(FULLTEXT)
9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally
A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling
of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the
petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not
established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration
in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more
particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area
of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant
Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration
covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and
occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling
him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a
certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No.
Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing
an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the
Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under
FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment
granting Malabanan’s application for land registration,
disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act
496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-
D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming
part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of
legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the
judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he
had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect
title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession
prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable
was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Noting that the
CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been
declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982,
Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be
tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of
possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the
CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February 23, 2007
to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling
doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land.
In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural
land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be
counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect
title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141)
and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the
ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land
subject of the application for registration as alienable and
disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier,
was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration
proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab
initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the property had
been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their
predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public
domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was
essential was that the property had been "converted" into
private property through prescription at the time of the
application without regard to whether the property sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the
public domain.
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in
good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had
been the real owners of the land with the right to validly
transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-
year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the
application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had
already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years
reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared
alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain
a clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in
Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the
decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through
judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is
entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative

to discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari
existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.
because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence
possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the
part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Classifications of land according to ownership

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as
either of public dominion or of private ownership.11 Land is
considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for
public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that
use, and is intended for some public service or for the
the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable
development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the
should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial
State that is not of such character, or although of such character
property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De
but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms
Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v.
part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of
other than part of the patrimonial property of the State,
the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive
prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it
belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal
concept first introduced into the country from the West by
Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14
all lands of the public domain belong to the State.15 This means
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain
part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State
is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private
persons.17
unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of
the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25
and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under
existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the
courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when
public land is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively
removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that
effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or
the President declares that the State no longer intends the land
to be used for public service or for the development of national
wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and
manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public
disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands
domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18
lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely,
agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can
seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing
land, with the reservation that the law might provide other
classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the (1) For homestead settlement;
classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural,
forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20
Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according (2) By sale;
to the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The identification
of lands according to their legal classification is done
exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive
(3) By lease; and
Department.22

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the
type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of
the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources (a) By judicial legalization; or
may not be.

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper
Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of
domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a
with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words
"lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise
classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and
lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the
coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include,
it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and
disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only
the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such
limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must
satisfy the following requirements in order for his application
to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-
interest, has been in possession and occupation of the property
subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since
June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an
agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is
vested with the authority to classify lands of the public domain,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the
land subject of the application for registration must have been
already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in
order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land
is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain,
the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption
that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on
the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a
public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of
the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should
likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because
any possession of the land prior to such classification or
reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the
fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed
over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy
concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be
respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the
reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was
the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which
should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that
said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no
other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing
of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should
interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written
by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the
land subject of the registration should have been classified as
agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the
applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This
means that the character of the property subject of the
application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not
the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now
exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted run against the State.
to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the
period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may
now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the
were already converted to private ownership, by operation of disposition of public land or lands of the public domain,
law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession namely:
prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that
the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not
be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of
lands of the public domain belong to the State and are
possession.
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership
are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not
be alienated or disposed;
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have
been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at
the time of the application for registration is necessary only to
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves
alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes
to determine the point at which prescription may run against the
enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the
State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under
mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by
48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the
reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the
application needs only to be classified as alienable and
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to
Government are complied with through actual physical, open,
June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption
continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and
that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a
disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed
government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the
to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant,
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title.
but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that
By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the
a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
public domain and has become private property.37
sanctioned by the courts.31

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land
declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor
development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of
of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and
public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial
cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32
lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or
will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that
disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership
such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative
under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription,
development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation
whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been
(Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent
already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite
requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in
public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential
observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property
lands, subject to area limitations.34
of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object
of prescription.

