Why Vote with the Chief?

Political Connections and Public Goods Provision in Zambia

Author(s): Kate Baldwin
Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 57, No. 4 (October 2013), pp. 794-809
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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 Why Vote with the Chief? Political Connections
and Public Goods Provision in Zambia

Kate Baldwin Yale University

Why are voters influenced by the views of local patrons when casting their ballots? The existing literature suggests that
coercion and personal obligations underpin this form of clientelism, causing voters to support candidates for reasons
tangential to political performance. However, voters who support candidates preferred by local patrons may be making
sophisticated political inferences. In many developing countries, elected politicians need to work with local patrons to
deliver resources to voters, giving voters good reason to consider their patron's opinions of candidates. This argument is
tested using data from an original survey of traditional chiefs and an experiment involving voters in Zambia. Chiefs and
politicians with stronger relationships collaborate more effectively to provide local public goods. Furthermore, voters are
particularly likely to vote with their chief if they perceive the importance of chiefs and politicians working jointly for local
development.

This article provides an alternative explanation for

local elites in developing countries claims their in the continued electoral influence of local elites, or as I
The existing literature
fluence operates through practices on
that arethe
trou electoral influence of refer to them here, "patrons."1 I argue that voters may
bling for democracy. Studies from Argentina (Stokes prefer the candidate backed by a local leader because
2005) to Senegal (Schatzberg 2001) to Taiwan (Wang and they expect this candidate to perform better in office.
Kurzman 2007) suggest that clientelism is underpinned This argument emphasizes the relevance of patrons' re
by vote buying and deference. Some scholars focus on lationships with elected politicians for the provision of
deficiencies in the secret ballot that allow local leaders public goods and access to government resources in their
to monitor voting and punish individuals depending communities.
on Voters have compelling reasons for electing
how they vote (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Med
candidates with good relationships with local patrons in
ina and Stokes 2007). Others emphasize the importance contexts where patrons play a key role in facilitating the
government's delivery of goods and services locally. In
of voters' personal loyalties and obligations to local elites
(Auyero 2000; Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Scott 1972). these contexts, the performance of politicians in provid
But in both of these arguments, elites give voters non ing for their constituents once in office is dependent on
political reasons for supporting candidates and thus un them having good working relationships with patrons.
dermine the integrity of the voting process. The implication is that individuals who decide to vote

Kate Baldwin is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale University, 115 Prospect Street, P.O. Box 208301, New Haven, CT 06520-8301
(after July 1, 2013, e-mail katharine.baldwin@yale.edu; until then e-mail kabaldwin@ufl.edu).

The author is grateful for feedback on earlier versions from Thad Dunning, Tim Frye, Fred Greenstein, John Huber, Macartan Humphreys
Kimuli Kasara, Carmen Le Foulon, Victoria Murillo, Virginia Oliveros, Alexandra Scacco, David Stasavage, Leonard Wantchekon, Rebecca
Weitz-Shapiro, and Matthew Winters. Jean Cheelo, Patrick Engaenga, Rickson Kanema, Sepo Lemba, Nkhatazo Lungu, Njekwa Mate,
Golden Mutenda, Enock Msoni, Dominic Nzala, and Peter Soko provided excellent research assistance in Zambia. The research was
supported by a National Science Foundation Dissertation Improvement Grant, a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada Doctoral Fellowship, a grant from the Center for International Business Education and Research at Columbia University, and
Dracopoulos Fellowship. Part of the writing was completed while the author was a fellow at the Alexander Hamilton Center for Political
Economy at New York University, a visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University, and an
assistant professor at the University of Florida. This research was approved by the Columbia University Institutional Review Board as
Protocol IRB-AAAC3883(Y1M00). The data used in the study are available via the AJPS DataVerse site.

'I define this term at length at the beginning of the next section.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 57, No. 4, October 2013, Pp. 794-809

©2013, Midwest Political Science Association DOI: 10.1111/ajps. 12023

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 WHY VOTE WITH THE CHIEF? 795

with their patron

also have may be
performance-related making
reasons for supporting the s
tions about their political
candidate interests;
preferred by local leaders. In particular, I ar
sarily coerced or gue
cowed into
that voters should care supporti
about relationships between
believe will politicians and
perform local leaders when voters view the main
poorly.
This article makes bothas bringing
role of their representatives a theoreti
home pork, and
ical contribution community
to the literature
leaders facilitate the government's delivery ofon
provides a revised
goods and explanation
services locally. for
fluence. This argument recasts the
In many developing countries, voters are predomi
the voting decisions of
nantly concerned withclients.
the ability of politicians These
to provide
primarily concerned with
local public goods and services the
rather than perform
their stances on
sentatives, using the
national political
policy opinions
issues (Kitschelt 2000; Wantchekon 2003).
this. This perspective bridges
But in places where governments gaps
have weak bureaucratic
orize about voter behavior
capacity, into develo
politicians have limited capacity deliver re
countries, suggesting
sources directly that
to communities.poor
In "weak states,"voter
bureau
evaluating candidates.
cratic agencies and political parties lack the capacity to
Second, the article empirically
monitor problems, mobilize resources, or encourage partes
against the ticipation at the
strongest local level (Herbst 2000; Migdal 1988).
alternative expl
litical influence of local
In these elites,
contexts, the ability which
of politicians to successfully e
coercion and norms
respond to of
the needsreciprocity.
of community members hinges on Th
quantitative studies of
their ability political
to work with local patrons. patron
the difficulties I use the term "patron"
associated to denote unelected
with measur local
This article uses original data
elites in leadership positions by virtue of sources,
their centrality
of traditional to the social and
chiefs andeconomic structure
an inexperime
their commu
to test the nities (Scott 1972). The
explanatory title and exact basis
power of of power
diff
Zambia. I study not just
of these leaders the
vary across amount
countries, including land o
have, but also the characteristics
lords in Chile and India (Baland and Robinson 2009; o
fluenced them, and
Wilkinson 2007), by
Islamic I use
leaders in Senegalthis
and Indone in
sia (Schatzberg individuals
inferences about why 2001; Slamet-Velsink 1994),"gamonales"
vote
and "caciques" in
The article proceeds byColumbiaoutlining
and Mexico (Cornelius 1977; its
Schmidt 1984), and
the political influence oftraditional
localleaders in Sierra
patronLeone
Then I introduce and Zambia (Clapham
the case 1982). They
of are Zambia,
similar, however,
experienced a series of
in that they relatively
are all unelected leaders at the zenith of fair
the
but where unelected
socioeconomicchiefs
hierarchy in their communities.
are still This puts t
nificant political them
influence
in a unique position to lobby in
on behalfrural
of their com ar
section providesmunities,
preliminary
to obtain information on problems,empir
to organize
article's argument, showing
local resources, that
and to ensure community chie
participation
ships to elected politicians have
in programs. The embeddedness signifi
of patrons within their
public goods provision
communities gives them andthe capacity toelectora
broker relation
cal candidates inships
Zambia. The
between voters and politicians, main
and the incentive to e
an experiment designed to
do so.2 Patrons can serve as the analyze
technology by which local h
goods and services are demanded
opinions affect Zambian voters. and delivered. I con
the implications of the evidence for t
clientelism.
2I argue patrons have an incentive to broker relationships between
voters and politicians not because they are benevolent but because
they gain materially from doing so. Patrons who live full-time
A Performance-Based
among their subjects or rely in great part on contributions from E
for Patrons' Electoral Influence community members for material support are akin to Olson's "sta
tionary bandits," who have an encompassing interest in the local
economy (2000); they stand to benefit from the provision of public
Existing explanations for the electoral influence of localgoods and services within their communities. In addition, patrons
may "capture" a share of the resources targeted at their communi
elites emphasize the ability of these leaders to coerce or
ties. As long as this amount is less than the benefits that would be
pressure voters into supporting candidates the voter belost if politicians tried to deliver resources directly to communities,
lieves will perform poorly in office. However, voters may the argument outlined in this section still holds.

