,
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage 1987 Constitution).
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism,
The above provisions express so well and so
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on
during the marriage, they become mere
marriage and the family, and they are doubt the
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of
tenets we still hold on to.
the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being The factual settings in the case at bench, in no
themselves, depending on the degree and measure at all, can come close to the standards
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological required to decree a nullity of marriage.
incapacity. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society
Until further statutory and jurisprudential
itself can always provide all the specific answers
parameters are established, every
to every individual problem.
circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent, and other conditions of that
incapacity must, in every case, be carefully WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate
and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of SO ORDERED.
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
helpful or even desirable. Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime
commitment. We should continue to be Feliciano, J., is on leave.
reminded that innate in our society, then
enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still
indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
—

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of

permanent union between a man a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the ‘
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO
BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the
most likely, controversial provision
introduced by the Family Code is Article
36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated
17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review
on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel
Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the
above provision which is now invoked by
him. Undaunted by the decisions of the
court a quo1 and the Court of
Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching
its application in his attempt to have his
marriage with herein private respondent,
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"),
declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who
then held the rank of First Lieutenant in
the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful
day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
September 1986, the two exchanged
vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge
Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's
parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La
Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia
gave birth to a baby boy, and he was
christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The
ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was
bound to happen, Leouel averred,
because of the frequent interference by
Julia's parents into the young spouses
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple
would also start a "quarrel" over a number
of other things, like when and where the
couple should start living independently
from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own
parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the
United Sates of America to work as a
nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia
called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to
return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989. She never did.
When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a
training program under the auspices of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines from
01 April up to 25 August 1990, he
desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with, Julia but all
his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow
come home, Leouel filed with the regional
trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30,
a complaint for "Voiding of marriage
Under Article 36 of the Family Code"
(docketed, Civil Case No. 9814).
Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in
Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her
answer (through counsel), opposed the
complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner
who had, in fact, been irresponsible and
incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties
to obtain a decree of nullity of their
marriage was ruled out by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to
the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial
conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court,
Julia ultimately filed a manifestation,
stating that she would neither appear nor
submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a
quo finally dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The latter affirmed the decision of the trial
court.4
The petition should be denied not only
because of its non-compliance with
Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for
its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to
return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five
years are circumstances that clearly
show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In
his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no
affection for (him) because respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all
these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years,
more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term
"psychological incapacity." The
deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which
has drafted the Code, can, however,
provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be
void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration,
was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from
the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.)
Reyes suggested that they say "wanting
in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo)
Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the
sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice
Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in
sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that the idea is that
one is not lacking in judgment but that he
is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He
added that lack of judgment would make
the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia
Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of
judgment is more serious than insufficient
use of judgment and yet the latter would
make the marriage null and void and the
former only voidable. Justice Caguioa
suggested that subparagraph (7) be
modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the
phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of
reason of judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage" refers to
defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since
"insanity" is also a psychological or
mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a
ground for annulment and not for
declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that in insanity, there
is the appearance of consent, which is the
reason why it is a ground for voidable
marriages, while subparagraph (7) does
not refer to consent but to the very
essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in
subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be
deleted, with which Justice Caguioa
concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers
to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that
subparagraph (7) refers to psychological
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated
that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not
with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-)
Luciano said that it is called selective
impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the
confusion lies in the fact that in inserting
the Canon Law annulment in the Family
Code, the Committee used a language
which describes a ground for voidable
marriages under the Civil Code. Justice
Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there
are voidable marriages under the Canon
Law, there are no voidable marriages
Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the
reason why they should make a
distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon
Law, the defects in marriage cannot be
cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the
problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for
void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that insanity is curable
and there are lucid intervals, while
psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno
suggested that the phrase "even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest" be
modified to read "even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity,
at the time of the marriage, it is not
apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two
interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally incapacitated"
— in the first one, there is vitiation of
consent because one does not know all
the consequences of the marriages, and
if he had known these completely, he
might not have consented to the
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of
making psychological incapacity a
ground for voidable marriages since
otherwise it will encourage one who really
understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to
make excuses for invalidating the
marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage.
Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of
providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point
is that in the case of incapacity by reason
of defects in the mental faculties, which is
less than insanity, there is a defect in
consent and, therefore, it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage
because there is the appearance of
consent and it is capable of convalidation
for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the
insanity is curable. He emphasized that
psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do
with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof.
(Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they
do not consider it as going to the very
essence of consent. She asked if they are
really removing it from consent. In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that,
ultimately, consent in general is effected
but he stressed that his point is that it is
not principally a vitiation of consent since
there is a valid consent. He objected to
the lumping together of the validity of the
marriage celebration and the obligations
attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other,
because they require a different capacity,
which is eighteen years of age, for
marriage but in contract, it is different.
Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of
vice of consent and that it should not be
classified as a voidable marriage which is
incapable of convalidation; it should be
convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as
the defect has not been cured, there is
always a right to annul the marriage and
if the defect has been really cured, it
should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for
annulment is instituted, the issue can be
raised that actually, although one might
have been psychologically incapacitated,
at the time the action is brought, it is no
longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the
question: Will not cohabitation be a
defense? In response, Justice Puno
stated that even the bearing of children
and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological
incapacity is still insanity of a lesser
degree. Justice Luciano suggested that
they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa,
however, reiterated that psychological
incapacity is not a defect in the mind but
in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same
manner that there is a lucid interval in
insanity, there are also momentary
periods when there is an understanding
of the consequences of marriage. Justice
Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the
ground of psychological incapacity will
not apply if the marriage was contracted
at the time when there is understanding
of the consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include
physical incapacity to copulate among
the grounds for void marriages. Justice
Reyes commented that in some
instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only
temporary and only with respect to a
particular person. Judge Diy stated that
they can specify that it is incurable.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the term
"incurable" has a different meaning in law
and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that
"psychological incapacity" can also be
cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed
out that "psychological incapacity" is
incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the
present draft provision, it is enough to
show that at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he
can comply with the essential marital
obligations, the marriage is still void ab
initio. Justice Caguioa explained that
since in divorce, the psychological
incapacity may occur after the marriage,
in void marriages, it has to be at the time
of the celebration of marriage. He,
however, stressed that the idea in the
provision is that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one is
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations,
which incapacity continues and later
becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however,
pointed out that it is possible that after the
marriage, one's psychological incapacity
become manifest but later on he is cured.
Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa
opined that the remedy in this case is to
allow him to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article
as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated, to
comply with the essential obligations of
marriage shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if"
be substituted with "although." On the
other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that
the clause "although such incapacity
becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may
encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity.
Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in
other provisions, they cannot argue on
the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also
include mental and physical incapacities,
which are lesser in degree than
psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa explained that mental and
physical incapacities are vices of consent
while psychological incapacity is not a
species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said
on the matter in the minutes of their
February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz
indicated that the phrase "psychological
or mental impotence" is an invention of
some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered
a weak phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they
deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He
explained that "psychological incapacity"
refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members
that, at the last meeting, they have
decided not to go into the classification of
"psychological incapacity" because there
was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it
as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that,
since there having been annulments of
marriages arising from psychological
incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile
with Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With
this common provision in Civil Law and in
Canon Law, are they going to have a
provision in the Family Code to the effect
that marriages annulled or declared void
by the church on the ground of
psychological incapacity is automatically
annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired
if Article 37 should be retroactive or
prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its
retroactivity because it is their answer to
the problem of church annulments of
marriages, which are still valid under the
Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice
Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned
about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the
issue to a vote, which the Committee
approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof.
Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean
Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director
Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put
in the prescriptive period of ten years
within which the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage should be filed in
court. The Committee approved the
suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family
Code Revision Committee in ultimately
deciding to adopt the provision with less
specificity than expected, has in fact, so
designed the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Code Committee, has been quoted by
Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any
examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would
limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the
judge to interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of
contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of
discretion of judgment concerning
essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to
be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature
are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive
nor even perhaps all that persuasive for
having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law
prevailing at the time of the code's
enactment, nevertheless, cannot be
dismissed as impertinent for its value as
an aid, at least, to the interpretation or
construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his
treaties, 10 giving an account on how the
third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon
does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden
the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential
obligations of marriage because of a
grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob
gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are
unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon,
novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological
anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon
1049);
then the same wording was retained in
the text submitted to the pope
(cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological
nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual
to psychological anomaly, then the term
anomaly was altogether eliminated. it
would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal
and healthy person should be able to
assume the ordinary obligations of
marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term
"psychological incapacity" defies any
precise definition since psychological
causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and
Commentaries on Marriage," written by
Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and
LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation
appears:
This incapacity consists of the following:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to
the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other
disorders of personality can be the
psychic cause of this defect, which is here
described in legal terms. This particular
type of incapacity consists of a
real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding
contract to deliver the crops which he
cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to
commit oneself must refer to
the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring;
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. The mere
difficulty of assuming these obligations,
which could be overcome by normal
effort, obviously does not constitute
incapacity. The canon contemplates a
true psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from giving what
is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R.
Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under
this incapacity, it must be proved not only
that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the
defect did in fact deprive the person, at
the moment of giving consent, of the
ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and consequently of the
possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval
the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who
opines that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required
in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party
involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the
foregoing disquisitions, including, and
most importantly, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee itself,
that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages
in the Family Code and their Parallels in
Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by
the American Psychiatric Association;
Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter
intensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This
pschologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the
other hand, an inability of the spouse to
have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of
the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration
of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing
at the inception of marriage, like the state
of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual institution, is the foundation of the family
alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality and shall be protected by the State.
should occur only during the marriage, (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family
The above provisions express so well
Code. These provisions of the Code,
and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our
however, do not necessarily preclude the
laws on marriage and the family, and they
possibility of these various circumstances
are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological The factual settings in the case at bench,
incapacity. in no measure at all, can come close to
the standards required to decree a nullity
of marriage. Undeniably and
Until further statutory and jurisprudential
understandably, Leouel stands
parameters are established, every
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
circumstance that may have some
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor
bearing on the degree, extent, and other
society itself can always provide all the
conditions of that incapacity must, in
specific answers to every individual
every case, be carefully examined and
problem.
evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons
with expertise in psychological disciplines
SO ORDERED.
might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
lifetime commitment. We should continue Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
to be reminded that innate in our society, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,
then enshrined in our Civil Code, and concur.
even now still indelible in Article 1 of the
Family Code, is that — Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of
permanent union between a man a
woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino
family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011
DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner,
vs.
VIDA MA. CORAZON P.
AURELIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on
certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the October 6,
2005 Decision2 and October 26, 2006
Resolution,3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. SP No. 82238.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent
Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on
March 23, 1988. They have two sons,
namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage.4 In her petition,
respondent alleged that both she and
petitioner were psychologically
incapacitated of performing and complying
with their respective essential marital
obligations. In addition, respondent alleged
that such state of psychological incapacity
was present prior and even during the time
of the marriage ceremony. Hence,
respondent prays that her marriage be
declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code which provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void, even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
As succinctly summarized by the CA,
contained in respondent’s petition are the
following allegations, to wit:
x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that
both husband and wife are psychologically
incapable of performing and complying with
their essential marital obligations. Said
psychological incapacity was existing prior
and at the time of the marriage. Said
psychological incapacity was manifested by
lack of financial support from the husband;
his lack of drive and incapacity to discern
the plight of his working wife. The husband
exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust
towards his wife. His moods alternated
between hostile defiance and contrition. He
refused to assist in the maintenance of the
family. He refused to foot the household bills
and provide for his family’s needs. He
exhibited arrogance. He was completely
insensitive to the feelings of his wife. He
liked to humiliate and embarrass his wife
even in the presence of their children.
Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive
and displays her feelings openly and freely.
Her feelings change very quickly – from joy
to fury to misery to despair, depending on
her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance
for boredom was very low. She was
emotionally immature; she cannot stand
frustration or disappointment. She cannot
delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset
when she cannot get what she wants. Self-
indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their
hostility towards each other distorted their
relationship. Their incapacity to accept and
fulfill the essential obligations of marital life
led to the breakdown of their marriage.
