CASES DECIDED BY HELD:

JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

IN CIVIL LAW No. The acquittal of Padilla in the criminal case is immaterial to the instant case for
breach of contract. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides, “when the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
Prepared by: may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
Judge Emily L. San Gaspar-Gito latter.
RTC, Branch 5, Manila
As a common carrier, G & S "is bound to carry Ochoa safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS regard for all the circumstances." "In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common
carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. This statutory
presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary
1 diligence." Unfortunately, G & S miserably failed to overcome this presumption.
Heirs of Jose Ochoa vs. G & S Transport Corporation
G.R. No. 170071, July 16, 2012 2
Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz
(Civil obligation not arising from a felony. The acquittal of the taxi driver in the G.R. No. 201988, October 11, 2017
criminal case is immaterial to the case of breach of contract.)

FACTS: (Article 36 contemplates “incapacity or inability,” not merely “difficulty, refusal or

In 1995, Jose Marcial K. Ochoa boarded a taxicab operated by G & S
Transport and driven by Bibiano Padilla, Jr. While going up the Santolan fly-over, he
overtook another vehicle which was trying to overtake another vehicle, a ten-wheeler cargo
truck. Because of the narrow space between the left side railing of the fly-over and the ten-
wheeler truck, Bibiano was unable to pass and because of his speed, he was unable to
control it.
To avoid colliding with the truck, Bibiano turned the wheel to the left
causing his taxicab to ram the railing throwing itself off the fly-over and falling in the
middle of EDSA. The forceful drop of the vehicle broke and split it into two parts. Ochoa was
declared dead on arrival from the accident. Bibiano was acquitted in the reckless
imprudence case but the heirs of Ochoa filed the present Breach of Contract case.
ISSUE:
neglect.”)
FACTS:
Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz and Nilo Cruz are husband and wife.
After almost two (2) decades of being together and with two (2) children, Maria filed for
nullification of their marriage on the ground that Nilo is psychologically incapacitated. She
cited as grounds: his infidelity and his acting like a bachelor, lack of oneness in their
marriage, treatment of her like a mayordoma, keeping from her his whereabouts, lack of
sexual contact, preference towards the company of friends and even preference for anal
sex.
Nilo retaliated by claiming that Maria was jealous of his friends, has volatile
temperament, impulsive in making decisions, lacks respect towards him and accuses him of
being gay. She even talks about their sexual problem with her family.

