Vda. De Bataclan vs.
Medina
Salud Villanueva Vda. De Bataclan and minors Norma, Luzviminda, Elenita, Oscar and Alfredo Bataclan vs. Mariano
Medina
GR No. L-10126 | Oct. 22, 1957 | J. Montemayor
Facts:
After midnight on September 13, 1952, Bus 30 of
Medina Transportation, owned and operated by R
Medina, left Amadeo, Cavite and was bound for Pasay
City. It was driven by its regular driver Conrado Saylon,
and together with his conductor, was with 16
passengers. Among the passengers was Juan Bataclan
who was seated to the right of the driver.
(Baka tanungin ni Sir bilang dami niyang obiter
questions)
VISAYAN DRIVER JUAN FELIPE
PERSON BATACLAN LARA
NATALIA VILLANUEVA (somewhere behind them)
At about 2 AM somewhere in Imus, Cavite, one of the
front tires burst and the bus began to zigzag until it fell
into a canal on the right side of the road and turned
turtle. The 4 passengers above (except the driver, who
was able to get out – don’t know how) couldn’t get out of
the overturned bus and about 30 mins later, 10 men
living in the area came to help, one of them carrying a
lighted torch made of bamboo, evidently fueled with
petroleum. As they approached the bus though, a fierce
fire started, consuming the bus and the 4 passengers
trapped inside. Apparently, when the bus overturned,
gasoline began to leak and escape from the tank,
permeating the body of the bus and the ground around
it, and the torch brought by one of the men helped set it
on fire.
By reason of Juan Bataclan’s death, his widow and his 5
minor children filed an action to recover from Medina
damages amounting to P87,150.
CFI Cavite: P1,000 + P600 attorney’s fee + P100 for
value of merchandise for sale carried by Bataclan then
Issue: WON Medina could be held liable – Yes
Held: The Civil Code provides for the responsibility of
common carrier to its passengers and their goods. (note
Torts class discussion)
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and
1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence
for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in
articles 1755 and 1756.
In instant case, there was a breach of contract of
transportation for hire, Medina Transportation having
undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination.
There was also negligence on the part of Medina,
through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is
evidence to show that at the time of the blowout, the bus
was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers,
and as shown by the fact that from the point where one
of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus
overturned, there was a distance of about 150 meters,
indicating that Saylon must have applied the brakes in
order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at
which the bus must have been running, its momentum
carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into
the canal and turned turtle.
Defendant carrier is responsible, but to what extent?
What is the proximate cause?
According to the trial court, the proximate cause was the
fire that burned the bus, for when the bus overturned,
Bataclan was still alive. SC disagrees and holds that the
proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, for it
was because of this that the leaking of the gasoline
happened. The arrival of the men with a lighted torch
was expected as the accident happened at 2:30 in the
morning and was a natural sequence of the overturning
of the bus (for help and assistance).
Furthermore, the driver and conductor were just on the
side of the road; they could have warned or taken steps
not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus, as it was
evident gasoline already leaked and soaked the area in
and around the bus. Said negligence come under the
CC provisions Articles 1733, 1759, and 1763.
It further makes use of this definition of proximate cause,
as provided for in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American jurisprudence:
'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'
And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.
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Hence, damages awarded by the trial court are
increased from P1,000 to P6,000, and for attorney’s
fees, from P600 to P800.
Obiter:
 One of the injured passengers who was
hospitalized was visited by Medina, and in the
course of his visit, she overheard him speaking
to one of his bus inspectors, telling said
inspector to have the tires of the bus changed
immediately because they were already old, and
that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the
driver to change the said tires, but that the driver
did not follow his instructions. If this be true, it
goes to prove that the driver had not been
diligent and had not taken the necessary
precautions to insure the safety of his
passengers. Had he changed the tires,
especially those in front, with new ones, as he
had been instructed to do, probably, despite his
speeding, as we have already stated, the blow
out would not have occurred.
 The criminal case against Saylon was
provisionally dismissed due to witnesses being
reluctant to testify. As a matter of public interest,
the prosecution of Saylon should be pursued.
“Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal
of Cavite.”

