Soliven v Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)FACTS

:Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with otherswas charged for libel by the president. Cory h
erself filed a complaint-
affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannotfile a complaint affidavit because this would def
eat her immunityfrom suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that apresident cannot be sued. However, if
a president would sue thenthe president would allow herself to

be placed under the court’s

jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president
, the president may notbe able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she maybe liable for contempt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President, under the Constitution, may initiatecriminal proceedings against the petitioners throu
gh the filing of acomplaint-affidavit?

HELD:

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presid
ential dutiesand functions free from any hindrance or distraction, consideringthat being the Chief Executive of the G
overnment is a job that, asidefrom requiring all of the office-

holder’s time, also demands undi

videdattention.But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President byvirtue of the office and may be i
nvoked only by the holder of the

office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an

accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President iscomplainant cannot raise the presidential privil
ege as a defense toprevent the case from proceeding against such accused.Moreover, there is nothing in our laws t
hat would prevent thePresident from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded thePresident may shed the protectio
n afforded by the privilege and

submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercisethe privilege or to waive it is solely the Presiden
t’s prerogative. It is a

decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

WHEREFORE finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting toexcess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents,the court resolved to D
ISMISS the petitions.

Atty Dara DigestPublic Interest vs. ElmaG.R. no. 138965 March 5 2007PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES, and JOC
ELYN P.CELESTINO, vs.MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and as Chairman of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government, and RONALDOZAMORA, asExecutive Secretary, Accused AppellantFacts:For consideratio n is the om
nibus m otion, dated 14 a ugu st 2006, whe rerespondent Magdangal Elma sought the following:

1.

the reconsid eratio n of the d ecision in the case Public Interest Center Inc., et al. vs. Magdangal Elma, et.al ( GR. NO.
138965), promulgated on30 June 2006;

2.

The clarification of the dispositive part of the decision ; and

3.

The elevation of the case to the court en banc.The solicitor general, in behalf of the respondent, filed an omnibus motion,dated 11 a
ugust 2006 with substantially the same allegation.R e s p o n d e n t E l m a w a s a p p o i n t e d a s C h a i r m a n o f T h e P r e s i
d e n t i a l Commission on Good Government (PCGG) ON 30 October 1998. Thereafter,during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he wa
s appointed as Chief Presidentiallegal counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointm ent, but waived anyrenum
iration th at he m ay receive a s CPLC. Petitioners sought t o have bothappointments declared as unconstitutional and th
erefore, null and void.In its decision, the court declared that the concurrent appointm ents of therespondents as PCG
G chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that theconcurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of section 7(2) O
F ARTICLEix-
b of the 1987 constitution, since these are incompatible offices. The duties of CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal a
dvice on the action of theh e a d s o f v a r i o u s e x e c u t i v e d e p a r t m e n t s a n d a g e n c i e s a n d r e v i e w i n g investigati
ons involving heads of executive depart6mnets. Since the actions of thePCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are subje
ct to the review of theCPLC, such appointments would be incompatible.The court also decreed that the strict prohibition under sectio
n 13 Article VIIof the 1987 con stitution would not appl y to the present case, since neither thePCGG chairman nor C
PLC is a secretary, under sectary or assistant secretary.However, had the rule hereunder been applicable to the case, the defect of
thesetwo incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The said section allows theconcurrent holding of position only when sec
ond post is required by the primaryfunction of the first appoint m ents and is exercised i n an e x-
officio capacity.Although respond ent Elm a wai ved receivi ng rem uneration for the secondappoi ntm ent, the pri
m ary functions of the PCGG chairm an do not requi re hisappointment as CPLC.Ruling

1.

After revi e win g the argum en ts propou nde d in respondent s’ om nibusmotion, we find that the basic issues that were rais
ed have already beenpassed upon. No substantial arguments were presented. Thus, the courtdenies the respondents’ motion for re
consideration.

2.