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796 KATE BALDWIN

However, about
the how w
effectiv
work withbased on
patrons a
to
vices collaborate
depends on the q
have a poor By viewin
relationsh
action sources
costs when are
wor
resources the
will incentiv
translat
vices that patron
benefit usin
com
two oped
leaders have by
a Co
stro
work dregan
together (199
more e
tween a amount
voter's of
patronr
of great community
political relev
have little efits will
choice oc
over
for their stronger
political re
rep
to use voters
their vote do se
to n
with theircians will
patron. t
Ind
be making sophistica
they have
likely (Dixit
performanceand
inL
This sons
argument for w
contr
planations stronger
for the re
pol
existing explanation
pect to rece
e
violable, is elected.
making it K
p
ward) voters for vot
terpretation
Stokes 2007; Stokes
serve as a t
suggested commit
that to
local p
le
individuals The explan
vote; leade
similarities
technologies that allow
vote (Kitschelt andcu
heuristic W
in small tight-knit
endorsemenc
believe which
they can polit
find
and Stokes 2004;
RedlawskCha
2
The secondthe promine
Americ
that local dorsements
leaders dra
them in order to
"lazy" mob
voter
(Auyero 2000; Lemar
information
2001 ; Scott
In 1972).Nor
contrast,
to repay local leaders are more thanassistanc
past an information shortcut for
the patron's
"lazy" voters. Patrons'preferr
opinions of politicians don't sim
2012; Lawson
ply reflect how well a 2009). Ac
political candidate will perform; they
voters areaffect
not
how well politicians will
coerced
serve their constituents.
they are still influenc
How does my explanation differ in its empirical pre
that are tangential
dictions from existing theories that emphasize the im t
performance.
portance of coercion or reciprocity in underpinning the
Both of influence of patrons?leading
the Two unique predictions follow from e
can get this explanation for patrons'to
voters political influence.
supp First, the
will relationship between politicians
perform poorly and patrons should af i
them or by
fect the delivery ofdrawing
public goods and services in patrons'
generally, the
communities. In places whereliteratu
politicians have better rela
describes voters
tionships as
with patrons, communities should un
receive more
are easily manipulated
argument suggests th
3Our research differs in that Keefer and Vlaicu (2007) seek to ex
assessments of
plain politicians' choices, candid
and this project seeks to explain voters'
opinions choices.
into account.

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 WHY VOTE WITH THE CHIEF? 797

public goods and services.

(approximately two-thirds of whom represent rural ar The
article tests eas), and mostprediction
this Zambians believe the main function of and
are more likelytheirto
MP is to deliver
vote goods and services
forto their com candid
tionships to munities. This local
their is a common expectation across develop
patrons.
In addition, although
ing countries, particularly where MPs areall
elected from three
that some single-member
voters constituencies (Ashworth and
should be Bueno de influe
opinions, they Mesquita
differ 2006).6 Zambian MPs in are expectedthe
to deliver char
dict will condition
local projects by lobbying an individua
for resources from ministries
with their patron.
and by allocating resources
Accordingfrom the constituency devel to t
ward above, individuals
opment funds they control.7 who beli
patrons must In addition, like manytogether
work other new democracies, to
vices should be Zambia
most has weak political parties,
likelywhich further height to vot
contrast, ens MPs' incentives to campaign onthat
explanations promises of targeted empha
coercion or norms of
redistribution rather than reciprocit
programmatic policies (Keefer
influence of patrons
2007). The field research for predict
this project was conducted that
individuals are in 2007
crucialand 2008, at which time the
inMovement for Multi
condition
to their party Democracy
patron's (MMD) formed the government. Two
influence. The fif
adjudicates regional opposition parties,
between the Patriotic Front (based
different exp
the characteristics of individuals that condition their like in northern and urban Zambia) and the United Party
lihood of being influenced by their patron's opinion in an for National Development (UPND, based in southern
experiment. Zambia), also had significant numbers of parliamentary
seats. There are few ideological differences between these
parties, which differ mainly in their ethnic bases of sup
Background on Chiefs and port (Posner 2004). None of the parties existed prior to
Politicians in Zambia 1990, and none has a significant organizational presence
in rural areas between elections.