[G.R. No. 137775. March 31, 2005]

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, and
ESTATE OF ANG GUI, represented by LUCIO, JULIAN, and JAIME, all surnamed ANG, and CO TO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 140704. March 31, 2005]

ESTATE OF ANG GUI, Represented by LUCIO, JULIAN and JAIME, all surnamed ANG, and CO TO, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SAN MIGUEL CORP., and FGU INSURANCE CORP., respondents.

Facts: were discharged into the custody of the arrastre

Anco Enterprises Company (ANCO) was
engaged in the shipping business. It owned the M/T
ANCO tugboat and the D/B Lucio barge which were
operated as common carriers. Since the D/B Lucio had
no engine of its own, it could not maneuver by itself and
had to be towed by a tugboat for it to move from one
place to another.
San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shipped from
Cebu, on board the D/B Lucio to be towed by M/T
ANCO, around 40,550 cases of beer. Around half was to
be delivered to San Jose, Antique, and the rest to Iloilo.
The vessels arrived at San Jose at 1:00pm. The tugboat
M/T Anco immediately left the barge after reaching
Antique. When they arrived, the clouds were already
dark and the waves were big.
The arrastre workers unloading the cargoes of
SMC on board the D/B Lucio began to complain about
their difficulty in unloading the cargoes. SMC’s District
Sales Supervisor, requested ANCO’s representative to
transfer the barge to a safer place because the vessel
might not be able to withstand the big waves. ANCO’s
representative did not heed the request because he was
confident that the barge could withstand the waves.
This, notwithstanding the fact that at that time, only the
M/T ANCO was left at the wharf of San Jose, Antique, as
all other vessels already left the wharf to seek shelter.
With the waves growing bigger and bigger, only Ten
Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety (10,790) cases of beer
operator.
At about ten to eleven o’clock in the evening of
the following day, the crew of D/B Lucio abandoned the
vessel because the barge’s rope attached to the wharf
was cut off by the big waves. At around midnight, the
barge run aground and was broken and the cargoes of
beer in the barge were swept away. As a consequence
of the incident, SMC filed a complaint for Breach of
Contract of Carriage and Damages against ANCO for
the amount of P1,346,197.00 plus interest, litigation
expenses and Twenty-Five Percent (25%) of the total
claim as attorney’s fees.
ANCO claims that it should not be liable since
the cargo was lost due to fortuitous event. ANCO further
asserted that there was an agreement between them
and SMC to insure the cargoes in order to recover
indemnity in case of loss. Pursuant to that agreement,
the cargoes to the extent of 20,000 cases was insured
with FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU) for the total
amount of P858,500.00.
ANCO, with leave of court, filed a Third-Party
Complaint against FGU, alleging that before the vessel
of ANCO left for San Jose, Antique with the cargoes
owned by SMC, were insured with FGU. According to
ANCO, the loss of said cargoes occurred as a result of
risks insured against in the insurance policy and during
the existence and lifetime of said insurance policy.
Issues:
D2017 | Insurance Digests | Page 2 of 9
 1) WON ANCO was negligent – YES
2) WON FGU is liable – NO
Held:
1) A careful study of the records shows that
ANCO’s representatives failed to exercise the
extraordinary degree of diligence required by the law to
exculpate them from liability for the loss of the cargoes.
It is borne out in the testimony of the witnesses on
record that the barge D/B Lucio had no engine of its own
and could not maneuver by itself. Yet, the patron of
ANCO’s tugboat M/T ANCO left it to fend for itself
notwithstanding the fact that as the two vessels arrived
at the port of San Jose, Antique, signs of the impending
storm were already manifest. As stated by the lower
court, witness Mr. Anastacio Manilag testified that the
captain or patron of the tugboat M/T ANCO left the barge
D/B Lucio immediately after it reached San Jose,
Antique, despite the fact that there were already big
waves and the area was already dark.
In this case, the calamity which caused the loss
of the cargoes was not unforeseen nor was it
unavoidable. In fact, the other vessels in the port of San
Jose, Antique, managed to transfer to another place, a
circumstance which prompted SMC’s District Sales
Supervisor to request that the D/B Lucio be likewise
transferred, but to no avail. The D/B Lucio had no
engine and could not maneuver by itself. Even if
ANCO’s representatives wanted to transfer it, they no
longer had any means to do so as the tugboat M/T
ANCO had already departed, leaving the barge to its
own devices. The captain of the tugboat should have
had the foresight not to leave the barge alone
considering the pending storm.