In response to the respondents’ request for clarification, the court ruledthat respondents Elma’s concurrent appointments as PCGG
Chairmanand CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices. This rulingdoes not render both appointments void. Followin
g the common-
law ruleon incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated hisoffice as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the se
cond office as CPLC.

3.

There also is no m erit in the respond ents’ m otion to refer the case toc o u r t e n b a n c . W h a t a r e i n q u e s t i o
n i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e a r e t h e constitutionality of respondent Elma’s concurrent appointments, and nott h e c o n s t i t u t i
o n a l i t y o f a n y t r e a t y , l a w o r a g r e e m e n t . T h e m e r e application of the constitutional provisions does not require th
e case tob e h e a r d a n d d e c i d e d e n b a n c . C o n t r a r y t o t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f t h e respondent, the decision of the
court in this case does not modify theruling in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary. It should be notedthat Section 3 of
Suprem e Cou rt Circula r No. 2-
89, dated 7 Fe bruary1989 clearly provides that the court en banc is not an appellate court towhich decisions or resolutions of a
division may be appealed.WHEREFORE, the respondents’ motion for consideration and for elevation of thiscase of court en banc is
hereby DENIED.“All our dreams can come true – if we have the courage to pursue them.” – WaltDisney-
Teacher: ok class ano ang gusto nyong maging pag laki? ikaw Gloria ano anggusto mong maging pag laki mo?Gloria (Istudyante): ako ma
m gusto ko pong maging abogado para makatulongsaaaa kapwaaaaTeacher:ok very good ikaw Daniel ano ang gusto mong maging
pag laki mo?Daniel(Istudyante): ako mam gusto ko png maging doktor paraaa makatulog sakapwaaaTeacher:ok verygood ikaw naman juan
? Ano ang gusto mong maging pag lakimo?Juan(Tamad – Istudyante): ako mam gusto ko png maging KAPWA para maymatulungan sila.

Mondano vs Silvosa
G.R. No. L-7708 May 30 1955

FACTS:
The Assistant Executive Secretory indorsed the complaint for rape and concubinage against
Mondano, duly elected and qualified mayor of Mainit, Surigao,to Silvosa, provincial governor
of Suriga, for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. Silvosa issued an
Administrative Order suspending Mondano from office. Mondano filed a petition for
prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.
 ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of suspension by the provincial governor is illegal.

RULING:
Yes. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over
all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in Sec. 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that
exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local
governments over which the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided
by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the RAC are to be construed as conferring upon
the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local
government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions
of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If “general supervision over all local
governments” is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in sec
79 (c) of the RAC, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the
power of control and that of supervision.

Supervision - overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate

officers perform their duties.

Control - power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of RAC.