The combination of voter expectations and weak

The explanatory power of this argument is tested using
data from Zambia. Zambia was among the firstparties
coun means that Zambian MPs are under great pres
tries in Africa to amend its constitution to allow multi sure to deliver pork to their constituents, but they can
party elections in the early 1990s, and it has since held not rely on the bureaucracy to implement the projects
five national elections. However, during this sequence offor which they secure funding. Like in "weak states"
relatively free and fair elections, nonelected traditional and "brown zones" elsewhere in Africa, Asia, and Latin
leaders have continued to influence governance in rural America (Migdal 1988; O'Donnell 1993), the state bu
areas, and political candidates have gone to great effortsreaucracy is largely absent from rural Zambia (Bratton
to demonstrate they have the support of local chiefs. As1980; Herbst 2000). Instead, in order to ensure that the
a senior leader of one political party expressed it, "The projects for which funds are secured are actually imple
first port of call in any election is the chief."4 This artimented, Zambian MPs need to work closely with com
cle focuses specifically on the relationships between rural munity leaders.
Members of Parliament (MPs) and traditional chiefs, and Community leaders work with politicians to orga
the effects chiefs have on parliamentary elections.5 nize local involvement in the delivery of public goods
Although the empirical data used in this article are and services in many developing countries (Olken and
drawn exclusively from Zambia, the findings have broadSinghal 2011). For example, in Senegal, the state works
implications. Zambia is a classic example of a new democ
racy with a weak state bureaucracy in which elected repre
6In the Afrobarometer survey (2009), 91% of Zambians said the
sentatives are expected to provide targeted goods. Zambia
main function of their MP was to represent their constituents' needs
has 150 MPs elected from single-member constituencies or deliver jobs and development; only 9% said their main function
was to make laws for the good of the country or to monitor the
4InterviewPOL-l. government. A majority of respondents indicated their MPs main
function was bringing home pork in all 20 surveyed countries, with
'Zambia also has a directly elected and powerful president who has
particularly high percentages in countries using single-member
a narrower network of regional leaders and paramount chiefs on systems.
whom he depends for support; unfortunately, there are not enough
independent observations to study these relationships systemati 7In 2008, government and opposition MPs each had a fund worth
cally. about US$125,000.

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 798 KATE
with marabouts
information and local organizational capacity. As(Islam
tural policies
ticularly blunt MP told me, "Once you have the resistance
monales" of the chief, I don't see how you can operate
(local notab as Mem
for ber
clinics of Parliament."16 Another
(Schmidt MP noted that it would be
closely with
difficult to get elected without the support of the chief,
projects.
Traditional chiefs are customary leaders who head
communities (sometimes very) loosely based on precolo
nial governance structures. Rural Zambia is divided into
286 chiefdoms, each of which is headed by a hereditary
chief who rules for life; there are approximately three
chiefs per electoral constituency.8 The fact that Zambian
chiefs and their "subjects" live in geographically defined
areas is a methodological advantage, as it provides a means
of measuring the administrative and political impact of
chiefs.9 Chiefs are constitutionally barred from running
for office, but they continue to play an important role
in allocating land, administering justice, and organizing
community projects.10 They are highly respected within
their communities, with two-thirds of rural Zambians
saying that they trust traditional leaders a lot.11
Chiefs are uniquely positioned to facilitate the im
plementation of local projects. First, chiefs typically have
up-to-date information on local problems. As an oppo
sition MP told me, "All the things [constituents] need,
they cry to [the chief] So the chief knows what the
problems are."12 Chiefs must also give permission before
customary land can be used for development projects.13
Finally, chiefs organize voluntary labor, and they monitor
the progress of local projects.14 A government minister
explained the importance of involving chiefs in commu
nity organization, emphasizing that "once the chief says
something, there is no debate."15
As a result, in rural Zambia, chiefs and MPs must
work jointly to provide local public goods and services,
with the MPs providing financing, and the chief providing
8Chiefdoms are rarely divided between constituencies. In the few
cases where chiefdoms are divided, I assigned the chiefdom to the
constituency in which the majority of its population lives.
'Patrons whose clients are not geographically clustered may have
equal influence, but it will typically be harder to detect.
10The fact that chiefs cannot run for office also helps the study.
In cases where patrons can run for office, voters can ensure the
smooth delivery of goods and services not just by electing someone
with a close relationship with their patron but also by electing the
patron himself.
"This statistic is from the Afrobarometer survey (2009).
!2Interview POL-9.
''Interviews POL-3, POL-4, POL-7, POL-10, POL-13, POL-25.
"Interviews POL-2, POL-7, POL-10, POL-25, CHF-32.
15Interview POL-25.
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BALDWIN
a par
(Coulo
tradition
"because whichever political leader aspires to be the MP,
they must work with the chief."17 The importance of MPs
having good working relationships with chiefs was also
noted by a number of voters I interviewed. For example,
interviewees noted that political candidates without the
support of the chief "will not deliver if elected," or "if they
are voted in, they will fail in their duties."18
The Political Effects of Connections
between Chiefs and MPs
In this section, I provide two pieces of evidence in support
of the theory outlined above. I show both that politicians
with stronger relationships to chiefs actually do provide
more local public goods and that candidates' relation
ships to chiefs affect their electoral support. Both parts of
the analysis draw on a new chiefdom-level data set based
in part on an original survey of chiefs conducted in three
provinces of Zambia in 2007. The survey data were then
combined with census data, electoral data, and geocoded
information on the provision of classrooms by georefer
encing historical maps indicating the boundaries of each
chiefdom.
I measure the strength of relationships between chiefs
and MPs using a question that asked the chief the number
of years since he or she first met the MP. The logic of this
measure is that individuals face high barriers to cooper
ating when they first meet, but they typically overcome
these challenges the more times they interact. Further
more, an additional year of interaction probably makes a
larger difference when people first meet and less so once
they have an established pattern of interaction, so the
measure employed is the log of the number of years the
chief and the MP have known each other ( Connections to
MP (In)).19 The number of years chiefs have known MPs
varies from 0 to 50, so the logged variable ranges from 0 to
16Interview POL-IO.
"interview POL-3.
18Interviews CIT-56, CIT-57.
19I have added 1 to the number of years of the relationship prior to
taking logs to avoid undefined values in cases where the chief and
the MP had not met. The survey also included a question that asked
chiefs about their preferred candidate in the 2006 parliamentary
election. There are concerns that chiefs may have felt pressure to
say they liked the winning candidate best, and almost half of the
respondents refused to state which candidate they liked best. Even
WHY VOTE WITH THE CHIEF? 799