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer

intended for public use or for the development of national
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient
wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby
evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest
converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the
had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without
State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and
satisfying the requisite character and period of possession -
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot
be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon
the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the
land has remained ineligible for registration under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the
land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
(FULLTEXT)
G.R. No. 181284, April 18, 2017
LOLOY UNDURAN, BARANGAY CAPTAIN ROMEO
PACANA, NESTOR MACAPAYAG, RUPERTO DOGIA,
JIMMY TALINO, ERMELITO ANGEL, PETOY BESTO,
VICTORINO ANGEL, RUEL BOLING, JERMY ANGEL,
BERTING SULOD, RIO BESTO, BENDIJO SIMBALAN,
AND MARK BRAZIL, Petitioners, v. RAMON
ABERASTURI, CRISTINA C. LOPEZ, CESAR LOPEZ
JR., DIONISIO A. LOPEZ, MERCEDES L. GASTON,
AGNES H. LOPEZ, EUSEBIO S. LOPEZ, JOSE MARIA
S. LOPEZ, ANTON B. ABERASTURI, MA. RAISSA A.
VELEZ, ZOILO ANTONIO A. VELEZ, CRISTINA
ABERASTURI, EDUARDO LOPEZ, JR., ROSARIO S.
LOPEZ, JUAN S. LOPEZ, CESAR ANTHONY R. LOPEZ,
VENANCIO L. GASTON, ROSEMARIE S. LOPEZ, JAY
A. ASUNCION, NICOLO ABERASTURI, LISA A.
ASUNCION, INEZ A. VERAY, HERNAN A. ASUNCION,
ASUNCION LOPEZ, THOMAS A. VELEZ, LUIS
ENRIQUE VELEZ, ANTONIO H. LOPEZ, CHARLES H.
LOPEZ, ANA L. ZAYCO, PILAR L. QUIROS, CRISTINA
L. PICAZO, RENATO SANTOS, GERALDINE
AGUIRRE, MARIA CARMENCITA T. LOPEZ, AND AS
REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT RAMON
ABERASTURI, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution are petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's en
banc Decision dated October 20, 2015, the dispositive portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of
Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2006, and its Resolution
dated July 4, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-MIN, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners maintain that it
is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), not
the regular courts, which has jurisdiction over disputes and
controversies involving ancestral domain of the Indigenous
Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs)
regardless of the parties involved.
Petitioners argue that the rule that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, admits
of exceptions and can be relaxed in view of the special and
unique circumstances obtaining this case, i.e., the actual issue,
as shown by their motion to dismiss, involves a conflicting
claim over an ancestral domain. They seek to apply by analogy
the principles in Ignacio v. CFI Bulacan,1Ferrer v.
Villamor,2Nonan v. Plan,3 among others, where it was held that
the allegations of tenancy by the defendant in its answer may
be used in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court, and
if indeed tenancy exists, the same should be lodged before the
Court of Industrial Relations (now the Department of Agrarian
Reform and Adjudication Board). They also invoke Leoquinco
v. Canada Dry Bottling Co.,4 and Mindanao Rapid Co. v.
Omandam5 where it was ruled that if allegations of labor
disputes or employer-employee relations are alleged by
defendants in their answer and the same is shown to exist, the
Industrial Court (now the National Labor Relations
Commission) takes cognizance of the case.
Petitioners also argue that the Court's interpretation of Section
666 of Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Act of 1997," (IPRA) to the effect that the NCIP shall
have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP group, is contrary to law and the
Constitution. They posit that the State recognizes that each ICC
or IP group is, and has been since time immemorial, governed
by their own customary laws, culture, traditions and governance
systems, and has the right to preserve and develop them as they
may deem fit and necessary. Thus, each ICC and IP group did
not, and does not, need an act of Congress such as the IPRA, to
enforce their customary laws among themselves and their
respective communities, and more so in further developing
them.
Petitioners insist that claims and disputes within ICCs/IPs
and/or between ICCs/IPs shall be resolved using customary
laws, consistent with the State policy under the Constitution and
the IPRA to recognize, respect and protect the customs,
traditions and cultural integrity and institutions of the ICCs/IPs.
They claim that cases of disputes between IPs within the same
ICC/IP group are always resolved completely and with finality
in accordance with their customary laws and practice, hence,
the interpretation that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction in cases
of disputes among IPs within the same ICC/IP group is not only
absurd but unconstitutional. They aver that even disputes
between different ICCs/IPs shall also fall within the jurisdiction
of whatever their customary laws and practice provide since
Section 657 of the IPRA does not so distinguish. They presume
that after co-existing for centuries in adjacent ancestral
domains, some of the ICCs/IPs have developed their own
indigenous means of settling disputes between other ICCs/IPs.
With respect to unresolved claims and disputes between
different ICCs/IP groups and between ICCs/IPs and non-IPs,
petitioners theorize that they fall under the jurisdiction of the
NCIP pursuant to the provisions of the IPRA. They cite the
concurring opinion of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. that the
second and third parts of Section 66 of the law only provide for
a condition precedent that is merely procedural and does not
limit the NCIP jurisdiction over disputes involving the rights of
ICC/IPs. They contend that such interpretation is consistent
with other provisions of the IPRA which lay out NCIP's
jurisdiction under Sections 46(g),8 62,9 69,10 7011 and 7212
of the IPRA.
Petitioners further point out that Section 72 of the IPRA permits
the imposition of penalties under customary law even to non-
IPs, and does not distinguish as to whom customary law may
apply. According to them, any natural or juridical person, IPs
or not, found to have violated provisions of then IPRA,
particularly those identified in Section 72, may be dealt with by
imposing penalties found in the corresponding customary laws.
They submit that Section 72 does not require as a condition
precedent familiarity of the person to be penalized to the
existing customary law of the affected community nor does it
require for the said customary law to have been published to
allow for its imposition to any person who committed the
violation. Thus, they assert that Section 72 negates the ruling
that NCIP's jurisdiction applies only to Sections 52, 54, 62 and
66, insofar as the dispute involves opposing parties belonging
to the same tribe.
Petitioners likewise aver that Sections 46(g), 62, 69, 70 and 72
of the IPRA, taken together and in harmony with each other,
clearly show that conflicts and disputes within and between
ICCs/IPs are first under the jurisdiction of whatever their
customary law provides, but disputes that are not covered by
their customary laws, either between different ICCs/IPs or
between an ICC/IP and a non-IP are also within the jurisdiction
within the NCIP. Petitioners invoke The City Government of
Baguio City v. Masweng13 and Baguio Regreening Movement,
Inc. v. Masweng14 to support their theory that NCIP has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving a
dispute or controversy over ancestral domains even if one of the
parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to the same ICC/IP
group.
In essence, petitioners argue that (1) the IPRA was not enacted
to protect an IP from another IP whether from the same or
different group, because they have their own means of resolving
a dispute arising between them, through customary laws or
compromises, as had been done for a very long time even before
the passage of the law; (2) the IPRA is meant to address the
greater prejudice that IPs experience from non-IPs or the
majority group; and (3) the limited interpretation of Section 66
of the IPRA to its minute details without looking into the intent
of the law will result in an unimaginable situation where the
jurisdiction of the NCIP is only limited to those where both
parties belong to the same ICCs/IPs; and (4) the. application of
the provisions of the IPRA, as a national law and a landmark
social justice legislation, is encompassing and not limited to a
particular group, i.e., ICCs/IPs.
In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners
stress that (1) the NCIP and not the regular courts has
jurisdiction over the case under the principle that jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint, and pursuant to jurisprudence
allowing exemptions thereto; (2) the jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case rests upon the NCIP as conferred by
the IPRA; (3) the IPRA is a social legislation that seeks to
protect the IPs not so much from themselves or fellow IPs but
more from non-IPs; (4) the IPRA created the NCIP as the
agency of government mandated to realize the rights of IPs; (5)
in the exercise of its mandate, the NCIP was created as a quasi-
judicial body with jurisdiction to resolve claims and disputes
involving the rights of IPs; (6) the jurisdiction of the NCIP in
resolving claims and disputes involving the rights of IPs is not
limited to IPs of the same tribe; (7) harmonizing the related
provisions of the IPRA supports the argument that the NCIP has
jurisdiction over cases involving IP rights whether or not the
parties are IPs or non-ICCs/IPs; (8) the NCIP as quasi-judicial
agency provides IPs mechanisms for access to justice in the
fulfillment of the State's obligations to respect, protect and
fulfill IP's human rights; (9) the NCIP has the competence and
skill that would greatly advance the administration of justice
with respect to protection and fulfillment of ICC/IP
rights/human rights; and (10) recognition and enforcement of
customary laws and indigenous justice systems fulfill the State's
obligations as duty bearers in the enforcement of human rights.
While the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration fail to persuade,
there is a need to clarify the NCIP's jurisdiction over claims and
disputes involving rights of ICC/IPs.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of a case is not
merely based on the allegations of the complaint in certain cases
where the actual issues are evidenced by subsequent pleadings.
It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made
to depend on the defenses raised by the defendant in the answer
or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
would depend almost entirely on the defendant.15 Suffice it
also to state that the Court is unanimous16 in denying the
petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the CA
correctly ruled that the subject matter of the original and
amended complaint based on the allegations therein is within
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
concurred with the ponencia that the RTC has jurisdiction over
the case:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Both original and amended complaints, accion reivindicatoria
and injunction, respectively, are incapable of pecuniary
estimation; thus falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC. As
correctly pointed out by the ponencia, "jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause
of action." It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged
by the mission of the parties or conferred by acquiescence of
the court.17
In his Separate Opinion, Justice Arturo D. Brion also concurred
with the ponencia's conclusion that the RTC has jurisdiction
over the case because (1) the CA correctly ruled that the RTC's
February 14, 2005 Order is not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, (2) jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
by law and the allegations of the complaint; and (3) the NCIP's
jurisdiction over disputes is limited to cases where both parties
are members of the same ICC/IP group.
In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Jose Portugal Perez agreed
with the ponencia that jurisdiction over the original and
amended complaint, accion reivindicatoria and injunction,
correctly lies with the RTC, based on the principle that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law
and determined by the allegations in the complaint.
In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
likewise voted to dismiss the petition for review on certiorari,
and to affirm the assailed decision and resolution of the CA. He
concurred with the ponencia in holding that respondents' action,
alleged to be involving a claim over the ancestral domain of an
ICC/IP, does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NCIP.
In sum, the Court finds no substantial argument in petitioners'
motions for reconsideration to justify a reversal of its ruling that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents' original and
amended complaint based on the allegations therein lies with
the RTC.
The crucial issue in this case, however, revolves around the
complex nature of the jurisdiction of the NCIP, as shown by the
different but well--reasoned opinions of the Associate Justices
