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On Animal Laborans and Homo Politicus in Hannah Arendt: A Note

Author(s): Martin Levin


Source: Political Theory, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Nov., 1979), pp. 521-531
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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ON ANIMAL LABORANS AND
HOMO POLITICUS
IN HANNAH ARENDT
A Note

MARTINLEVIN
of Victoria
University

L2 VERY POLITICALPHILOSOPHER tomisunderstanding,


is subject
but perhapsnonemoreso thanthosewho insiston distinctions to which
theirage is not accustomedor whichit is determined to ignore.Thusitis
not surprisingto discoverthatHannahArendt, whosephilosophy is based
on just suchdistinctions whichwe findeitheralienormeaningless, should
be particularlyvulnerableto misunderstanding andmisinterpretation.
Two recentissuesof PoliticalTheoryhaveincludedarticleswhichhave
containedcriticalbut thoughtful appreciationsof Arendt'scelebration of
the political.'However,the authorsof thesearticles,GeorgeKateband
Margaret Canovan,havefoundquitetroubling thecounterpart of Arendt's
glorificationof the political:herdenigrationof all nonpoliticalactivities,
and in particularlaboringas personified in Arendt'sanimallaborans.2
Indeed, Kateb findsArendt'sindictment of labor so relentlessand so
completethathe feelscompelledto defendheragainstthepossiblecharge
of austocratic"fastidiousness."3 Canovanbelievesno defenseis possible
and findsArendtguiltyof "demonstrating a haughty and distantcontempt
forthevulgarity ofthemodernworld."4
I believe both Kateb and Canovan are wrongin discerning elitist
tendencies in Arendt,at leastto theextenttheybase theirconviction on
Arendt'sallegedharshstrictures againstthelaboringclass.Theymakethat
mistakebecausebothof themtoo easilyassumethatArendt'sdevaluation
of laborandherindictment ofanimallaboransreferto a socialcategory of
humanitythatwas formerly describedas the lowerordersand todayis
POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 7 No. 4, November1979 521-531
i 1979 Sage Publications,Inc.

521

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522 / POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1979

calledtheworkingclass.WhatI willargueis thatfirst, Kateband Canovan


fail to pay sufficientlyclose attentionto how Arendtactuallydefines
animallaborans.It has littleto do withtraditional sociologicalcategories
and everything to do with Arendt'soriginaland subtlephilosophical
distinctions.
Second,Canovanparticularly failsto explorethefundamental
groundof Arendt'sindictment of animallaborans.Third,withthe first
two pointsclarified,Arendt'schoiceof homopoliticusas thealternative
to animal laboranstakeson specialmeaningand becomesmoreunder-
standable,ifno lessshocking.

I. WHO IS ANIMAL LABORANS?

Both Kateb and CanovanbelievethatArendt'sharshstrictures against


animallaboransare not simplythe expressionof the low valuationshe
placeson a particularactivityor relationshipto theworld,butconstitute
the castigationof a whole social class,namelythelabouringor working
class.5 In otherwords,not onlylabouringbutthesocialclassmadeup of
thosewho labourstandscondemned. Forinstance, Katebwritesin passing
that"whenArendtspeaksofwhatshouldbe hidden,shecharacteristically
has the labouringmass in mind, the animal laboransin enormous
number."6Animallaboransis seento be synonymous withthelabouring
class.
The sameassumption is madeby CanovanwhoplacesArendt'sdenigra-
tion of animallaboransat the centreof heranalysis.Canovanclaimsto
have uncovered"a deep and seriousinconsistency,"7 a "contradiction"8
in Arendt,a contradictionbetweendemocratic and elitisttendencies.
On
the one hand, Arendtarguesthat each individualhas the potentialof
beginning something new in the worldand praisesthe ordinary working
people who inventedthe systemof peoples' councilswhichhave been
spontaneouslyformedin almostall modernrevolutions.9 On the other
hand, CanovansuggeststhatArendt'sworkalso containsa harshindict-
mentof theworkingclassin theformofanimallaborans,whoseactivities
aredescribedas fundamentally privateand profoundly antipolitical.10
How
then Canovan asks, can Arendtcondemnthe workingclass for being
"'world-less""1
and "herdlike"'12and at the sametimepraiseit as leading
theway in inventing newformsof politicalactionand discovering thejoys
of publicfreedom?

