Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR
EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP),
represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN
SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process.While the facts
surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed
conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within
which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling
unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue
the peace process effectively.

I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their
respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it
splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what
Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.1

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners,
specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two
parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels
signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement
of Intent on August 27, 1998.

The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among
others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in
the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while
the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.2

Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process. Towards
the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took
control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.3 In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out
an "all-out-war" against the MILF.

When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the
government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with
deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to
help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the
matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.4

The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties
signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and
the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions.5

Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects
of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral
Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their
next meeting."

A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of
the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the
parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the
Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of
violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.

Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who
was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.6

In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft
MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied in an instrument - the MOA-AD which is
assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962.

Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain7 and the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No.
183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order.9 Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and
furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the
MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon.
Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.10

This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for Mandamus and Prohibition11 filed by the
City of Zamboanga,12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for
similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro
Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void.

By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing public
respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.13 The Court also required the Solicitor
General to submit to the Court and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD,14 to which she complied.15

Meanwhile, the City of Iligan16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that
respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had already been signed, from implementing the same, and
that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as
respondent.

The Province of Zamboanga del Norte,17 Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon,
Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members18 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a
petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition,19 docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be
declared null and void and without operative effect, and that respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.

On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition, 20docketed as G.R.
No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the
MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional
and illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its
Chairman Mohagher Iqbal.

Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-/comments-in-intervention. Petitioners-
in-Intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of
Isabela21 and Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat22 and Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu, the Municipality
of Linamon in Lanao del Norte,23 Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member
Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat,
Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim
Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development (MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention.

By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions. Respondents filed Comments on the petitions,
while some of petitioners submitted their respective Replies.

Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive Department shall thoroughly review the
MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and thus moved to dismiss the cases. In the
succeeding exchange of pleadings, respondents' motion was met with vigorous opposition from petitioners.

The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the following principal issues:

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that
consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;

2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis-à-vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;

4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III,
Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec.
28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]

If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines;

6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the
Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable
question; and

7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines.24
The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most of the parties submitted their memoranda
on time.

III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD

As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject five petitions and six petitions-in-
intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as the two comments-in-intervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an
overview of the MOA.

The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.

Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier agreements between the GRP and
MILF, but also two agreements between the GRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final Peace Agreement
on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the administration of President Fidel
Ramos.

The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes - the organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)25 and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),26 and several international law instruments - the ILO Convention No.
169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the
Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among others.

The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-
ul-mua'hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty
device."

During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world through a simple dichotomy: there was
the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to those lands where Islamic laws
held sway, while the second denoted those lands where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or
ineffective.27 This way of viewing the world, however, became more complex through the centuries as the Islamic world became
part of the international community of nations.

As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States and inter-governmental organizations, the
classical division of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. New terms were drawn up to describe
novel ways of perceiving non-Muslim territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada (land of compact) and dar-ul-sulh (land
of treaty) referred to countries which, though under a secular regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim
States, having been bound to each other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to
countries which, though not bound by treaty with Muslim States, maintained freedom of religion for Muslims. 28

It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada and dar-ul-
sulh simply refers to all other agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government - the Philippines being the land of
compact and peace agreement - that partake of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as "any solemn
agreement in writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that
elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]."29

The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS," and starts with its main body.

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and
Governance.

A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES

This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original inhabitants of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.30

Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only "Moros" as traditionally
understood even by Muslims,31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the
freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically
defined.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation.32 Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.33

The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right is said to be rooted on ancestral
territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The
sultanates were described as states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-
state in the modern sense.34

The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority of the
sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in
the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent principalities (pangampong)
each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme over the others.35

The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of
government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations."

The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that territory, particularly those known as
Indians. In Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called "First Nation," hence, all of them are
usually described collectively by the plural "First Nations."36 To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the Bangsamoro people
as "the First Nation" - suggesting its exclusive entitlement to that designation - departs from the Canadian usage of the term.

The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and
jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.37

B. TERRITORY

The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial
domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic
region.38

More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM - thus constituting the following
areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes certain
municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.39

Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two
categories, Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates,
years apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months
following the signing of the MOA-AD.40 Category B areas, also called "Special Intervention Areas," on the other hand, are to be
subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate agreement - the Comprehensive Compact.41

The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its "internalwaters,"
defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; 42 that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters,"
which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and
south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used
interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources.43 Notably, the
jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint."

The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central Government and the
BJE, in favor of the latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation agreement.44 The activities which the Parties
are allowed to conduct on the territorial waters are enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of natural
resources, regulation of shipping and fishing activities, and the enforcement of police and safety measures. 45 There is no similar
provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with respect to the internal waters of the BJE.

C. RESOURCES

The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and
shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships and understandings, however, are not to
include aggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation agreements.46
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The Central Government is also
bound to "take necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN
and the specialized agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for
the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues
involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain.47

With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral
oil and natural gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the party having control within its territorial
jurisdiction." This right carries the proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so requires," the Central
Government may, for a fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct the
operation of such resources.48

The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in
favor of the BJE.49

The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust dispossession of their
territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is
no longer possible, reparation is to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties. 50

The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral
Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure
instruments granted by the Philippine Government, including those issued by the present ARMM.51

D. GOVERNANCE

The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the implementation of
the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and
modalities for the actual implementation" of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party
shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.52

The "associative" relationship between the Central Government and the BJE

The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by shared
authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and
administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact.

The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing
of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. As will be discussed later,
much of the present controversy hangs on the legality of this provision.

The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and
banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional
institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.

As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons
of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph of the MOA-AD
identifies the signatories as "the representatives of the Parties," meaning the GRP and MILF themselves, and not merely of the
negotiating panels.53 In addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD states that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd
Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, "ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace Process in Southern Philippines,
and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais
Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August 5, 2008.

Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the provinces, municipalities, and
barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on TERRITORY.

IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

A. RIPENESS
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. 54 Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve
hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions.55 The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases
and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.56

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that
can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.57 The Court can decide the constitutionality of an
act or treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination. 58

Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.59 For a case to be considered ripe
for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court
may come into the picture,60 and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result
of the challenged action.61 He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained of.62

The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the present petitions,
reasoning that

The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and legislative enactments as well
as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be
a proposal that does not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations until the list of operative acts
required have been duly complied with. x x x

xxxx
In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon issues based on
hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete bases. Considering the preliminary character of
the MOA-AD, there are no concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights since the acts
complained of are mere contemplated steps toward the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and
intervenors' perceived injury, if at all, is merely imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere
conjectures. (Underscoring supplied)

The Solicitor General cites63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD:

TERRITORY

xxxx
2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations:
xxxx
d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, using
all possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas
as enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A attached herein (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an
integral part of this framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and
resolve all outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the MOA-AD.
xxxx
GOVERNANCE
xxxx

7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the
Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively.

Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing
of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non-
derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive
Compact.64 (Underscoring supplied)

The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.

Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,65 this
Court held:
 x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

xxxx

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of
the courts.66

In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,67 the United States Supreme Court held that the challenge to the
constitutionality of the school's policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games was ripe for adjudication, even if
no public prayer had yet been led under the policy, because the policy was being challenged as unconstitutional on its face. 68

That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in New York v. United
States,69 decided in 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York challenging the
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to
take effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New York had to take immediate action to avoid the
provision's consequences.70

The present petitions pray for Certiorari,71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies granted by law
when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of prohibition, without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 72 Mandamus is a remedy
granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.73 Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. 74

The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February 28,
2001.75 The said executive order requires that "[t]he government's policy framework for peace, including the systematic approach
and the administrative structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process x x x be governed by this Executive Order." 76

The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without
consulting the local government units or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As will be discussed in
greater detail later, such omission, by itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3.

Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that "any
provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework," implying an amendment of the
Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the
Constitution. Such act constitutes another violation of its authority. Again, these points will be discussed in more detail later.

As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their duties under
E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition,
and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute.77

B. LOCUS STANDI

For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions."78

Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary
question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised. 79

When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.80 When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the
execution of the laws.81
For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or deflected to an
illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. 82 The
Court retains discretion whether or not to allow a taxpayer's suit.83

In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes a
derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A member of the House of Representatives
has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.84

An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members,85 but the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with
standing.86

As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other
LGUs.87

Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention,88 such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties.

In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has
exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,89 where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the
constitutional issues raised being of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.90 The Court's forbearing stance on locus standi on issues
involving constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of fundamental rights.

In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine whether the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion given
them, has brushed aside technical rules of procedure.91

In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of Zamboanga del Norte (G.R.
No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-
intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct
and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the
intended domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which would be
expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt.

In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing as citizens
and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or privilege or there would be wastage of public
funds. The fact that they are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro,
respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues at hand,
however, the Court grants them standing.

Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be
expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can
be given legal standing. Their allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable transcendental
importance" clothes them with added basis for their personality to intervene in these petitions.

With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate and a citizen to enforce
compliance by respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a genuine legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the requisite standing as
an intervenor.

With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3rd district of Davao City, a taxpayer and a
member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and taxpayers; Marino
Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer,
they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax
the procedural technicality on locus standi given the paramount public interest in the issues at hand.

Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and
the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-
government organization of Muslim lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the
resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such
legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing.
B. MOOTNESS

Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by
petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately
decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA."92

In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President had already disbanded the GRP
Peace Panel.93

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,94 this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not being a magical formula that
automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is
a grave violation of the Constitution;95 (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved;96 (c)
the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 97 and (d)
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.98

Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of
by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not
automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when
the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation. 99

The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited
above in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but also in Province of Batangas v.
Romulo100 and Manalo v. Calderon101 where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events that would
ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding.

Petitions not mooted

Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP
Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to
the Court's issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.

Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of consensus points," especially given
its nomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching
Constitutional implications of these "consensus points," foremost of which is the creation of the BJE.

In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend and effect
necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently,
the present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future negotiations
and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions have not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the
public disclosure of the MOA-AD,102 the manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not
withstanding.

Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest

There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a significant part of the country's
territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further
legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court
to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its
negotiating entity.

Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.103 where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues which no longer legitimately
constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole."

The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and eventually cancelled was
a stand-alone government procurement contract for a national broadband network involving a one-time contractual
relation between two parties-the government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved specific
government procurement policies and standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional
therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in the controversy.

The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements

In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli
Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the third such
component to be undertaken following the implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian,
Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002.

Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated that "no
matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[-AD]," mootness will not set in in light
of the terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001.

Need to formulate principles-guidelines

Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect
of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While
the Court notes the word of the Executive Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an agreement that is both
constitutional and equitable because that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be assured," it is minded to render
a decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public
and, most especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral Domain.

Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Sanlakas v.
Reyes104 in which he stated that the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review" can override mootness, "provided the
party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance." They
contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter for the doctrine to be invoked.

The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R. No.
183893 (City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as one for Prohibition as it
has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved.105 At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most
if not the rest of the petitions.

Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it
had done in a number of landmark cases.106 There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of
North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of
Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another
or any form.

It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot, respondents having, by Compliance of
August 7, 2008, provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too,
intervenors have been furnished, or have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD.

V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one
relating to the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its provisions, viz:

1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they
negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD?

2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?

ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as provided in Section 7, Article III on
the Bill of Rights:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. 107

As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,108 the Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a
right which was eventually accorded constitutional status.
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been
recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.109

In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,110 the Court ruled that access to public records is predicated on the right of
the people to acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a legitimate
interest in matters of social and political significance.

x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in
a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-
making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to
cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on
protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." x x x 111

In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information
of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues
confronting the nation112 so that they may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible,
reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed
public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people. 113

The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern

That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern 114 faces no serious challenge. In
fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern.115 In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of
real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds,116 the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws,117 the
civil service eligibility of a public employee,118 the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public
officials,119 the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth,120 and the identity of party-list nominees,121 among others, are
matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically
ruled:

x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise,
the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the
public to expose its defects.

Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous
to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of
public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent
the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right
enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its
avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."122 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

Intended as a "splendid symmetry"123 to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.124

The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on
matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.125

The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open
democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such
policy.126 These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people.127

Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose:
 MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will not be in force and effect until
after Congress shall have provided it.
MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately but, of course, the implementing law will have to
be enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer.128
The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the issue, is enlightening.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the Gentleman correctly as
having said that this is not a self-executing provision? It would require a legislation by Congress to implement?
MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment from Commissioner Regalado,
so that the safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause "as may be provided by law"
MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and Congress may provide for
reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national interest?
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediately influence the climate of the
conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved,
revoking this principle, which is inconsistent with this policy. 129 (Emphasis supplied)

Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot
revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards." The complete and effective exercise of the
right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature.
Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader130 right to information on matters of public concern is
already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable
until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not
effecting such policy.

An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the
end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.131Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms.

MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to participate? Will the
government provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can participate and can react where the existing
media facilities are not able to provide full feedback mechanisms to the government? I suppose this will be part of
the government implementing operational mechanisms.
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses take place. There is a message
and a feedback, both ways.
xxxx
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence?
I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public officials but also network of
private business o[r] community-based organizations that will be reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more
credence or credibility on the private network of volunteers and voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not think
we are afraid that there will be another OMA in the making.132(Emphasis supplied)

The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the "marching orders" to
respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda
and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3.133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to
further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people's
participation.

One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be community-based, reflecting the
sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the
different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community."134 Included as a component of the comprehensive
peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes "continuing consultations on both national
and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people's
participation in the peace process."135

Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate "continuing" consultations, contrary
to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more than sufficient consultation."136

Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to "[c]onduct regular
dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments,
recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace
process."137 E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be "the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek
advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the
implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building
on peace agenda and initiatives."138
In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional
right to information and disclosure.

PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion

The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive process by
which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a
whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.

The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way or manner. It may, however,
require him to comply with the law and discharge the functions within the authority granted by the President.139

Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retort in justifying the denial of petitioners'
right to be consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by which they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on
people's participation. Such disregard of the express mandate of the President is not much different from superficial conduct
toward token provisos that border on classic lip service.140 It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined.

As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable under the premises. The argument defies
sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue on both national and
local levels. The executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public's right even before the GRP makes its official
recommendations or before the government proffers its definite propositions.141 It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit
relevant advice, information, comments and recommendations from the people through dialogue.

AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified disclosure of the
official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally complying with the Court's August 4, 2008 Resolution, without
a prayer for the document's disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation that it was complying therewith ex abundante ad
cautelam.

Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy to "require all national agencies
and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions"142 is well-taken. The LGC chapter on intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy:

Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unlessthe
consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned
is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless
appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 143 (Italics and
underscoring supplied)

In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Paño,144 the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted provision of the LGU apply only to
national programs or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Among the programs and projects
covered are those that are critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.145 The MOA-AD is one peculiar program
that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,146 which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.

With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose interests are represented herein by
petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at
all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies.147 The MOA-AD, an instrument
recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act,148 which
entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.

Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an
ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the
MOA-AD, without which all other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In proceeding to make a sweeping
declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-
AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority. As it seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still
subject to necessary changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on Governance suspends the effectivity of all
provisions requiring changes to the legal framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be discussed in the following section.
Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government
authority emanating from them.149

ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all be accommodated under the present
Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD itself
recognizes the need to amend the existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its provisions. Respondents,
nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity because any provisions therein which are inconsistent with
the present legal framework will not be effective until the necessary changes to that framework are made. The validity of this
argument will be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon how

The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.

In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners
assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go
beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE,
however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD,
namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that
the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.

Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on

GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.

4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative
characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative,
judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of
transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central
Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged
Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by
its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association
may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD.

Keitner and Reisman state that

[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one
state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international
status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. x x
x150 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of
the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free
Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their
own travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN
Security Council and by their admission to UN membership.

According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign
affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade,
banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to
consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or
affecting either government.

In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority and obligation
to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of establishing and using
military areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country from
having access to these territories for military purposes.
It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an international association
between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation's national
constitution, and each party may terminate the association consistent with the right of independence. It has been said that, with
the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is
actually based on an underlying status of independence.152

In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies
on their way to full independence. Examples of states that have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional
phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become independent
states.153

Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association,
specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of
the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN
agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to
participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of
revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles
the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs
matter affecting them.

These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of
an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with
the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any
local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does
not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of
constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:

SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.

SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution

It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid
down in the Montevideo Convention,154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to
enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating
it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to
the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and
powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.

Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces,
cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis
supplied)
As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
"autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph
2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of
Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan
and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A
and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities
voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely
because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.

The MOA-AD, moreover, would not comply with Article X, Section 20 of the Constitution since that provision defines the
powers of autonomous regions as follows:

SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic
act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
(Underscoring supplied)

Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that
would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said
constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must,
itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE
with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to
enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and
understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our
constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary155 instructs:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy,
the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with
the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations,
enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the
President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be
effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development." (Underscoring supplied) An associative arrangement
does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and
the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has
generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.

Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among
which are R.A. No. 9054156 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.157

Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro
people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states:

1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
"Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its
adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants
whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the
Indigenous people shall be respected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather
than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes
between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows:

"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the
autonomous region who are:

(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors
of the national community; and

(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own
social, economic, cultural, and political institutions."

Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-
AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure. By
paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro
homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the
aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region."

Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in the following provisions thereof:

SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance
with the following procedures:
xxxx
b) Petition for Delineation. - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of
the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the
ICCs/IPs;
c) Delineation Proper. - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all community members
therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs
concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all times include genuine
involvement and participation by the members of the communities concerned;
d) Proof Required. - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or community under oath, and
other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such
ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents:
1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;
2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;
3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old
villages;
4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs
concerned with other ICCs/IPs;
5) Survey plans and sketch maps;
6) Anthropological data;
7) Genealogical surveys;
8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds;
9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces
and the like; and
10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community.

e) Preparation of Maps. - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains
Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural
features and landmarks embraced therein;

f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. - A complete copy of the preliminary census and a report of investigation,
shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;

g) Notice and Publication. - A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs
concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be
posted at the local, provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation
once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from
date of such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a
valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not
available;
 h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains
Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof.
However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional
evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent
after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the
applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the
NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of
ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in
coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section
below.

xxxx

To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system, a discussion of not only the
Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international law is in order, for

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land."

Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,158 held that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is part of the law of the land on account of which it ordered the release on bail of a detained alien of Russian
descent whose deportation order had not been executed even after two years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin v. Edu159 applied
the aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals.

International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples," understood not merely as the entire population
of a State but also a portion thereof. In considering the question of whether the people of Quebec had a right to unilaterally
secede from Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC 160 had occasion to
acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in international conventions that the
principle has acquired a status beyond ‘convention' and is considered a general principle of international law."

Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 161 and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights162 which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of
self-determination, "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."

The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession. A
distinction should be made between the right of internal and external self-determination. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF
QUEBEC is again instructive:

"(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination

126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally
fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural
development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case
potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of
cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x

External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on Friendly Relations,
supra, as

The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent
State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a peopleconstitute modes of implementing
the right of self-determination by that people. (Emphasis added)

127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of respect for the
territorial integrity of existing states. The various international documents that support the existence of a people's right to
self-determination also contain parallel statements supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be
sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign
states.

x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external self-determination can arise, namely,
where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination or exploitation outside a colonial context, and - less
definitely but asserted by a number of commentators - is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to internal self-
determination. The Court ultimately held that the population of Quebec had no right to secession, as the same is not under
colonial rule or foreign domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom to make political choices and pursue economic, social
and cultural development, citing that Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and judicial institutions within
Canada, even occupying prominent positions therein.

The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION.163 There, Sweden presented to the Council
of the League of Nations the question of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands should be authorized to determine by
plebiscite if the archipelago should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council,
before resolving the question, appointed an International Committee composed of three jurists to submit an opinion on the
preliminary issue of whether the dispute should, based on international law, be entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland.
The Committee stated the rule as follows:

x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of disposing of national territory is
essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. Positive International Law does not recognize the right of
national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression
of a wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant
or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some
other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is definitively constituted. A
dispute between two States concerning such a question, under normal conditions therefore, bears upon a question which
International Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned. Any other solution would
amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack of
stability which would not only be contrary to the very idea embodied in term "State," but would also endanger the interests of
the international community. If this right is not possessed by a large or small section of a nation, neither can it be held by the
State to which the national group wishes to be attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question which is left by international law to
the domestic jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception rather than the rule elucidated above. Its ground for
departing from the general rule, however, was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation originated at a time when
Finland was undergoing drastic political transformation. The internal situation of Finland was, according to the Committee, so
abnormal that, for a considerable time, the conditions required for the formation of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of
revolution, anarchy, and civil war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national government was disputed by a large section of the
people, and it had, in fact, been chased from the capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed camps
and the police were divided into two opposing forces. In light of these circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant time
period, a "definitively constituted" sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not possess the right to
withhold from a portion of its population the option to separate itself - a right which sovereign nations generally have with respect
to their own populations.

Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship as well as
international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections to land (spiritual
and otherwise) that have been forcibly incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as "indigenous"
since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Otherwise stated,
indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies
born of the forces of empire and conquest.164 Examples of groups who have been regarded as indigenous peoples are the Maori
of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of Canada.

As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to
independence or secession from those states under international law,165 but they do have rights amounting to what was
discussed above as the right to internal self-determination.

In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the
Philippines being included among those in favor, and the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to
autonomy or self-government, to wit:

Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Article 4
 Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in
matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural
institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of
the State.

Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has been understood as equivalent
to "internal self-determination."166 The extent of self-determination provided for in the UN DRIP is more particularly defined in its
subsequent articles, some of which are quoted hereunder:

Article 8

1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.

2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:

(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural
values or ethnic identities;

(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources;

(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their
rights;

(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;

(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.

Article 21

1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social conditions,
including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and
social security.

2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their
economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders,
women, youth, children and persons with disabilities.

Article 26

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned,
occupied or otherwise used or acquired.

2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess
by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise
acquired.

3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be
conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.

Article 30

1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public
interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned.

2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures
and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for military activities.

Article 32
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their
lands or territories and other resources.

2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative
institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or
territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or
other resources.

3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall
be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.

Article 37

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other
constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements.

2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in
treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.

Article 38

States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative
measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.

Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be regarded as embodying customary
international law - a question which the Court need not definitively resolve here - the obligations enumerated therein do not
strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and
powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for
flexibility in its application by the different States.

There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples their own police and
internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection for indigenous peoples
against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands - a function that is normally performed by police officers. If the protection
of a right so essential to indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the
protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an
acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26
thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired.

Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to grant
indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that document are qualified
in Article 46 as follows:

1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in
any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States.

Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would
not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary.

It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the Constitution
and the laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have
entailed any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof
inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD strand on
GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced below for convenience:

7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in
the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively.
 Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non
derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.

Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into force until the necessary
changes to the legal framework are effected. While the word "Constitution" is not mentioned in the provision now under
consideration or anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is certainly broad enough to include the
Constitution.

Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD the provisions
thereof regarding the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government, have already violated the
Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the "negotiations shall be conducted in
accordance with x x x the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrityof the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis
supplied) Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already
discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an independent status already prevailing.

Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective because the suspensive clause is
invalid, as discussed below.

The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section 5(c), which
states that there shall be established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with different rebel groups to be
"appointed by the President as her official emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions with rebel
groups." These negotiating panels are to report to the President, through the PAPP on the conduct and progress of the
negotiations.

It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem through its negotiations with the
MILF, was not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as they presently stand. One of the
components of a comprehensive peace process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the "Paths to Peace," is the pursuit of
social, economic, and political reforms which may require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O.
No. 3, which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No. 125,167 states:

SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise the processes
known as the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must
therefore be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited to,
the following:

a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous
implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal
armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional
amendments.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to address, pursuant to this provision of
E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to "think outside the box," so to speak.
Hence, they negotiated and were set on signing the MOA-AD that included various social, economic, and political reforms which
cannot, however, all be accommodated within the present legal framework, and which thus would require new legislation and
constitutional amendments.

The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause," however, cannot stop here, because it must be asked whether the
President herself may exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4(a).

The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President, in the course of peace
negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the reforms
be restricted only to those solutions which the present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a discussion of the
extent of the President's power to conduct peace negotiations.

That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution
does not mean that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,168 in issue was the authority of the President
to declare a state of rebellion - an authority which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The Court held thus:
 "In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7
margin, upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling
rested on the President's

. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for
her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the
Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986
to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a
limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive power.

Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief
executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.169

As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict will show, however, peace is rarely
attained by simply pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a fundamental reconfiguration of the
nation's constitutional structure is required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit:

x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must form the core of any post-conflict peace-
building mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti over the last ten years, conflict cessation without modification of
the political environment, even where state-building is undertaken through technical electoral assistance and institution- or
capacity-building, is unlikely to succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of states emerging from conflict return to
conflict. Moreover, a substantial proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies.

The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in the political and governance
transition. Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road
map on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by
which the new democracy will operate.170

In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal status of peace agreements, observed that the
typical way that peace agreements establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization and demobilization is by linking them
to new constitutional structures addressing governance, elections, and legal and human rights institutions. 171

In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and constitution-making has been recognized by no less than
the framers of the Constitution. Behind the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions 172 is the framers' intention to
implement a particular peace agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the GRP and the MNLF, signed by
then Undersecretary of National Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari.

MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I will reserve my right to ask them if
they are not covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions.
I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists in the Muslim region; it is working very well;
it has, in fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my question is: since that already exists, why do we have to
go into something new?
MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right that certain definite
steps have been taken to implement the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement with respect to an autonomous region
in Mindanao. This is a good first step, but there is no question that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli
Agreement itself and to the fuller standard of regional autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by state
policy.173(Emphasis supplied)

The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have, to the credit of their drafters, been
partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government
and the MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in
Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require
changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with
rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring
an end to hostilities.
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be prevented
from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal
procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII,
Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional
convention, or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional change
to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers.

In Sanidad v. COMELEC,174 in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of directly submitting proposals for
constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing the interim National Assembly which was the body vested by the 1973
Constitution with the power to propose such amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never convened the interim
National Assembly. The majority upheld the President's act, holding that "the urges of absolute necessity" compelled the
President as the agent of the people to act as he did, there being no interim National Assembly to propose constitutional
amendments. Against this ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma vigorously dissented. The Court's concern at present,
however, is not with regard to the point on which it was then divided in that controversial case, but on that which was not
disputed by either side.

Justice Teehankee's dissent,175 in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the President may directly submit proposed
constitutional amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition that he would have upheld the President's
action along with the majority had the President convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his proposals through it.
Thus Justice Teehankee opined:

"Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government, defines and delimits the
powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and the constituent power has not been granted
to but has been withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it follows that the President's questioned decrees proposing
and submitting constitutional amendments directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim National
Assembly in whom the power is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis."176 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations -
may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally
implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a
certainty.

Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose amendments through initiative and
referendum, the President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted on in a
plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of whether these
recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative.

These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's suggestions to the people, for any further
involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine "people's initiative." The only
initiative recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court stated in Lambino v.
COMELEC:177

"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the ‘people's voice.' However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that ‘ULAP maintains its unqualified
support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms.' The Lambino Group
thus admits that their ‘people's' initiative is an ‘unqualified support to the agenda' of the incumbent President to change
the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of ‘people's voice' or ‘sovereign will' in the present
initiative."

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, 178 only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to
recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to
the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an
unconstitutional act.

The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, since her authority to
propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new
legislation. One of the more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation Address of the
President to Congress. Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill has always been based on the budget prepared by the
President, which - for all intents and purposes - is a proposal for new legislation coming from the President.179
The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards

Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guaranteeto any third
party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do
is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the
present Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework." This stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive condition - defined in civil
law as a future and uncertain event - but of a term. It is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework
will be effected, but when. That there is no uncertainty being contemplated is plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes on
to state that the contemplated changes shall be "with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated
timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact."

Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework contemplated in
the MOA-AD - which changes would include constitutional amendments, as discussed earlier. It bears noting that,

By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted among the "prior agreements" from
which there could be no derogation.

What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing details for these "consensus
points" and, notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework.

Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to propose
constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines
will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down
as unconstitutional.

A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a similar provision appearing in the 1996 final peace
agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most instructive.

As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in two phases. Phase Icovered a
three-year transitional period involving the putting up of new administrative structures through Executive Order, such as the
Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development
(SPCPD), while Phase II covered the establishment of the new regional autonomous government through amendment or repeal
of R.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of the ARMM.

The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the expanded autonomous region envisioned
by the parties. To that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a crucial difference between
the two agreements. While the MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the legal framework" will be
put in place, the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement states thus: "Accordingly, these provisions [on Phase II] shall
be recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in the amendatory or repealing law."

Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international law obligation on the part of the
Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be considered either as a binding
agreement under international law, or a unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the international community that it
would grant to the Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in international
law, however.

The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In addition,
representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These circumstances readily lead one to
surmise that the MOA-AD would have had the status of a binding international agreement had it been signed. An examination of
the prevailing principles in international law, however, leads to the contrary conclusion.

The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty180 (the Lomé Accord case) of the Special Court of Sierra
Leone is enlightening. The Lomé Accord was a peace agreement signed on July 7, 1999 between the Government of Sierra
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government had been in armed
conflict for around eight years at the time of signing. There were non-contracting signatories to the agreement, among which
were the Government of the Togolese Republic, the Economic Community of West African States, and the UN.

On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone Government,
another agreement was entered into by the UN and that Government whereby the Special Court of Sierra Leone was
established. The sole purpose of the Special Court, an international court, was to try persons who bore the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra
Leone since November 30, 1996.

Among the stipulations of the Lomé Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the members of the RUF with respect to
anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization since the conflict began.

In the Lomé Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an internationally binding obligation not to prosecute
the beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the participation of foreign dignitaries and
international organizations in the finalization of that agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this argument, ruling that
the Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only create binding obligations and rights between the parties in municipal law,
not in international law. Hence, the Special Court held, it is ineffective in depriving an international court like it of jurisdiction.

"37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed conflict it is easy to assume and to argue with
some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the defendants seem to have done, that the mere fact that in
addition to the parties to the conflict, the document formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of state
or their representatives and representatives of international organizations, means the agreement of the parties is
internationalized so as to create obligations in international law.

xxxx

40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict and the mediator or facilitator of the settlement, or
persons or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took place but who are not at all parties to the conflict, are not
contracting parties and who do not claim any obligation from the contracting parties or incur any obligation from the
settlement.

41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State and the RUF which has no status of
statehood and is to all intents and purposes a faction within the state. The non-contracting signatories of the Lomé
Agreement were moral guarantors of the principle that, in the terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace
agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties". The moral guarantors assumed no legal
obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its representative appended, presumably for avoidance of doubt, an understanding
of the extent of the agreement to be implemented as not including certain international crimes.

42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations regulated by international law so
that a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international law which will also provide principle means of
enforcement. The Lomé Agreement created neither rights nor obligations capable of being regulated by
international law. An agreement such as the Lomé Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no
doubt creates a factual situation of restoration of peace that the international community acting through the
Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not convert it to an international agreement which creates an
obligation enforceable in international, as distinguished from municipal, law. A breach of the terms of such a peace
agreement resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a threat to peace in the determination of the Security
Council may indicate a reversal of the factual situation of peace to be visited with possible legal consequences arising from
the new situation of conflict created. Such consequences such as action by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII
arise from the situation and not from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it. Such action cannot be regarded
as a remedy for the breach. A peace agreement which settles an internal armed conflict cannot be ascribed the same
status as one which settles an international armed conflict which, essentially, must be between two or more
warring States. The Lomé Agreement cannot be characterised as an international instrument. x x x" (Emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied)

Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not parties to
the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law.

In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral declaration of the Philippine State,
binding under international law, that it would comply with all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it would have to
amend its Constitution accordingly regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for this view is Australia v.
France,181 also known as the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of France's nuclear tests in the South Pacific. France
refused to appear in the case, but public statements from its President, and similar statements from other French officials
including its Minister of Defence, that its 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to dismiss the
case.182 Those statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal undertaking addressed to the international community, which
required no acceptance from other States for it to become effective.
Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be bound to the international community in
issuing its public statements, viz:

43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have
the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the
intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention
confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to
follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an
intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances,
nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction
from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the
strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made.

44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain position in relation
to a particular matter with the intention of being bound-the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the
act. When States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.

xxxx

51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French Government conveyed to
the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume
that other States might take note of these statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of these
statements and their legal consequences must be considered within the general framework of the security of
international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential in the relations among States. It is from the
actual substance of these statements, and from the circumstances attending their making, that the legal
implications of the unilateral act must be deduced. The objects of these statements are clear and they were
addressed to the international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an undertaking
possessing legal effect. The Court considers *270 that the President of the Republic, in deciding upon the effective
cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to the international community to which his words were addressed. x x
x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative may be construed as
a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the
international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to
those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in
peculiar circumstances.

The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case decided by the ICJ entitled Burkina
Faso v. Mali,183 also known as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration subject of that case was a
statement made by the President of Mali, in an interview by a foreign press agency, that Mali would abide by the decision to be
issued by a commission of the Organization of African Unity on a frontier dispute then pending between Mali and Burkina Faso.

Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's President was not a unilateral act with legal
implications. It clarified that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances surrounding the French
declaration subject thereof, to wit:

40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken of all the factual circumstances
in which the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court took the view that since the applicant
States were not the only ones concerned at the possible continuance of atmospheric testing by the French
Government, that Government's unilateral declarations had ‘conveyed to the world at large, including the
Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests‘ (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In
the particular circumstances of those cases, the French Government could not express an intention to be bound
otherwise than by unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it could have accepted the terms of a negotiated
solution with each of the applicants without thereby jeopardizing its contention that its conduct was lawful. The
circumstances of the present case are radically different. Here, there was nothing to hinder the Parties from
manifesting an intention to accept the binding character of the conclusions of the Organization of African Unity
Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since no agreement of
this kind was concluded between the Parties, the Chamber finds that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration made
by Mali's head of State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral act with legal implications in regard to the present case. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on the part of the
Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same with the clear intention of being
bound thereby to the international community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were States and
international organizations involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they
participated merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lomé Accord case, the mere fact that in
addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and international organizations
does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law.

Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such commitments would not be
detrimental to the security of international intercourse - to the trust and confidence essential in the relations among States.

In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as already
discussed, the Mali President's statement was not held to be a binding unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in that case, there
was also nothing to hinder the Philippine panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other States, to manifest that
intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear
commitment to be legally bound to the international community, not just the MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the
signatures of the participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of that commitment. Entering into such a
formal agreement would not have resulted in a loss of face for the Philippine government before the international community,
which was one of the difficulties that prevented the French Government from entering into a formal agreement with other
countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it had no intention to be bound to
the international community. On that ground, the MOA-AD may not be considered a unilateral declaration under international
law.

The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost
consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse
of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a
state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would
give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent
powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the
only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference
with that process.

The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to the Moros for the sake of
peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change is not inconsistent with what, in international law,
is known as Jus Cogens.184 Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that decision.

SUMMARY

The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected
constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority
by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of
government is a proper matter for judicial review.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court
grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal
stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace
Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic"
principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and
paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the
fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one
drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.

The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents' action in
providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.

The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid
symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of
the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes
the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to
information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject
only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring
that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence
finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.

An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public
consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public rights.

At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to be
consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.

One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal
forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues
to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before
any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular
group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition
and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of
the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to
consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents
effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial
compliance and public scrutiny.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the
pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a
whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept
underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not
be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD
establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum
of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is
worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.
Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would
amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the
people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under
international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the
MOA-AD fatally defective.

WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and
hereby GRANTED.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is
declared contrary to law and the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 169815 August 13, 2008

BUREAU OF FISHERIES AND AQUATIC RESOURCES (BFAR) EMPLOYEES UNION, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VII, CEBU
CITY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

On appeal are the Decision1 dated April 8, 2005 of respondent Commission on Audit (COA) in LAO-N-2005-119 upholding the
disallowance by the COA Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO), Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City of the P10,000.00 Food
Basket Allowance granted by BFAR to each of its employees in 1999, and COA Resolution 2 dated August 5, 2005, denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said Decision.

First, the facts:

On October 18, 1999, petitioner Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) Employees Union, Regional Office No. VII,
Cebu City issued Resolution No. 01, series of 1999 requesting the BFAR Central Office for a Food Basket Allowance. It justified
its request on the high cost of living, i.e., "the increase in prices of petroleum products which catapulted the cost of food
commodities, has greatly affected the economic conditions and living standard of the government employees of BFAR Region
VII and could hardly sustain its need to cope up with the four (4) basic needs, i.e., food, shelter, clothing and education."3 It also
relied on the Employees Suggestions and Incentive Awards System (ESIAS), pursuant to Book V of Executive Order No. 292, or
the Administrative Code of 1987, and approved by the Civil Service Commission on December 3, 1996. The ESIAS "includes the
granting of incentives that will help employees overcome present economic difficulties, boost their morale, and further
commitment and dedication to public service."4 Regional Director Corazon M. Corrales of BFAR Region VII indorsed the
Resolution, and Malcolm I. Sarmiento, Jr., Director of BFAR recommended its approval. Honorable Cesar M. Drilon, Jr.,
Undersecretary for Fisheries and Livestock of the Department of Agriculture, approved the request for Authority to Grant a Gift
Check or the Food Basket Allowance at the rate of P10,000.00 each to the 130 employees of BFAR Region VII, or in the total
amount of P1,322,682.00.5 On the strength of the approval, Regional Director Corrales released the allowance to the BFAR
employees.

On post audit, the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City
disallowed the grant of Food Basket Allowance under Notice of Disallowance No. 2003-022-101 (1999) dated September 19,
2003. It ruled that the allowance had no legal basis and that it violated: a) Sec. 15(d) of the General Appropriations Act of 1999,
prohibiting the payment of honoraria, allowances, or other forms of compensation to any government official or employee,
except those specifically authorized by law; b) par. 4.5 of Budget Circular No. 16 dated November 28, 1998, prohibiting the grant
of food, rice, gift checks, or any other form of incentives/allowances, except those authorized via Administrative Order by the
Office of the President; and c) Sec. 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758, or the Salary Standardization Law of 1989, which
includes all allowances in the standardized salary rates, subject to certain exceptions.

On February 26, 2004, BFAR Regional Office No. VII, through Regional Director Corrales, moved for reconsideration and
prayed for the lifting of the disallowance. It argued that the grant of Food Basket Allowance would enhance the welfare and
productivity of the employees. Further, it contended that the approval by the Honorable Drilon, Undersecretary for Fisheries and
Livestock, of the said benefit was the law itself which vested the specific authority for its release. The Commission on Audit –
Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City denied the motion.

Petitioner appealed to the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) National, Quezon City. The appeal
was denied in a Decision dated April 8, 2005. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution dated
August 5, 2005.

Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner cites the following grounds for its appeal:

 1. The disallowance in question is unconstitutional as it contravenes the fundamental principle of the State enshrined under
Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provide as follows:
SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the
nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a
rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.6
2. The Undersecretary for Fisheries and Livestock is an extension of the Secretary of Agriculture who is an alter-ego of the
President. His approval was tantamount to the authority from the Office of the President, as contemplated in DBM Budget
Circular No. 16, dated November 28, 1998.7
3. The grant of the Food Basket Allowance is in conformity with Sec. 12 of the Salary Standardization Law.8

We deny the petition.

First, we rule on the issue of constitutionality. Petitioner invokes the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on social justice to
warrant the grant of the Food Basket Allowance. Time and again, we have ruled that the social justice provisions of the
Constitution are not self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are merely statements of principles
and policies. To give them effect, legislative enactment is required. As we held in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,9the
principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are "not self-executing provisions, the
disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights
but guidelines for legislation."10

Second, petitioner contends that the approval of the Department of Agriculture (DA) Undersecretary for Fisheries and Livestock
of the Food Basket Allowance is the law which authorizes its release. It is crystal clear that the DA Undersecretary has no
authority to grant any allowance to the employees of BFAR. Section 4.5 of Budget Circular No. 16 dated November 28, 1998
states:

All agencies are hereby prohibited from granting any food, rice, gift checks, or any other form of
incentives/allowances except those authorized via Administrative Order by the Office of the President.

In the instant case, no Administrative Order has been issued by the Office of the President to exempt BFAR from the express
prohibition against the grant of any food, rice, gift checks, or any other form of incentive/allowance to its employees.

Petitioner argues that the grant of the Food Basket Allowance does not violate Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 6758 or the Salary
Standardization Law. This law was passed to standardize salary rates among government personnel and do away with multiple
allowances and other incentive packages and the resulting differences in compensation among them.11 Sec. 12 of the law
provides:

Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. — All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances;
clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and
hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM [Department of Budget and Management],
shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether
in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates
shall continue to be authorized.

Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local funds of a local
government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or employee and shall be paid by the National
Government.

Under Sec. 12, as quoted, all kinds of allowances are integrated in the standardized salary rates. The exceptions are:

1. representation and transportation allowance (RATA);

2. clothing and laundry allowance;
3. subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels;
4. subsistence allowance of hospital personnel;
5. hazard pay;
6. allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and
7. such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM.

Petitioner contends that the Food Basket Allowance falls under the 7th category above, that of "other additional compensation
not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM."
The Court has had the occasion to interpret Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 6758. In National Tobacco Administration v. Commission on
Audit,12 we held that under the first sentence of Section 12, the benefits excluded from the standardized salary rates are the
"allowances" or those which are usually granted to officials and employees of the government to defray or reimburse the
expenses incurred in the performance of their official functions. These are the RATA, clothing and laundry allowance,
subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel, hazard pay, and
others, as enumerated in the first sentence of Section 12. We further ruled that the phrase "and such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM" is a catch-all proviso for benefits in the nature
of allowances similar to those enumerated. In Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audit,13 we explained that if
these allowances were consolidated with the standardized salary rates, then government officials or employees would be
compelled to spend their personal funds in attending to their duties.

In the instant case, the Food Basket Allowance is definitely not in the nature of an allowance to reimburse expenses incurred by
officials and employees of the government in the performance of their official functions. It is not payment in consideration of the
fulfillment of official duty. It is a form of financial assistance to all officials and employees of BFAR. Petitioner itself stated that the
Food Basket Allowance has the purpose of alleviating the economic condition of BFAR employees.

Next, petitioner relies on National Compensation Circular No. 59 dated September 30, 1989, issued by the DBM, which is the
"List of Allowances/Additional Compensation of Government Officials and Employees which shall be Deemed Integrated into the
Basic Salary." The list enumerates the following allowances/additional compensation which shall be incorporated in the basic
salary, hence, may no longer be granted to government employees:

1. Cost of Living Allowance (COLA);

2. Inflation connected allowance;
3. Living Allowance;
4. Emergency Allowance;
5. Additional Compensation of Public Health Nurses assigned to public health nursing;
6. Additional Compensation of Rural Health Physicians;
7. Additional Compensation of Nurses in Malacañang Clinic;
8. Nurses Allowance in the Air Transportation Office;
9. Assignment Allowance of School Superintendents;
10. Post allowance of Postal Service Office employees;
11. Honoraria/allowances which are regularly given except the following:
a. those for teaching overload;
b. in lieu of overtime pay;
c. for employees on detail with task forces/special projects;
d. researchers, experts and specialists who are acknowledged authorities in their field of specialization;
e. lecturers and resource persons;
f. Municipal Treasurers deputized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to collect and remit internal revenue collections;
and
g. Executive positions in State Universities and Colleges filled by designation from among their faculty members.
12. Subsistence Allowance of employees except those authorized under EO [Executive Order] No. 346 and uniformed
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Integrated National Police;
13. Laundry Allowance of employees except those hospital/sanitaria personnel who attend directly to patients and who by
the nature of their duties are required to wear uniforms, prison guards and uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and Integrated National Police; and
14. Incentive allowance/fee/pay except those authorized under the General Appropriations Act and Section 33 of P.D. No.
807.

Petitioner invokes the rule of statutory construction that "what is not included is excluded." Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
Petitioner claims that the Food Basket Allowance is distinct and separate from the specific allowances/additional compensation
listed in the circular.

Again, we reject petitioner’s contention. The Food Basket Allowance falls under the 14th category, that of incentive
allowance/fee/pay. Petitioner itself justified the Food Basket Allowance as an incentive to the employees to encourage them to
be more productive and efficient.14 Under National Compensation Circular No. 59, exceptions to the incentive allowance/fee/pay
category are those authorized under the General Appropriations Act (GAA) and Section 33 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
807. Sec. 15(d) of the GAA for Fiscal Year 1999 or R.A. No. 8745 clearly prohibits the payment of honoraria, allowances or other
forms of compensation to any government official or employee, except those specifically authorized by law. There is no law
authorizing the grant of the subject Food Basket Allowance. Further, Sec. 33 of P.D. No. 807 or the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines does not exempt the Food Basket Allowance from the general rule. Sec. 33 states:

Section 33. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. There shall be established a government-wide employee
suggestions and incentive awards system which shall be administered under such rules, regulations, and standards as may
be promulgated by the Commission.
 In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission, the President or the head of each
department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of
subordinate officers and employees of the government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and
other personal efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or who perform
such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or in relation to, their official employment.

We are not convinced that the Food Basket Allowance falls under the incentive award system contemplated above. The decree
speaks of suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishments, and other personal efforts contributed by an employee to the
efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or other extraordinary acts or services performed by an
employee in the public interest in connection with, or in relation to, his official employment. In the instant case, the Food Basket
Allowance was granted to all BFAR employees, without distinction. It was not granted due to any extraordinary contribution or
exceptional accomplishment by an employee. The Food Basket Allowance was primarily an economic monetary assistance to
the employees.

Lastly, we note, as the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent did, that petitioner failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies. It stopped seeking remedies at the level of respondent’s Legal and Adjudication Office. It failed to
appeal the latter’s adverse decision to the Commission on Audit proper. The consequence for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is clear: the disallowance, as ruled by the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office Regional Office No.
VII, Cebu City and upheld by the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office National, Quezon City, became final and
executory. Sections 48 and 51 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, or the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines provide:

Section 48. Appeal from decision of auditors. – Any person aggrieved by the decision of an auditor of any government
agency in the settlement of an account or claim may, within six months from receipt of a copy of the decision, appeal in
writing to the Commission.
Section 51. Finality of decisions of the Commission or any auditor. – A decision of the Commission or of any auditor upon
any matter within its or his jurisdiction, if not appealed as herein provided, shall be final and executory.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication
Office dated April 8, 2005 and August 5, 2005, respectively, in LAO-N-2005-119, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32052 July 25, 1975

PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,

FERNANDO, J.:

The principal issue that calls for resolution in this appeal by certiorari from an order of respondent Court of Industrial Relations is
one of constitutional significance. It is concerned with the expanded role of government necessitated by the increased
responsibility to provide for the general welfare. More specifically, it deals with the question of whether petitioner, the Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration, discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. The landmark opinion of the then
Justice, row Chief Justice, Makalintal in Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions
in Government Corporations and offices, points the way to the right answer.1 It interpreted the then fundamental law as hostile to
the view of a limited or negative state. It is antithetical to the laissez faire concept. For as noted in an earlier decision, the welfare
state concept "is not alien to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution."2 It is much more so under the present Charter, which is
impressed with an even more explicit recognition of social and economic rights.3 There is manifest, to recall Laski, "a definite
increase in the profundity of the social conscience," resulting in "a state which seeks to realize more fully the common good of its
members."4 It does not necessarily follow, however, just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary
functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised
that petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.5 We cannot then grant the reversal
sought. We affirm.

The facts are undisputed. On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with respondent Court a petition
wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by
them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for
the differential between the amount actually paid to them and the amount allegedly due them.6 There was an answer filed by
petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denying the allegations and raising the special defenses of lack of a cause
of action and lack of jurisdiction.7 The issues were thereafter joined, and the case set for trial, with both parties presenting their
evidence.8 After the parties submitted the case for decision, the then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of respondent Court
issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to the date the
decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid. 9 There was a
motion for reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc denied the same. 10 Hence this petition for certiorari.

Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, as had been noted, would predicate its plea for the reversal of the order
complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental
functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444. 11 While, to repeat, its submission as to the
governmental character of its operation is to be given credence, it is not a necessary consequence that respondent Court is
devoid of jurisdiction. Nor could the challenged order be set aside on the additional argument that the Eight-Hour Labor Law is
not applicable to it. So it was, at the outset, made clear.

1. A reference to the enactments creating petitioner corporation suffices to demonstrate the merit of petitioner's plea that it
performs governmental and not proprietary functions. As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265, 12 its purposes and
objectives were set forth thus: "(a) To promote the effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign
markets so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To establish and maintain
balanced production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its manufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will
insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production plus reasonable profit both in the local as well as
in the foreign market; (c) To create, establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable
centers and supervise the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a
fair return of their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading, classifying, and inspecting of
Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and economic conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry." 13The
amendatory statute, Republic Act No. 4155, 14 renders even more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its first section
on the declaration of policy reads: "It is declared to be the national policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry, to
encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and
foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and, to create a climate conducive to local
cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to
improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes." 15 The objectives are set forth thus: "To attain this national policy the
following objectives are hereby adopted: 1. Financing; 2. Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit
Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainable prices and conditions in
order that a reinvigorated Virginia tobacco industry may be established on a sound basis; and 4. Improving the quality of locally
manufactured cigarettes through blending of imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco; such importation with corresponding
exportation at a ratio of one kilo of imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the importer-exporter from
the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration." 16

It is thus readily apparent from a cursory perusal of such statutory provisions why petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine
announced in the leading Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration decision 17 and why the objection of
private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth
in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation 18 if futile. The irrelevance of such a distinction considering the needs of the times was
clearly pointed out by the present Chief Justice, who took note, speaking of the reconstituted Agricultural Credit Administration,
that functions of that sort "may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from
"ministrant"),such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and
property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those
relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by
the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these
latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government." 19Nonetheless, as he explained
so persuasively: "The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the
functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative
and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the
public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals", continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be
absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of
economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself
in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice." 20 Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani v. National
Coconut Corporation, 21 based on the Wilsonian classification of the tasks incumbent on government into constituent and
ministrant in accordance with the laissez faire principle. That concept, then dominant in economics, was carried into the
governmental sphere, as noted in a textbook on political science, 22 the first edition of which was published in 1898, its author
being the then Professor, later American President, Woodrow Wilson. He took pains to emphasize that what was categorized by
him as constituent functions had its basis in a recognition of what was demanded by the "strictest [concept of] laissez faire, [as
they] are indeed the very bonds of society." 23 The other functions he would minimize as ministrant or optional.

It is a matter of law that in the Philippines, the laissez faire principle hardly commanded the authoritative position which at one
time it held in the United States. As early as 1919, Justice Malcolm in Rubi v. Provincial Board 24 could affirm: "The doctrines
of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The
modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity." 25 The 1935
Constitution, as was indicated earlier, continued that approach. As noted in Edu v. Ericta:26 "What is more, to erase any doubts,
the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government the
responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs.
Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action." 27 Nor did the opinion in Edu stop
there: "To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy
is a repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first
President of the Republic, made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the
"vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions" and the "almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry
and agriculture as well as to compete with existing business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then] current
tendencies' in other jurisdictions. He spoke thus: "My answer is that this constitution has a definite and well defined philosophy,
not only political but social and economic.... If in this Constitution the gentlemen will find declarations of economic policy they are
there because they are necessary to safeguard the interest and welfare of the Filipino people because we believe that the days
have come when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to grow,
the freedom to develop national aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a
constitutional provision automatically imposes." 28

It would be then to reject what was so emphatically stressed in the Agricultural Credit Administration decision about which the
observation was earlier made that it reflected the philosophy of the 1935 Constitution and is even more in consonance with the
expanded role of government accorded recognition in the present Charter if the plea of petitioner that it discharges governmental
function were not heeded. That path this Court is not prepared to take. That would be to go backward, to retreat rather than to
advance. Nothing can thus be clearer than that there is no constitutional obstacle to a government pursuing lines of endeavor,
formerly reserved for private enterprise. This is one way, in the language of Laski, by which through such activities, "the harsh
contract which [does] obtain between the levels of the rich and the poor" may be minimized. 29 It is a response to a trend noted
by Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams 30 for the humanization of laws and the promotion of the interest of all component
elements of society so that man's innate aspirations, in what was so felicitously termed by the First Lady as "a compassionate
society" be attained. 31
2. The success that attended the efforts of petitioner to be adjudged as performing governmental rather than proprietary
functions cannot militate against respondent Court assuming jurisdiction over this labor dispute. So it was mentioned earlier. As
far back as Tabora v. Montelibano, 32 this Court, speaking through Justice Padilla, declared: The NARIC was established by the
Government to protect the people against excessive or unreasonable rise in the price of cereals by unscrupulous dealers. With
that main objective there is no reason why its function should not be deemed governmental. The Government owes its very
existence to that aim and purpose — to protect the people." 33 In a subsequent case, Naric Worker's Union v. Hon.
Alvendia, 34 decided four years later, this Court, relying on Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Tan, 35 which specified
the cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, included among which is one that involves hours of
employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, ruled that it is precisely respondent Court and not ordinary courts that should pass
upon that particular labor controversy. For Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the ponente, the fact that there were judicial as well as
administrative and executive pronouncements to the effect that the Naric was performing governmental functions did not suffice
to confer competence on the then respondent Judge to issue a preliminary injunction and to entertain a complaint for damages,
which as pointed out by the labor union, was connected with an unfair labor practice. This is emphasized by the dispositive
portion of the decision: "Wherefore, the restraining orders complained of, dated May 19, 1958 and May 27, 1958, are set aside,
and the complaint is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the National Rice and Corn Corporation's seeking whatever remedy
it is entitled to in the Court of Industrial Relations." 36 Then, too, in a case involving petitioner itself, Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration, 37 where the point in dispute was whether it was respondent Court or a court of first instance that is possessed of
competence in a declaratory relief petition for the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, one that could readily be
thought of as pertaining to the judiciary, the answer was that "unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should
fall on the Court of Industrial Relations." 38 Reference to a number of decisions which recognized in the then respondent Court
the jurisdiction to determine labor controversies by government-owned or controlled corporations lends to support to such an
approach. 39 Nor could it be explained only on the assumption that proprietary rather than governmental functions did call for
such a conclusion. It is to be admitted that such a view was not previously bereft of plausibility. With the aforecited Agricultural
Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration decision rendering obsolete the Bacani doctrine, it has, to use a Wilsonian
phrase, now lapsed into "innocuous desuetude." 40 Respondent Court clearly was vested with jurisdiction.

3. The contention of petitioner that the Eight-Hour Labor Law 41 does not apply to it hardly deserves any extended consideration.
There is an air of casualness in the way such an argument was advanced in its petition for review as well as in its brief. In both
pleadings, it devoted less than a full page to its discussion. There is much to be said for brevity, but not in this case. Such a
terse and summary treatment appears to be a reflection more of the inherent weakness of the plea rather than the possession of
an advocate's enviable talent for concision. It did cite Section 2 of the Act, but its very language leaves no doubt that "it shall
apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private ... ." 42 Nor are private respondents
included among the employees who are thereby barred from enjoying the statutory benefits. It cited Marcelo v. Philippine
National Red Cross 43 and Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Araos.44 Certainly, the activities to which the two above public
corporations devote themselves can easily be distinguished from that engaged in by petitioner. A reference to the pertinent
sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 on which it relies to obtain a ruling as to its governmental character should render
clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it
has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that
one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that
such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of March 21, 1970 and the Resolution of respondent Court en banc of May 8, 1970 denying
a motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed. The last sentence of the Order of March 21, 1970 reads as follows: "To find
how much each of them [private respondents] is entitled under this judgment, the Chief of the Examining Division, or any of his
authorized representative, is hereby directed to make a reexamination of records, papers and documents in the possession of
respondent PVTA pertinent and proper under the premises and to submit his report of his findings to the Court for further
disposition thereof." Accordingly, as provided by the New Labor Code, this case is referred to the National Labor Relations
Commission for further proceedings conformably to law. No costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands,plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.

William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish
Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863.
Subsequent thereto and on October 6 of that year, a central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to
distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed. After a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted
$365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution, dated September 22, 1866, and, by order of the Governor-General
of the Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, together with the names of those entitled thereto, was published in the Official
Gazette of Manila dated April 7, 1870. There was later distributed, inaccordance with the above-mentioned allotments, the sum
of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of S365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de
Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine Government, by order dated the 1st of that month, directed its treasurer to turn
over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each. These amounts were
received on the following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the Monte
de Piedad. On account of various petitions of the persons, and heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were
made by the central relief board for the payment of those amounts, the Philippine Islands to bring suit against the Monte de
Piedad a recover, "through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands," the
$80.000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the
Official Gazette instituted on May 3, 1912, by the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer,
and after due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine
currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause. The defendant appealed and makes
the following assignment of errors:

1. The court erred in not finding that the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000), give to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros,
were so given as a donation subject to one condition, to wit: the return of such sum of money to the Spanish Government of
these Islands, within eight days following the day when claimed, in case the Supreme Government of Spain should not
approve the action taken by the former government.

2. The court erred in not having decreed that this donation had been cleared; said eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) being
at present the exclusive property of the appellant the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros.

3. That the court erred in stating that the Government of the Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish Government in
its rights, as regards an important sum of money resulting from a national subscription opened by reason of the earthquake
of June 3, 1863, in these Island.

4. That the court erred in not declaring that Act Numbered 2109, passed by the Philippine Legislature on January 30, 1912,
is unconstitutional.

5. That the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the prescription of this suit brought by the Insular
Government against the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros for the reimbursement of the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000)
given to it by the late Spanish Government of these Islands.

6. That the court erred in sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros to reimburse the Philippine Government in the
sum of eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) gold coin, or the equivalent thereof in the present legal tender currency in
circulation, with legal interest thereon from February 28th, 1912, and the costs of this suit.
In the royal order of June 29, 1879, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was directed to inform the home Government
in what manner the indemnity might be paid to which, by virtue of the resolutions of the relief board, the persons who suffered
damage by the earthquake might be entitled, in order to perform the sacred obligation which the Government of Spain had
assumed toward the donors.

The next pertinent document in order is the defendant's petition, dated February 1, 1883, addressed to the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands, which reads:

Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad of Manila Presidencia.

Excellency: The Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros of Manila informs your Excellency, First: That
the funds which it has up to the present been able to dispose of have been exhausted in loans on jewelry, and there only
remains the sum of one thousand and odd pesos, which will be expended between to-day and day after tomorrow. Second:
That, to maintain the credit of the establishment, which would be greatly injured were its operations suspended, it is
necessary to procure money. Third: That your Excellency has proposed to His Majesty's Government to apply to the funds
of the Monte de Piedad a part of the funds held in the treasury derived form the national subscription for the relief of the
distress caused by the earthquake of 1863. Fourth: That in the public treasury there is held at the disposal of the central
earthquake relief board over $1090,000 which was deposited in the said treasury by order of your general Government, it
having been transferred thereto from the Spanish-Filipino Bank where it had been held. fifth: That in the straightened
circumstances of the moment, your Excellency can, to avert impending disaster to the Monte de Piedad, order that, out of
that sum of one hundred thousand pesos held in the Treasury at the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred
to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000, there to be held under the same conditions as at present in the Treasury, to
wit, at the disposal of the Relief Board. Sixth: That should this transfer not be approved for any reason, either because of the
failure of His Majesty's Government to approve the proposal made by your Excellency relative to the application to the
needs of the Monte de Piedad of a pat of the subscription intended to believe the distress caused by the earthquake of
1863, or for any other reason, the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad obligates itself to return any sums which it may
have received on account of the eighty thousand pesos, or the whole thereof, should it have received the same, by securing
a loan from whichever bank or banks may lend it the money at the cheapest rate upon the security of pawned jewelry. —
This is an urgent measure to save the Monte de Piedad in the present crisis and the board of directors trusts to secure your
Excellency's entire cooperation and that of the other officials who have take part in the transaction.

The Governor-General's resolution on the foregoing petition is as follows:

GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.

MANILA, February 1, 1883.