Private respondent manifested
psychological aversion to cohabit with her
husband or to take care of him. The
psychological make-up of private
respondent was evaluated by a THE
psychologist, who found that the
psychological incapacity of both husband
and wife to perform their marital obligations
is grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private
respondent suffers from a Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Narcissistic
features; whereas petitioner suffers from
passive aggressive (negativistic)
personality disorder that renders him
immature and irresponsible to assume the
normal obligations of a marriage.5
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss6 the petition. Petitioner
principally argued that the petition failed to
state a cause of action and that it failed to
meet the standards set by the Court for the certiorari10 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
interpretation and implementation of Article Court.
36 of the Family Code.
On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a
On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Decision dismissing the petition, the
Order7 denying petitioner’s motion. dispositive portion of which reads:
On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the]
Motion for Reconsideration, which was, instant petition is DISMISSED.
however, denied by the RTC in an
Order8 dated December 17, 2003. In
SO ORDERED.11
denying petitioner’s motion, the RTC ruled
that respondent’s petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage complied with the In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the
requirements of the Molina doctrine, and CA dismissed petitioner’s motion for
whether or not the allegations are reconsideration.
meritorious would depend upon the proofs
presented by both parties during trial, to wit:
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of
the RTC and held that respondent’s
A review of the petition shows that it complaint for declaration of nullity of
observed the requirements in Republic vs. marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition
Court of Appeals (268 SCRA 198), with Article 36 of the Family Code and the
otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a
There was allegation of the root cause of the sufficient cause of action.
psychological incapacity of both the
petitioner and the respondent contained in
paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The Hence, herein petition, with petitioner
manifestation of juridical antecedence was raising two issues for this Court’s
consideration, to wit:
alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition.
The allegations constituting the gravity of
psychological incapacity were alleged in I.
paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The
incurability was alleged in paragraph 10 of
the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of WHETHER OR NOT THE
incurability was quoted in paragraph 15 of COURT OF APPEALS
the petition. There is a cause of action VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE
presented in the petition for the nullification LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
Code. ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN
PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF THE
Whether or not the allegations are
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ARE
meritorious depends upon the proofs to be
SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT
presented by both parties. This, in turn, will TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF
entail the presentation of evidence which THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
can only be done in the hearing on the VIDA AND DANILO.
merits of the case. If the Court finds that
there are (sic) preponderance of evidence to
II.
sustain a nullification, then the cause of the
petition shall fail. Conversely, if it finds,
through the evidence that will be presented WHETHER OR NOT THE
during the hearing on the merits, that there COURT OF APPEALS
are sufficient proofs to warrant nullification, VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE
the Court shall declare its nullity.9 LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
WHEN IT DENIED
On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed PETITIONER’S ACTION FOR
CERTIORARI DESPITE THE
the RTC decision to the CA via petition for
 FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF
HIS MOTION TO DISMISS BY
THE TRIAL COURT IS
PATENTLY AND UTTERLY
TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION; AND THAT
APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS
NOT A PLAIN, ADEQUATE OR
SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES. 12
Before anything else, it bears to point out
that had respondent’s complaint been filed
after March 15, 2003, this present petition
would have been denied since Supreme
Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-
1013 prohibits the filing of a motion to
dismiss in actions for annulment of
marriage. Be that as it may, after a
circumspect review of the arguments raised
by petitioner herein, this Court finds that the
petition is not meritorious.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court
created the Molina guidelines to aid the
courts in the disposition of cases involving
psychological incapacity, to wit:
(1) Burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the
marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of
marriage.
(6) The essential marital
obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife, as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition.15
This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court
Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has
modified the above pronouncements,
particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that
the certification of the Solicitor General
required in the Molina case is dispensed
with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the
Family Code mandates that the appearance
of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned be on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.16
Petitioner anchors his petition on the
premise that the allegations contained in
respondent’s petition are insufficient to
support a declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity.