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Levin / HANNAH ARENDT: A NOTE / 523

Of course,Arendtis not guiltyof sucha contradiction. Herindictment


of animallaboransis theindictment of an activity,
a wayoflife,evenofa
relationship to theworld,but not of a socialclass.Contrary to Canovan's
argument, Arendtis generallyquite carefulthroughout herworkto dis-
tinguishanimallaboransfromthelabouringor working classas such.The
whole groundof Arendt'sobjectionto the modernage is thatanimal
laboranshas becomethe dominantmodelof humanlife.However,thisis
not becausetheworking classhas takenoverthepublicrealmbutbecause
we haveall becomeanimallaboransin ourattitudeto ourworkandin our
relationshipto the public world.A carefulconsideration of Arendt's
specialusageofanimallaboransis in order.
In Arendt'sfirsteditionof The Origins of Totalitarianism,shepresents
us with an earlyformulation of animallaboransin her theoryof mass
societyand morespecifically in her discussionof the "masses."In that
work,she explicitlyemphasizesthatthe "masses"who made totalitari-
anismpossiblewererecruitedfromall classesand not simplyfromthe
lowerordersor theworkingclass.'3 Nor does shemodifythatpositionin
latereditions,contrary to Canovan'sassertions.14Canovanclaimsto find
in Arendt'snew chapter"Ideologyand Terror,"in hersecondeditionof
Origins,an explicitidentification of "the masseswith the activityof
labouring,""5i.e., witha specificsocialclassand thelinkingof thatclass
to totalitarianism. As evidenceshe cites Arendtthat "a tyrannyover
'labourers. . . wouldautomatically be a ruleoverlonely,notonlyisolated,
men and tendto be totalitarian."'16 However,thefactthatArendtplaces
"labourers"in quotationmarksshouldsuggest to Canovanas itis meantto
suggestto the readerthatArendtis employing thetermin a specialway.
For Arendtis not referring to a sociologicalclassherebut,as she writes
onlya fewlinespreviously in theverysameparagraph, to a "worldwhose
chiefvaluesare dictatedby labour,thatis whereall humanactivities have
been transformed intolabouring."'17It is thislast statement whichCano-
vanignoresthatrequiresexplicationand whichconstitutes thegroundof
herindictment of themodemage.
Whatcan Arendtmeanwhenshedescribes a "worldwhosechiefvalues
are dictatedby labour"? To understand Arendt,it is necessaryto grasp
thatherthoughtrevolves aroundtwofundamental polarities:the,polarities
of necessityand freedom.The characteristic activitycarriedon in the
realmof necessityis labour,that in the realmof freedomis political
action.The tensionbetweenthesetwo realmsis describedby Arendtas
the oppositionbetweenprivateand public,shameand honour-andmost
ofall-futility
significant and permanence.'8

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524 / POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1979,

WhatArendtis identifying here is all activitiesdone in bondageto


necessity, i.e., performed underthe compulsionof providing thenecessi-
tiesof life.All suchactivitiesArendtcallslabouring. Whatis uniqueabout
the modernage, accordingto Arendt,is thatmerelifehas itselfbeen
elevatedto the highestgood and consequently, labouringwhichsustains
thatlifehas becomethe dominantactivity.All "the ancientdistinctions
and articulations withinthevitaactive,"`9the distinctionsbetweenlabour,
work,and actionhas been levelledout or obliterated.20 Theyhavedisap-
pearedbecauseonlythoseactivities whichcontribute to thebiologicallife
processare seen as havingvalue.Thismeansthatlabouring, whichsustains
thatprocess,hasbeen"elevatedto thehighest rankof man'scapacities,"2 1
an elevationthathas had fatefulconsequencesforthemodernage. What
are essentiallyhouseholdor privateactivities(labouring),in Arendt's
terminology, havetakenoverthe publicrealm.But sinceanimallaborans
has no notionof how to createand carefora durablelastingworldwhich
is durablepreciselybecauseit transcends life,whatwe are leftwithis
actuallynot a truepublicrealm,"but onlyprivateactivities displayedin
the open."22 That is why Arendtcould writein the statementcited
previouslythat we live in a "worldwhose chiefvaluesare dictatedby
labour."
However,thelatterpartof thatsentenceremainsto be explained:how
thevictoryof animallaborans(the chapterwithwhichArendtconcludes
The Human Condition)is not thevictoryof a particular classbut is the
consequenceofa world"whereall humanactivities havebeentransformed
intolabouring."
Arendtis quiteexpliciton thispoint.Animallaboransdoesnotreferto
a sociologicallydefinedclass. Our societyof labourers"did not come
about throughthe emancipationof the labouringclassesbut by the
emancipation of thelabouringactivity itself,whichprecededby centuries
thepoliticalemancipation oflabourers."23