2) One of the purposes for taking out insurance is
to protect the insured against the consequences of his
own negligence and that of his agents. Thus, it is a
basic rule in insurance that the carelessness and
negligence of the insured or his agents constitute no
defense on the part of the insurer. This rule however
Virginia Calanoc v CA and the Philippine American Life Insurance Co.
GR No. L-8151, December 16, 1955 | Bautista-Angelo, J
Facts:
 Melencio Basilio, watchman of the Manila Auto
Supply, located at the corner of Avenida Rizal
and Zurbaran, secured a life insurance policy
from Philam in the amount of P2k.
presupposes that the loss has occurred due to causes
which could not have been prevented by the insured,
despite the exercise of due diligence. When evidence
show that the insured’s negligence or recklessness is so
gross as to be sufficient to constitute a willful act, the
insurer must be exonerated. In the case of Standard
Marine Ins. Co. v. Nome Beach L. & T. Co.,[24] the
United States Supreme Court held that:
“The ordinary negligence of the insured and his
agents has long been held as a part of the risk which the
insurer takes upon himself, and the existence of which, where
it is the proximate cause of the loss, does not absolve the
insurer from liability. But willful exposure, gross negligence,
negligence amounting to misconduct, etc., have often been
held to release the insurer from such liability.”
From the above-mentioned decision, the United
States Supreme Court has made a distinction between
ordinary negligence and gross negligence or negligence
amounting to misconduct and its effect on the insured’s
right to recover under the insurance contract. According
to the Court, while mistake and negligence of the master
or crew are incident to navigation and constitute a part of
the perils that the insurer is obliged to incur, such
negligence or recklessness must not be of such gross
character as to amount to misconduct or wrongful acts;
otherwise, such negligence shall release the insurer
from liability under the insurance contract.
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the
appellate court had concluded from the evidence that the
crewmembers of both the D/B Lucio and the M/T ANCO
were blatantly negligent. To wit:
There was blatant negligence on the part of the
employees of defendants-appellants when the patron
(operator) of the tug boat immediately left the barge at the San
Jose, Antique wharf despite the looming bad weather.
Negligence was likewise exhibited by the defendants-
appellants’ representative who did not heed Macabuag’s
request that the barge be moved to a more secure place. The
prudent thing to do, as was done by the other sea vessels at
San Jose, Antique during the time in question, was to transfer
the vessel to a safer wharf. The negligence of the defendants-
appellants is proved by the fact that on 01 October 1979, the
only simple vessel left at the wharf in San Jose was the D/B
Lucio.
 He died of a gunshot wound on the occasion of
a robbery committed in the house of Atty. Ojeda
(1 block away from Manila Auto Supply)
o Umuwi si Atty, may-ilaw ang bahay,
medyo fishy so naghanap ito ng pulis,
nakita ni Atty. si Basilio. “Ser, hinde po
ako pulis, may traffic enforcer po sa may
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 dulo.” Nakuha ni Atty. si traffic enforcer
tapos biglang natripan na lang din ni
Basilio sumama. Front gate ni Atty.,
tapos BOOM sa abdomen patay si
Basilio.
 Wife was paid P2k as face value of the policy,
but Philam refused to pay additional P2k
representing value of the supplemental policy
because death was due to a murder and while
making an arrest as an officer of the law, which
contingencies were expressly excluded in the
contract and have the effect of exempting
Philam from liability.
 CFI: Basilio was killed which "making an arrest
as an officer of the law" or as a result of an
"assault or murder" committed in the place and
therefore his death was caused by one of the
risks excluded by the supplementary contract
which exempts the company from liability.
 CA: upheld CFI.
Issues: WoN Philam is exempt from liability
Held: No, the circumstances unfolded in the present
case do not warrant the finding that the death of the
unfortunate victim comes within the purview of the
exception clause of the supplementary policy and,
hence, do not exempt the company from liability.