Specifically, petitioner contends that the
petition failed to comply with three of the
Molina guidelines, namely: that the root
cause of the psychological incapacity must
be alleged in the complaint; that such illness
must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage; and that
the non-complied marital obligation must be
stated in the petition.17
First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this
Court finds that the root cause of
psychological incapacity was stated and
alleged in the complaint. We agree with the
manifestation of respondent that the family
backgrounds of both petitioner and
respondent were discussed in the complaint
as the root causes of their psychological
incapacity. Moreover, a competent and
expert psychologist clinically identified the
same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that
the illness of both parties was of such grave
a nature as to bring about a disability for
them to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The psychologist reported that
respondent suffers from Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Narcissistic
Features. Petitioner, on the other hand,
allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive
(Negativistic) Personality
Disorder.lawph!1 The incapacity of both
parties to perform their marital obligations
was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and
incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the
essential marital obligations that were not
complied with were alleged in the petition.
As can be easily gleaned from the totality of
the petition, respondent’s allegations fall
under Article 68 of the Family Code which
states that "the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support."
It bears to stress that whether or not
petitioner and respondent are
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their
marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to
decide at the first instance. A perusal of the
Molina guidelines would show that the same
contemplate a situation wherein the parties
have presented their evidence, witnesses
have testified, and that a decision has been
reached by the court after due hearing.
Such process can be gleaned from
guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a
decision rendered by the RTC after trial on
the merits. It would certainly be too
burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at
first instance whether the allegations
contained in the petition are sufficient to
substantiate a case for psychological
incapacity. Let it be remembered that each
case involving the application of Article 36
must be treated distinctly and judged not on
the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but
according to its own attendant facts. Courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals.18 It would thus be more
prudent for this Court to remand the case to
the RTC, as it would be in the best position
to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear
and weigh the evidentiary value of the
testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and
expert witnesses presented by the parties.
Given the allegations in respondent’s
petition for nullity of marriage, this Court
rules that the RTC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse
of discretion is not enough. It must be grave
abuse of discretion as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of
law.19 Even assuming arguendo that this
Court were to agree with petitioner that the
allegations contained in respondent’s
petition are insufficient and that the RTC
erred in denying petitioner’s motion to
dismiss, the same is merely an error of
judgment correctible by appeal and not an
abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari.20
Finally, the CA properly dismissed
petitioner’s petition. As a general rule, the
denial of a motion to dismiss, which is an Before us is a Petition for Review
interlocutory order, is not reviewable by on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
certiorari. Petitioner’s remedy is to reiterate Court, assailing the July 24, 1998
the grounds in his motion to dismiss, as Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
defenses in his answer to the petition for CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as
nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case follows:
of an adverse decision, appeal the decision
in due time.21 The existence of that
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set
adequate remedy removed the
aside and the marriage between the parties is
underpinnings of his petition for certiorari in
hereby declared valid."[2]
the CA.22
Also challenged by petitioner is the
WHEREFORE, premises considered the
December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying
petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005
her Motion for Reconsideration.
Decision and October 26, 2006 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. Earlier, the Regional Trial Court
82238, are AFFIRMED. (RTC) had ruled thus:
SO ORDERED. "WHEREFORE, the marriage between
petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent
Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6,
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab
Associate Justice
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family
Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is
WE CONCUR: dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126
and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles
50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the
legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best
interest and welfare of the minor children, their
custody is granted to petitioner subject to the
visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy
each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, City where the marriage was solemnized, the
vs. WILSON G.
National Census and Statistics Office, Manila
MARCOS, respondent.
and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City
for their appropriate action consistent with this
DECISION Decision.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"SO ORDERED."
Psychological incapacity, as a ground
for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may
be established by the totality of evidence The Facts
presented. There is no requirement,
however, that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist
The facts as found by the Court of
as a conditio sine qua non for such
Appeals are as follows:
declaration.
"It was established during the trial that the
parties were married twice: (1) on September 6,
The Case 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto
H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh.