Again,Canovanmisunderstands Arendtwhenshe accusesArendtof


lapsingintoa materialist determinism.2 WVhen Arendtrefers to labourers,
she does not mean the Marxianproletarians who are definedby their
relationship to themeansof production. Arendtexplicitlydisclaimsthat
everymemberof thelabourers'societymustactuallybe a labourerin the
sociologicalsense,"but onlythatall membersconsiderwhatever theydo
primarily as a way to sustaintheirown lives and thoseof theirfam-
ilies,"2 5 WhenArendtinveighs againstthelabourers'or consumers' soci-
ety,26she is not pointing herphilosophical fingerat thelabouring masses

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Levin / HANNAH ARENDT: A NOTE / 525

Forthemodern
butat all classesin society. age'spreoccupationwiththe
lifeprocessitselfandtheconsequent theoretical oflabourhas
glorification
transformed thewholeofsociety intoa society oflabourers.
The problem is thatall humanactivities havebeenreducedto the
common denominator oflabouring,
i.e.,ofprocuringthenecessities
oflife
andproviding fortheirabundance. Withthepossible exceptionofartists,
all ofus-labourers, bourgeoisie,
professionals,
academics,politicians-have
becomelabourers.27 Ourrelationship to lifeand theworldis thatof
animallaborans. Thatis,everythingwedois considered tobe doneforthe
sakeof"making a living."

As a result,all seriousactivities, of theirfruits,


irrespective are calledlabour,
and everyactivity whichis notnecessaryeitherforthelifeoftheindividualor
forthelifeprocessofsocietyis subsumed underplayfulness.28

Theparticular derangement of themodern ageisnotthentheresultof


theemancipation of theworking classbuttheemancipation ofa single
activity-labour-and its "almostundisputed predominance"29overall
otheractivities of the vitaactive,i.e., overworkand especially over
The result
politics. is a society"inwhichthefactofmutualdependence
forthesakeof lifeandnothing elseassumes publicsignificance."30
It is
the ideal of animallaborans, theidealof effortless consumption and
abundance thathasbecometheidealofthewholesociety. Ofcourse,the
completely realizeddreamof animallaborans wouldtransform oureco-
nomyintoa totalwasteeconomy in whichthings wouldbe "almostas
quicklydevoured anddiscarded"3 1 as theyappearedin theworld.There
are obviously somenatural limitsto sucha process.Butwhatinterests
Arendt muchmorearetheexistential implications.
Fortherealdanger,
according to Arendt, is thatsuch a labourers' or consumer society,
"dazzledby the abundance of its growing futility
and caughtin the
smooth functioning ofa never-ending process,
wouldnolonger beableto
recognize
itsownfutility."3 2

It

II. ARENDT'S INDICTMENT OF


ANIMAL LABORANS
Herewe arriveat thechiefground of Arendt's
indictmentofanimal
laboransand discoverthe realsignificance
of the polarity
in Arendt's

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526/ POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1979

thinking betweennecessityand freedom,labourand action,futility and


permanence. In his articleon Arendt,Kateb writesthatArendt'svindica-
tion of the politicallife is "shockingand foreign."33 Indeed it is. But
equally shockingis what Kateb describesas Arendt's"elaborateand
complexre-evaluation things."34For Arendt's"re-evalua-
of non-political
tion"is,of course,a radicaldevaluation ofnonpoliticalthings. WhatKateb
partlymissesand whereI believeCanovanto be quitemistakenis in the
identificationof thatdevaluationwitha social classratherthanwitha set
ofactivitiesor wayoflife.
Howeverthe question still to be answeredis how to account for
Arendt's radical devaluationof nonpoliticalthings,particularlyof
labouring.The answeris to be foundat the most profoundlevel of
Arendt'sreflections, in heracuteawarenessoftheevanescence and precar-
iousnessof human accomplishment.35 It is to be foundin Arendt's
conviction thatmuchof life'sactivities aredonein unredeemable futility,
a futility
boundup in thetransiency andephemerality inherent in thevery
biologicalprocessesof life itself.Labour,in particular,is singledout by
Arendtbecauselabouris theactivity

whichcorresponds to the biologicalprocessof the humanbody, whose


spontaneous growth,
metabolism,and eventualdecayare boundto thevital
producedandfedintothelifeprocessbylabour.36
necessities