In view of the foregoing petition addressed to me by the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad of this city, in which it is
stated that the funds which the said institution counted upon are nearly all invested in loans on jewelry and that the small
account remaining will scarcely suffice to cover the transactions of the next two days, for which reason it entreats the
general Government that, in pursuance of its telegraphic advice to H. M. Government, the latter direct that there be turned
over to said Monte de Piedad $80,000 out of the funds in the public treasury obtained from the national subscription for the
relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, said board obligating itself to return this sum should H. M.
Government, for any reason, not approve the said proposal, and for this purpose it will procure funds by means of loans
raised on pawned jewelry; it stated further that if the aid so solicited is not furnished, it will be compelled to suspend
operations, which would seriously injure the credit of so beneficient an institution; and in view of the report upon the matter
made by the Intendencia General de Hacienda; and considering the fact that the public treasury has on hand a much
greater sum from the source mentioned than that solicited; and considering that this general Government has submitted for
the determination of H. M. Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the
subscription referred to, may remain as a surplus should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a
loan upon the security of the credit of the institution, believing that in so doing the wishes of the donors would be faithfully
interpreted inasmuch as those wishes were no other than to relieve distress, an act of charity which is exercised in the
highest degree by the Monte de Piedad, for it liberates needy person from the pernicious effects of usury; and

Considering that the lofty purposes that brought about the creation of the pious institution referred to would be frustrated,
and that the great and laudable work of its establishment, and that the great and laudable and valuable if the aid it urgently
seeks is not granted, since the suspension of its operations would seriously and regrettably damage the ever-growing credit
of the Monte de Piedad; and

Considering that if such a thing would at any time cause deep distress in the public mind, it might be said that at the present
juncture it would assume the nature of a disturbance of public order because of the extreme poverty of the poorer classes
resulting from the late calamities, and because it is the only institution which can mitigate the effects of such poverty; and
 Considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained, for the funds in question
are sufficiently secured in the unlikely event that H> M. Government does not approve the recommendation mentioned, this
general Government, in the exercise of the extraordinary powers conferred upon it and in conformity with the report of the
Intendencia de Hacienda, resolves as follows:

First. Authority is hereby given to deliver to the Monte de Piedad, out of the sum held in the public treasury of these Islands
obtained from the national subscription opened by reason of the earthquakes of 1863, amounts up to the sum $80,000, as
its needs may require, in installments of $20,000.

Second. The board of directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand, the
sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this resolution.

Third. The Intendencia General de Hacienda shall forthwith, and in preference to all other work, proceed to prepare the
necessary papers so that with the least possible delay the payment referred to may be made and the danger that menaces
the Monte de Piedad of having to suspend its operations may be averted.

H. M. Government shall be advised hereof. lawphi 1.net

(Signed) P. DE RIVERA.

By the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was ordered to "inform
this ministerio what is the total sum available at the present time, taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de
Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general Government on February 1, 1883," and after the rights of the claimants,
whose names were published in the Official Gazette of Manila on April 7, 1870, and their heirs had been established, as therein
provided, as such persons "have an unquestionable right to be paid the donations assigned to them therein, your general
Government shall convoke them all within a reasonable period and shall pay their shares to such as shall identify themselves,
without regard to their financial status," and finally "that when all the proceedings and operations herein mentioned have been
concluded and the Government can consider itself free from all kinds of claims on the part of those interested in the distribution
of the funds deposited in the vaults of the Treasury, such action may be taken as the circumstances shall require, after first
consulting the relief board and your general Government and taking account of what sums have been delivered to the Monte de
Piedad and those that were expended in 1888 to relieve public calamities," and "in order that all the points in connection with the
proceedings had as a result of the earthquake be clearly understood, it is indispensable that the offices hereinbefore mentioned
comply with the provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the royal order of June 25, 1879." On receipt of this Finance order
by the Governor-General, the Department of Finance was called upon for a report in reference to the $80,000 turned over to the
defendant, and that Department's report to the Governor-General dated June 28, 1893, reads:

Intendencia General de Hacienda de Filipinas (General Treasury of the Philippines) — Excellency. — By Royal Order No.
1044 of December 3, last, it is provided that the persons who sustained losses by the earthquakes that occurred in your
capital in the year 1863 shall be paid the amounts allotted to them out of the sums sent from Spain for this purpose, with
observance of the rules specified in the said royal order, one of them being that before making the payment to the interested
parties the assets shall be reduced to money. These assets, during the long period of time that has elapsed since they were
turned over to the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, were used to cover the general needs of the appropriation, a part
besides being invested in the relief of charitable institutions and another part to meet pressing needs occasioned by public
calamities. On January 30, last, your Excellency was please to order the fulfillment of that sovereign mandate and referred
the same to this Intendencia for its information and the purposes desired (that is, for compliance with its directions and, as
aforesaid, one of these being the liquidation, recovery, and deposit with the Treasury of the sums paid out of that fund and
which were expended in a different way from that intended by the donors) and this Intendencia believed the moment had
arrived to claim from the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros the sum of 80,000 pesos which, by
decree of your general Government of the date of February 1, 1883, was loaned to it out of the said funds, the (Monte de
Piedad) obligating itself to return the same within the period of eight days if H. M. Government did not approve the delivery.
On this Intendencia's demanding from the Monte de Piedad the eighty thousand pesos, thus complying with the provisions
of the Royal Order, it was to be supposed that no objection to its return would be made by the Monte de Piedad for, when it
received the loan, it formally engaged itself to return it; and, besides, it was indisputable that the moment to do so had
arrived, inasmuch as H. M. Government, in ordering that the assets of the earthquake relief fund should he collected, makes
express mention of the 80,000 pesos loaned to the Monte de Piedad, without doubt considering as sufficient the period of
ten years during which it has been using this large sum which lawfully belongs to their persons. This Intendencia also
supposed that the Monte de Piedad no longer needed the amount of that loan, inasmuch as, far from investing it in
beneficient transactions, it had turned the whole amount into the voluntary deposit funds bearing 5 per cent interests, the
result of this operation being that the debtor loaned to the creditor on interest what the former had gratuitously received. But
the Monte de Piedad, instead of fulfilling the promise it made on receiving the sum, after repeated demands refused to
return the money on the ground that only your Excellency, and not the Intendencia (Treasury), is entitled to order the
reimbursement, taking no account of the fact that this Intendencia was acting in the discharge of a sovereign command, the
fulfillment of which your Excellency was pleased to order; and on the further ground that the sum of 80,000 pesos which it
received from the fund intended for the earthquake victims was not received as a loan, but as a donation, this in the opinion
of this Intendencia, erroneously interpreting both the last royal order which directed the apportionment of the amount of the
 subscription raised in the year 1863 and the superior decree which granted the loan, inasmuch as in this letter no donation
is made to the Monte de Piedad of the 80,000 pesos, but simply a loan; besides, no donation whatever could be made of
funds derived from a private subscription raised for a specific purpose, which funds are already distributed and the names of
the beneficiaries have been published in the Gaceta, there being lacking only the mere material act of the delivery, which
has been unduly delayed. In view of the unexpected reply made by the Monte de Piedad, and believing it useless to insist
further in the matter of the claim for the aforementioned loan, or to argue in support thereof, this Intendencia believes the
intervention of your Excellency necessary in this matter, if the royal Order No. 1044 of December 3, last, is to be complied
with, and for this purpose I beg your Excellency kindly to order the Monte de Piedad to reimburse within the period of eight
days the 80,000 which it owes, and that you give this Intendencia power to carry out the provisions of the said royal order. I
must call to the attention of your Excellency that the said pious establishment, during the last few days and after demand
was made upon it, has endorsed to the Spanish-Filipino Bank nearly the whole of the sum which it had on deposit in the
general deposit funds.

The record in the case under consideration fails to disclose any further definite action taken by either the Philippine Government
or the Spanish Government in regard to the $80,000 turned over to the Monte de Piedad.

In the defendant's general ledger the following entries appear: "Public Treasury: February 15, 1883, $20,000; March 12, 1883,
$20,000; April 14, 1883, $20,000; June 2, 1883, $20,000, total $80,000." The book entry for this total is as follows: "To the public
Treasury derived from the subscription for the earthquake of 1863, $80,000 received from general Treasury as a returnable loan,
and without interest." The account was carried in this manner until January 1, 1899, when it was closed by transferring the
amount to an account called "Sagrada Mitra," which latter account was a loan of $15,000 made to the defendant by the
Archbishop of Manila, without interest, thereby placing the "Sagrada Mitra" account at $95,000 instead of $15,000. The above-
mentioned journal entry for January 1, 1899, reads: "Sagrada Mitra and subscription, balance of these two account which on this
date are united in accordance with an order of the Exmo. Sr. Presidente of the Council transmitted verbally to the Presidente
Gerente of these institutions, $95,000."

On March 16, 1902, the Philippine government called upon the defendant for information concerning the status of the $80,000
and received the following reply:

MANILA, March 31, 1902.

To the Attorney-General of the Department of Justice of the Philippine Islands.

SIR: In reply to your courteous letter of the 16th inst., in which you request information from this office as to when and for
what purpose the Spanish Government delivered to the Monte de Piedad eighty thousand pesos obtained from the
subscription opened in connection with the earthquake of 1863, as well as any other information that might be useful for the
report which your office is called upon to furnish, I must state to your department that the books kept in these Pious
Institutions, and which have been consulted for the purpose, show that on the 15th of February, 1883, they received as a
reimbursable loan and without interest, twenty thousand pesos, which they deposited with their own funds. On the same
account and on each of the dates of March 12, April 14 and June 2 of the said year, 1883, they also received and turned
into their funds a like sum of twenty thousand pesos, making a total of eighty thousand pesos. — (Signed) Emilio Moreta.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a literal copy of that found in the letter book No. 2 of those Pious Institutions.

Manila, November 19, 1913

(Sgd.) EMILIO LAZCANOTEGUI,
Secretary

(Sgd.) O. K. EMILIO MORETA,

Managing Director.

The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of the transactions which took place between the Government of Spain
and the Philippine Government on the one side and the Monte de Piedad on the other, concerning the $80,000. The Monte de
Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute necessity for more
working capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the
central relief board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to be held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the disposal of
the relief board." The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be approved by the Government of
Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a donation. The Governor-General,
after reciting the substance of the petition, stated that "this general Government has submitted for the determination of H. M.
Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain
as a surplus, should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the
institution," and "considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained," directed the
transfer of the $80,000 to be made with the understanding that "the Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly
bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this
resolution." It will be noted that the first and only time the word "donation" was used in connection with the $80,000 appears in
this resolution of the Governor-General. It may be inferred from the royal orders that the Madrid Government did tacitly approve
of the transfer of the $80,000 to the Monte de Piedad as a loan without interest, but that Government certainly did not approve
such transfer as a donation for the reason that the Governor-General was directed by the royal order of December 3, 1892, to
inform the Madrid Government of the total available sum of the earthquake fund, "taking into consideration the sums delivered to
the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general Government on February 1, 1883." This language, nothing
else appearing, might admit of the interpretation that the Madrid Government did not intend that the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands should include the $80,000 in the total available sum, but when considered in connection with the report of the
Department of Finance there can be no doubt that it was so intended. That report refers expressly to the royal order of
December 3d, and sets forth in detail the action taken in order to secure the return of the $80,000. The Department of Finance,
acting under the orders of the Governor-General, understood that the $80,000 was transferred to the Monte de Piedad well
knew that it received this sum as a loan interest." The amount was thus carried in its books until January, 1899, when it was
transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra" and was thereafter known as the "Sagrada Mitra and subscription account."
Furthermore, the Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as late as March 31, 1902, that it received the $80,000 "as a
returnable loan, and without interest." Therefore, there cannot be the slightest doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received
the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not as a donation. Consequently, the first alleged error is entirely without foundation.

Counsel for the defendant, in support of their third assignment of error, say in their principal brief that:

The Spanish nation was professedly Roman Catholic and its King enjoyed the distinction of being deputy ex officio of the
Holy See and Apostolic Vicar-General of the Indies, and as such it was his duty to protect all pious works and charitable
institutions in his kingdoms, especially those of the Indies; among the latter was the Monte de Piedad of the Philippines, of
which said King and his deputy the Governor-General of the Philippines, as royal vice-patron, were, in a special and peculiar
manner, the protectors; the latter, as a result of the cession of the Philippine Islands, Implicitly renounced this high office
and tacitly returned it to the Holy See, now represented by the Archbishop of Manila; the national subscription in question
was a kind of foundation or pious work, for a charitable purpose in these Islands; and the entire subscription not being
needed for its original purpose, the royal vice-patron, with the consent of the King, gave the surplus thereof to an analogous
purpose; the fulfillment of all these things involved, in the majority, if not in all cases, faithful compliance with the duty
imposed upon him by the Holy See, when it conferred upon him the royal patronage of the Indies, a thing that touched him
very closely in his conscience and religion; the cessionary Government though Christian, was not Roman Catholic and
prided itself on its policy of non-interference in religious matters, and inveterately maintained a complete separation between
the ecclesiastical and civil powers.

In view of these circumstances it must be quite clear that, even without the express provisions of the Treaty of Paris, which
apparently expressly exclude such an idea, it did not befit the honor of either of the contracting parties to subrogate to the
American Government in lieu of the Spanish Government anything respecting the disposition of the funds delivered by the
latter to the Monte de Piedad. The same reasons that induced the Spanish Government to take over such things would
result in great inconvenience to the American Government in attempting to do so. The question was such a delicate one, for
the reason that it affected the conscience, deeply religious, of the King of Spain, that it cannot be believed that it was ever
his intention to confide the exercise thereof to a Government like the American. (U. S. vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet. [U. S.], 711.)

It is thus seen that the American Government did not subrogate the Spanish Government or rather, the King of Spain, in this
regard; and as the condition annexed to the donation was lawful and possible of fulfillment at the time the contract was
made, but became impossible of fulfillment by the cession made by the Spanish Government in these Islands, compliance
therewith is excused and the contract has been cleared thereof.

The contention of counsel, as thus stated, in untenable for two reason, (1) because such contention is based upon the
erroneous theory that the sum in question was a donation to the Monte de Piedad and not a loan, and (2) because the charity
founded by the donations for the earthquake sufferers is not and never was intended to be an ecclesiastical pious work. The first
proposition has already been decided adversely to the defendant's contention. As to the second, the record shows clearly that
the fund was given by the donors for a specific and definite purpose — the relief of the earthquake sufferers — and for no other
purpose. The money was turned over to the Spanish Government to be devoted to that purpose. The Spanish Government
remitted the money to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the suffers. All officials, including the King of Spain
and the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, who took part in the disposal of the fund, acted in their purely civil, official
capacity, and the fact that they might have belonged to a certain church had nothing to do with their acts in this matter. The
church, as such, had nothing to do with the fund in any way whatever until the $80,000 reached the coffers of the Monte de
Piedad (an institution under the control of the church) as a loan or deposit. If the charity in question had been founded as an
ecclesiastical pious work, the King of Spain and the Governor-General, in their capacities as vicar-general of the Indies and as
royal vice-patron, respectively, would have disposed of the fund as such and not in their civil capacities, and such functions
could not have been transferred to the present Philippine Government, because the right to so act would have arisen out of the
special agreement between the Government of Spain and the Holy See, based on the union of the church and state which was
completely separated with the change of sovereignty.
And in their supplemental brief counsel say:

By the conceded facts the money in question is part of a charitable subscription. The donors were persons in Spain, the
trustee was the Spanish Government, the donees, the cestuis que trustent, were certain persons in the Philippine Islands.
The whole matter is one of trusteeship. This is undisputed and indisputable. It follows that the Spanish Government at no
time was the owner of the fund. Not being the owner of the fund it could not transfer the ownership. Whether or not it could
transfer its trusteeship it certainly never has expressly done so and the general terms of property transfer in the Treaty of
Paris are wholly insufficient for such a purpose even could Spain have transferred its trusteeship without the consent of the
donors and even could the United States, as a Government, have accepted such a trust under any power granted to it by
the thirteen original States in the Constitution, which is more than doubtful. It follows further that this Government is not a
proper party to the action. The only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful,
are the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither.

If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship," and it being true that the Spanish Government could not, as counsel say, transfer the
ownership of the fund to the Monte de Piedad, the question arises, who may sue to recover this loan? It needs no argument to
show that the Spanish or Philippine Government, as trustee, could maintain an action for this purpose had there been no change
of sovereignty and if the right of action has not prescribed. But those governments were something more than mere common law
trustees of the fund. In order to determine their exact status with reference to this fund, it is necessary to examine the law in
force at the time there transactions took place, which are the law of June 20, 1894, the royal decree of April 27. 1875, and the
instructions promulgated on the latter date. These legal provisions were applicable to the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la
Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34)

The funds collected as a result of the national subscription opened in Spain by royal order of the Spanish Government and
which were remitted to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the earthquake sufferers by the Central Relief Board
constituted, under article 1 of the law of June 20, 1894, and article 2 of the instructions of April 27, 1875, a special charity of a
temporary nature as distinguished from a permanent public charitable institution. As the Spanish Government initiated the
creation of the fund and as the donors turned their contributions over to that Government, it became the duty of the latter, under
article 7 of the instructions, to exercise supervision and control over the moneys thus collected to the end that the will of the
donors should be carried out. The relief board had no power whatever to dispose of the funds confided to its charge for other
purposes than to distribute them among the sufferers, because paragraph 3 of article 11 of the instructions conferred the power
upon the secretary of the interior of Spain, and no other, to dispose of the surplus funds, should there be any, by assigning them
to some other charitable purpose or institution. The secretary could not dispose of any of the funds in this manner so long as
they were necessary for the specific purpose for which they were contributed. The secretary had the power, under the law above
mentioned to appoint and totally or partially change the personnel of the relief board and to authorize the board to defend the
rights of the charity in the courts. The authority of the board consisted only in carrying out the will of the donors as directed by
the Government whose duty it was to watch over the acts of the board and to see that the funds were applied to the purposes for
which they were contributed .The secretary of the interior, as the representative of His Majesty's Government, exercised these
powers and duties through the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The Governments of Spain and of the Philippine
Islands in complying with their duties conferred upon them by law, acted in their governmental capacities in attempting to carry
out the intention of the contributors. It will this be seen that those governments were something more, as we have said, than
mere trustees of the fund.

It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even
considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty, or inn other words, the present Philippine Government cannot
maintain this action for that reason. This contention, if true, "must result from settled principles of rigid law," as it cannot rest
upon any title to the fund in the Monte de Piedad acquired prior to such change. While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the
Spanish Government was still pending, war between the United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898, the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to the United States, the latter agreeing to pay
Spain the sum of $20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article, Spain relinquished to the United States "all
buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law,
belonged to the public domain, and as such belonged to the crown of Spain." As the $80,000 were not included therein, it is said
that the right to recover this amount did not, therefore, pass to the present sovereign. This, in our opinion, does not follow as a
necessary consequence, as the right to recover does not rest upon the proposition that the $80,000 must be "other immovable
property" mentioned in article 8 of the treaty, but upon contractual obligations incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded
to the United States. We will not inquire what effect his cession had upon the law of June 20, 1849, the royal decree of April 27,
1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date. In Vilas vs.Manila (220 U. S., 345), the court said:

That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws
theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign,
lose their force, is also plain. (Alvarez y Sanchez vs. United States, 216 U. S., 167.) But it is equally settled in the same
public law that the great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated
or changed by the new ruler.
If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of the new
sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if they
are among "that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and are still in
force unless they have been repealed by the present Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear from their very
nature and character. They are laws which are not political in any sense of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish
Government the right and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and charitable institutions. The
present sovereign, in exempting "provident institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of charitable
institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the investment in securities are concerned, under the general
supervision of the Insular Treasurer (paragraph 4 of section 111 of Act No. 1189; see also Act No. 701).

Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of he crown of Spain devolved upon he United States.
In Magill vs. Brown (16 Fed. Cas., 408), quoted with approval in Mormon Charch vs. United States (136 U. S.,1, 57), the court
said:

The Revolution devolved on the State all the transcendent power of Parliament, and the prerogative of the crown, and gave
their Acts the same force and effect.

In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 Hw., 369, 384), Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the court in a charity case, said:

When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States. And
this power still remains with them except so fact as they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal Government. The
sovereign will is made known to us by legislative enactment. The State as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.

Chancelor Kent says:

In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public
nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.
(4 Kent Com., 508, note.)

The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United States, supra, after approving also the last quotations,
said:

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal
person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible
monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficient
functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who
cannot protect themselves.

The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3 Cush., 483, 497), wherein the latter court
held that it is deemed indispensible that there should be a power in the legislature to authorize the same of the estates of in
facts, idiots, insane persons, and persons not known, or not in being, who cannot act for themselves, said:

These remarks in reference to in facts, insane persons and person not known, or not in being, apply to the beneficiaries of
charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting
as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased t exist under the change of government from a
monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever
required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other
cases whatever.

In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest; that the Attorney-
General had no power to institute the action; and that there must be an allegation and proof of a distinct right of the people as a
whole, as distinguished from the rights of individuals, before an action could be brought by the Attorney-General in the name of
the people. The court, in overruling these contentions, held that it was not only the right but the duty of the Attorney-General to
prosecute the action, which related to charities, and approved the following quotation from Attorney-General vs. Compton (1
Younge & C. C., 417):

Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the hands of those who hold it devoted to that trust, it is the
privilege of the public that the crown should be entitled to intervene by its officers for the purpose of asserting, on behalf on
the public generally, the public interest and the public right, which, probably, no individual could be found effectually to
assert, even if the interest were such as to allow it. (2 Knet's Commentaries, 10th ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec. 732.)
It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it
was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. Consequently, the plaintiff is not the
proper party to bring the action." The earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a great number of small
contributions. The names of the contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted with the
title to their respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting of the original sufferers and their heirs, could have been
ascertained. They are quite numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers have died, leaving various
heirs. It would be impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000.
The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the
object for which it was originally destined.