A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was
solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential
Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park,
Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five
(5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he
was transferred to the Presidential Security
Command in Malacaang during the Marcos
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the
other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary
Corps under the Philippine Air Force in
1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them
sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of
them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she
as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a
Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they
became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they
resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she
acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left
the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however
prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look
for work so that their children would see him,
instead of her, as the head of the family and a
good provider. Due to his failure to engage in
any gainful employment, they would often
quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and
beat her. He would even force her to have sex
with him despite her weariness. He would also
inflict physical harm on their children for a slight
mistake and was so severe in the way he
chastised them. Thus, for several times during
their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In
1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business
of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she
was still in the military, she would first make
deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacaang.When she was discharged from the
military service, she concentrated on her
business. Then, she became a supplier in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was
able to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction
Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took
place on October 16, 1994, when they had a
bitter quarrel. As they were already living
separately, she did not want him to stay in their
house anymore. On that day, when she saw him
in their house, she was so angry that she
lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting
physical harm on her and even on her mother
who came to her aid. The following day,
October 17, 1994, she and their children left the
house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to]
medical examination at the Mandaluyong
Medical Center where her injuries were
diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with
her two sisters and driver, went to him at the
Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their
missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got
mad. After knowing the reason for their
unexpected presence, he ran after them with a
samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and
their children were renting a house in Camella,
Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the
Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker
Sonia C. Millan, the children described their
father as cruel and physically abusive to them
(Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist
Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological
evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216),
while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations mainly because of his failure
to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towardsappellee and their children, x x
x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
 Reversing the RTC, the CA held that In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the valid assumption
psychological incapacity had not been presents for this Court's consideration the guidelines governing the application and the thereof. Although no
established by the totality of the evidence following issues: interpretation of psychological example of such incapacity
presented. It ratiocinated in this wise: incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the need be given here so as
"I. Whether or not the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court not to limit the application of
Honorable Court of as follows: the provision under the
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the Appeals could set aside the principle of ejusdem
allegation of the root cause of the spouse's findings by the Regional "1) The burden of proof to show generis, nevertheless such
psychological incapacity which should also be Trial Court of psychological the nullity of the marriage root cause must be
medically or clinically identified, sufficiently incapacity of a respondent belongs to the plaintiff. Any identified as a
proven by experts and clearly explained in the in a Petition for declaration doubt should be resolved in psychological illness and
decision. The incapacity must be proven to be of nullity of marriage simply favor of the existence and its incapacitating nature
existing at the time of the celebration of the because the respondent continuation of the fully explained. Expert
marriage and shown to be medically or clinically did not subject himself to marriage and against its evidence may be given by
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave psychological evaluation. dissolution and nullity. This qualified psychiatrists and
enough to bring about the disability of the parties is rooted in the fact that clinical psychologists.
to assume the essential obligations of marriage II. Whether or not the totality of both our Constitution and
as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 evidence presented and our laws cherish the validity 3) The incapacity must be
to 225 of the Family Code and such non- the demeanor of all the of marriage and unity of the proven to be existing at 'the
complied marital obligations must similarly be witnesses should be the family. Thus, our time of the celebration' of
alleged in the petition, established by evidence basis of the determination Constitution devotes an the marriage. The evidence
and explained in the decision. of the merits of the entire Article on the Family, must show that the illness
Petition."[7] recognizing it 'as the was existing when the
"In the case before us, the appellant was not foundation of the nation.' It parties exchanged their 'I
subjected to any psychological or psychiatric decrees marriage as legally do's.' The manifestation of
evaluation. The psychological findings about the 'inviolable,' thereby the illness need not be
The Court's Ruling
appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were protecting it from perceivable at such time,
based only on the interviews conducted with the dissolution at the whim of but the illness itself must
appellee. Expert evidence by qualified the parties. Both the family have attached at such
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is We agree with petitioner that the and marriage are to be moment, or prior thereto.
essential if only to prove that the parties were or personal medical or psychological 'protected' by the state.
