Bureau of Forestry v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-37995 August 31, 1987 (153 SCRA 351)

Facts: Mercedes Diago submitted an application for registration for the four (4)
parcels of land, but the Director of Forestry opposed the said application on the
ground that certain specific portions of the lands are within Timberland Block which
is needed for forest purposes. Filomeno Gallo then purchased the said four parcels
of land from Mercedes Diago and filed a motion for an Amended Application for
Registration of Title. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of Filomeno Gallo
which was later affirmed by the C.A.

Issue: WON the classification of lands of the public domain by the Executive Branch
of the Government can be changed or varied by the court.

Rulings: The controversial area is within a timberland block as classification of the

municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry as lands needed for forest
purposes and hence they are portions of the public domain which cannot be the
subject of registration proceedings. As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department
of the government and not of the courts. With these rules, there should be no more
room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of
the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral.
Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo v. Municipality of Buruanga
G.R. No. m149145 March 31, 2006 (486 SCRA 229)

Facts: The petitioner and respondent were both claiming as the lawful owner and
possessor of Cadastral Lot No. 138 which was divided into three parts: 138-A, B and
C. The court a quo rendered its decision declaring the petitioner as the lawful owner
and possessor of Lot 138-B and the Municipality of Buruanga as the lawful owner
and possessor of Lots 138-A and 138-C. The CA affirmed the ownership of the
petitioner over Lot 138-B but reversed the court a quos’ ruling relative to the
ownership of Lots 138-A and 138-C declaring the said lots as property of public
dominion, hence, not owned by either of the parties.

Issue: WON the C.A. grievously erred in finding that lots 138-A and 138-C are
properties of the public (domain) and not susceptible to private ownership by the
petitioner.

Rulings: The appellate court correctly declared that Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise
the public plaza and are property of public dominion; hence, may not be the object
of appropriation either by the petitioner or respondent municipality. The free and
continuous use by the public of Lots 138-A and 138-C incontrovertibly establishes
that they are property for public use. Property for public use of provinces and towns
are governed by the same principles as property of public dominion of the same
character. The ownership of such property cannot be the object of appropriation,
either by the State or by private persons.
Rachel C. Celestial v. Jesse Cachopero
G.R. No. 142595 October 15, 2003 (413 SCRA 469)

Facts: Respondent, the bother of petitioner were both claiming ownership and
possession over the same piece of land which was a dried-up creek as respondent
was trying to obtain Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) with the Bureau of
Lands. In the ocular inspection, it was verified that the land in dispute was formerly
a part of the Salumayan Creek that became dry as a result of the construction of an
irrigation canal by National Irrigation Administration. Hence, the land was declared
as outside the commerce of man and therefore, not susceptible of private acquisition
under the provision of Public Land Act.

Issue: WON the land in question owned by one of the parties when it is classified as
outside the commerce of man.

Ruling: Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. A creek, like the
Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the
ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code,
the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain
which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And,
absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up
does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.
Marasigan v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. L – 69303 July 23, 1987 (152 SCRA 253)

Facts: A deed of absolute sale was executed twice by Fe Bazar in favor of Maria
Marasigan in the year 1974 and to Maria Marron in 1975 for a residential lot covered
by TCT No. 100612. It was Maria Marron caused the annotation of notice of lis
pendens at the back of TCT No. 100612 in the year 1976. In 1977, when Marasigan
had the title registered, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued a TCT naming Maria
Marasigan as the new owner, the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated by
Marron on the Bazar’s title was carried over on the said new title.

Issue: Who between Maria Marron and Maria Marasigan has better right over the
subject lot?

Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the party who had the notice annotated and who
won the litigation over the property. Hence, court ruled that Maria Marron has the
better right over the subject property.

It was shown that although Marasigan acquired the property in question in 1974.
However, the transaction between Marasigan and spouses Bazaar became effective
as against third persons in 1977, when it was registered with the Register of Deeds
of Manila. It is the act of registration that conveys or affects the land, and binds third
persons. Thus, there is no question that when the RoD issued the new certificate of
title to Marasigan, the notice of lis pendens was carried over to such title. A notice
of lis pendens "means that a certain property is involved in a litigation and serves as
a notice to the whole world that one who buys the same does it at his own risk. Thus
it was a clear notice to Marasigan that there was a court case affecting her rights to
the property she purchased.
Paat v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997 (266 SCRA 167)

Facts: The truck of Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR because the driver
of the truck was not able to produce the required documents for the forest products.
Jovitio Layugan, Officer of CENRO, issued an order of confiscation of the truck
and gave the owner 15 days to submit an explanation. The DENR Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugan’s action for confiscation
and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. The issue was brought to the secretary of the
DENR. While pending, the owner filed a suit for replevin against the Layugan.
Layugan filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the owner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. Trial court ruled in favor of the owner. CA sustained Trial
Court’s decision.

Issue: WON the trial court has jurisdiction

Ruling: It is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and
regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall
within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given
a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is
well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the
replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment
into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence.
Villarin v. People
G.R. No. 175289 August 31, 2011

Facts: Petitioners Crisostomo Villarin, Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Aniano

Latayada and Cipriano Boyatac, were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D.No.
705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277 when Crisostomo Villarin, being then
a Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, CDO, was the one who procured the subject
flitches for the reconstruction of the bridge without securing permit or license and
informing the City Engineer, while accused Aniano Latayada and Cipriano Boyatac
mutually helped him and each other by transporting the flitches from Sitio Batinay
to the Pagalungan Bridge. The timber flitches were seized by the DENR Strike Force
Team and taken to its office. RTC found them guilty. CA affirmed.

Issue: WON mere possession of timber without criminal intent is punishable.

Ruling: The petitioners violated Section 68 (2) of P.D.No. 705 which states that
“Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required
under existing forest laws and regulations.” As a special law, the nature of the
offense is malum prohibitum and as such, criminal intent is not an essential element.
"However, the prosecution must prove that petitioners had the intent to possess
(animus possidendi)" the timber. "Possession, under the law, includes not only actual
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the
[object of the crime] is in the immediate physical control of the accused. On the other
hand, constructive possession exists when the [object of the crime] is under the
dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion
and control over the place where it is found.” There is no dispute that petitioners
were in constructive possession of the timber without the requisite legal documents.
Villarin and Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and
storage without any license or permit issued by any competent authority. Given these
and considering that the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners’ contention that
the possession of the illegally cut timber was not for personal gain but for the repair
of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequenti al.