Does the acquittal of driver Bibiano material to the present breach of contract filed ISSUE:
by Ochoa’s heirs?
 Whether or not their marriage should be declared a nullity pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.
HELD:
No, the marriage should not be declared a nullity. Mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities do not constitute psychological
incapacity. Article 36 contemplates “incapacity or inability,” not merely “difficulty, refusal or
neglect.”
Nilo’s failure to sexually perform appears to be “selective impotency”
caused by his being turned-off by Maria’s disclosure of their sexual problems. Nilo has no
unresolved oedipal complex; he just got a very demanding and taxing job. Maria also failed
to substantiate Nilo’s alleged womanizing activities.
As to Maria, she appeared for have a well-functioning, supportive and emotionally
healthy family environment. Nilo himself attested that she is a good wife and good mother.
Nilo admitted that her demand for attention, time and fidelity is normal for a wife.
3 (The “well-founded belief” means that “sincere honest to goodness efforts” to
Matudan vs. Republic
G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016
(Abandonment of spouse is not psychological incapacity. It is only a ground for
legal separation.)
FACTS:
Nicolas and Marilyn were married on October 26, 1976. They have four children. In
1985, Marilyn left to work abroad and since then, she had not been seen nor heard from by
her husband and children. On June 20, 2008, Nicolas filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
on the ground of psychological incapacity. The evidence presented consists of Nicolas’
Judicial Affidavit, their daughter Maricel’s Judicial Affidavit and Dr. Nedy Tayag Sworn
Affidavit. The RTC dismissed the Petition for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not Marilyn is psychologically incapacitated.
(b) Whether or not the totality of evidence is sufficient.
HELD:
Psychological incapacity refers to no less than mental- not physical– incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, as expressed in Article 68.
Abandonment of spouse is not psychological incapacity. It is only a ground for
legal separation.
Here, the evidence failed to sufficiently establish such psychological incapacity.
Maricel’s testimony could not be of help as she was only two (2) years old when her mother
left. She could not have witnessed her alleged psychological incapacity. Dr. Tayag’s finding is
also based on one-sided account. There was really no in-depth study.
4
Republic vs. Sareñogon, Jr.
G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.)
FACTS:
Jose Sareñongon filed a Petition for the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
her wife Netchie. He alleged that a month after they got married, he left to work as a
seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For three (3) months he did
not receive any communication with her.
He did not know her whereabouts. He tried to contact her parents but they
were no longer residing in Clarin, Misamis Occidental. Her relatives and friends did not also
know where she was. He filed the Petition as he wanted to contract another marriage
pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose’s effort to locate his wife Netchie sufficiently support a well-
founded belief that she is probably dead.
 HELD:
The “well-founded belief” requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is
complied with only upon a showing that “sincere honest to goodness efforts” had indeed
been made to ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Here, Jose failed to comply. His efforts are notches below the strict
requirement. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and
relatives as to Netchie's whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific
individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for
the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the
pertinent government agencies as well as the media.
5 the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.
Juliano-Llave vs. Republic, et al.
G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a
petition for nullity, is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse
from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.)
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Senator Tamano married Estrellita
twice — initially under the Islamic laws and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony. In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano's civil status was indicated as 'divorced.‘ Since then,
Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano's wife, and upon
his death, his widow.
In 1994, Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano's legitimate
children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint
alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
ISSUE:
Shall P.D. No. 1083 apply to Sen. Tamayo’s marriage? Can the Muslim Code be
applied retroactively as to affect certain marriages? Did Zorayda and Adib have legal
personalities to file the Petition?
HELD:
P.D. No. 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13 (1) thereof provides that
the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims or wherein only
the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines." Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this
law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on
In view of Sen. Tamano's prior marriage which subsisted at the time
Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab
initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file
the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the
husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does
not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent
marriage.
6
Titan Construction Corporation, vs. Spouses David
G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010
(Any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written
consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void.)
FACTS:
Manuel and Martha got married in 1957. They acquired a 602-
meter lot in White Plains in 1970. It was registered in the name of Martha, married to
Manuel. In 1976, they separated and lost communication.
 In 1995, Manuel was surprised to learn that Martha sold to Titan
Construction Corporation the above-mentioned lot.
Manuel filed a complaint for Annulment of Contract and Reconveyance. He
alleged that the sale was without his knowledge. Titan Construction Corporation claimed it is
a buyer in good faith.
ISSUE:
Is the Deed of Sale null and void?
HELD:
Article 116 of the Family Code is unequivocal in that "all property acquired during
the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered
in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved.” The presumption being in favor of the conjugal nature of the property, the burden
to prove otherwise rested with Titan Construction Corporation.
In the absence of Manuel's consent, the Deed of Sale is void. Article 165 of the Civil
Code expressly provides that "the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership." Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains that "(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law".
Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or
encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse,
otherwise, such disposition is void.
7 document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned."
Rodolfo S. Aguilar vs. Edna G. Siasat
G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
(Under Article 172 of the Family Code, the SSS Form E-1 by itself, constitutes an
"admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.")
FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died, intestate and
without debts. Included in their estate are two (2) parcels of land. Petitioner Rodolfo,
claiming that he is the sole surviving heir of the Spouses Aguilar, filed a civil case for
mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna, alleging that the titles over
the said two (2) parcels of land were missing, and he suspected that someone from the
Siasat Clan stole the same.
Respondent Edna claimed that petitioner Rodolfo in not the son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses. She alleged that he is but a mere stranger who was
raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness. She stressed that since Alfredo
Aguilar predeceased Candelaria Siasat, the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former
and that upon the death of Candelaria, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she
had no issue. She admitted that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for
safe keeping by her Aunt.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Rodolfo was able to can prove his filiation by presenting
his father’s SSS Form E-1.
HELD:
In the instant case, it must be concluded that petitioner Rodolfo — who was born
on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar
and before their respective deaths — has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue
of the Aguilar spouses. As petitioner Rodolfo correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar's
SSS Form E-1 declaring him as his son under oath, satisfies the requirement for proof of
filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. By
itself, the said document constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public
It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof,
the same being an express recognition in a public instrument.
PROPERTY

