Notan Lumbos vs.

Baliguat

Facts:

Complainant is one of the accused in a complaint for arson and robbery in Criminal Cases before respondent’s sala.
Complainant alleges that instead of dismissing the case for patent lack of jurisdiction, respondent conducted P.I.
and subsequently issued a warrant of arrest against all the accused.

Hence, administrative case was file by the complainant against the RTC Judge , for Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Grave Abuse of Authority, Dereliction of Duty, Grave Misconduct, Oppression and Disbarment.

Issue:

WON the conduct of PI and subsequent issuance of warrant of arrest was proper.

Held :

Yes. The conduct of P.I and subsequent issuance of the warrants of arrest are well within the mandate of the law

and no indicative of any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge.

In the instant case, it appears that respondent ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the complainant

and his co-accused not only because of the existence of probable cause, but because of her finding that it was

necessary to place them under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It must be

emphasized that the conduct of respondent in the handling of the PI and the subsequent issuance of the warrants

of arrest is well within the mandate of the law and not indicative of any grave abuse of discretion on her part. The

criminal cases subject of this complaint were filed on July 15, 2004 and still governed by Rule 112 of the Revised

Rules on Criminal Procedure in force at the time of the commission of the crime charged; while A.M. No. 05-8-26-

SC which took effect on October 3, 2005, commanded the first level courts to continue with the preliminary

investigation of cases pending with them and terminate them not later than December 31, 2005.
 SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Office of the Ombudsman, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION and ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD,

Facts:

Several complaints for Plunder were filed against Sen. Estrada, among others. The Ombudsman served Estrada
copies complaints against him thus, the latter filed his counter-affidavits. Estrada further filed his request to be
furnished with copies of counter-affidavits of the other respondents, and other documents in pursuant to his right
as to Section 3b, Rule 112 of the ROC. However, the request was denied: the office of the Ombudsman finds that
the aforementioned provisions do not entitle the respondent to be furnished all the filings of the other
respondents.

Issue:
WON the Ombudsman’s denial of Estrada’s request constitute grave abuse of discretion resulting the latter’s
violation of right to due process

Held:

No. considering the facts of the case, the Office did not violate Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.

Ang Tibay requires substantial evidence for a decision against the respondent tin the administrative case. In PI,
only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence,
as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
 Hipos Sr, vs. Bay

Facts:

Two informations for crime of rape and information of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners and two
others. Private complainants AAA and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been filed against petitioners and their co-
accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases. Petitioners filed their Joint
Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[ before the City Prosecutor. City Prosecutor affirmed the Informations filed
against them. However, 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor reversed the Resolution holding that there was lack of probable
cause. City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay. Judge Bay denied the motion
hence the petition.Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the Petition
for Mandamus to compel Judge Bay to dismiss the case.

Issue:

WON the case may be dismiss thru Writ of Mandamus

Held:

No. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty,
not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the
law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act,
because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. However, mandamus is never available
to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already
taken in the exercise of either.

In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but against the trial court,
seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the City Prosecutors Office. The
prosecution has already filed a case against petitioners. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If
petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the
Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for
Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.
 PCI JIMMY M. FORTALEZA and SPO2 FREDDIE A. NATIVIDAD, vs HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ in his capacity as the
Secretary of Justice and ELIZABETH N. OROLA VDA. DE SALABAS,

Facts:

Justice Secretary Gonzalez issued a resolution modifying the resolution of the prosecution office hence filing a
information for Kidnapping with murder against the petitioners. Petitioners filed for Certiorari with the CA for the
modification of information but it was dismissed for lack of merit. The petitioner then filed Petition for Review
under Rule 45 challenging the CA’s decision. The Office of the Pres issued a decision to set aside the modified info;
the entire case should be remanded to the Provincial Prosecutor of Negros Oriental on the ground that the
Secretary of Justice may not exercise its power to review where there was allegedly no new resolution rendered by
the local prosecutor

Issue:

WON the Secretary of Justice's power has the power to review the actions of the investigating prosecutor

Held:

Yes. It is established in jurisprudence that the Secretary of Justice has the statutory power of control and
supervision over prosecutors. Moreover, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court recognizes the Secretary of
Justice's power to review the actions of the investigating prosecutor, even motu proprio: “If upon petition by a
proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice
reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the
prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The
same rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.”

Verily, the Secretary of Justice was empowered to review the actions of the Provincial Fiscal during the preliminary
investigation or the reinvestigation.
JASPER AGBAY vs. THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY, SPO4 NEMESIO NATIVIDAD, JR.
and SPO2 ELEAZAR M. SOLOMON,

Facts:

Petitioner together with a certain Sherwin Jugalbot, was arrested and detained for an alleged violation of RA 7610.
On the following day, a complaint was filed for the said crime.

The counsel for petitioner wrote the chief of police demanding the immediate release of petitioner considering the
failure to deliver Agbay to the proper judicial authority with 36 hours. Private respondents did not act on this letter
and continued to detain the petitioner. During the pendency of the case, petitioner was ordered released after he
had posted bond.