concerned vis-a-vis the arguments in petitioners' motions for
reconsideration.
To recall, the ponencia has held that pursuant to Section 66 of
the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group.
When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties
who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the case shall fall
under the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the NCIP.
Thus, even if the real issue involves dispute over a land which
appear to be located within the ancestral domain of an ICC/IP,
it is not the NCIP but the RTC which has the power to hear, try
and decide the case. In exceptional cases under Sections 52, 54
and 62 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over
such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not
belong to the same ICC/IP group.
Justice Velasco's position is that the NCIP has jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, regardless
of whether or not they belong to the same IP/IC group.
According to him, all cases and disputes where both parties are
ICCs/IPs fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP; all
cases and disputes where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP are
covered by the jurisdiction of the regular courts regardless of
the subject matter even if it involves ancestral domains or lands
of ICCs/IPs; and regular courts have jurisdiction over cases and
disputes as long as there are parties who are non-ICCs/IPs.
For Justice Brion, the IPRA's intent is neither to grant the NCIP
sole jurisdiction over disputes involving ICCs/IPs, nor to
disregard the rights of non-ICCs/IPs under national laws.
However, he stresses that the NCIP maintains primary
jurisdiction over: (1) adverse claims and border disputes arising
from delineation of ancestral domains/lands; (2) cancellation of
fraudulently issued Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles
(CADTs); and (3) disputes and violations of ICCs/IPs rights
between members of the same ICC/IP group.
Justice Perez opines that neither does the IPRA confer original
and exclusive jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. He adds that the NCIP is
only vested with jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs
based on customs and customary law in a given controversy
against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and
every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing
non- ICC/IP. He concludes that under Section 66 of the IPRA,
the jurisdiction of the NCIP is limited, and confined only to
cases involving rights of IPs/ICCs, where both such parties
belong to the same ICC/IP group.
Justice Leonen is of the view that the jurisdiction of the NCIP
is limited to disputes where both parties are members of ICC/IP
group and come from the same ethnolinguistic group. He states
that the requirements for the proper exercise of the NCIP's
jurisdiction over a dispute, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA,
are as follows: (1) the claim or dispute must involve the rights
of ICCs/IPs; (2) both parties must belong to the same ICC/IP
group; (3) these parties must have exhausted remedies under
their ICC/IP's customary laws; and (4) compliance with this
requirement of exhausting remedies under customary laws must
be evidenced by a certification issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the
dispute, to the effect that the dispute has not been resolved.
Meanwhile, in Lim v. Gamosa,18 which was penned by Justic
Perez, the Court held that the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP
is at best concurrent with that of the regular trial
courts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As previously adverted to, we are not unaware of The City
Government of Baguio City, et al. v. Atty. Masweng, et al. and
similar cases where we made an implicit affirmation of the
NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties are non-
ICCs/IPs. Such holding, however, and all the succeeding
exercises of jurisdiction by the NCIP, cannot tie our hands and
declare a grant of primary and/or original jurisdiction, where
there is no such explicit conferment by the IPRA. At best, the
limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the
regular trial courts in the exercise of the latter's general
jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought before them
within the legal bounds of rights and remedies.19
Guided by the foregoing ruling, the Court held in Begnaen v.
Spouses Caligtan20 that the NCIP-Regional Hearing Office
(RHO), being the agency that first took cognizance of
petitioner-appellant's complaint, has jurisdiction over the same
to the exclusion of the MCTC. In said case where both parties
are members of the same ICC and the subject of their dispute
was an ancestral land, petitioner-appellant first invoked the
NCIP's jurisdiction by filing with the RHO his complaint
against respondents for "Land Dispute and Enforcement of
Rights." When the RHO dismissed the complaint without
prejudice for his failure to first bring the matter for settlement
before the Council of Elders as mandated by the IPRA,
petitioner-appellant filed instead a complaint for forcible entry
before the MCTC. Aside from its ruling that th NCIP has
excluded the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the same subject
matter the Court said that petitioner is estopped from belatedly
impugning the jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO after initiating a
complaint before it and receiving ail adverse ruling.
Based on the diverse views on the nature and scope of the
NCIP's jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving the
rights of ICCs/IPs, the recent jurisprudence21 on the matter, as
well as petitioners' arguments in their motions for
reconsideration, the Court is confronted again with the issue of
whether the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to cases where both
parties are ICCs/IPs, or primary and concurrent with regular
courts, and/or original and exclusive to the exclusion of said
courts, on all matters involving the rights of ICCs/IPs.
After a circumspect review of the relevant laws and
jurisprudence, the Court maintains that the jurisdiction of the
NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited to claims and
disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both parties belong
to the same ICC/IP group, but if such claims and disputes arise
between or among parties who do not belong to the same
ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction.
To begin with, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
by the Constitution or by law. A court of general jurisdiction
has the power or authority to hear and decide cases whose
subject matter does not fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial function.22 In contrast, a court of limited
jurisdiction, or a court acting under special powers, has only the
jurisdiction expressly delegated.23 An administrative agency,
acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited
jurisdiction which could wield only such powers that are
specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes.24 Limited or
special jurisdiction is that which is confined to particular causes
or which can be exercised only under limitations and
circumstances prescribed by the statute.25
As held in the main decision, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction
over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only
when they arise between or among parties belonging to the
same ICC/IP group because of the qualifying provision under
Section 66 of the IPRA that "no such dispute shall be brought
to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies
provided under their customary laws." Bearing in mind that the
primary purpose of a proviso is to limit or restrict the general
language or operation of the statute,26 and that what determines
whether a clause is a proviso is the legislative intent,27 the
Court stated that said qualifying provision requires the presence
of two conditions before such claims and disputes may be
brought before the NCIP, i.e., exhaustion of all remedies
provided under customary laws, and the Certification issued by
the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt
to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved. The
Court thus noted that the two conditions cannot be complied
with if the parties to a case either (1) belong to different ICCs/IP
groups which are recognized to have their own separate and
distinct customary laws, or (2) if one of such parties was a non-
ICC/IP member who is neither bound by customary laws or a
Council of Elders/Leaders, for it would be contrary to the
principles of fair play and due process for parties who do not
belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its own
distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders. In
which case, the Court ruled that the regular courts shall have
jurisdiction, and that the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is, in
effect, limited to cases where the opposing parties belong to the
same ICC/IP group.
That the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is limited can be
further gathered from Justice Perez' discussion in Lim v.
Gamosa,28 thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 83 of the IPRA, the repealing clause, only specifies
Presidential Decree No. 410, Executive Order Nos. 122B and
122C as expressly repealed. While the same section does state
that "all other laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or
parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly," such an implied repeal is predicated
upon the condition that a substantial and an irreconcilable
conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. The two laws
refer to different subject matters, albeit the IPRA includes the
jurisdiction of the NCIP. As such, resolution of conflicts
between parties who are not both ICCs/IPs may still fall within
the general jurisdiction of regular courts dependent on the
allegations in the complaint or petition and the status of the
parties.
There is no clear irreconcilable conflict from the investiture of
jurisdiction to the NCIP in instances where, among others, all
the parties are ICCs/IPs and the claim or dispute involves their
rights, and the specific wording of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,
Sections 19-21 on the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts, and Sections 33-35 on the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
We should not, and cannot, adopt the theory of implied repeal
except upon a clear and unequivocal expression of the will of
the Congress, which is not manifest from the language of
Section 66 of the IPRA which, to reiterate: (1) did not use the
words "primary" and/or "original and exclusive" to describe the
jurisdiction of the NCIP over "all claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs" and (2) contained a proviso requiring
certification that the parties have exhausted their remedies
provided under customary laws.
We are quick to clarify herein that even as we declare that in
some instances the regular courts may exercise jurisdiction over
cases which involve rights of ICCs/IPs, the governing law for
these kinds of disputes necessarily include the IPRA and the
rights the law bestows on ICCs/IPs.
In Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan,29 the Court affirmed and
emphasized the afore-quoted ruling in Lim v. Gamosa30 where
it struck down as void an administrative rule that expanded the
jurisdiction of the NCP beyond the boundaries of the IPRA.
However, exception must be taken to the pronouncement in
Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan31 that "[a]t best, the limited
jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the regular
trial courts in the exercise of the latter's general jurisdiction
extending to all controversies brought before them within the
legal bounds of rights and remedies."
Concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction is that which is "exercised
by different courts at the same time over the same subject matter
and within the same territory, and wherein litigants may in the
first instance resort to either court indifferently, that of several
different tribunals, each authorized to deal with the same
subject matter, and when a proceeding in respect of a certain
subject matter can be brought in any one of several different
courts, they are said to have concurrent jurisdiction."32 While
courts of concurrent jurisdiction are courts of equal dignity as
to matters concurrently cognizable, neither having supervisory
power over process from the other,33 the rule is that the court
which first takes cognizance of an action over which it has
jurisdiction and power to afford complete relief has the
exclusive right to dispose of the controversy without
interference from other courts of concurrent jurisdiction in
which similar actions are subsequently instituted between the
same parties seeking similar remedies and involving the same
questions.34 Such rule is referred to as the principle of priority
or the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. Although
comity is sometimes a motive for the courts to abide by the
priority principle, it is a legal duty of a court to abide by such
principle to reduce the possibility of the conflicting exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction, especially to reduce the possibility that
a case involving the same subject matter and the same parties is
simultaneously acted on in more than one court.35