8 Art. 449.
Pen Development Corp, et al., v. Martinez Leyba, Inc.
G.R. No. 211845, August 9, 2017
(Obstinate refusal to abide with repeated demands to cease and desist from
encroaching in the area makes one a builder in bad faith.)
FACTS:
Martinez Leyba, Inc. is the owner of 3 contiguous lands. Pen Development
Corp. and Las Brisas Resorts Corp., which merged into one corporate entity is also the owner
of a land adjacent to that of the former.
In 1967, Las Brisas occupied put a fence on its land. The fence encroached
with that of Martinez. Surveyors confirmed the encroachment. In 1968, Martinez sent letter
to Las Brisas informing it of the encroachment and requested it to refrain. It did the same
thing twice in the year 1970. In 1971, Las Brisas wrote back stating it could not trace the
origin of Martinez’s land. Martinez sent two more letters. Despite notices, Las Brisas
continued on developing the property.
In 1997, Martinez filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Cancellation of Title
and Recovery of Ownership with Damages. Las Brisas denied the encroachment.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not Las Brisas is a possessor/builder in good faith.
(b) Whether or not Martinez incurred laches in enforcing its putative rights.
HELD:
Las Brisas is a builder in bad faith because of its obstinate refusal to abide
with Martinez’s repeated demands to cease and desist from encroaching on their area.
As a builder in bad faith, Las Brisas is not entitled to indemnity and Martinez may
demand the demolition of the developments in the property. Martinez also has the right to
recover damages.
The Civil Code provides:
He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or
sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be
removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person
who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the
land, and the sower the proper rent.
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled
to damages from the builder, planter or sower.
Martinez is not guilty of laches because as owner of the land, it has an
imprescriptible right to recover possession thereof from any person illegally occupying its
lands. “prescription and laches cannot apply to registered land covered by the Torrens
system” pursuant to Section 47 of the Property Registration Decree 1529, which states that
“no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.”
9
Andres et. Al. v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development Inc.
G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioners are demanding from respondent an easement of right of way. They
alleged that they are co-owners and possessors for more than 50 years of three (3) parcels
of unregistered agricultural land in Pag-asa, Binangonan, Rizal with a total area of more or
less 10,500 square meters.
When respondent acquired the lands surrounding the subject property and
developed it into a residential subdivision, it also built a concrete perimeter fence around it
such that petitioners were denied access from subject property to the nearest public road
and vice versa. They thus prayed for a right-of-way.
 It was established however that the 10,500 square meter claimed by petitioners
through extraordinary and ordinary acquisitive prescription remained to be a public
agricultural land.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way from
respondent despite the fact that they have not acquired ownership over the supposed
dominant estate.
HELD:
Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-way may be
demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use the same.
Sifting through petitioners' allegations, it appears that the subject property is an
unregistered public agricultural land. Thus, being a land of the public domain, petitioners, in
order to validly claim acquisition thereof through prescription, must first be able to show
that the State has -expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a
proclamation issued by the President that the subject [property] is no longer retained for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the
land remains to be a property of public dominion and hence, not susceptible to acquisition
by virtue of prescription.
In the absence of such proof of declaration in this case, petitioners' claim of
ownership over the subject property based on prescription necessarily crumbles.
Conversely, they cannot demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent for lack of
personality.
DONATION
9 10
Republic vs. Daclan, et al.
G.R. No. 197115/197267, March 23, 2015
(The rights and obligations derived from contracts, in this case a donation, are
transmissible. Even if the agency operating the breeding station had turned defunct, the
donation remains effective as its functions devolved to the LGU.)
FACTS:
Federico Daclan, et al. donated 13 hectares of land to the Republic, subject
to the condition that it would be used as a breeding station and shall not be used for any
purpose except with the prior consent of the donors or their heirs.
In 1972, the Agoo Breeding station was established by the Department of
Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), which later became defunct.
In 1991, the powers and functions of the DA devolved to the Province of La Union.
In 2003, Daclan et. al. demanded for the return of the land on the ground that the
breeding station ceased operation and that the land has been abandoned, since the BAI
turned defunct.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation should be nullified as the BAI, the one
operating the breeding station became defunct.
HELD:
Evidence, particularly the testimonies of public officers, were given credence insofar
as they established that the breeding station is still operational.
Also, the fact that BAI ceased to exists and its functions were devolved to
the LGU, the Province of La Union, should not result to the nullification of the Deed of
Donation. As a general rule, rights and obligations derived from contract are
TRANSMISSIBLE.
CO-OWNERSHIP
Antipolo Ining, et. al v. Leonardo Vega, et al.
G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013
 (One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the
latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent's property. Consequently, he
cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the
decedent's heirs.)

FACTS:

Romana and Gregoria are siblings. In 1997, Leonardo, the grandson of

Romana, filed an Action for Partition claiming that he was entitled to one-half of the
property, being Romana’s heir. Gregoria’s heirs claimed that he has no cause of action as
they have become the land’s sole owners through Lucimo Sr. who executed an Affidavit of
Ownership of the Land in 1979, having acquired it through sale as early as 1943. From then
on, Lucimo Sr. enjoyed possession of the property. This allegedly resulted to the
repudiation of the co-ownership. Lucimo Sr. appeared to be the husband of Teodora,
Antipolo’s daughter. Antipolo is one of the children of Gregoria.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Leonardo’s right prescribed because 30 years had already lapsed.

HELD:

NO, Leonardo’s right did not prescribe.

Lucimo cannot be considered as a co-owner as he was just the son-in law of

Antipolo, being married to his daughter Teodora. Lucimo is NOT AN HEIR of Gregoria hence
not a co-owner.

A family relation under Article 150 of the Family Code is confined to

husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants and brothers and
sisters. It was Teodora who is the co-owner, not Lucimo as he is merely related by affinity to
the decedent.