By its verynaturethenlabour is condemnedto neverleave anything


lastingbehind.
Yet whatjustifies
lifeforArendtandmakes"life'sburden"37 bearable
is preciselythatwhichdefiesand transcends themortality of individual
lifeand thenaturalcyclicalprocesseswhich.surroundit. Arendt'sdenigra-
tionof labouring(or animallaborans)can now be seenforwhatit is. It is
rooted in her profound"repugnanceto futility,"38 a futilityto which
labour,by its verynature,is consigned.HenceArendt'soppositionis not
evento labouringor animallaboransas such(as it certainlyis not to the
labouringor workingclass) but to the fiutility
to whichthe labouring
activityis condemned.The pointcan perhapsbe emphasized by observing
that while labouringis an exampleof futilityfor Arendt,all of life's
is notencompassed
futility bylabouring.
In an intriguing
passagein her essay on "WhatIs Freedom?"Arendt
writesthateven the wordsand deeds of men of actionin the political

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Levin / HANNAH ARENDT: A NOTE / 527

realmaresubjecttoman-made historical
processes
which acquirea lifeand
automatism oftheirownandwhich"areno lessruinous thanthenatural
lifeprocessthatdrivesour organism."3 9 "The truthis," according to
Arendt,"thatautomatism isinherentinallprocesses,
nomatter whattheir
originmaybe,"40whether theybe in thenaturalprocessesofbiological
lifeorthehistoricalprocessesinitiated
by man.Hence even in thepublic
realm-that realmof possibleimmortality-"no singleact and no single
event,can ever,onceandforall,deliver andsavea man,ora nation, or
mankind."41
Labour,theendless repetitivecycleofman'smetabolism withnature,
andthedeadening oftheautonomy
sterility ofautomaticprocesses-both
"theessential
constitute worldly of thelifeprocess."42
futility Moreover
theyarenoteradicable. Theycannotbe vanquished: "theyarerather the
modesinwhich lifeitself,
together withthenecessitytowhich itisbound,
makesitselffelt."43AsArendt remindsus:

Man cannot be freeif he does not know thathe is subject to necessity,because


his freedomis always won in his neverwholly successfulattemptto liberate
himselffromnecessity.44

WhatArendthas presented us withis the challengeof thehuman


condition:
where"nature forever
invadesthehumanartifice, threatening
thedurability
oftheworldanditsfitness forhumanuse,"45 whileman
foreverstruggles
to demonstrate his capacityforlifein theworldby
nature
transcending in asserting
thepurely worldlystability
ofthehuman
againstthedeadlyerosionof automatic
artifice processes.
However,the
gameis worththecandle:thestakesarefreedom in a publicworldand
ofliving
eventhepossibility ineverlastingness.

II. ARENDT'S AL TERNATI VE TO


ANIMAL LABORANS: HOMO POLITICUS

Wearenowin a positionto consider


Arendt's
answertohersearch
for
whatcouldchallengelife'sfutility,
forwhatcouldjustify
andredeem
"life'sburden,"
forwhatcouldrescueus fromwhatArendtsignificantly

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528 / POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1979

calls"thedarkness ofeverydaylife."46Wearealsonowin a position to


reflecton how misleadingis Canovan'sidentification
ofArendt'sanimal
laboranswiththesociologist'sworking class.TheHumanCondition, far
fromdemonstrating Arendt's"haughty and distantcontempt forthe
vulgarityof the modernworld,"47as Caniovan wouldhaveus believe,
containsherfullest theoretical
vindication
of a lifethatoffers
notonly
permanence but the promise of immortality,namelythelifeof homo
thefreelifeofpolitical
politicus, action.
The attraction
of classicalGreeceand the reasonthatArendtfindsher
homein the polis derivesfromher beliefthatthepolis
intellectual
the
provided spacewhere mencouldnotonlyappearandreveal themselves
in theirheroicindividuality
but couldstrivefornothingless thanan
earthly
immortality.
Accordingto Arendt,
thepoliswasfortheGreeks

firstof all their guarantee against the futilityof individuallife, the space
protectedagainstthis futilityand reservedfor the relativepermanence,ifnot
immortality, of mortals.48