The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground upon which the right of the Government to
maintain the action rests. The true ground is that the money being given to a charity became, in a measure, public property, only
applicable, it is true, to the specific purposes to which it was intended to be devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the
public use, and became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government.
(Mormon Church vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public
policy, as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity and Christian benevolence in like instances in
the future.

As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error relating to the constitutionality of Act No. 2109, little need be said for
the reason that we have just held that the present Philippine Government is the proper party to the action. The Act is only a
manifestation on the part of the Philippine Government to exercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. The Act is not,
as contended by counsel, in conflict with the fifth section of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, because it does not take
property without due process of law. In fact, the defendant is not the owner of the $80,000, but holds it as a loan subject to the
disposal of the central relief board. Therefor, there can be nothing in the Act which transcends the power of the Philippine
Legislature.

In Vilas vs. Manila, supra, the plaintiff was a creditor of the city of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands
to the United States by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. The action was brought upon the theory that the city, under its
present charter from the Government of the Philippine Islands, was the same juristic person, and liable upon the obligations of
the old city. This court held that the present municipality is a totally different corporate entity and in no way liable for the debts of
the Spanish municipality. The Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing this judgment and in holding the city liable for the
old debt, said:

The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise affected, and, in law, the present city is, in every legal sense, the
successor of the old. As such it is entitled to the property and property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law,
subject to all of its liabilities.

In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue that as the Monte de Piedad declined to return the
$80,000 when ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the
time this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912, citing and relying upon article 1961, 1964 and 1969 of the Civil Code. While on the
other hand, the Attorney-General contends that the right of action had not prescribed (a) because the defense of prescription
cannot be set up against the Philippine Government, (b) because the right of action to recover a deposit or trust funds does not
prescribe, and (c) even if the defense of prescription could be interposed against the Government and if the action had, in fact,
prescribed, the same was revived by Act No. 2109.

The material facts relating to this question are these: The Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 in 1883 "to be held under the
same conditions as at present in the treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the relief board." In compliance with the provisions of the
royal order of December 3, 1892, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedadin June, 1893, to return the
$80,000. The Monte declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands
and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement. The amount was carried on the books of the Monte
as a returnable loan until January 1, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra." On March 31, 1902,
the Monte, through its legal representative, stated in writing that the amount in question was received as a reimbursable loan,
without interest. Act No. 2109 became effective January 30, 1912, and the action was instituted on May 3rd of that year.

Counsel for the defendant treat the question of prescription as if the action was one between individuals or corporations wherein
the plaintiff is seeking to recover an ordinary loan. Upon this theory June, 1893, cannot be taken as the date when the statute of
limitations began to run, for the reason that the defendant acknowledged in writing on March 31, 1902, that the $80,000 were
received as a loan, thereby in effect admitting that it still owed the amount. (Section 50, Code of Civil Procedure.) But if counsels'
theory is the correct one the action may have prescribed on May 3, 1912, because more than ten full years had elapsed after
March 31, 1902. (Sections 38 and 43, Code of Civil Procedure.)

Is the Philippine Government bound by the statute of limitations? The Supreme Court of the United States in U. S. vs. Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. (118 U. S., 120, 125), said:
 It is settled beyond doubt or controversy — upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy, applicable to all
governments alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to
whose care they are confided — that the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign government, is not
bound by any statute of limitations, unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that it should be so bound.
(Lindsey vs. Miller, 6 Pet. 666; U. S. vs. Knight, 14 Pet., 301; Gibson vs. Chouteau, 13 Wall., 92; U. S. vs. Thompson, 98 U.
S., 486; Fink vs. O'Neil, 106 U. S., 272, 281.)

In Gibson vs. Choteau, supra, the court said:

It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do not run against the State. That no laches can be imputed to
the King, and that no time can bar his rights, was the maxim of the common laws, and was founded on the principle of public
policy, that as he was occupied with the cares of government he ought not to suffer from the negligence of his officer and
servants. The principle is applicable to all governments, which must necessarily act through numerous agents, and is
essential to a preservation of the interests and property of the public. It is upon this principle that in this country the statutes
of a State prescribing periods within which rights must be prosecuted are not held to embrace the State itself, unless it is
expressly designated or the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a nature that it must necessarily be included. As
legislation of a State can only apply to persons and thing over which the State has jurisdiction, the United States are also
necessarily excluded from the operation of such statutes.

In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is stated as follows:

In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, statute of limitations do not as a general rule run against the
sovereign or government, whether state or federal. But the rule is otherwise where the mischiefs to be remedied are of such
a nature that the state must necessarily be included, where the state goes into business in concert or in competition with her
citizens, or where a party seeks to enforces his private rights by suit in the name of the state or government, so that the
latter is only a nominal party.

In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is
exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands
were ceded to the United States. The United States having in 1852, purchased as trustee for the Chickasaw Indians under treaty
with that tribe, certain bonds of the State of Tennessee, the right of action of the Government on the coupons of such bonds
could not be barred by the statute of limitations of Tennessee, either while it held them in trust for the Indians, or since it became
the owner of such coupons. (U. S. vs. Nashville, etc., R. Co., supra.) So where lands are held in trust by the state and the
beneficiaries have no right to sue, a statute does not run against the State's right of action for trespass on the trust lands.
(Greene Tp. vs. Campbell, 16 Ohio St., 11; see also Atty.-Gen. vs. Midland R. Co., 3 Ont., 511 [following Reg. vs. Williams, 39
U. C. Q. B., 397].)

These principles being based "upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy" are, in the very nature of things,
applicable to the Philippine Government.

Counsel in their argument in support of the sixth and last assignments of error do not question the amount of the judgment nor
do they question the correctness of the judgment in so far as it allows interest, and directs its payment in gold coin or in the
equivalent in Philippine currency.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009

ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA
CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M.
SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 165636 April 29, 2009

ELISEO F. SORIANO Petitioner,

vs.
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, ZOSIMO G. ALEGRE, JACKIE AQUINO-GAVINO,
NOEL R. DEL PRADO, EMMANUEL BORLAZA, JOSE E. ROMERO IV, and FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in their capacity as
members of the Hearing and Adjudication Committee of the MTRCB, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ,
MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL,
and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, in their capacity as complainants before the MTRCB Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano seeks to nullify and set aside an
order and a decision of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection with certain
utterances he made in his television show, Ang Dating Daan.

Facts of the Case

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the
following remarks:

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;

Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba,
[dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang
babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.1 x x x

Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and
seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), 2 against petitioner in connection with the above
broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a
regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.3 Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16,
2004 in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan. 4

After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively suspended
the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986,
creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and
Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.5 The same order also set the case for preliminary investigation.

The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that Chairperson Consoliza P.
Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the case. 6 Two days after,
however, petitioner sought to withdraw7 his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court of a petition for
certiorari and prohibition,8 docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive suspension order thus issued.
On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances
and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program, "Ang Dating Daan".

Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are hereby exonerated for lack of
evidence.

SO ORDERED.9

Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as G.R. No. 165636.

In a Resolution dated April 4, 2005, the Court consolidated G.R. No. 164785 with G.R. No. 165636.

In G.R. No. 164785, petitioner raises the following issues:

THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT [MTRCB] DATED 16 AUGUST 2004
AGAINST THE TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN x x x IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ISSUED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

(A) BY REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT PROVIDES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION ORDERS;
(B) BY REASON OF LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE AT BENCH;
(C) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW;
(D) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION; AND
(E) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION.10

In G.R. No. 165636, petitioner relies on the following grounds:

SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ENACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION x x x CONSIDERING THAT:

SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION, SPEECH, AND EXPRESSION AS IT PARTAKES OF THE NATURE OF A
SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT CURTAILING THE SAME; CONSEQUENTLY, THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS, RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E. DECISION
DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS
APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH;

II

SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW; CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR],
RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E., DECISION DATED 27
SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN
THE CASE AT BENCH; AND

III

[PD] 1986 IS NOT COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A SUFFICIENT STANDARD FOR ITS
IMPLEMENTATION THEREBY RESULTING IN AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY REASON THAT IT
DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF ITS PROVISIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR],
RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E. DECISION DATED 27
SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN
THE CASE AT BENCH11
G.R. No. 164785

We shall first dispose of the issues in G.R. No. 164785, regarding the assailed order of preventive suspension, although its
implementability had already been overtaken and veritably been rendered moot by the equally assailed September 27, 2004
decision.

It is petitioner’s threshold posture that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR provision
authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.

Petitioner’s contention is untenable.

Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or
quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. 12 They have in fine only such powers or
authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law.13 And in determining whether an agency has certain
powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally
construed.14

A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly,
to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the
exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision.

Sec. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following:

Section 3. Powers and Functions.—The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties:

xxxx

c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the x x x production, x x x exhibition and/or
television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph,
which, in the judgment of the board applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being
immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people,
or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of wrong or crime such as but not limited to:

xxxx

vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person, whether living or dead;

xxxx

(d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x production, copying, distribution, sale, lease,
exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such
pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof
shall be x x x produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or broadcast by television;

xxxx

k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of
this Act x x x. (Emphasis added.)

The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB’s authority and functions expressly set
forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to "supervise, regulate,
and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs
and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be
objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television."

Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCB’s express regulatory and supervisory statutory
mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other construal would
render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation.15 And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative
complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint. 16

To reiterate, preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers conferred under PD 1986. The MTRCB did
not, as petitioner insinuates, empower itself to impose preventive suspension through the medium of the IRR of PD 1986. It is
true that the matter of imposing preventive suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD 1986. Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR
provides:

Sec. 3. PREVENTION SUSPENSION ORDER.––Any time during the pendency of the case, and in order to prevent or stop
further violations or for the interest and welfare of the public, the Chairman of the Board may issue a Preventive Suspension
Order mandating the preventive x x x suspension of the permit/permits involved, and/or closure of the x x x television network,
cable TV station x x x provided that the temporary/preventive order thus issued shall have a life of not more than twenty (20)
days from the date of issuance.

But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not work to deprive the MTRCB
a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate
and supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials and to
impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it investigates. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion,
the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by
imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive suspension was
actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCB’s duty of regulating or supervising television
programs, pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter
XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.

Sec. 3(c) and (d) of PD 1986 finds application to the present case, sufficient to authorize the MTRCB’s assailed action.
Petitioner’s restrictive reading of PD 1986, limiting the MTRCB to functions within the literal confines of the law, would give the
agency little leeway to operate, stifling and rendering it inutile, when Sec. 3(k) of PD 1986 clearly intends to grant the MTRCB a
wide room for flexibility in its operation. Sec. 3(k), we reiterate, provides, "To exercise such powers and functions as may be
necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x x." Indeed, the power to impose
preventive suspension is one of the implied powers of MTRCB. As distinguished from express powers, implied powers are those
that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings or conferred by necessary or fair implication of the enabling act.17 As we held
in Angara v. Electoral Commission, when a general grant of power is conferred or a duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred by necessary implication. 18 Clearly, the power
to impose preventive suspension pending investigation is one of the implied or inherent powers of MTRCB.

We cannot agree with petitioner’s assertion that the aforequoted IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable only to
motion pictures and publicity materials. The scope of the MTRCB’s authority extends beyond motion pictures. What the acronym
MTRCB stands for would suggest as much. And while the law makes specific reference to the closure of a television network,
the suspension of a television program is a far less punitive measure that can be undertaken, with the purpose of stopping
further violations of PD 1986. Again, the MTRCB would regretfully be rendered ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions
petitioner envisages.

Just as untenable is petitioner’s argument on the nullity of the preventive suspension order on the ground of lack of hearing. As it
were, the MTRCB handed out the assailed order after petitioner, in response to a written notice, appeared before that Board for
a hearing on private respondents’ complaint. No less than petitioner admitted that the order was issued after the adjournment of
the hearing,19 proving that he had already appeared before the MTRCB. Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986,
preventive suspension shall issue "[a]ny time during the pendency of the case." In this particular case, it was done after MTRCB
duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 1986 20 and of administrative complaints that had been filed against
him for such violation.21

At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a hearing.22

Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his right to the equal protection of the law, arguing that, owing to the
preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers.

Petitioner’s position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that "all persons subject to legislation should be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed." 23 It guards against
undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination. 24 Surely, petitioner cannot, under the premises, place
himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For
another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use language similar to that which he used in his own,
necessitating the MTRCB’s disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner
remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation of the equal protection
guarantee. The Court need not belabor the fact that the circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang Dating Daan, on one hand,
and the INC ministers, as hosts of Ang Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the purview of this case, simply too different to
even consider whether or not there is a prima facie indication of oppressive inequality.

Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom, submitting that what he uttered was religious speech, adding that words
like "putang babae" were said in exercise of his religious freedom.

The argument has no merit.

The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioner’s utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of the
1987 Constitution on religious freedom. The section reads as follows:

No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering
his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not
automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be
elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioner’s attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by
anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers
distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in
retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion,
as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply
illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to
contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.

Petitioner, as a final point in G.R. No. 164785, would have the Court nullify the 20-day preventive suspension order, being, as
insisted, an unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of speech and expression and an impermissible prior restraint. The
main issue tendered respecting the adverted violation and the arguments holding such issue dovetails with those challenging the
three-month suspension imposed under the assailed September 27, 2004 MTRCB decision subject of review under G.R. No.
165636. Both overlapping issues and arguments shall be jointly addressed.

G.R. No. 165636

Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision suspending him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for three months on the main
ground that the decision violates, apart from his religious freedom, his freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under
Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution, which reads:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievance.

He would also have the Court declare PD 1986, its Sec. 3(c) in particular, unconstitutional for reasons articulated in this petition.

We are not persuaded as shall be explained shortly. But first, we restate certain general concepts and principles underlying the
freedom of speech and expression.

It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio, television, and motion pictures come within the broad protection of
the free speech and expression clause.25 Each method though, because of its dissimilar presence in the lives of people and
accessibility to children, tends to present its own problems in the area of free speech protection, with broadcast media, of all
forms of communication, enjoying a lesser degree of protection.26 Just as settled is the rule that restrictions, be it in the form of
prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against publication or threat of cancellation of license/franchise, or subsequent liability,
whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of
expression. Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination.27 The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is, however,
not absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important public interests, some forms of speech not being protected.
As has been held, the limits of the freedom of expression are reached when the expression touches upon matters of essentially
private concern.28 In the oft-quoted expression of Justice Holmes, the constitutional guarantee "obviously was not intended to
give immunity for every possible use of language."29 From Lucas v. Royo comes this line: "[T]he freedom to express one’s
sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be
expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others."30
Indeed, as noted in Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire,31 "there are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech that are harmful, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problems."
In net effect, some forms of speech are not protected by the Constitution, meaning that restrictions on unprotected speech may
be decreed without running afoul of the freedom of speech clause. 32 A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the
utterances involved are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step of truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."33 Being of little or
no value, there is, in dealing with or regulating them, no imperative call for the application of the clear and present danger rule or
the balancing-of-interest test, they being essentially modes of weighing competing values, 34 or, with like effect, determining
which of the clashing interests should be advanced.

Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech.

The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to
libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or "fighting words", i.e., those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security.

The Court finds that petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child. Hence, it is, in
that context, unprotected speech. In Fernando v. Court of Appeals, the Court expressed difficulty in formulating a definition of
obscenity that would apply to all cases, but nonetheless stated the ensuing observations on the matter:

There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which established basic guidelines, to
wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what
is "patently offensive." x x x What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be
treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion. 35

Following the contextual lessons of the cited case of Miller v. California, 36 a patently offensive utterance would come within the
pale of the term obscenity should it appeal to the prurient interest of an average listener applying contemporary standards.

A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the case reveal that to an average adult, the
utterances "Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa putang babae x x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung
ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!" may not constitute obscene but merely indecent utterances. They
can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words. In the context they were used, they may not appeal to the
prurient interests of an adult. The problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV program that is rated
"G" or for general viewership, and in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children.

While adults may have understood that the terms thus used were not to be taken literally, children could hardly be expected to
have the same discernment. Without parental guidance, the unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner in a television
broadcast could corrupt impressionable young minds. The term "putang babae" means "a female prostitute," a term wholly
inappropriate for children, who could look it up in a dictionary and just get the literal meaning, missing the context within which it
was used. Petitioner further used the terms, "ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba," making reference to the female sexual
organ and how a female prostitute uses it in her trade, then stating that Sandoval was worse than that by using his mouth in a
similar manner. Children could be motivated by curiosity and ask the meaning of what petitioner said, also without placing the
phrase in context. They may be inquisitive as to why Sandoval is different from a female prostitute and the reasons for the
dissimilarity. And upon learning the meanings of the words used, young minds, without the guidance of an adult, may, from their
end, view this kind of indecent speech as obscene, if they take these words literally and use them in their own speech or form
their own ideas on the matter. In this particular case, where children had the opportunity to hear petitioner’s words, when
speaking of the average person in the test for obscenity, we are speaking of the average child, not the average adult. The
average child may not have the adult’s grasp of figures of speech, and may lack the understanding that language may be
colorful, and words may convey more than the literal meaning. Undeniably the subject speech is very suggestive of a female
sexual organ and its function as such. In this sense, we find petitioner’s utterances obscene and not entitled to protection under
the umbrella of freedom of speech.

Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not obscene but merely indecent speech, still the Court rules that petitioner
cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to
children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.

No doubt what petitioner said constitutes indecent or offensive utterances. But while a jurisprudential pattern involving certain
offensive utterances conveyed in different mediums has emerged, this case is veritably one of first impression, it being the first
time that indecent speech communicated via television and the applicable norm for its regulation are, in this jurisdiction, made
the focal point. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica Foundation,37 a 1978 American landmark case cited
in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, Jr.38 and Chavez v. Gonzales,39 is a rich source of persuasive lessons. Foremost
of these relates to indecent speech without prurient appeal component coming under the category of protected speech
depending on the context within which it was made, irresistibly suggesting that, within a particular context, such indecent speech
may validly be categorized as unprotected, ergo, susceptible to restriction.

In FCC, seven of what were considered "filthy" words40 earlier recorded in a monologue by a satiric humorist later aired in the
afternoon over a radio station owned by Pacifica Foundation. Upon the complaint of a man who heard the pre-recorded
monologue while driving with his son, FCC declared the language used as "patently offensive" and "indecent" under a
prohibiting law, though not necessarily obscene. FCC added, however, that its declaratory order was issued in a "special factual
context," referring, in gist, to an afternoon radio broadcast when children were undoubtedly in the audience. Acting on the
question of whether the FCC could regulate the subject utterance, the US Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, owing to two
special features of the broadcast medium, to wit: (1) radio is a pervasive medium and (2) broadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children. The US Court, however, hastened to add that the monologue would be protected speech in other contexts, albeit it did
not expound and identify a compelling state interest in putting FCC’s content-based regulatory action under scrutiny.

The Court in Chavez41 elucidated on the distinction between regulation or restriction of protected speech that is content-based
and that which is content-neutral. A content-based restraint is aimed at the contents or idea of the expression, whereas a
content-neutral restraint intends to regulate the time, place, and manner of the expression under well-defined standards tailored
to serve a compelling state interest, without restraint on the message of the expression. Courts subject content-based restraint
to strict scrutiny.

With the view we take of the case, the suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one perspective, permissible
restriction. We make this disposition against the backdrop of the following interplaying factors: First, the indecent speech was
made via television, a pervasive medium that, to borrow from Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, 42easily "reaches every home where
there is a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown"; second, the broadcast
was aired at the time of the day when there was a reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner
uttered his speech on a "G" or "for general patronage" rated program. Under Sec. 2(A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a
show for general patronage is "[s]uitable for all ages," meaning that the "material for television x x x in the judgment of the
BOARD, does not contain anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or
supervision." The words petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language is
categorized as indecent, as in petitioner’s utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as
unprotected speech.

A view has been advanced that unprotected speech refers only to pornography,43 false or misleading advertisement,44 advocacy
of imminent lawless action, and expression endangering national security. But this list is not, as some members of the Court
would submit, exclusive or carved in stone. Without going into specifics, it may be stated without fear of contradiction that US
decisional law goes beyond the aforesaid general exceptions. As the Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions to the
rule against censorship in the past, this particular case constitutes yet another exception, another instance of unprotected
speech, created by the necessity of protecting the welfare of our children. As unprotected speech, petitioner’s utterances can be
subjected to restraint or regulation.