After a careful perusal of the provisions of the entire IPRA, the
Court discerns nothing therein that expressly or impliedly
confers concurrent jurisdiction to the NCIP and the regular
courts over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs
between and among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP
group. What the Court finds instead is that the NCIP's limited
jurisdiction is vested under Section 66 of the IPRA, while its
primary jurisdiction is bestowed under Section 52(h) and 53, in
relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, and Section 54 thereof.
Having discussed why the NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66
of the IPRA is limited, but not concurrent with the regular
courts, the Court will now expound on the NCIP's primary
jurisdiction over claims regardless of whether the parties are
non-ICCs/IPs, or members of different ICCs/IP groups, namely:
(1) adverse claims and border disputes arising from the
delineation of ancestral domains/lands,(2) cancellation of
fraudulently issued CADTs, and (3) disputes and violations
ofiCCs/IPs rights between members of the same ICC/IP.
Primary jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by the
Constitution or by statute upon an administrative body to act
upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence.36 Given that
the provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by
which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial
powers that an administrative agency may exercise, as defined
in the enabling act of such agency,37 it is apt to underscore the
provisions of the IPRA which invest primary jurisdiction over
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IP groups to the
NCIP, as the primary government agency responsible for the
recognition of their ancestral domain and rights thereto:38
1. Section 52(h) of the IPRA anent the power of the NCIP
Ancestral Domain Office (ADO) to deny application for
CADTs, in relation to Section 62, regarding the power of the
NCIP to hear and decide unresolved adverse
claims:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and
delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance
with the following procedures:
xxxx
h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from
publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a
favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient
proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the
Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of
additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains
Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or
fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further,
That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall
give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned,
containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be
appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases
where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the
boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains
Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist
them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict,
without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the
section below.
xxxx
SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts. - In cases of conflicting
interest, where there are adverse claims within the ancestral
domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which cannot be
resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice to the
proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such
ancestral domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between
and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional boundaries of
their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be
followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions:
Provided,further, That any decision, order, award or ruling of
the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter
pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement and
interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for
Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof.39
2. Section 53 on the NCIP-ADO's power to deny applications
for CALTs and on the NCIP's power to grant meritorious claims
and resolve conflicting claims:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 53. Identification, Delineation and Certification of
Ancestral Lands.-
xxxx
e) Upon receipt of the applications for delineation and
recognition of ancestral land claims, the Ancestral Domains
Office shall cause the publication of the application and a copy
of each document submitted including a translation in the native
language of the ICCs/IPs concerned in a prominent place
therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document
shall also be posted at the local, provincial, and regional offices
of the NCIP and shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow
other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15)
days from the date of such publication: Provided, That in areas
where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station and institutions.44 At this juncture, it is not amiss to state that
will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting the NCIP's decision shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals
shall be deemed sufficient if both newspapers and radio station by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
are not available; Court.45