Table 1 Chiefs' Connections to MPs and Local focus on this outcome because there is significant varia
Classrooms tion in the construction of classrooms across rural Zambia

and because collaboration between chiefs and MPs is par

(1) (2) (3) ticularly important for constructing these classrooms.20
Connections to MP 0.352** 0.378** 0.331* The dependent variable in Table 1, Temporary Classrooms,
(In) (0.036) (0.039) (0.057) measures the number of classrooms in the chiefdom dur

Temporary Classrooms 0.385*** 0.380*** 0.440*' ing the 2007-08 school year. It takes on 21 unique values
06-07 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ranging from 0 to 29 but with the data concentrated at
Population 0.042*** 0.053*** 0.033*' the bottom end of the range. Because the data are not
(0.000) (0.001) (0.028) continuous, I use ordered logit models to analyze the
Years since MP -0.057* -0.054 -0.045 data. The standard errors in the models are clustered by
First Elected (0.094) (0.134) (0.254) constituency.
Years Chief Installed 0.027** 0.023* 0.009 Model 1, the baseline specification, includes four con
(0.047) (0.061) (0.694) trol variables. The first is the number of temporary class
Proportion Vote for 0.932 rooms in the chiefdom during the previous academic year
MP (Chiefdom) (0.343) ( Temporary Classrooms 06-07).21 The second is the size
MMD MP -0.481 of the chiefdom (Population, measured in thousands of
(0.342) people). Finally, in order to isolate the effect of chiefs'
Difference in Vote -1.932 connections to MPs from the experience of each leader,
(Constituency) (0.191) the model includes measures of the MP's years of experi
University MP -0.129 ence ( Years since MP First Elected) and the chief's years in
(0.802) office (Years Chief Installed).
Cabinet MP 0.399 Model 1 shows the effect of connections between the

(0.336) chief and the MP on the number of temporary class

Local MP 0.482 rooms in the chiefdom is large, positive, and statistically
(0.331) significant at the 95% confidence level. This suggests that
Chief with Secondary -0.012 electing a MP with a stronger relationship to the local
Education (0.980) chief makes a material difference to voters. Substantively,
Chief with Political 0.616 the impact of a one-unit increase in the connections be
Experience (0.238) tween the chief and the MP (equivalent to an increase
Chief Age 0.030 from 0 to 2, 2 to 6, 6 to 19, or 19 to 54 years in their
(0.112) relationship) is almost as large as the effect of having one
Pseudo R-squared 0.199 0.198 0.222 additional temporary classroom in the chiefdom during
N 99 96 94 the previous academic year. The coefficients on the other
control variables are positive and statistically significant,
Note: ***, **, and * indicate 99, 95, and 90% confidence levels,
as expected, with the exception of the negative coefficient
respectively. Table displays p-values in parentheses. Models are or
on Years since MP First Elected.
dered logit regressions, with standard errors clustered at the con
stituency level. The dependent variable is the number of temporary Model 2 shows the results in Model 1 are robust to
classrooms in the chiefdom during the 2007-08 academic year.
controlling for political variables thought to influence
the allocation of local public goods. Cox and McCubbins
about 4. About three-quarters of the chiefs in the analysis (2004) suggest that core supporters are favored in the allo
met their current MP before the MP was elected to office, cation of goods; politicians favor their supporters within
indicating the measure captures something distinct from constituencies, measured here by Proportion Vote for MP
the political experience of the MP. (Chiefdom), and the government favors MPs from its own
The models in Table 1 analyze the impact of rela
tionships between chiefs and politicians on the provision 20MPs mobilize funds for the construction of these classrooms,
of "temporary" classrooms (defined as classrooms built while chiefs organize voluntary labor and community contribu
tions and allocate land for classrooms. Interviews POL-5, POL-7.
in part from local materials) in government schools. I
21The outcome is not specified as the change in the number of
so, there is a strong correlation between preferring the winning classrooms because classrooms constructed from local materials
candidate and knowing that candidate longer (r = .44), suggesting will decay substantially from year to year, implying that the coeffi
the length of MP-chief relationships is an important determinant cient on the number of classrooms in existence in the previous year
of the strength of these relationships. should be less than one.

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8oo KATE BALDWIN

party, measured by a dummy variable for MMDTable 2 Chiefs' Connections to Candidates and
MP. In
contrast, Dixit and Londregan (1996) suggest that politi Electoral Support of Incumbent
cians often target resources at swing constituencies, mea
sured here using the difference in the vote share between
(1) (2)
the top two candidates at the constituency level (Differ
Difference in 0.023** 0.024*

ence in Vote (Constituency)). Even controlling for these

Connections (0.048) (0.092)
additional covariates, the effect of connections between
Incumbent Vote 2001 0.116 0.036

the chief and the MP remains large and precisely esti (0.621) (0.859)
mated. Furthermore, none of the new variablesIncumbent
obtain Candidate -0.025 -0.041

statistical significance. (0.719) (0.551)

Model 3 shows that chiefs' connections to MPs con MMD Incumbent -0.061 -0.055
tinue to affect classroom construction even once control (0.223) (0.248)
ling for a host of other personal characteristics of the MP UPND Incumbent 0.132 0.130*
and the chief that could conceivably influence their will (0.137) (0.094)
ingness and capacity to provide local public goods. TheNumber of Candidates -0.028*** —0.027*!
model includes a series of dummy variables indicating (0.001) (0.001)
whether the MP has a university degree ( University MP),Years since Incumbent -0.013 -0.008

whether the MP has at any time been in the cabinet ( Cab First Elected (0.170) (0.366)
inet MP), and whether the MP is local to the chiefdomIncumbent from 0.044
(Local MP). In addition, the model includes variables in Chiefdom (0.264)
dicating whether the chief completed secondary schoolOpposition from 0.041

