G.R. No.
L-32328 September 30, 1977
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO: ALDINA
MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION
MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, and ASILO
DE MOLO, petitioners-appellants
vs.
FELINO MALOTO and FELINO MALOTO, oppositors-appellees.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition to review the order dated April 13, 1970 of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, in Special Proceeding No. 2176
dismissing the petition for the probate of a will. 1
One Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963 in Iloilo City, her place
of residence.
Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and
Felino Maloto, niece and nephews, respectively, of Adriana Maloto,
in the belief that decedent died intestate, commenced on November
4, 1963 in the Court of First Instance of iloilo an intestate proceeding
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1736. In the course of said
intestate proceeding, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto,
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto executed an extrajudicial Partition
of the estate of Adriana Maloto on February 1, 1964 whereby they
adjudicated said estate unto themselves in the proportion of one-
fourth (1/4) share for each. 2 The Court of First Instance of iloilo, then
prescribed by Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, ed he diamond partition on
March approve extrajudicial on March 21, 1964. 3
On April 1, 1967, a document dated January 3, 1940 purporting to be
the last with and testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the
Clerk of Art of the Art of First Instant of Iloilo. 4 It appears that Aldina
Maloto Casiano Consent Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto
are named as heirs but Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto
allegedly have shares in said with which are bigger, different and
more valuable than what they obtained in the extrajudicial partition.
The said will also allegedly made dispositions to certain devisees
and/or legatees, among whom being the Asilo de Molo, the Roman
Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
On May 24, 1967, Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto
filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion (1) for reconsideration;
(2) annulment of the proceedings; and (3) for the allowance of the
last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 5 The Asilo de Molo, the
Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor also filed
in Special Proceeding No. 1736 petitions for the allowance of the will
of Adriana Maloto. 6
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto opposed the motion of Aldina
Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto.
The Court of First Instance of iloilo, through Judge Emigdio V. Nietes,
issued an order dated November 16, 1968 denying the motion to
reopen the proceedings on the ground that the said motion had been
filed out of time. A motion for reconsideration of said order was
denied. Petitioners appealed from the order of denial. On motion of
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto, the lower court dismissed the
appeal on the ground that it was filed late. A motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal was denied. A supplemental
order dated April 1, 1969 stating as additional ground that the appeal
is improper was issued.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. L-30479. This Court dismissed
the petition in a resolution dated May 14, 1969 which reads:
L-010479 (Constancio Maloto, et al, vs. Hon.
Emigdio V. Nietes, etc., et al.) — THE COURT
RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for certiorari
and mandamus, without passing on the issue of
whether or not the petitioners appeal from the
order of November 16, 1968 of respondent
Judge was made on time, it appearing that the
more appropriate remedy of petitioners in the
premises stated in the petition is for petitioners
to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate
of the alleged will in question. 7
Acting on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and citation, fl
Art issued a resolution dated July 15, 1969 which reads:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration and/or
clarification filed by petitioner in G. R. No. L-
30479, Constancio Maloto, et al., vs. Hon.
Emigdio V. Nietes, etc. et al., dated June 11,
1969, the Court resolved to DENY the motion for
reconsideration, with the clarification that the
matter of whether or not the pertinent findings of
facts of respondent Judge in his herein subject
order of November 16, 1968 constitute res
adjudicata may be raised in the proceedings for
probate of the alleged will in question indicated
in the resolution of this Court of May 14, 1969,
wherein such matter will be more appropriately
determined. 8
Thereupon, the herein petitioners commenced Special Proceeding
No. 2176 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the probate of the
alleged last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 9
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto filed an opposition with a motion to
dismiss on the following grounds:
I. THAT THE ALLEGED WILL SOUGHT TO BE
PROBATED HAD BEEN DESTROYED AND
REVOKED BY THE TESTATRIX.
II. THAT THE INSTANT PETITION FOR
PROBATE IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR
JUDGMENT OR ORDER (OR RES JUDICATA).