 The circumstance that he was a mere watchman
and had no duty to heed the call of Atty. Ojeda
should not be taken as a capricious desire on
his part to expose his life to danger
G.R. No. L-21574 June 30, 1966
SIMON DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
THE CAPITAL INSURANCE and SURETY CO., INC., defendant and appellant.
FACTS: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an
accident insurance policy underwritten by respondent. In
connection with the celebration of the New Year, the
Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. (where Eduardo is employed)
sponsored a boxing contest. Eduardo, a non-
professional boxer participated. In the course of his bout
with another person, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his
opponent on the left part of the back of the head,
causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of
the ring. He was brought to the Baguio General Hospital
the following day. The cause of death was reported as
hemorrhage, intracranial, left.
Petitioner Simon, the father and beneficiary, filed a claim
with the insurance company but the same was denied.
He then instituted an action in the CFI for specific
performance. Defendant insurer said that the death of
the insured, caused by his participation in a boxing
considering the fact that the place he was in
duty-bound to guard was only a block away.
In volunteering to extend help under the
situation, he might have thought, rightly or
wrongly, that to know the truth was in the
interest of his employer it being a matter that
affects the security of the neighborhood. No
doubt there was some risk coming to him in
pursuing that errand, but that risk always existed
it being inherent in the position he was holding.
He cannot therefore be blamed solely for doing
what he believed was in keeping with his duty
as a watchman and as a citizen. And he
cannot be considered as making an arrest as an
officer of the law, as contended, simply because
he went with the traffic policeman, for certainly
he did not go there for that purpose nor was he
asked to do so by the policeman.
 In any event, while the act may not exempt the
triggerman from liability for the damage done,
the fact remains that the happening was a pure
accident on the part of the victim. The victim
could have been either the policeman or Atty.
Ojeda for it cannot be pretended that the
malefactor aimed at the deceased precisely
because he wanted to take his life.
Wherefore, reversing the decision appealed from, we
hereby order the company to pay petitioner-appellant the
amount of P2,000, with legal interest from January 26,
1951 until fully paid, with costs.
contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered
by insurance. TC ruled in favor of dela Cruz.
Side note: The insurance company appealed the CFI
decision (shouldn’t it be the plaintiff herein?)
ISSUE: Whether or not insurance company is liable to
indemnify dela Cruz
HELD: Yes, insurance company is liable to pay the
proceeds of the policy.
Capital Insurance claims that the participation in the
boxing contest was the "means" that produced the injury
which, in turn, caused the death of the insured. And,
since his inclusion in the boxing card was voluntary on
the part of the insured, he cannot be considered to have
met his death by "accidental means".
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The terms "accident" and "accidental", as used in
insurance contracts, have not acquired any technical
meaning, and are construed by the courts in their
ordinary and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have
been taken to mean that which happen by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is
unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an
event that takes place without one's foresight or
expectation — an event that proceeds from an unknown
cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and,
therefore, not expected.
General rule: death or injury does not result from
accident or accidental means within the terms of an
accident-policy if it is the natural result of the insured's
voluntary act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen
except the death or injury. Where the death or injury is
not the natural or probable result of the insured's
voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the
doing of the act which produces the injury, the resulting
death is within the protection of policies insuring against
death or injury from accident.
In the present case, while the participation of the insured
in the boxing contest is voluntary, the injury was
sustained when he slid, giving occasion to the infliction
by his opponent of the blow that threw him to the ropes
of the ring. Without this unfortunate incident, that is, the
G.R. No. L-25579 March 29, 1972
EMILIA T. BIAGTAN, JUAN T. BIAGTAN, JR., MIGUEL T. BIAGTAN, GIL T. BIAGTAN and GRACIA T. BIAGTAN
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD
Juan S. Biagtan was insured with defendant Insular Life
Assurance Company under Policy No. 398075 for the
sum of P5,000.0. There was also a supplementary
contract denominated "Accidental Death Benefit Clause,
for an additional sum of P5, 000.00 if "the death of the
Insured resulted directly from bodily injury effected solely
through external and violent means sustained in an
accident ... and independently of all other causes." The
clause, however, expressly provided that it would not
apply where death resulted from an injury" intentionally
inflicted by another party."