( Chief with Secondary Education), whether the chief was Chiefdom (0.318)
ever involved in politics (Chief with Political Experience),Constant 0.535 0.528

and the age of the chief in years {Chief Age). None of (0.000) (0.000)
the new variables has a statistically significant effect on R-squared 0.498 0.499
classroom construction, and although the statistical sigN 87 86
nificance of the coefficient on Connections to MP drops
Note: ***, **, and * indicate 99, 95, and 90% confidence levels,
slightly below the 95% confidence level, the size of the
respectively. Table displays p-values in parentheses. Models are OLS
effect remains large. regressions with standard errors clustered at the constituency level.
In sum, the length of relationships between chiefs andThe dependent variable is the proportion of votes for the local
incumbent.
MPs has a strong effect on classroom construction at the
local level.22 Insofar as relationships between chiefs and
politicians impact the amount of development in their(logged).23 The dependent variable, Incumbent Vote, indi
communities, voters have good reasons for consideringcates the proportion of votes for the local incumbent party
the strength of this relationship when deciding whether in the chiefdom. Incumbent Vote ranges from .07 to .9,
to support political candidates. But are voters actuallywith 80% of the data falling between .2 and .8, suggesting
little truncation. As a result, the models in Table 2 are
influenced by the relationship between their chief and
their MP? I turn to this in Table 2. ordinary least squares regressions, with the standard er
The models in Table 2 analyze the effect of candi rors clustered at the constituency level. All of the models
dates' connections to chiefs on electoral support for the include controls for the incumbent party's vote share in
2001 (Incumbent Vote 2001 ), whether the incumbent can
incumbent party at the chiefdom level in the 2006 parlia
mentary elections. The independent variable of interest in didate was running (Incumbent Candidate), which party
these models is Difference in Connections, a variable that was the local incumbent party (MMD Incumbent, UPND
compares candidates' relationships with the chief. It is Incumbent), the number of candidates for the parliamen
equal to the length of the chief's relationship with the in tary seat {Number of Candidates), and the incumbent can
cumbent party candidate (logged) minus the length of the didate's years of experience ( Years Since Incumbent First
Elected).
chief's relationship with the opposition party candidate
Model 1 indicates that the incumbent party received
significantly higher levels of electoral support when their

22 In the supplementary information, I show that these relationships 23This is equivalent to the log of the incumbent party candidate's
also affect road repairs and the ability of the chief to lobby the MP connections over the opposition party candidate's connections,
more generally. which provides another way of interpreting the measure.

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 WHY VOTE WITH THE CHIEF? 801

candidate had stronger

resentative to work jointly with theconnectio
chief, because they
opponent. A one
are worriedstandard
about being sanctioned by the chief deviat
if they
ratio of the connections
do not, or because they feel obliged to reciprocate of
favors th
could reflect either an increase
from the chief. I use an experimental design to identify
candidate's connections or
the effect of chiefs' opinions on voters, and then examine a d
party candidate's connections
whether the attributes predicted to be important by each
centage points more
explanation votes
condition respondents' likelihood of beingfor
small but important
influenced by their chiefs'margin
opinions. In spite of the ubiq of d
quarter of the uity
parliamentary
of arguments about coercion and reciprocity in the ra
decided margins by of
literature, my data provide 6
compelling percen
evidence that these
it is factors do significant
statistically not drive Zambians to vote with their chiefs;at t
Model 2 instead,the
shows voters support effect
candidates with strong relation
of h
tions to the local chief
ships to their chiefs remains
because of concerns about their joint
less statistically
performance
significant,
in providing local development. onc
whether the incumbent party
tion party candidate were from
from Chiefdom, Opposition fro
Experimental Design
controls are introduced, the sta
coefficient on This research employs an experimental design
Difference in becauseCon
confidence level, but the size
of the challenges of measuring the influence of chiefs on of
unchanged, and
voters using
the observational
coefficients
studies. The difficulty is that
ing whether observed similarities
the candidates between the political views of elites
are f
statistically and other voters could be driven by common environ
significant.24
To summarize,
mental the results
factors or even by prese
the effect of voters' interests on
that Zambianthe voters consider
views articulated by their leaders. In addition, given
tionships to that elite influence
their is a sensitive topic, voters
chiefs when may sys d
The results in Table 1 demonstrate that it would be ratio tematically over- or understate the extent to which they
nal for voters to support politicians with stronger connec are influenced by local elites if asked directly. However,
tions to their chiefs because they expect these politicians by randomly exposing respondents to information about
to provide more local public goods. However, the article their chiefs' political opinions, I can measure the extent
has not yet presented any evidence that this is why voters to which different subsets of voters are influenced by their
decide to vote with their chiefs. The next section provides chiefs' views.
this crucial piece of evidence. This experiment randomized citizens' information
about their chief's opinion of their current MP. At the two
selected research sites, I first interviewed the traditional
chiefs to assess their level of support for the current MP;
How Do Chiefs' Opinions Influence the chiefs were supportive at both sites. Then I conducted
Voters? an attitudinal survey of a representative sample of
the chiefdom's voters. After completing the attitudinal
survey, a randomly selected subset of the respondents
This section tests the power of different explanations for
chiefs' influence by examining whether the characteristics
were informed of their chief's views, as elicited during
the interview with the chief. For example, in Ndake
of individuals most affected by their chiefs are those pre
dicted by each explanation. Specifically, this sections aims
chiefdom, the treated respondents were told: "In a recent
to assess whether individuals vote with their chief because
interview, Chief Ndake said that he would love to see For
rie Tembo re-elected in the next parliamentary election."
they are concerned about the ability of their elected rep
The treatment cue was taken word-for-word from the in

terview with the chief to maximize the authenticity of the

24In the supplementary information, I also demonstrate that these
statement. Then all respondents were asked to participate
results are not driven by high levels of electoral support for long
serving and hard-working MPs (who may also have longer rela
in an opinion poll on whether they would support their
tionships with local chiefs); similar results obtain when the sample
is restricted to communities without incumbent MPs and commu
MP if an election were held in the next year. The opinion
nities where the incumbent party candidate met the chief before he poll was made distinct from the rest of the survey in order
or she was first elected to office. both to encourage respondents to reflect carefully on