Despite the settled ruling in FCC which has remained undisturbed since 1978, petitioner asserts that his utterances must
present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil the State has a right and duty to prevent and such
danger must be grave and imminent.45

Petitioner’s invocation of the clear and present danger doctrine, arguably the most permissive of speech tests, would not avail
him any relief, for the application of said test is uncalled for under the premises. The doctrine, first formulated by Justice Holmes,
accords protection for utterances so that the printed or spoken words may not be subject to prior restraint or subsequent
punishment unless its expression creates a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantial evil which the government
has the power to prohibit.46 Under the doctrine, freedom of speech and of press is susceptible of restriction when and only when
necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the government may lawfully protect. As it were, said
doctrine evolved in the context of prosecutions for rebellion and other crimes involving the overthrow of government. 47 It was
originally designed to determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action, or to have
serious and substantial deleterious consequences on the security and public order of the community.48 The clear and present
danger rule has been applied to this jurisdiction.49 As a standard of limitation on free speech and press, however, the clear and
present danger test is not a magic incantation that wipes out all problems and does away with analysis and judgment in the
testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which compels a court to release a defendant from liability the moment the
doctrine is invoked, absent proof of imminent catastrophic disaster. 50 As we observed in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, the
clear and present danger test "does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in
all forums."51

To be sure, the clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has been applied by the courts. Generally, said
doctrine is applied to cases involving the overthrow of the government and even other evils which do not clearly undermine
national security. Since not all evils can be measured in terms of "proximity and degree" the Court, however, in several cases—
Ayer Productions v. Capulong52 and Gonzales v. COMELEC,53 applied the balancing of interests test. Former Chief Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro, in Gonzales v. COMELEC, elucidated in his Separate Opinion that "where the legislation under constitutional attack
interferes with the freedom of speech and assembly in a more generalized way and where the effect of the speech and
assembly in terms of the probability of realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of impressionistic
calculation,"54 then the "balancing of interests" test can be applied.

The Court explained also in Gonzales v. COMELEC the "balancing of interests" test:

When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial
abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection
under the particular circumstances presented. x x x We must, therefore, undertake the "delicate and difficult task x x x to weigh
the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment
of rights x x x.

In enunciating standard premised on a judicial balancing of the conflicting social values and individual interests competing for
ascendancy in legislation which restricts expression, the court in Douds laid the basis for what has been called the "balancing-of-
interests" test which has found application in more recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Briefly stated, the "balancing"
test requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or
type of situation.

xxxx

Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by Congressional power restricting the individual’s freedom,
and the social importance and value of the freedom so restricted, "are to be judged in the concrete, not on the basis of
abstractions," a wide range of factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining the point or line of equilibrium. Among these are
(a) the social value and importance of the specific aspect of the particular freedom restricted by the legislation; (b) the specific
thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether the restriction is direct or indirect, whether or not the persons affected are few; (c) the value
and importance of the public interest sought to be secured by the legislation––the reference here is to the nature and gravity of
the evil which Congress seeks to prevent; (d) whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is reasonably appropriate
and necessary for the protection of such public interest; and (e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest
involved may be achieved by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.55

This balancing of interest test, to borrow from Professor Kauper, 56 rests on the theory that it is the court’s function in a case
before it when it finds public interests served by legislation, on the one hand, and the free expression clause affected by it, on
the other, to balance one against the other and arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed. If, on balance, it
appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such nature that it outweighs the abridgment of freedom,
then the court will find the legislation valid. In short, the balance-of-interests theory rests on the basis that constitutional
freedoms are not absolute, not even those stated in the free speech and expression clause, and that they may be abridged to
some extent to serve appropriate and important interests.57 To the mind of the Court, the balancing of interest doctrine is the
more appropriate test to follow.

In the case at bar, petitioner used indecent and obscene language and a three (3)-month suspension was slapped on him for
breach of MTRCB rules. In this setting, the assertion by petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of speech is ranged against
the duty of the government to protect and promote the development and welfare of the youth.

After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the arguments raised by petitioner in support of his claim to free speech, the
Court rules that the government’s interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children adequately buttresses
the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on petitioner’s prayer to continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan during the
suspension period.

No doubt, one of the fundamental and most vital rights granted to citizens of a State is the freedom of speech or expression, for
without the enjoyment of such right, a free, stable, effective, and progressive democratic state would be difficult to attain.
Arrayed against the freedom of speech is the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social being which the
State is constitutionally tasked to promote and protect. Moreover, the State is also mandated to recognize and support the vital
role of the youth in nation building as laid down in Sec. 13, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.

The Constitution has, therefore, imposed the sacred obligation and responsibility on the State to provide protection to the youth
against illegal or improper activities which may prejudice their general well-being. The Article on youth, approved on second
reading by the Constitutional Commission, explained that the State shall "extend social protection to minors against all forms of
neglect, cruelty, exploitation, immorality, and practices which may foster racial, religious or other forms of discrimination."58
Indisputably, the State has a compelling interest in extending social protection to minors against all forms of neglect,
exploitation, and immorality which may pollute innocent minds. It has a compelling interest in helping parents, through regulatory
mechanisms, protect their children’s minds from exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting experiences. The
Constitution, no less, in fact enjoins the State, as earlier indicated, to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the field of nation-building.59 In the same
way, the State is mandated to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character.60

Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the
children. His statements could have exposed children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare
of children and the State’s mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, 61 constitute a substantial and compelling
government interest in regulating petitioner’s utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.

FCC explains the duty of the government to act as parens patriae to protect the children who, because of age or interest
capacity, are susceptible of being corrupted or prejudiced by offensive language, thus:

[B]roadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. Although Cohen’s written message, ["Fuck the
Draft"], might have been incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an
instant. Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the young without restricting the expression at its source.
Bookstores and motion picture theaters, for example, may be prohibited from making indecent material available to children. We
held in Ginsberg v. New York that the government’s interest in the "well-being of its youth" and in supporting "parents’ claim to
authority in their own household" justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression. The ease with which children may
obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of
indecent broadcasting.

Moreover, Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak likewise stressed the duty of the State to attend to the welfare of the young:

x x x It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so
because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set.
Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It
cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the
young.62

The compelling need to protect the young impels us to sustain the regulatory action MTRCB took in the narrow confines of the
case. To reiterate, FCC justified the restraint on the TV broadcast grounded on the following considerations: (1) the use of
television with its unique accessibility to children, as a medium of broadcast of a patently offensive speech; (2) the time of
broadcast; and (3) the "G" rating of the Ang Dating Daan program. And in agreeing with MTRCB, the court takes stock of and
cites with approval the following excerpts from FCC:

It is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our holding. This case does not involve a two-way radio
conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. We have not decided that an
occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanction. x x x The [FFC’s] decision rested entirely on a nuisance
rationale under which context is all important. The concept requires consideration of a host of variables. The time of day was
emphasized by the [FFC]. The content of the program in which the language is used will affect the composition of the audience x
x x. As Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote a ‘nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of
the barnyard.’ We simply hold that when the [FCC] finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power
does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene. (Citation omitted.)

There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question petitioner uttered on prime-time television are blatantly indecent if not
outright obscene. It is the kind of speech that PD 1986 proscribes necessitating the exercise by MTRCB of statutory disciplinary
powers. It is the kind of speech that the State has the inherent prerogative, nay duty, to regulate and prevent should such action
served and further compelling state interests. One who utters indecent, insulting, or offensive words on television when
unsuspecting children are in the audience is, in the graphic language of FCC, a "pig in the parlor." Public interest would be
served if the "pig" is reasonably restrained or even removed from the "parlor."

Ergo, petitioner’s offensive and indecent language can be subjected to prior restraint.

Petitioner theorizes that the three (3)-month suspension is either prior restraint or subsequent punishment that, however,
includes prior restraint, albeit indirectly.
After a review of the facts, the Court finds that what MTRCB imposed on petitioner is an administrative sanction or subsequent
punishment for his offensive and obscene language in Ang Dating Daan.

To clarify, statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed unconstitutional breaches of the
freedom of speech. The exceptions to prior restraint are movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access
to numerous people, including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech. PD 1986
was passed creating the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (now MTRCB) and which requires prior permit or
license before showing a motion picture or broadcasting a TV program. The Board can classify movies and television programs
and can cancel permits for exhibition of films or television broadcast.lavvphi1.net

The power of MTRCB to regulate and even impose some prior restraint on radio and television shows, even religious programs,
was upheld in Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals. Speaking through Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, the Court wrote:

We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public
broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even
the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State
when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e.,
serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. x x x

xxxx

While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that [PD 1986] is unconstitutional for Congress to grant an
administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its decision subject to review by our
courts. As far back as 1921, we upheld this setup in Sotto vs. Ruiz, viz:

"The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in order to avoid its abuse.
Persons possess no absolute right to put into the mail anything they please, regardless of its character."63

Bernas adds:

Under the decree a movie classification board is made the arbiter of what movies and television programs or parts of either are
fit for public consumption. It decides what movies are "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people," and what "tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition,"
or "tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government and/or duly constituted authorities," etc.
Moreover, its decisions are executory unless stopped by a court.64

Moreover, in MTRCB v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,65 it was held that the power of review and prior approval of MTRCB
extends to all television programs and is valid despite the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, all broadcast
networks are regulated by the MTRCB since they are required to get a permit before they air their television programs.
Consequently, their right to enjoy their freedom of speech is subject to that requirement. As lucidly explained by Justice Dante
O. Tinga, government regulations through the MTRCB became "a necessary evil" with the government taking the role of
assigning bandwidth to individual broadcasters. The stations explicitly agreed to this regulatory scheme; otherwise, chaos would
result in the television broadcast industry as competing broadcasters will interfere or co-opt each other’s signals. In this scheme,
station owners and broadcasters in effect waived their right to the full enjoyment of their right to freedom of speech in radio and
television programs and impliedly agreed that said right may be subject to prior restraint—denial of permit or subsequent
punishment, like suspension or cancellation of permit, among others.

The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of
Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB for such broadcast. Rather, the suspension is in the form of
permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for the offensive and obscene remarks he uttered on the evening
of August 10, 2004 in his television program, Ang Dating Daan. It is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its
charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. And the imposition is separate and distinct from the criminal action the
Board may take pursuant to Sec. 3(i) of PD 1986 and the remedies that may be availed of by the aggrieved private party under
the provisions on libel or tort, if applicable. As FCC teaches, the imposition of sanctions on broadcasters who indulge in profane
or indecent broadcasting does not constitute forbidden censorship. Lest it be overlooked, the sanction imposed is not per se for
petitioner’s exercise of his freedom of speech via television, but for the indecent contents of his utterances in a "G" rated TV
program.

More importantly, petitioner is deemed to have yielded his right to his full enjoyment of his freedom of speech to regulation under
PD 1986 and its IRR as television station owners, program producers, and hosts have impliedly accepted the power of MTRCB
to regulate the broadcast industry.
Neither can petitioner’s virtual inability to speak in his program during the period of suspension be plausibly treated as prior
restraint on future speech. For viewed in its proper perspective, the suspension is in the nature of an intermediate penalty for
uttering an unprotected form of speech. It is definitely a lesser punishment than the permissible cancellation of exhibition or
broadcast permit or license. In fine, the suspension meted was simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in the enforcement and
administration of the law which it is tasked to implement. Viewed in its proper context, the suspension sought to penalize past
speech made on prime-time "G" rated TV program; it does not bar future speech of petitioner in other television programs; it is a
permissible subsequent administrative sanction; it should not be confused with a prior restraint on speech. While not on all fours,
the Court, in MTRCB,66sustained the power of the MTRCB to penalize a broadcast company for exhibiting/airing a pre-taped TV
episode without Board authorization in violation of Sec. 7 of PD 1986.

Any simplistic suggestion, however, that the MTRCB would be crossing the limits of its authority were it to regulate and even
restrain the prime-time television broadcast of indecent or obscene speech in a "G" rated program is not acceptable. As made
clear in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, "the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than
the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media." The MTRCB, as a regulatory agency, must have the wherewithal to
enforce its mandate, which would not be effective if its punitive actions would be limited to mere fines. Television broadcasts
should be subject to some form of regulation, considering the ease with which they can be accessed, and violations of the
regulations must be met with appropriate and proportional disciplinary action. The suspension of a violating television program
would be a sufficient punishment and serve as a deterrent for those responsible. The prevention of the broadcast of petitioner’s
television program is justified, and does not constitute prohibited prior restraint. It behooves the Court to respond to the needs of
the changing times, and craft jurisprudence to reflect these times.

Petitioner, in questioning the three-month suspension, also tags as unconstitutional the very law creating the MTRCB, arguing
that PD 1986, as applied to him, infringes also upon his freedom of religion. The Court has earlier adequately explained why
petitioner’s undue reliance on the religious freedom cannot lend justification, let alone an exempting dimension to his licentious
utterances in his program. The Court sees no need to address anew the repetitive arguments on religious freedom. As earlier
discussed in the disposition of the petition in G.R. No. 164785, what was uttered was in no way a religious speech.
Parenthetically, petitioner’s attempt to characterize his speech as a legitimate defense of his religion fails miserably. He tries to
place his words in perspective, arguing evidently as an afterthought that this was his method of refuting the alleged distortion of
his statements by the INC hosts of Ang Tamang Daan. But on the night he uttered them in his television program, the word
simply came out as profane language, without any warning or guidance for undiscerning ears.

As to petitioner’s other argument about having been denied due process and equal protection of the law, suffice it to state that
we have at length debunked similar arguments in G.R. No. 164785. There is no need to further delve into the fact that petitioner
was afforded due process when he attended the hearing of the MTRCB, and that he was unable to demonstrate that he was
unjustly discriminated against in the MTRCB proceedings.

Finally, petitioner argues that there has been undue delegation of legislative power, as PD 1986 does not provide for the range
of imposable penalties that may be applied with respect to violations of the provisions of the law.

The argument is without merit.

In Edu v. Ericta, the Court discussed the matter of undue delegation of legislative power in the following wise:

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative
power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs
participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal
them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To
determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done,
who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make laws which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. The
Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the
above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.67
Based on the foregoing pronouncements and analyzing the law in question, petitioner’s protestation about undue delegation of
legislative power for the sole reason that PD 1986 does not provide for a range of penalties for violation of the law is untenable.
His thesis is that MTRCB, in promulgating the IRR of PD 1986, prescribing a schedule of penalties for violation of the provisions
of the decree, went beyond the terms of the law.

Petitioner’s posture is flawed by the erroneous assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that PD 1986 does not
prescribe the imposition of, or authorize the MTRCB to impose, penalties for violators of PD 1986. As earlier indicated, however,
the MTRCB, by express and direct conferment of power and functions, is charged with supervising and regulating, granting,
denying, or canceling permits for the exhibition and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs, and
publicity materials to the end that no such objectionable pictures, programs, and materials shall be exhibited and/or broadcast by
television. Complementing this provision is Sec. 3(k) of the decree authorizing the MTRCB "to exercise such powers and
functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purpose and objectives of [the law]." As earlier explained,
the investiture of supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary power would surely be a meaningless grant if it did not carry with it the
power to penalize the supervised or the regulated as may be proportionate to the offense committed, charged, and proved. As
the Court said in Chavez v. National Housing Authority:

x x x [W]hen a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also conferred. x x x [W]hen the statute does not specify the particular method to be followed
or used by a government agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by law, said agency has the authority to adopt any
reasonable method to carry out its function.68

Given the foregoing perspective, it stands to reason that the power of the MTRCB to regulate and supervise the exhibition of TV
programs carries with it or necessarily implies the authority to take effective punitive action for violation of the law sought to be
enforced. And would it not be logical too to say that the power to deny or cancel a permit for the exhibition of a TV program or
broadcast necessarily includes the lesser power to suspend?

The MTRCB promulgated the IRR of PD 1986 in accordance with Sec. 3(a) which, for reference, provides that agency with the
power "[to] promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation of this Act, and the
accomplishment of its purposes and objectives x x x." And Chapter XIII, Sec. 1 of the IRR providing:

Section 1. VIOLATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS.––Without prejudice to the immediate filing of the appropriate
criminal action and the immediate seizure of the pertinent articles pursuant to Section 13, any violation of PD 1986 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations governing motion pictures, television programs, and related promotional materials shall be
penalized with suspension or cancellation of permits and/or licenses issued by the Board and/or with the imposition of fines and
other administrative penalty/penalties. The Board recognizes the existing Table of Administrative Penalties attached without
prejudice to the power of the Board to amend it when the need arises. In the meantime the existing revised Table of
Administrative Penalties shall be enforced. (Emphasis added.)

This is, in the final analysis, no more than a measure to specifically implement the aforequoted provisions of Sec. 3(d) and (k).
Contrary to what petitioner implies, the IRR does not expand the mandate of the MTRCB under the law or partake of the nature
of an unauthorized administrative legislation. The MTRCB cannot shirk its responsibility to regulate the public airwaves and
employ such means as it can as a guardian of the public.

In Sec. 3(c), one can already find the permissible actions of the MTRCB, along with the standards to be applied to determine
whether there have been statutory breaches. The MTRCB may evaluate motion pictures, television programs, and publicity
materials "applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard," and, from there, determine whether these audio and
video materials "are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, [etc.] x x x" and apply the
sanctions it deems proper. The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular
statute.69 The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers
and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative powers.70 Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation"
calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of
the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law." 71 Allowing the MTRCB some
reasonable elbow-room in its operations and, in the exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions, according it ample latitude in
fixing, by way of an appropriate issuance, administrative penalties with due regard for the severity of the offense and attending
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, as the case may be, would be consistent with its mandate to effectively and efficiently
regulate the movie and television industry.

But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to review and impose sanctions for violations of PD 1986, its decision to
suspend petitioner must be modified, for nowhere in that issuance, particularly the power-defining Sec. 3 nor in the MTRCB
Schedule of Administrative Penalties effective January 1, 1999 is the Board empowered to suspend the program host or even to
prevent certain people from appearing in television programs. The MTRCB, to be sure, may prohibit the broadcast of such
television programs or cancel permits for exhibition, but it may not suspend television personalities, for such would be beyond its
jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation beyond what the law provides. Only persons, offenses, and
penalties clearly falling clearly within the letter and spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be within the decree’s penal or
disciplinary operation. And when it exists, the reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the person charged with violating
the statute and for whom the penalty is sought. Thus, the MTRCB’s decision in Administrative Case No. 01-04 dated September
27, 2004 and the subsequent order issued pursuant to said decision must be modified. The suspension should cover only the
television program on which petitioner appeared and uttered the offensive and obscene language, which sanction is what the
law and the facts obtaining call for.

In ending, what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted speech paradigm in which absolute permissiveness is the
norm. Petitioner’s flawed belief that he may simply utter gutter profanity on television without adverse consequences, under the
guise of free speech, does not lend itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. We repeat: freedoms of speech and expression are
not absolute freedoms. To say "any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows" is not to say that any act
that restrains or regulates speech or expression is per se invalid. This only recognizes the importance of freedoms of speech
and expression, and indicates the necessity to carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the MTRCB in Adm. Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION of limiting the suspension to the program Ang Dating Daan. As thus modified, the fallo of the MTRCB shall read
as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, imposing a penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS
SUSPENSION on the television program, Ang Dating Daan, subject of the instant petition.

Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz, and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are hereby exonerated for lack of
evidence.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO," represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA
CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian
Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in
the house of Dominique’s parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa,
Rizal.

On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.1 After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with
Dominique’s parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors
Hospital, Antipolo City.

Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar,
Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the child’s Certificate of Live Birth, 2 Affidavit to Use the Surname of the
Father3 (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father Domingo
Butch Aquino.4 Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his
yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled
"AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read:

AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I’M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005. 5 I
RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I
HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHER’S NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH
AQUINO AND MY MOTHER’S NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.

xxxx

AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL.
AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD
COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT’S
ALL.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By letter dated November 11, 2005,7 the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie’s
application for registration of the child’s name in this wise:

7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9255 ["An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father, Amending for the Purpose, Article 176 of Executive Order No.
209, otherwise Known as the ‘Family Code of the Philippines’"]) provides that:

Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father

7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed by the father, either at the back
of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.

7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten instrument, the child shall use the surname of the father,
provided the registration is supported by the following documents:

a. AUSF8
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the filing of the document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the paternity between the father and the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)

In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately
died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal
Form No. 102 – Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity – or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father).
(Underscoring supplied)

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint9 for injunction/registration of name against respondent before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged that,
inter alia, the denial of registration of the child’s name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father
under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,10 which provides:

Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation
has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in
a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half
of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in a "private handwritten
instrument" within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of law.

For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons, respondent was declared in default.

Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the circumstances of her common-law relationship with
Dominique and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he had acknowledged his yet unborn child.11 She
offered Dominique’s handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit "A") as her documentary evidence-in-chief.12 Dominique’s lone brother,
Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also testified, corroborating Jenie’s declarations. 13

By Decision14 of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause of action" as the Autobiography
was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the
Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines "private handwritten document" through
which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:

2.2 Private handwritten instrument – an instrument executed in the handwriting of the father and duly signed by him where
he expressly recognizes paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)

The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any
express recognition of paternity. 1avvphi 1

Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari raising this purely legal issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN
DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT"
WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES
THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHER’S SURNAME.15(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly require that the private handwritten
instrument containing the putative father’s admission of paternity must be signed by him. They add that the deceased’s
handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of
the Administrative Order that the admission/recognition must be "duly signed" by the father is void as it "unduly expanded" the
earlier-quoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code.16

Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Dominique’s handwritten Autobiography contains a "clear
and unmistakable" recognition of the child’s paternity.17

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that respondent’s position, as affirmed by the trial court, is in
consonance with the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the petition. It further submits that Dominique’s Autobiography
"merely acknowledged Jenie’s pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child she was carrying in her womb."18

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the
latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through
an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. 19

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument
acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction
with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.

xxxx

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly
implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such
requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.

In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography, though unsigned by him,
substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.

First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography,
unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.20 Third,
Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of
his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of
the child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that
"JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR
THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."

In Herrera v. Alba,21 the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant
part:

Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence

Establishing Filiation

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
 xxxx

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:

SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the
pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon
be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts,
engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a
case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary
recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of
the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered
acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling
the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a
written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as
authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominique’s Autobiography have been made and
written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein – that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were
living together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents’ house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa,
Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to
the child – they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique’s.

In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of
affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the
claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.

Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving questions affecting him.22 Article
3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.23(Underscoring
supplied)
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
children, especially of illegitimate children x x x."24 Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from
abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development."25

In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child’s best interests
to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the
surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his
Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of Births.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,

vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.1

Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.

P. A. Revilla for respondent Valdez Tan Keh.
Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf.

FERIA, J.:

This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands.

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on the ground that the
proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial
proceedings and judgements of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the
absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And the same respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this
Court, contends that the government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de
facto governments.

On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, and on the next day their Commander in Chief
proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by the Army." In said proclamation, it was also
provided that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive
and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in
their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."

A civil government or central administration organization under the name of "Philippine Executive Commission was organized by
Order No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and Jorge B.
Vargas, who was appointed Chairman thereof, was instructed to proceed to the immediate coordination of the existing central
administrative organs and judicial courts, based upon what had existed therefore, with approval of the said Commander in Chief,
who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.

The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central administrative organization, issued Executive Orders Nos. 1
and 4, dated January 30 and February 5, 1942, respectively, in which the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First
Instance, and the justices of the peace and municipal courts under the Commonwealth were continued with the same
jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions given to the said Chairman of the Executive Commission by the Commander in
Chief of Japanese Forces in the Philippines in the latter's Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942, concerning basic principles to be
observed by the Philippine Executive Commission in exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers. Section 1 of said
Order provided that "activities of the administration organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing
statutes, orders, ordinances and customs. . . ."

On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but no substantial change was effected thereby
in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the
laws they administered and enforced.

On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur issued a proclamation to the
People of the Philippines which declared:

1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the Government
of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;
 2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines
free of enemy occupation and control; and

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control.

On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27, 1945, General MacArthur, on behalf of the
Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the full powers and responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the
Commonwealth whose seat is here established as provided by law."

In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the principal questions to be resolved in the present case may be
reduced to the following:(1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces; (2)Whether the proclamation issued on October 23,
1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United States Army, in which he declared "that all laws,
regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and
without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has invalidated all judgements and judicial
acts and proceedings of the said courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said
proclamation, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and continued
during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time
the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.

We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts
and proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines were good and valid and remained good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
United States and Filipino forces.

1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be determined is whether or not the governments
established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those
governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino
forces.

There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government
that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and
maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament
and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and
occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases
of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war
with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the third is that established as an independent government by the
inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy
in revolt not concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto governments.

Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall., 1), said: "But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a
government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing
characteristics are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful
authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private
citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those
acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established over districts
differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be
administered, also, civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force. . . . One example of this sort of government is
found in the case of Castine, in Mine, reduced to British possession in the war of 1812 . . . U. S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A
like example is found in the case of Tampico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States . . .
Fleming vs. Page (9 Howard, 614). These were cases of temporary possessions of territory by lawfull and regular governments
at war with the country of which the territory so possessed was part."

The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the Hague Conventions of
1907, which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of said Section III provides
"the authority of the legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take steps in his
power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country."

According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty to
insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possesses all the powers of a de factogovernment, and he can
suspended the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined to
respect, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in the
country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and regulate social and commercial life of the country. On the other hand,
laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the
freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during
the military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a
country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. In practice, the
local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; and judges and other judicial officers are kept in their
posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the supervision of
the military or civil authorities appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. These principles and practice have the
sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject, and have been asserted by the Supreme Court and applied by the
President of the United States.

The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The right of one
belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and
flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for
authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the
rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from
the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts
— in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights,
continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He,
nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new
ones."

And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied territory, which were later embodied in the said
Hague Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the Secretary of War of May 19,1898, relating to the
occupation of the Philippines by United States forces, said in part: "Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and
supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory,
such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in
force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying
belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the
ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be
adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they
accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the
supervision of the American Commander in Chief." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of President, X, p. 209.)

As to "de facto" government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same case of
Thorington vs. Smith, supra, recognized the government set up by the Confederate States as a de factogovernment. In that
case, it was held that "the central government established for the insurgent States differed from the temporary governments at
Castine and Tampico in the circumstance that its authority did no originate in lawful acts of regular war; but it was not, on the
account, less actual or less supreme. And we think that it must be classed among the governments of which these are
examples. . . .

In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme Court of the United States, discussing the validity of the acts
of the Confederate States, said: "The same general form of government, the same general laws for the administration of justice
and protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and
afterwards. As far as the Acts of the States do not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just
rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be treated as valid and binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart
(17 Wall., 570; 21 Law. ed., 657): "The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do
away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police regulations maintained,
crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of
property regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the validity of judicial or
legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States touching these and kindered subjects, where they were not hostile in their purpose
or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the
Constitution'. The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other cases."

And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388, 400), held: "That what occured or was done in respect of
such matters under the authority of the laws of these local de facto governments should not be disregarded or held to be
invalid merely because those governments were organized in hostility to the Union established by the national Constitution; this,
because the existence of war between the United States and the Confederate States did not relieve those who are within the
insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor destroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil government or
the regular administration of the laws, and because transactions in the ordinary course of civil society as organized within the
enemy's territory although they may have indirectly or remotely promoted the ends of the de facto or unlawful government
organized to effect a dissolution of the Union, were without blame 'except when proved to have been entered into with
actual intent to further invasion or insurrection:'" and "That judicial and legislative acts in the respective states composing the so-
called Confederate States should be respected by the courts if they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to
the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution."

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on
January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of
occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not different from the government established by the
British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "The government established over an
enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the
conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government be
called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a
government imposed by the laws of war, and so far it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those
laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was
a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. In 1806,
when Napoleon occupied the greater part of Prussia, he retained the existing administration under the general direction of a
french official (Langfrey History of Napoleon, 1, IV, 25); and, in the same way, the Duke of Willington, on invading France,
authorized the local authorities to continue the exercise of their functions, apparently without appointing an English superior.
(Wellington Despatches, XI, 307.). The Germans, on the other hand, when they invaded France in 1870, appointed their own
officials, at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in every department of administration and of every rank. (Calvo, pars. 2186-93; Hall,
International Law, 7th ed., p. 505, note 2.)

The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any
other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the
Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of
its authority was the same — the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation
of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the
'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the people's will
nor the sanction of the Government of the United States." Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or
transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military
occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of
peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established doctrine in International Law, recognized in
Article 45 of the Hauge Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of the occupied territory to swear
allegiance to the hostile power), the belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty
over the territory controlled although the de jure government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise
its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs. Page,
9 Howard, 603; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived
by Japan to delude the Filipino people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of transferring or
turning over the rights of government into the hands of Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken belief that by doing so,
Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States and
other allied nations.

Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino who, taking advantage of the
withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the occupation thereof by the Japanese forces of invasion, had
organized an independent government under the name with the support and backing of Japan, such government would have
been considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or the Unite States. And
as such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that organized by the confederate states during the war of
secession and recognized as such by the by the Supreme Court of the United States in numerous cases, notably those of
Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs. Bruffy, and Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted; and similar to the short-lived government
established by the Filipino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de
facto government by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of McCleod vs. United States (299 U. S., 416).
According to the facts in the last-named case, the Spanish forces evacuated the Island of Cebu on December 25, 1898, having
first appointed a provisional government, and shortly afterwards, the Filipinos, formerly in insurrection against Spain, took
possession of the Islands and established a republic, governing the Islands until possession thereof was surrendered to the
United States on February 22, 1898. And the said Supreme Court held in that case that "such government was of the class of de
facto governments described in I Moore's International Law Digest, S 20, . . . 'called also by publicists a government de facto,
but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force . . '." That is to say, that the government
of a country in possession of belligerent forces in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state, rests upon the same
principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile army of an enemy at regular war with the legitimate power.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of
those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of
postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by
the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in
international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate
government of sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one
reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political
complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various
acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the
whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and the individuals the evil would
be scarcely less, — it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress should be ignored, and it would be
contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the
intrusive government ." (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have been
each an incident of the same war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror
and for the time substituted his own sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to the
Philippines and establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)

That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and remain
valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General
Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments
established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said proclamation to
abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.

2. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase "processes of any other government" as used in the above-
quoted proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944 — that is, whether it was the intention of the
Commander in Chief of the American Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts
established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.

The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to
administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental
agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated,
according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political
complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so
after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and
could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other government" in
said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The only reasonable
construction of the said phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes of court proceedings, for
according to a well-known rule of statutory construction, set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."

It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation, as an agent of his government, may not unlawfully
suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied territory, if and when the exigencies of the military occupation
demand such action. But even assuming that, under the law of nations, the legislative power of a commander in chief of military
forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military and before the
restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation
(although the exigencies of military reoccupation are evidently less than those of occupation), it is to be presumed that General
Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the United States,
constitutional commander in chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations
asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the
United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907, as above indicated. It is not to be presumed that General
Douglas MacArthur, who enjoined in the same proclamation of October 23, 1944, "upon the loyal citizens of the Philippines full
respect and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines," should not only reverse the international
policy and practice of his own government, but also disregard in the same breath the provisions of section 3, Article II, of our
Constitution, which provides that "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation."

Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public hardship would result, and great public interests would
be endangered and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled accrued or vested rights
nullified, sentences passed on criminals set aside, and criminals might easily become immune for evidence against them may
have already disappeared or be no longer available, especially now that almost all court records in the Philippines have been
destroyed by fire as a consequence of the war. And it is another well-established rule of statutory construction that where great
inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great
mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the
makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. (25 R. C. L., pp. 1025, 1027.)

The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular sovereign or his representatives who reoccupies a territory occupied
by an enemy, may set aside or annul all the judicial acts or proceedings of the tribunals which the belligerent occupant had the
right and duty to establish in order to insure public order and safety during military occupation, would be sufficient to paralyze the
social life of the country or occupied territory, for it would have to be expected that litigants would not willingly submit their
litigation to courts whose judgements or decisions may afterwards be annulled, and criminals would not be deterred from
committing crimes or offenses in the expectancy that they may escaped the penalty if judgments rendered against them may be
afterwards set aside.

That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgements and proceedings of the courts of justice during the Japanese
regime, is impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of law, issued by the President of the Philippines
on March 10, 1945, by virtue of the emergency legislative power vested in him by the Constitution and the laws of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Said Executive order abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided "that all case which have
heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court final decision." This provision
impliedly recognizes that the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese military occupation have not been
invalidated by the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, because the said Order does not say or refer to cases
which have been duly appealed to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases which had therefore, that is, up to
March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed cases
pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of
by the latter before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appealed cases
pending on March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance during the
Japanese regime.

The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International Law which say: "Moreover when it is said that an occupier's
acts are valid and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent conqueror, it must be remembered that no
crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should be reversed, any international wrong would be committed. What does
happen is that most matters are allowed to stand by the restored government, but the matter can hardly be put further than this."
(Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p. 245.) And from this quotion the respondent judge "draws the
conclusion that whether the acts of the occupant should be considered valid or not, is a question that is up to the restored
government to decide; that there is no rule of international law that denies to the restored government to decide; that there is no
rule of international law that denies to the restored government the right of exercise its discretion on the matter, imposing upon it
in its stead the obligation of recognizing and enforcing the acts of the overthrown government."

There is doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of the acts of the occupier, such as the laws,
regulations and processes other than judicial of the government established by the belligerent occupant. But in view of the fact
that the proclamation uses the words "processes of any other government" and not "judicial processes" prisely, it is not
necessary to determine whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had power to annul and set aside all judgments and
proceedings of the courts during the Japanese occupation. The question to be determined is whether or not it was his intention,
as representative of the President of the United States, to avoid or nullify them. If the proclamation had, expressly or by
necessary implication, declared null and void the judicial processes of any other government, it would be necessary for this court
to decide in the present case whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had authority to declare them null and void. But the
proclamation did not so provide, undoubtedly because the author thereof was fully aware of the limitations of his powers as
Commander in Chief of Military Forces of liberation or subsequent conqueror.

Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public of conscience, constitute or from the law of nations.
(Preamble of the Hague Conventions; Westlake, International Law, 2d ed., Part II, p. 61.) Article 43, section III, of the Hague
Regulations or Conventions which we have already quoted in discussing the first question, imposes upon the occupant the
obligation to establish courts; and Article 23 (h), section II, of the same Conventions, which prohibits the belligerent occupant "to
declare . . . suspended . . . in a Court of Law the rights and action of the nationals of the hostile party," forbids him to make any
declaration preventing the inhabitants from using their courts to assert or enforce their civil rights. (Decision of the Court of
Appeals of England in the case of Porter vs. Fruedenburg, L.R. [1915], 1 K.B., 857.) If a belligerent occupant is required to
establish courts of justice in the territory occupied, and forbidden to prevent the nationals thereof from asserting or enforcing
therein their civil rights, by necessary implication, the military commander of the forces of liberation or the restored government
is restrained from nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendered by said courts in their litigation during the period of
occupation. Otherwise, the purpose of these precepts of the Hague Conventions would be thwarted, for to declare them null and
void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts the right and action of the nationals of the territory during the military
occupation thereof by the enemy. It goes without saying that a law that enjoins a person to do something will not at the same
time empower another to undo the same. Although the question whether the President or commanding officer of the United
States Army has violated restraints imposed by the constitution and laws of his country is obviously of a domestic nature, yet, in
construing and applying limitations imposed on the executive authority, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Ochoa, vs. Hernandez (230 U.S., 139), has declared that they "arise from general rules of international law and from
fundamental principles known wherever the American flag flies."

In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U.S., 712), a special order issued by the officer in command of the forces of the United
States in South Carolina after the end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a decree rendered by a court of chancery in that state in
a case within its jurisdiction, was declared void, and not warranted by the acts approved respectively March 2, 1867 (14 Stat.,
428), and July 19 of the same year (15 id., 14), which defined the powers and duties of military officers in command of the
several states then lately in rebellion. In the course of its decision the court said; "We have looked carefully through the acts of
March 2, 1867 and July 19, 1867. They give very large governmental powers to the military commanders designated, within the
States committed respectively to their jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to warrant the order here in question. . . . The
clearest language would be necessary to satisfy us that Congress intended that the power given by these acts should be so
exercised. . . . It was an arbitrary stretch of authority, needful to no good end that can be imagined. Whether Congress could
have conferred the power to do such an act is a question we are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law that
the exercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency
requires. (Mithell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey, 4 Taunt., 67; Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1 Cowp., 161; s.c., 1
Smith's L.C., pt. 2, p. 934.) Viewing the subject before us from the standpoint indicated, we hold that the order was void."

It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared that "all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void
without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has not invalidated the judicial acts and
proceedings, which are not a political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that were continued by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that said judicial acts
and proceedings were good and valid before and now good and valid after the reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by
the American and Filipino forces.

3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth, which are the same as those existing prior to,
and continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine Executive Commission and by the so-called Republic
of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending in said courts at the time the Philippine
Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth Government was restored.

Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as
soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own
hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely
prevented, to respect. As stated in the above-quoted Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War on May 19,
1898, "in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered
by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be
adhered to on the present occasion." And Taylor in this connection says: "From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the
conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and
judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which
compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit." (Taylor, International Public
Law, p.596.) Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be
unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the
occupant of transient character.

Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces proclaimed on January
3, 1942, when Manila was occupied, the military administration under martial law over the territory occupied by the army, and
ordered that "all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be
affective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present post and carry on faithfully their
duties as before." When the Philippine Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in
Chief, on January 23, 1942, the Chairman of the Executive Commission, by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and
February 5, respectively, continued the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, and justices of the peace of
courts, with the same jurisdiction in conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese
Army in Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called Republic of the Philippines was
inaugurated, the same courts were continued with no substantial change in organization and jurisdiction thereof.

If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued
during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines,
it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law,
7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law
conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles "a
state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties
substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to
regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing
of the whole fibre and content." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 615.)

The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in support in his conclusion that the Court of First Instance of
Manila presided over by him "has no authority to take cognizance of, and continue said proceedings (of this case) to final
judgment until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . shall have provided for the transfer of the
jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the cases commenced and the left pending therein,"
is "that said courts were a government alien to the Commonwealth Government. The laws they enforced were, true enough,
laws of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but they had become the laws — and the courts had become the
institutions — of Japan by adoption (U.S. vs.Reiter. 27 F. Cases, No. 16146), as they became later on the laws and institutions
of the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines."

The court in the said case of U.S. vs. Reiter did not and could not say that the laws and institutions of the country occupied if
continued by the conqueror or occupant, become the laws and the courts, by adoption, of the sovereign nation that is militarily
occupying the territory. Because, as already shown, belligerent or military occupation is essentially provisional and does not
serve to transfer the sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant. What the court said was that, if such laws and
institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him, in the sense that he may
continue or set them aside. The laws and institution or courts so continued remain the laws and institutions or courts of the
occupied territory. The laws and the courts of the Philippines, therefore, did not become, by being continued as required by the
law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. The provision of Article 45, section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907 which
prohibits any compulsion of the population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power, "extends to prohibit
everything which would assert or imply a change made by the invader in the legitimate sovereignty. This duty is neither to
innovate in the political life of the occupied districts, nor needlessly to break the continuity of their legal life. Hence, so far as the
courts of justice are allowed to continue administering the territorial laws, they must be allowed to give their sentences in the
name of the legitimate sovereign " (Westlake, Int. Law, Part II, second ed., p. 102). According to Wheaton, however, the victor
need not allow the use of that of the legitimate government. When in 1870, the Germans in France attempted to violate that rule
by ordering, after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon, the courts of Nancy to administer justice in the name of the "High German
Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," upon the ground that the exercise of their powers in the name of French people and
government was at least an implied recognition of the Republic, the courts refused to obey and suspended their sitting. Germany
originally ordered the use of the name of "High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but later offered to allow use of
the name of the Emperor or a compromise. (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English ed. 1944, p. 244.)

Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, "Law once established continues until changed by the
some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of
Laws, III, Summary Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on the
Conflict on Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): "There can no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into
existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once
created, it persists until a change take place, and when changed it continues in such changed condition until the next change,
and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues
unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative acts creates a change."

