6. Serg's Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.

,
G.R. No. 137705

FACTS: PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI) filed a complaint for a sum of money with
an application of writ of replevin. The judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff
to seize and deliver the machinery and equipment to PCI. Serg filed a motion for special
protective order praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer the enforcement of the writ
of replevin contending that the machines were not proper subjects of the writ because
they are in fact real property defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code.

PCI opposed the motion on the ground that Section 12.1 of their Lease
Agreement clearly provided that the machines were to be considered as personal
property. The property is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property
notwithstanding that the property or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become,
in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real
property or any building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery is considered a real or personal property.

HELD: The machinery is considered personal property. The Court has held that
contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal.
After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming
otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded
from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. Hence, Serg is estopped from
denying the characterization of the machinery as personal property, which are proper
subjects of Writ of Seizure.

7. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No. L-64261

FACTS: Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal, Quezon City,
issued 2 search warrants of business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We
Forum” newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and
control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized.
A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity
of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city
fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case
Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations of possession and printing of subversive

materials may be the basis of the issuance of search warrants.
HELD: The law provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

In mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce”; the Constitution requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of
a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos “is in
possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news
publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used
as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as
amended” is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials,
the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish.
Mere generalization will not suffice. Hence, the warrants are void.

8. LOPEZ V. OROSA AND PLAZA THEATRE

103 SCRA 98

FACTS: After agreeing to make an investment in Orosa’s theatre business and his
assurance that he would be personally liable for any account that the said construction
might incur, Lopez delivered the lumber which was used for the construction of the
Plaza Theatre. Plaza Theatre was erected on a piece of land formerly owned by Orosa,
and was acquired by the corporation. As Lopez was pressing Orosa for payment of
remaining unpaid obligation, the latter promised to obtain a bank loan by mortgaging the
properties of Plaza Theatre. Unknown to Lopez, the corporation already got a loan from
a bank with Luzon Surety Company as surety, and the corporation in turn executed a
mortgage on the land and building in favor of said company as counter-security.

Persistent demand from Lopez caused Orosa to execute an alleged “deed of

assignment” of his 480 shares of stock of Plaza Theatre, and as the obligation still
remain unsettled, Lopez filed a complaint against Orosa and Plaza Theatre Inc, praying
that in case defendants fail to pay, the building and land owned by corporation be sold
at public auction, or the shares of the capital stock be sold, and the proceeds thereof be
applied to said indebtedness. As a defense, Orosa contended that the shares of stocks
were personal properties and cannot be made to cover and satisfy the obligation. it was
thus prayed that he be declared exempted from payment of deficiency in case the
proceeds from the sale of properties are not enough. The surety company, upon
discovery that the land was already registered, file a petition to annotate the rights and
interests of the surety company over the said properties, which was opposed by Lopez
who asserted that he has preferred lien over the properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not a materialmen’s lien for the value of materials used in the
construction of building attaches to said structure alone, and does not extend to the land
on which building is adhered to.

HELD: Yes. Such lien attaches to structure alone, and does not extend to the land
where the building is. In view of employment of the phrase, “real estate or immovable
property”, and in as much as said provision does not contain any specification delimiting
the lien to the building, said article must be construed as to embrace both the land and
building or the structure adhering thereto. SC cannot subscribe to this view, for while it
is true that real estate connotes land and building constructed thereon, it is obvious that
the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of
what may constitute real properties could mean only one thing – that the building is by
itself an immovable property. Moreover, in view of the absence of any specific provision
of law to the contrary, a building is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or
not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner.

A close examination of the provision of the Civil Code reveals that the law gives
preference to unregistered refectionary credits only with respect to the real estate upon
the refection or work was made. The conclusion is that it must be that the lien so
created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of
which the obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the
unpaid value of the lumber used in construction of the building attaches only to said
structure and to no other property of the obligors.

9. Yap vs. Tañada

163 scra 464

FACTS: The case began in the City Court of Cebu with the filing by Goulds Pumps
International Inc. of a complaint against Yap and his wife, seeking recovery of
P1,459.30representing the balance of the price and installation cost of a water pump in
the latter's premises. The City Court ruled in favor of Goulds and ordered Yap to pay the
former the sum of P1,459.30 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum until fully paid.
Yap appealed to the Court of First Instance. The appeal was assigned to the sala of
respondent udge Tañada. Tañada affirmed the decision of the City Court. A writ of
execution was issued. With this, the Sheriff levied on the water pump in question and
scheduled the execution sale. The said property was sold to Goulds as the highest
bidder. Yap filed his petition for review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the pump installed had become immovable property by its being
installed in his residence.
HELD: The Court ruled on the negative. The Civil Code considers as immovable
property, among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such
a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object." The pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was
in fact separated from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering deterioration.
Obviously the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated
than the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.

10. Machinery & Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-7057.

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for replevin in the CFI of Manila against Ipo
Limestone Co., Inc. and Dr. Antonio Villarama for the recovery of the machineries and
equipment sold and delivered to defendants at their factory in Bigti, Norzagaray,
Bulacan. Respondent judge issued order for Provincial Sheriff to seize and take
immediate possession of the properties. But the equipment could not possibly be
dismantled without causing damage to the wooden frames attached to them. As Roco,
pet's president, insisted in dismantling it on his own responsibility, alleging that bond
was posted for such, the deputy sheriffs directed that some of the supports thereof be
cut. Defendant filed counter-bond. Trial court ordered return and reinstallation of
machineries. Petitioner deposited them along the road, near the quarry of the defendant
without reinstallation rendering them useless. Petitioner complains that the respondent
Judge had disregarded his manifestation that equipment seized are the Petitioner's
property until fully paid for and as such never became immovable and ordinarily replevin
may be brought to recover any specific personal property unlawfully taken or detained
from the owner thereof, provided such property is capable of identification and delivery;
but replevin will not lie for the recovery of real property or incorporeal personal property.

ISSUE: Whether or not special civil action known as replevin is applicable only to
personal property.

HELD: Ordinarily replevin may be brought to recover any specific personal property
unlawfully taken or detained from the owner thereof, provided such property is capable
of identification and delivery; but replevin will not lie for the recovery of real property or
incorporeal personal property.

When the sheriff repaired to the premises of respondent, Ipo Limestone Co., Inc.,
machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly
to the concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the
former could not be separated from the latter "without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object." Hence, in order to remove said outfit, it became necessary,
not only to unbolt the same, but also, to cut some of its wooden supports. Moreover,
said machinery and equipment were "intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry" carried on said immovable and tended." For these reasons, they were already
immovable property pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of Civil Code of the
Philippines, which are substantially identical to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 334 of the
Civil Code of Spain. As such immovable property, they were not subject to replevin.