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802
Table 3 Attributes of Individuals Most Likely toacross groups defined by their relationships with
effects
Vote with Chief
Explanation Attribute
Benefits from Belief that MP and chief jointly
Collaboration important for local governance
Coercion Belief that chief can change
treatment based on how vote
Reciprocity Belief in norm of reciprocity
Belief in norm of reciprocity and
received assistance from chief
their choices and to mimic the level of confidentiality that
exists in the voting process; respondents were instructed
that, although individual responses in the opinion poll
would be kept confidential (names were never asked
or recorded as part of the attitudinal survey or the
opinion poll), the results of the opinion poll would be
compiled at the village level and sent back to community
leaders.
All explanations for patrons' political influence ex
pect the treatment to affect certain voters, but the expla
nations differ in who they predict will be affected. The
main purpose of the experiment is to examine whether
the treatment effect varies depending on whether respon
dents have the characteristics the different explanations
predict to be important in conditioning individuals' re
sponsiveness to the treatment. The predictions of each
explanation are outlined in Table 3. If people who believe
that their chief and their MP jointly affect local gover
nance are particularly influenced by their chief's opin
ions, this would be consistent with my argument that
voters are concerned about the ability of politicians to
collaborate with chiefs once in office. If people who be
lieve their chief can change their treatment of them based
on how they vote are more likely to vote with the chief,
this would suggest the chief can coerce people into voting
for particular candidates. If people who feel obliged to re
ciprocate favors from the chief are more likely to support
their chief's candidate, this would suggest that norms of
reciprocity underpin the influence of chiefs.
The main challenge for the study was ensuring the
treatment assignment actually varied respondents' infor
mation about their chief's opinion. Most experimental
studies of political communication ask individuals to re
spond to hypothetical statements from, or about, hy
pothetical individuals (Berinsky and Mendelberg 2005;
Weitz-Shapiro 2012; White 2007). Because the purpose
of this experiment was to find heterogeneous treatment
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KATE BALDWIN
their chief, this design was not appropriate for this study.
Instead, this experiment varied individuals' information
about their chief's true opinion.
The challenge in administering an experiment that
selectively reveals the opinions of real actors is that some
respondents may already know their chief's views of their
current MP. I adopted two strategies to minimize the pos
sibility of respondents being aware of their chief's political
views prior to the administration of the treatment. First,
the survey was implemented during the middle of a par
liamentary term because background research suggested
chiefs are particularly likely to broadcast their support
for MPs during parliamentary campaigns. Second, I se
lected research sites where the MPs were in their first
term, thereby avoiding locations where the relationship
between the chief and the MP had a well-known history.
Responses to questions in the preexperimental section
of the survey suggest that these site selection rules were
effective in minimizing the probability that respondents
were already aware of their chief's views.25
A second consideration in the site selection was
testing the generalizability of the results. I chose two
sites with very different chieftaincy institutions. Ndake
chiefdom in Zambia's Eastern province has decentralized
traditional institutions, and the chief is highly accessible
to the general population. In contrast, Kashiba/Lubunda
in Zambia's Luapula province is part of the Lunda king
dom, a hierarchically organized kingdom in which chiefs
are more removed from their subjects. At each research
site, a representative sample of 192 adults was targeted.
The research design adopted for this study falls some
where in between a field experiment and a survey ex
periment. The project manipulated individuals' access to
information about a real political actor, but collected in
formation about political behavior and opinions in the
context of responding to a survey, and thus involved some
departures from the full realism that is the hallmark of
a field experiment. For example, in a real election cam
paign, voters typically learn their chief's opinion from a
member of their village, rather than from an enumerator.
The design also relies on self-reported intentions, rather
than measures of actual voting behavior. Fortunately, field
reports suggest that respondents took the information
provided in the experimental prompt at face value, and
25 In the preexperimental part of the survey, individuals were asked
whether they thought their chief would support their MP if an
election were to be held in the next year; 55% of people volun
teered that they did not know, and 25% of people guessed wrong,
suggesting the 20% of people who gave correct responses may also
have simply made good guesses.
 WHY VOTE WITH THE CHIEF? 803

the opinion poll was explicitly

Finally, I measured desig
whether individuals felt obliged
dents similar to reciprocate
levels of favorsconfidentiality
from their chief through a two-step
reasonably expect to have
process. Respondents in
are coded as being subject an
to an ac elec
results are also compiled
tivated norm of reciprocityat the
only if they village
both believed in a
norm of reciprocity and had received personal assistance
from their chief in the past year. The survey included a
Measuring
vignetteCovariates
designed to elicit respondents' views about the
obligation to reciprocate favors from chiefs. In the vi
Questions designed to measure each
gnette, a person was provided a gift from the local chief
listed in Table 3 were asked as part
and asked to support the chief's candidate. Individuals
survey conducted prior to the exper
who reported that the person in the vignette had some or
attitudinal questions were asked bef
a lot of obligation to support the chief's preferred candi
in order to ensure responses would no
date — 44% of respondents — are coded as believing in a
by the treatment. Because the quest
norm of reciprocity. However, even if individuals believe
attributes in Table 3 were asked as p
in the abstract in a norm of reciprocity, they may not feel
battery of questions, the priming effe
obliged to follow their chief's instructions unless they
In the analysisalsothat follows,
received assistance the
from the chief in the past year. m
whether individuals believed their chief and their MP
Only 17% of respondents who believed in a norm of reci
jointly affected local development is a measure of whether
procity had also received assistance from their chief in the
the respondent believed both the chief and the MP played
past year and are therefore coded as having an "activated"
important roles in the governance of their local com norm of reciprocity.
munities. Respondents were asked to rate separately how
Before presenting the tests of these three explanations
much the decisions of their chief and the decisions of their
for chiefs' influence, it should be noted that chiefs have
MP influenced daily life in their community on a scale of
only a modest impact on political behavior across their
0 to 10. Respondents who answered above 5 to both ques
chiefdoms as a whole. Across all respondents, the effect
tions are coded as perceiving the two actors to be jointly
of information about the chief's support for the MP is
important. Approximately 43% of respondents believed
a four percentage point increase in support for the MP.
that both actors were important in the governance of their
Although this effect is not statistically significant, the size
communities, while 57% believed that only one of these
is in line with the finding in Table 2 that a one standard
actors (or that neither of these actors) was an importantdeviation increase in connections to the chief relative to
community leader.27
political opponents is associated with 3 percentage points
I measured whether individuals were worried about
more support. In addition, to the extent that information
being personally punished or rewarded by their chief for on the chief's opinion about the MP is shared strategi
voting a particular way by asking respondents how likely
cally with voters upon whom it has greatest impact dur
they thought it was that their chief could change their ing real elections, the average treatment effect from the
treatment of them based on how they cast their ballot experiment-—which was conducted on a random sample
in an election. If respondents said there was any chance
of voters—may understate the impact of chiefs' opinions
their chief could change their treatment of them, they are on electoral results.28 The takeaway is that chiefs are not
coded as being worried about being punished/rewarded able to influence all voters, but the next section shows
for voting a particular way. It is noteworthy that only they have a large impact on certain types of voters.
20% of respondents thought it was possible to be treated
differently based on how they cast their ballot.