Petitioner then filed a complaint for violation of Art 125 of the RPC for delay in the delivery of detained persons
against private respondent. The Deputy Ombudsman for Military issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal
of the t criminal complaint

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court constitutes delivery to a proper judicial
authority as contemplated by Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code

Held:

No. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person
without informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on bail. More specifically, it punishes public
officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to
the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law. The continued detention of the accused
becomes illegal upon the expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such detainee having been
delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities

The words judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts
vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having
committed a public offense, that is, the Supreme Court and other such inferior courts as may be established by
law. Hence, the filing of the complaint with the MTC satisfied the intent behind Art. 125.
 Bell vs. Wolfish
Decided May 14, 1979
441 U.S. 520

Facts:

Respondent inmates brought this class action in Federal District Court challenging the constitutionality of
numerous conditions of confinement and practices in the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC), a federally
operated short-term custodial facility in New York City designed primarily to house pretrial detainees. The District
Court, on various constitutional grounds, enjoined, inter alia, the practice of housing, primarily for sleeping
purposes, two inmates in individual rooms originally intended for single occupancy; enforcement of the so-called
"publisher only" rule prohibiting inmates from receiving hard-cover books that are not mailed directly from
publishers, book clubs, or bookstores; the prohibition against inmates' receipt of packages of food and personal
items from outside the institution; the practice of body cavity searches of inmates following contact visits with
persons from outside the institution; and the requirement that pretrial detainees remain outside their rooms
during routine inspections by MCC officials. The Court of Appeals affirmed these rulings, holding with respect to
the "double-bunking" practice that the MCC had failed to make a showing of "compelling necessity" sufficient to
justify such practice

Issue:

WON such practices show compelling necessity

Held:

1. The "double-bunking" practice does not deprive pretrial detainees of their liberty without due process of law in
contravention of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 441 U. S. 530-543.

(a) There is no source in the Constitution for the Court of Appeals' "compelling necessity" standard. Neither the
presumption of innocence, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, nor a pretrial detainee's right to be
free from punishment provides any basis for such standard. Pp. 441 U. S. 531-535.

(b) In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the
protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, the proper inquiry is whether those
conditions or restrictions amount to punishment of the detainee. Absent a showing of an expressed intent to
punish, if a particular condition or restriction is reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental
objective, it does not, without more, amount to "punishment," but, conversely, if a condition or restriction is
arbitrary or purposeless,

Judged by the above analysis and on the record, "double-bunking" as practiced at the MCC did not, as a matter of
law, amount to punishment, and hence did not violate respondents' rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. While "double-bunking" may have taxed some of the equipment or particular facilities in certain
of the common areas in the MCC, this does not mean that the conditions at the MCC failed to meet the standards
required by the Constitution, particularly where it appears that nearly all pretrial detainees are released within 60
days

Nor do the "publisher only" rule, body cavity searches, the prohibition against the receipt of packages, or the
room search rule violate any constitutional guarantees.
(a) Simply because prison inmates retain certain constitutional rights does not mean that these rights are not
subject to restrictions and limitations. There must be a "mutual accommodation between institutional needs and
objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application," Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S.
539, 418 U. S. 556, and this principle applies equally to pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. Maintaining
institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or
retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees. Since problems
that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions, prison
administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices
that, in their judgment, are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.
Pp. 441 U. S. 544-548.

The "publisher only" rule does not violate the First Amendment rights of MCC inmates but is a rational response by
prison officials to the obvious security problem of preventing the smuggling of contraband in books sent from
outside. Moreover, such rule operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression, there
are alternative means of obtaining reading material, and the rule's impact on pretrial detainees is limited to a
maximum period of approximately 60 days.

(c) The restriction against the receipt of packages from outside the facility does not deprive pretrial detainees of
their property without due process of law in contravention of the Fifth Amendment, especially in view of the
obvious fact that such packages are handy devices for the smuggling of contraband. Pp. 441 U. S. 553-555.

(d) Assuming that a pretrial detainee retains a diminished expectation of privacy after commitment to a custodial
facility, the room search rule does not violate the Fourth Amendment, but simply facilitates the safe and effective
performance of the searches, and thus does not render the searches "unreasonable" within the meaning of that
Amendment. Pp. 441 U. S. 555-557.

(e) Similarly, assuming that pretrial detainees retain some Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment to a
corrections facility, the body cavity searches do not violate that Amendment. Balancing the significant and
legitimate security interests of the institution against the inmates' privacy interests, such searches can be
conducted on less than probable, cause and are not unreasonable. Pp. 441 U. S. 558-560.

(f) None of the security restrictions and practices described above constitute "punishment" in violation of the
rights of pretrial detainees under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. These restrictions and practices
were reasonable responses by MCC officials to legitimate security concerns, and, in any event, were of only limited
duration so far as the pretrial detainees were concerned

reversed and remanded.