On May 21, 1964, while the said life policy and
supplementary contract were in full force and effect, a
band of robbers entered the house of the insured Juan
S. Biagtan where he received thrusts from their sharp-
pointed instruments resulting in his death. (Upon
reaching 2nd floor, the robbers had "rushed towards the
doors of the second floor room, where they suddenly
met a person ... who turned out to be the insured Juan
S. Biagtan who received thrusts from their pointed
instruments.") – this fact is relevant in the dissent.
unintentional slipping of the deceased, perhaps he could
not have received that blow in the head and would not
have died. The fact that boxing is attended with some
risks of external injuries does not make any injuries
received in the course of the game not accidental. In
boxing as in other equally physically rigorous sports,
such as basketball or baseball, death is not ordinarily
anticipated to result. If, therefore, it ever does, the injury
or death can only be accidental or produced by some
unforeseen happening or event as what occurred in this
case.
Furthermore, the policy involved herein specifically
excluded from its coverage —
(e) Death or disablement consequent upon the
Insured engaging in football, hunting,
pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing, racing
of any kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling.
Death or disablement resulting from engagement in
boxing contests was not declared outside of the
protection of the insurance contract. Failure of the
defendant insurance company to include death resulting
from a boxing match or other sports among the
prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the conclusion that it
did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for
such death.
Plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of the insured, filed a claim
under the policy. IL paid the basic amount of P5,000.00
but refused to pay the additional sum of P5,000.00 under
the accidental death benefit clause on the ground that
the insured's death resulted from injuries intentionally
inflicted by third parties and therefore was not covered.
Lower court decided in favor of beneficiaries. Hence
appeal. Lower court:: no "proof that the act of receiving
thrusts from the sharp-pointed instrument of the robbers
was intended to inflict injuries upon the person of the
insured or any other person or merely to scare away any
person so as to ward off any resistance or obstacle that
might be offered in the pursuit of their main objective
which was robbery.”
Issue: WON the wounds were inflicted intentionally?
Ruling: Yes. Reversed
Ratio: Whether the robbers had the intent to kill or
merely to scare the victim or to ward off any defense he
might offer, it cannot be denied that the act itself of
inflicting the injuries was intentional. The exception in the
D2017 | Insurance Digests | Page 5 of 9
accidental benefit clause invoked by the appellant does
not speak of the purpose of a third party in causing the
injuries, but only of the fact that such injuries have been
"intentionally" inflicted. The intent was obviously to
distinguish them from injuries which, although received
at the hands of a third party, are purely accidental.
The Calanoc vs. CA case which the trial court based its
decioson, is different. There, the firing of the gun could
which caused the killing could not be said as intentional
for there was the possibility that the malefactor had fired
the shot to scare people around for his own protection
and not necessarily to kill or hit the victim. While a single
shot fired from a distance, and by a person who was not
even seen aiming at the victim, could indeed have been
fired without intent to kill or injure, nine wounds inflicted
with bladed weapons at close range cannot conceivably
be considered as innocent insofar as such intent is
concerned
"Intentional" as used in an accident policy excepting
intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any other
person, etc., implies the exercise of the reasoning
faculties, consciousness and volition. Where a provision
of the policy excludes intentional injury, it is the intention
of the person inflicting the injury that is controlling. If the
injuries suffered by the insured clearly resulted from the
intentional act of a third person the insurer is relieved
from liability as stipulated.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
1. The case of Calanoc cited by the lower court is
indeed controlling here. This Court, there
construing a similar clause, squarely ruled that
fatal injuries inflicted upon an insured by a
malefactor(s) during the latter's commission of a
crime are deemed accidental and within the
coverage of such accidental death benefit
clauses and the burden of proving that the killing
was intentional so as to have it fall within the
stipulated exception of having resulted from
injuries "intentionally inflicted by a third party"
must be discharged by the insurance company.
This Court there clearly held that in such cases
where the killing does not amount to murder, it
must be held to be a "pure accident" on the part
of the victim, compensable with double-
indemnity, even though the malefactor is
criminally liable for his act.