f) Fifteen (15) days after such publication, the Ancestral Meanwhile, the fatal flaw in petitioners' insistence that the
Domains Office shall investigate and inspect each application, NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is exclusive and original, can
and if found to be meritorious, shall cause a parcellary survey be gathered from records of the Bicameral Conference
of the area being claimed. The Ancestral Domains Office shall Committee cited in Justice Brion's Separate
reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after Opinion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
inspection and verification. In case of rejection, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy The word "jurisdiction" in the first part of Section 66 is
furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The unqualified. Section 66 (then Section 71) of Senate Bill 1728
denial shall be appealable to the NCIP. In case of conflicting was originally worded exclusive and original jurisdiction.
claims among individuals or indigenous corporate claimants, During the Bicameral Conference, the lower house objected to
the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties giving the NCIP exclusive and original
to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary jurisdiction:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full Sen. Juan Flavier: (Chairman of the Senate Panel)
adjudication according to Sec. 62 of this Act. In all proceedings
for the identification or delineation of the ancestral domains as
herein provided, the Director of Lands shall represent the
There is exclusive original. And so what do you suggest?
interest of the Republic of the Philippines; and

g) The Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare and submit a

report on each and every application surveyed and delineated to .... ....
the NCIP, which shall, in tum, evaluate the report submitted. If
the NCIP finds such claim meritorious, it shall issue a certificate
of ancestral land, declaring and certifying the claim of each
individual or corporate (family or clan) claimant over ancestral
lands.40

3. Section 54 as to the power of the NCIP to resolve fraudulent Rep. Zapata (Chairman of the Panel for the House of
claims over ancestral domains and Representatives)
lands:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 54. Fraudulent Claims. - The Ancestral Domains

Office may, upon written request from the ICCs/IPs, review Chairman, may I butt in?
existing claims which have been fraudulently acquired by any
person or community. Any claim found to be fraudulently
acquired by, and issued to, any person or community may be
cancelled by the NCIP after due notice and hearing of all parties
concerned.41

As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP has Sen. Flavier
primary jurisdiction over these cases even if one of the parties
is a non- ICC/IP, or where the opposing parties are members of
different ICCs/IPs groups. Indeed, the questions involved in Yes, please.
said cases demand the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring special knowledge, experience, and
services of the NCIP to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.42 No less than the IPRA states that the NCIP is
the primary government agency responsible for the formulation
and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote
and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the Rep. Zapata
recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights
thereto,43 with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions
This was considered. The original, we were willing in the Senado na lang.
house. But the "exclusive", we objected to the word "exclusive"
because it would only be the commission that would exclude
the court and the Commission may not be able to undertake all
the review nationwide. And so we remove the word "exclusive"
so that they will have original jurisdiction but with the removal
of the word "exclusive" that would mean that they may bring
Rep. Zapata
the case to the ordinary courts of justice.

Oo, iyong original na lang.

Sen. Flavier

Sen. Flavier
Without passing through the commission?

In other words, it's not only the Commission that can originate
it, pwedeng mag- originate sa courts.

Rep. Zapata

Yes, Anyway, if they go to the regular courts, they will have to

Rep. Zapata
litigate in court, because if its (sic) exclusive, that would be
good.

Or else, we just remove "exclusive original" so that they will

say, the National will have jurisdiction over claims. So we
remove both "exclusive and original".

Sen. Flavier

But what he is saying is that...

Sen. Flavier

So what version are you batting for, Mr. Chairman?

Rep. Zapata

But they may not have the facility.

Rep. Zapata

Just to remove the word "exclusive original." The Commission

will still have jurisdiction only that, if the parties will opt to go
to courts of justice, then this have (sic) the proper jurisdiction,
Rep. ____ then they may do so because we have courts nationwide. Here
there may be not enough courts of the commission.

