Tecson vs.

COMELEC – 424 SCRA 277 [2004] (need for post-election issue)

Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X.
Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no
such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23
January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004,
Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en
banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise
prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would
stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with
GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the office of the President of the
Philippines.

Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus
soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify
a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912),
did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries
on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be
drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were
married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the
time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of
public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding
the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or
not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must
not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.

Macalintal vs. PET 635 SCRA 783 [2010] (Constitutionality)

FACTS:

Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal questioned the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an
illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he
chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set
of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.

Petitioner’s averment is supposedly supported by the provisions of the 2005 Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (2005 PET Rules), specifically:

(1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices are
designated as "Chairman and Members," respectively;

(2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint employees and confidential employees of
every member thereof;

(3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate "Administrative Staff of the Tribunal" with the appointment of a
Clerk and a Deputy Clerk of the Tribunal who, at the discretion of the PET, may designate the Clerk of Court
(en banc) as the Clerk of the Tribunal; and

(4) Rule 11 which provides for a "seal" separate and distinct from the Supreme Court seal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is
unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

RULING: Petition is dismissed.

The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), specifically and exclusively clothed with
jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as "sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications" of the President and Vice-President.

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court
sitting en banc. It states that, “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose."

The word "contest" in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be invoked after the
election and proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no "contest" before a winner is
proclaimed.

To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply
constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the PET in
our country cannot be denied.

PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the
Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution, and it faithfully complies – not unlawfully defies – the constitutional directive. The adoption of a
separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into
Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and
exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral court.

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential
election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with
latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the
plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the
Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.

PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as
intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the
judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.

As regards petitioner’s claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in contravention of Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution, issue raised is more imagined than real. Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution reads:

SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated
to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of "dealing with the settlement of
disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and
enforceable" is apportioned to courts of justice.