2. 2. Defendant company patently failed to
discharge its burden of proving that the fatal
injuries were inflicted upon the deceased
intentionally, i.e. deliberately. From the
undisputed facts, supra, 8 the robbers had
"rushed towards the doors of the second floor
room, where they suddenly met a person ... who
turned out to be the insured Juan S. Biagtan
who received thrusts from their pointed
instruments." The thrusts were indeed properly
termed "purely accidental" since they seemed to
be a reflex action on the robbers' part upon their
being surprised by the deceased.
3. Because Insurance policies are contacts of
adhesions, any "ambiguous, equivocal or
uncertain terms" are to be "construed strictly and
most strongly against the insurer and liberally in
favor of the insured so as to effect the dominant
purpose of indemnity or payment to the insured,
especially where a forfeiture is involved.
4. This ambiguous clause conflicts with all the
other four exceptions in the same paragraph 51
particularly that immediately preceding it in item
(d) which excepts injuries received where the
insured has violated the law or provoked the
injury, while this clause, construed as the
insurance company now claims, would
seemingly except also all other injuries,
intentionally inflicted by a third party, regardless
of any violation of law or provocation by the
insured, and defeat the very purpose of the
policy of giving the insured double indemnity in
case of accidental death by "external and violent
means" — in the very language of the policy."
It is obvious from the very classification of the
exceptions and applying the rule of noscitus a
sociis that the double-indemnity policy covers
the insured against accidental death, whether
caused by fault, negligence or intent of a third
party which is unforeseen and unexpected by
the insured. All the associated words and
concepts in the policy plainly exclude the
accidental death.
1
— Injuries effected through non-external means which are
excepted: self-destruction, bodily or mental infirmity or disease,
poisoning or infection, injuries with no visible contusions or exterior
wounds (exceptions 1 to 4 of policy clause);
— Injuries caused by some act of the insured which is
proscribed by the policy, and are therefore similarly exepted:
injuries received while on police duty, while travelling in any form
of submarine transportation, or in any violation of law by the
insured or assault provoked by the insured, or in any aircraft if the
insured is a pilot or crew member; [exceptions 5 (a), (c) and (d),
and 6 of the policy clause]; and
— Accidents expressly excluded: where death resulted in any riot,
civil commotion, insurrection or war or atomic energy explosion.
D2017 | Insurance Digests | Page 6 of 9
 5. Two other insurance companies which likewise
covered the insured for which larger sums under
similar accidental death benefit clauses promptly
G.R. No. 92383 July 17, 1992; SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NERISSA
LIM, ;CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Felix Lim Jr accidentally shot himself dead and so his
wife, Nerissa Lim is sought the payment of his Personal
Accident Policy that has a face value of P200K but it was
rejected. So what happened? According to the sole
eyewitness, Pilar Nalagon, Felix’ Secretary, it was on
October 6, 1982, at about 10:00 pm, after his mother's
birthday party. According to Nalagon, Lim was in a
happy mood (but not drunk) and was playing with his
handgun, from which he had previously removed the
magazine. As she watched television, he stood in front
of her and pointed the gun at her. She pushed it aside
and said it might he loaded. He assured her it was not
and then pointed it to his temple. The next moment there
was an explosion and Lim slumped to the floor. He was
dead before he fell.
The parties agree that Lim did not commit suicide. The
insurer refused, saying that when he put a gun to his
head, though thinking it was not loaded, he willfully
exposed himself to needless peril and removed himself
from the coverage of the insurance policy. ->Accident
insurance policies were never intended to reward the
insured for his tendency to show off or for his
miscalculations. They were intended to provide for
contingencies. (Used example of person jumping into the
Paig River, miscalculating the current and thus
drowining.)
The family said that Lim had removed the magazine
before and fully believed that the gun was not loaded. As
such, it was an accident that should be covered by the
policy.
The words "accident" and "accidental" have never
acquired any technical signification in law, and when
used in an insurance contract are to be construed and
considered according to the ordinary understanding and
common usage and speech of people generally. In-
substance, the courts are practically agreed that the
words "accident" and "accidental" mean that which
happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention or
design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and
unforeseen. The definition that has usually been adopted
Finman General Assurance Corp. vs CA and Julia Sorposa
GR 100970 ; 2 Sep 1992 ; Nocon, J.
paid the benefits thereof to plaintiffs-
beneficiaries.
by the courts is that an accident is an event that takes
place without one's foresight or expectation — an event
that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual
effect of a known case, and therefore not expected.