Sen. Flavier
So we are going to adopt the senate version minus the words
"exclusive original"?
Rep. Zapata
Yes, Mr. Chairman, that's my proposal
Sen. Flavier
No, problem. Okay, approved.
xxxx46
The Bicameral Committee's removal of the words "exclusive
and original" mean that the NCIP shares concurrent jurisdiction
with the regular courts. Thus, I agree with the revised ponencia
that it would be ultra vires for the NCIP to promulgate rules and
regulations stating that it as exclusive jurisdiction.47
Another cogent reason why the NCIP's quasi-judicial
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs under Section 66 of the IPRA cannot be exclusive and
original, is because of the so-called "Contentious Areas/Issues"
identified in the Joint Department of Agriculture-Land
Registration Authority-Department of Environment and
Natural Resources-National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (DAR-DENR-LRA-NCIP) Administrative Order No.
01, Series of 2012.48 Such contentious matters arose in the
course of the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law,49 the IPRA, the Public Land Act,50 and the Land
Registration Act,51 as amended by the Property Registration
Decree,52 which created not only issues of overlapping
jurisdiction between the DAR, DENR and NCIP, but also
operational issues and conflicting claims in the implementation
of their respective programs.
Section 12 of the Joint DAR-DENR-LRA-NCIP
Administrative Order defines those contentious areas/issues
which are subject of operational issues and conflicting claims
between and among the DAR, the DENR and the NCIP, as
follows:
Untitled lands being claimed by the ICCs/IPs to be part of their
AD/AL which are covered by approved survey plans and also
being claimed by the DAR and/or the DENR.
Titled lands with registered Certificate of Land Ownership
Awards (CLOAs), Emancipation Patents (EPs), and Patents
within Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title
(CADT)/Certificate of Ancestral Land Title
(CALT)/Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim
(CADC)/Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC).
Resource access/development instruments issued by the DENR
over lands within Ancestral Land/Domain Claims such as, but
not limited to, Community-Based Forest Management
Agreement (CBFMA), Integrated Forest Management
Agreement (IFMA), Socialized Forest Management Agreement
(SIFMA), Protected Area Community-Based Resources
Management Agreement (PACBRMA), Forest Land Grazing
Management Agreement (FLGMA), Co-Management
Agreement, Certificate of Stewardship Contract (CSC),
Certificate of Forest Stewardship Agreement (CFSA), Wood
Processing Plant Permit (WPPP), Special Land Use Permit
(SLUP), Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP), Special Private
Land Timber Permit (SPLTP), and Foreshore Lease
Agreement/Permit (FLA/FLP).
Exploration Permit (EP), Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA); Mineral Agreement (either Production
Sharing, Co-Production or Joint Venture) issued within CARP-
covered areas.
Reservations, proclamations and other special law-declared
areas a portion or the entirety of which is subsequently issued a
CADT/CALT.
Areas with existing and/or vested rights after the registration of
the CADTs/CALTs but for any reason not segregated/excluded.
Other jurisdictional and operational issues that may arise
between and amongst the DAR, the DENR and the NCIP as
may be determined by the National/Regional/Provincial Joint
Committees, as created under Section 19 of the Joint
Administrative Order.
Formal complaints filed by concerned ICCs/IPs or by the NCIP
in behalf of the ICCs/IPs over those identified titled areas found
within the AD/AL.
It is inevitable that disputes will arise involving the above-
stated contentious areas/issues, and affecting the rights of
parties who are non-IPs or those who belong to different
ICCs/IPs groups. As a matter of fair play and due process,
however, such parties cannot be compelled to comply with the
two conditions53 before such disputes may be brought before
the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, since IPs/ICCs are
recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary
laws and Council of Elders/Leaders. Hence, the Court cannot
sustain the view that the NCIP shall have exclusive and original
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs.
Moreover, having in mind the principle that rules and
regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law
which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force and effect of
law, and are entitled to great respect,54 the Court cannot ignore
that Sections 14 and 16 of the Joint DAR-DENR- LRA-NCIP
Administrative Order provide for the proper forum where the
contentious areas/issues involve lands with prior and vested
property rights, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 14. Exclusion/Segregation of Lands Covered by
Judicially Decreed Titles and Titles Administratively issued by
DENR and DAR. In the delineation and titling of ADs/ALs, the
NCIP must exclude and segregate all lands covered by titles.
For this purpose, the registered owner of the land may opt to
submit to the NCIP a copy of the title of the property to facilitate
segregation or exclusion pursuant to existing guidelines and
other pertinent issuances.
The ICCs/IPs, however, are not precluded from questioning the
validity of these titles in a proper forum as hereunder
enumerated:
1. DAR Secretary for registered EPs or CLOAs; and
2. Regional Trial Court for registered patents/judicially-decreed
titles.
On the other hand, the DAR and DENR shall not process titles
pursuant to their mandate on lands certified by NCIP as
ancestral domain or ancestral lands except in areas with prior
and vested rights. Provided, however, that the certification by
NCIP on lands as Ancestral Domains or Ancestral Lands
pursuant to Section 52(i) of IPRA presupposes that the
provision of Section 13 hereof on the projection of survey plans
and issuance of Certification ofNon-Overlap have already been
complied with.
xxxx
Section 16. CARP Coverage of Titled Properties. Titled lands
under the Torrens System issued prior to IPRA are deemed
vested rights pursuant to the provision of Section 56 of IPRA.
Accordingly, the DAR shall proceed with the CARP coverage
of said lands, unless a Restraining Order is issued by the
Supreme Court without prejudice, however, to the rights of the
ICCs/IPs to question the validity of these titles before a court or
body of competent jurisdiction.55
Note that the "property rights" referred to in Section 5656 of the
IPRA belong to those acquired by individuals, whether
indigenous or non- indigenous peoples, as said provision makes
no distinction as to the ethnic originof the ownership of these
rights.57 Considering the rule on statutory construction that
courts should not distinguish where the law does not do so, the
IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights" regardless of
whether they pertain to IPs or non-IPs, and it only requires that
these "property rights" already exist and/or vested upon its
effectivity.58
On petitioners' assertion that Section 7259 of the IPRA negates
the ruling that the NCIP has jurisdiction only over claims and
disputes under Sections 52, 54, and 62 thereof, even if the
parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP, the Court
finds the same as misplaced.
Note that under Section 72 of the IPRA, any person who
commits violation of any of the provisions of the IPRA may be
punished either (1) in accordance. with the customary laws of
the ICCs/IPs concerned, provided that the penalty shall not be
a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, and that neither
death penalty nor excessive fines shall be imposed; or (2) upon
conviction, by imprisonment of not less than 9 months but not
more than 12 years, or a fine of not less than P100,000.00 nor
more than P500,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment
upon the discretion of the court. Again, it would be contrary to
the principles of fair play and due process for those parties who
do not belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its
separate and distinct customary laws, and to be punished in
accordance therewith. The Court thus rules that the NCIP shall
have primary jurisdiction over violations of IPRA provisions
only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the
same ICC/IP group. When the parties belong to different
ICC/IP group or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP,
jurisdiction over such violations shall fall under the proper
Regional Trial Court.
Justice Brion has aptly discussed that even if Section 72 of the
IPRA is a special penal law that applies to all persons, including
non-ICCs/IPs, the NCIP jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP
rights is limited to those committed by and against members of
the same ICC/IP group, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 72 of the IPRA provides that any person who violates
the rights.ofiCCs/IPs shall be punished "in accordance with the
customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned.... without prejudice
to the right of the ICC/IP concerned to avail of the protection of
"existing laws. . .[i]n which case," the penalty shall be
imprisonment and/or fine, and damages, "upon the discretion of
the court."
"Existing laws" refer to national laws as opposed to customary
laws; while "the court" refers to the regular courts as opposed
to administrative bodies like the NCIP.
Under Section 72, ICCs/IPs can avail of the protection under
national laws and file an action before the regular courts, in
which case, the penalty shall be imprisonment and/or fine, and
damages. From this perspective, Section 72 is a special penal
law that applies to ALL persons, including non-ICCs/IPs.
The phrase "without prejudice," however, means without
limiting the course of action that one can take. Thus, a recourse
under customary laws does not take away the right of ICCs/IPs
to secure punishment under existing national laws. An express
caveat under the customary law option is that the penalty must
not be cruel, degrading, or inhuman, nor shall it consist of the
death penalty or excessive fines.
Since the regular courts, not the NCIP, have jurisdiction over
national laws, then the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to
punishment under customary laws.
The NCIP's power to impose penalties under customary laws
presents two important issues: first, whether it is legally
possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs with penalties under
customary laws; and second, whether a member of a particular
ICC/IP could be punished in accordance with the customary
laws of another ICC/IP.
Laws that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as
tax and revenue measures, must be published.
Most customary laws are not written, much less published.
Hence, it is highly unlikely that the NCIP or even the regular
courts have the power to penalize non-ICCs/IPs with these
penalties under customary laws. A contrary ruling would be
constitutionally infirm for lack of due process.
Similarly, an ICC/IP cannot be punished under the customary
law of another. Otherwise, the former would be forced to
observe a non- binding customary law.
Therefore, while the NCIP has jurisdiction over violations of
ICC/IP rights, its jurisdiction is limited to those committed by
and against members of the same ICC/IP.
This view does not detract from the IPRA's policy to "protect
the rights of ICCs/IPs." ICCs/IPs, whose rights are violated by
non-ICCs/IPs or by members of a different ICC/IP, can still file
criminal charges before the regular courts. In this situation, the
NCIP's role is not to adjudicate but to provide ICCs/IPs with
"legal assistance in litigation involving community interest."60
There is also no merit in petitioners' argument that the Court's
interpretation of the NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66 of the
IPRA runs counter to its purpose to protect the rights, customs,
customary laws and cultural integrity of the ICCs/IPs. To stress,
even as Section 66 grants jurisdiction to the NCIP over claims
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, it is required that the
opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs who have exhausted all their
remedies under their customs and customary law before
bringing their claim and dispute to the NCIP.61 And, in some
instances that the regular courts may exercise jurisdiction over
cases involving rights of ICCs/IPs, the governing law for such
disputes necessarily include the IPRA and the rights the law
bestows on ICCs/IPs.62
It also bears emphasis that the right of ICCs/IPs to use their own
commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution
institutions, peace building processes or mechanism under
Section 1563 of the IPRA pertains only to those customary laws
and practices within their respective communities, as may be
compatible with the national legal system and with
internationally recognized human rights. In this regard, it is
fitting to quote the Separate Opinion of Justice Santiago M.
Kapunan in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment & Natural
Resources64 on the constitutionality of Sections 63, 65 and
other related provisions, like Section 15, of the
IPRA:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership
and extent of ancestral domains, suffice it to say that such is
allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the
Constitution. Said provision states, "The Congress may provide
for the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of
the ancestral domains." Notably, the use of customary laws
under IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks merely of
primacy of use. xxx
xxxx
The application of customary law is limited to disputes
concerning property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of the ancestral domains, where all the
parties involved are members of indigenous peoples,
specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows
that when one of the parties to a dispute is a non-member of an
indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples involved
belong to different groups, the application of customary layv is
not required.
Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the
primacy of customary law in disputes concerning ancestral
lands and domains where all parties involved are indigenous
peoples is justice. The utilization of customary laws is in line
with the constitutional policy of recogmzmg the application
thereof through legislation passed by Congress.
Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a
novel idea in this jurisdiction. Under the Civil Code, use of
customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is proved as a fact
according to the rules of evidence, and it is not contrary to law,
public order or public policy. Moreover, the Local Government
Code of 1991 calls for the recognition and application of
customary laws to the resolution of issues involving members
of indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of
customary laws in the settling of disputes if such are ordinarily
used in barangays where majority of the inhabitants are
members of indigenous peoples.65
Likewise, unavailing is petitioners' contention that unresolved
claims and disputes between different ICCs/IPs groups, and
those between ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs should fall under the
jurisdiction of the NCIP. In this regard, the Court shares the
view of Justice Perez:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That the proviso found in Section 66 of the IPRA is
exclusionary, specifically excluding disputes involving rights
of IPs/ICCs where the opposing party is non-ICC/IP, is
reflected in the IPRA's emphasis of customs and customary law
to govern in the lives of the ICCs/IPs.
Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to the special and
limited jurisdiction of the NCIP even if the dispute involves
rights of ICCs/IPs since tile NCIP has no power and authority
to decide on a controversy involving as well rights of non-
ICCs/IPs which may be brought before a court of general
jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights and remedies.
Even as a practical concern, non-IPs and non- members of ICCs
ought to be excepted from the NCIP's competence since it
cannot determine the right-duty correlative, and breach thereof,
between opposing parties who are ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs,
the controversy necessarily contemplating application of other
laws, not only customs and customary law of the ICCs/IPs. In
short, the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the
rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs and customary law in a
given controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the
applicable law for each and every kind of ICC/IP controversy
even against an opposing non-ICC/IP.66
Anent what Justice Perez described as the "implicit affirmation"
done in The City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng67 of
the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties is
not ICC/IPs, a careful review of that case would show that the
Court merely cited Sections 3(k),68 3869 and 66 of the IPRA
and Section 570 of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03
dated April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice
and Procedure Before the NCIP, as bases of its ruling to the
effect that disputes or controversies over ancestral
lands/domains of ICCs/IPs are within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO. However, the Court did not
identify and elaborate on the statutory basis of the NCIP's
"original and exclusive jurisdiction" on disputes or
controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs. Hence,
such description of the nature and scope of the NCIP's
jurisdiction made without argument or full consideration of the
point, can only be considered as an obiter dictum, which is a
mere expression of an opinion with no binding force for
purposes of res judicata and does not embody the determination
of the court.71
On a final note, the Court restates that under Section 66 of the
IPRA, the NCIP shall have limited jurisdiction over claims and
disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group;
but if such claims and disputes arise between or among parties
who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular
courts shall have jurisdiction. However, under Sections 52(h)
and 53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, as well as Section
54, the NCIP shall have primary jurisdiction over adverse
claims and border disputes arising from the delineation of
ancestral domains/lands, and cancellation of fraudulently-
issued CADTs, regardless of whether the parties are non-
ICCs/IPs, or members of different ICCs/IPs groups, as well as
violations of ICCs/IPs rights under Section 72 of the IPRA
where both parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are DENIED for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED.