Harkingback to theGreeksand forward in timeto the creationof "new


revolutionary organsof selfgovernment"4 9 Arendt'soverwhelming sense
of the futilityof mostof life'sactivities
now findsits counterpart in her
exaltedconviction in the redeeming
possibilityofthepolitical.The politi-
cal realmis theone realmwheretheephemeral natureofmostman-made
"products"canbe overcome.For the"freedeedsandlivingwords"50that
are the outcomeof a lifelivedin the politicalrealmecho and resonate
through theages.Indeed,theybecome"imperishable."51
It is important to be clearwhatArendtis assertinghere.Forsheis not
simplycallingto us to recoverthat "shiningbrightness we once called
gloryand whichis possibleonlyin thepublicrealm."52 It is morethana
questionof gloryor honouror even freedom.53It is the possibility of
achievinga kind of immortality. Arendt'sclaimis so startling thatshe
shouldbe allowedto stateit inherownwords:

The task and potential greatnessof mortalslies in their ability to produce


things... which would deserveto be and, at least to a degree,are at home in
everlastingness,so that throughthem mortals could fmd their place in the
cosmos where everything is immortalexcept themselves.By theircapacityfor
the immortaldeed, by theirabilityto leave non-perishabletracesbehind,men,

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Levin/ HANNAHARENDT: A NOTE / 529

theirindividual
mortality
notwithstanding, oftheirown
attainan immortality
to be ofa "divine"nature.54
andprovethemselves

To appreciate theuniqueness of Arendt's claim,it might be recalled


thatAristotle,whodefined manas a political being,consideredmanto
partakeof the divineonlyto theextenthe leftthepolisbehindand
contemplated the eternalorder.But suchis Arendt's esteemforand
celebration ofthepolitical
thatit is political
actors,thosewhoactinthe
politicalrealm,who "willbe able to establish together theeverlasting
remembrance of theirgoodand bad deeds,to inspire admiration in the
present andin future ages"55andwhowillthereby "provethemselves to
be ofa 'divine'nature."56
The modern agestandscondemned byArendt notforits"vulgarity"
(Canovan's but the
term) because public realmhaswithered away.Orwhat
amounts to thesamething, it hasbeentakenoverforalienpurposes. In
modern democracies,allweareleftwithare"private activities
displayed in
theopen."57Theprivate has superseded thepublic,politicsyieldedto
economics andfreedom hasbeensubmerged bynecessity.Thisis thereal
meaning forArendt oftheascendancy ofanimallaborans.Moreover, inan
agewhichbelieves thatourfreedom andindividualitybeginwhere politics
ends,i.e., in our private
life,Arendt has leftus a startling
legacy:the
assertion of the redeeming and evenimmortal possibilities
of political
action.

NOTES

1. George Kateb, "Freedom and Worldliness in the Thoughtof Hannah


Arendt,"PoliticalTheory5, 2 (May 1977) and Margaret Canovan,"The Contradic-
tionsof HannahArendt'sPoliticalThought," PoliticalTheory6, 1 (February1978).
Hereaftercitedas "Contradictions."
2. ActuallyArendtsinglesout twokindsof activitesforcriticism and devalua-
tion,bothof whichare characteristic
of themodernage: labouring and itscounter-
part,consumption, and thecultivation
of consciousnessand an innerlife.As Kateb
succinctlysumsup Arendt'sposition:"In the Modernage, the manyconsumeor
aspireto consumption,and thefewwithdraw intothemselves.Bothareprisoners."
"FreedomandWorldliness in theThought ofHannahArendt," p. 146.

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530 / POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1979