An accident is an event which happens without any
human agency or, if happening through human agency,
an event which, under the circumstances, is unusual to
and not expected by the person to whom it happens. It
has also been defined as an injury which happens by
reason of some violence or casualty to the injured
without his design, consent, or voluntary co-operation.
ISSUE: WON what happened was an accident// WON
the family should be paid
HELD: YES.
The court held that while Lim was unquestionably
negligent, that should not prevent his widow from
recovering from the insurance policy he obtained
precisely against accident. The ‘drowned man’ analogy
used by the petitioner is not applicable to this case. The
SC agrees with the family that when Feliz pointed the
gun to this head he thought it was safe to do so.
Further, there is nothing in the policy that relieves the
insurer of the responsibility to pay the indemnity agreed
upon if the insured is shown to have contributed to his
own accident.
OBITER: With regard to the award of moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees: the Court must
rule in favor of the petitioner. The basic issue raised in
this case is, as the petitioner correctly observed, one of
first impression. It is evident that the petitioner was
acting in good faith then it resisted the private
respondent's claim on the ground that the death of the
insured was covered by the exception. The issue was
indeed debatable and was clearly not raised only for the
purpose of evading a legitimate obligation. We hold
therefore that the award of moral and exemplary
damages and of attorney's fees is unjust and so must be
disapproved.
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Facts: Carlie Surposa was insured by Finman General
Assurance Corporation under its General Teachers
Protection Plan and Individual Policy, with Carlie’s
parents and siblings as beneficiaries.
On 18 October 1988, during the life of the policy, Carlie
died as a result of a stab wound inflicted by one of the
three (3) unidentified men without provocation and
warning on the part of the insured as he and his cousin,
Winston Surposa, were waiting for a ride on their way
home along Rizal-Locsin Streets, Bacolod City after
attending the celebration of the "Maskarra Annual
Festival." When the beneficiaries claimed the insurance
proceeds, the insurer denied liability. Hence,
beneficiaries filed a complaint before the Insurance
Commissioner.
Insurer’s claims: Murder and assault are not within the
scope of the coverage of the insurance policy. expresso
unius exclusio alterius. Death resulting from murder
and/or assault is impliedly excluded in said insurance
policy considering that the cause of death of the insured
was not accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional
act of the assailant in killing the insured.
Commissioner: Insurer is liable.
P filed this case, alleging GAD on the part of the
Commissioner.
Issue: WON murder is within the accidental death
coverage of the policy
Held: Yes
PHILIPPINE HOME ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and EASTERN SHIPPING
LINES, INC., respondents; G.R. No. 106999 June 20, 1996
FACTS: Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (ESLI) loaded on
board SS Eastern Explorer in Kobe, Japan, the following
shipment for carriage to Manila and Cebu, freight pre-
paid and in good order and condition, (a) two (2) boxes
internal combustion engine parts, consigned to William
Lines, Inc. (b) ten (10) metric tons (334 bags)
ammonium chloride, consigned to Orca's Company (c)
two hundred (200) bags Glue 300, consigned to Pan
Oriental Match Company (d) garments, consigned to
Ding Velayo.
While the vessel was off Okinawa, Japan, a small
flame was detected on the acetylene cylinder located in
the accommodation area near the engine room on the
main deck level. As the crew was trying to extinguish
the fire, the acetylene cylinder suddenly exploded
sending a flash of flame throughout the accommodation
area, thus causing death and severe injuries to the crew
and instantly setting fire to the whole superstructure of
the vessel.
Ratio: The terms "accident" and "accidental" as used in
insurance contracts have not acquired any technical
meaning, and are construed by the courts in their
ordinary and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have
been taken to mean that which happen by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is
unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an
event that takes place without one's foresight or
expectation — an event that proceeds from an unknown
cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and,
therefore, not expected. Where the death or injury is not
the natural or probable result of the insured's voluntary
act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the
act which produces the injury, the resulting death is
within the protection of the policies insuring against
death or injury from accident. Hence, it is only when the
insured died due to his voluntary acts that the death is
deemed “not accidental”.