(FULLTEXT)

FIRST DIVISION DECISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154953

Petitioner,

Present: CARPIO, J.:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
The Case

- versus - CORONA,

AZCUNA, and
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 21
August 2002 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. CV No. 66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 16
December 1999 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of
Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration
Case No. T-635.

T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., Promulgated:

Respondent. June 26, 2008

The Antecedent Facts

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
--------x This case originated from an Application for Original
Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering
Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a
portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre. The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or
56.4007 hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas.
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing
at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Notice of Initial
Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, 20 September
1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794,[4] and in
the 18 October 1999 issue of Peoples Journal Taliba,[5] a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice
of Initial Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous place on the
bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the land.[6] All
adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices
concerned were notified of the initial hearing.[7]
On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for
initial hearing, there was no oppositor other than the Opposition
dated 7 October 1999 of the Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15
November 1999, the trial court issued an Order[8] of General
Default against the whole world except as against petitioner.
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang
(Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave
Carandang until 29 November 1999 within which to file his
written opposition.[9] Carandang failed to file his written
opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an
Order[10] dated 13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated
the Order of General Default.
During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999,
respondent presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga
Torres (Torres), respondents Operations Manager and its
authorized representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista
(Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records
Officer II of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon
City.
The testimonies of respondents witnesses showed that Prospero
Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and
continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner
since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by
his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960,
Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor
of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later,
however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence,
on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of
Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonios
children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting).[11] On 8 August 1997,
Porting sold the land to respondent.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated
the land in favor of respondent.
The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation
could apply for registration of land provided such entity and its
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or
more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that
respondents predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the
concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession
converted the land to private property.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order
of General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates and decrees
Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741, situated in Barangay of San
Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas,
with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of and in the
name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws with principal
office at 19th Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de
Roxas, Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the
corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision. Petitioner
alleged that the trial court erred in granting the application for
registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of
possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner
alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are
general in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner
argued that additional witnesses should have been presented to
corroborate Evangelistas testimony.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed
in toto the trial courts Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelistas knowledge of the
possession and occupation of the land stemmed not only from
the fact that he worked there for three years but also because he
and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On
Evangelistas failure to mention the name of his uncle who
continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled
that Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to
name his uncle when he testified. The Court of Appeals also
ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of
Fortunatos relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect
Evangelistas statement that Fortunato took over the possession
and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroys death. The
Court of Appeals further ruled that the events regarding the
acquisition and disposition of the land became public
knowledge because San Bartolome was a small community. On
the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled
that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the corroboration
of the sole witness testimony.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent
witness since he was only testifying on the fact that he had
caused the filing of the application for registration and that
respondent acquired the land from Porting.
Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision. Petitioner raises the following grounds in its
Memorandum:
The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the
grant of title to applicant corporation despite the following:
1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest
had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or
earlier; and
2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the
subject tract of land.[13]
The Issues
The issues may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June
1945 or earlier; and
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration
of the land under the Public Land Act.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Respondent Failed to Prove
that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has
the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land forms
part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent
failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the public
domain.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be
clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State.[14]
The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable rests with the
applicant.[15]
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO),
Batangas City,[16] certified that lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto.
Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls
within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under
Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on]
31 December 1925. The second certification[17] in the form of 4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles,
a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the piles, and lumber dealers.
Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of
the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated that the subject area falls
within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto.
Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582.

Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-

DENR:

The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative

Order (DAO) No. 20,[18] dated 30 May 1988, delineated the
functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under
DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products]
land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The
(OM) permits except rattan;
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices
(PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for
lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38,[19] dated 19
April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles,
38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue and piles and lumber dealers;
certificates of land classification status for areas below 50
hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue
certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
50 hectares.[20] In this case, respondent applied for registration
of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50
hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters
covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square
within calamity declared areas for public infrastructure
meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the
projects; and
authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.

5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits

covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects.

The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no

authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land
classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical
Director, FMS-DENR:

Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical

Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial
court, has no probative value.

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products

(OM) permits except rattan;

2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five
hectares for public infrastructure projects; and
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify
that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of
the application for registration falls within the approved area
per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land
is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because
the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the
certifications submitted by respondent. The government
officials who issued the certifications were not presented before
the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should
not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of
the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed
duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative
value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official
repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR
Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable.
The CENRO should have attached an official publication[21]
of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable
and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting
of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against
a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and
of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
certifications do not fall within the class of public documents
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132.
The certifications do not reflect entries in public records made
in the performance of a duty by a public officer, such as entries
made by the Civil Registrar[22] in the books of registries, or by
a ship captain in the ships logbook.[23] The certifications are
not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of
original official records in the legal custody of a government
office. The certifications are not even records of public
documents.[24] The certifications are conclusions unsupported
by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value.[25]
Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the
alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR
Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere
issuance, prove the facts stated therein.[26] Such government
certifications may fall under the class of documents
contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132.
As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due
execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as
part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of
the facts stated therein.[27] Here, Torres, a private individual
and respondents representative, identified the certifications but
the government officials who issued the certifications did not
testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the
certifications cannot be given probative value.[28] The contents
of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was
incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the
certifications.[29] Torres did not prepare the certifications, he
was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not
conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within
the area classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and
disposable.
Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land
allegedly became alienable and disposable. The DENR
Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No.
582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December
1925. However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that
it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted
by respondent show that under the Land Classification Map No.
582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December
1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable and
disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that the
blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and
the metes and bounds of the land described therein x x x and
does not in any way certify the nature and classification of the
land involved.[30] It is true that the notation by a surveyor-
geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not
sufficient proof of the lands classification.[31] However,
respondent should have at least presented proof that would
explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez,
LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted
to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the technical
description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and
the Geodetic Engineers certification were faithful reproductions
of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain
the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer
presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue
print plan was different from the other certifications submitted
by respondent.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Petitioner alleges that the trial courts reliance on the testimonies
of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that
Evangelistas statement that the possession of respondents
predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous,
peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general
conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of possession of
title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to establish that its
predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly, continuously,
and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared
alienable and disposable.
We agree with petitioner.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in
possession of the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only
worked on the land for three years. Evangelista testified that his
family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroys land. The Court of
Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelistas knowledge
of Kabesang Puroys possession of the land stemmed not only
from the fact that he had worked thereat but more so that they
were practically neighbors.[32] The Court of Appeals observed:
 rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership
or possession of the land only in that year.

In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto.

Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to understand that people in Land Application by a Corporation
the said community knows each and everyone. And, because of
such familiarity with each other, news or events regarding the
acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land
spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event
became of public knowledge to them.[33] Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot
apply for registration of the land of the public domain in this
case.

We agree with petitioner.

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by
Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not know the exact
relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is
rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not
also know the relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In
fact, Evangelistas testimony is contrary to the factual finding of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son
Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one of Antonios children.
Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelistas testimony.

Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into

The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires
that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration.
However, in this case, we find Evangelistas uncorroborated
testimony insufficient to prove that respondents predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of
an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider the
testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified
primarily on the fact of respondents acquisition of the land.
While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his
knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay. He did
not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited
to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease
not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than
twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology,

and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands
1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held,
ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership.[34] or leased and the conditions therefor.
Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the
realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim
that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land
before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[35] the Court traced the
law on disposition of lands of the public domain. Under the
1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private
corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973
Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public domain
to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Under the
1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned
by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable
lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution
continues the prohibition against private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.[36]
The Court explained in Chavez:
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973
Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations
to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease.
xxxx
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the
Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable
lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The
Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals,
who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands
of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more
than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size
farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation would be
more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the
farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the
death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the
corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This
would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into
smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the
constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more
than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already
acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public
domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more
alienable public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allow him. An individual
could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is
a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation
on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public
domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of
alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual.
This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision
prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public
lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing
population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence
to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of
the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is
the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.[37]
In Director of Lands v. IAC,[38] the Court allowed the land
registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with an area of 481,390
square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from
members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was
whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the
proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution which prohibited private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled
that the land was already private land when Acme acquired it
from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable
title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could
acquire public agricultural lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares
while individuals could acquire not more than 144 hectares.[39]
In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open,
exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable land for the
period prescribed by law created the legal fiction whereby the
land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be public
land and becomes private property. The Court ruled:
who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to
have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse
possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short,
when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land was
not yet private property.