3. Ibid.,p. 144.
4. "Contradictions," p. 11.
5. Arendtactuallymakesa noveldistinction betweenlabourand work.While
thedistinction is important ofthethreeactivities
in a discussion ofthevitaactiva,it
is notrelevant to thepresent essay.
6. "FreedomandWorldliness in theThoughtofHannahArendt," p. 144.
7. "Contradictions," p. 5.
8. Ibid., p. 7. Canovanhad "by-passed"thesecontradictions in her earlier
excellentstudy,ThePoliticalThought ofHannahArendt(NewYork:Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1974).
9. For Arendt'saccountof thesepeople's councils,see HannahArendt,On
Revolution(New York: Viking,1963), pp. 265-285.Hereafter cited as OR. On
Arendt'slinking of birthandnewbeginnings anditssignificance,
see HansJonaswho
assertsthatwith" 'natality', Arendtnot onlycoineda newwordbut introduced a
newcategory intothephilosophical doctrineofman.""Acting, Knowing, Thinking:
Gleanings fromHannahArendt'sPhilosophical Work,"SocialResearch44, 1 (Spring
1977),p. 30.
10. E.g., The HumanCondition(GardenCity,NY: Doubleday-Anchor, 1959),
pp. 42, 74, 111-113,140-141,191. Hereafter citedasHC.
11. Ibid.,p. 102.
12. Ibid.,pp. 190-199.
13. TheBurdenof Our Time(London:Secker& Warburg, 1951),pp. 308, 310.
14. "Contradictions," pp. 10-12.
15. Ibid.,pp. 11-12.
16. The Originsof Totalitarianism (NewYork:Meridian Books,1958),p. 475.
Citedin "Contradictions," p. 12.
17. Ibid. In a lateressayon masscultureand masssociety,it is againclearthat
Arendt,in discussing "themasses"is notreferring to a specifilc
classbut a relation-
shipwiththe world.See HannahArendt, "The Crisisin Culture,"in BetweenPast
andFuture(NewYork:Viking,1968),pp. 199,210-211.
18. HC, p. 65.
19. Ibid.,p. 289. See all ofpp. 286-292.
20. The reasonsforthisarerelatedbyArendt, ina subtleandcomplexargument,
to theriseof Christianity, theimpactof modernscienceandthelossoffaitharising
fromCartesian doubt.See thewholeofSectionVI, "The VitaActivaandtheModern
Age,"inHC, pp. 225-297.
21. Ibid.,p. 286.
22. Ibid.,p. 115. On theincapacity ofanimallaboransto sustaina truepublic
world,seeHC, pp. 44, 102, 111-113and"The CrisisinCulture," pp. 210-211.
23. HC, p. 110. Arendtrepeatsthisargument severaltimes.See, forexample
ibid.,p. 43. The "emancipation oflabourwasnota consequence oftheemancipation
of theworking class,butprecededit."
24. "Contradictions," pp. 11-12.
25. HC, p. 43.
26. "Labour and consumption are but twostagesof thesameprocess,"HC, p.
110.
27. HC, pp. 5, 110-111.
28. Ibid.,p. 111.
29. Ibid.

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Levin/ HANNAHARENDT: A NOTE / 531

30. Ibid.,p. 43.


31. Ibid.,p. 116.
32. Ibid.,pp. 116-117.
33. "FreedomandWorldliness in theThought ofHannahArendt," p. 141.
34. Ibid.,p. 143.
35. Arendt'sconcluding paragraph in On Revolutioncontainsthe linesfrom
Sophocles:"Not to be bornprevailsoverall meaning utteredin words;by farthe
second-best forlife,once it has appeared,is to go as swiftlyas possiblewhenceit
came."OR, p. 285. Alsoseehercomments on goodfortune "whichis rareandnever
lastsand cannotbe pursued," HC, p. 93 and on the"good thingsinhistory" which
"are usuallyof shortduration," in "Thoughts on PoliticsandRevolution," in Crises
of theRepublic(NewYork:Harcourt BraceJovanovich, 1972),p. 204.
36. HC, p. 9.
37. OR, p. 285.
38. A phrasefromVeblenwhichArendtcitesoverandoveragain.
39. InBetweenPastandFuture,p. 168.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.AlsoseeHC, pp. 93-94.
42. HC, p. 113.
43. Ibid.,pp. 103-104.
44. Ibid.,p. 105.
45. Ibid.,p. 87.
46. Ibid.,p. 32.
47. "Contradictions," p. 11.
48. HC, p. 51.
49. OR, pp. 250, 259-285 and "Thoughtson Politicsand Revolution,"pp.
231-233.
50. OR, p. 285.
51. HC, p. 176.
52. Ibid.,p. 160.
53. It is also morethana questionof dramaturgy. For theviewthatpoliticsfor
Arendtis "essentially dramaturgic," see SheldonS. Wolin,"HannahArendtandthe
Ordinance ofTime,"SocialResearch44, 1 (Spring1977),p. 96.
54. HC, p. 19.
55. Ibid.,p. 176.
56. Ibid.,p. 19.
57. Ibid.,p. 115.

MartinLevin is an AssistantProfessorof PoliticalScienceat the University


of
Victoria,BritishColumbia, Canada. He is the authorof an articleon "The Challenge
to EconomicMan" thatwillshortlyappearin Journal
ofSocialandPoliticalStudies
andis currently
engagedin workon HannahArendt'sthought.

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