Experimental Results
26Respondents should have expected even higher levels of This section tests whether the effect of finding out the
anonymity in their answers to the attitudinal part of the survey, chief's opinion differs across groups of voters defined by
as compared to the opinion poll, because the reports sent back to
the characteristics listed in Table 3.1 do this by calculating
communities were based only on the opinion poll results. In the
supplementary information, I show that it is impossible that miss
the difference in the size of the treatment effects across
ing data could change the substantive conclusions of this section.

27Within the 57% of people who did not think both the chief and
the MP important, 33% believed that only the chief was important, 28 Interviews with politicians suggest that information on the chief's
11% believed that only the MP was important, and 13% believed opinion of politicians is often targeted at voters thought to be
that neither was important. particularly influenced by it. Interviews POL-3, POL-7, POL-8.

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 8θ4 KATE BALDWIN

Figure 1 Testing

Fear of Punishment
Importance of Bo
O

o Need both leaders o Chief can punish for vote

• Do not need both leaders • Chief cannot punish for vote

Control Control Treatment

Norm of Reciprocity Activated Norm of Reciprocity

o Activated norm of reciprocity

• Not activated norm of reciprocity

i—

Control Treatment Control Treatment

these groups. The results that follow are based on testsaround the point estimates indicate the 95% confidence
of differences in means. The statistical significance of the intervals. The difference in the slope of the lines in the graph
differences are assessed using t-tests, applying the conseris the quantity of greatest interest in this analysis, as a large
vative Neyman estimates of the standard errors of each difference indicates finding out the chief's opinion dif
treatment effect when calculating the standard errors of ferentially affects these two groups.
the differences. The data in the top-left graph support the hypothesis
I present the experimental results graphically. For ex that people who perceive the joint importance of their
ample, the top-left quadrant of Figure 1 shows the effectchief and their MP are most likely to be influenced by
of finding out the chief's support for the MP across peo their chief's opinion. The treatment has a positive effect
ple who believe that both their chief and their MP areon voters who believe both the chief and the MP are im
important local leaders and those who do not. For the portant local leaders, as the positive slope of the gray line
group of respondents who believe both their chief andindicates. Within this group, support for the MP increases
their MP to be important, the open gray circles indicate by 18 percentage points if the chief's opinion is revealed.
the proportion who voted for the MP in the control and In contrast, among individuals who do not believe that
treatment groups. For the group of respondents who did both the chief and the MP are influential local leaders,
not believe both their chief and their MP to be important, support for the MP decreases by 5 percentage points if
the closed black dots represent the proportion who voted the chief's opinion is revealed. This is depicted by the
for the MP in the control and treatment groups. The barsdownward-sloping black line. The difference in the slopes

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WHY VOTE WITH THE CHIEF? 805

Figure 2 Robustness of Main Result

Alternative Cut-Point Alternative Measure

Need both leaders

Do not need both leaders

Control

Ndake Kashiba-Lubunda
00

o Need both leaders

• Do not need both leaders

I 1

Control Treatment

of the gray and black lines indicates that, as predicted, the The analysis also finds lit le sup ort for the claim that
size of the treatment ef ect varies depending on respon norms of reciprocity drive the political influence of chiefs.
dents' beliefs about the dual importance of chiefs and The bot om-left panel in Figure 1 shows that respondents
MPs. The dif erence in the size of the ef ect acros these who believe people are obliged to reciprocate as istance
two groups is statistical y significant at the 95% confi from their chief are general y more likely to sup ort their
dence level. MP, but they are not particularly influenced by finding out
In contrast, the analysis finds lit le sup ort for the their chief's opinion. The ef ect of finding out the chief's
argument that coercion underpins the political power of views is statistical y indistinguishable acros respondents
chiefs. The top-right quadrant of Figure 1 shows that who believe people should reciprocate as istance from
respondents who believe their chief could change their their chief and those who do not. The bot om-right panel
treatment of them based on how they vote are slightly examines whether individuals whose norm of reciprocity
les likely to sup ort the MP, regardles of experimental has be n "activated" by the receipt of as istance from the
treatment. Furthermore, this group of respondents is not chief in the past year are particularly likely to be influenced
more likely to be influenced by the chief's views. The by their chief's views. Again, the ef ect of finding out
chief's opinion makes lit le dif erence to either group the chief's views is smal and statistical y insignificant
of respondents' political views, as evidenced by the near among both respondents subject to an activated norm of
horizontal lines in the graph. reciprocity and respondents who are not.