For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability for registration of alienable and disposable land, the corporation
of considering possession of public land which is of the must have acquired the land when its transferor had already a
character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by
an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the
itself that the possessor(s) x x x shall be conclusively presumed land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,[41] the
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x. No proof Court declared:
being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption,
confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the
possession claimed is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings,
not originally convert the land from public to private land, but
the parcels of land in question had already been converted to
only confirm such a conversion already effected by operation
private ownership through acquisitive prescription by the
of law from the moment the required period of possession
predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the latter purchased
became complete.
them in 1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the
titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-interest of
TCMC.

x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or

through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of (30 years
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979,
under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except through
jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed
lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply
facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private
to them for they were no longer alienable lands of the public
property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme.
domain but private property.
Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time
no prohibition against said corporations holding or owning
private land. x x x.[40] (Emphasis supplied)

What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to

apply is for the corporate applicant for land registration to
establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In
private land by operation of law because the statutory
Director of Lands, the land x x x was already private property
acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed.
at the time it was acquired x x x by Acme. In this case,
The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot
respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting,
be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive
prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such
acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the
public domain.
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original
registration of land under the doctrine in Director of Lands.
Republic Act No. 9176[42] (RA 9176) further amended the
Public Land Act[43] and extended the period for the filing of
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended,
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are
hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020
within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided,
That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does
not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the
several periods of time designated by the President in
accordance with Section Forty-five of this Act shall apply also
to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this
Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said persons
from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period
fixed by the President.
Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of
this amendatory Act shall be treated as having been filed in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is
limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only
acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable
land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an
individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of
land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for
56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area of 44.4007
hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying
for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right
higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its
right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the
land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already
become private land by operation of law. In the present case,
respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was
already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting
in 1997.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16
December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-
635. We DENY the application for registration filed by T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
(FULLTEXT)
G.R. No. 185092 June 4, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CORAZON C. SESE and FE C. SESE, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSGJ,
assailing the November 21, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, which dismissed its
appeal and affirmed the October 3, 2003 Decision2 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Pulilan, Bulacan (MTC), in LRC Case
No. 026.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents:
Records show that on September 17, 2002, Corazon C. Sese and
Fe C. Sese (respondents) filed with the MTC an application for
original registration of land over a parcel of land with an area
of 10, 792 square meters, situated in Barangay Sto. Cristo,
Municipality of Pulilan, Province of Bulacan, and more
particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345, Pulilan Cadastre,
under Plan No. AP-03-004226.
Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired,
through a donation inter vivos from their mother, Resurreccion
L. Castro (Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that
they, through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
possession of the subject property; and that the property was not
within a reservation.
In support of their application, respondents submitted the
following documents, namely: (1) Tax Declaration No. 99-
19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor,
representing their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural
Guardian"; (2) Certificate of Technical Description which was
approved on December 10, 1998 by the Land Management
Service, Region III, of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR); (3) Certification in lieu of lost
Surveyor’s Certificate issued by the same authority; (4) Official
Receipt of payment of real property tax over the subject
property; (5) Certification from the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the registered owners of a
property under Tax Declaration No. 99-19-015-01557 were
Corazon Sese and others; and (6) Survey plan of Lot 11247,
CAD 345,Pulilan Cadastre, approved by the Regional
Technical Director of the Land Management Service, Region
III, of the DENR, stating that the land subject of the survey was
alienable and disposable land, and as certified to by the Bureau
of Forestry on March 1, 1927, was outside of any civil or
military reservation. On the lower portion of the plan, there was
a note stating that a deed of absolute sale over the subject
property was executed by a certain Luis Santos and Fermina
Santos (the Santoses) in favor of Resurreccion on October 4,
1950.
On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, among
others, that: "This survey is inside the alienable and disposable
area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or
military reservation." The said plan was approved by the
DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San
Fernando, Pampanga, on December 3, 1998.
Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the
MTC issued the Order, dated October 10, 2002, setting the case
for hearing with the corresponding publication. After
compliance with all the requirements of the law regarding
publication, mailing and posting, hearing on the merits of the
application followed.
During the trial on June 4, 2003, respondent Corazon C. Sese
(Corazon) testified on their claim over the subject lot.
Thereafter, respondents submitted their formal offer of
evidence, after which the evidence offered were admitted by the
MTC in the Order, dated July 10, 2003, without objection from
the public prosecutor.
The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the
application.
On October 3, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision,3 ordering
the registration of the subject property in the name of
respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant application to be sufficient
in form and substance and the applicants having established
their right of ownership over the subject parcel of land and are
therefore entitled to registration thereof, the Court thereby
grants the petition.
Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the registration of the
parcel of land subject matter of this petition which is more
particularly described in Plan Ap-03-004226 Pulilan Cadastre
and in their corresponding technical descriptions in the name of
Resureccion Castro.
Upon this decision becoming final, let an Order for the decree
be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The MTC reasoned out that there was evidence to show that the
subject lots had been in open, continuous, adverse, and public
possession, either by the applicants themselves or their
predecessor-in-interest. Such possession since time
immemorial conferred an effective title on the applicants,
whereby the land ceased to be public and became private
property. It had been the accepted norm that open, adverse and
continuous possession for at least 30 years was sufficient. The
MTC noted that evidence showed that the parcel of land
involved was not covered by land patent or a public land
application as certified to by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources of Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan. Moreover,
it added that the technical descriptions of Lot 11247 were
prepared and secured from the Land Management Sector,
DENR, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, and were verified
and found to be correct by Eriberto Almazan, In-Charge of the
Regional Survey Division.
On December 19, 2003, the OSG interposed an appeal with the
CA, docketed as CA-GR. CV No. 81439. In its brief,4 the OSG
presented the following assignment of errors: a) only alienable
lands of the public domain occupied and possessed in concept
of owner for a period of at least thirty (30) years is entitled to
confirmation of title; and b) respondents failed to prove specific
acts of possession.
The OSG argued that there was no proof that the subject
property was already segregated from inalienable lands of the
public domain. Verily, it was only from the date of declaration
of such lands as alienable and disposable that the period for
counting the statutory requirement of possession would start.
Also, there was absolutely no proof of respondents’ supposed
possession of the subject property. Save for the testimony of
Corazon that "at present, the worker of (her) mother is
occupying the subject property," there was no evidence that
respondents were actually occupying the subject tract of land or
that they had introduced improvement thereon.
On November 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision5 affirming
the judgment of the MTC ordering the registration of the subject
property in the name of respondents. The decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed
decision dated October 3, 2003 of the MTC of Pulilan, Bulacan,
in LRC Case No. 026 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The CA reasoned out, among others, that the approved survey
plan of the subject property with an annotation, stating that the
subject property was alienable and disposable land, was a
public document, having been issued by the DENR, a
competent authority. Its contents were prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to
establish that the subject property was indeed alienable and
disposable.
With respect to the second issue, the CA was of the view that
the doctrine of constructive possession was applicable.
Respondents acquired the subject property through a donation
inter vivos executed on July 22, 1972 from their mother. The
latter acquired the said property from the Santoses on October
4, 1950 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. Further, respondent
Corazon testified that a small hut was built on the said land,
which was occupied by the worker of her mother. Moreover,
neither the public prosecutor nor any private individual
appeared to oppose the application for registration of the subject
property.
The CA also stated that respondents’ claim of possession over
the subject property was buttressed by the Tax Declaration No.
99-19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese,
minor, representing their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her
Natural Guardian"; the official receipt of payment of real
property tax over the subject property; and the certificate from
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the
registered owner of a property under Tax Declaration No. 99-
19015-01557 were respondents.
The CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax
payments of property were not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they were good indicia of possession
in the concept of owner.
Hence, the OSG filed this petition.
ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAW IN RULING THAT THE APPROVED SURVEY PLAN
IDENTIFIED BY ONE OF THE RESPONDENTS IS PROOF
THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAW IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION.
The OSG argues that unless a piece of land is shown to have
been classified as alienable and disposable, it remains part of
the inalienable land of the public domain. In the present case,
the CA relied on the approved survey indicating that the survey
was inside alienable and disposable land. It is well-settled,
however, that such notation does not suffice to prove that the
land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable. What
respondents should have done was to show that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration fell within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. In addition, they should have adduced a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records.
To bolster its argument, the OSG cites the case of Republic of
the Philippine v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,6 where the Court
stated that the trial court should not have accepted the contents
of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if
the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in
evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the
land is alienable and disposable. Such government
certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts
stated therein. As such, the certifications are prima facie
evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do
not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the OSG argues
that respondents failed to present specific acts of ownership to
prove open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse
possession in the concept of an owner. Facts constituting
possession must be duly established by competent evidence. As
to the tax declaration adduced by respondents, it cannot be said
that it clearly manifested their adverse claim on the property. If
respondents genuinely and consistently believed their claim of
ownership, they should have regularly complied with their real
estate obligations from the start of their supposed occupation.
Position of Respondents
On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA correctly
found that the subject land was alienable and disposable. The
approved survey plan of the subject property with an
annotation, stating that the subject property is alienable and
disposable land, is a public document, having been issued by
the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein and are sufficient to establish
that the subject property is indeed alienable and disposable.
Respondents cite the case of Republic v. Serrano,7 where the
Court stated that a DENR Regional Technical Director’s
certification, which was annotated on the subdivision plan
submitted in evidence, constituted substantial compliance with
the legal requirement. The DENR certification enjoyed the
presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary.
Anent the second assignment of error, respondents contend that
the CA correctly applied the doctrine of constructive possession
because they acquired the subject land from their mother,
Resurreccion, through a donation inter vivos, dated July 22,
1972.Their mother, in turn, acquired the subject land from the
Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale. They
claim that a small hut was built in the said land and was
occupied by a worker of her mother. They countered that
although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are
not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property which is
not in his actual or constructive custody.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The vital issue to be resolved by the Court is whether
respondents are entitled to the registration of land title under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 1529, or
pursuant to Section 14(2) of the same statute. Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141,8 as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073,9
provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
now Regional Trial Court of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to
wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for
registration of land title must establish and prove: (1) that the
subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it
is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.10 Compliance with the foregoing requirements is
indispensable for an application for registration of land title,
under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, to validly prosper. The
absence of any one requisite renders the application for
registration substantially defective.
Anent the first requisite, respondents presented evidence to
establish the disposable and alienable character of the subject
land through a survey plan, where on its lower portion, a note
stated, among others, as follows: "This survey is inside the
alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No.
637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is
outside any civil or military reservation." The said plan was
approved by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional
Office III, San Fernando, Pampanga on December 3, 1998. The
annotation in the survey plan, however, fell short of the
requirement of the law in proving its disposable and alienable
character.
In Republic v. Espinosa,11 citing Republic v. Sarmiento12 and
Menguito v. Republic,13 the Court reiterated the rule that that
a notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the
property surveyed was alienable and disposable was not the
positive government act that would remove the property from
the inalienable domain and neither was it the evidence accepted
as sufficient to controvert the presumption that the property was
inalienable. Thus:
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy
of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR
Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic
engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable
area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January
3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such
annotation to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and
does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public
domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on
the printed words which read: ‘This survey plan is inside
Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per
L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on
January 3, 1968,’ appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No.
Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State..."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in
this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought
to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private
person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant.
Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains
inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic
engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey
was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does
not constitute a positive government act validly changing the
classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor
has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By
relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have
not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable." (Citations omitted and emphases supplied)
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. The applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; or a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the government that the land
claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable.14
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.15 declared that a CENRO
certification was insufficient to prove the alienable and
disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The
applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR
Secretary approved the land classification and released the land
in question as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original
registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO
Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records.16
Here, the only evidence presented by respondents to prove the
disposable and alienable character of the subject land was an
annotation by a geodetic engineer in a survey plan. Although
this was certified by the DENR, it clearly falls short of the
requirements for original registration.
With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the
possession and occupation of a parcel of land by the applicant,
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on
June 12, 1945 or earlier.17 A mere showing of possession and
occupation for 30 years or more, by itself, is not sufficient.18
In this regard, respondents likewise failed. As the records and
pleadings of this case will reveal, the earliest that respondents
and their predecessor-in-interest can trace back possession and
occupation of the subject land was only in the year 1950,when
their mother, Resurreccion, acquired the subject land from the
Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale.
Evidently, their possession of the subject property commenced
roughly five (5) years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning date
expressly provided under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus,
their application for registration of land title was legally infirm.
The respondents cannot invoke Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529
which provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.1avvphi1 The
case of Malabanan v. Republic19 gives a definitive clarity to
the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In the
said case, the Court laid down the following rules:
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
xxxx
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become
only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these
are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can
the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the
public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government.
The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial
property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just
title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at
least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title,
ripens into ownership. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that
the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and, thus, incapable of acquisition
by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can
begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law.20
Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive
prescription to commence and operate against the State, the
classification of land as alienable and disposable alone is not
sufficient. The applicant must be able to show that the State, in
addition to the said classification, expressly declared through
either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by
the President that the subject land is no longer retained for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that
the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the
land remains to be a property of public dominion and, hence,
not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription.21 The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain does not change its status as property
of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.
It is still insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.22
For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either
Section 14 (1) or 14 (2) of P.O. No. 1529. Under Section 14 (1),
respondents failed to prove (a) that the property is alienable and
disposable; and (b) that their possession of the property dated
back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. Failing to prove the alienable
and disposable nature of the subject land, respondents all the
more cannot apply for registration by way of prescription
pursuant to Section 14 (2) which requires possession for 30
years to acquire or take. Not only did respondents need to prove
the classification of the subject land as alienable and disposable,
but also to show that it has been converted into patrimonial. As
to whether respondents were able to prove that their possession
and occupation were of the character prescribed by law, the
resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the
foregoing considerations.
In fine, the Court holds that the ruling of the CA lacks sufficient
factual or legal justification.1âwphi1 Hence, the Court is
constrained to reverse the assailed CA decision and resolution
and deny the application for registration of land title of
respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 21,
2007 Decision and the October 8, 2008 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Application for Registration of
Title of Respondents Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese in Land
Registration Case No. 026 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
(FULLTEXT)
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO
BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN
DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS,
NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA,
DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG,
DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES,
DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU
RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY
MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING,
DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN
PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY,
BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI
TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU
MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,
LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA
GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L.
GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO,
JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-
VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY,
CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN,
LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO,
CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE
G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI,
PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL,
MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O.
SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H.
MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A.
LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S.
LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY,
JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY
UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG,
MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M.
ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL,
FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P.
BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA,
NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR.,
JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR.,
SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA,
ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN,
DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID,
represented by her father CORNELIO MALID,
MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father
MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented
by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA,
represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,
EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND,
PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC.
and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON
FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required
respondents to comment.1 In compliance, respondents
Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created
under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October
13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend
the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary
of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The
Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over
natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the
petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of
Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano
Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous
peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to
Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality
of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as
Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of
the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the
responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who
are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this
reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan
Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the
Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed
a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention.
They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and
organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the
parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in
which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier
pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the
ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of
ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines
ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that
ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of
water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous
peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines
the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of
the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the
indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development
or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within
the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25
years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the
responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral
lands" which might even include private lands found within
said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA
defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making
customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes
involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground
that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which
vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the
NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon
notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and
Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of
the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions
and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with
respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt
or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in
favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices
shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples;
and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous
peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II,
Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of
the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a
lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes
upon the President’s power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59,
63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and
desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371
and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to
cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of
1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary
of Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing
public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions
of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply
with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court
voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed
an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with
the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be
read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a
justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the
petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66
of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific
cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the
IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the
view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices
Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary
majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.
However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate
opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and
Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
(CASE DIGEST)
LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et.
al. v. V. O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment
and Natural Resources; H. RAMOS, Director, Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); R. TORRES,
Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into
FTAA is a exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s
natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision
must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-
Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9,
1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995,
the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized
under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of
land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and
North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment
Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order
95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative
Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and
the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared
unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned
corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop
Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII
Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining
and exploration company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to
Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while
40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian
company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the
FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed
the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of
Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987,
authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals
from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for
contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial
assistance for large scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation
of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the
foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the
annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the
Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of
Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional
for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the
Philippine mineral resources. 2. Whether or not the FTAA
between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract that
permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine
mineral resources.
HELD:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is
unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the
Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. The same
section also states that, ―the exploration and development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935
and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses,
concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation,
development, or utilization of natural resources. By such
omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public
domain through license, concession or lease is no longer
allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct
equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular
natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts
to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s
natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to
exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase
―management or other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter.
The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and
financial assistance. The management and the operation of the
mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of
the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the
1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into
FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the
nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos.
Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against
their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is
invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts.
Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and
technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution,
its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as
service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign
contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that
the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like
the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign
contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining
operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial
ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these
contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit
a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40%
capitalization requirement for corporations or associations
engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of
Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are
unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent,
conditional or connected, must fail with them.

Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned

corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial
assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development
and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.

Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service

Contract

The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government

is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a
service contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned

corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and
dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced
from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement
provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology,
management, and personnel necessary for the Mining
Operations.

These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the

FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over
natural resources that properly belong to the State and are
intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are
abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices
that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to
suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring
must be struck down.