LawIsKool
Collection of notes, reviewers and case digests

Public Interest Center Inc vs Magdangal Elma

MARCH 30, 2018 BY LAWISKOOL

Facts:
For consideration is the omnibus motion, dated 14 august 2006, where respondent Magdangal Elma sought
the following:
1. the reconsideration of the decision in the case Public Interest Center Inc., et al. vs. Magdangal Elma, et.al
( GR. NO. 138965), promulgated on 30 June 2006;
2. The clarification of the dispositive part of the decision ; and
3. The elevation of the case to the court en banc.
 The solicitor general, in behalf of the respondent, filed an omnibus motion, dated 11 august 2006 with
substantially the same allegation.
Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of The Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) ON 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as
Chief Presidential legal counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but waived any
renumiration that he may receive as CPLC. Petitioners sought to have both appointments declared as
unconstitutional and therefore, null and void.
In its decision, the court declared that the concurrent appointments of the respondents as PCGG chairman
and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that the concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of
section 7(2) OF ARTICLE ix-b of the 1987 constitution, since these are incompatible offices. The duties of
CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the action of the heads of various executive
departments and agencies and reviewing investigations involving heads of executive depart6mnets. Since
the actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are subject to the review of the CPLC,
such appointments would be incompatible.
The court also decreed that the strict prohibition under section 13 Article VII of the 1987 constitution would
not apply to the present case, since neither the PCGG chairman nor CPLC is a secretary, under sectary or
assistant secretary. However, had the rule hereunder been applicable to the case, the defect of these two
incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The said section allows the concurrent holding of position
only when second post is required by the primary function of the first appointments and is exercised in an
ex-officio capacity. Although
respondent Elma waived receiving remuneration for the second appointment, the primary functions of the
PCGG chairman do not require his appointment as CPLC.
Ruling
1. After reviewing the arguments propounded in respondents’ omnibus motion, we find that the basic issues
that were raised have already been passed upon. No substantial arguments were presented. Thus, the
court denies the respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
2. In response to the respondents’ request for clarification, the court ruled that respondents Elma’s concurrent
appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices. This ruling
does not render both appointments void. Following the common-law rule on incompatibility of offices,
respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his office as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second office
as CPLC.
3. There also is no merit in the respondents’ motion to refer the case to court en banc. What are in question
in the present case are the constitutionality of respondent Elma’s concurrent appointments, and not the
constitutionality of any treaty, law or agreement. The mere application of the constitutional provisions does
not require the case to be heard and decided en banc. Contrary to the allegations of the respondent, the
decision of the court in this case does not modify the ruling in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary.
It should be noted that Section 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated 7 February 1989 clearly
provides that the court en banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of a division may
be appealed.
WHEREFORE, the respondents’ motion for consideration and for elevation of this case of court en banc is
hereby DENIED.
GPI vs Springer 50 Phil 259
Facts:

This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the
Philippine Islands against three directors of the National Coal Company who were elected to
their positions by the legislative members of the committee created by Acts. Nos. 2705 and
2822. The purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part of section 4 of Act No.
2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which provides that "The voting power of all
such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands
shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President
of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine
Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: “The voting power … shall be
vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the
Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested
the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized
that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the
government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage
government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the
House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the
House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still
elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo
warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning
the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.

Issue:

Whether or nor EO no. 37 is invalid.

Rulings:

No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The
Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to
do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is
essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was
created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate
President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of
executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this
rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be
found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative
branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.

Aytona vs Castillo
4 SCRA 1 G.R. No. L-19313 January 19 1962 [Midnight Appointment]

FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador
Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On
the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next
day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim
appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last
minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President
Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona
instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed,
thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.

RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia
administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for
the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought
to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to use
powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself
of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important
positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly
be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost
all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be
regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a
mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and
thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding
appointments.

Skinny Cases
Case Digests and Scratch Notes

Jorge v Mayor
G.R. No. L-21776 February 28, 1964 [Ad interim appointments]

FACTS:

Nicanor Jorge attained the position of Acting Director in the Bureau of Lands through regular and
successive promotions. He was appointed by President Carlos Garcia ad interim Director of Lands in
December 13, 1961, he took his oath of office on the 23rd, his appointment was transmitted to the CoA
in 26th. In May 1962, CoA confirmed the said ad interim appointment.

President Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2 revoking ad interim appointments extended and
released by former Pres. Garcia after the joint session of Congress that ended on December 13 1961.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of Macapagal administration, informed Jorge that
pursuant to a letter from the Asst. Executive Sec., served on Jorge that his appointment was among
those revoked by Admin Order No. 2, and that his position of Director of Lands was considered vacant.
Jovencio Mayor had been designated by the President to be Acting Director of Lands. Jorge instituted a
petition for mandamus and quo warranto, claiming that he is the legally appointed Director of Lands.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal operated as valid revocation of
Jorge's ad interim appointment.

RULING:

No. Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no evidence on record
that it was made and released after the joint session of Congress that ended on the same day. It is a
matter of contemporary history, of which this Court may take judicial cognizance, that the session
ended late in the night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore, after regular office hours. In the
absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the appointment of Jorge
was made before the close of office hours, that being the regular course of business. The
appointment, therefore, was not included in, nor intended to be covered by, Administrative Order
No. 2, and the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly confirmed by the CoA and
thereafter, the office never became vacant.

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