III. THAT THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA
MALOTO HAD ALREADY PASSED OUT OF
EXISTENCE AND TITLE THERETO HAD
ALREADY ARRESTED IN THE DISTRIBUTEES
OF THEIR ASSIGNS.
IV. THAT PETITIONERS ALDINA MALOTO
CASIANO AND CONSTANCIO MALOTO ARE
NOW ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING THE
REMEDY TENDER THIS PROCEEDING, THEY
HAVING CEASED TO BE INTERESTED
PARTIES. 10
In an order dated April 13, 1970, the probate court dismissed the
petition for the probate of the with on the basis of the finding of said
court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 that the alleged win sought to
be Probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. The
probate court sustained the oppositors' contention that the petition
for probate is now barred by the order of November 16, 1968 in the
intestate estate proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 1736. 11
The herein petitioners allege that the probate court committed the
following errors:
I
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE .kl).NIITTEI)I,Y GENUINE LAST
WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE
ADRIANA MALOTO (THE SUBJECT OF
PETITION FOR PROBATE — SPECIAL
PROCEEDING NO. 2176, CFI ILOILO) HAD
PREVIOUSLY BEEN REVOKED BY HER
(ADRIANA MALOTO).
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT SAID PETITION (FOR PROBATE OF
THE AFORESAID LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA
MALOTO) IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR
JUDGMENT. I. E., THAT THE MATTER
CONCERNED IS NOW RES ADJUDICATA
III
THE LOWER COURT, THEREFORE, ERRED
IN DISMISSING THE AFORESAID PETITION
FOR PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA
MALOTO AND IN NOT, INSTEAD, GIVING IT
(THE PETITION ABOVE-CITED DUE
COURSE.12
The instant petition for review is meritorious.
The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the
probate of the alleged with of Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding
No. 1736. Indeed, the motion to reopen the was denied because the
same was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a
finding in an intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will has
been revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in Special
Proceeding No. 1736 stated in the order of November 16, 1968 that
"Movants should have filed a separate action for the probate of the
Will." 13 And this court stated in its resolution of May 14, 1969 that
"The more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises
stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate
proceeding for the probate of the alleged with in question."
In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special
Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition for the
probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.
WHEREFORE, the order dated April 13, 1970 dismissing the petition
for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto is hereby set
aside and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of
the petition in Special Proceeding No. 2176 on the merits, with costs
against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
In Re: Chanliongco
AM No. 190. 18 October 1977
FACTS:
The matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits by the heirs of
the late Atty. Chanliongco of the SC, who was more than 63 years of
age, with more than 38 years of service in the government. He left as
heirs the following: his widow, one legitimate child and 2 illegitimate
children. He died intestate and stated in his application
for membership with the GSIS the beneficiary, of his retirement
benefits, should he die before retirement.
ISSUE:
How should the retirement benefits and the monetary value of
terminal leave of the decedent be settled?
RULING:
As to the retirement benefits:
Widow 4/16
Legitimate Son 8/16
Illegitimate
2/16
Daughter
Illegitimate Son 2/16
As to the monetary value of the terminal leave pay and unused
vacation and sick leave, the SC treated the same as conjugal
property and as such, ½ goes to the widow as her share in the
conjugal partnership and the other half to be distributed to the legal
heirs in the same way as in the retirement benefits. This is so
because ‘vacation with pay is not a gratuity but is compensation for
services rendered’.
Concurring Opinion AQUINO, J.:
I concur. The provisions on legitime are found under the rubric of
testamentary succession. That does not mean that the legitime is
taken into account only in testamentary succession. The legitime
must also be taken into consideration in legal succession.
There may be instances, like the instant case where in legal
succession the estate is distributed according to the rules on legitime
without applying the rules on intestate succession. The reason is
that sometimes the estate is not even sufficient to satisfy the
legitimes. The legitimes of the primary compulsory heirs, like a child
or descendant, should first be satisfied.
In this case the decedent's legal heirs are his legitimate child, his
widow and two illegitimate children. His estate is partitioned among
those heirs by giving them their respective legitimes.