4) Such incapacity must also be
any one of them was mentally or psychically ill examination of respondent is not a
xxxxxxxxx shown to be medically or
to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations requirement for a declaration
clinically permanent or
he or she was assuming, or as would make him of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, 2) The root cause of the incurable. Such incurability
or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he the totality of the evidence she presented psychological incapacity may be absolute or even
offered testimonial evidence to show that he does not show such incapacity. must be: (a) medically or relative only in regard to the
[was] not psychologically incapacitated. The clinically identified, (b) other spouse, not
root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the complaint, (c) necessarily absolutely
alleged in the petition, nor medically or sufficiently proven by against everyone of the
clinically identified as a psychological illness or Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
experts and (d) clearly same sex. Furthermore,
sufficiently proven by an expert.Similarly, there explained in the such incapacity must be
is no evidence at all that would show that the decision.Article 36 of the relevant to the assumption
appellant was suffering from an incapacity Family Code requires that
Petitioner contends that the of marriage obligations, not
which [was] psychological or mental - not the incapacity must be
testimonies and the results of various tests necessarily to those not
physical to the extent that he could not have psychological - not
that were submitted to determine related to marriage, like the
known the obligations he was assuming: that the physical, although its
respondent's psychological incapacity to exercise of a profession or
incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the manifestations and/or
perform the obligations of marriage should employment in a
marriage and [was] incurable."[4] symptoms may be
not have been brushed aside by the Court job. Hence, a pediatrician
of Appeals, simply because respondent had physical. The evidence may be effective in
Hence, this Petition.[5] not taken those tests himself. Petitioner must convince the court diagnosing illnesses of
adds that the CA should have realized that that the parties, or one of children and prescribing
under the circumstances, she had no choice them, was mentally or medicine to cure them but
but to rely on other sources of information in psychically ill to such an not be psychologically
Issues order to determine the psychological extent that the person capacitated to procreate,
capacity of respondent, who had refused to could not have known the bear and raise his/her own
submit himself to such tests. obligations he was children as an essential
assuming, or knowing obligation of marriage.
them, could not have given
 5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the
disability of the party to
assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
Thus, 'mild
characteriological
peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot
be accepted as root
causes. The illness must
be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling
factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in
the personality structure
that effectively
incapacitates the person
from really accepting and
thereby complying with the
obligations essential to
marriage.
6) The essential marital
obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such
non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and
included in the text of the
decision.
7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive,
should be given great
respect by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order
the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as
counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor
General issues a support to the family and may have resorted
certification, which will be
quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is
deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three
basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos v. Court
Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity(b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In
fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately
establish
party's psychological condition. For indeed,
if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether
the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case -- including the testimonies of
petitioner, the common children, petitioner's
sister and the social worker -- was enough
to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this petitioner to show that the alleged
Court is sufficiently convinced that psychological incapacity is characterized by
respondent failed to provide material gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the
to physical abuse and abandonment, the guidelines outlined in Molina.
totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on WHEREFORE, the Petition
his part. There is absolutely no showing that is DENIED and assailed
his "defects" were already present at the Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion
inception of the marriage or that they are requiring personal medical examination as a
incurable. conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. No costs.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can
be attributed to the fact that he had lost his SO ORDERED.
job and was not gainfully employed for a
period of more than six years. It was during Melo, (Chairman), Vitug,
Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
this period that he became intermittently
drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological
illness was traced only to said period and
not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that
his condition is incurable, especially now
that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
of
Article 36 of the Family Code, we
stress, is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities
the of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. These marital obligations are
those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220,
221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated
with legal separation, in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment and the like.[12] At
best, the evidence presented by petitioner
refers only to grounds for legal separation,
not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused
as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid
down the procedural requirements for its
invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however,
has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the
dissolution of the marriage for failure of
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-
HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the
decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals2 affirming the
decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72,
declaring as null and void the marriage
contracted between herein respondent
Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her
husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita
Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her
husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986,
she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio
went back to Japan and stayed there for half
of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave
birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were
married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities, which incapacity
became manifest only after the marriage.
One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by
Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his
family. After sending money to respondent
for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several
times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends
that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did
not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained
unserved because he was no longer
residing at his given address.
Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent
filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect
service of summons by publication. The trial
court granted the motion on July 12, 1996.
In August 1996, the summons,
accompanied by a copy of the petition, was
published in a newspaper of general
circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Because Toshio failed to file a
responsive pleading after the lapse of 60
days from publication, respondent filed a
motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the
case to the prosecutor for investigation. The
trial court granted the motion on November
7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor
Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding
that no collusion existed between the
parties. He prayed that the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence
submitted was not fabricated. On February
13, 1997, the trial court granted
respondent’s motion to present her
evidence ex parte. She then testified on
how Toshio abandoned his family. She
thereafter offered documentary evidence to
support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered
a decision, the dispositive portion of which
read:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the marriage
between petitioner Lolita M.