As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence defends upon that of the laws which create and confer upon them their
jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being a political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continue
in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly
continued is not necessary in order that they may continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the
intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. Therefore, even assuming that Japan had legally acquired sovereignty over
these Islands, which she had afterwards transferred to the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and that the laws and the courts
of these Islands had become the courts of Japan, as the said courts of the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them
have continued in force until now, it necessarily follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over
cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, unless and until they are abolished or the laws
creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. As a consequence, enabling laws or acts
providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued by or transferred to another court, are not required by the mere
change of government or sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the former courts are abolished or their jurisdiction so
change that they can no longer continue taking cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order that the
new courts or the courts having jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings. When the Spanish sovereignty in the
Philippine Islands ceased and the Islands came into the possession of the United States, the "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was
continued and did not cease to exist, and proceeded to take cognizance of the actions pending therein upon the cessation of the
Spanish sovereignty until the said "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was abolished, and the Supreme Court created in Chapter II of
Act No. 136 was substituted in lieu thereof. And the Courts of First Instance of the Islands during the Spanish regime continued
taking cognizance of cases pending therein upon the change of sovereignty, until section 65 of the same Act No. 136 abolished
them and created in its Chapter IV the present Courts of First Instance in substitution of the former. Similarly, no enabling acts
were enacted during the Japanese occupation, but a mere proclamation or order that the courts in the Island were continued.
On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of Act No. 136 was enacted abolishing the civil jurisdiction of
the provost courts created by the military government of occupation in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War of 1898,
the same section 78 provided for the transfer of all civil actions then pending in the provost courts to the proper tribunals, that is,
to the justices of the peace courts, Court of First Instance, or Supreme Court having jurisdiction over them according to law. And
later on, when the criminal jurisdiction of provost courts in the City of Manila was abolished by section 3 of Act No. 186, the
same section provided that criminal cases pending therein within the jurisdiction of the municipal court created by Act No. 183
were transferred to the latter.

That the present courts as the same courts which had been functioning during the Japanese regime and, therefore, can continue
the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is confirmed by
Executive Order No. 37 which we have already quoted in support of our conclusion in connection with the second question. Said
Executive Order provides"(1) that the Court of Appeals created and established under Commonwealth Act No. 3 as amended,
be abolished, as it is hereby abolished," and "(2) that all cases which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of
Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. . . ." In so providing, the said Order considers that the Court
of Appeals abolished was the same that existed prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government;
for, as we have stated in discussing the previous question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending therein, or which had
theretofore (that is, up to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court, must have been cases coming from the Courts of
First Instance during the so-called Republic of the Philippines. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said Executive Order was
not the same one which had been functioning during the Republic, but that which had existed up to the time of the Japanese
occupation, it would have provided that all the cases which had, prior to and up to that occupation on January 2, 1942, been
dully appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision.

It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of
political complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government.

Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to continue to final
judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves civil rights of the parties under the laws of the Commonwealth
Government, pending in said court at the time of the restoration of the said Government; and that the respondent judge of the
court, having refused to act and continue him does a duty resulting from his office as presiding judge of that court, mandamus is
the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, especially taking into consideration the fact that the question of
jurisdiction herein involved does affect not only this particular case, but many other cases now pending in all the courts of these
Islands.

In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case
No. 3012 of said court. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla and Pablo, JJ., concur.

 Minute Resolutions of the Supreme Court

EN BANC

G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO,
ET AL.

SIRS/MESDAMES:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22, 1986.

In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.; G.R. No. 73972, People's
Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs.
Corazon C. Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino is questioned. It is claimed that her government
is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated below. On April 17,
1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested that they
would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.

The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no
cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government
of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de factogovernment
but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic
under her government.

In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS

Clerk of Court
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,

vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J:

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court
of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."

The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the
Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred on October 28, 1968 for
investigation, thus:

Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola,
defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and
defendant.

In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales
was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were defendant Macariola,
she being the only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who
were the children of the deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were all
the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired by the deceased
during his second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made, those conjugal properties should first be partitioned
into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa
Espiras, and the other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his
children by his two marriages.

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds,
and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to
Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz;
(3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No.
3416 as belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2
of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita
R. Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-half of
each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos.
4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as belonging to the
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304
and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-
half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the
division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as
surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco
Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to be divided
among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla
Reyes and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R.
Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the
other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal shares from the
hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the
parties, within thirty days after this judgment shall have become final to submit to this court, for approval a project of
partition of the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the parties may, by
 agreement, deemed convenient and equitable to them taking into consideration the location, kind, quality, nature and
value of the properties involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to
pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3) by the second
named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].

The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of partition was
submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not signed by
the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his
Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted hereunder in full:

The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for approval the following project of partition:

COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court respectfully submit
the following Project of Partition:

l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes Macariola;

2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along the eastern part of the lot shall be awarded
likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;

3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;

4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along the western part of the lot shall likewise be
awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;

5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes,
Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;

6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions awarded under item (2) and (4)
above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in
equal shares, provided, however that the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated above which is made in accordance with
the decision of the Honorable Court be approved.

Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.

(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City

(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City

While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed this Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon
assurance of both counsels of the respective parties to this Court that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had
been made after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant approving the above Project of
Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to the Court that they are given full authority to sign by themselves the
Project of Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance with law,
hereby approves the same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute such papers, documents or instrument
sufficient in form and substance for the vesting of the rights, interests and participations which were adjudicated to the
respective parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to each
one in view of said Project of Partition, and to perform such other acts as are legal and necessary to effectuate the said
Project of Partition.

SO ORDERED.

Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.

(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge

EXH. B.
 The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving authority to the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of title to the respective
adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see Exh. U).

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with an area of 15,162.5
sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was
adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in
equal shares, and when the project of partition was approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be
subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).

Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1), while
Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was
issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).

On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq. meters
to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared by the latter for
taxation purposes (Exh. F).

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E
to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale the stockholders of the
corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife,
Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The
Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall henceforth refer to as
"TRADERS" were registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385,
rec.].

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of
action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that
he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder
and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an
impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and
publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys
and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by
respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).

Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein
complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of
Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated
May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of
action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is
prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that
respondent Judge be exonerated.

The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an action
before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al.,
defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of
the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from the
civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest when
Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on
August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against
defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the
aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio
Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases
against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta
Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on
June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear
and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION

(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the issue of
the legality and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the
partition;

(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;

(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,

(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral damages;

(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary damages;

(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and

(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.

B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE
DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased Gerardo Villasin;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the cost of the suit.

C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 3010 —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa,
Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.

D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]

It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the
appeal on February 22, 1971.

WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that
respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion
of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person or
through the mediation of another:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
 within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied].

The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to
the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88
SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).

In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case
No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the
reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March
6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October
16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from
said orders.

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely,
Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled
that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz
Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots
denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was
issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to
respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by
spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the
finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of
partition.

While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders approving the same, as well
as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.

The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence,
after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated
October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation.

The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid
facts — that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and consummated long after
the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.

Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the
litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.

It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes,
Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to
respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of
the Investigating Justice thus:

And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the acquisition by respondent of a portion of
Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent was the President and his wife
the Secretary, was intimately related to the Order of respondent approving the project of partition, Exh. A.

Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between the Reyeses and the Galapons
concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the
purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).

xxx xxx xxx

On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a
mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator as a
 respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and I believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for
valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any intervention of, or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp.
391- 394, rec.).

On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition although it was
not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as follows:

1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the parties more particularly that of Mrs.
Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however, whatever error was committed by respondent in
that respect was done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel
of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p.
24, January 20, 1969). While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not presented by respondent in
evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the only one that was
presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the
contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:

1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in which the
deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order dated November 11, 1963,
(Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly entered and registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);

2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola on October 22, 1963,
conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the
vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated to her as her
share in the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No.
3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on December 3, 1963 (see
Exh. 9-e).

In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of partition dated October 16, 1963,
which was approved by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154
or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena
on October 22, 1963, several days after the preparation of the project of partition.

Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the
decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is absurd because from the
decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the
other half of said one-fourth was the share of complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not
adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant became
the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola
sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she was wen aware of the distribution of the
properties of her deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola
admitted during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena
(tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce that she could not have been kept ignorant of the proceedings in
civil case 3010 relative to the project of partition.

Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the properties adjudicated to her were
insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any direct and positive evidence to prove the
alleged gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of the real properties when she could have easily done so by
presenting evidence on the area, location, kind, the assessed and market value of said properties. Without such evidence
there is nothing in the record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of the properties of complainant's father
(pp. 386389, rec.).

Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the
same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should
be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of
judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "...
it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or
had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers
at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining
the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations
must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of
respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion
and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was
purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it
for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that
his acquisition was related in one way or another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave
cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and
fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).

II

With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article
14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a
stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:

Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office or have
any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts,
provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:

1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service. This
provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by
chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.

xxx xxx xxx

5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate territory.

It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the
commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between
the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental
organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897
[1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including
the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an
administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in
business: hence, political in essence.

It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications
made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal
Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the
Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:

By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest or otherwise, ...
those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease
upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).

While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign continue in force
without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par.
14). However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new
sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during
the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of
American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:

On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other
undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between
them and the government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the
allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although
 that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly-
created power of the State.

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that
on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce
after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court
of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with
which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw
from having any interest.

Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that respondent
participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or
connection with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in
his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the
Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any
contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime;
it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who
intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A.
40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).

It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its business operations
by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by
or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
in which the corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola,
plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid
corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on
November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporation,
having disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967.

Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or
having interest in any lawful business.

It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any
prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other
vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.

Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated,
deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in nature.

Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a property in
litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale
of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving
the project of partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation.

In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an
officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of department, the same,
however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the last
portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public officer from having any interest in any
business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in
the civil service, that is, engaging in private business without a written permission from the Department Head may not constitute
graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.

On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that
the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule
XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any
private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the Head of Department ..."

It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as
amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.

Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in
the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the
recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary
(now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and
prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.

And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts
as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.

It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the existing Civil
Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or
employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount
not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil
service officers and employees.

However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of
the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which they
belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the
department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the
only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII
cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to recognize the same as applicable to them,
would be adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only
two grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.

Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and
exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all administrative cases
against permanent officers and employees in the competitive service, and, except as provided by law, to have final authority to
pass upon their removal, separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of
such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline"
(emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government
as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in
interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to
the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA
710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).

Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon 25
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:

A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in his
court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such investments previously made, longer than a period
sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible,
refrain from all relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or
prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the
aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not
in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its
incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such
disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the
corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon
25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its
incorporation and before it became involved in any court litigation

III

With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and
acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree,
however, with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid
causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:

The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated and closely fraternized with
Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in
truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine
Bar as certified to in Exh. K.

The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all the time he believed that
the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been
shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting
up a signboard with his name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural
for respondent and any person for that matter to have accepted that statement on its face value. "Now with respect to the
allegation of complainant that respondent is guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his
wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of
violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence his
official actuations as a judge where said persons were concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof that herein
respondent gave any undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law
from his personal relations with respondent, or that he used his influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the other
branches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.

Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from maintaining close friendly
relations with practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations or
friendship constitute an element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does
have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his
social relations be clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in
acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private
corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in
his private and business activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with
propriety but must always be above suspicion.

WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE
MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 104768 July 21, 2003

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division)1 dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution dismissed petitioner’s
Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second
Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended
Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings
allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.

Antecedent Facts

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily
tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be
necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order" and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman
Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. 2

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on
the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution reads:

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City.
He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at ₱700,000.00.

The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated
by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO
Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by
respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate money in
the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los
Baños, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and
sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth
Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of
Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by
respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.

Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized in her house on March
3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for
Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.

This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an intention to cover the
existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members
of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would
have never been known.

The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the Board’s consultant.
Although the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an
unexplained wealth of ₱104,134. 60.

IV. CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth
in the amount of ₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act
for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property."3

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No. 1379") 4against Ramas.

Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended Complaint naming the
Republic of the Philippines ("petitioner"), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant. The Amended
Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano ("Dimaano") as co-defendant.

The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the other
hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of
Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property
by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos." 5

The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe that
respondents have violated RA No. 1379.6 The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents’
properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.

Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint. In
his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City,
valued at ₱700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any
mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.

Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas
from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land
titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.

After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November 1988.

On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of preparation for trial and the absence of
witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.

On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order "to charge the delinquent properties with
being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x." 8
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioner’s presentation of evidence on the
ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when petitioner would file the amended complaint. The
Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the
existing complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been pending in court, petitioner should
proceed to present its evidence.

After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.

On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed to trial because of the
absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present. Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the
complaint to conform to the evidence already presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully
acquired the monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.

The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly because of its many
postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage when in fact the case had long been
ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.

During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further evidence. Giving petitioner one more
chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18
May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private respondents
might take under the circumstances.

However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had no further evidence to
present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate
pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.

Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino. 9 The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG
does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that
they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos.

On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. The
counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry
and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the
forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in
connection herewith.

SO ORDERED.

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its
Reply on 10 January 1992.

On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan10 and Republic v. Migrino11 which involve the same issues.

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.
 (4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A
CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP
BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE,
HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PETITIONER.

B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER,
INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK
OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND
REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable to this
case;

2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or waived by
respondents with the filing of their respective answers with counterclaim; and

3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they were filed after commencement of the
presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even before the latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence and
rest its case;

C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF
MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF
RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE. 12

The Court’s Ruling

First Issue: PCGG’s Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan13 and Republic v.
Migrino.14

The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture
petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.

We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.

The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in the
active service or retired.15 The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary recommendations to appropriate
government agencies on the action to be taken based on its findings. 16 The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to
the PCGG’s power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to
carry out the purposes of this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all
business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking
undue advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from time to time.

x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who
fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated
ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative, subordinate
or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x; 17 or (2) AFP personnel
involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. 18

Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas’ case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas’ case should fall
under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas
was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas’ position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief,
undeniably making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.

We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its
amendments.

Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this
wise:

A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within the term ‘subordinate.’
The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.

EO No. 2 freezes ‘all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda
Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or
participation.’

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-

‘[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on
Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].’

[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with former President Marcos
and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative,
business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.

xxx

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the administration of
former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of
his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)

Ramas’ position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General19 does not suffice to make
him a "subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a
prima facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business
associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is manifested
either by Ramas’ complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by
former President Marcos’ acquiescence in Ramas’ own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.

This, the PCGG failed to do.

Petitioner’s attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues that unlike in Migrino,
the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its
jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former
President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the Resolution begins with such
statement, it ends with the following recommendation:

V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act
for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property."20

Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result
yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This
absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal to petitioner’s case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific
and limited purpose, and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.

Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the properties Ramas allegedly
owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a "subordinate" of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the
properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate
income without showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former President Marcos. Petitioner,
in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close
association with former President Marcos, thus:

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines did not
categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of
his close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was
not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be read in the context of the law creating the same and the objective of
the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;21 (Emphasis supplied)

Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a
"subordinate" of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1 22 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG
on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the
creation of the PCGG.

In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1,
2,24 14,25 14-A:26

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 14,
shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute covers:

(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act No. 1379,
accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned
or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/or using their powers, authority and influence, connections or relationships; and

(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as contemplated
under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling under the foregoing
categories, require a previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in
accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the
Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their
assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)

The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO
No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls
under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor
General.27 The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests in the Ombudsman the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986. 28

After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of a prima facie finding
that Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be
dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and
its amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there are
violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas’ case to the Ombudsman who has
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent for
violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to
any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be
allowed to exercise only the powers granted to it.

Petitioner’s argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting their
respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.

Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG cannot
exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGG’s powers are specific and limited. Unless given
additional assignment by the President, PCGG’s sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives
and cronies.29 Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.

Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute their cases by filing their
Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August
1990, which explains why private respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held
that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. 30 Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of
jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an action. 31

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation. The
Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor
General may file the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan.32 The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA
No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or estoppel.33

Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of
petitioner’s evidence.

We disagree.

Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-
completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan
dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April
1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the
presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Even before the date set
for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.34 The motion
sought "to charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioner’s evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as
having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x."

The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioner’s evidence since petitioner did not state when it
would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the presentation of evidence on
28-29 September and 9-11 October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989,
petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order
expressing its view on the matter, to wit:

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case has been ready for trial for
over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of the government to produce on scheduled dates for
pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the
presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public about its alleged
failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the developments such as those of today,
this Court is now faced with a situation where a case already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-
month pause where appropriate action could have been undertaken by the plaintiff Republic. 35

On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary investigation on the unexplained wealth
of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379.36 The PCGG prayed for an additional four months to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this request and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March
1990. However, on the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the preliminary investigation the
PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the presentation of
its evidence and to inform the court of "what lies ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x." 37 Still on the date
set, petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-Amended Complaint.38 The
Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already pending for years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to
accept the Re-Amended Complaint.

Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete the presentation of its
evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the presentation of its evidence. The
Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioner’s delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended
Complaint, which would only prolong even more the disposition of the case.

Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since the
PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against private respondents. This alone would have been
sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case against private respondents.

Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of petitioner’s
evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house as illegally seized
and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioner’s case since these properties comprise
most of petitioner’s evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against
private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence a search warrant captioned "Illegal Possession
of Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaano’s cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding
team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding
team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45;
communications equipment, cash consisting of ₱2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure "on March 3, 1986 or
five days after the successful EDSA revolution."39 Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time
by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name
and by the will of the Filipino people."40 Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of
the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the
date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its
embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano
and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional
right.

Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated
25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution."41 The resulting
government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations
that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during
the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation
of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2)
whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the
protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the
successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus,
during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a
constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:42
A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who
were previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence or at least some acts of violence." In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that
which "occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the
first order itself."

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as the "people power
revolution" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented
rise to power of the Aquino government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right of a people to cast out their
rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising
when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be
unavailable." It has been said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state" and from there is
derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing
constitution."

xxx

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was
achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier
declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs.
Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the
Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and
the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis
supplied)

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would render void all
sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government ("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive
issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one
could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration
orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 43 petitioner Baseco, while
conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum, questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders upon
adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom
Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of sequestration orders, thus:

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze
and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue
them have received constitutional approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution
recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-
gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through
orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts." And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution treats of, and ratifies the "authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March
25, 1986."

The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the sequestration orders would
clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to include specific language recognizing the validity of
the sequestration orders. The following discourse by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission is instructive:

FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the present amendment.

For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salonga’s lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of which all of us
have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is
repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On
the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results and not the legal niceties, thus
suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or exceptions.

Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special protection? The answer is clear. What
they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes
malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an
allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give three reasons:

First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten constitutional normalization. Very
much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for
constitutional normalization and at the same time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of
constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of due process and rule of law.
The New Society word for that is "backsliding." It is tragic when we begin to backslide even before we get there.

Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee report asks for extraordinary
exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening of Congress, and Congress may even extend this longer.

Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee report is asking for is that we
should allow the new government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.

Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to think that they have a vested
right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the
gains of a democratic revolution.

Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that is very disturbing. When it
comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian like
Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an
auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search and seizure clause will be sold. "Open
your Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in your private safe."

Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will
release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in the
search and seizure clauses. So, there is something positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to
the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only if it would become
convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.

For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of the committee report
and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue
the Salonga and the Romulo argument — that what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the law. If
sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even without the support of Section 8. If not sustained, however,
the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.

The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what another Christian replied
when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my nation’s
safety sake." I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit of law for our nation’s sake. And we should delete Section 8.

Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)

Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of
Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section 26, 44 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The
framers of the Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the test of due process
under the Bill of Rights.

Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional
provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the
interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith
compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State
"to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights45 recognized in the present
Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a
declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State.46 Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights 47 of
individuals under the Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the
revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and
is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that
Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the
revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution.
As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance
with its treaty obligations under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The
Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.48 The Provisional Constitution served as a
self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers were
valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and
orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively
sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically
described in the warrant.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by petitioner’s witnesses, the
raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:

Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian

AJ AMORES
Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else, aside from the weapons, were
seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some jewelries, land titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know the
reason why your team also seized other properties not mentioned in said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason why they also brought the other
items not included in the search warrant was because the money and other jewelries were contained in attaché cases and
cartons with markings "Sony Trinitron", and I think three (3) vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attaché cases and the steel
safes were containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to find out that they contained money.
xxx
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team seized this money instead of
weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along also the money because at that
time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they will bring that because they might be suspected also of taking money
out of those items, your Honor.49
Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag
Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before the Municipal Trial Court of
Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and five (5)
boxes of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
AJ AMORES
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or contraband which could be
found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the communications equipment and money.
However, I did not include that in the application for search warrant considering that we have not established concrete evidence
about that. So when…
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons were in the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.50
xxx
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how many ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscal’s office who charged Elizabeth Dimaano
for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscal’s office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in the name of Felino
Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for instance, jewelries. Why did you seize
the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the jewelries and other items, sir. I
do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also these articles. I do not really know their reason for bringing the
same, but I just learned that these were taken because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.
xxx
Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be contained in attaché
cases.1âwphi1 These attaché cases were suspected to be containing pistols or other high powered firearms, but in the course of
the search the contents turned out to be money. So the team leader also decided to take this considering that they believed that
if they will just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team, like Transfer Certificates of Title
of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.51

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment,
jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the
raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing
that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. 52 Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when
it seized these items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, 53 and they are not, they must be
returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of
these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November
1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate
action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.