The legitimate child gets one-half of the estate as his legitime which
is regarded as his share as a legal heir (Art. 888, Civil Code).
The widow's legitime is one-fourth of the estate. That represents
also her share as a legal heir (Art. 892, 1st sentence, Civil Code).
The remaining one-fourth of the estate, which is the free portion,
goes to the two illegitimate children in equal shares, as their legitime,
pursuant to the provision that "the legitime of the illegitimate children
shall be taken from the portion of of the estate at the free disposal of
the testator, provided that in no case shall the total legitime of such
illegitimate children exceed that free portion, and that the legitime of
the surviving spouse must first be fully satisfied" (Last par., art. 895,
Civil Code).
The rule in Santillon vs. Miranda, L-19281, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA
563, that when the surviving spouse concurs with only one legitimate
child, the spouse is entitled one-half of the estate and the child gets
the other half, pursuant to article 996 of the Civil Code, does not
apply to this case because her illegitimate children concur with the
surviving spouse and the legitimate child.
In this case, to divide the estate between the surviving spouse and
the legitimate child would deprive the illegitimate children of their
legitime.
So, the decedent's estate is distributed in the proportion of 1/2 for the
legitimate child, 1/4 for the widow and 1/8 each for the two
illegitimate children.
Also not of possible application to this case is the rule natural that
the legitime of an acknowledged natural child is 1/2 of the legitime of
the legitimate child and that the legitime of the spurious child is 2/5 of
that of the legitime of the legitimate child or 4/5 of that of the
acknowledged natural child.
That rule cannot be applied because the estate is not sufficient to
cover the legitimes of all the compulsory heirs. That is one of the
flaws of the law of succession.
A situation, as in the instant case, may arise where the illegitimate
children get less than their legitime.
With respect to the decedent's unpaid salary and the money value of
his terminal leave, the same are conjugal properties because of the
rule that property "obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of
the spouses, or either of them", is conjugal in character (Art. 153[2],
Civil Code).
NUGUID v. NUGUID
17 SCRA 449 (1966)
FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, died without descendants. Her surviving
relatives are her parents and six brothers and sisters. On May 18,
1963, Remedios, sister of the deceased, filed a petition to probate a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario 11 years prior to her
death. Both parents opposed on the ground that the institution of
Remedios as universal heir resulted to their preterition, they being
compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line.
ISSUE: Whether the will is void due to preterition.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner contends that what we have is a case of
disinheritance rather than preterition. This is not meritorious, as this
argument fails to appreciate the distinction between preterition and
disinheritance. Preterition is the omission in the testator’s will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, either by not mentioning them, or
although mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law. The will does not explicitly disinherit the parents. It
simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than being
labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the forced
heir suffers from preterition.
The effects of preterition are totally different from disinheri-tance.
Preterition annuls the institution of heirs, except devises and legacies
insofar as the latter are not inofficious. In disinheri-tance the nullity is
limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs
have been illegally deprived. Considering, however that the will
before us solely provides for the institution of the petitioner as
universal heir and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire
will is void.
Legal Effects of preterition:
1. Annulment of the institution of heirs: The annulment of the
institution is mandatory so that a portion of the estate may be freed
to satisfy the remaining unpaid legitimes.
2. Legacies and devises cannot be cancelled but can be
reduced only if the estate is still insufficient to pay the legitimes after
the annulment of the institution. Instituted heirs do not enjoy any
preference over specific properties unlike legatees and devisees who
enjoy a priority because the testator has indicated the specific
property to be given to them. Nevertheless, legatees and devisees
can still lose their legacies and devises if the portion of the estate is
insufficient to pay the legitime(s) of the preterited heir(s).