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8o6 KATE BALDWIN

Table
In sum, the findings indicate that individuals who4 Who Thinks Chiefs and MPs Are Both
recognize the importance of both chiefs and politicians in Important?
governing their communities are particularly likely to vote
with their chief. In contrast, people who are worried about (1) (2)
being punished or who are subject to norms of reciprocity
Female -0.006 0.134
are not particularly likely to be influenced by their chief's (0.979) (0.587)
political views. Voters appear to use their chief's opinions
Age 0.008 0.012
to make inferences about the future performance of their (0.339) (0.205)
political representatives rather than being manipulated
Listen to Radio 0.569" 0.038
into casting their ballots for reasons unrelated to political
Every Week (0.026) (0.895)
performance. Engage in 0.339 0.657*

Agriculture (0.374) (0.098)

No Cash Income -0.162 0.138
Robustness Tests
(0.475) (0.590)
Party Member
The finding that individuals are most likely to vote with 0.686*** 0.315

their chief if they believe their chief and their MP are (0.003) (0.218)
Finished Primary 0.678*
jointly important in delivering development is very ro
bust. The top-left quadrant of Figure 2 shows that the re (0.008)
Chief's 1.284*
sults are not dependent on the particular cut-offs used to Ethnicity
code whether individuals believe both their chief and their (0.000)
MP are important; the results are virtually unchangedConstant
if -1.604 -2.631

only individuals who rated leaders above a 7 on a scale of (0.008) (0.000)

Adj. R-squared 0.037 0.101
0 to 10 are coded as believing them to be important. The
N 345 343
top-right quadrant shows that results are similar using a
second measure of individuals' beliefs about the impor
Note: ***, **, and * indicate 99, 95, and 90% confidence levels, re
tance of their chief in brokering benefits from the govspectively. Table displays p-values in parentheses. Models are logis
ernment. Individuals who have benefited from resources tic regressions with robust standard errors. The dependent variable
measures whether the respondent believes both the chief and the
provided to their chief from the government are 24 per
MP to be important.
centage points more likely to support their MP if they find
out their chief is supporting him, while individuals who
do not view their chief as a broker are uninfluenced by Model 1, which does not include controls for education
their chief's opinion, a difference in effect size that is sig level and ethnicity, a number of measures of information
nificant at the 90% confidence level. Finally, the bottom and political engagement are positively associated with
two quadrants of Figure 2 show that in both decentralized the likelihood of believing both leaders important. Indi
chiefdoms (Ndake) and centralized chiefdoms (Kashiba viduals who belong to political parties and respondents
Lubunda), the interaction effect remains large and statis who listen to the radio every week are significantly more
tically significant (at the 95% confidence level in Ndake, likely to believe both chiefs and MPs are influential local
and at the 90% confidence level in Kashiba-Lubunda).29 leaders. However, these effects disappear once controlling
But what are the characteristics of the respondents for whether respondents have completed primary educa
who recognize the importance of both chiefs and MPs tion and whether they are co-ethnics of the chief, the
in governing their communities? Are they really so two variables with the strongest effects on believing both
phisticated voters? Or are they people who might be chiefs and MPs important. Model 2 indicates that people
manipulated into supporting their chief's candidate? who have finished primary education are 16 percentage
Table 4 examines the characteristics of the respondents points more likely to believe both leaders important. In
who believe chiefs and MPs are both important in gov addition, co-ethnics of the chief are 30 percentage points
erning their communities using logit models. more likely to believe both leaders important, which may
The results show that people with greater knowledge reflect greater cognitive awareness of the chief's role in
of and exposure to how politics works are more likely to assisting MPs to deliver projects or the greater objective
recognize the importance of both their chiefs and MPs. In importance of chiefs in brokering goods for co-ethnics.30

29Even more robustness tests are included in the supplementary

information. 30These estimates were made holding other variables at their means.

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WHY VOTE WITH THE CHIEF? 8o7

Figure 3 Interaction Effects within Different different education, information, par

Demographic Strata ethnicity. The size of the sample in ea
tion of the overall sample size, so the
No Primary Education Primary Education
do not achieve the same level of sta
within each stratum. However, the in
main positive and large across all o
groups, as the divergence between the
2 3 in each graph indicates. Thus, demo
not appear to be driving the article's
In summary, individuals who vote
appear to be making sophisticated p
The previous section showed that Z
development benefits from electing
along with their chiefs and that th
to candidates with stronger relationsh
This section then demonstrated that individuals who
vote with their chiefs appear to be aware of the devel
opment benefits of electing politicians with positive re
lationships with chiefs; voters who recognize the joint
importance of chiefs and politicians to local governance
Not Party Member Party Member are more likely to vote with their chief. These individu
als, who are better informed than average, are not misled
when they vote with the chief; they are making a so
C o phisticated assessment about the future performance of
s,
0 ° politicians.
1Q.O
m.
o
CL cvj

Conclusion
Not Chief's Ethnicity Chiefs Ethnicity

This article shows that the electoral influence of local pa

2 .
* §"
trons does not always indicate that voters are being misled
i_ o
°
£

into voting against their political interests. The leading ex

t2- planations for patrons' political power emphasize the role
a. °
2 CM _
a. o of coercion and obligations in underpinning clientelistic
politics. However, this article shows that voters who sup
port candidates preferred by their local patrons may be
making sophisticated political inferences.
This is because, in many contexts, politicians with
stronger relationships
Although many of the correlations in Table with local
4 arepatrons can be expected
to the
sensible, they raise concerns that perform better in office.
conditional In places where the formal
effect
of beliefs about the importancebureaucracy
of both is leaders
weak, the delivery
may be of public goods and
driven by one of these demographic variables. In order on collaboration
services to communities often depends
between these
to demonstrate that these demographic two leaders,
variables are making
not the relationship be
tween themthe
driving the main finding, I examine politically
sizerelevant.
of the The in
political opinions of
teraction effect between beliefs about the importance of against their polit
patrons do not cause voters to vote
both leaders and exposure to the ical interests
chief's but to within
views alter their dif
expectations about the
performance
ferent demographic strata.31 Figure 3 shows of candidates
that the in delivering
size local public
of the interaction effect remainsgoods
large andacross
services. groups with

311 examine the robustness of the effect by partitioning the data,

interaction effects, and I do not have sufficient degrees of freedom
rather than using regression models, because I am interested
in thein
data to control for all of the interaction effects simultaneously.

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 8o8 KATE BALDWIN

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ing Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. Why

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