Quintero-Hamano and Toshio
Hamano, is hereby declared
NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor,
Cavite and the National Statistics
Office are ordered to make proper
entries into the records of the
afore-named parties pursuant to
this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the
ground of Toshio’s psychological incapacity,
the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the
case that respondent spouses
failed to fulfill his obligations as
husband of the petitioner and
father to his daughter.
Respondent remained
irresponsible and unconcerned
over the needs and welfare of his
family. Such indifference, to the
mind of the Court, is a clear
manifestation of insensitivity and
lack of respect for his wife and
child which characterizes a very
immature person. Certainly, such
behavior could be traced to
respondent’s mental incapacity
and disability of entering into
marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General,
representing herein petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the same was denied in a
decision dated August 28, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, and pursuant to
applicable law and jurisprudence
on the matter and evidence on
hand, judgment is hereby
rendered denying the instant
appeal. The decision of the court
a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
6 holding that respondent was able
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court found that Toshio left
respondent and their daughter a month after
the celebration of the marriage, and
returned to Japan with the promise to
support his family and take steps to make
them Japanese citizens. But except for two
months, he never sent any support to nor
communicated with them despite the letters
respondent sent. He even visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see
them. Respondent, on the other hand,
exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no
avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that
respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations to his family, and to "observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support" pursuant to Article
68 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve
when the other spouse is an
unwilling party to the cohesion
and creation of a family as a
social inviolable institution? Why
should petitioner be made to
suffer in a marriage where the
other spouse is not around and
worse, left them without even
helping them cope up with family
life and assist in the upbringing of
their daughter as required under
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this
case could not be equated with Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Molina8and Santos vs.
Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the
spouses were Filipinos while this case
involved a "mixed marriage," the husband
being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic
based on this lone assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in
to prove the psychological
incapacity of Toshio Hamano to
perform his marital obligations,
despite respondent’s failure to
comply with the guidelines laid
down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment
by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity
to them did not automatically constitute
psychological incapacity. His behavior
merely indicated simple inadequacy in the
personality of a spouse falling short of
reasonable expectations. Respondent failed
to prove any severe and incurable
personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set
in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney,
representing respondent, reiterated the
ruling of the courts a quo and sought the
denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage
with Toshio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following
guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must
be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the
decision.Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not
physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations
he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233
SCRA 100, June 13, 1994),
nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a
psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may
be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their
"I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the
personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital
obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included
in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
xxx
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted
in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor-General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor-General shall
discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.13 (emphasis
supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic
requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos: "psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In
fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party’s psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether
respondent successfully proved Toshio’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital
responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet
his duty to live with, care for and support his
family. He abandoned them a month after
his marriage to respondent. Respondent
sent him several letters but he never replied.
He made a trip to the Philippines but did not
care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence
presented fell short of proving that Toshio
was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s
act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. After respondent respondent, terminating her marriage to her
testified on how Toshio abandoned his husband may not necessarily be the fitting
family, no other evidence was presented denouement.
showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule,
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is
there was no need for an actual medical
hereby GRANTED. The decision dated
examination, it would have greatly helped
August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is
respondent’s case had she presented
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been
done through an expert witness. This SO ORDERED.
respondent did not do.

We must remember that abandonment is

also a ground for legal separation.16 There
was no showing that the case at bar was not
just an instance of abandonment in the
context of legal separation. We cannot
presume psychological defect from the
mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the
marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet
his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown
to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness.17 There
was no proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.18

According to the appellate court, the

requirements in Molina and Santos do not
apply here because the present case
involves a "mixed marriage," the husband
being a Japanese national. We disagree. In
proving psychological incapacity, we find no
distinction between an alien spouse and a
Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the
spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign
national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used
for determining psychological incapacity
should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared

that marriage is an inviolable social
institution that the State cherishes and
protects. While we commiserate with