Where the court held that ORDINARILY, while the probate is going
on, intestate proceedings may not proceed. However, in the case of
Remedios Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, L-
23445, June 30, 1966, the Court held that while it is true that the
probate should deal only with EXTRINSIC VALIDITY, and NEVER
with INTRINSIC VALIDITY, still if it is alleged that the will is VOID be-
cause of PRETERITION (which is a matter of intrinsic validity), a
probate would be useless, if indeed there was a preterition, and no
legacies or devises are involved. Indeed, the authentication or
probate of the will decides no other questions than such as touch
upon the capacity of the testator, and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a
will. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudice the
validity or efficacy of the provisions; that may be impugned as being
vicious or null, notwithstand-ing its authentication. The questions
relating to those points remain entirely unaffected, and may be
raised even after the will has been authenticated. (Palacios v.
Catimbang Palacios, L-12207, Dec. 24, 1959). Similarly, it has been
held that a deed of partition approved in the course of settlement of
estate proceedings CANNOT BAR on the ground of res judicata an
accion reivindicatoria over the properties involved.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA
SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C.
BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON,
assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO
SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
At issue in this case s the status of the private respondents and their
capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The
petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves to the
exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio,
Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November
10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married
Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years
later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession
of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to
be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios,
together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for
partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the
Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia,
Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to
the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own
complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate
estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four
surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the
Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted
the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and
Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit
Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents
on the basis of practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated
March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced
by her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the
three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right
of representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez
dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being
the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the
aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their
estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were
consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the
respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R.
No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R.
No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED
in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are
disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the
deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson,
but is affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review
by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent court is sought on the
ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and
misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the
private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not
legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on February
27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9,
1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The
pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among
those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is
not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact
born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship
of the child that she was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The
petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the
ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at
the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by
denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late
now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final
and executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the
petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was
seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of
Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and
Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier,
before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although
Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967,
or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of
the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have
notified the court about the fact of birth of
DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or
perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for
the revocation or rescission of the adoption
(although the birth of a child is not one of those
provided by law for the revocation or rescission
of an adoption). The court is of the considered
opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA
and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding
and binding to the present, the same not having
been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for
adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not
disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their
challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally,
as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally
addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite
jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or
not, cannot be questioned in a collateral
proceeding, for a presumption arises in such
cases where the validity of the judgment is thus
attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts
were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I,
Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2
American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption,
Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary
facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it
cannot be considered void merely because the fact
needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a
judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be
essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of
adoption, this does not make it essential to the
jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be
determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in
accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the
jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until
reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally
attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted
children would always be uncertain, since the evidence
might not be the same at all investigations, and might be
regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the
adoption might be held by one court to have been valid,
while another court would hold it to have been of no avail.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of
the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be
sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of
evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under
Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is
true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers
only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to
Edita Abila was understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an
interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement
in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let
alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower
courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld
in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11where we ruled that "the
evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the
absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or
nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the
impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's
legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and
accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code .
. . does not have this purely evidential character.
It serves a more fundamental purpose. It
actually fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties, and within the
period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested
by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different
purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the
intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following
Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from different
marriages.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead,
survive, the former shall inherit in their own right,
and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and
thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to
represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate
estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is
entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he
survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents'
other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and
Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is
true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child
and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the
right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is
between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does
not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as
the adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and
are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the
petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding
that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of
her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents
being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioners.
Salao, et al. v. Salao
L-26699, Mar. 16, 1976
FACTS: If a person dies intestate survived by a nephew (child of a
brother), a grandniece, and great grandnephews, who will inherit?

HELD: Only the nephew, since in the collateral lines, rep-resentation

An adopted child succeeds to the property of the (in intestate succession) takes place only in favor of the children of
adopting parents in the same manner as a
brothers and sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood. (Art.
legitimate child.
972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece or great
grandnephews. (Pavia v. Iturralde, 5 Phil. 176).
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love
descends first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to
his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is
also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to
leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them
and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from
this earth.

Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the

following pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by

fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the

succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one
who the person represented would have
succeeded.