In this case, the insured’s death is clearly not due to any
voluntary acts on his part. The insured died from an
event that took place without his foresight or expectation,
an event that proceeded from an unusual effect of a
known cause and, therefore, not expected. Neither can it
be said that where was a capricious desire on the part of
the accused to expose his life to danger considering that
he was just going home after attending a festival.
Also, the insurance policy enumerates 10 circumstances
wherein no liability attaches to petitioner insurance
company. Death by murder or assault is not one of them.
Applying the principle expresso unius exclusio alterius,
therefore, death by murder or assault is deemed within
the coverage of the policy.
After the fire was extinguished, the cargoes which
were saved were loaded to another vessel for delivery to
their original ports of destination. ESLI charged the
consignees several amounts corresponding to
additional freight and salvage charges which were
all paid by Philippine Home Assurance Corporation
(PHAC) under protest for and in behalf of the
consignees.
PHAC, as subrogee of the consignees, thereafter
filed a complaint against ESLI to recover the sum paid
under protest on the ground that the same were actually
damages directly brought about by the fault, negligence,
illegal act and/or breach of contract of ESLI.
ANSWER: ESLI contended that it exercised the
diligence required by law in the handling, custody and
carriage of the shipment; that the fire was caused by an
unforeseen event;
D2017 | Insurance Digests | Page 8 of 9
TC: Dismissed PHAC's complaint and ruled in favor of
ESLI.
CA: Affirmed the trial court's findings and conclusions.
ISSUE: WON PHAC is liable for the additional freight
and salvage charges.
HELD: It is worthy to note at the outset that the goods
subject of the present controversy were neither lost nor
damaged in transit by the fire that razed the carrier. In
fact, the said goods were all delivered to the consignees.
What is at issue therefore is not whether or not the
carrier is liable for the loss, damage, or deterioration of
the goods transported by them but who, among the
carrier, consignee or insurer of the goods, is liable for
the additional charges or expenses incurred by the
owner of the ship in the salvage operations and in the
transshipment of the goods via a different carrier.
In absolving respondent carrier of any liability,
respondent Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's
finding that the fire that gutted the ship was a natural
disaster or calamity. Petitioner takes exception to this
conclusion and we agree.
In our jurisprudence, fire may not be considered a
natural disaster or calamity since it almost always arises
from some act of man or by human means. It cannot be
an act of God unless caused by lightning or a natural
disaster or casualty not attributable to human agency.[6]
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that a small
flame was detected on the acetylene cylinder and that by
reason thereof, the same exploded despite efforts to
extinguish the fire. There is strong evidence indicating
that the acetylene cylinder caught fire because of the
fault and negligence of respondent ESLI, its captain and
its crew.
First, the acetylene cylinder which was fully loaded
should not have been stored in the accommodation area
near the engine room where the heat generated
therefrom could cause the acetylene cylinder to explode
by reason of spontaneous combustion. Respondent
ESLI should have easily foreseen that the acetylene
cylinder, containing highly inflammable material, was in a
real danger of exploding because it was stored in close
proximity to the engine room.
Second, respondent ESLI should have known that
by storing the acetylene cylinder in the accommodation
area supposed to be reserved for passengers, it
unnecessarily exposed its passengers to grave danger
and injury. Curious passengers, ignorant of the danger
the tank might have on humans and property, could
have handled the same or could have lighted and smoke
cigarettes while repairing in the accommodation area.
Third, the fact that the acetylene cylinder was
checked, tested and examined and subsequently
certified as having complied with the safety measures
and standards by qualified experts[7] before it was loaded
in the vessel only shows to a great extent that
negligence was present in the handling of the acetylene
cylinder after it was loaded and while it was on board the
ship. Indeed, had the respondent and its agents not
been negligent in storing the acetylene cylinder near the
engine room, then that same would not have leaked and
exploded during the voyage.
Verily, there is no merit in the finding of the trial
court to which respondent court erroneously agreed that
the fire was not fault or negligence of respondent but a
natural disaster or calamity. The records are simply
wanting in this regard.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. is ORDERED to return to
petitioner Philippine Home Assurance Corporation the
amount it paid under protest in behalf of the consignees
herein.
SO ORDERED.
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